areable to those -- online, most of the students are able to download without any problem depending on how long, we try to keep the video, there's a speed issue in this country so we need to keep the video short, so we are often better off having many shorter one than one long one because people do not have the speeds in this country that you would find in other countries, we are behind in other panels, we have talked about that. another change we have been able to make because things have gotten better, not where we wanted, but have gotten better with high speed access, many of our coses require at least 20 hours of lab work. this is physical lab work. when we first started we built labs across the country in our local union halls. we actually installed routers and servers and pcs across the

country t we could only do so many of those. so our students, sometimes 25 hours, they would drive to these labs. these are full time working folks so almost always want to go on the weekend and. they drive 400 miles to get to this lab and they want to do it on the weekend, they would have to spend the night at a motel in order to finish all of that course work in one weekend. .. night in a hotel in order to finish all of th@t course work in one weekend. wealthy logistics of that for us we would have to get an instructor there for the weekend. we would obviously want as many students as possible that weekend to make the instructor cost-effective. the fact the student had to leave their family, spend a night away, the whole thing was quite logistically complicated and believe it or not, hundreds and hundreds of workers though

did it because it was one of the only ways they had to get these skills. now, all of our labs are done remotely so that students -- we no longer have those physical labs, and now students can access raúl person remotely -- routers remotely from wherever they are doing their course work, usually their homes and the instructor can either be they they can do troubleshooting which is part of the lab and the instructors can see step by step what they've done, so there's no requirement for them to go anywhere else. so this has been actually huge. it's very, very helpful to the students and to us. the video i've talked about, that's also been important. the last thing i'll say about the video is that we also do video chatting where i call it video chatting, where the

instructor actually has a time and he speaks -- he can speak to a cohort, a group of students, his class and they can speak back. again, because of speed what we'd really like is to be able to do an interactive video, but our surveys show that our students, again, who are workers, just do not have by and large, the speed necessary for that kind of high-definition interactive video. most of them can down load high-speed, not all of them, but most of them can down load hig@-speed video, but we still are not quite there. we don't have enough speed for the two-way, but we hope -- we hope with the work of the f.c.c. and a policy for this country to be there shortly. some things that we have learned, and that would be the next slide.

the bottom there. speed matters. and i think christopher mentned a speed test that was in the "u.s.a. today" and that actually is a test that cwa did that shows the different speeds in the different states and where the different states fall. speed does matter for instruction. so not only do you have to be able to afford internet, but you have to have fast internet, or else these courses are very, very tedious and frustrating and the learning is not as good. instructors matter p you can't just take a classroom instructor and say now you're going to do an on-line cours it doesn't work that way. it's different. some classroom instructors make the transition very well. others don't like it. and aren't very good at it. there is actually -- and this is something people often don't understand. there is actually more instructor-student interaction oftentimes on line, than there is in the classroom.

educational partners matter. you need to have a partner who actually understands on-line training and who is committed to it. we have two excellent partners in pace university and stanley community college. content matters. i think somebody mentioned that it's not just about having a corresndence course on line, it's not just about xeroxing chaprs in a textbook and putting it on line. having people read a chapter at a time and then giving them a test, but it's really about using the technology to have the learning be rich. and in many cases, and people have mentioned this, actually can be better than classroom learning. on-line training is not for everyone. so we can -- it just isn't. some people just cannot learn through this thnology. it's not for them. and that's fine. and we've also learned that courses have to have a start and end time. we like to say that our courses

are anywhere, any time. but there is a start and an end time to it and that's important for the structure ofhe training. and then lastly, on-line education and training really can make a difference in people's lives. we see it every day. we get e-mails, phone calls, letters, testimonials tell us what a difference it's made, just a few that we -- just a few examples that i can share with you. we get quite a few testimonials from women. this h been mentioned by heather and others who have children or who are caring for parents. they work full time, because remember, our -- the population we're training are full-time workers. so these are folks that need to increase their skills, or get a new skill set or get certification. they want to advance or just really keep the job they have. so for reasons that they're

caring for someone else at night, they can't go out three nights a week to the college, the on-line program that they can do at 2:00 a.m., you know, whenever they want, 5:00 a.m., really brings access to them, that they would normally not have. we have also hear that people in some parts of the country, in some places, don't feel comfortable driving at night, to go to a community college, parking, going three times a fight and they love the on-line option and they wouldn't have gone otherwise. we have lots of members whoork unusual hours, and it's knots possible for them to go monday, wednesday, and thursday to a community college from 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. they work weekends, they wor nights, their shifts change, their shifts are unpredictable unfortunately and they just cannot do the traditional classroom. we gets lots of e-mails saying i would have never been able to get this degree, i would never have been able to get this

certification had it not been for on-line training. we also have older members, and by older, i mean younger than me, but we have members who have not been in the classroom for 20 years. and this is an interesting one. this is an interesting one for me, but we get this a fair amount, and there's a certain intimidation about going back into the classroom, and what we hear from them is that they thought it would be safer to get back in to education through an on-line venue. we hear that, you know, they weren't sure, they didn't want to make a fool of themselves, they weren't sure they were up to it. perhaps they hadn't done that well in school. previously. and so they thought in an on-line setting, it would be, if i can say, more private. their failure would be more private, or their experience would be more private and they wouldn't feel as foolish. of course, they tend to do very

wellble they underestimate themselves but then they get hooked and continue on, but that is a driver for a number of people. so just to end, i would say any time, anywhere, flexibility of on-line courses really have allowed a lot of our members to do training and to get the skills and get the degrees they would not have been able to do if they had to go to a traditiol institution. but i would say that we continue to bump into the problem that a number -- that a lot ofur members either in a place where they cannot get high-speed internet or even the high-speed internet that's called high-speed internet is really not fast enough for the kindsf things that you need to do on-line to be really effective.

>> tnk you for telling us about the two very impressive and fascinating programs that cwa runs. this concludes our panelist presentations. we have about 20, 15 minutes allocated to questions from the audience, from callers on webx and questions have that been submittad through twitter and also by the f.c.c. panel here. >> i'll go ahead and ask a question while you're hecking on that. each you has argued in compelling ways for the government to really focus on access and access at high speeds that you can actually do something with, so we hear that loud and clear. the question for you is, from your perspective, if you were charged with writing a strategy

for its country, that focused on the way broadband could further work force development, job training, what specifically would you recommend the federal government do, whether it's anything from addressing market failures, putting incentives in place for suppliers of job training or employers, who would take seriously the programs offered on line, whether it's some of the barriers that you, kermit, mentioned, regarding the policy issues about the 50% rule, for example, what other policy areas are out there, any specific recommendations that you would like for us to consider in our proposals? to congress? >> i can start with that. i think that one of the specific areas that i would think is very important is bridging the digital divide by an issue of access, which is not only having affordable broadband internet

access, but also having as kermit said, you know, the space of where you do your job training, where you do it, hopefully is in your home. and the best way to do that that i have found through our research in the center for women and work has found is by providing a laptop in someone's home, so that they can take that laptop to work if they're able to do their job training at work. if their employer says it's ok, they can do it in a small room, even if -- we've recently done a program with inmates who are going into halfway houses and having a laptop allows those inmates in a halfway house where they have only a bunk bed and a chair to do their work. so providing that access, making money available through the work force system to provide computers and laptops and printers and things. >> yes, please. >> i would say two things. one is, again, harking back to telephone, there was a time in this country where very few people had a telephone and then they got to have more and more telephones and then there was a

policy in the country for universal access to dial tone. right? which then pushed telephone access to 90% if not more in a number of yea, so what we would like to see is the same kind of policy. now they did that through subsidies, so that there would be rural access and the kinds of things, but in a very -- there was a public policy to get as many americans as possible dial tone and telephone, and then in a number of years, that was accomplished. so we would like to see the same thing with high-speed internet access. and we think it's -- it is the telephone of our generation, of this here ra. the second thing i would say is we would like the definition for high-speed o be looked at again. >> that's definitely being considered right now. do you have a sense of how quickly, what's reasonable, how hard would you push the federal

government in terms of setting bench marks like that? >> i think it has -- it's an economic competitive issue. so i would push them hard. rit. as hard as i could push them. i don't know. five years. five years and what, 90% coverage. >> i'd kind of like to jump in there as well. i do believe it's open access, so that there are no, you know, state or local regulations that are in hindering multiple competitors going into these rural marketplaces, potentially some of the historical telephone regulations that existed in the states and also setting a mandate of, you know, 5 megabit per second. if i look across the e learning industry, the various tools out there, what people are trying to utilize, it's a given. you need that to even begin to start to allow people not to get frustrated and i go back to the

statement, no one wants to use the 1980's dialup of 30 years ago. >> so i'll jump in there as well, because i think the true value of the infrastructure that would be the high-speed broadband internet access, actually comes from the private sector and the applications that we build to actually utilize it, so i think it's important that you keep that in mind andlets look at, it may seem odd to call them incentives, but i think don't leave the private sector out of this, as bng someone who can contribute to the actual overall goal of putting people to work or helping them understand what possibilities they have. i think another component of this is me integration or collaboration with other agencies. in other areas of the government to be able to align some of your goals strategically around this to be able -- did i make some frnds down there. department of labor may have a lot to say on this, but you know, i think that when we look at those things, we have to remind ourselves that, you know,

where we decided to build roads and we decided to build electricity into homes, we didn't really get it down to the level of wow, the hair dryer is really going to have a compelling impact on the work force, right? you've got to really think about what the tools are that are going to benefit from this. >> and i'll jump in on that. i also think -- i'm a research researcher. demographics really matter and these things have to be built to to the unique needs of those different learners and how they learn and where they learn. i also think that there's also a difference for at least in the community that i deal with, of around the issue of labor force participation. when you look at the disparities in labor force participation rates for people with disabilities, it's like 78% aren't even showing up, so they're not even getting in to these on-line -- so how do we get ways to market this and get at outreach to these underserved

communits, especially those who are low income, will find this very difficult to access and i think you reallyeed to coider that has you think about more long-term proposal to congress. >> can i follow up on that actually? i think as we've learned today, we heard a lot aboutosk a barrier or access in one way or another and then usability. this is the first that i think any of you have mentioned the relevant point. there's a lot of people who are not using broadband right now, because they don't see the point to it and particularly, given all the benefits that you've all talked about, from a job training and education perspective, wanted to hear your thoughts on, you know, what we can do and what you are doing on your own to do outreach and make people understand the benefits of this, to increase adoption if they understand the relevance of it. >> i think giving the

experience, if somebody hasn't experienced something, whether, you know, they're a displaced worker with little skills in the you're area, where there's, you know, high level of poverty, etc., giving them the experience through community, through the library, through community activism, etc., i mean, their eyes will light up when they see what's possible, when they experience theechnology and then the inspection step is, how do you make the educational part accessible to them? you know, so we have a lot of displaced workers, because of offshoring of jobs for example, they want to improve their lot in life, they want to move to a skilled labor job as we become a knowledge economy, etc., etc., so there willing to go with the trends that are happening in our economy, whether they understand them or not, but only if they can understand how to use the technology, so yeah, you can't always expect a government to pay for it. it can't be hey, let's get a subsidy so all libraries and all community centers can have high-speed internet. that would be great. the providers have to make money

as well, so maybe we try to form some consortium with business, with municipalities, you know, trying tohow them here's where you can shift some of your budget to add value to your constituents, as well as federal, state, and local. >> i think from the work force development system perspective, again, it's a system that is very, very overwhelmed, as you all acknowledged earlier. the extent to which we are -- we at labor in partnership with our other federal agencies can create within states virtual one stops, could greatly reduce costs. when you look at the typal cost of orating a one-stop physical, you kno kind of a center, and i don't think we've done a lot to really test that concept of how do we provide work force development services, including vocational rehabilitation, one stops, that are virtual, and i would be -- it would be interesting to see some kind of a parership between the f.c.c. and labor on

