some linked to russia, some not. sphere of influence is still a critically-important phrase. it's, it's certainly used as steve just referenced in not only russia's western periphery, but there are leaderships in central and eastern europe who are integrated into the european union and nato who are still quite concerned. and from their standpoints that could be justifiable. whether there will be russian military intervention into former central and east european territories -- and i'm speaking

about countries already integrat into the european union and nato as full members -- i highly doubt it. however, when you see the european union as i just touched upon briefly in my presentation increasing this eastern partnership or outreach to your raise ya and os -- eurasia and ostensibly for energy assistance and development which includes countries such as georgia if i'm not mistaken, couries which may never become european union members in the next 5-10 years but i couldn't say for sure how that will evolve, i have to believe that it's less a matter of sphere of influence in military terms as it is in staking out the absolute

requirement for energy supplies becausi don't see alternative engy from oil and gas emerging as rapidly as a lot of europeans would like. i also just want to say that the united states and its transatlantic allies, those which have committed forces in afghanistan, have their hands so full operationally in a northern and southeastern afghanistan and certainly the u.s. priority for pakistan is part of that afghanistan strategy is a really significant development over the last 6-8 months.

and i believe that iteduces the u.s. impact on how the europeans will view their nonmilitary priorities on their eastern periphery as being absolutely critical. and i'm at least enunciating that you'd have toook at how the russian military would at least begin to be considered part of the russian national security strategy to protect energy interests. and it's already proving that perhaps it can get involved in whether pipelines get shut down and how they can be protected, but this is not part of training and doctrine just yet, but i wonder where this would go and

whose sphere of influence that would be carved out. i don't know if that's the best phrase as opposed to integration or not integrating as effectively to europe. >> with respect to your question about a loan,ou've seen an interesting phenomenon in an earlier discussion about how the russians because they don't -- they can use military force when they have to as with georgia, but they prefer not to, and energy's often seen as -- there was a joke in the czarist times that when asked who were the two main allies of russia, his response was the army and the navy. well, during the cold war it was at least during the latter cold war there it was their nuclear s and the rest of the military. now people say they're an energy super power, oil and gas. the chinese may have found their

own means without engaging in military competition with russia or anyone else in which there is immense military resources. even more influential was during the recent summit, the chinese offered $10 billion to the central asian countries to help them stabilize their economy. and there have been oer instances. and we mentioned the loan for the well and potentially gas in the case of russia. now, the cnese, of course, don't give this money away freely. at least they get some concessions out of it, but it gives them a lot of influence to in the world in, a way in which it doesn't threaten necessarily other countries directly, it's through other means. so it's an interesting phenomena because on the one end you'd want them to see stabilization if you were in russia, stabilization in central asia, and so if the chinese are willing to give money to help that occur economically, that's

terrific. but we've made the same arguments the case of nat expansion, you know, if you want to have stable countries on your border, one way that could contrite is through closer ties with the e.u. and nato, and the russians have decided that's not good for them. and potentially at some point they're going to think having the chinese gaining so much influence through direct investments, through commerce, through loans in the former soviet union is something they're going to become uncomfortable with as well. >> okay. gentleman right here. yes. >> thank you. michael from george washington -- [inaudible] i had a question for richard weitz, and that is given that you could make the argument that th chinese are increasing influence which are traditionally within the soviet or russian sphere why isn't there more signs of the russians doing the same to china?

after all, one hears that the russians have been selling more advanced weapons to india, they have also sold some advanced weapons to malaysia and i understand indonesia. they have, obviously, a deep oblem with japan because of the northern territories, but nevertheless, if the rusans were to see their relationship with china as in some respects inhibited, aren't the assets avaible to the russians to, if you like, increase their livery somewhat? >> well, the russians have been trying to exercise those. they understand that, and so, for example, the arms relationship was always something that implicitly if the tensions became worse, the russians could do what the united states did after

tiananmen which was cut that off. but now the chise can develop a lot of this stuff indigenously, so that leverages decline. the oil and gas we discussed, it's something that russia's been trying to use to, say, threaten or not threaten but really just bargain off china and japan and other countries to get them to pay higher prices, and the chinese for a while, you know, pretty much stood on their terms. now the russian for their own economic reasons and commercial reasons are yielding again to china in these concessions. longer term there's, as i mentioned, this concern that generally globally you've got a rise in china and, at best, a stagnant russia. how that's going to play out geopolitically, they don't really have the levers of influence they would hope to have. even during the cold war you would think they could use communist ec mechanic --

chanisms, but at the moment they don't feel necessarily threatened by chao -- china's rise soith india or versus china if -- also for good reasons. neithe of these countries would want to get involved in an an alliance against china. so they're struggling to come with this. the chinese haven't directly confronted russia in any of the areas. even central asia for the russians to become more comfortable with the chinese presence because the chinese, unlike the americans, share a lot of goals with russia in central asia paragraphly in term -- particularly in terms of regime stability and maintaining, dealing with quote, unquote terrorists or other groups that they feel threatening. but at some point this is going to become a problem. russia, as your question implies correctly, doesn't have much influence over china the way,

for example, even the united states does thanks to the massive commercial relationship. it may be considered a mutual sure destruction relationship, but they can't allow our economy to collapse because we'll take them down with them. still it gives us some leverage over beijing with theate with the chinese currency. but the russians really don't have that, and they're struggling how to come to terms with that. >> if i may exercise the chairman's prerogative here, let me go beyond richard because the question you asked points to a very important strategic plan. the fact of the matter is that as a result of the russian government to deliver on its far eastern policies at home which have been a complete failure and putin has invested a lot of time and effort as has medvedev in this, and they've gone out there and they've, you know, tried to in good czarist and soviet fashion kick bureaucrats into acting and spent a lot of money, they have very little to show for it in the far eas and not only is the recent deal

with china a sign of this, on may 21st medvedev said we welcome chinese investment in siberia, and the regional cooperation which meant that there's no alternative but to turn to china to help develop the far east. russia is accepting that the russian far east will be the cement that holds it together. and the foreign minister said that we welcome chinese foreign investment in central asia which is utterly unprecedented giv the paranoia they have about foreign interest in central asia. as far as weapons, we haven't discussed it today, but the general rot that affects the industry, yes, malaysia has bought weapons, vietnam,

indonesia, but you look at the examples of what happened in algeria and india. in algeria the russians sold them mig 29s, had to take them back. >> it is a fiasco of cosmic proportions, and the russians are utterly embarrassed. it turns out a lot of the mig 29s they sold india were also in defect iave in some respects -- defective in some respects. and people have been complaining for years now the russians are selling them junk. the rubber is going to meet the road when the indian government puts up a tender for 126 fighter planes. fighter planes are what made the

russian defense link to india. if they lose that, they're in a very dangerous position economically. yes, they're selling weapons to the southeast asians, and the southeast asians obviously want to diversify their foreign exposure, but the fact of the matter isussia cannot compete, and it's its own fault as we've discussedarlier. next question over here. henry gaffney. >> that gentleman -- >> right here. second row right here. >> yeah, i should add that the malaysians also have had trouble with the mig 29s, they did not take their second tranche of them until a lot of those problems had been solved. you know, the energy question for europe is extremely complicated. and, you know, any one of us who have heard alexander medvedev, we don't move gas, we don't get

paid. and, of course, utterly dependent on that. we also have a nice quote from putin, we do not attack pipelines with the rumors that maybe they fired some missiles towards the btc line. there's so the point that the russians are saying we want market price at which point if they get market price, their leverage is gone. and last ri, of course, is -- lastly, of course, is wild corruption involved in all those pipelines. but, and so i'm very confused as to why you're trying to connect it to russian military contingency planning. do you have any clues as to whether they do this kind of planning? any evidence whatsoever? i mean, i know militaries sit around having nothing else to do especially when they can't exercise and have no fuel. [laughter] drawing up all kinds of battle plans. i mean, this is a problem in the u.s. but do you have any evidence that they do this kind of planning? >> i'm looking at more of the

mid to long-term trends. i mean, i don't have specific evidence as i think i've said that the russian military is specifically planning its military contingencies on its western periphery specifically for oil and gas priorities that the russian political ldership and its, its businesses deem crucial. especially its supply routes to europe. when i look at russian military objectives in places like ukraine and after the russo-georgian war from a year ago, i don't have planning

documents. but if i were looking at russian military strategy in these non-russian regions that used to be soviet republics and which our panelists today with which i agree have saidhat these independent countries today are still seen in russian military planning terms as very much part of -- i'm talking about the soviet republics of old -- priorities for influence. i see it much less in terms of how military capabilities from russia would take those over again, but i'm also looking at the broader issue of how pipeline politics is playing in russian national security strategy for europe through

eurasia. and i'm looking at ways for how the russian military which you've heard today so incapable in many ways could possibly be used. and i'm looking at protection of pipelines to follow up on what you have said so that what flows through those pipelines -- and i agree with you fully -- gets russia what it wants even if there's a manipulation of world prices if that can be manipulated on supply and demand. i see it as a national security priority which i see weighing more heavily in the years ahead on energy priorities. so, no, i don't have specific evidence, but these are the tren i'm just looking at.

>> okay, give me all your conjecture. >> based on russian statements an documents tha i've been looking at, again,ublicly available and meetings between russian and european union leaderships and even pressuring by russian officials through nato because that's still haening and retreats that i see happening within the nato alliance on issues such as the pursuit of enlargement for ukraine and georgia, the potential dropping of missile defense systems into poland and the czech republic. and i think it has less to do with concerns about what the russian military will do in those regions and more to do with the u.s. being focused on southwest asia and the europeans

being focused on energy supplies. >> let me give you, quickly, three cases. one, 2006 defense minister said that in the future of the russian military would be tasked with defending energy installations specifically referring to the baltic. >> [inaudible] >> baltic. yeah, in order stream. >> oh, to nord stream. >> second. last week major exercise combined arms exercise and maybe ground forces also but defending explicitly defense of energy installations in the baltic. that was the exercise. >> in the baltic sea. >> in the baltic sea. third, the national security strategy, again, it says that the future wars they're predicting are most likely to occur with regard to the competition for sources of energy, and it outlines specifically t areas, the arctic, the middle east, central asia, areases around russia.

this is clear evidence, and i think it's incontrovertie evidence, that they see tir missions as being connected with the defense of energy installations and energy sources in and around russia and that future missions, to some degree, will be organized about that. >> we do the same thing. >> i'm sure we do, but so what? i don't say this is an illegitimate aim, i'm just saying this is a mission on their part. yes, over here. constantine, yes. >> constantine, girardi group international. i'm the former adviser on china to the deputy head of the kgb intelligence, and i remember how in the '90s russian military very quickly became pro-chinese, chinese come raids are our only hope now in opposing the united states. th understand that we have to

conceal it, but we're hoping very much for this. and actually russia you know that three years ago putin has yielded china strategically important piece of land. so on the one hand just russians are not afraid of china, but afraid of nato which has no intention to invade russia. russia is, very easily can do it china can, russia is not afraid. your opinion, dr. weitz, how dangerous for the united states could be the military and, of course, intelligence rapprochement between china and russia now? >> now i don't see much of a problem because there for ery instance you can show cooperation and pursuit of common aims which maybe the united states doesn't share,

particularly central asia versus their focus on -- [inaudible] their cooperation is very limited. often it's because they're pursuing parallel policies towards third areas like iran or north korea, not directly in con junction with each other, but their policies overlap. and you see areas of tension between them which has allowed united states some influence, say, for example, orgia or the relationship economically at least china is much stronger with the united states. you mentioned the intelligence cooperation. i have less of a good hand on that because it's classified, but for the instances of where you think they're cooperating -- perhaps their case officers are sharing iellince or they probably have these joint meetings among military people and so on, they probably exchange threat assessments. you also have these very publicized instances in which the russian countermilitary

insur gents are arresting people for trying to divt technology to china. you have several instances of that. space propulsion which could be used for ballistic missiles and so on. so there is an element of tension, and there's an element of cooperation, and the united states doesn't want to see either extreme. itould be very unfortunate if they were to become very close allies as was theoretically posited off at the end of the cold war because, for obvious reasons, that would just cause problems for us in various areas. but we don't want them to go back to the very tense relationship we saw in the 19 of 0s this -- 1960s in which there was speculation, you know, how the actual fighting along the border could escalate, and there were these soviet proposals asking henry kissinger, well, you know, what if t soviet union decided to

destroy china's nuclear capabilities? how would the u.s. respond? you don't want to get into that kind of scenario because of the unpredictable conquences. so where is it now, it's not the kind of, it's not a direct security threat at the present. now, china itself is going to prent security problems for the united states as it continues to evolve economically, militarily. how the russians play into that will be a factor, but it's not the main factor. the main factor is that the chinese-americans i still think have very difrent visions of where they want to see the world evolve, and you're seeing that now in the contest of sovereignty over the south china sea. again, the chinese haven't directly confronted the united states. it's not clear that china will become a major security threat to the united states, but insofar as this economy can strengthen, that gives them military potential.

it's a latent potential that could become a problem and how russia, again, plays into that will be a factor but not a major factor. >> we have time for one more question. sir? right here. >> hi, joe from foreign institute service. i think this is for richard weitz. with following up on that question, to what extent are china and russia unified as the u.s. seeks to gain more influence and leverage in central asia? are we competing primarily with russia, or is russia and china working together jointly in fending off our influence and our increased military presence specifically in that region? if you want to -- you mentioned a promotion a couple times. appreciate comments on that as well. >> the area of central asia is complex. i think the russians are more concerned about the american presence than the chinese. this became very much an issue in 2005 as you'll recall the

shanghai cooperation association which most americans have never heard of which includes russia, china and several asian communities. they had a clause saying, well, you know, we would like, you know, is about time for the western forces to give us a timeline when they plan to remove their forces from their bases in the region now that the campaign in afghanistan seems to be resolving. and at the time it looks worrisome, and we had, i think it was chief of staff, u.s. chief of staff made a comment about, you know, two big countries bowing smaller countries to drive the americans out of the region. but in retrospect those probably resulted from certain temporary overlappingnterests. the use becks yearly won the south. they were criticized for their military crackdown, but the cur geese, for example, they signed on because they helped them get leverage to get more money from

their base, and we've seen this phenomenon later on much more clearly. russiand chi, the russians seemed to want to constrain the military, but not as rapid. and they haven't made that declaration since. they've been very careful about that. again, there was recent speculation that the russian were trying to get the united states to give up or be expelled from its base in curl stand, but it didn't pan out that way, so it's not clear to what extent who was leading that. but in general i think the russians are less comfortable about the american military presence there than the chinese just because they still consider that as a main zone of influence, and they would prefer not -- at the moment they are the dominant military player. china does not have military potential, and i should have made that clear when i was speaking on the joint exercises.

though that is changing. they don't have any foreign military bases, for example, whereas the russians have important bases there. their military is very secure. they have the collective tree te organization which includes the organization states but china and a couple others are included. so they would want to preserve that. but again, what you have now is you have afghanistan because it's ironic but because the situation has been deteriorating so much, the chinese, the russians are less eager to get the americans out. i think they're now confronting the fact that, well, if the americans and nato troops were to withdraw, they would basically be left with this disastrous situation in afghanistan. they can't deal with that. the organization isn't designed to conduct a joint organization, they've made clear they don't want to send their troopsack

, so as long as the relationship remains, the situation in afghanistan remains so poor, we have the fact that they're not going to try to drive us out of central asia. if, however, we manage to turn things around, it will become more complex again >> we're going to have to break here. i want to thank all the panelists. if you have first questions, either see them during lunch or communicate offline. we are going to be serving lunch now and resume at 1:30. thank you very much. [applause] ..