that, would be really cool. >> i think from our perspective to answer that question, is there's also this compelling instance or this circumstance that i find myself in, hand the's known that illustrates this more effectively than the job loss that we've seen. right. if i had no other reason, when i was working, when i was gainfully employed, when i one of the millions of people who worked a year ago that isn't working today, i had no real reason to go out there and do a job search or to do a career map, but now that i'm one of the millions of out of works, that may be my compelling reason to actually have to go on line. you know, when i'm there, it's actually -- i'm behind now to figure out what's my path, what am i going to have to do to get there. now i have to go through six months or a year or two years or four years of job retooling and education, it would be really good if we don't find ourselves in this situation again. if we take this a little more proactive approach. so you look at it, you say how do we do outreach? it's really to look at, for us,

our cheapest, most effective way of connecting with people is through the internet. that doesn't help me very much if i can't connect with them through the internet. when we look at what we're doing, it's incredibly creative around that, but its other way we get people in and how you'll reach people is through that compelling need that they actually finally have and you'll see more and more and more, you want tonow where the jobs are. they're on line. they're with brds like mine but they're also with companies, they're with the government. everyone has their sites where jobs are, but no one says jobs aren't on line, so therefore i must go on line to find a job. >> i think that another piece of the relevance and showing people the relevance is having content that works for them and serves their needs and as kermit watts talking about earlier, there are 42% of americans don't have the work force skills, literacy skills they need to compete in the work for and there needs to be program programming out there that provides them with that and in many cases, there are university programs, there are things that serve the other americans, but not people who

need these workplace literacy skills and that's one of the reasons that the center for work has been working to create this free web site on sign called building skills for work which is going to serve the interpersonal and academic skills needs. it's in its infancy now, but i hope that we are not the only ones who are going to develop tools like this, that people are going to look to serve all the populations that are out there and to serve them in a way that looks specifically at how adult learners learn and isn't geared towards children. a lot of the available con at the particular time out there for low skilled individuals is geared towards children and it's not usable for adults reallthe. >> one other thing i would like to -- we touched on the concept of career pathways earlier in the preseation. one thing that i think is very, very difficult, particularly for low skilled workers, is in order to do -- youeally do have to go to one institution and get one kind of training and then go another institution and get another kind of training and maybe the first kind of -- the adult education, the basic skills that you got doesn't translate to the -- to

another -- to the josh training world or doesn't translate to higher education, post secondary education, so to the extent that we can develop an on-line educational and work force strategy, that makes that process more seamless, that lps bridge -- this is is across agency, cross-system problem, that if you're an individual learner trying to find the skills and education, it's not very obvious to you, so the way we can sort of stitch it together and do that work for you, so with i can kind of figure out what i need to learn and what credentials i'm going to need to get there, mean, we make it very difficult for a lot of adult learners to get the skills they need, so to the extent we can use, you know, high-speed internet to bridge those gaps, that would be an immense value to a hot of learners in this country and help people to get the skills they need to help businesses be competitive. >> i had just add on to that, based on the last 12 to 15 years, on-line learning, companies like blackboard being

started, monster, the rapid change that we've gone through and that we will continue to go through, time to market is key for relevancy. something that we can get to market, get real broadband into the hands of the communities that are underserved today, and be able to iterate on some of those programs, do some experimentation and so forth, let's not wait any longer. let's get it out there, see what works, doesn't work, and then, you know, tweak it over time. >> final thought for me, because i pcess slower. is that i think we also -- i would encourage you, or i would like to see that this doesn't -- rule doesn't equal low skilled and i think that when we looat the focus and the conversation tends to be about low skilled workers or people who need a lot of assistance, but i think the onehing, you know, as americans, we work more than we do anything else, so if you think about that, i work more than i spend time with my family, i work more than i sleep, work is so critical to me that i would challenge -- that

hall of us can improve, you kn know, our lot in life, right, or just work in a different way, so i think broadband allows us to add value to every worker, right, or to all the future workers, and i think that's the component of this, that i'd le to see, not just focused on low skills. >> i think one of the biggest -- one of the biggest challenges, you know, it's kind of the elephant in the middle of the room, is those of us who are on the webx in the audience, we have probably high-speed internet. we are gainfully employed, we can afford it. we don't always love the cost of it per month, but it gives us education, entertainment, access to others. what do we do to keep the integrity and the investmenof the vendors, the suppliers, of broadband and high-speed, and keep their margins there,

without, you know, having the government subsidize everything, so that's the biggest challenge. i mean, the providers who invested in the technology, they can't give it away. they maybe could reduce their margins somewhat and make it more affordable in certain areas, but the biggest challenge is how do we do that without expecting our government to pay for all of it, but still make it accessible. it's tough. and maybe we have to convince our population that it's more important to have broadband than to have cable tv or something else. i don't know. i mean, we all want everything. we want the entertainment, we want the broadband, but we also want profitable companies like your members, who can gainfully employ people to build it. so ion't know what the answer is, but that might be a good question to throw out. maybe too controversial. >> thanks, tim.

i don't think it's controversial. of i think it's important to -- it's important to understand what are the partner ships between the private sector and the public sector work, if they exist -- i'm sure they exist, but what is working and what partrs are necessary. and i think in kermit's presentation earlier, he did talk about how relevant on-line training programs really need to happen when there are partnerships across agencies, across the various organizations that touch upon this particular topic, as well as the employers who are going to be creating jobs in the industry. so thank you for that input. we have a question from caller on webx, this is about e-learning, so i'm going to ask him to answer it. what is the bigger problem in terms of serving e-learning platforms, lack ever of

technological access, low speed internet or lack of e-literacy and what is the best way to address this gap? >> that's a tough one to answer because i think it's a little bit of earning. again, millions of people use e-learning in some form. it might not be an education platform, it might be gng to a government web site, it might be going to, you kno googling something so you can learn a skill and it's free on line, so i think first is the literacy, the digital list racy. if you want -- literac if you want the masses to have it. and industry, private-public sector, everyone is responsible for induingrial to people can get out there and have exposure to it. if you don't have exposure, you don't know better. that's the first part. the second part is content, it does take time to build -- and effort, to build meaningful learning content, so you can't just throw a bunch of videos and text on line. it's got to be organizing a

thoughtful, manner around how people learn, so every organization has to learn about that. whether you're a corporation training your employees, you're a university faculty delivering a course, because how people interact with the content, and if it's designed so they can learn from it, and you can assess wha they've learned and they can use it in their life o on their job, that's the other critical component. >> all right. great. thank you. think we've actually reached our two-hour limit, so i'm going to conclude the workshop. we've heard a lot of interesting things during the presentations and afterwards and the few common comments that i've gotten written down here is the lack of equipment that is not available to people who are underserved and need e-training and job traini the most, and people

who really need to understand how to even use the computer, how to get on line, how to, you know, -- how to pursue programs that can help them get better jobs and better pay, and also, lack of regulation, lack of sort of this efficiency or streamlining within job training industries and the government agencies that cover this topic. there isn't the type of collaboration that we have seen yet and that's something that i think we should explore. so those are some of the topics, some of the themes that we've talked about today and i just want to thank you for attending this workshop and for coming -- carving out time from your day jobs to speak at this panel, so thank you again. [applause]

[inaudible conversations]

clear cloor weep >> we'll hear about the comprehensive test band treaty, which the u.s. has not ratified. this is about an hour 20 minutes. >> we'll get underway, we're a little bit late, so we will start off, what i wanted to do is just give you a very brief inter ducks to who we are and what we're doing and hans is going to talk about the current nuclear force structure and then i wanted to talk briefly about some of the nuclear missions and what we, the federation of american science, thinks should be the goals of the current and future negotiations. on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces and so just to -- i'm ivan ulrich, acting

president of the federation of american science, acting because our president went over to run the renewable energy hand energy efficiency program there, he's principal deputy assistant secretary in that office and that's a great job for him and key times, we're very happy for him. and so i -- and i'm serving as acting president until he is replaced. my day job is that i'm the vice-president for the strategic security program. which includes the nuclear information project, which hans runs, we have an arms sales monitoring project that looks at the illicit trade in small arms around the world and also tracks u.s. weapons exports, and export policy, which we hold up as a model for the world. and the government secrecy project, which steve runs and we have a biosecurity program. that michelle runs. and those ofou that don't know, the federation was founded

in 1945 as the federation of atonic scientists by scientists and engineers who had worked on the manhattan project to develop the first atomic bombs, and from the beginning, in i think it was march or april of 1946, we wanted to expand the membership beyond those who had actually worked on the manhattan project and that's when the federation of atomic scientists, we call them today nuclear physicists, became the american federation of -- federatn of american scientists. so with that, i think that hans is going to ge a -- we have also, i wanted to hold up and i hve my little party piece here, we've just published an occasional paper called from counterforce to minimal deterrents, and we discuss -- how we would get to very low numbers and how the mission would have to change, and it's

one thing to talk about, oh, i want to have, you know, 1,000 or 500, but then you have to get down to the nitty gritty of how are you going to base these thin, what are their targets going to be, what is the doctrine for their use, etc., and we want to try to put some specifics on that. i think the nuclear debate very quickly becomes so theoretical that people so quickly that people forget what we're really talking about. these massive explosions that kills tens of thousands of people at a go and you know, that it's sobering and caution inducing to get down into the details and ask why, why, why, when people make proposals for the use of nuclear weapons, so we're going to start with hans and hans is going to give us a little review on where we are today and then i'm going to that you can somewhat about projections for the future.

so -- this is hans christian, he's the director of the nuclear information project. >> thank you. yes. you might haveeen these folders already floating around in town. this is the sort of nice design they have created forhe nuclear policy row view, and -- review and it's in full swing, and in this folder that you have gotten, we don't have these, this is from a meeting, in this folder, you'll see several things, a couple of articles, background information about developments in u.s. nulear policy, the status of u.s. nuclear forces from the bulletin of the atomic scientists, our latest estimate. you'll find a series of 10 briefing slides for this particular briefing today that i will walk you through in a minute. and you'll also find copies of two fax sheets, so to speak, that were handed outs recently to a number of ngo's, including

myself, that were invited to sit in on a round table as part of a nuclear policy review process over at osd. and this first round table was about the nuclear possi -- policy review and modernization of the force and how that will impact non-proliferation policy and there will be other round table discussions between now and christmas, which will look at issues like stability issues, you know, crisis stability, if you go to low numbers, issues such as deterrents, their relationship with the allies and all this stuff. this is a new approach apparently from the department of defense, trying to invite so-called stakeholders into this process. a very different kind of stakeholders. and so we as part of the ngo

crowd out here on the outside have been allowed to sort of come in and hear a few mention once in a while, and utter our views on what we think it should be and not, so at least, it's in, you know, a new style. [inaudible] >> no at least not to my knowledge. it was a very close process in those days. let me start with a briefing here, and of course, at the outset, unfortunately, this is about numbers. and that's still where we are. it's very much about reducing the cold war stockpiles. we're still in that process. and what i've prepared for you is a series of slides. one that gives a little status of where the nuclear posture review it, compares what it's looking at with the previous nuclear -- or one of the previous nuclear posture reviews from 1994 and some comparisons

between what the posture reviews concluded and what the current one might conclude. of course, we cannot predict that in any way, but there are hints and rumors and what have you. and then of course, a breakdown with numbers for your use of the current nuclear posture, how many warheads we have, what categories they're in, what kind of delivery vehicles we have. there is a briefing -- there's a slide on the development over the years of the nuclear arsenal, how the numbers of warheads have fluctuate in the stockpile compared to how the number of warheads loaded on strategic delivery systems have all been the same period and then of course, where these different nuclear posture reviews have ce in in that process. and then a slide aut nuclear planning, and then after i talk about that, ivan will take over and go into more details about