>> and russian military relationship with china. again live coverage here on c-span 2 started at 1:30 eastern. a new study links rapid growth and health care cost to negative economic performance for several u.s. industries. today 1:00 eastern, rand economist explain the results. that will be live on c-span. tonight on booktv justin fox with his "the myth of the rational market." also "no sense of decency" and "why spy?". that's 8:30 eastern on c-span 2. form democratic national committee chair and howard dean

will join jim rand. it'll be just outside washington, d.c. tomorrow. we'll have live coverage on 8 -- 7 eastern. that will be on c-span. >> as the debate on health care continues, c-span's health care hub is the latest. watch the latest events including town hall meetings and share your thoughts with your own citizen video. including video from town halls, and there's more at c-span.org/health care. >> george mason university president on the role of higher education in training information technology professionals, tonight on c-span 2. >> how is c-span funded? >> donations. >> you know, grants and stuff like that. puic television. >> i don't know where the money

comes from. >> federally. >> contribution from donors. >> how is c-span funded? american cable companies created c-span has a public service. a private business initiative, no government mandate, no government money. >> while you can't find the draft that's being written o numbers of houses and committee. michael white, managing editor talks about this as a forum held at national archive. >> i'd like to introduce michael white. he's the manager of the editor, and he's here to talk to you. >> thank you. [applause] >> i'm all wired up. i hope i'm getting a good sound level. okay. good. it's my pleasure to speak with

you all this afternoon. as a washington, d.c. native, i'm glad we can provide you with the authentic summer experience in our nation's capital, sweltering heat and plenty of humidity. i was very pleased to be asked to present a program for the national archives 75th anniversary. i'm over at the federal register, which is a component of the national archives, and has been since our inception. i was asked to talk on how a bill becomes a law, which is an old chestnut, i guess. but i'm going to look at it a little bit more from our side, the executive branch, because i'm not a house or senate parliamentarian, and i don't want them to think i'm encroaching on their territory. i'm going to start off by

orienting the office of a federal register within the national archives. just last year we launched this new web site, it's called federalregister.gov. and this is a portal page essentially to all of our publications on various web sites. most of our publicaons are found on the gpo web site. but we do also have materials on the national archives, archive.gov web site. and we also only post a certain material on thaweb site. so bring it all together, w cread this as a way to get the register publications a little more easily. toy's topic is federal laws. you hit that or hit public and private laws down here.

and it'll get you to the right place. a little bit about the office of the federal register. as you can see, founded in 1935. we're one year behind the nationalrchives itself. the federal register was founded more in concept before it actually became a reality. after the infamous refing case where federal regulation was litigated up to the supreme court and found not to exist because it had been amended out of existence and could not be found as an original document, that is incident spurred the american bar association, to recommend that the federal register be founded. we have fdr over there. he's often thought of as the

father. when he was secretary of the navy, he proposed the federal register be established. later on he wasn't so keen on the idea once he was president, because like all presidents, there was some concern about opening up the governmental process to the general public. and, of course, the federal register is a government newspaper. and you know, in those days fdr was considered, tre was a great deal of talk about him being a socialist. and the register might be a propaganda. so nothing really changes. fdr, although given a lot of credit, wasn't all that keen on it by the time it actually came around. new scholarship is relieved that the supreme court was really behind the scenes motivating factor. and there's a wonderful article about it if you should care to look it up. a couple of other milestones.

the statutes were not always with the archives. they were produced by the secretary of state. and it was only after the -- after world war ii and the national security apparatus was reorganizethat the state department threw off its domestic duties. it really has none to this day expect to accept a presidential resignation. remember he nixon resigned and submitted the letter to the henry kiss -- kissinger. a couple of electronic notes there, the federal register mandated by congress was in 1994. we put the entire code of federal regulations online in

1997, but began updating it daily in 2001. and we began authenticating laws in 2007. we're very proud of the fact that we inaugurateed on inauguration day the presidential documents which replaced the old pamphlet version that was basically in print. the daily compilation posted the president's president within two hours after the inauguration. and we now update it every day. this is the official publication of the presidential remarks. and other official documents that are in the federal register itself. a little bit -- a word about technology, we're switching the entire platform of the laws, regular lace -- regulations to a new system falled the federal

digitsal system. we hope in the next couple of years to embrace all the social networking tools and things like rssv to notify the public in changes of the regular laces -- regulations and laws. well, our objective todays, and this always presents a dilemma, i'm going to try to quickly run through the how a bill becomes a law. and i'm going to talk more about the publications a sects, which is what we do at federal register specificically. i'm going toouch on the constitutional and evidentiary issues and comment on executive branch role in law making. and dumping a little deeper there, we're hoping as i saido just speed through the law making itself.

we're going to talk about the two different types of publications for laws. two different agencies handle this. and then at the bottom there, i want to go over some cases and ano, ma'amlies if we have time. i think that's a little more interesting here than the introduction of a bill. i picked out this cartoon because, you know, this is kind of a deep subject. we received some legislation here on the beach, and it sure is easier now to handle automatic ins and out of. we're certainly not going to cover all that today. here i express my apologies to the house of representatives for stealing their cartoons. but this is on their web site in a little different form.

well, the law making, law making has been compared to sausage making, and it is chancellor who was credited. that's not too closely to look at the process, because it resembles sausage making, because it's not pretty. he didn't say that. but he's generally given the credit. the only person who can introduce the bill in congress is a member of congress. president can't do that. he has to have an agent introduce something for the executive branch. we see the forums and basic types of legislation. the first two bills and joint resolutions are virtually indistinguishable. it's by tradition that there are two different names for these actions. there are a few things that are specificically joint resolutions like amendments to the

constitution that are proposed. and of course i was here when the last one was ratified and the federal register oversees that process as well. that was 27th amendment. it had to be introduced as a joint resolution. that was back, it originated 200 years ago. but we won't go into that. also concurrent and simple resolutions. the two houses can come up with a concurrent resolution on a procedure or a statement they'd like to make. it would have to be passed by both or simple resolution from just one house. and those of course get presented to the president. now we'll talk more about this bill type issues. there are private bills as well as public bills. private bills affect private parties, maybe a single family maybe an immigration case, for

instance, a special arrangement for someone to get citizenship. we'll talk a little bit about this in the context of the schiavo case. as we all know when a bill gets introduced members of congress try to gather support from the other members and the big lobbying campaigns kick off. sometimes that's before the bill is introduced. occasionally you will see a draft version of a bill circulated around. that's patrol before the official process. well, here's the picture of a hopper. and there literally is hopper in the house of representatives. if you look at the rolls, there's a hopper, is where you put the bill in when you want to introduce it. in the senate it's not specificically a little brown box. but you put it on the presiding officer's desk.

and then a bill clerk will assign a number. and these are basically sequential numbers. there is sometimes a competion to get hr1 or s1. this year s1 and hr1 were both the american recovery and reinvestment act to deal with the economic crisis. of course they didn't come out that way on the other end as a public law it was 111-5. so it was the 5th bill of the 111th congress to be enacted. trivia, the first bill to be enacted was public law 111-1 which was the salary fix for the secretary of the interior, ken salazar who's salary had to be reduced in order for him to take the office since he had voted on

pay raises, he was a member of the senate. okay. here we have, there are many committees, 19 house and 16 senate committees. they cover different subject matters. actions get placed on a committee calendar. and then they get marked up in committee, literally marked up. amendments are introduced, and they may not go anyway. they may get tabled. and very commonly, they are referred to subcommittee. so the real work takes place at a lower level. reporting a bl out. well, a bill is reported out literally with a report attached to it. this may afflict the amendments, the discussion and the

recommendations. this may also be a minority report. if they don't agree, they can make that known. then the bill gets placed on the calendar. but there are different calendars to get placed on. and basically, it's up to the majority leader in the senate and speaker in majority leader in the house as to rho the bills go on the calendar. again we're generalizing here about floor debate. every rule has to go to the committee of the house for specific parameters of debate to be outlined. how long will a bill in the house be debated? that's all done through the rules committee. it may specify 20 hours and so forth. the senate of course has unlimited debateheoretically.

limited debate can lead to filibuster. and we are all hearing a lot about that these days. well, the calling of the yas or nays. i don't watch c-span that often, but the house is using electronic, where the senate hasn't adopted that. you hear the yas and nays in the senate or short of one of the senators walked up to the front and record their vote. each house as a journal. and of course the votes are reflected in the congressional record which coming out every day after the congress or one of the houses at least is in session. now when a bill gets through one house, its sent to the other house. a couple of terms here that are important to note. one of those is engrossed.

if you look on thomas web site at the library of congress, you will see these terms. engrossed, enrowed, and it's all very confusing. what stage is legislation at? when one house passes a bill, it's called the engrosses bill version. that's the version that goes over to the other house. now that house may or may not be picked up the bill. it may literally be laid on the table. that term means it can be ignored. if the majorit leader in the senate doesn't want to consider, that can be the end of it. of course there is a certain degree of comedy between the houses. they try to work those things out. once a bill is passed, they are very often differences in the two houses. so the differences must be resolved in conference.

each of the members of the house and senate are assigned, there are several nebraskas -- members assigned. that would include the majority and minority members often. and they work out the differences. then the final bill has to be sent back to both if they have consolidated or made some additional changes. and when that goes through each house again, it's called the enrolls verse. the enrolled version is just about as good to the public law, because that's the version that's sent to the president. interestingly, we still talk about the parchment being sent. we no longer use goat skin for the parchment. but the paper is very thick, and it resembles parchment. note also that it has to be signed by the speaker and the president of the senate.

that we will talk about later and one of these specific special cases that i will bring up. i don't recall bill signing this was. this was one of our gpo web sites. the president is signing a bill. this idea of presentment is very important in constitutional law. of course the normal progress is the president agrees he will have a signing ceremony, maybe with just a few members of congress like you see here. maybe it'll be in the rose garden with a different constituent groups there. but also the can take no action. if after 10 days, sundays excluded, president doesn't do anything with a bill presented to him, then the law goes into effe. and so you will see in the statute book, and

distinguishable between the two, it simply says approved, neither the signed version nor 10-day law version carries a signature. we'll talk more about that in terms of vetoes. it gets a little complicated. what if there aren't ten days left in a session, and the president does nothing? well, he can literally engage a pocket veto by simply putting the bill aside and not returning it to the congress if he objects. but the first case is more common where the president actually sends the veto back in a message that goes to the congress with the. object that goes back like the hot potato gets traded back to the congress.

interestingly enough, this process pocket veto and regular veto spawned a number of cases back in the '70s in particular, nixon and gerald ford. richard nixon sent back a number of bills. and it really wasn't clear just what adjrnment means. now we all here that congress is in adjournment. but along about the '70s, congress decided that in order to reduce the number of vetoes that the president of the opposite party in those days, of course, richard nixon would put into effect, they would appoint an agent to receive the bill while they were in adjournment in case the president sent the bill back. when you read it closely, if the president is prevented by turning the bill by adjournment, then a pocket veto takes

effect. it's not impossible for him to return the bill, we have our agent. and that went through a lot of litigation as well pocket veto cases later under president ford where the president adopted this very sort of strange version. it was like experiments with the constitution. what does it mean? president ford sent back bills with the message but then claiming to pocket vetoes them at the same time. that's seems quite odd. so the congress sort of decided how they wanted to treat that. of course, their decision, again democrats versus a republican president would say this isn't pocket veto, you returned the bill, we're going to override this. that went to the courts, and we

got our first real hard definition on what adjournment is. and it really, the course almost gave us a hard and fast rule that if it's adjournment at the end of a session, congress is in adjournment. if it's not at the end of the session think may opponent an agent. the constitution didn't give the president the right to pocket the veto bill if he goes out of town for the weekend. that's not what it was intended for. later on that became a little less clear. okay so we've already talked veto override. it takes the 2/3 majority. and so what happened in terms of where the law ends up? that's where we finally come into the process at federal register. now if the president approves a

bill, a clerk comes over from the executive clerks office at the white house with the bill. she physically showed up at the office, knows the combination t the door to get in, and presents it to us, gets a receipt. if on the oer hand that is a veto override, they know where to go. they will take that parchment, bring it other, and of course that won't have a presidential signature, it'll have a notification that this was a veto override. okay. we'll talk about congressional process a lot. but it is worthwhile mentioning the executive branch. befo a bill is enacted into law before there is any legislative activity, each of the agencies is authorized by the president and his agents at

the office of the management budget to come up with a legislative agenda. so each year you'll see a call go out to the agencies, submit your -- not only your budget requests, but also your legislative agenda. and then, you know, that will go throuh a review process at omb. and they may or may not agree with some ambitious agency initiatives that the agency has put forward. there is a process where you have to go through the hole list of considerations, and it is to how you're proposed legislation is going to affect things. most agencies also have legislative liaisons who work with congressional committees there, their oversight bodies. maybe they do get their legislative initiative put forward. but then getting it through committee, getting it on to the

floor is a another matter and short of pushing along and greasing of the skids. the agencies themselves consult during this process too. and, you know, agencies have different interest and progatives and they don't always agree and they are very conscience of their turf. we see the financial regulatory agencies now sort of battling over who gets to regulate the financial system how, and you got five or six different entities like the fcc and fdic, federal reserve, they are all short of trying to protect their turf in all these legislative initiatives. now after a bill is passed by the congress, there comes a review period. so above is before, and after there's a review. and another department of

justice weighs in. they have about 48 hours generally to take a whack at a bill. a president may say i'm not sure if i should sign this. it's the office of legal council that is generally charged with reviewing the bill, seeing if there are any technical matters that are out of whack that they want to weigh in on. they look at it in terms of president's prerogaves and they may have advice about whether the policy in the bill is good for the president's program. omb also sends out copies to the various agencies. again you have that 48-hour period to take a crack at it. and then the president of course makes a decision. and we all know that there are many competing interests that may or may not agree with some of the parties. well, here we go, now this is

the nuts and bolting of my job. i want to talk about the two different types of publications of the laws. this is my two favorite animals here. they are different animals. but unlike these two, they work together pretty well. in terms of public case, we've talked about the laws coming to the office of federal register. we have two formats who are essentially the soft bound paper back version and a hard bound version. but the same material. slip laws are the first thing that goes out on the street after the bill has enacted and is published. later on the united states statutes at large, which i have one standing up there, is produced. that should be identical to the various slip laws, which are

literally slips of paper in the case of one paper or pamphlet in the case of some larger ones. now at the same time there's an office in the house of representatives called the law revision council. and this group of mostly lawyers is looking at newly enacted legislationnd deciding where the various components of it should be codified, organized into the different publication called the united states code. >> now, so you see the statutes at large and the slip laws are chronological. it's one bill enacted into law after another. whereas, the united states code is organized by subject matter. and that involves very literally the process is to take a pencil and kind of go across the page and create a segment of the law

as to state and say this should go in title 44. or this piece needs to go in title 28. and then they do that electronically a little bit later on. so here's a little at the statutes at large. sound volumes and a slip law. this is the publication of the federal register produces. the distinguishing thing about the statutes at large that is extremely important for us is that there is no resort to the original document. if there's any question about what's in a slip law or statute. in other words, this is inreputable evidence of the law. and we have to take tremendous effort to make sure thate capture the law correctly. because those mistakes, if there are any will become law. we'll talk more about that in

one of the special cases. the u.s. code on the oth hand is prima facie evidence of the law, or it's the law on its face. it appears to be the law. and that means it can be charged. if you are looking for the original source document, you need to go to the slip law or stutes at large. however, it is a lot easier to find material in the u.s. code. commonly lawyers look at the u.s. code rather than investment a slip law after its seval years old. the tm positive law gets a lot of discussion sometimes in internet groups and whatnot. some people think that if something isn't enacted into positive law it isn't law. that's a misimpression.

the law revision council goes through their volumes periodically, and we have done the rest, the congress made a few mistakes, like miss designated the paragraph, now we have two paragraph cs perhaps. so they try to clean it up little. and then they submit to judiciary committee. andhe congress will reenact the entire book into law. in other words, it's tak the cleaned up version, reenacting it in a bill that goes through both houses through the president for signare. the problem is that it's an everchanging legal system. as soon as they get one of these books up to date, somebody else as ameed it. they are always behind trying to catch up. there are a number of revisions

that has been reand -- reand accounted. a little bit more about the u.s. code. because that's what they think about when they are doing this. they are literally chopping up pieces and putting it in those 50 titles that you see there on the left. the other interesting thing about that, and the way we work together is classifier as they are called are doing the slice and dice after the bill is signed. and they are sending it over to us at the federal register. so we have an opportunity to put those into the slip law. so we can sort of help the reader forecast where this is going to appear in the code. the other thing to mention is that a lot of lawyers and other folks don't use the official version. they use the united states code

or the lexus u.s. code service or even cornell university does a very nice jobn their web site. the u.s. code is only updated every six years. and so a lot of activity that happens over six years. it's difficult for a person to see the full picture of the law. we'll talk more about our process over on our side. we've already talked about the executive clerk. but i do want to mention it's a very important function. the executive crk is a year person. and often there for 25 to 30 years at the white house. they take custody of the laws from the secretary of the senate or the clerk of the house. when is passed on from congress, the idea of the chain of evidence must be maintained.

the clerk takes custody and that's the point at whichost constutional scholars consider the law to be presented. whethere puts it on the president's desk the same day, we don't know. but that's what happens insid the white house. and that starts the 10-day clock running. the president may affix his signature, and barack obama's official signature that he submitted to the federal register. then my ffice immediately assigned a public law number. before we get it has a congressional like hr1 or s453. we give it its identity, public law 111-2.

ad we make a working cy. we have a big old safe, you kind you see in those old bank robbery movies where we put the originals. and we letter send those to the national archives. which we are a component of the archives. the other thing that goes on in the background is gpo. remember i said they were kind of common denominator. in the old days g would tak a print of the law all along the way. so the engrossed bill, as an enrolled, and produced bill, that was a print that was considered the text of the law. every little change along the way had to be recorded.

so the congress does its work during the day and at night they send the changes over to the gpo, and the gpo in the old days would rekey the material in. so you have a large room of keyboarders putting the law back together after it's been torn apart by various amendments. this is done electronically. you can see when you have a copy, that's a hard piece of physical evidence. we have to take a great deal of care to make sure ty are using the right file. now, what we do at the federal register. as i said, we add some value to these, including those u.s. code sights. we also make changes, not that we change language, but when you send material back and forth, you have to be sure that nothing gets corrupted in the electronic

file. when we are satisfied that everything is in order, we have taken the chain of custo in the enrolled bill and added material to it, then we will say okay go to print. that usually takes about 5 to 10 days and much longer after a big adjournmentnd you have 13 appropriations bills it takes a while to get that going. it's about two years running behind. all right. here's an example of the type of value added. up here at the top, of course that indicates the public law and order and the date of enactmt. there you see what will be the united states statutes at large citation. so the pagination is there and it doesn't get changed in the hard bound book.

over here the original house or senate resignation is there, hr2508. the popular name is usually highlighted. then you see the notes. we call them willets. there was a man named ed willet, and he was a legend. so we call the side notes willets. these point out the key subjects which is like regulatio which is also our business. when an agency has months to act to a proposed rule or final rule, that's a key component of information. all right. again, we also keep track of the legislative history and so we'll add that on to the end. and then we have these presidential signing statements that have been in the news

lately. here's the old weekly cop sight. now we're doing the daily comp. so we will add on a reference right here at end. we talked a lot about this chain of evidence idea. and this is something new, digital authentication. you see the eagle over here, eddy the eagle opinion if you chick on him, you get some kind of a notice that there's a little hard to understand. but basically what it says is that this document has been incaplated in an electronic envelope. if any change to any character in this learn to bic fi has been made, then the signature on the document will become invalid. and you can test that by simply being online, clicking on the cerdificate, and if it's been

altered, it not will show that it's valid. will you want to say i've got it, you can do so, and they will be able to do the same thing. go online and click that it's not been altered. why? because pdf files which we thought were unchangeable, they are easily changeable. it's important to have certainly as to what the law is. and the digital authentication. this by the way will be rolled out to every fellow register publication this year. the federal register cfr all carry this little signature. i want to mention some of these. now maybe we should have started here with what is the law. but this leads to several discussion points.