the requirements, minimal posture, minimum deterrent posture, those type of thoughts we have been working on. so briefly, the nuclear posture review, as far as we hear, it's supposed to be finished by the end of this year, but not completely until february 2010. and this is -- the latter is probably about the process itself, of handing it formally over and presenting it to congress as part of the budget cycle, and also when the qdr, the quad drain yell defense review will be ready. but as you might remember, the previous nuclear posture review of the bush administration 2001 was also not presented officially, if you wil in public, to the congress until february 2002, but it was actually finished by the end of 2001. so it is formally called the 2001 posture review. the current working groups that have been set up to analyze for this nuclear posture review are four groups, one is on policy

and strategy, one is on capabilities for structure and programs, the third is on stockpile and infrastructure and the fourth one is on international dimensions. the role internationally that nuclear weapons play. for example, vis-a-vis, allies. this has become a hugely important issue, at least in the public debate. not least because of the work of the studies that came late last year and the congressional study that came -- or in this year, the office of that very much hammered home that issue of the tent of the deterrent nation and the importance, not only for policy issues, but also for how our nuclear posture should look in the future. what kind of weapons do you need for that, which ones can you retire and which ones do you need to detain. this is the first time that, if you will, extended deterrents

have been elevated to that level of importance in the nuclear posture review after the cold war. it has always been in there, of course. it's always been debated but always bn parof the mission and the force structure. now it has its own title and that's a significant development i think. it's the good mission. it is the non-proliferation mission, that's the way it's being portrayed, that by having this, i think the number is some 30 plus countries will not develop nuclear weapons of their own. that's the kind of argument. of course, once you look at these countries and who they are, the countries, the number of countries tt have the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons and also much less could actually theoretically decide to do so is a very, very small list. so this 30 plus importance is heavily ballooned obviously. you can also see the working groups that were in the 1994,

they're listed here on the other ones. comparing the different posture reviews, you can see the 1994, this is slide number 4, the 1994, nuclear posture review was a nuclear posture review that was sorts of a, i call it a nuclear light, it's sliced here and there, it didn't fundamentally change the cold war mission or structure of nuclear weapons. it retained 14 submarines and icbm's and bombers as you can see down here. it also decided to introduce modified versions of new nuclear weapons, including the b-61, the nuclear bunker buster. the nuclear posture review was essentially start three posture review, the hel helsinki agreem. talking about 200 strategic warheads deployed. 2001 and 1994 nuclear posture

review operated with about 10,000 warheads in the stockpile. the total stockpile, not those warheads that are just deployed, but the total stockpile. the bush administration later on cut that number significantly to -- by almost half, but the force structure largely remained the same and the 2001 nuclear posture review essentially implementedecisions that were made back in the 1990's. it didn't come up with new decisions about force structure. now we have a new situation where the president has said, you know, we have to reduce the cold war mission of nuclear weapons and move forward, and so what will it bring? i mean, we obviously cannot say, we hear rumors about 1500 perhaps operations ofeployed strategic warheads, we hear rumors about 10 he to 12 submarines, slight reductions of the ballistic missile

submarines, we heard rumors about some reductions in the icbm work force, whether that's going to be a sqadron from each of the three wings or cutting one of the three wings, we don't know. we also hear remorse about reductions in the -- rumors about reductions in the bomber rce, but we also hear that all the discussions in the npr about retaining a triad of nuclear forces on three different legs, so that cold war structure, according to that rumor, if it's correct, is not going to be changed. the current nuclear posture, i'll skip over that. you can go back and look over that. i just want to talk about the development here of the nuclear -- the force structure and now the nuclear posture reviews we've had since the end of the cold war have fallen. it's not as if the individual reviews dratically changes very quickly the posture.

thei happen and these things are phased out over a long period of time. we are on a slide path that goes down and it doesn't seem tha either of these postus have significantly changed the direct of where these nuclear -- of where the nation's nuclear forces and stockpile have been going so far. the next posture review might be different. we're still on this downward trend from the cold war. which part? >> when you say it's changed the numbers -- >> it didn't change the direction that the downward trend had already. we came out of the cold wars with some unilateral decisions about changing retiring weapons, retiring warheads. that was a huge drop in our posture. that was the -- those were the signicant decisions that were made. the nuclear posture reviews sort of built on that, if you will.

>> 2001? >> correct. >> you're saying the trends continue to -- >> we're still in that drawdown phase. none of these posture reviews have entered a phase where they're saying this is the post-cold war nuclear posture, they're still sort of modifying how that went. just the last thing for me, which is that of course, this is about the mission. this is about targets at the other end of the war plans, the x's on the map. this is about retaining a certain number of warheads to destroy a certain number of facilities in other countries. and right now, our strategic war plan here in the states is called -- in the united states is called operation plan 8010. it's formal title is strategic deterrents and global strikes and these two missions have been mixed, if you will. it is a very -- it's a product of a mission creep that happened during its 1990's and during the

bush administration years. wher deterring nuclear, primarily, of the soviet union and china, was broadened out to deterring all -- well, all forms of weapons of mass destruction. not only in russia, china, but also in regional states. actual executable nuclear strike plans against regional states were included into the strategic war plan in 2003. in response t guidance from the white house. >> say that again. >> actually nuclear sike plan, executable nuclear strike plans against regional states were included into the strategic war plan in 2003. the cyop was focused on russia and china. there would be little side chapters if you will regionally for regional contingencies, but not as those countries being wmd adversaries of their own weight.

they are individual adversaries, not as parts of a china or russia or soviet scenario. cyop was the cold war strategic operational plan. that was dropped and transformed in 2003, and turned into this operational plan. too complicated to go into the details, but that's the general trend i'll say. this war plan is aimed at six adversaries. this is a significant expansion compared to the cold war. it was focused on russia and china. now there are six adversaries in the war plan. that means that there are new requirements to weapons, delivery systems, the strike plans that are drawn up of course, but it has the side effect also created a -- what is described as an increasingly complex plan. there are fewer weapons, you have to be able to do more with

them, more scenarios, more contingencies, but with fewer of them. so that's creating some sort of a dilemma in the planning, if you will. we will see if the nuclear posture review tries to change that, we don't know, but it's hard to predict, especially the future. ivan, do you want to take over here? >> yes. we wanted to know, i just want to tal a little bit about what we wish the nuclear posture review would be and what it might turn out to be. almost all of the discussion about nuclear weapons focuses on the numbers, should we have go down to 1500 or 1,000 and how many should be actively deployed and how many should be in reserve. and what we're starting to see is that the military is starting -- we're start to go get push back from the military, saying we can't go down to these lower numbers because we can't accomplish our missions hands in fact, they're right and we believe that while focus on numbers was fine in the past, if you, you know, if you have a

million nuclear weapons and you know that you need something on the order of, you know, something less than 10,000, then sure, you know, cut nuclear weapons and focus on the numbers, but now we're getting down to the points where the numbers are starting to impinge on the missions and we need to change the know cuss of the debate about the future of our nuclear forces from mere numbers to what the missions are for nuke letter weapons. what are they for? what are we going to use these things for. how are we going to target them and win, what are the political objectives that we hope to accomplish with our nuclear weapons? and what we talk about in our report from counterforce to minimal deterrents is we ought to reduce the mission of nuke letter weapons to a one mission and that is to hold them in reserve, to retaliate against a nation that uses nuclear weapons against us or allies or even at all and in which case, we will use our nuclear weapons for retaliation to make that -- to deter that attack in the fst place. that will be the mission of

nuclear weapons. >> someeople -- [inaudible] >> the core, well, you have to be very careful when people ever use the word deterrents, because it's become some linked with the -- there are shelves of books on the cold war. deterrents is a word that's tossed around. we talk about minimal deterrents, but you have to remember that the word deterrents has been overhe used to the point it's corrupt. to the point where nuclear weapons are often referred to as our deterrents. icbm's are our land based deterrent, as though nuclear weapons and deterrents were actually the same thing. obviously it's more complex than that. so we have to keep in mind that sometimes we seem to think that nuclear weapons are so immense powerful, they're so

destructive, that the missions are sort of forced on us, that they derive from the laws of physics, an we have to keep in mind that most of the missions that nuclear weapons once had have gone away. we can make decisions with what their missions ought to be. in the height of the cold war, we had nuclear arm torpedoes and surface-to-air defense missiles. i went to the university of chicago, and when i started there in 1968, there were nuclear a nike hercules armed missles. that mission has gone away. a lot of missions have gone away. we don't seek control, air defense and such, were missions and they have gone away. so we -- one of the things that we want to do in this report, and elsewhere, is not simply to say, we should go to minimal deterrents, because people think, yeah, that sounds good, but ok, we don't want to give ourselves too easy a job.

what does this actually mean? and what it means is we wan to explicitly give up the benefits -- supposed benefits of what we have now, which is a counterforce strategy. we say officially that we do not target russian forces, but one of the very few good things that came out of this congressional mission report was that they admitted that it was the ability to hold russian nuclear forces at risk, which drove the requirements for u.s. force structure. that's what drove our numbers, that's what drove our deployment rates, that is what drives our readiness rates, is to be able to -- if the decision is made to defeat the russian send tram nuclear forces, to destroy them on the ground before they can be launched, that is the challenging driving mission for u.s. nuclear forces.

and it was during its cold war and it is today. now officially we don't target russia, but if you have a defense analyst come down from mars and see how our missiles are deployed, their accuracies, their yields, how our submarines are deployed, forward off the coast of russia and china, there is no other target set that makes sense except for russian central nuclear forces. now, if we he go to a minimal deterrence strategy, which we're only going to use nuclear weapons in response to someone else's use of nuclear weapons, it's essentially a declaration of no first use among other things, that means we give up this ability, ok, and that i think is the hard step, that is what the npr, if it's going to be revolutionary, it's going to have to explicitly give that up. the problem with it is that

the -- it appears to raise risks. what i'm doing is i'm going to the president and i safe, well, now, ok, if things got really, really dark, ok, you do have the option, we could push the button and try to destroy the russian missiles on the ground before they could attack us. and i want to give up that capability. and that seems like a huge step. because we argue that in net, it is to our benefit for several reasons. one is the combination of circumstances that you would use that ability are remote. ok. e idea that the president is going to tdeoff t high probability for a nuclear war against the cents certainty of a nuclear war and certain because he's about to start i is just not going to occur -- it's so unlikely that you're unlikely to get the benefits of having that capability, but the risks we run

every d, because the russians keep theirissiles at alert, they are prepared during a crisis to give launch authority to lower echelons. they have mobile missile systems that are harder to keep track of. the risk from us is we have to keep our missiles and -- on ready alert and it raises the risk of accidental nuclear war, raises the risk of unauthorized launch. the problem is that we've lived with this risk every day throughout the cold war and we've become i newerred to it. and it's sort of like that day-to-day risk has become the wallpaperer that we no longer notice, but this potential benefit in the future that i could do the strike against the russians, that seems something that we can at least in theory imagine. also what i think is overlooked is that by removing this mission, we make further reductions in nuclear weapons

far easier. one reason that the russians keep the number of weapons that they have is that say they've made a calculation that they need 100 nuclear weapons to be be able to retaliate against the united states to deter whatever it is they want to deter. and then they further have calculated that a u.s. first strike might be 90% effective. well, if they want to ends up with 100, that means they have to have 1,000. by giving up the ability to detroy their weapons on the ground, we make it easier to negotiate from 1,000 down to 100. and again, i'm using round shall arbitrary numbers to make this points. this is not where we are today. so given the highly unlike live benefit, comparing it to the day-to-day cost, we believe that you should explicitly give up this counterforce mission and that's what we have to do to make dramatic further reductions in nuclear weapons and to have a

path cleared open to meet the president's objective of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons in the world. so the question, is this nuclear posture review going to make that jump? and it is a jump. it's a radical change. if you have bought an old house, with an oil heater in it, ok, there are a lot o things you can do to improve that oil heater. you can make the little burners more efficient, you can make certain that you clean the flue and get a new fan and get a very good oil heater, but no matter how much you have tinker with t you're not going to have gas heat. if you want to have gas heat, you have to rip out the old stuff and put in the new stuff. you're not going to get there through incrementalism and this is where we have an opportunity with this npr to make a jump a to abandon the other missions, get ourselves to a minimal deterrence mission only, and from there, you can see a path

forward to a world free -- world free of nuclear weapons. also you have technical aspects that i will not go into detail, but we can discuss later if you have questions. when you go to smaller numbers and you have available to you basing modes that you would not normally have, you remove the requirements for rapid launch, then you have basing modes available, that before you wouldn't have thought, like putting things in deep tunnels that take a long time to get out. if your mission is to have a quick launch, then those basing modes are not options, not technical options and those technical options open up when you reduce them. [inaudible] >> my sense is the nuclear posture review is going to be incremental and all the evidenc i get suggests -- pushes me

further in that direction, think that they're not going to make a dramatic change. they're going to maintain this option of using nuclear weapons for counterforce missions both against russian and chinese nuclear forces. that they're not going to make that jump. :

>> and they know how difficult it is to make any radical change, and they are very realistic and pragmatic, and you know, i suspect that they know exactly what the president says and they have hurt his broad speech. but they know how difficult it is to make radical changes. so they might have also calculated that there is political costs and pushing for that in failing. and if he judged that to be high, then you might want to set your sights lower to begin with. but i n only speculate on that. i am basing this on comments i've heard at briefings from people who helped me to write

the npr and things have come out in the press, that it does not seem they are preparing the public to get ready to receive a radical change in direction, which they would be if that's what they had in mind. >> i'm sure there's a domestic political opponent. there's also an international negotiation going on right now. they come before the release of the npr, so that sort of reached the speculation that the npr is going to be used to provide cover or justification for whatever it is they can manage to negotiate. in other words, we will see what we do in terms of reductions and en we will build a strategy and policy to fit that based on what we can -- what you think about that?

>> this is -- sometimes that the administration is criticized for entering into these negotiations, and even talking about having negotiations finished up with the npr will be done. that's exactly what happened with the moscow treaty or the sword tree is that the treaty was negotiated first and npr came out. i'm sure hans knows all the dates which i'm not as good at. yeah, i think -- it's not -- i believe that the npr should direct our goals with what our negotiations ought to be, rather than see how low we can get with the russians and then come back and try to reverse engineering and think what strategy can we fit into this kind of thing that we also have to be careful about talking to when the npr is done. maybe it is not signed, sealed and delivered but i'm sure that if president obama wants to get

a preview, that they would give him, tell them what they are thinking. it isn't built like it is one day it is not done and the next day it is. so i would like also, there is no reason that we enter into discussions with the russians over numbers that we fit in or in discussions with russians on strategy. we could say to them what we are trying to get to here is a world where this is our relationship. okay. and not just talk about numbers, but this is the vision we have for our strategic relationship and what dangers we would face from one anoth. discuss it in those terms, and then come back and say how would we have to arrange our weapons in order to get to that point. that is, to me, a valid negotiating position, or negotiating approach with the russians. and i don't think the russians would object to that. and a lord knows, we've been

negotiating with these guys for 60 years. we should know them by now. and figure something like that out. and so we would start off with missions and then go to the numbers. >> just to add to that. the force levels that have been talked about, they were in fact one the first jobs of the npr, that one of the earliest processes in the npr was to come up with those. until i see the npr dealing in essence with two things. to horizon, if you appear to what is the immediate that has to do with this agreement. and it's a very modest goal, of course, 1500, or 1675. something a little below. but there is also another horizon of course which is about further 10, 15,0 years, because one of the unique things about this policy review is that

if it has to make decisions about new, central procurement, the next generations of delivery systems for all three legs, it is a huge task that has huge implications for not only what our postur is going to look like in 30 years, but also what we are telling the world that our intentions are. you know, we have a president that came out and said very forcefully that he is going -- he wants his administration to take concrete steps to move to what the elimination of nuclear weapons. all presidents have talked about elimination of nuclear weapons but he seems to be the first who is talking about those concrete steps to try to get them. of course, the big fight is over how fast to maybe take those steps. but it is posture review comes in and says well, we're going to have a new submarine, will have all of this, we will have a long

range bomber, it could be hard to convince people that we will get there anytime soon. and more so, we're goingo be thinking very clearly it seems to me also to countries like russia and china that we are in this for the long haul. so these are important things. there is so much focus on should we build a modernized warhead? that seems to be the focus of it, but in my view, although that is important, delivery systems are what's really speak the language out there. when we are worri about chinese modernizations, it's not because they have developed a new warhead. it is because they developed or deployed a new delivery system. that is the next days were come to. >> and these have lifetimes of 30 or 40 years, so we start bending metal, we are committing ourselves to kind of nuclear force structure we're going to have admitted sentry. >> since you brought about. i would ask about the new nuclear warhead. whatever they want to call it,

that that is it. i think i underand what the administration is going, but what i would like to hear from you is what is a consequence of each one of thoseecisions, what somehow say once and for all forget it, and we're going to go with a certain thing. >> elaine just wrote a story about how biden has apparently put his foot down from dates to revive the rw. so the question is wt form will it take? the reliable replacement warhead. it is a notion you're going to build a new geration of warheads based on existing old signs. but where you relax them and you can build in more features, safety and security and other features. so who knows how long they can spend that one or how far they can spin that, but ihink what is given is that there will be some sort of modifications to

existing warhead as part of the life extension. though seems to be the signs, whether it is called a formal rw program we will have to see but i think that's it. >> what is your expert take on what is better, what is culpable, in line with the goal? >> i think that i would rather see the life extension programs go forward then the our rw. the our rw -- the name itself is the basis of my critique. you know, it's the reliable replacement warhead, the implication saying it is reliable implies it is more reliable than what we have today, which it will not be. and our current nuclear warheads are perfectly reliable, you know, at the 98, 99 percent

range. so in fact, the uncertainty in the warhead reliability is wanted by the uncertainty in the delivery system reliability. and so they're basically is no difference between a 98 and 99% reliable warhead. it will not be really a replacement either. and because if you look out, you know, 30 years at least, if you look at navy and air force plans, they are going to deploy these warheads in parallel with the existing warheads. so it's possible that x. might be cheaper than why, but it will not mean that x. plus y. will be cheaper that x. or y. it will not a replacement. so the department of energy's justification that we're going to save money iges and we don't buy it. and the department of energy is notoriously bad at predicting how much things will cost. and finally it's not a, they are talking about the least for reliable replacement warhead that would replace, or be

deployed i parallel with the existing warheads. and so, i think, some people at the national labs would've been one of the big justifications is this is an exercise to keep their ability to build warheads all the time, which i think is not necessary. and even if you wanted to do that, they're going in the wrong direction. you don't need to make warheads that are extremely sophisticated and complex. because they are still thinking back in the cold war that they have to bullfight hundred ton, kiloton yields. and in fact, in our report here, we were trying to show targets. into a too to minimal deterrence. you want to inflict pain on the country to make the attacks seem not worth while, what kindsf targets, let's get specific and season targets are. so we did over backwards trying to find remote economic targets that were not associated with cities, because people talk

about how we don't target populations. wielded target, we only have military target. but think about washington, d.c., the pentagon, if that has to be a military target. the white house is a military target. that becomes a military command post. it just happens that millions of civilians are living around these things. and so to the people who live in the cities, there would be no distinction between counterforce and a counter force targeting anyone that was just designed to inflict pain by killing civilians. so we would to some effort and found a nickel refinery in the middle of siberia. and we look at 10 of these targets. and if you used 300-kiloton warheads, which is sort of average yield for our warheads, you would kill a quarter of a million people. and the casualties were over 1 million. but if you used 3-kiloton warheads, and you still killed 50 million people, i mean 50000

people, i'm sorry, and you would have casualties of almost 70000. so people forget just how immensely powerful these things are. and the current warhes are 10 times more powerful from the bomb that destroyed hiroshima. we don't need new warhead, and if we we sort of don't these you huge yields that they plan on having. >> there is -- two things. there is a notion here that counterforce doesn't kill civilians. you know, today we have a new technology called global earth. eryone can go out there and plot and where we know those nuclear launchers are in russia and where they're stored sites are and where their nuclear bomber bases are, etc. and i was just doing that the other day. i was looking at, i think it is down near sarnoff, where they have a bomber base.

they have weapons storage facility or to have an old missile field to the west of the city. you have an example of a pure counterforce attack, that would utterly devastate the city of millions of people. the example that you can certainly have enormous casualties, even from a pure counterforce strike. that is one thing, the other thing i want to make is we hear so much these days about the whole world is modernizing its nuclear forces, except us. you know, russians are building. the chinese are going to everyone is building and modernizing, but we are not. so we are losing the skills and are going to be out of business soon. but i just want to remind that they are building because they have to, if you will. we didn't have to build. we modernize our existing systems instead. they are so reliable that in the new, round up -- we just had something in the order of 128 or

so consecutive -- successful launches of our sea washed missile. the new russian missile has failed half of their test launches. this is an enormously reliable weapons system. plus, we are so confident. confident in our ability to ensure the warhead reliability of the future that in the life extensn program that is now starting for the tribal missile. we're going to extend his warhead for another 30 years. it was initially built to last 10. that's how confide we are in technology. so this notion here that everybody is building and we are just falling behind is really sort of spinning it. >> you know, if anybody asks you, you, confronts you with e russians are modernizing and we are not, the standard question is would you want to trade

nuclear arsenals with the russians. and there is no one who knows anythi about russian or american weapons systems would take that trade. >> with minimal deterrence, if u back off posture of being able to destroy russia's or china's, russia's particularly, capability before any launch, if you try to back off of that, doesn't that require sort of a political level of trust, in a way? you can see change in the political scenarios and russia that gave you the assance that that wouldn't be necessary. >> right. no, i take exactly what you

mean. and i think that is partly true. it would require changes in the level of political trust between any two adversaries, but it would also make possible the reduction in forces. it would make -- changing our missions will change -- will reduce the difficulty of getting further negotiations. and negotiated reductions in numbers. and part of at it is is exactly what you say is we feel confident with our security being based on distrust or not. and the analogy i use is that almost everybody knows from statistics, it is absolutely proven that it is safer to driv than it is flying. but when you fly, you feel as though you don't have any control. so you would rather take the risky route because then you have some control over your own destiny. imagine if we go back to my

round numbers before that the russians thought they needed to have 100 weapons to retaliate against us to deter whatever it is they're going to deter. and so they're going to keep 1000 so they would have 100 after our attack. so that his case a. and se b. is that we go to the russians and we say we are going to give up the ability to destroy your forces on the ground, and let's work out and we will negotiate down to the point where you have 100 weapons, okay. and it is true, we can't do anything about that. we can't stop you from launching that. we can do a first strike against those and reduced those for the pic you are just going to have those 100 we are at your mercy. and whereas the first case, data, we have 1000 missiles pointed at us, but if we push the button first we can get them down to 100. and the second case, day-to-day, we have 100 but there is nothing we can do. there is and people that would actually prefer the first case because it makes you feel as though you have some kind of control or the situation that's not simply based on

trust. but if youook at what the damage that can be done to the united stes, what the risks are we are running day today, with a probability of an accidental launch is or an unauthorized launch, or even haven't a war escalate into beyond past anyone's expectations into a real danger of nuclear exchange, then the second case is clearly unambiguously safer for us and the world. but it is true, it seems as though you are giving up some sort of control. and that is a psychological barrier that israel difficult to break through. i agree. writing the equations and doing the calculations and confronting people with, you know, even if i could make this airtight antenna to everybody, they still might prefer the first case just like the statistics, you can read the statistics and you still feel more comfnrtable driving and you do flying. >> can i just add there that it's interesting to look at the