the the key parts of the constitution here article 1, section 7 are that a requires concurrence of both house and the senate. and be has to be presented to the president. okay. c is simple enough. down here we have our guiding principals which i try to establish amongst our staff when i was the general council at federal register. we all looked at the constitution when we have to make a tough decision. we also keep in mind that we're dedicated to transparency. we don't want anything to go on behind the scenes than isn't reported as law making. this is what i'm going to call the bait and switch. this is the piece of legislation, the sausage making process, where a bill goes back

and forth, goes into congress, and in this case, the senat clerk failed to make a change to the law of the house had agreed on. and this involves medicare, essentially extending coverage for 36 months rather than 13. so i say it's either a two-billion short fall or savings, dependingn how you look at it. it's a savings if it doesn't go into law, it's a short fall if you're wanting to have your medicare payments extended. so now the two bills clairely differ because of that error. the one that went through the house had the extension. the one in the senate didn't get changed. so the president signs the bill from the senate. it saves $2 billion. the republicans who are on that side to begin with say, ya! we've saved money.

law suits fly all over the place. everybody who might be affected files suit. and lots of law professors right ticles. well, we published the law as a law? why? because we're very cognizant of field versus clark. this is marshal field where the signature of the officers is final despite the fact that there is no argument about these being two difference versions that did not get passed by beth houses as exactly the same bill. well, here comes the 2008 farm bill. now the democrats are in charge. you think things might have changed a little. no, people still makeistakes. there's a print in the house that malfunctions. and when they are going to parchment, they have regular

paper and some establish happens when running parchment. the printer and title three drops out. this is the food for peace act, which isn't entirely noncontroversial. well, the bill is sent to president bush and the white house staff reads the conference report. remember, when it goes, there's a report, that contains the law. the ite house staff says it looks fine. but we don't like the dollar amou. so we're going to veto it. well, congress goes and overrides it because farm bill, everybody has a steak in that. so that's one of the -- i think that was first veto override of president bush. well, you know, after the fact we sort of have a pow wow with the congress and everybody says, you know, if there was a contract, everybody has a mutual understandin

everybody thought we were passing the entire farm bill. but it's a printing error that title three fell out. and the presint intended, it was presented to him in effect. well, our point of view that that's not going to -- we're not going to slip title three into the bill. so when the -- when the bill has to be reintroduced, they considered only missing title three. that involves foreign aid and that may not go through on its own. so the entire bill with title iii included goes through the whole process and we public both versions killing lots of trees. now this one, i know i have a piece of paper in the office. this is from memory. in this case, it wasn't troth issue.

-- controversial. i think it had to be with defense appropriations. something falls out of the bill. congress ends up noticing this error, and to make up repasses the entire bill. but in order to save money they say, well, treat it though the first bill were never enacted. just public the secon one. that keeps everything sort of under the radar. and this is the specific directive. so it's really hard to defy the congress. but that's what we did. our position was in reading this that they really hadn't amended the basis law on the published laws. and you can't change the definition of a law. so we published both bills.

and i'm sure that didn't make som people happy. but our principals are transparency, accountability, and evidentiary record. now, the veto bill. this is a little different scenario here. you remelber there was this perhaps unholy alliance because president collinton -- clinton and speaker gingrich. in order to do that congress is willing to give president clinton a line item veto. a lot of state constitutions have this strike out provision for a governor. but it's not the federal constitution. so to come up with this hybrid scheme whereby the bill is presented and signed and goes into effect, we publish it as a law. but then the president gets another whack at it. and he can cancel certain items

of spending. now to do that, he publishes these in the federal register, which i have one there. so ts is involves two of our publications, sort of regulatory side and law publishing side in one thing. initially there was some question about it, should we go into law and do a strike through? should we put in little notes? we did end up putting in some notes about reported cancellations. law suits fly, professors talk about whether it is legal or not. when the congress is doing is saying to the president okay here's a big trillions of dollars of spending that you are authorized to do. but well give you a chance not to spend the money. all you have to do is publish the notice, say you are not going to spend some of the money, isn't that an executive function deciding how to

allocate the budget including holding some of it back? supreme court says no. no. it wasn't all one opinion. there were some concurring opinions. so the rational is different. essentially they find this violates the clause. you get one chance or the whole thing and sometimes we have the bills that are all consolidated in the one thing. they plop on the president's desk. i remember president reagan doing the speech with the actual bill as it was being signed, and it was this tall. the court says no, you can't go back after the fact. you didn't like the spending you should have cut it out before it went to the president. and so the various constitutional issues there, separation of powers, delegation, so we still have those art facts in the law

saying that president clinton did this, and it's still in the law. the supreme court didn't say under no circumstances, the way it was down was not acceptable. i'll be sure to mention hand enrolled bills. these are strangest things we will encounter. during the last few days, congress is rushed for time. the appropriations bills are all due. they are defense related about medicare and social security. so there is a rule that the congress can suspend a normal production process and coat and paste everything together. so the technology that we thought we left behind in the '70s and '80s, and the hand cannations come back. i have an example of ronald reagan signing one of these

things all the way down the left-hand corner. because it's not enrolled as the regular law. it's a cut and paste job on a bill and several different bills. but also almost indecipherable handwriting in this bill. and i don't know about the story, but i saw it with my own eyes, think we had blinders on and just didn't see that one. because our job is to do again a true enrollment of this even though it wasn't properly enrolled in the first place. and we have to key in every single case stroke. so we don't have that e-file to rely on, we have tonter the characters and proofread them ourself. fortunate, this is what of a thing of the past. the congress came up with a

thing to enroll it after, which is way to complex to go into. finally i will give you a few references to online resources. that's our federalregister.gov, there's my contact. if you have general federal register questions, and also questions on our new fdsys. any questions? yes, sir. >> federal register goes way back to the second flag of the -- federal register came into existence because there was no source document electricity panama canal bill? two things. it didn't exist as a source document, plus it had already

been defeated, and it didn't exist in law either. >> well, you know, this is in the age of course when president fdr when enacting through the agencies legislation to control the economy with a twist. this involves interstate transportation of oil and gas. and actually, this was really a civil liberties iue. the president's agents could go into any plant without a search warrant and make sure they weren't transporting gas overlines and not reporting it and maybe taking some profits here and there. it's kind of complex. but along the way, maybe five or six of these borders were issued. and one of them repealed require piece. but it wasn't realized generally by the warriors of each side, justice or private sector. and literally when the case went

to the court, i believe it was justice jackson said after hearing the plea, it sort of song and dance about how he couldn't pry the original regulation. and then sur enough the justice department was ordered to come up that they couldn't find it. that was sort of representative of we have a chaotic system. the governor was embarrassed. that's how we got the federal register. yes, sir? >> from your perspective, how influential have you found lobbyist to be? have you found inappropriate lobby at any stage of the process? >> well, i think i'm going to dodge that one. you know, the issue for us, from have been some concerns that legislation of the being drafted in hole by outside interest

groups. well, you know, that's anyone privilege to come up with a bill. you can come up with a bill and send is to your member of congress and say i'd like to see this enacted. i don't know that that's tin proper influence per se. i suppose both of the federal election commission might have something to say if there's some direct link established between the lobbying group and campaign contributions. but that's the old washington game. just a little me directly infused into the system. interesting thing about drafting legislation is you would think that it's professorially drafted, but members of the congress and staff often don't know how to draft a bill. the lobbyist often having been in congress do know. so they might have a nicely perfectly bill where the member of congress has to submit to the

council who looks at what the congressman or senator wants to do and draft the amendments for them. i think i'll still with that on the undoe influence. yes, sir? >> we have the title here how a bill becomes the law:the executive branch perspective. how would your discussion be different if it were called the legislate branch perspective? >> i think there's a lot more inside of what goes on in the committee, and how the parliamentarians react with the house and senate. i think they are unsung high row -- heros, they usually don't get any publicity. sometimes you'll see the leader lean over to a person, i think it used to be robert dove and

they will advice is this process that we are proposing here, is that appropriate? or if you look at something, like the schiavo case, and i wanted to mention that. something a public bill or private bill. well, for us it was discussed as a private bill because it was a termination of a life of this young women who was brain damaged. however, by the time it got out the door, and over to our office, we took a look at it and saw ere was a policy language within the bill. so the parliamentarian may have adviced it was an appropriate bill. but when it came over to us, we decided it teeters on the other side as a public law. and we published it as a publish law. even though that's the last thing we wanted to get involved in. >> we're going to go live to the

hudson ititute on a congress of the future mel tear . : >> good afternoon, everyone. like several of our other

speakers, i also had the pleasure years ago of meeting and working with mary fitzgerald, and clearly, her work on the revolution and military affairs really began, i think, a lot of the discussion that we're going to have over the next hour or so on information technologies. as richard mentioned, i'm out at fort leavenworth. i actually work for the training and doctrine command, and our office is called foreign military studies office. in 1985 we were actually founded, we were the soviet army studies office, and as the world changed in the 1990s, we changed as well. however, for thosef you who are there are with the office and -- familiar with the office, a lot of those faces still remain out there. our directer is now tom will

helm, our xo is kent bowman, mr les grou is still there, and many the other areas we have moved a little bit into south america. dr. jeffrey demrest is our south merge expert. we have mr. scott henderson looking closely at chinese hackers, rob kurtz looks at europe, and we have a u.s.-mexican border team, so we really have kind of spread out an awful lot over the past couple years. some things haven't changed out at fort leavenworth, wetill have a lot of prisons -- [laughter] and you'll know you're near fort leavenworth if you go to the kansas city airport and you see the t-shirt that says leavenworth penitentiary, a gated community. [laughter]

you know you're in the area. well, what i would like to discuss today is some of the consequences, aually, of the georgian/russian conflict of august 2008 from an information technology and, perhaps, cognitive point of view. i'm also prepared if anybody has questions about chinese information warfare techniques, tactics, whatever to answer those questions as well. interestingly enough, there seems to be very little confrontation between the russians and the chinese in the information area with cyber attacks. we see that mostly from china. those alleged attacks you read about all the te in theaper, they've hitbout every other country, it seems, except russia significantly. so there may be a reason there. i'm actually going to divide this talk about the consequences

into three parts, and the first part i'm going to kind of give you a definition from a russian perspective of information warfare. i'll tell you what i see as the three levels of information warfare theory and practice in russia, and i'll talk about a little bit some of the lessons learned, the consequences of those lessons learned from the georgian/russian conflict, and then i want to conclude with a few comments about some other cyber-related terms that seem to be evolved out of this conflict such as cyber capabilities, cyber maneuver, and you've probably read -- some of you -- in parameters an excellent article called george's cyber left hook. and i think it will give you perspective onome of the new

issues we're confronting in the information area. to begin with, though, here is a russian definition of information warfare, and this is from april of009. information warfare is a conflict among states in the information space with the objective of inflicting damage on information systems, processes and resources and on critically-important structures. this really covers what we have referred to over time as the information technical component. they've always broken in -- they, the russians have always oken it into two parts, information technical and information psychological. and the rest of the definition goes: undermining the political and social systems and massively brainwashing troops in the population with the objective of destabilizing society and the state as a whole. so there's this information psychological or cognitive

aspect and the information technical aspect. within the u.s. armed force, we've broken it down into different pillars at one point in time, and we've been readjusting our definitions accordingly. but the russians have stayed pretty sble with their military, or information technical and information psychological aspects. also of note was this statement -- the mission of information warfare is to destroy the fndations of national self-awareness and way of life of the opposing side state, the philosophical foundations of cognitive activity must be eroded. so there is quite a focus, it seems, on this information psychological aspect as well, especially for a country as you realize that lost its ideological foundation. now, the three levels. i would break them down into what i call the international level, the domestic level, and then the military level.

for years now, i'd say for the past 15 years, at the international level the russians have reay pushed in the united nations legislation trying to formalize the u.n.'s approach to information warfare, and they've taken part in all o the conferences on the development of an information society. in okinawa in 2000, yes geneva n 2003, tunis in 2005 and so on and so forth. they also are running yearly now to conferences, one in germany and one in moscow, on information-related topics. so there really is an interesting international push that they have to try to discuss this issue and bring it out for a wider audience. domestically, they have a program called electronic russia that they have bee working on

for number of years, and this really is focused on how do we informationallize if you can use that concept. the country. they also in the year000 developed an information security doctrine for the country, and in 2008 they put together a doctrine for the development of an information society in russia. so they have been quite active over time at both the international and the domestic level in, in writing very formalized doctrine for information operations, information technologies, information warfare, what have you. the other document that steve alluded to earlier today was the national security strategy, and certainly there is a big component in there on information technologies as well. we saw in 2007 the appointment of oleg eskin to be the minister

in charge of communications, so now we're starting intohat military component. and after he was one of the consequences, unfortunate ones, i guess, after the august 2008 conflict they replaced hii with dmitri chiewsh kin. he is now the acting seventh deputy of defense for information technology and communication. so at the very top level they did have a change that occurred quite rapidly. i was looking through a few interfax articles before i came here just to try to give you a flavor for what's happening now after the 2008 conflict between georgia and russia in the information area, and here are a few of them. almost immediately in 23 october

2008, prime minister putin formed a high technology scientific development policy. he and others saw some of the shortcomings of the russian military that we'll discuss in a second. the second thing that occurred was there was several articles, one by igor who i understand has been to d.c. and gave his view of information warfare, why russia los the information warfare campaign. and this is mostly the cognitive side, not the technical side. the technical side you'll see in a second, but there certainly was a huge discussion about this cognitive, this morale, this psychological warfare side as well. third, in april of 2009 one of the generals in charge of the operation in georgia said that, or south ossetia said information war is a new challenge. we had the head of the communications troops call for

the creation of a unified information system for continuous information exchange and common battlefield pictures in order to help decision making and timely troop deployments. in july president medvedev called for supercomputer progress. he pointed out that russia is currently 15th in the world in developing strategic information technology, and he recommended that it's time to start talking with some partners and develop supercomputing in russia. then we had a test of some advanced automated command and control systems which you might expect in july. there was a long series, a couple series of articles on information service restructuring with the press secretaries, some civilians being appointed and replacing some public relations people. another july article, the armed forces has decided to convert to the infrastructure of civilian

cellular operators, and finally another russian general said there were two common acts by the georgians that we really have to be concerned with, information and propaganda and reconnaissance. so as you can see, there was a whole listf developments on the military side that have occurred recently. i would say that there are three eas in the lessons learned for the military that really seem to be the most significant. the first is that prime minister putin was one of the big proponents behind this, and that is they need -- they, the russians -- need to further develop their global navigation satellite system, and we see that nowhey are talking about putting up systems of 36 satellites to do e-iail tercepts and secret communications and a lot more things. not that they don't have them already, they just need to improve the number that they

have now. the second thing, clearly, is the development of development of command and control resources. the russians seem to be dissatisfied with their reconnaissance strike complex. now, that's something that mary fitzgerald wrote a lot about. in this country we call it c4isr. the russians call it reconnaissance strike complexes, and they have written extensively about it, but they don't feel they've gotten those components which really does require glonass to the level that it needs to be in order to really have an effective equivalent of the c4isr system. the third thing is the uav issue. we had a lot of people complain, a lot of russian military officers complain that they really needed uavs during that conflict, and they weren't allowed to employ 'em. on the other hand, within russia there are some domestic uavs

that the federal, the ministry for emergency situations, the ministry of internal affairs, the federal border service, all of them are using them for natural disasters and the border and internal conflict, and they're asking why can't we have 'em? we had this huge conflict for us, and we were caught short. so those seem to be the three most significant areas that the russians are focused on at the moment. now, the other thing that was interesting that developed after this conflict, we saw some people writing now about in their militar journals about strategic operations in a theater of information warfare. whenever the russians talk about theaters of information warfare or theaters of any kind, we know it's on a massive scale, and it has a lot of historical baggage that really is important for

everybody to pay attention to. i'll read you what the definition was of a strategic operation in a theater of information war. it's the sum total of the simultaneous and sequential actions coordinated and linked by objective task, place and time and unified by a single aim and plan executed under the supreme command's general leadership to accomplish strategic objectives of war. software and electronics strikes, special and psychological operations, systemic actionso identify key resource objects, and this i think was the most important, gain secret control of other countries' software beforehand as well as operatis and combat actions by strategic task forces in order to disorganize the government and military administration. d if you go bk in time and have listened to any of the stuff that we have written in

our office, a lot of these words you may recognize because these are very consistent themes that the russians have had when they talk about gaining information superiority. the way to do that is to disorganize the other side's force. just attaining information superiority isn't enough. and the example they like to use is kosovo where they said time and again, look, you had total information superiority, nobody was shooting at you, and yet you couldn't employ your weapons. when you did sometimes you would see a tank in daytime, and at night you'd shnot at it, and it was nothing but a mock up with a heat source because the serbs were able to disorganize you. you may have had it, but it didn't help you in the end because somebody could still fool your systems. they focused an awful lot on this idea of disorganization. one other thing they had to say was operational tasks, when you

target an adversary's information resource, those tasks are the first one, disorganize. there's that word again. the add adtersary's governmentad military administration. two, damage his economic potential and, three, conduct intelligence operations. so they're fairly focused on what their missions are. now, the last thing that i wanted to mention was this idea of cyber maneuver, and as i mentioned, there was a great article in parameters called george's cyber left hook, and what's important here is how neutrals can be pulled into some conflictif there isn't the legal parameters established to prevent those neutrals from being so pulled in. and in the examplehat they're talking about, when the initial cyber strike took place against georgia and some of their servers were shut down, the georgians then looked to pull into the united states and use

some servers there in order to reestablish communications. the question then became this cyber maneuvering to a neutral, and if that neutral supported their effort, did that then involve that cyber neutral in the conflict? were they then pled into it? in the case with georgia, the georgians were using commercial sites in the united states. it's very doubtful our government even knew that that was taking place because you know of the number of servers in this country. so a nation could be pulled in and not even understand that they're being part of the conflict because they have no knowledge of the fact that some servers whin their country are being used. so there certainly are a number of cyber issues that came up that we need to explore in the near future to prevent some of these misunderstandings. perhaps we need a better crisis management system, one that has

a special section between countries on cyber issues because certainly that was one that could have gotten out of control. it did not, but it could have. so in conclusion, i think that there were many consequences that you should be aware of regarding this particular conflict. remember that there's a big infrastructure that the russians have created in the theory side, and they're very good at that. they do an excellent job of putting this stuff together. they also have some excellent mathematicians. i was listening to npr just the other day on the way home, and i think the united states has now fallen out of the teens even in math mat ticks and science and technology. we're down in the 20s and 30s worldwide. so it may take only a couple good software writers to get in there. and if you want to be able to get a strategic advantage ahead of time, one way certainly that you can do it is by taking control of someone else's

resources through software. so it is a, it is an issue that we're going to have to consider seriously in the future. thank you. >> thank you. jacob kipp wasn't able to make it, some travel problems at the last minut but he was kind enough to sen us his paper, so dr. blank who's familiar with his work will summarize. >> jake is going to be retiring this week as the dean of the school of advance studies at fort leavenworth. he was directer and leading member of the foreign military studies office there for many years, and to all of us who study russian and soviet military history and current developments, jake has been a mentor in the field. he worked very closely with mary. i happened to have the privilege to be involved in some of those operations.

and in consequence of jake's working relationships with mary and as a historian by training, he has written a paper on the content of operational art, and it's entitled operational art and the curious narrative on the ssian contribution, presence and absencever the last two decades. and since jake is still with the army, his views represent only himself. they don't represent the views of the army defense department or the u.s. government. the term operational art has come into vogue in the last generation or so not least thanks to the contribution of people like jake and mary who brought to all of us an understanding of -- not just a vocabulary of the soviet military, but of the way they thought about modern strategy and contemporary war. and future war which is a big subject for russian military thinkers.

and, therefore, operational art has to be understood not only in the terms that we use it, but in the terms the russians do, and it's a term that has a very long providence as far as military historians are concerned. operational art refers to the use of all the forces at the disposal of a command not just to win tactical battles, but to use tactical engagements and battles as a basis for them achieving strategic objectis. it means bringing all the instruments of power together whether it be in war or in a peacetime situation to leverage strategic outcomes in a positive direction. the origins of the term need to be traced back in european military history to the no pole ontic campaigns -- napoleonic campaigns. where napoleon aimed mainly to drive his opponents from the field by means of an

overwhming battle and thus achieve victory, or after 1809 when it became clear thanks to the rise in scope, scale and means of cqi at that time that the individual battles alone did not wring a campaign to -- bring a campaign to an end, but that a whole slew of battles had to be waged if you were to achieve a strategic objective. and it's no accident that napoleon fails after 1809 repeatedly to bring campaigns to a successful end. thanks to the industrial revolution, the rise of mass armies of large nation states, the maturation of modern means of communication, command and control and intelligence, the concept of operational art or the phenomenon of operational art grows in importance. for example, in u.s. strategy in

the civil war particularly if you look at lincoln and grant's strategy in the last year and a half where, for example, all the armies start moving the same day against lee and johnston and others. then we see van mull ca using something like this as well. we get into distributed maneuver of large masses of men across various fronts and so on until we get to world war i where the real problem is converting tactical gains into strategic objectives and getting past -- which the failure to do so leads to the stalemate on the western front. on the eastern front, it's a very different kind of war, but there again strategic objectives are not really achieved until the russian army breaks down in 1918, and then the germans still lost the war despite overrunning western russia. the concept of operational art is developed in the '20s and '30s, the most outstanding

examples, there's a glorious play of perhaps the best military thinkers in this country writing on the summit, and i would recommend the two-volume study in english by the israeli general who himself is an outstanding military thinker and in many ways foreign head of many american military thinkers. i had the privilege to be at a conference with him a couple of years ago here in town where he started quoting, and everybody went like, who? and the idea being that we need to understand how to use operational art to leverage technical prowess into strategic victory. the term, therefore, comes into favor in the united states in the '80s not leastecause of mary's and jake's work, but also because in the '80s the army's

focus shifts back to the territorial battle of europe. the army, frankly, wanted to forget vietnam. it did not want to deal with guerrilla wars again, and it refocused in the '80s on the integration into the nato and american militaries of the first generation of precision-guided weapons that was coming onboard and high-tech of that era. and this is the series of weapons first seen in vietnam and in the yom kippur war and the concepts that grow out of those wars that led marshall to talk about the rma and the advent of what he called weapons based on new physical principles that would transform warfare. and he was urging the soviet union to make the leap forward to that generation and gray jeff who was his deputy also arguing

for this, and the soviet union couldn't make that transition. nonetheless, the concept of operational art applied to the u.s., and the u.s. in the '80s and in europe took concepts like deep operations and the rma and ultimately these were materialized in operation desert storm. mary and jake and i have all written on operation desert storm, and we all got confirmation from the soviets that from there point of view what we were doing was implementing the soviet attack plan for europe, albeit in the desert. and this is important because then the next generation russian military thinkers, slip cn coa and younger men who have come in sense, have grappled with what they expect to be future wars. again, the term noncontact war

where the armed forces of the two sid don't come into contact with each other directly, either don't have force on force engagements but major operations at long range either informational or long-range strike capabilities whether it be air, land, or sea, the falklands being an exale of neighbor warfare, is the preoccupation of these men because they saw nato do this in kosovo, they saw the u.s. do this in iraq in 2003 in the original offensive which completely dumbfounded russian military analysts who had no idea that we could do something like that with ground forces. they expected a kosovo attack or a long-term orinal, initial period of the war which would then morph into a long-term struggle. they did not count on our inability to translate tactical achievement into strategic victory, and they did not

predict the kind of unconventional strikes, attacks on us that have materialized since then. nonetheless, the terms of operational art, systems analysis because if you are dealing with large bureaucracies and large military forces as have grown upver the years and the support systems, logistics, medical, and so on, you need to think about military systems in system logical terms. and jake traces the evolution of this term through the 19th century into the soviet period, talks about post-stalinist developments where the legacy is rediscovered. it had been suppressed by stalin who had the general murdered and enshrined his own thinking as the ultimate in military wisdom. the soviets by trial and error,

ry grievous trial and error, learned how to do deep operations in world war ii, and particularly the manchurian operation became the template for them. by the '8 0s, oligarchy has begun to understand that technology and the nature of warfare are changing and that this template of a combined arms attack that results in a deep penetration leadi to the collapse of the enemy in a strategic outcome which is political, not just military, were being superseded by new developments and urged on to the soviet soviet union. it did not happen. ..

that information war fairs that they are paying. it's not inconceivable that you could have that. and this hole concept to wage these wars indicating bad perception of the advent of the new policy to man control with the weapons necessary to wager. in tim's case, it would be the iw. in the '85, they set up strategic military action to space. because they saw sbi as leading

to space war. and that weapons would be in space or from space attacking their targets. and that it needed to be counted. to point to that is that the russian military intellectual tradition of theorizing although it has suffered previously and it had not produced anybody of the candle power in the last 20 years it nonetheless alive. and to come to terms with new concepts a phenomenon and new types of warfare, and it is a rich tradition. it is a tradition that needs to be understood in terms of its own frame of reference, not just our terms of reference when we talk about information warfare, but in terms of a border societal concept, like georgia and chechnya.

and systemmology is vital enduring concept as is the thought process behind him which needs to be understood if we need to understand the strategy for what remains in military power. >> thank you. i nted to make a deponent him about -- let's go straight to questions and answers again. if you have a question, please raise your hand and remember to identical yourself and affiliation. in addition people watching the presentation on television are free to e-mail me. my e-mail is my last name at hudson.o. weitz@hudson.org. thank you. >> thank you. i'm bob miller from mdu. this is a question mostly for

tim thomas i think. does the current russian concept of information turn into the more effective use of nonmilitary, nongovernment cyber assets, cyber mercenaries, and if so how? >> i would imagine it does. you know, the evidence in russian honestly is less clear and it's just not as numerous as it is with the chinese. so it's a little bit harder to identify. however, when you look at russian society, you see the roll of hackers increasing in their heroism, their public image. there was old soviet film where they had a genie come out of a

bottle. and the genie met this young kid and the young kid would show the genie all the benefits. they have updated that version, ten when the genie comes out of bottle, he meets a lot of hacker. the hacker shows the society and there are benefits that would be gained by the use of cyber issues. they put a whole new spin on this ancient and very popular soviet film from the past. certainly with what we saw in a o'ah certain ya if you were reading foreign policy came out with some deprescription of the bloggers. we know there are -- the foreign people. these were just folks who wanted to gain some type of a

notoriety. you know there's a lot of people that are introduced into hacking. if you really want to read, there are hacker journals, the lab is running and developing viruses all the time. so the issue is alive and well in russia. and they are doing an awful lot. and i would imagine that because they really think issues through quite well in my opinion they have probably really fought through what is means to have a cyber attack, and perhaps that's why there's such a push in the international arena by them to try to organize information in society and rules and regulations within the u.n.. certainly a supporting reason is the fact that that's certainly a supporting reason. whenever you are behind, it certainly helps you to gain an

advantage. don't think that's not part of equation too. >> i might add last week the u.s. cyber contiency units. u.s. came out with a paper on russian cyber war against georgia. i think the executive summer are available and unclassified an it lays out clearly the that case that these hackers were working on their own mr with the russian military, not the government but they are clearly working with the military and organized crime, which is a significant factor of its own to attack georgia cyber during the war. i don't know more than that. but it does suggest some coordination at some level between the hacker community and the military command. >> yeah, i wrote about that actually andhe piece and the

study in world politics review. i thought it was interesting. it connects it with time and pattern and they were using social networks in the united states to recruit people. i thought it was very insightful. and the prospects of his summary that it's hyperlinked. it is available. >> i'm sorry why is there the differentuation or distinctions between association with the milita but not the government. if they are associated with the military don't they have the support of the government? >> the operations were timed in such a ways to be coordinated with the military offenses against georgia. and thereforehere's no sign of it being coordinated by the vernment. and the military command and these hacker were doing this this -- i would suggest, because i'm summarizing the newspaper

accounts of what i read. i havej't read the hole summary yet. but the unclassified executive summary is available at the two web sites richard and i have given you which talks about this. it givesou a lot of food for thought. as to the way to use cyber warfare. but also sop of the social networks, if you like, of the russian military, the hackers and oanized crime. >> e-mail me if you want a copy and i can send it to -- back as an attachment. >> yes, my question is you mentioned a few of the things that we are doing in the real cyber. and they have grown ups. t basically what we are talking about is the cyber

friends and what the russian activities are actually using my themselves as a cyber capability? to what extent to we know anything about it and how big is that? we know that even if we don't know anything, we know a little about the american capabilities. that's huge. and we canertainly be the subject of the past. how much d the russian mercenaries know about these kinds of activities? >> the activity itself is something i don't know much about. that certainly is in the classified world. the theory part i can tell you quite a bit about. first of all, the russians, there seems to be some sort of common ground in the russian and chinese in the sense that they really believe in order to retain a strict advantage, and maybe i shouldn't include all russians. but several that -- i've read.

you have to prepare your ground for the cyber attack. and the way you do that, in peace time you do recognizance. u recog everything you can think. that would be the preliminary step to gain the advantage in case there was ever the need to kick off the offensive, your cyber attack would as the counties say allow victory before the first battle. if you want take down certain sights and nworks, especially if you could interfere with logistics. on the other hand, you know, this is the peace time, we don't see that much happening from the russians. really we see most of it from if you look across the international arena, most are against china. angela merkle of australia.

the list goes on and on. ople accused of chinese doing some type of recognizance ahead of time. there's certainly seems to be much more of the it on the counties side than the russian side. the other thing we really see on the russian side is the need to what they call, and i think there's an honest debate going on in russia right now. the debate is should we or should we go not comment on information space. that everybody can access. that everyone within all those agencies can access so they have the same systems and terms and the understanng. and the reason they are having the debate is the question becomes what's the end use of this thing? they are good of trying to good many up with the end use before

making it. i understand it helps us talk and everying. but is there a use for it out there? sohere areome really interesting debates going on in russia and china at this time. the interesting thing for people in the cyber realm, i think, and a lot of people don't know much attention to foreigners. they like to, we're so focused on ourselves right now and the problems we're having or seem to be in the cyber area that they miss some of these discussions that are russian source. there's some fascinating discussions going on because it does matter for the future especially in the economic sector. that needs to be the one that has the greatest concern of everyone i think. so i hope that answers your question or comes close.

>> yes, in light of the recognizance -- [inaudible] >> well, as the cyber coingency report indicates, they were able to connect in the social networks in the u.s. in order to stre in georgia. i can't having -- i haven't read it all so i can't give you specifics as to that. we see on a global scale rather the phenomenon of hacker getting involved in conflict situation of one sort or anoth. even if they are let's say third parties and not directly involved. so, for example, there was -- haseen reporting that arab

hackers have attempted to strike an israeli systems and these are hackers -- beyond gaza when the israeli attacked gaza last at the end of 2008. so it's nothinkable that you could see something like that in the future as there are signs of it already in the present. and again, the russian orchestrated the attack. it's clearly an attempt by an outside state to leverage developments in a domestic affairs of the state which it is at peace. and the same with the russian orchestrative in january as part of pressure campaign to oust us and threaten if he didn't go with the russians we have ways of making your life very

mirable. >> okay. if there is no question, i have it on c-span e-mail which i'll read outloud. >> first question did the russian occur as a result of u.s. recognizing and giving kosovo. did the u.s. advice to proceed with the action? >> can i take a second qstion first? absolutely in the. we never gave georgia green lights to do anything. a lot of russian propaganda has alleged this. the record is quite clear that georgia acted in defiance of u.s. advice. rice told him to sign an agreement, publyically we gave

no support to attack. the russian government claims that kosovo says there's the president. obviously you can make that case if you want to. i don't think that's the reason that they attacked georgia in 2008. an online record publicly having said that the world of the a provocation to dossered and that they fell into the trap. but rather because of nato enlargement because of the fact of the iense antagonism personally as well georgia. so i don't believe tre are other people who would disagree with that. that cost -- kosovo was responsible. indirectly it plays a roll.

i never saw a record in kosovo except for the europeans were tired and wanted to get out. and the russians constantly make up objections to say their opinions doesn't count for much. obviously that does not sit well in moscow. no russian government wants to be toldheir opinion does not count. even if they maybe objectively the case. but in terms of it being a provocation to russian saying we ca go in and attack georgia and territories and abridge itssoeverty, -- sovereignty. >> i don't know how many of you have had a chance to read the putin economist. he really has come up with a totally different scenario for

georgia and russia that it may not be true. i don't know if it's right or not. at least it gives you something else to think about. onof his quotes that really pertains to this, the proclamation on the independence moves the war preparations into the home stretch. before vladimir putin stated this will be a signal. we will not mirror the actions, we have our own home maid products and know what we will go. he makes the point that there was a little bit of a statement way back in february. and his point is that between february and april war preparations were kind of fed up between 20 april and 28 july, he called it low intensity war.

where we had the russians shooting down the uavs and there were a lot of skirmishes and people pulled out of different agreement. there was the so-called low intensity issue. and then i don't know how many of you saw or read the cost exercise that went on just before the war. but the russians openly stated i think it was 15 july and 28 july if my memory serves me correctly where they stated that we are watching the nato exercises across the border. and we are prepared to implement a peace enforcement operation if need be. so theyere quite clear about their focus, and they were quite clear about the fact that they were ready to do something. this really makes me wonder about all the stuff we hear about their general staff and this guy went on vacation. it really makes me wonder.

because on the one hand you have this strategic issue where people are moving all over and it makes it sound like something is being done. they are not ready to fight or do anything. where in the newspaper, they say they are ready. we got everybody and we're ready. peace enforme operation. you have these two conicting pair pair -- paradigms all the time. the russians are master em beigity. because if you look back in time over the deaths we still don't know how they perished. there's still questions that exist. and they will give you three reasons,our reasons, or four ways it could have happened, but they will not never you which one it is. they are quite good at that. i don't know if they were part of this one or this is just you

have giving his version and military saying this is ready to happen, you got the guys back in moscow running the place reorganizing. i don't know. but it's interesting when you start thinking aut the confusion they caused in our brns as well. >> okay. question back there. >> there was an article that was mentioned that listed these items from july of that the military announced its plan to convert to using cellar operator and internet provider. that's the state taking over different services. and it seems to be admission of the military's own weakness in that area, i would imagine, unless it means that intertwining the private providers which would be considered the cyber attacks in georgia. >> i saw the same article.

i'm not sure what to make of it. but i thinkoth of your suggestions might be true. and the one hand there is the reflection that they had failed and on the other hand they are going to someway integrate and subsubordinate. it makes some interested possibilities. we could talk about the cna. we can talk about the immediate circumstances of the beginning of this war, but how come we american never noticed that this powder keg had been builting and flashing for the last 19 years? >> it would be easy to say it's an intelligence failure.

that would be the easy way out. but it was the last of series of policy failures not just in georgia with regard to the use of american intelligence to understand strategic situations globally. and i'm not trying to point the finger at any one of administration or politician or public service. but the fact of the matter is all i can say is i played war games on georgia wre these -- where it should have been clear what can happen. the fact of the matter is that, and i published a long article about this that was administration was caught by surprise. and there's no excuse it should have been. and being caught by surprise, it was unable to device an effective resolution to the situation.

secretary rice wanted to do one thing, the president wasn't able to enforce guidance. and that was characteristic of too ny policies. and i don't say that in a paisan way. >> hold tha line. would you wait for the mic? >> marshal e. miller. the russian press has a dumb beat on georgia -- drum beat on georgia. so what's the real reason for this press issue? >> that's a good question. first of all let me say i don't think they plan to attack. putin said they didn't. and not that he's a spokesman for the truth. i find it hard to imagine what

they would gain from doing so. >> yeah, they would overrun georgia. but they'd lose more than they pained. i think what's gong on here is a determination to keep the defensive, i think they convinced themselves he's trying to rearm and take back the places and no ideahat bases they are doing this. i do know that russian intelligence are habitually fake and addicted to the worse-case scenario. third they want to make it clear to the united states, and this is clearly linked to the -- at the cis is what you would say, it's ours, it's yours. the reason i said is tt earlier today it was written that in moscow the concept of e reset button is seen as an

apology by the u.s. that we were wrong. and what's more is seems as an acknowledgment that the cis is really russian spirit influence. the obama administration has said no such thing and denyied republicly that we would not stand by if there was another war in georgia. vice president biden's tp made it very clear in public as well as i believe in private. i think this is an attempt to maintain the strategy. two to keep the threat perception going for domestic purposes for allocational purposes. because actually, they had to t back due to the financial crunch. it was supposed to be bigger than it's going to be. third they want to keep the caucuses in the state of perspective attention, and fourth they believe their own propaganda about what a monster

he i and six, they are determined to push everybody to accept their justification for the war and it's outcome such as the new law that it wants to push to give legal sanction to the war of last year. i think it's extraordinarily dangerous and risky policy. i don't think i really gains anything especially wn you have the -- on fire. but i'm not making policy. >> okay. i'll take another question. and again any television viewers that want to ask, just e-mail me at weitz@hudson.org. years ago you wrotehat -- do you believe russia has integrated new operational to shut down and not maneuver?