chinese posture. because china in a way has, they call it a minimum deterrence posture. but it is in a way a minimal deterrence posture because it does not have forces on alert. it has never required or seems alert forces, nuclear forces to be central to its security. it has never seen a requirement for having a lot. and it's interesting to see what has driven their sse of security that when you see modernizations come forward, thereto a significant event trgered by concern about vulnerability of those forces to the type of postures that the united states and russia have. i mean,ur intelligence community has been saying this ever since we started deploying tritons any specific they have said well, chinese modernization program was hardly launched in response of that deployment. now we're ending the second

phase. we are just days out the first trident system in the pacific and that we have tried the trident to missile which is much more accurate, greater capability. and that will trigger some reactions in their planning of course. so the objective of a minimum he cared policy is to try to take the dynamic out of te nuclear posture and that continues to happen today. we have seen some of it in sort of the russian-u.s. bickering here over the last several years. we have the system and we will move this one, and all of that stuff. but that's the dynamic element that is unfortunately still very much alive in the nuclear posture today. and it would be important to stephen nuclear posture review any direction that would take away some of the drivers for

that type of modernization. >> if we were to move towards that very small minimal deterrence, yeah, there are some people who say that we want those nuclear warheads that remain, highly vulnerable so you have the confidence that you can withstand an airstrike. so would that suggest that the submarines go, that we would want to maintain them at a higher state of alert? or at least the current state of alert? are would you feel better really reducing the alert posture because it could also be dangerous? the mac right. you touched on something that is near and dear to me and hans. the submarines. we get a sketch out of what forced posture might look like and we actually eliminate the nuclear weapons from subregion or submarines have a really great public relations history going back into the cold war

between u.s. and the soviet union. submarines, when they first were developed, looked like the perfect stabilizing weapon. because they had the size of the missiles and the yield of the warheads, combine with the technical limitations that limited their accuracy made them impossible to use as a first strike weapo. but they were ideal because they were vulnerable, they would be idl retaliatory weapons. so in a situation we found herself in with a mutual assured destruction, which some pple call a doctrine, bute never had a doctrine of nuclear destruction to aquatic doctrine and the soviets had a doctrine of assed destruction and the result was mutual assured destruction. that seemed to be all good. well then of course, technology marches on the submarines got bigger and the missiles got bigger, the warheads now we can

put 475-kiloton yield warheads on a g5. day now, he used to be a did know exactly where the submarine was but you had to use the navigation systems were limited and so yououldn't have the missile be getting more accurate than the uncerinty into launch position, right? that is now all change with gps and star sightings and all sorts of other things. so now the missis on submarines are just as accurate as they are from icbms, land-based missiles. moreover, we can move the submarines close to the coast airport and fly into what are called depressed trajectories, which means that they might be 12 or 15 minutes away from their targets. we can also move submarines around to exploit gaps in russian early warning radar systems. so the submarines are, if you are on the other side, look like particularly threatening for strike weapons. so to answer -- your question was about subframes but you also

keep in mind, if we go to much, much lower numbers, okay, then we have abasing options opened up to us and also we don't have the requirement for rapid launch. now we can do things that before we would have just dismissed and. many, many years ago at the office of technology assessment, they did a book on mx basing mode, and they looked at, i don't know if you remember that debate. it was quite amazing that they had this missile and the question was well going to put it. and there was this huge debate about the basing of the mx missile which later became the peacekeeper when it was actually deploy. but one of the ideas was to come and i'm not proposing this as the solution, but an example of digging tunnels deep into the ground. even sealing the tunnels up and having the missiles in there, having the warheads in there. and then the soviets might be able to attack the interest of the tunnel where you dug in but you would have digging equipment and you would dig your way out at some random direction, did your way out of the mountain.

okay. that takes me a week to launch my weapons. it is very expensive. i can't, you know, i can't avoid many missiles that would. so that was just completely out. that was never considered. all right. let's back up. if i don't need to retaliate, i can't believe that my deterrence is going to change what i launch in a minute or an hour or a day. i have, maybe now i'm down to just 100 or so weapons, in the hundreds. i have fewer missiles. i can entertain us as it potential basic but. i can open myself up to ideas that have been around where i had to eliminate that basing mode because, for example, it didn't allow more or less instantaneous launch. which has been a requirement for a large segment of our nuclear forces since the russians, the soviets had developed a nuclear bomb themselves.

and so we can open up ourselves to new kinds of basing mode that we would not have considered for, like, putting things in tunnels or keeping warheads separate from the missiles. you can imagine things like, you know, intercontinental range cruise missiles that could be stored underground. there are a lot of possibilities that open up. >> what does that mean for the stuff that we have today? what would you want to do with that? and again, if you could sort also talk about alert postures and consideration of reducing them in npr. that looks like that is kind of a dead issue. >> they are sort of platforms because people have the perception that they are sort of the benign, sort of working force. that's all they do.

the trident today are the fun line of our offense of strike planes. they are not just those things that are waiting. so they are very offensive weapons, and that changes the dynamic. and in addition to that, you have no situation where russia is building a new generation of strategic submarines. they were down 20 d. care to patrol just a few years ago. now they are sort of gradually try to bring that up to speed again. china is now introducing a n class of ballistic missile submarines, god knows how many they're goinf to build. probably not very many but enough for them to have sort of a demonstration. i personally believe that stupid pasta because if their interest is to develop, the last place they should put it to put a lot of warheads on a few submarines and send them out to see. it is a big country and have a much better chance of hiding

mobile launchers on the landma landmass. and then of course we had i-india, just a few weeks ago india launched its first submarine that has a capability so they can launch missile. they're not as potent as russia and china and the united states, but nonetheless. this is a trend. and i think what we're thinking nuclear posture review and what it is, we would like to shape, the kind of nuclear relationship we would try to influence for the future, i don't think it is in our interest to advocate a posture where countries have nuclear weapons floating around in the oceans, hiding. there hard to verify. hard-to-find. they can sneak up on you, etc. etc. this is a bad posture it seems to me. we're trying to take the dynamic

out of the plan, etc. so those are my angles to the submarine issue. but we're advocating phasing them out. and focusing our posture on a land-based posture. also where you have -- ever since the cold where what we have been doing is we have been pulling our nuclear weapons in. they used to be deployed all over the world. we have been pulling them back to the country and everybody else has been doing that also. . . the person

i talked to certainly said that the sea-based lake, the submarines but now he was no longer so sure. but there were oth elements that come in. it's a very expensive platform d eecially if we go to lower numbers to build a submarine and ballistic missiles operate these things as we do with two crews, all the security, at&t logistics, infrastructure, et cetera, et cetera, to deploy how many nuclear weapons? so those factors come in too. the bomber force is another element. after the mina incident there's been an effort to try to blow

new life into the bomber force. that it was really a fading mission and now they're trying to beef it up and even retain a couple of squadrons to have enough bombers so they have six months in row when a turnover fashion focus on the nuclear situation, whether that trend is going to continue or survive remains to be seen. i mean, we need -- i mean, we'll have to make a decision not only the delivery vehicle but also the weapons they are going to carry. i mean, the air launch cruise missile is getting very old. are we going to have a new air launch cruise missile? so it' certainly cheaper, it seems to me, to operate like that. one thing you could mention what with the b-1 bomber and we faced

it out back in 1997 but we retained the weapon in what they call a nuclear reroll plan and daily operations it would not have nuclear missions. it won't be target -- you know it wouldn't be tasked on the strategic war plan on a daily basis, but it would have the capability if it became necessary within some months to bring the nuclear capability back, the weapons, the ability to deliver the weapons. and so you have a rerolled kind of posture where if necessary, the terrible situation arises and you have to -- and you have to increase what you can do with your -- well, the bomb is a very flexible system. it can do conventional missions or you could reintroduce a conventional mission to it. the strategic subrine is very different, you know, it's nuclear >> but your question has the general answer, yes, we're going

to get down to the point where issues about base closings and interservice roles and missions are going to start to play in these questions. you would like to pretend the world is pure and that isn't going to happen but, of course, issues -- i like the icbms because they bring money in my state. that is inevitably going to rise, absolutely, no question about it. >> just kind of a dumb question, maybe. just to make sure i understand this correctly. in the current u.s. nuclear plans, there are specific plans against china, iran, north korea, russia, syria and a 9/11 type like -- >> that's what we hear, yes. >> so there's no iran plan, right? >> there is an iran plan. >> i'm sorry. it's in there. you're right. >> iran is an wmd adversary. it may not have nuclear but it has other wmd so it is in the

plan. >> specifically, war plans xs on maps -- >> yeah. >> to hit -- >> we don't where the xs are but we know they're somewhere. >> even though like north korea can't really hit the u.s., right? >> no. well, they can strike u.s. forces stationed in north koa. they can strike our allies, japan, south korea. [inaudible] >> right, so we ar committe to defend south korea and japan. >> so if you think it is probably, that the nuclear ely, posture review would result in some -- in the kind of big shift that you are advocating -- >> uh-huh. >> does that basically mean that this lofty goal of moving significantly toward a world without nuclear weapons is

really just rhetoric and they're really -- there's no way without that significant shift they can actually start movement in that direction? >> i think that the -- no, it isn't just rhetoric. i mean, part of what we're trying to do at the fed recession of american scientists and, you know, talking to reporters and writing pers is to remind people what the president's vision. and, you know, i think there's a risk that the president -- people call it lofty, which sort of means, you know, idealistic and impossible but certainly sounds good, i don't think -- it is lofty goal but it isn't impossible. we can make real movement in that direction. we have this one mountain in front of us, which is the giving up the first strike capabilities, the counter-force capabilities, but i think part of what we're trying to do is to remind the people who are actually sitting in front of the keyboards and writing this

stuff, this is what the presidt has said and he means it. i think that that president obama really believes this is possible. i think he's right. i agree with him. and i think that that's what he wants to do. and it will be a tragedy if because of the, you know -- the vast machinery of how decisions get made in any government the size of ours -- it just -- you kno know,, you know, the wheels just stop turning. no, i don't think it' hopeless and idealistic and the president is imagining things and all the real serious people are going to say, well, what he meant to say was. no, i think it's clear what he said and he didn't mean to say anything. >> he said that but you're saying -- >> i'm afraid - >> it's not going to happen. >> i'm afraid it's not going to happen. i hope that it happens. i hope i didn't make -- i'm expressing a worry and a pessimism that i have but i'm not giving up, okay?