>> sometimes you're sorry you title articles the way you do. the mind has no fire wall was written in discussion of some russian use of subliminal messages. it was -- and the purpose of that book was to write algorithms and find ways to put suggestive influen in someone's head. they had to of try to find a way to plant the subliminal. in this day and age, i wrote another article that was called cyber september skepticism, the

mind's firewall. and i really and truly believe if you are not a cyber skeptic, you are going to be fooled terrib about the use of the internet. because it is so easy to make everything look so authentic and attribute things to people that aren't true at all. and -- this ability goes well beyond some simple examples. the best one i can give you that demonstrates this is there is a calirnia newspaper that wrote an article that had a lot of people write in to criticize it. so if i was gne of those people who wrote in to this newspaper, would look at it every day, my criticism, but no one else had anything to say about what i wrote. i was disappointed. so i thought i had some good

points. steve, idant understand it. you remember that article? i wrote this great abstract and sent it in. an one no has rponded. and steve said, what article? what abstract? so w go online and my abstract's not there. no wonder nobody saw it. i go back to my computert night and i'm looking around. guess what appears? the abstract. i'm the only one who can see it. so whoever the cyber administrator were allowed me to see, but no one else. talk about that, you can fooled in so many ways. if you are not a really good cyber skeptic these ways, i think you can be fooled enormously. what are the russians doing today? most muchheir focus is on

nonlethal weapo. you should look a america for example and see what woody norris is doing. he's an inventor that really scares the russians. you know, a country that has some belief in this subliminal issue and some believe in parapsychology. he's been in business week, history channel, he has a directal sound division. if he was in this room and focusing on someone with the directal sound division, that personal would be the only one who cld hear. you can imagine the impact of that from thetand point of subliminals and all these other issues that you can be fooled badly that way too. the issue or the article about

woody in news week magazine had people walking we a coke machine. and the coke machine had fizzing noises. as you hit it, the idea was you'd be thirsty and want to buy a coke. yo can see the more you think about it, there is so many issues out there today that we're going to have to deal with in the coming years. i don't think we're the only ones or they are the only ones. we have some as well. >> go ahead. >> again, so why is all this brilliant art and warfare helping them to solve all the problems of chechnya and how did it apply in the 1990 in

chechnya? and why aren't they doing better? >> you know, they are not doing better because they hadn't developed any of what especially when chechnya first started. in fact they didn't understand the power of the internet at that time. and the chechnyaians did. they put a lot of that out at the start. they did respond and set up their own web sites. i this that one of the reasons they haven't done more is because some of thistuff haven'torked. i haven't seen any proof about the subliminal messages and algorithms. they have reasons they keep saying the first one to develop a tech nothing in this area will really gain an advantage. maybe 20 years ago maybe

infinity away. it may never happen. so they seem to keep trying. it's just part of the psyche there. >> did theta to learn from their failure in '94 and '96. when they did to oppose the information blockage essentially that they would not allow anybody from progovernment media and they restricted what information came out of the theater as far as the russian auence was concerned in the '99. which shows some learning. as for the earlier affairs, the whole operational plan. as for now we have the terrorism in pakistan and the entire north caucasus. why isn't this working? it isn't working because you can

have superiority, but you have to knowow to turn it into an advantage. what they have in the north caucasus is an record of governance of mall governance, misgovernment, corruptions, brutality, and you have a competing information space. you have the muslim immigrants what are.org that are competing web sites. if there's a cyber community there they have options beyond the russian information space. and you can only do so many with information war. if you don't have a good strategy call region. they tried a lot things. they sent kozak. and he reported that he came back in 2005 escaping the parts that were released to the

press. probably the private and part that weren't worse. so they they -- this is reform. these guys will know better. antesituation deteriorated. you have in chechnya where the government is pretty good at what it can do. and it's blows up and murders in cold blood. and that's not really a basis for laughing legitimacy. although it does inspire fear. i don't know what the solution is. it appears that moscow is putting the hole area. the idea of aointing ten days ago to after the kicked out the government for the failure and after the big bombing on

thursday. they suggest to me that they have run back to the approach. and put in a military governor. he's just going to apply and call i peace. >> one other thing that you know you've mentioned, why haven't they done more? i would say what interest me is what can we learn from them? there are things they are trying to implement right now. some of them are going toork, maybe none of them will. i really like studying to see if there was something that we can learn from and get better here. because in this country right now as many of you know we are discussing strategic communication. how are we going to do? everybody has the buzz word in your head. so the russians had an answer to me it's basically strategic calms. it's certain isn't template we're going to use.

but i'll read you the eight steps i think are really interesting. at least you know what they are doing. they need a specialized management system and structure the encounter. they a right off. it's a counter system. a council for pubc diplomacy. it includes member of the political parties and so on headed by prime minister putin. advisor of the propaganda activities, i thought maybe he was writing this for himself. he did his doctoral thesion this years ago. state foreign affairs media holding company supporting this company to where the american experience can be copied. state internet holding company, create a domestic internet media copy for the publishing of books. i mention that.

but that's something we need to develop. this is not the same thing i mentioned. that we need to do that in case we have somebody cyber this or that. this isn't the samehing. but i like the idea of information crisis action center. here's his definition. enable the authorities to prevent commentaries and unfolding events in a timely manner. homework assignments must be in advance. number 6, create a system by geopolitical enemies. 7, nongovernmental organization create a network operating in the cis, the eu, and the usa. and finally a system for training personnel for conducting infmation warfare. what institutions will train individuals? the diplomatic academy, the administration of foreign affairs, moscow state university, moscow state

constitution of relations. those who felt they lost the war they are looking hard at what information they can set up to counteraggression and then the other system will be internal to what they might call patriotic feelings and stability within the country. >> i see you mention this summer all the minut of the -- i don't know the timing of this. but how is it the doctrine by work on it? >> well, i have an article coming out that talks about that. we have already seen some of the reaction internationally in the cis as a whole and china to the people of iran and chechnya.

earlier this year we brought out -- in people have been arrested. in iran hundreds of people has been arrested, maybe thousands. the trials are on way. there are reports that people have been killed or raped in prison. this has been denied. but it's been charged. i don't know how it is. but the arrests and the trials are enough. in kazakhstan, the internet law which is even woe than the russian law was decreed by the president even though it flies in the face to the commitment of the osce. it really restricts what can be done on the internet in the crimin process. order 65 is part of that. but it's also part of the russian response to the massive economic crisis. they have created or are talking

about creating to uphold order to the major cities. the general staff has talked about using the army for unrest. there is talk now that they have put back on jury trials. i don't think that he woke up on the morning after the bombings and decided he's going to get mid of jury trials. he's a lawyer. he should know better. some of that has been discsed. the hole series of moves. he's creating its only regime, its only police fce not the milita force to enforce order again.

and it itself is trying to come across. which is turned on and off as it sees fit. but they are looking for more action and more scope. if you come out with many kind ofhing, it betrays the real a apprehension of the government about the domestic situation. i have no doubt that all those as well orders and probably you will see more regulation of the internet. they are part of the major historical reaction to the to the possibility of any kind of domestic dissent. and the real danger and the real possibility that we have a system that built with a czar's system with power. he played the role of a czar and to some degree still does if not completely. it is something that looks

recognizable. and i don't use that term likely. anybody that disagrees with me is fascist. there are clear similarities with the poly. but there are too many disturbing signs that it wou go in that directi unless there is some sort of countermovement to arrest that development. and the continuing instability in iran. and what we saw in earlier this year. it's just more justifications for that on the part of the regime. >> okay. far back we have a question. my question is how much of our problem is propaganda management. i've heard some things since we started about chechnya.

i want push back and say that chechnya is a example of some kind of propaganda or management of the chechnya policy achieving -- calling from amnesty for militants who no longer want to appose appointing political leadership and starting reconstruction. since when has tha ever been a formula for giving characters to that? at any rate chechnya is the reason today that despite all the things that you are pointing out is from moscow's perspective probably the least likely to be overthrown by some internal resistance. and in that case, it's more of a statement there to be extent that violenc continues. but going on to what something that isn't failure when you look at war, which you were also talking about.

do you think moscow has a political problem with that propaganda management? during the war i remember very vividly with wolf blitzer. the thing that i have access -- do they not feel they should have to do that? how would you address that? >> let me start with your first poin i think your point with regard to chechnya. in many ways you could sayt's a success for reasons you outlined in your question. however, it is very much on his own. i'm sure he's close to putin or it's claimed that he is. but the russians rage this war to keep him understand control. in fact chechnya really runs the place with an iron hand.

now they are not engaging in russian terrorism or so far. but i'm not sure that was necessarily thetrategic outcome that the russians wanted. it's the best they can dunder the circumstances, and as you said, it's not there. it's a fundamental unstable circumstances 37 it can put the country back in chaos. and the price has been the violence throughout the north caucasus. i would argue that the upsurge and the violence in the north caucasus in the last several years is the result of the russian campaign. i am not altogether that the russians have won a strategic victoryá granted they have achieved a lot of successes. but the kinds of wars, the test of the strategic victories is the legitimacy of the

government. you need it that goes up in sme. as far as the other problem, i think you are right. they do have fundamental problem with management. and they are creating an organization or have created an organize to improve their image in the west. they've hired lot of folks in this town. to do so i was going through my favorites listi the number of pr firms that are working for russian. it's quite an impressive list. but i don't think it's going good. i mean even in the public relations, even dawn will tell you you can't sell a bad product with a good catch line. the conduct has to be good. d russia is still not a good product as far as the west is concerned. the russians -- likely you are

going to see putin giving larry or wolf those kinds of briefings. if you remember putin appearances on cnn, they are not particularly successful. putin is not the best speaker for russia under those circumstances. but again i don't know that you -- that story so easily even with slick pr. >> right here. >> the title of conference is the russian military. as i hear the panel speak it's like the emerging russian threat. we had the cold war in the '90s, but it's built up and so on. now when we tal about the reset

button, the major achievement it seems to me is that russia is allowing its territory to be used to supply our forces in afghanistan. in given the title of the conference, do you think it's an acceptable risk, do you look at this that could approve or do you think we are assumin risk becoming so dependent on russian for those logistics? >> i don't know that the logistics cooperation between the u.s. and russia is going to be a magtude that poses at risk if it was cut back. it would make things were difficult. but i think we could manage the situation. i think the outstanding achievement of the reset button is going to be the treaty that is under negotiation. we're goi to talk about that in the next panel. i don't want to prejudge that. but we -- a lot of -- we went

into a consideration throne avoid saying that we talk about the russian threat to the united states. and we didn't talk about that in the first two panels or two one. now there is a russian threat to cis states and the russians themselves have to create that threat by many of their actions. but i really do not thinkhat the russian military is a direct threat to american forces or interests. they maybe a threat to american partners and allies and interest aboard. but it's nothing like a generation ago if we'd had ts conference. all of us here talking about developments in the '80s or '70s when there was really a much me -- a very hot threat environment. there are problems, there are issues with the neighbors. there's no throat china, for example, we talked about that.

they're maybe a chinese development that could be threatening to russian, quite the opposite. and we alluded to that as well. so i think that we are trying to clean up a russia threat it's just misplaced. i don't see where it comes from. >> can i say something? one thing that has fallen off the scale for us, unfinancial, in t mid 50e9s and early 2000, we did an awful lot of peace keeping. that has been replaced by the chinese now. we had built up a really good working relationship in kosovo and other places. hopefully we will be able to restore that. in fact, we might find that the three main missions of armed forces in the near future when it says today and tomorrow it could be peaceeeping, it could be fighting terrorism, or

natural disasters. those three could be the joint missions and in the background will be some threats a everything. but we may end up doing those three missions more than any others. as you mentioned the cold war, it came to peace keeping. a really chance to work with them. you kind of he to hope that that's going to be our future versus what could happen, i guess. >> yeses? >> the question related to u.s. cyber capabilities after the military cyber initiative a month or two ago. i had to be reading some blogs where people were imagining scenarios from the term nay formusees. they were afraid the americans

would have a weapon that would wipe out the soviet nuclear option. that totally in the realm of fantasy f these totly unexpert people? is that fear shared at all by anyone? >> you know, there's a russian proverb that says fear as big eyes. these are really big ones. let me tell you 30ears ago a friend of my and my roommate as an exchange student told me that before you come to moscow, this is 1976, he had taken a group around the country. and one night they had a free night and they went to see star wars. and their jaws drops because they thought the u.s. military had all this stuff and was going to blow them out into space or water or whatever. this is not a new story. there's probably people in the united states who believe the

russians have these magic -- the assassins and chinese -- what? weapons or corrupting the water supply. do you remember that movie? and so, you know, the internet is a magnificent invention. but it allows people to say anytng and everything without any creditability whatsoever. and up wouldn't lose any sleep over that. >> i'm really not one to follow blogs at all. you kno because so many people, i started with some sports blogs, i got so disgusted after the first hour, so minutes, whater it was where the opinions that came up that meant nothing. everybody has an opinion. so they like to express it. it gives them their opportunity. for the most part, no, those are things that are kind of bizarre.

the thing that's interesting is you do see these days someery creative even opposition. i remember one image that's sticks in my mind is that if you can remember what a russian parade uniform looks like, there's a blog photo of president putin sitting on a horse in red square. and he has his whole dress uniform and sitting in his lap just like mini me is dressed up in uniform. somebody out there can make the point that he's nothing but the mini me of prime minister putin. so the blogs kind of go both ways. there's some really interesting political commentary. there's se stuff that really fascinating and worth reading and die guesting. and then there's some that there's some science fiction stuff out there that's pretty

tough. >> stop there. >> all right. let's collect any final questions. and then we'll let you respond to what you wish. and then we will break until 3:15. anyone else back there? all right. go ahead. dan yours first >> cyber warfare question. conducted by states is it? i suppose. we have people that are not -- activities. and so are we making a fiction here between those people of who are not state who would be subject to state interchange perhaps influence or control or

whatever and the state of the conductor of the cyber war. just one umbrella so that we use it in our approach? >> actually, i think that's what you need. you need the crisis action center because you can't tell if an individual or state. it shouldn't be states. but states maybe out there doing reconnissance. it's really unbelievely gray line between state actions and individuals. because surrogates are so easy to use it'soing to stay with us for a long time. i don't think you can divide it into those two categories. there's certainly the huge gy area. >> okay. thank you. we will break until 3:15. please join me i thanking the

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[inaudible conversations] >> honestly, i don't know, but because i don't know enough about that kind of-- i honestly don't know. >> this is not your main focus? >> this is not my main focus. i can't really tell you if i agree or disagree. i would have to know more about tv channels. certainly there are sond thoughts for sure. >> i will be ready >> the other stuff is on line. there is a lot of stuff on line you will find.

you will fall asleep. lots of stuff. [inaudible conversations] >> when the hudson institute discussion on the russian military continues elected naval missions and capabilities for dewaal zoi presentation on a clear weapons and arms control. live coverage will continue at 3:15 eastern here on c-span2. >> tonight on booktv prime-time, justin fox with his book, the myth of the rational market.

the house is c-span funded? >> private donations? >> taxpayers? >> grants and stuff like that.

blic television. >> donations. >> i don't know where the money comes from. >> federally. >> contributions from donors. the america's cable companies created c-span as a public service, a private business initiatives, no government mandate, no government money.

>> the program had $3 billion starting with 1 billion that was deducted after one week in congress came in and gave it another 2 billion. the problem will be some money left over because, because the d.o.t. will end the program this most part, it's about $3 billion.

host: what's the official end date -- it's today, but what time do they close up shop on this program? guest: it's 8:00 p.m. this evening and that's when dealers actually have to submit the applications for reimbursement. there's a lot of car dealers that have already stopped doing clunker sales because they want to make sure they have time to get these applications in the system. host: if these applications go in, and the federal government winds up having to owe more money -- pledge more money for this program and somebody gets less standing with the $4,500 they're not going to get? guest: that's a very good question and that's what the car dealers were sayg last week, they actuallyet with the administration and at one point they said maybe you guyings should stop the program this week because we want to make sure all these deals are reimbursed. the administration said, n we're confident we will be able to honor all the deals even if we keep it going through monday.

so, i guess there is th risk, if sales over the weekend push it over the $3 billion mark, then some of these car dealers may be on the hook. but the administration insists that there is enough money there to honor all these deals. host: so the what were some of the top three are four brands of cars that were boht when trading in these clunkers? >> has of friday,he top brand would be if toyota, carolla. there was,-- the ford focus was number two but for the most part there re foreign cars and foreign-made vehicles but there were a couple of lords and there in the top-10. let's gohat about the auto companies themselves? we have seen a spike inales for this program. how are they going to come from here on out what did they think about the anticipated traffic in the future and their business going forward? >> guest: that is a big

question. are the sales that people are using because the rebates are out there, this is actually tra customers into the dealership are these people who would have bought cars next year but they simply moved up to this month? and other parts of the, and other places where they have been put into place for example in europe, car sales have been fact did so there is expected to be a dip in december for car cells. >> host: what was the european ehperience with their program? >> guest: ey had a very big spike, and right now, some of the automakers are pushing for them to extend this program, saying there is going to be a death, but you can't keep on saying that, so who once the program expires there is always going to be a dip because these rebates aren'going to be out there but there has been one of their program added. >> host: josh mitchell, the

dow jones newswires, thanks for being with us this morning. >> guest: ipe sheeted. >> the cash-for-clunkers program comes to an end tonight at 8:00 eastern. live picture from the hudson institute. live coverage of the day long form on the russian military. the next panel will begin at 3:15 eastern with elected naval missions capabilities and a presentation on nuclear. a few news stories to pass on to you from the "associated press." interrogators threatened to kill the children of the suspect, a document released by the justice department says one interrogator said a colleague told khalid sheikh muhammad that if any other tax gap and the u.s., we are going to kill your children. this from "the washington post" this afternoon.

attorney general eric holder has decided to appoint a prosecutor to examine a dozen cases in which the cia interrogators or contractors may have allegedly threatens terrorism suspes according toources familiar with the story. this also, nasa putting finishing touchesn discovery for an early morning flight to the station. heduled to blast off at 1:36 with a fallout of supplies forecasts at 80%. awaiting the fourth panel of the discussion on the future, the next pan will look at capabilities and a presentation on nucleareapons and arms control. live coverage at 3:15 here on c-span2.

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[inaudible conversations] >> just a minute or two away from the start of the final panel on the daylong conference on the future of the russian military. the next panel talks about naval missions and capabilities. there will be a presentation on nuclear weapons andrms control. this story just from the "associated press" this afternoon. the justice of barbon official sa attorney general eric holder is picc prosecutor john drum to investigate cia mistreatment of terror suspects, an official who spoke on the anonymity said that he is already investigating the destruction ofideotapes of cia interrogations he will exane whether officers or contractors broke lawin roh handling of suspects. that from the "associated press" this afternoon. [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudib conversations] >> whoa everyone please take your seats? naudible coversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [iudib conversations] >> oh. if everyone again please take your seats. please turn off any

communication devices so it doesn't interfere with the television audience. the last panel calm-- i am pleased to present-- to will talk about the challenge in understanding the russian navy. he is an associate professor in the department of national security affairs at the naval postgraduate school. author of many publications in russian national security. his latest is called policy making and the american missile defense which is a fascinating read and i think it is online on international affairs. he served in the past as the salvatori fellow at the heritage foundation. it and he completed his ph.d. in the university, and i had the honor ofeing one of his students when i was that harvard llege so i am pleased to be able to see him in a different

capaci. >> thank you. well, this is the last panl that i was told it had better be good, which given the time of day, i think it means he had better be brief. so, i would try. i have 14 pages of finally packed text in front of me. [laughter] this is just called incredible threat. alright, i think it is also sort of come i think it is symbolic that the russian navy ended up at the end of the day, given the discrepancy between much of the rhetoric coming out of russia and the reality of russia. if you lk at the last century, the russian naval tradition is really torn between a desire to become a great naval-- which means you have a balanced blue water fleets lik other great

naval powers and the reality that russia is actually a great land power. three times in the last century russia started building a real great blue water navy, before the first world war, before the second world war, and then in the mide of the cold war 1960's and 1970's. each time it turned out when push came to shove, that this beautiful blue water navy had little to do, have little to offer for the survival of the russiantate, and in the first world war, it played a marginal role. in the second world war itas helpful along the flanks of the fronts on land, and when the sovi union collapsed, it turned out that the real, that

the only relief necessary mission that the navy was fulfilling was nuclear deterrence. everything else, wars in the caucasus, brushfire wars along the periphery of the soviet union, protecting the current occupants of the kremlin, quite significant mission. the navy could not offer very much. it offered primarily opportunities for yeltsin. he surge the antonette you will see the late nicholai, the short, showing himself on board ve ships but otherwise it didn't offer very much. putin's irasema to change attitude to the navy. which received a lot of political attention under putin and it is also sort of history of trials and tragedies if you will. for every, for every deployment

to venezuela there is a bush disaster. for every promises of aircraft carriers are mixed with come to stick to maintaining protection of russia's economic interest at sea, not a very glorious mission. actually, putin, who likes to formalize documents and to have approved doctrines for everything, several important documents in the navy will, foundations of federal naval policy until the world-- year 2010 and then there was maritime doctrine of the russian federation until the year 2020. then in 2007 a strategy for the devepmt of the shipbuilding industry. created maritime council, which

has produced voluminous documentation on russian naval affairs. not to mention that the russian, that the russian navy officers have filled pages and pages of professional journal, naval digest, with impassioned arguments about the future of the navy. in the good old soviet days that would have provided us a firm basis for prediction. the soviets had a well-established, hover wrongheaded, but they will establish world view, policy goals and their policy debates were mostly secret andhen they would reveal the results to the world. moreover, they had a system for mobilizing the economy, again more of less, to produce eventually, to produce items of steel to implement tir policy.

now, russian is still seeking its position in the world. it is fluctuating between allowing hostility to the west and demands to beccepted as a partner of the west. it is also, the policymaking process is muc it is still not very logical and rather opaque but it is still much more open to the outside observer, and you have, you know policy is produced by clashing bureaucratic interests so there is a lot of verbal flak coming out of that process, and now is becoming more complicated because yo have a president with his bureaucracy and the prime minister with his bureracy and it is never clear exactly who decides what.

and, russia lost its mobilization mechanism. it doe't have resources to mobilized the economy to compete with much wealthier states, something theoviet union had. and, also i would say in here-- difficulty in forecasting, russian development is that we caot look at what they are doing today because what they are doing today, still done with the ships produced in the soviet era when few exceptions so we can't say well, this and come in 20 years they will be sending another cruiser to venezuela. is there going to be another cruiser? it is a very big question. and, russians unsettled few of its placen the world has had a direct impact on naval ports. putin s promoted the vion of russia as a great power. to raise the humiliations of the

1990's, and this vision it is kind of really rooted in soviet past. being a great power means an equal to the united states and it is not a very rational vision given the economic and demographic realities but there it is. and also russian politicians already discovered in the 1990's that the russian public which is very reluctant to send their chdren to serve in the military, neveheless associate patriotism with guns. once-- what is better force been? that is another thing to understand, thathe russian, it is rather difficult to import good democratic practices but it is very easy to import the worst things about western democracy. spinmeister airs, spin doctors and russian politics is very

virtual. they areood and they figured out that showing, showing a nice navy ship, and there were just painted and it looks nice, is much better for our spending then showing an infantry division. ships are glorious. infantry may be much more useful but it is not that glorious. so, plus wnow, the russian naval tradition is linked to peter the great. that is one person in russian political history who has more pluses and his reputation than nuses, so that is again good for politicians. also, the navy could provided visible proof of russia's resurgence. we will send a ship, we will send a couple of submarines off the atlantic coast, so you will see that russia is resurgent. nevermind the submarines are no threat to anybody and nobody, but you know, it is a gestu.

it is a diplomatic gesture, and the problem with this policy of ing a great naval power is that, because russians associate greatness with being a u.s. equal, requires aircraft carriers and an aircraft carrier is a symbol of being sort of the u.s. equal, of being with a big major industrial power, and the subject started sort of returned to russian naval, already in the 2000's and the foundations of russian naval policy but in a very minor way. generally speaking, it was kind of dormant. only rased by some naval officers and retirees for several years. then, in 25, the issue took off. there was a conference at the naval academy in st. petersburg, where the speakers who

represented not only the navy but interestingly the industry, talked about the iortance of aircraft carriers. .. were going down the tubes their rhetoric about aircrt carriers

escalated. in may, 2007a meeting of top navy brass and leaders of the shipbuilding industry needless to say considered the issue of aircraft carriers and obviously agreed they just couldn't d without aircraft carriers because they are buiing a ship of this class would incree the status of russia as a maritime power. what exactly -- you notice there is no mission there. it is a status, it is about status although the only justification for the mission they could come up with with carriers we are going to stop americans from attacking russian heartland with cruise missiles. i know, you know, i wou not comment on that particula explanation because it makes so little sense, simply because it's not just carriers. you need to have huge battle groups. if you're really serious about that you need to have -- you

ow, the only carriers the discussed would be small carriers, carrying 30 roguery and fixed-wing aircraft. you don't take on with that sort of crier and the still don't have an electronic warfare aircraft to deploy so it makes no sense. and then, you know, they would talk, you know, by 2008, current navy sank announced in four years from now russia would start building five or six aircraft carriers. i like this or six, that is really precise planningor you. and actually in october, 2008, president mvedev visiting aircraft carrier with of the admiral promised aircraft carriers. someone must have given him the

wrong talking points. that'sy -- is, we are going to build aircraft carriers. nobody told him with the military already knew, that building one aircraft carrier costs as much as equipping a whole morized rifle division, some think russia needs for real missions rather than, you know, chasing american carrier groups in the atlantic. so finally, fally, the end came as all good things come to an end, we all wake up from dreams. in june of thi year, @eputy minister of defense ready to retire general said we are not going to build any aircraft carriers any time soon, so enough's of this stuff. why, you know, why we have this talk of aircraft carrrs and this resurgence of blue water navy fantasies i think the apparent reason, one apparent reason was the rise and fall of the russian economy.

i think that at some point the economy was growing so rapidly at some point it produced the mood what stalin would have called business from success among from russian elites that anything could work. guys who run were important in russian government weren't quite a lot about finance, bu they don't know much about running industry. so their ideas, you know, i think if you just -- just invest and put enough money there will be a result. it's not so easy because that neglects the fact that russian capital plant is terribly borne out and up to 70% is outdated and needs to be replaced and the work force is aging and depleted. you know, you can't just invest in turn that around especially the human factor.

it's probably -- you know, i think that neither the navy nor the industrial management would tell, you know, their bosses in the kremlin the true situation because money was promised and they said yeah, when there is money you say yes, sir and take. it appears in reality the russian high command never had plans for carriers, blue water navy and so on because you look at what they said and they said one or two, a couple, five to six, you know, they got -- they got one sor of,ou know -- the gough funding to design, to discuss the idea of a carri. that's all they got but i don think there was ever any plans what kind of carriers the need for what the general evin jolie said what kind of carriers to we need? where? why? where are we going to sl with them? like the same thing stalin said

in 1958 or so, where are you going to go with those carriers? to the shores of the united states and, you know, you look at what ships they are going to build and it'she same old stuff. first of all, strategic msile carrying submarines then multi-purpose attack submarines, multipurpose surface ships, strike and reconnaissance systems, command and control navigation systems. it's a very -- this is the navy oriented on protecting the kind of liberal and operating the sea based leg of the nuclear triangle which is rather conservative vision. again, it's- you know, and june of 2009, the chief of general staff said one of the few things he had to say about the navy in his long ranging interview and stateme on the condition of the russian forces they are not going to be getting

too many new ships because they are just some expensive. this is returning to sort of the classical model of russian military development where the ground forces takeover. and of the russian leadership needed any proof how difficult it would be to build capital ships, you know, one of the speaker's earlier mentioned the disaster the overhaul of the carrier became. they started in 2004, promised to deliver for $600 million by 2008, delivered nothing. th cost escalated to over 2 billion. medvedev had to go there. he went to look at all t shipyards and look o long of of things at phese admiral and basically all the guys, this is an embarrassment, we've got to fix that problem.

still, i would say all this talk about carriers was useful because it was domestically because it was a carryover from putin's campaign for presidency for st of for succession in 2008, a little bit of huffing and puffing never hurt. and also there could have been for all i know economic interest involved. part of - some of t enterprises of shipbuilding industries are privately held. the guy who runs the holding company the state company united shipbuilding corporations one of the mtowerful people politics. somebody could have been making money from this talk of carriers because they already pronounced the northern machine building plt would be, which is owned by shareholders, who knows where

the shareholders are that would be that half. i'm not a specialist on this kind of stuff but i would not exclude somebody was making money from all of this talk. the real priorities of the russian navy, which in view of the current military reform the russians call the new look because i don'tnow how many military reforms since monday when they became so discredited as a concept of they don't want to see military reform the call it the new look and the eence is transformation from the whole military which would need to mobilize millions of people to fight into a much smaller military readyo fight on short notice and rarely it is not configured to fight a huge war against nato.

structure is to change as discussed -- it's a realistic approach. it's realized it recognizes large-scale conflictith nato for that matter is not very likely especially in view of nuclear arsenal, and russian experts have little to say i love specifics of what will happen to the navy. general macarthur had nothing to say, practically nothing to say except we will get rid of the bill in the navy and get rid of excess units and if there is one ship in a division of destroyers this is not quite be division any more. we are going to consolidate. but e missions, again, quite realistic strategic deterrence,

prevention o conflict, elimination of terrorism, guaranteed access to opening, the corporation with water birds, security for economic activity, search international search and rescue and the priority in procurement is very concerned for no aircraft carriers. no big ships like peter the great, multipurpose ships which you can use to defend your sort of a maritime borders and 500 kilometers from the shore. even that is not quite easy t plement. other guys already talked about the problems with the new strategic -- balicstli missile. it is very serious problem because if that -- if russian -- th the new arms control agreement probably one-third of russian warheads ll end up to have to be based on submarines.

this is a secure retaliatory force. it's critical for strategic stability now they can't come up with a new sl began. that is bad by itself but they built a whole submarine, building a whole class of submarines which only this small solid insel p.m.. they do have one that works, and sam 23 but it's bigger. they would have to totally redesign fought new class of submarines. it's a disaster an the disaster not just for strategic deterrent but the whole navy because it puts pressure on he budget. we hear different figures how much of the navy gets, 30%, 40% but when i asked how muc of that goes to the submarines we do not add anything to the navy missions. a lot goes there. then there is a problem of

geography. building russian navy's is a zero sum game. to strengthen the northern fleet, that adds nothing to the black sea fleet or t pacific fleet because you cannot reinrce those fleets quickly in an emergency. and right now, obviously the northern fle, the arctic seems to be the fashionable thi after russians through the stunt with placing a flag of their on the bottom of the arctic ocean and the talk a lot about t energy resources and they do have border problems with norway, but it's still the, you know, at the same time are they going to invest that much into the conventional capability in the northern fleet when they have a festering problem i the black sea? reover in the north they have to contend with u.s. navy, the

nato navy, next-door neighbors, norwegians are no pushovers by any means. while in the black sea u.s. is constrained. with a recognition of t paulson ennis atiyeh i have trouble that would fester for decades probably, and they could -- you know, they actually have been talking specifically when they discussed the defense budget which areas would be safe from cuts and one of this is reinforcing the black sea. another problem with the black sea is ukraine is threatening to eject the rusan navy and in 2017 from -- that is going to cost a lot of money if they have to build a new base and i don't think they started working on that, so there are problems of conflict and cost. steve already is looking at the watch. i have many more brilliant things to say.