i hope it will happen. and just that the hints that you get from people who, you know, speak in public on this, it is not always encouraging and i want to -- one of the things that ink is helpful is to goose them a bit and remind them, you know, what their boss has been saying. >> if i understand you correctly, what you're saying is they can't get to his expressed goal unless they make this specific, dramatic shift? >> that is -- i will not -- that is my belief having studied this problem. i think that there are people in the administration who would disagree with that. they would argue that there is a continual path down that does not require that we cod -- we can keep moving down with numbers and there's a way to get to that. i think that we would disagree on that. >> are you talking about while maintainin the -- >> yes, exactly. i don't believe that we can -- we're going to run up against that hill there and we've got --

we're not going to get down on the other side unless we remove that hill which is keeping the first strike option. i suspect that they would say, well, it'll naturally kind of go away -- if we could get down to 1500 weapons, then 1,000 and then 500, well, it has to go away eventually. because there won't be any weapons to shoot with when we get down to zero, right? and i make the opposite argent that we're going to -- if you leave that as a mission, then you're going to start to get push-back from the military who are going to say, in all honesty -- and one thing you should make it clear, the military are in general not big advocates of nuclear missions, okay? they are not the ones pushing this. but if you give them a mission, they say, okay -- the president has told me i have to do x, y and z. i have to have certain capabilities to be able to do that and they will come back to you and, you know, the civilian leadership and the congress and the president and the senate and say, we can't meet our mission

with these numbers. and that will be the end of it, okay? the president will have -- will lose that argument, okay? the president has the ability to -- he has a sales job but if he can -- he can remove that mission, then the military will go to the pentagon, the white house and the senate and say, yeah, we can accomplish all of our missions. you've given us different missions, you see? [inaudible] >> oh, yeah, that's effectively a excuse for policy, you're right. >> we've seen -- followed closely several nuclear policy reviews and we've seen how the process can take over and so i think what's really essential is that the president and his immediate sta keep the pressure on the process and what it is -- what they want to see happening from this and not just leave it in the hands of people to figure out what does this

an what he's saying? in a way it's sort of a schizophrenic nuclear policy review if you can say that because if you look at the themes for this, what they've been asked to do, one is matain a safe, secured, effective, reliable nuclear deterrent. maintain extended deterrence to allies. and then continue to reduce the rolef nuclear weapons in u.s. national security and continue concrete steps in a world without nuclear weapons. the planners are being asked to do in a way two very different things. how do you do that? how do you maintain a safe reliable? what does it mean a safe and reliable posture? what is adeqte? and this is where we try to argue in our report that well, there's one level of adequacy which is expressed in the form of very efficient forces that are capable of knocking out the other nuclear forces -- kind of war-fighting, nuclear war-fighting strategy. there's another kind of posture

which is exemplified by just having a secured retaliatory capability. if deterrence is the objective rather than war-fighting. and so that's where we think that it's important to this review to sort of signal what those interests and long-term trends will have to be. >> and other things will fall into place then. is that questions about the reliability of weapons. the requirements -- these very high reliability requiremes go back to the cold war when we really -- when the mission was to destroy those on the ground and attack their munitions. if we have a pure minimal deterrence doctrine, you have to imagine a scenario where kim jong-il is going to use a nuclear weapon against us and then he thinks about that b-this, no, those americans, their nuclear weapons are 98% reliable so i'm n going to do that. and the next day the head of

north korean intelligence comes in, dear leader, we have new intelligence. their weapons are only 95% reliable and then kim jong-il says, oh, in that case, let's push the button. just isn't plausible. the difference between 98 and 95 is a big difference if i have 5,000 icbms on theround and i'm trying to destroy them and that's the difference between whether, you know, five survive or 50 survive or, you know, 100 survive. those are big differences on the damage that's inflicted on me. and so though -- a lot of the discussion about what the requirements for nuclear weapons are go back to cold war requirements. they've been with us so long that we forget to ask wt are the policy and doctrine implications of th? how did this come to pass and if we had different doctrine and different missionsor nuclear weapons, we would not have those same requirements. we sit around tables and everybody says well, of course, we need to have reliable nuclear

weapons. and everybody nods and says, yes, of course, that's obvious, right? well, when do you stop? what is the difference between 95 and 98 or 99? no one ever makes any attempt to quantify those but where that did make a difference in the cold war when we had the first strike capability. they different set of circumstances when we have different sets of missions. >> the other example is that safety and security, of course. this is a very popular theme right now because after 9/11, suddenly the security of our nuclear forces is much more important. the terrorists will do difficult things now a go and steal them and what have you. and so now we have a driver, a very important driver that ensures the safety of the weapons. not only if somebody steals it, they can't do anything with it. the terminology i've used -- i've heard in a couple of meetings now is, well, we want a bomb to be as safe as a coffee

table. well, that sounds good. who could be against that? but the question is, why? who sets the level? how do we determine that that hi degree of safety, other than sort of philosophically being a great idea -- why is that necessary? and this drives requirements to reliable replacement warheads and new warhead technologies at the labs, et cetera, et cetera. so where do these requirements come from? who sets them? >> how do you quantify them? >> can you touch just very briefly about cbt and where is that right now? >> the ctbt is both secretary clinton and the president have said it's a high priority. you know, i go to meetings and i hear different dates about when it will be submitted.

you know, vice president biden has been given that job of shepherding that through the senate. his national security aid, as far as i can tell sort of -- that's his job full time is the ctbt. unfortunately, ts congressional commission that came out was very ambiguous and will -- i shouldn't say -- they were very explicit -- the congressional commission on the nuclear posture that was released -- when was it last may or spring? they could not come to agreement on the ctbt and they had a, you know, for andgainst section on the ctbt. the earliest i've heard that it will be submitted would be next spring, march or april. most people believe this is the best chance that we have. whether the republican -- i

mean, the democratic majority will be as large after 2010 election -- you know, a taty needs 67 votes and that's very, very tough. and even if you got all the democratic votes, there are, you know, three or four easy republican votes and then you kind of fall off the cliff. at least mccain, gho voted against i in '99, has said that he is open-minded did this. he has not said he would vote for it, but he has said that would reconsider what has happened in the past 10 years and so we should not take his no-vote in 1999 to, you know, mean that he would definitely vote against it this time. and everyone agrees that the worst thing that will happen is bring it up for a vote and have it fai again. so there will be some draconian vote-counting, i'm sure, from biden and many pints of blood will be held in reserve to make certain that nobody backs out.

because they don't want to fail again as they did in '99 'cause that would be an embarrassment. and one of the time scales is the five-year review of the nonproliferation treaty is taki place up at the united nations in may? is it may? i think it's may. yeah, the review conference is may, 2010, and that is -- during the bush administration we kind of ble off the npt review conferences. obama has said that he takes them very seriously and he wants to come with a gesture of his support for the nonproliferation regime and the nonproliferation treaty in particular. the nonproliferation treaty -- actually not in the treaty itself but the preamble calls out the comprehensive test span treaty as one of the measures that the nuclear weapon states could take to indicate that they are working toward the

elimination of nuclear weapons, which was part of the grand bargain of the nonproliferation treaty. so that is where it stands. an enormous amount of work has been done on the verification system, the ims, the international monitoring system. back in 1999 people could talk about what it was going to be able to do and now with the seismic system i believe is 90% finish. the hydroacoustic stems are in place. more than half the radiological measuring stations are in place and plus the instruments they have are far more sensitive than they had in 1999. and so the verification question is now much less hypothetical and, oh, let me tell you how great it's going to . we have things that are -- for

example, the north korean 400-ton -- you know, .5 killi ton nuclear test was detected by something like 20 stations, i believe, a that was -- you know, so we've actually -- >> what was it? >> their first test and the most recent test which most people think it was 3 or 4 killitons. >> which one is this >> north korea? but the system passed with flying colors and so that's -- unfortunately, the north koreans tested a nuclear weapon but the good part is we got to test our verification system. i guess, if you want to find some tiny silver lining, you could find that. so i'm not -- you know, i'm not encouraging the north koreans to be our calibration source. but, you know, you make do with what you can. so that is where that stands. i don't know much more that i can talk to you about the technology until you drop dead.

but i don't think that's what you want to hear. >> thank you. >> okay. are there any other questions? all right. well, feel free to get in touch with us and we'll be around. i mean, this is going to be -- the next 12 months is going to be very exciting. >> yeah. that's for sure. [inaudible conversations] >> during this one process you have any questions, absolutely call us. >> and i will. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

>> and coming up after that, a live defense department briefing on live military operations in iraq. deputy general will brief officials at 1:30 eastern.

>> and now part of a conference on the government's new use of communicatio technology. we'll hear remarks from admiral thad allen at this event hosted at the potomac forum. this is an hour, fifteen minutes. >> hi, everyone. if you could take your seats.

we'll be starting now. okay. okay. it always happens after the break. security concerns surrounding social media has been increasingly in the news. and our next speaker as deputy cio for emerging technology for the department of the navy is both an expert and an advocate for both security and social media an@ understands the important of leadership on both. ladies and gentlemen, brian burns. [applause] >> good morning, everyone. about security and social media this morning. and some of the activities that we've been working. just for my own edification i'd like to just do a quick poll. in terms of the work force, we've had and still have

traditionalists, baby boomers, generation y and generation x employees, generation y is also referred to as millennials. in the audience here i'm curious of the millennials in the audience how many are using social networking on a regular basis for personal use? okay how many are using it for professional use? all right. and of the baby boomers how many are using it for personal use? and how many are using it for professional use? okay. we've got a good mix here. that's good. if you think about it, we've gone through this evolution several times. we've gone from the industrial revolution to the information age and now we're going from the information age to the collaboration age. and as we do that, we're seeing some of the trends that we've seen before. if you go back 20 years ago for some of us that are boomers, we went through the process of going from a paper society into using desktops and using office automation and we went through the trials and tribulationsç ho

do we secure it and use it and put it in our processes and eventually it became embedded that it's almost the furniture and fixture in most organizations today. similarly we're going to be similar things of social media and collaboration media as we move forward and we're going to have some of the same challenges that we had in the life cycle 20 to 30 years ago. sort of what i want to do is go through and talk about areas that we have seen. i want to mention as part of the department of navy, rob cary who's the tree information office is also the cochair of the federal cio council information security and identity management committee. and tha committee was established in december of last year to really look at identity management, cyber-issues and to coordinate the issues across the federal government. he's also cochaired with van hitch from the department of justice and we've broken the committees int four subcommittees. there's one -- security program

management and that's looking at things like the information systems security line of business, the fisma reporting, relationships for the core compensate sis for i.t. work force, working with the federal cio council work force committee and also advising on other aspects of management of security. we have a security and acquisition subcommittee that's looking at acquisition language that would go into contracts to make sure we have appropriate security controls in place when we're doing contracts. we have the identity credentialing and access management committee, subcommittee and that's looking at things such as the federal identity credentialing, federal pki and pdt efforts and really focusing on the human side and bringing it together with the devices and the objects for authentication and that ties into network infrastructure security committee and i cochair that with rob martin from doj and we've been looking at things

such as the infrastructure issues related to the trusted internet connection, fdcc or the federal desktop core configuration, d & s security, key escrow, directory services, ltifactual authentication and security in doing that we're looking at web 2.0 what that is from definitio and in that group we also have established a web 2.0 worng group and that's chaired by earl crane from the department of homeland security. earl would have liked to have been here today, unfortunately, he had a conflict. so i'm presenting the material that we've put together and allow the work that he's done in the web 2.0 working group. so we look at from a department of defense and into the department of navy. we have a variety of layers of service, social media service or general services.

at the first level we have the navy as we know it, the u.s. navy, and the u.s. marine corps. they report in to the military department known a the department of navy. we collaborate with the air force and the army and then brings in the joint strategies of the department of defense. we also collaborate with the federal government. so we have a variety of security constraints as we go forward with those different layer and then we connect to the outside world either private citizens, public and private national organizations or international organizations. if you think about it, from the outside in, there's a lot of data that we can put o there that is from a federal information processing standard or fips 199 standpoint, low classified or low sensitive data. things likectivities that are falling under data.gov and putting information out that is public access. all the way down into the secured networks that you'll see within the department of defense that are typically within

in-house based on the nature of the high end of the security of that. so we have to strike a balance between what are our internal media tools, what are external external media tools. oppose, i went back to the end. let me go back up real quick. so as we go down, i want to give a quick overview of what we term web 2.0 is, the terminology, some of the issues, the threat landscape that we've seen and then the application in the federal government specifically in areas that we've identified as spear fishing, social engineering, and web application security. and then some proposed solutions or thing to think about. i also to put the footnote down in here is not an endorsement or preference for any of the vendors or solutions that are mentioned. so what is web 2.0? we've used the definition from

tim o'reilly. and what he is web 2.0 is a business revolution in the computer industry caused by the move to the internet as a platform in an attempt to understand the rules for success on new -- on that new platform. so the main issue for us is how do we enable the federal government to securely use the internet as a platform? well, if we look at it we also have some different terminologies that we're clear for what we're looking for. there's government 2.0 which is really embracing web 2.0 technologies for the federal government. and it's been traditionally more internet-based platforms, external -- for external access. there's social media which is a compont of that which are websites that enable communication and collaboration through the online social networks and when w look at this, we really have to make sure that our security must be considered more with the web 2.0

technologies that were not covered under the web 1.0 and for clarity in the picture here, all these things, mash-upses geo tagging, platform servers infrastructure service and service-oriented architectures and they are all components and we'll focus on social media as we move forward. so what are some of the differences between web 2.0 and web 1.0? well, if you think about it, web 2.0 is really no longer just a browser. if you think about it, web 1.0 is more of an autocratic monolog of posting data out. web 2.0 is more of a democratic dialog between communities of interest. so what we have now is user-created content, global contributors, not just web masters and contributors -- when we say not accountable, it also means that there are a lot of

people that can contribute information that don't necessarily have to authenticate against some authority as w move out. also web 2.0 provides some feature-rich applications or dynamic capabilities when viewing information and then provides some additional exploits. so the internet threat landscape. if you think about it, so i shall media really has recitelized some of the old school methods. if you think about risk, risk is typically likelihood times impact equals risk. the impact -- we have very similar threats that we've had before in terms of phisching and malware but the likelihood of it occurring because of the social aspect of this increasing as we go forward so the magnitude increases, therefore, the risk increases as we go forward with this. so an example. coup face is a malware is a virus that's distributed through social media sites.

it links to the video and it's sent to a circle of friends that you have surrounded yourself with. when a friend clicks on the video, it downloads the virus. and at that point the attack is underway and then they can do the exploits. as the vice president of semic its said as malicious code continues to grow as a record pa we're seeing that attackers have shifted away from the mass distribution of few threats to the microdistribution of millions of distinct threats and that's a key thing. if you think about it, we are seeing the proliferation increasing as we go forward. and we have to keep ahead of the game. some of the things that, you know, we're looking at is when do you cross the line between blacklisting and white listing code and applications? from the application of the federal government, margerie graves, the acting chief officer

at the department of homeland security testified before the house oversight and government reform on may 19th of 2009. and she had a very ieresting statemen she said, we have now learned firsthand about the growing category of threats that have -- threats that directly target the federal government, our systems and our information. we've also witnessed how these threats have become persistent, more pervasive and even more aggressive than we imagined. these actors appear to be highly motivated, well-resourced and it will take all of our collective efforts to keep them out of our networks. so with that said, that's why we have initiatives like trusted internet connection and other initiatives. we've moved from the ad hoc hacking to very professional organizationally based hacking and malicious activity. there's three significant

cybersecurity issues that we've identified. but they're along the traditional lines that we saw in web 1.0, spear phisching and application security. spear phisching is an attack targeted at a user that attempts to trick the user to perform an action that launches an attack such as opening a document or clicking a link. traditional spear phisching attacks have used email in the past and now moving to the social networking sites. they really take the easiest path. a lot of it is dealing with trying to get money or find financial information to exploit that. the social media sites now allow attaers to use new techniques through the circle of friends so the federal threats are more likely not targeting credit cards but the information that the federal government holds. and a diagram that ben

schneiderman on the circle of relationships. you pretty much trust yourself. you trust your friends and families pretty well and they trust other people, which associate you with other colleagues and neighbors and then citizens and markets. as you go out, the erosion of that defense wall decreases as the social engineering or the social networking or social media sites are used. so there's better opportunity to socially engineer information out of a person through the indirectof the associations that they have. so basically social relies on the exploiting the element. and it still happens day, the phone call. from the help desk, i need to reset your password they're doing a patch and somebody says okay and give out that information. that could be a social engineering exploit. but what's interesting is if we do this, the federal employees start self-identifying themselvesn the websites it

really educates a footprint for the department out there and that information then can be exploited by our adversaries. so if we have one, two, three people out there and they have a dot mil adjust and we have 15,000 people out there or more you can start trending and seeing more information than before. there's far more information that people would have typically not given -- i call it the boomer days of email, we just sent an email with an email address. now with the social media tools, we have a lot more informion that people can see on that site when they look at the information in addition to actually the content that they are sending. and then the footprint i growing larger as we go. high profile federal employees then cree even a larger footprint. people that are out in the public sector, speaking,hat opens doors and then there's other exploits that can occur from knowing the information that is posted.

on social engineeri side, a large scale social media footprint really creates a rich targ for the environment for our adversaries. an example of that is information elisetation. an attacker learns personal information about the target and builds the trust relationship by expressing similar interests in the topics and the victim falls trust to an attacker when they establish that relationship. so, for instance, they're not necessarily going in and getting in and taking the data immediately. what they're doing is they're finding information but that n then be used later for an exploit so that they can get additional information for other purposes other than just knowing who you are. and then from that they do gain more information about the user and use that relationship to expand the influences of other coworkers and do the exploit that they want to do. a traditional one is a letter scam. you get a person that sends you something. you open it up and it asks you

for some information, either by just opening that up or rending that session you now have been exploited or by answering back to that person you have validated certain information and then that can be exploited again. from web application security standpoint, wh dynamic web pages it introduces some more interesting capabilities to be exploited. for example, cross-site scripting attacks can now be launched and their job script base loggers capture user key strokes can occur. a cross-site across forgery can use your credentials to other websites. these things are happening in dynamic or real time mode as you launch these pages. while a high tech personal account may not be -- may not seem very significant, and may be annoying, and embarrassing, on a federal perspective it can have much more significant

ramifications. for example, it could produce unofficial posts, tweets, messages that may be seen tthe public as official messages or maybe used to spread malware encouraging people to click or downloading applications and they can gain access to federal information. if we have the wrong information posted and we don't have the integrity of the information and it looks like it's coming from the federal government, that could have significant impacts from simple things as weather patterns to sensitive data and statistical data, health data or other areas. so some suggestions, in terms of looking at social media sites, you may want to conder some of these things. let's throw out some ideas. training standpoint. operational security awareness is the fundamental issue. it's about the behavior of the user, whether that's professional behavior or private behavior or personal behavior.

we need to educate the user software privacy controls. what are the things you should be clicking on. do we accept the default. should there be different defaults in military users than your traditional private user. we need to educate them about the real threats when sharing personal information onne. and also any other data that they have pictures, et cetera. we need have recommendations in how federal employees need to identify themselves when on these external sites. again, i creates the footint. so how do we want to manage the footprint that does get out there? and then on the personal and professional counts, separating the information between your personal life and your personal life have a colleague list and a friend list and what do you want to post and do you really want a hybrid of the two combined? on the provider controls, we really do need code validation and signing.

that's more white listing, identifying code and having appropriate hash algorhms so we know this is valid code, having certificas with it and basically white listing saying we know these are good ones to use so we cavalidate. setting up specific profiles and privacy settings as defaults that would be more restrictive and partnering with the partners because at the end of the day, fr a low end stand ñ of sensitivy,e can put a lot of stuff out there in the public and we can collaborate a lot but as you move higher up in the chain in terms of the security of the information, we have to put more stringent controls in. and for those of you in the audience who are familiar with the special publication 837 which is a certification and accreditation criteria, there's a significant amount of things that we ve to do that leads to the special publication 863 which are the controls that have to put in contro low, medium and moderate and high systems and if you're in the military

world then it gets into dicat. those fundamental controls need to be in place if we're going to go to the social media sites and also into cloud computing for thes things. it's a matter of how muchata is pushed and when and where do you draw the line between external and internal because at the end of the day we still have to protect the data. on t network control side things to think about are the website content filtering based on agency social media acceptable use policy. this gets back to user behavior. what is allowed publicly and privately to be used for personal use? what is allowed to be put out in the public site clearing things appropriately with the public affairs office and so on. high assurance gateway. this is basically putting in e appropriate content filtering and the appropriate intrusion detection and intrusion prevention, whether it's host-based, whether it's perimeter-based but at the appropriate levels of gateways.

use o trust zones and virtualization technologies. and gets get into do we set up functional areas of trust based on the content of what the organization is doing? for instance, do we have a criminal trust zone for criminal investigations? do we have a health trust zone? do we have other type of health zones or do we associate it with all this data is lowso, therefore, it can be hosted in a certain location. this type of data is medium. we'll segment the data but it's hosted at a higher level of security and so on up the line. really developing a those trust zones going from a server and a data storage point of view to information management point of view in identifying how that information is going to be used tying both the devices, the objects to the human who wants to interact with that data. trusted internet connection give us a front door to the external world and better control and better insight and better

monitoring of the information flowing in and out of the networks. validation, proxy depack and inspection helps us identify what comes in and out either in real time, near real time or historically for whatever investigative needs we need to do. tagging is also another thing that we need to start looking at. what is the content of the data? what is the context? what is the security level, the privacy level, the authoritative location of the data and the authoritative duration of the data? we want to have accurate information. we don't want to be using data that's old that could reach an incorrect decision because we didn't have it so to speak tagged appropriately as we go forward. and new technologies to verify source and users such as dns and there is a requirement within the government for it at the external level to be implemented. from a host-controlled standpoint, obviously, end-point protection, common operating

environment, the federal desktop core computing or other federal platform core computing as we move forward. right now as you know, fdcc requires standard configuration for windows xp and windows vista but there are other operating systems out there and we need to consider those. and hspd12, or hard token and other type of token use for multifactual authentication. so basically what this mean is a information-centric approach. start with the information. the information has attributes. it's stored someplace. the storage is located within systems, systems have controls. we need to transport the data across the media, present it to a user, ideify that the user has the appropriate privileges and then the user can see the information. so start with the information and really look at the information-centric approach. so in summary, at the end of the day, security of social media

really starts with the protection of the data, confidentiality, integrity and availability and the user behavior, whether personal or professional. it's not necessarily the tool sets. it's the fundamental things that we've been doing for 30, 40, 50 years. protection of information and the behavior of the users. and if we look at those things and keep them in context of the tools, we'll be able to put these tool sets in place in the appropriate mode so that we can exploit the next capabilities and the benefits of these tools. thank you. [applause] >> we have time for a couple of questions, one or two questions. yes. i saw his hand up first. i'm not sure what happened to the mic. could you just stand up and state your question. >> i'm curious -- [inaudible]

>> i'm curious about the community and net opps, how much integration is taking place between those two communities of interest to actually safeguard our networks but still provide agility and freedom of maneuver and this new domain? it seems to me that typically the community is over here on the side, throws up all the caution flags and it's putting it upon the net opps community and the branch division directors level additional duty reps for the information to figure out how to live within those rules? i think that's probably one of the reasons -- i think one of

the reasons why we have -- one of the reasons why we have a lag in keeping with the technology. if you notice the demographics, the age demographics of this room, there are a few people under the age of 25. and i would just submit that it's a possibility that we're catching up. they already get it. they don't need to be here. one of the reasons why we don't is because the integration between i.a. and opps doesn't -- isn't really conducive to bringing with efficiency and speed the operational community up with technology as qckly as it changes. >> well, i think -- i think this is a fundamental thing that we've seen time and time again. that the innovation occurs very

rapidly and we see the new tool sets come out. the security lags behind that in terms of putting the constraints around that. the new ways of doing that is good but we have to put the wrapper so to speak around it. and it really gets back to -- it really gets back to the data. first of all, the classification of the data, what -- how it should be protected and then working with thoseommunities to sa what arehe business rules and how do we put that information out? as you probably know, we've gone through that issue as you just explained within the different organizations. we have seen from one end with public affairs and human resources absolutely want to use theseools to engage the public to recruit individuals and military individuals and also to put information out. to the other side of protecting the data and the intelligence information that we have. so we have to provide that balance. so there are activities going on within d.o.d. right now to bring the net opps -- the opps sect

folks together so that we have some common ground of what are those partitions or layers that are going to come out in the use of the tools? it will depend where we draw those boundaries or those trust zones. and that's -- at the end of the day, that's what it's going to have to be. what is the parameters for each one of those trust zones that we develop? >> thank you, brian. i'm sorry we don't have time for that second question. sorry about that. but thank you very much, brian. and please accept this as a small token of our appreciation for taking time to come. >> thanks. [applause] >> and now as i say for something really different, andy, with the graduate school formally the usda graduate school had a conflict that come up today for those of you who know andy that would not prevent him from being in two places at

once and being at a gov 2.0 event. we're going to do something a little bit different here. we have andy with us via video. and here he is. as soon as i allow his content because of the security risk. yes. yes for andy because we trust him. >> please allow me to thank ken fisher for his invitation to join me today. in particular i appreciate his openness to the possibility of appearing by video this morning since i am moderating a panel tonight that includes two of our local congressmen representative price and representative miller here in durham where i reside. it's not a town hall meeting on healthcare so i and the congressman should make it out without needing to dodge a verbal barrage. the topic is much less controversial.