>> as always. >> yeah, a always he suggests. i will skip that and we better do q&a. i will just say one thing about the net assessment of the situation because of the day we are talking how russian military is a terrible condition. nevertheless, look at the war with georgia. as far as what they wanted it got done. it wasn't done eloquently but it got done. georgia got btenadly. other countries in the region got the message, the message that russians still have some military punch left and the decisis to use it and that the united states was not likely to go and start a war with a nuclear superpower because nuclear-why is russia will continue to be a super power, so

this lesson despite the liabilities of the military that worked. is it a threat to the u.c.? that depends what we consider a threat and how far our strategic interests ago. if georgia weakness in face is a threat to the united states it is our decision whether we consider it a threat or not. i don't live in washington. trust me where i live in california, 99.99% of the popution think that george is where atlanta is and i wouldn't care very much of that part of the country got beat up by russians. [laughter] so that's one thing. and the second thing about military reform, i think russian politicians -- it's not just horrible, tariff and the eckert terrible pformance. russians have been spring loaded to do something about the military because they're tired of the bureaucracy and as politicians go they look for a pretext. into months after the georgian war they already have a plan.

that means there was something there, se paper work was sitting somewhere. the plans don't appear just like that especially giving you have medvedev, putin, thingsave to be agreed upon. it doesn't happen like that. i think if they didn't want to carry out reform they probably would have easily shrugged it off but they decided they found all kind of things wrong with the military. in the military officer here could confirm in any war you can find all kind of problems. i still remember the campaign to liberate grenada when american officers had to make phone calls from pay phones. so you could always find problems. t so a lot depends how what is a threat, it's not a threat, it depends how we define the threat and what do we do ourselves? we tell the russians won't be able to produce anything. that's true. but let me note that i think is the area where we are now washington, d.c. is the one in

the country not suffering from recession and notice what is produced here, hot air. [laughter] thank you very much and i am sorry, steve, if i cut into your time but i rarely get such a sophisticated audience provincial from california. [laughter] >> thank you. i'mfraid i might add to the hot air. [laughter] rst, danl goure couldn't be here today and i am going to speak in his place. when i say represents my views, not his -- >> i should have said that about myself. >> mikhail comey represents his views -- >> when i have any. >> that is an old soviet joke. [laughter] i know you oppose your own views. >> and i'm ready to change them. [laughter] >> sufficiently enlightened. now nuclear weapons constitute the premier weapon system for the russian military. the fundamental mission which is deterrence of attack upon the country and it's not jus

nuclear attack it is conventional as well and that is fr both east and west although i will never say publicly about china. they fully understand what the nature of the chinese military capabilities are and where the new framework for the treaty that is being negotiated stipulates the following terms: the two sides agree to the ceiling of 1,675 the 1700 nuclear warheads and of 500 to 100 launchers that will go into effect by 2016. in other words of the treaty is signed before september 5th, whicis when the treaty expires, and upon ratification, by the end of 2016 the t states would be down to these numbers. now, all so we and the russians apparently agreed in the framework document no strategic offensive arms will be deployed outside the territories or

territorial waters which includes ships at sea of the submarines at seao the power. that is a concession to russia which is demanding that kind of statement. but i don't know that we had any intention of deploying strategic offensive arms territory other than the united states to begin with, but we made that concession. now, if you loo at those figures, they are very interesting because they show a modest scope of what was agreed to. the treaty that president bush negotiated with the putin several years ago said that by 2012 the two ses would have a ceiling between 172200 nle warheads and we are on target as according to what's been published to reach that figure also we are not there yet. by 2016 i not earlier, russia will not be able to field more

than what stephen blank, 75 or heads, and more importantly 500 to 600 launchers. they just cannot replace these systems and with nuclear weapons you can't keep them on service past their decline. you can try to do things as they have but even so at the end of the day, when you have reached the end of the day with these systems they must be dismantled and carefully destroyed. the general staff in moscow, a line in the sand that said russia cldn't complete its deterrence mission or guaranteed emissions at anything less than 1500 warheads there for the agreement reads as it does, in the frame work the two presidents signed. now at present, if verification framework is being negotiated and there has been nothing in the press i know of, maybe others do, say what the framework would look like and

with the verification regime will be in the treaty that goes into effect. it will probably be considerably less than the verification protocols from the start of 1991 which are extensive and both sides cla to find as cumbersome but there will be adequate to both sides' concerns about cheating and so on so that remains to be seen. both ses have also said the treaty shod have a posite impact on the non-proliferation in general and on the riew conference for the non-proliferation treaty that is supposed to come about next year. there are other agreements on proliferation stating that there would be joint process of monitoring global missile programs and discussions on setting up joint data exchange center. it isn't clear t me if this mdets the russian demand for joint assessment of missile

threats. maybe it can be construed in such a light but it's not clear to me that it does and what will have toait and see what the agreements signed indicate. in the context of proliferation russia regards north korea as a greater threat tha year on -- iran. they do not see - publicly iran is having a threat, pvately they have accepted that it does constitute a threat but publicly they refuse to accept it does because they do not want to lose iran as aartner against the united states in the gulf but leased or connection to iran energy revenues or hav iran be anti-abortion to the point iran could quite easily make a lot of trouble in the caucasus and centralsia. if you have red john parker's excellent book on the relations, russians for moly believe iran

isn't pro-russian it's pro-american and if they don't stop selling wpons we will. you might think this is a cynical view but it's nonetheless widely held in moscow therefore there are a lot of important reasons moscow wants iran in its corner. they think they have leverage on iran. they do not think they have enough on north korea. that is the point medvedev is making that korea is out o the box and already has nuclear weapons and of course,he idea they might sell foot technologies tother states like myanmar. the political situation there is not clear. in 2003 the were contemplating a scenario or i would argue and printed in the chinese and exercise theve done including the last ones also have in the back of their mind joined senator dole about korea in order to keep us out of north korea if the situation

deteriorates. however, none of this means there wi definitely be a treaty. i don't want to leave the impression i think the treaty isn't going to be signed and hopefully ratified. that's possible. nonetheless the issue of missile defensis the ghost at the dining party. medvedev said some flexible things about missile defense and his statements with president obama in moscow however leader at the g8 he reiterated the threat made november 5th if missile defenses are in poland and czech republic he will put missiles that have a range of about 280 miles. this comes in both nuclear and conventional format. it can be used either as a ballistic missile or conventional missile which means

it cannot be defended against. however it is a counter value weapon rather than counterforce weapon. it cannot reach the installations in the czech republic which would b the radar for this system or the white people to reach the projected missile base but it is clearly to intimidate the polls for that matter it could reach part of germany and baltic states and its range. furthermore the rusan general as well as medvedev have insisted somewhat more flexible on thisut they have insisted the treaty must reflect linkages between offensive deployments and missile defense. the language of the communique can be construed in such a way we don't construe it that way. the russis obviously do. but this could lead to the point where if the russians feel the missile defenses are not comin out that the treaty will not be signed or ratified.

we have taken the view, as the president hasaid, that if the iranians threat is eliminated the need for those missiles goes away. thats not a formal quid pro quo. i don't want you to think here is the trade, however the argument is if the missiles were placed in iran -- are being placed in poland and the radar in the czech republic to deal with a missile threat of nuclear missiles coming o of iran. if tt threat is eliminated and the need for the missile defense as such goes away. now it remains to be seen what's going to happen. now the russians have sd there is no elon threat, therefore these missile defenses are only aimed at russia. privately they acknowledge now there is an iran and for that. actually they've always known but refused to say for the reasons i talked about. but because they said publicly there is no iran and threat there for these missiles can only have one purpose and that

to be the beginning of the global missile defense network that is going to threaten the russian nuclear capability to respond to any conventional or nuclr attacon russia by the west and that's in the fe of all the evidencehe dozen technical briefings they got from the pentagon and so on. nothing has been alleviated their concerns on that because it's in their interest not to have those concerns alleviated quite frankly. it's a good justification for budgets, planning the country is under threat and dumping on the united states. they are talking about developing hypersonic missiles that can elude any missile defense known to man. those missiles are going to be tested i believe soon if they haven't alread been tested and maybe it's true what they are sang, but the idea of their skin to be the response and asymmetric one using missiles of hypersonic quality presumably nuclear missiles that can eat

eight missile defense against the united states because of eir concerns that we could do another kosovo type of attack on russia and take out their cqi or nuclear capabilit if they fail to get the calls and the treaty at least in the framework agreement sayin that if conventional weapons are loaded on strategic platfms they must be considered as strategic. it remains to be seen how that issue is going to be dealt with. the u.s. under the bush administration and currently has plans to do this for example converting platforms to conventional missiles and using them either to nuclear platforms. this frightens the russians a great deal because it creates a conventional threat that they are unable to deal with. .. to deter attacks on

russia except for really small-scale options like terrorism, something on the scale ofeorgia, hezbollah, leban lebanon. they believe with out nuclear-weapons, nato might tie get them in action in georgia. and make it possible for russia

maneuver militarily in the cis in case of contingencies. that is not really an issue of russia's visible congressional -- inferiority in nato and the u.s. iis also testimony to the fact that despite 18 years of upheaval and god knows how many reform plans, the defense ministry doesn't work. it cannot produce high tech, quality weapons i quality or number. we talked about this earlier today. i don't have to be labor the point further. that leave you, we should point out, a situation where you have to rely on nuclear weapons because of sething else. they can produce six to eight icbms a year. the question is, can they produce not only a submarine but

a weapon system to match the ones that are being constructed are configured in such a way that their bill with boulaba a missile, if it turns out to be a dud, there's an immense race to retrofit the submarines if you can do them, to accommodate the one that does work. this is going to be one third of the planned nuclear deterrent, reliable second strike capabili. if that doesn't work, where are you? where are you as an or as a nuclear powe the problems here are enormous. the new defense doctrine doesn't have an answer for technical failu failure, whatever it is going to be.

when you write to this defense doctrine and the weapons you are testing and work, your doctrine isffectively on the mind without any any action. it has taken nine years for them to come here the defse doctrine has to be at the theater in moscow, seven years ago, it is still n there. we talked about this this morning. currently, according to the 2000 doctrine, the operative doctor until durther notice, as many commentators haveointed out, russia and others have argued as well, sees nuclear-weapons, they will be used to deter attacks on the final interests of russia. that probably includes cis bases as well. in russian terminology interests, they said they would lower the first strike if the

first strike is breached, if they use a nuclear weapon in first strike mode. unresponsive strike probably, although not necessarily, will be a tactical nuclear weapon. the purpose of this is to regai intrawar if collation control radical to control the escalation ladder and this would, in russian believe, mpel nato or the enemy, perhaps china, to sit down and renegotiate and gback to the statusuo. i need not tell you at this is in any way the american doctrine in the 50s, and widely regarded as extremely dangerous to the fact that nuclear war, should it happen, is unpredictable and uncontrollable and entirely lily that a president of the

united states seeing the russians use -- attack european battle group or european ally, is not going to say we have to negotiate but i'm not going to let them get away with that, and there be go. then who knows what happens? that is the point, how many nuclear wars havyou fought? such wars are inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable. furthermore, in the pacific, the russians don't talk about the threat from china, nuclear-weapons are the only way on land d sea to determine a chinese attack on russia. the russians think the chinese military is not coming after them, publicly and privately, nonetheless, it is very clear the pacific district is a district that has to be sustaining, coentional weapons will not get the indication because the chinese air force

could take out the transcripto the siberian railway in half an hour if they wanted to. therefore, this area has to be self sustaining and nuclear-weapons are the deterrent, land-based, sea bass and air base. furthermore, the vice admiral has said the russians place tactical nuclear weapons and cruise missile forms on the submarines in order to give russia and in vulnerable taliatory capability, then it would be used in a first strike -- this could be referring to low yield weapons although they accuse us of working on low yield weapons, they are too. the russian press is quite visible. finally, if you look out in the future given the current economic suation and the nature of russian defense and problems there, procurement in the foreseeable future, that means at least into part of the fohcoming 2011-2020 procurement plan which is replacing the 26 to 2015 plan which was admitted toe a

failure as were all the others before that, would be likely primarily given to the priority of reducing icbms and from there point of view, llbm and ss ssbm--procurement that once procured, deployed for the primary mission of deterrent, they will be cprehensive of a vast range of contingencies by the threat of nuclear use. thank you. >> thank you. i don't know if you want to comment on what steve said, otherwise we can go straight through questions and answers. we will have questions from the television audience. if you want to ask a question, please send me the question at a dozen.org. my last name is dubya e

tb@hudson.org. let's start in the back and move forward over here. someone had their hand up. >> hello, good afternoon, i am a graduate student at washington university. my question relates toowar are the russians likely to take nuclear reduction? you had the state of the balance, stated that the defense community at 1500 warheads necessary to carry out what they considered their effective deterrence policy. what is the purpose of negotiating down even further, seeing that they don't have conventional capability to match ours and they effectively has what i understand is a massive retaliation like we did in the 50s. realistically, do you foresee this as anyone in the panel,

negotiating dn further than that? >> the answer to that is complicated. th do not have a massive retaliation policy. what they're talki about is a term called preset damage. what they believe would be sufficient damage done by a nuclear weapon to foe the other side to stop. we are not talking about massive retaliation. that inot a concept -- it might come in the future. anything is possible. but that is not where they are today. they will begin moving as we have towards a decision targeting which allows you to minimize the damage. remember the old neutron bom was a weapon that killed people t could not damage infrastructure and buildings. that was sort of the idea precision nuclear targets, you take out the enemy but you don't take out the whole neighborhood where the bomb is dropped.

i was going to say that. the idea of precision targeting is to minimize damage and just reach that criteria, the damage they have assigned to targets when they do their targeting. ife are going to accept the terms laid out in the framework agreement and that is going to be a basis for retreating, none of this certain, that is what was signed by the new president, negotiators are working on this, the obstacle coming up verification regime and question of missile defense can that and the treaty is ratified by the senate and the russian authorits, then the way is open at least as far as president obama is concerned, to negotiate further reductions beginning sometimes in the

future. if you would like to negotiate further reductions within the framework which presumably would be in the treaty, you are now going to have to change the format of the negotiations because you're going to have to include britain, france, china, he might have to include -- assuming israel, as many believe, has nuclear-weapons, perhaps they would have to be invited too. you have to multilateralized these negotiations. that makes it a much more cumbersome process under the best of circumstances. so i don't want to get inront of this moving train and say this is gointo happen. there are people who wan it to happen. the people campaigning for zero nuclear-weapons want that panel process to happen, they have made their arguments in the public domain and the debate

continues. as far as the russian general staff is concerned, particularly if the conventional inferiority as low as their ingrained sense of threat continues to drive their policies, they are going to draw a big linin the sand where they are presently, unless major fundamental changes take place. i hope that answers your question. >> hello, matthew kranick is professor at georgetown university. in my discussion with nato defense planners they express the concern with nuclear coercion, not qte exactly what they mean that basically the idea is the united states and nato emphasize nuclear-weapons and russia increasing prominence of nuclear weons, this was the russian advantage that they could use a, explicit nuclear

threats to get their wayn the crisis. the question is, what do russians say, if anything, about the nuclear coercion as a role in weapons and regaress of what they say, what you see as future prospects for russian nuclear coercion against nato? >> they css trying to do it to them. there's an ironic parallel to thesee us as trying to do it to them. there's an ironic parallel to the discussions we have had. it is precisely because it is regarded by them as essential to have the option of intimidating europe with nuclear capability. they believe also that the europeans can be more easily swed by this than the united states, with the europeans don't have the guts that we have. they also believe that if it were not for nuclear weapons,

they would be coerced. you are driven by the presuppositions of conflict, conflict is an essential condition, surrounded by enemies, therefore, a situation of conventional in for eric -- in theory or in, you need nukes that can be uscan be used like nuclear weapons. sometime in the future we want to get to negotiating on non strategic nuclear weapons, very difficult subject to negotiate around. nuclear coeron is alive and well. if you go down -- let's say in

the previous question, we go to 1500, 1675, 17,000 and then we say we want to go to another level, as you tak out weapons from each de, the remaining weapons individually, eacone becomes individually more important. because of the missions i has to achieve, conventionally inferior power which thinks of itself as being at risk. so the possibilities for nuclear coercion exist on all sides. why do we get so excited about nuclear proliferation? they tried t coerce its neighbors to extend the currents to terrorists or attack israel.

>> do you tell the difference from what it is? >> the idea of the remodeled. the iranians and russis have an immense capability to make trouble. when those guys launch attacks on israel or somebody else, if you come after them, we have nuclear-weapons, the russians are now written quite publicly, privately admitted the iranians represent a missile threat.

the nuclear missile threat, we see this as being in the caucus in central asia. >> josh brogan has an e-mail question, we have the opportunity, we talk about joining with russia to cooperate in this, using existing radar in russia. is this realistic? why or why not? >> i know steve -- >> there are a number of problemsith cooperation, it is a technical question which is very if a call to answer for us on technical types. once it is on the radar, the radar in russia is not guiding

-- as gerald ford said, the americans need a shotgun and we are offing them binoculars. that is probably true. there are a variety of problems with cooperation, there is a basic lack of trust, fears and the other party would be able to veto what you are doing, we use their cooperation as a cover, they don't know we are nice and reasonable. they are going to have a concern on the american side of leakage of information to third parties. for political reasons or sale or

something like that. is difficult. several of my russian colleagues came up with a better technical background and i am, they are specialists, they came up with various schemes, rich the detailed assessment that needs to be gained, and politically, is going to be fried difficult because of the bad atmospheres. >> all those points are right on. besides that, the russians have been clamoring for what they call joint assessment of threats. what does that mean? i don't know. no one has spelled out, maybe in negotiations, what that means. the russians continue to insist in public that iran is not a threat with its missile and space satellite capability and

nuclear programs, widely believed to be a mechanizing capability, for joint assessment of fred. what basis is there for a joint assessment of threat from north korea? if you look at the russian position on north korea, even though they think north korea is more dangerous than wrath, their singularly unhappy with the american position in negotiations in the process and they have not been shy in expressing when everything goes wron for us, everything that has gone wrong is our fault. in principle, this might ce about, it will be a very arduous negotiation and it will take a long time and reir an immense change of opinion not just among generals but among senator levin's collgues too. >> right here, why don't we go ahead and answer your question

and -- >> with the university of maryland, formerly with the ceer for non-proliferation, just a comment and a few questions. the proliferation threat you admitted the russians, not just the national security strategy, but also the hhlight threat from pakistan, and security issues which is where u.s. a russian policy converge. that needs to be nod. a question for both of you, we see earlier indications o nuclear posture in new countries, the u.s. is gog to retain the triad structure. what does that mean? had the see discussions like that in russia? for how long? what is the status of that? question no. two, talking about the price of the defense industry, it is being highlighted from last year and october. vladimir putin supported the policy of creating a holdings,

we did need that to be the situation forever. has been effective for not affected and there the cash flow problem. how do you see that the faltering? >> first of all, there's going to be a triad, the leg of this triad is going to be relatively small. at least the intention is to build next-generation of t 160s that have nuclear capability and able to fly those missions. they are building six teight land-based icbms annually. the problem is naval. if the bulava is abandoned, you're getting contradictory

statements, everyone has an interest in this, those who want to get rid of bulava say it is going to be scrapped and those who like bulava are say we ar going to find a way to make this work. if it fails and the end o the day the political decision is made, it just won't work, we ha to go back to square 1, we destroyed the basis for a strategic naval force and your whole construction program because it was built to accommodate that particular missile. what do you do? i don't know. the triad is there, circumstances are not hard to envisiono undermine that situation. let me do the second one. the defense industry, i don't know if dmitry medvedev is launching the section which cludes the head of the defense

industries i read something two years ago, cooperations don't work better than anything else they have tried for the last 16 years. this system can't work. certainly, recreating the soviet ministry and defense ministry, enormous bureaucracy, one third of the industries are still bankrupt and so on. >> regarding the triad, steve discuss the situation very clearly. once the dust settles from the last unsuccessful test, they will decide to fix that because they don't have a choice and eventually russia being russia, they will fix it. part of the problem is their own exoitation o pr. every time there is a test, they are leaking announcements to the media how there's going to be

another great victory and so oj. as chief designer of t desn bureau, the -year-old academician, we launcone of those missiles, many of them can fly, nobody talked about it, which is probably right. they also apparently, in order to save money and time and oversell their project, they initially skipped ground testing, promised miracles, which happens in this industry. that is one thing. regarding the condition of the defense industry, the basic problem, the defense industry is lost in transition. it is a big chunk of soviet industrial network, stuck in the notion of market economy.

if nsa misheard in the cayman islands. you ed to have all kindsf things that money isn't enough hmmm. it is a major effort. also, i am so grateful and so patient. you deserve some magic. i willo a revelation and talk about how the is going to be classified section. i can tell you what going to be in that section, the same stuff. just look at the old things, some stuff from numbers of systems which we know any way you, what they're going to have, and arms control agreement because it could be nothing serious, it is not the operational plan. 70 things can be said about

nuclear deterrents at work. st basically 1-way. that is what is going to be there. how americans do that? they classifier part of their most unfortunate -- we are going to classify stuff too. it gets more and more attention. it is ally interesting. the russians may have some trump cards up their sleeve. anyway, that is my magic for the day. >> do you want to go ahead? an expert in the russian nuclear issue, get your comments on it. >> just one quick comment, it is interesting that the largest surface combatant, they are going to build, is to be called. --gorshk

--gorshkov. >> the more they talk about is sacred memory, the more they basically try to -- the reasonable thing. >> for steve, first of all eaton -- en iskander is not indicated to the nuclear. there's no indication of a nuclear warhead at all. if they say anything, we have accuracy, we don't nee any more. besides, we can hardly afford them. they have three batteries, the military district, the other is in a flat vostok.

let's not exaggerate that. i was there when herman cahn paid a visit and the biggest shock of the day, when the russian military discovered tt nukes were no longer jt another form of artillery, i read the other day also that since 1963, if anybody else wrote, the russians accepted every concept of deterrence as we have known it, that has been reaffirmed in my discussions with those guys. so i think your basic analogy for all these scenarios are wild and i am not sure they really get the russians to say those things. it is knows the our conjecture of what they might do, because

they know what is more useful, they're simply not useful. and all this talk, we went through year after year, showing that we had a small yield, no collateral damage, nobody would know we have broken the rules, the nuclear threshold, we had that for years, just as we bottom off the notion that if we use a few weapons and restore deterrence, they have a massive retaliation, they think we would afct, that is what massive retaliation is for. a massive attack. we need to reinvestigate our concept of deterrence. it is really worn down. nobody understands it any more. >> not allowed to comment about.

my sources are what the russians themselves say. i have seen what they have talked about, the lowering of the threshold of nuclear usage in 1999, where they have said in a 2000 document, they implied that nucle-weapons wouldn't write be be used against the crux of pieces of survival and the russian federation, and their deplment in the pacific and so on. i do think that they fully believe in nuclear deterrence. i agree with you about that. but their concept of what deterrence his, the same as will gain in his 70s article which was a mutual relationship, strategic stability, the u.s. and russia locked together likely to scorpions, no one side should be allowed to gain a

strategic advantage over the other. they believe in any conngen plans, many scenarios they envision, they think they will have to go first and be able -- we will have to have a nuclear war to force decides to go back to the table. i think they still believe nuclear weapons can be used, quite frankly if you look lot of the statements in the last several years. >> let me just point out,he reason herman cahn said what he said is it is not up to the military. >> it is a decision taken by the

supreme command of the government in session. it is not the man or woman making the decision. the options are there. >> i got a question over the internet about the chances of the russian navy past 2017. he thinks they are good and what we are seeing is hardball on both sides, people -- each side -- you haven't seen any destruction -- >> i have seen overseas in the last 58 years -- i wouldn't know. iuspect knowing how the construction industry works, there will be something --

obviously it is an enormously expensive tconstruct a base. if you put yourself in the place of russian politicians and military officers, they have to invest in something else, officers go without housing. i think there was a short window in 2007/2008 when they thought the money would be rolling in, oil is u $150 a barrel. >> they could only break-even at $70. >> not quite -- 74. >> 74? >> 168. >> that is a big problem. it goes up and down. >> what i read, they say they're building -- i don't know what that means. the answer to the questio

depends on who is president of ukraine. in january, we're probably going to have a new president of ukraine. we will see what happens. i am of thepinion the russians will have to leave. not everybody thinks that way. the russian fleet and a lot of people in the russian government are not happy about the prospect, two different motives but i cannot see the ukraine tolerating are russian base with all the superior the problems this poses for them beyond the  limits of the treaty. >> it all depends on who would be president, but whoever is president, in moscow th don't understand what is going on. they think they're our guys, not our guys, that is not how it

works. i would say the only possibility of keeping that base, shooting more, whi is not a possibility, paying a lot of money, keeping iet, because they escalate, to a political, existentialist conflict, instead of putting -- minimizing the issue to the issue of money, as long as they make a political deal out of it, no ukrainian government is going to worry if it could be driven down to just the issue we pay you that much and is that ok with you, it is a different story but i don't seehat happening just yet. it is quite the opposite unfortunately. >> that also assumes there will

be any ships left. >> yes. that is another question. >> what i am going to do is take all the questions, there are a nch of questions. we will gohrgh them all, first year and then take notes and answer when you feel appropriate. there's one here and another there. >> a question about the russian quarters, how much is going to cost. and the start of the navy and other forces? >> are there questions? keep your hands up so we can give you the mike. >> i would like to ask a question about security of russian warheads, especially

tactical. >> my question deals with e arctic, the economic fail for buding up a arctic fleet significantly greater than investing money -- >> one of the big busts in the twenty-dirst century, it is great utility because it prevents coercion from outside. it was possible that the border states around russia, we want nuclear-weapons to prevent coercion militarily. >> the qstions we received over the internet, what are the security implications of the respective energy policies of russia, china and japan, can they provide energy and reduce the needor blue water na of

china and japan? what about the arctic sea hijacking? i don't know about that one. russian leaders whose reputation is more positive than negative, improved the russian navy and was well thought of. it was there john paul jones influence? you might want to menti they actually do. i think that is it that i see. any other questions? there was one that came in earlier this session. what about the two subset of the u.s. coast recently, what was the purpose? how did that play out? the last question, what can mr.

blank say aut russia's nuclear stockpe? what do you feel most comfortable with, make your final comment at the same time. >> on the security of warheads, a lot has been written and said but the fact of the matter is there have been no substantive evence of any sale of nuclear warheads, people w are claiming or attempting to sell nuclear or radioactive material from time to time but they will be stopped. i don't want to sound cynical about this, but i suspect that the russians are, by and large, doing a pretty good job guarding those materials. they understand perfectly well like everybody else how important that is and how essential it is regarded. i think a lot of -- a fair amount of height from the u.s.

from organizations who want a budget about this and therefor are constantly beating the drum, thinking it is important but i don't know if it is more important than it is. i have not seen any reliable evidence that the nuclear stockpile in russia or nuclear weapons are at risk of being smuggled out of the country. this is an awfully corrupt place. ther is that. the two subs off the u.s. coast, they ritteror two purposes, one, to let them know they're still in business, and for the navy to say to everybody in moscow, we can perfor important missions, you have got to give us the money. we are important, weill show the u.s. they can't do what they please. let me talk about the china/pan energy security. i am skeptical, i don't know if the russians will produce enough

energy in the future to satisfy the russian domestic marke that is still a ptected market and we demand is rising this year. unless the russians change their waysf doing business, that is invest more in the development of their own infrastructure, they're going to have to go to china and jap to get loans and investment and so forth, which the kind american companiesre british petroleum, willing to be suckered a trd time, give it to them. the japanese and not willing to give us for the -- the money for two reasons, the islands, the japanese have limited confidence in rsian business practis. i am skeptical. liquefied natural gas is going to japan. that might actually work. that isot enough in japan. if you notice with japan, south korea and china are doing, investing all over the world because they don't want to be

tied excessively to russia, the experience of negotiating has not been decided. john paul jones was not a great naval fear arrest. his influence lies in memorials. >> let me just say a couple things -- the missi failed but the idea since early 2000 was to make the navy do somedhing, because it is bad for them to be sitting in ports and doing nothing. wet them deploy far ay from home,ood for their moral. as far as arctic forces, members

of the audience noticed, building anything in the arcc is enormously expensive, a very punishing environment to operate. i don't see any use f any ground forces. there is nothing for them to do. as i said, they will try to procure more ships the size of admiral gorshkov, to protect the maritime zone. they will certainly by this, they plan to buy more ballistic missile carrying submarines, but i don't see any grand plans for anything. the russian advantages lie north

-- they launche two icebreakers, from other state holding. and from what i read, i am not a sailor, these are pretty impressive icebreakers. the northern sea route opens navigation, that gives russia significant economic advantages, not to mention a change in the geopolitical situation on the far east because today, still supplied by that one railroad just north -- not very good. not launching a couple ships. the russians will understand

that because the pressure of -- something with the black sea fleet. it is not how our budget process works. the navy gets pardon moneilot m have to figure out what goes where. i should also say, related to the economy, admiral desadesky said they would buy ships from abroad. russia bought ships from warships in 1930, the 1940s they used shipshey stole the bounty from the second world war, but this isn't the way to return to the pre 1917 tradition where russia had to buy ships.

it was raw materials, it is kind of retarded to them. if you start buying shi, that is going tanother weapons system, were cooperating, that is going to eventually affect foreign poly, national security pocy, you cannot be proclaiming for a long time a threat in the same country. it is not going to work. >> a question about nuclear weapons in the cis, i find that highly unlikely. i don'tee that happening. a number of international treaties, ukraine and kazakhstan are signatories to the treaty banning them from nuclear-weapons. they don't want them. >> it is enormously expensive and creates problems. >> okay. that is it. please join me in thanking our two palists. 7 to thank everybody.

also want to thank victory, the internes and ctaff who cam in from early this morning to help set up and helpful cleanp the conference room. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversatio]

[inaudible conversations] >> tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span, a congressional town hall meeting with wisconsin democrat ron kind, a member of the house ways and means mmittee who voted against the health care bill in that committee. tonight on book tv prime-time -- former democratic national committee chair and medical doctor howard dean will join virginia congressman james moran to discuss health care legislation in virginia, a suburb of washington, tomorrow. live coverage of that starting at 7:00 eastern on c-span.

>> as the debate over health care continues, c-span's health care of is a key resource. go online, follow the latest week's, video ads and blanks. follow town hall meetings and share your thoughts on the issue with your own citizen video including video from any town halls you have gone through. there's more and c-span.org/healthcare. >> george mason university prident alan merton on trading information technology professionals tonight on the communicator's on c-span2. >> how is c-span funded? >> private donations. >> grants andstuff. >> public telesion. >> donations. >> i don't know where the money comes from. >> fetterman? >> contributions from donors. >> how is c-span funded? america's cable companies created c-span as a public service, a private business initiative, no government

mandate, no government money. >> nasa has given the space shuttle discovery a green light for an overnight blastoff as long a thunderstorms say away. it is flying to the international space station. they will deliver 17,000 pounds ofpace station supplies and equipment. earlier this month, scientists from nasa's goddard's space flight center talked about the next robotic missions to the red planet. this runs 1 hour and 40 minutes. >> our first speaker today is a research physicist at the goddard space flight center. in 1997 he started working on thpathfinder team. in 2003 he started working on the mars phoenix project which he is going to talk about today. he is currently at nasa goddard, he joined the james webb space telescope team and an impressive lineup of acmplishments and

achievements. he is also an accredited inventor, 25 united parents in the united states, very impressive. you want to come up? >> thank you for t nice introduction, good morning, i am happy to be here to talk about the phoenix mission which was in the middle of its operations last year at this time. peter smith, who was the principal investigator, couldn't be here this morning. he is moving his daughter across the country from arizona to n.c. but he sends his best wishes to you and regret for not being here. i amohng to be talking about phoenix today. let's get right into it. i want to give you background on the mission, how did it start? why do we call it phoenix? and give you some background on how it came to fruition. i will give you some detail on

the spacecraft and instruments, i really like the harare, i like building it, i like sending it places. i'm going to go into some detail on that. and we will get into the water observations we made. it wasn' that hard to find water once we got there. there with a lot of concern particularly as we were planning a mission and traveling there, that we would have a very difficult time locating it, we might have to dig and dig and dig, we saw water on the surface every time we turned around. i will summarize with how the mission ended and what were the most intesting things we learned and show you some of the results, the most interesting results we have right now. phoenix was called phoenix because it rose from the aes of two emissions. one was a failed mission and one was a canceled mission. the failed mission was the mars polar lander. lamar splatter crashed into the martian surfa

december of 1999. this is a mockup of the mars polar lander, and engineering mockup in the test bed where the science operations were placed for the mars polar lander. after the failure, nasa convened a reew panel to try to understand why the mission failed. they sort of found the best you can in thibusiness in terms of a smoking gun. they found out the moslikely cause was that thruster's cut off prematurely about 131 feet above the surface of mars. 32 of them on each side of the landing legs, tw of them cated on each side of the struts. at they think happened was when the lander legs the ford, there was enough force generated from that deployment that sent the signal to the computer saying we touchdown, we are on

the surface. with consumer during the out phase, descent and landing phase, started to look for signals to touch down on the surface, the first time it looked and saw that signal, it said it is on the surface, let's cut the thrusters of the we were too high above the surface. this was duplicated by the engineering test unit and we did tests that found during the crusades, would have been able to fix this before we landed. ere is a concern the review panel highlighted, the center thruers, and like viking, whh was the other soft wetter that the u.s. successfully put on mars, the momarsthmost polar these thrusters, weaver sure it

s a strch issue, premature sensing gf the surface. the second mission that phoenix was based on was the canceled mission, the 2001 mars surveyor lander. this is an artist rendition of the 2001 mars surveyor. after the failure review board came out with their recommendations, their findings, we lost our nerve in my opinion, particularly those of us working on this, even though nasa had already spent more than the one hundred million dollars on the development of the hardware, we lost our nerve because the entry, decent and landing portions of the spacecraft were essentially a direct copy of the mars par lander hardware. even though we thought we had a really good idea on the smoking gun on what killed the mars polar lander, nasa decidenot to fly it, we put all the hardware in stores, and its future was really unknown at the time. this was back in 2000, six months after the failure of the

mars polar lander. but then, in summer of 2001, headquarters announced they wriggling to make all of this 2001 mars surveyor hardware that was just sitting on the shelf, going to make that available free of charge for mars scout missions. mars scout missions were kind of a new concept for the first time nasa was going to do a mars scout mission. the key thing with the mars scout mission, it is a principal investigator led missio instead of a big panel of scientists and engineers and management types at nasa deciding what the goal of the mission is, the pncipal investigator is responsible for all aspects of the mars scout mission. the editing the mars got mission has to be is low-cost. in order to be a mission that supplements what is going on in the normal course of mars exploration ha to be low cost.

you can't spend ten years and $1 billion building a mission to go off and do your own exploration. it has to be relatively cheap and it has to be responsible for the latest mars discoveries. the three key things mars scout missions needed to have a, this was the fir time nasa was doing a mars scout mission. so at that point in time i was working for peter smith. here is peter in the arctic in devon island in the summer of 2001. the mars society was involved in some of the work we were doing, we took a turn during the rotation, mars society paid to get some of our equipment up there and get ourselves up there as well. we took some ofur engineering test unit hardware for cameras and other space flight hardware. in addition to and doing them and mars still believe we were doing some unmanned mars mission

simulaons. this shows the robotic arm digging into the surface, the robotic arm camera scoop. when nasa made this announcement, peter decided to throw his hat into the ring which was late in the game. at this point in time, there have already been ten proposal studies funded by nasa given to various teams across the country to go and study their mars scout mission concept in more detail. peter was coming to the game of late but he had a couple things going for him. the image from mars pathfinder principal investigator, he had a really good reputation in inside the exploration community. he had also built five other mars lander imager is so he had a lot of space flight haware experience. peter put together -- in august of 2002, h submitted it to nasa. the university of arizona being the lead institution because that was his institution, univ. of arizona was in charge of