why foreign aid is important to you. now that should be an easy sell in this economic environment. wish me luck. as an aside i'm a big fan of stephen colbert if fictitious characters appear on that late night show it may not a coincidental. as a question we might ask, what do we expect from a gov 2.0 lead? just who is this we that is asking the question? is it the 20-somethings who are just beginning to enter government and who expect to have immediate and unfettered access to facebook, cell phones, twitter and youtube for both personal and professional use on day one? actually, no. it not about them.

true, the millennials and gen x jerks grew up with the phones and boomers grew up with tv. yet, the we that wants leaders to hear this message today is anyone who hopes that government will become more open, collaborative, and participatory. my humbling is is that everyone desires a government that more efficiently accomplishes the work of the people and more effectively engages citizens in the process of policymaking and service provision. when we speak of leaders that buy into this vision and have begun to implement novel, web-based projects to achieve it, we often say that they get it. but what does that mean? today i would like to suggest that there are at least six

essentially competencies that have a leader. you get it by being first. innovative. gov sprays 2.0 leaders are innovative. in a playbook, the authors indicate that say that many public organizations make sporatic efforts to encourage innovation but few implement the formal changes needed to spark transformational change. for innovation to take route, government agencies will need to take theiew of the innovation process provide by generation, selection and diffusion. in other words, if you want to be a gov 2.0 leader you have to create a culture by enabling employees, industry partners and the citizens to take risks and receive incentives for ground-breaking initiatives.

innovation is not just about coming up with ideas. it's about empowering people to make those ideas take flight. second, gov 2.0 leaders know it's linked to trust. in an interview of his book, steven m. cubby contends today's increasing global marketplace puts a premium on true collaboration, teaming, relationships and partners and all these interdependencies require trust. he goe on to say that compliance does not foster innovation. trust does. you can't sustain long-term innovation in a climate of distrust. trust is the one thing that affects everything else you're doing. it's a performance multiplier which takes your trajectory upwards. for every activity you engage in, from strategy to execution. employees will be more likely to

take risks if they feel trusted and they will trust you only when you follow through on their innovative ideas. of course, a gov 2.0 shares informatn freely. and at the center of technology and national security policy at the national defense university there in washington, d.c., states, quote, nowhere is getting the right informati at the right time more critical than in the area of national security. and people working in the government know all too well the consequences of not having such information available in a timely manner. although, there are completely reasonable concerns about network security in information assurance, the costs of not sharing information and outweigh the costs of sharing it, unquote. in the same article, it indicates that strong top-down leadership is necessary to create an environment of need to

share or responsibility to provide rather than need to know. leaders make information readily available to authorized users and incentive sharing through performance measures and accountability. in other words, let's create a culture where the people who advance most quickly are the most generous with information. not the ones who hoard and guard it. of course, information-sharing works best within communities of practice, among people that trust one another with the data that they are divulging. that's why a fourth competency for a gov 2.0 leader is to be team-oriented. beth simone novak now in the white house office of science and technology policy recommend that working in groups rather than individually offers several important advantages for the government agencies in need of useable information and solutions to problems. she points out that these vantages go beyond mere

u the effect of mutual reinforcement and motivation. enthusiasm from collective action is bolstered by the ability to be effective and powerful and power is in turn created by a shared enthusiasm for working together. did you hear that? our is not controlled bit individual who holds all the information. rather, true power is catalogized by the gov leader of a capability of a team that accomplishes a common mission. ..

>> there can be as much as you as in the blink of an eye as in months of rational analysis, unquote.

the gov20 later trust the data generated and shared by the team. then, follows his or her intuition boldly and bravely. finally, gov20 leaders must be cast oriented. and a highly mobile society, most projects to longer require a specific place or time. for most knowledge workers, work is not a destination or duty station. rather, it is a set of discrete tasks that need to be accomplished by the particular date. web-based and phone-based tools enable employees to accomplish their specific functions whenever and wherever they are most productive. the gov20 and will focus less on an employee's time and tactics, and more on the tasks and target. closy to this task organization is imperative for the government to move forward a performance-based environment. if both the supervisor and the

employee are clear on the wide, behind any given activity, it has specified who needs to complete what by when, the where in that equation becomes irrelevant. gov20 leaders that move towards a task orientation, the recruit and retain the best employees as those employees experience eight better worklife balance and feel trusted to fulfill the role they were hired to perform. so these are the six core competencies of a gov20 leader. innovative, trusting, information share, team oriented, intuitive, and task oriented. if you want to get it, spend some time reflecting on the degree to which these traits are integrated in your leadership portfolio. before we conclude, it's important to point out what we did not mention. first, no one expects a leader to be infallible. in fact, in his keynote at the

open government innovation conference a couple of weeks ago, noted visionary can o'reilly said government should encourage safe failures. our new chief information officer echo this idea at the same event when he said that quote capturing data lets you measure went to fail fast, quick, and stop putting money in bad projects, unquote. robin of the white house office is a technology policy says to iterate, try, even if you fail, she said. keep changing. for each of these individuals, the ascension was that failure is an option, and that it will happen. failure for them seems to be inevitable. in fact, it seems to be an essential element of a more tranarent innovative government. also, please note that the gov20 leader ds not need to be technologically savvy. there are plenty of technical

experts that can take the gov20 vision and make it a reality. one word is worth ripping. vision. generate ideas and code abstractions that inhibit execution. as a gov20 leader, create a culture whe ideas fall freely aninnovation is rewarded. starting from the top, champions and smashing the silence in between. after all, gov20 isn't just about information technology. that's merely an enabler for creating more transparent, collaborative governments. gov20 leadership is about being innovative, and information share, intuitive, trusting, team oriented, and task oriented. so if you get it now, well, we all want it, right? i mean, don't we?

so i would say let's share it. thank you very much for your time this morning, and i will look forward to seeing you across the web. have a great rest of the conference. >> okay. thank you, and he. and i will forgive you for the interruption. other than that, he lded exactly on time. i appreciate that. so, just curious, what is positive on having a video at a conference like that from a remote speaker? i see some shaking heads no. just put on your feedback form, please help us understand what you did enjoy, didn't feel as useful to you in your job. and now were going to have a

word from dan. dan in his role as the public administration has been reacted in a collaboration project which seeks to collect examples of gov20 inaction from across programmer. as image viewer, but at totemic forum is working to present today at the bar as well as in a wiki one government to broaden the reach of the conference to the entire gov20 space. then we'll talk more about why this important hiking participate. dan? >> please welcome dan. [applause] >> thanks, everybody. i'm going to steal a little bit of indeed's time but i don't think you'll mind because he is not here. just roper, how many of you have heard of nafta?

>> excellent account if you're really cold? me to. we are in the same boat here, but good that gets the creative juices flowing so that's great. part of what we do at the national academy is tackle what we call the really important big issues of government management and federal management. and we have traditionally been in areas like acquition, h.r., things like that. but a year or two ago we started branching out into the view that this issue of collaboration and innovation government is also a management challenge. and i want to use that to set kind of the frame of what i'm going to be talking about here are what we have done is we've gotten together, as ken mentioned, with government and some other great folks to make sure that what we do here makes a lasting impression. what we mean by that? this is a form on success stories. is about sharing best practices

and things that went really well or really important findings that you've learned and when we say success story on with a best practice, what we really mean is more people should do this. you know, i think i found se good or valuable, a better way to do something, and things would be better if more people didn't like us, or at least tried. but to do that, they have to know about it, of course. and this is a big conference, which is great, but not everyone is here. and i'm sure all of you, as you're hearing about some of the great innovations that are being shared here today are thinking about folks om your organization who are finding things back at the ranch but who really could benefit from some of the learnings, some of the tools that you are hearing about here. and to what i want to do is talk about how we are answering the question of the ideas and successes that we share here today gned wider knowledge and gain wider adoption, live beyond what we just do and talk about here today and tomorrow. so, but how? one ep is document what

participants say. and we are doing that talking about just documenting the conference itself, the fact that it was here, the fact that happen, where it was hell, taking notes from sessions, links that you can provide. that a step that is going to want the gov loop that we've been talking about which i will show you in a moment. the other piece is documenting what attendees and other folks think about it. that is a critical point. we don't want to just be in broadcast mode. would also want to be in receive mode. one of the most important things to do at an event like this is make sure we capture what are the interesting questions that a presentation raises, or what are some of the reflections, or reactions that you have that can really add value to some of the stories that are being shared here. the 13 to do, and this is kind of where we come from the management perspective, is that after the collaboration project with out how to develop a framework for turning successes like this into real case studies, things that document import in fact that are really

durable d that lavonne. so what i want to do is show, not tell. and show you some of the compent of how i wil be doing this. so the gov loop, which is the first beast, and that is category immediate stop to help us docent some of the great things that are talked about here throughout the week you will see, you go to gov loop.com and click the tab and there are a bunch of pages. i think you will see one dedicated to this conference. come here and dropour note, whatever you think is hopeful. like i said some of it can be logistical information. some of it should be, you know, just real interesting notes on points that were raised that were important. and your own reactions and links to external resources of well, things that weren't mentioned here but if they could add to the conversation. because we really want this to be living record of not just what was sai but the question that was raised and the interaction that happened. a second piece of it is recording what folks thought about it. that's kind of where he comes in. i know we have been tweaking

about this and part of what we're going to try to do i record that twitter stream alongside the notes on what we said we had kind of a running record of how folks reacted to it and what sort of some of the reactions are. we did is for odi, which ay rivoli talked about a few moments ago. d it was a great resource. soe will be doing that. and the third piece is this collaboration project website. this is collaboration project.org. and this is a place where we have documented really a lot of, dozens of different case studies and success stories of the government 2.0, not necesrily things all about government, but things about governance. so could the websites we're just citizens banded together to take some kind of action. we put together a case that is like that, eventually we will feature all the cases that come out of here on the site. and part of that is in the ucd, the top of it. we develop a framework for developi these.

that includes talking about the business challenge that you face, the lessons you learned by taking it, and what you consider your return on investment. are you measured it, y it might've been hard to measure it, things like that. and so that's going to be som of the framework that we would use for that. so what can you do now, right? i see a lot of you have laptops here. and when you can get on the web you can take notes right in ther tweak using, that is the wrong dish what i'm using now? pf got. so pay no attention to my gigantic powerpoint screen over here. pfgov. always think of other resources to tt, including on. and finally invite others even who were unable to attend with us today and tomorrow invite them to come out and make some contributions, just knowledgebase and really help spread this around because i can, i would just include the top that what we are doing here is trying to share some of the really important successes and

lessons that we've learned. and while there are a lot of people here today and tomorrow, there's a much wider universe of people who need to know about this knowledge who could benefit from it. and want to really make sure that what we talk about today does make a lasting impression. so thanks a lot for your time. i have another session tomorrow, but i appreciate having a few minutes to talk to you now. thanks. [applause] thank you, dan and i hope that you do participate. i think embracing gov20 is embracing participation. so we hope as many of you as possible to take some time to participate in the wiki. as a wrap up our session, on leadership, i'm re that many of you are very anxious to go back and start toward leadership blog. out when? how they are going to start a leadership block after this? can win the back. know what is even. but what you say? where do you start?

our next speaker is andrew baker, of social media and program director of club d.c. she is an enthusiastic she trained federal agencies in the use of social media and we invited her here to wrap up our session and leadership of social. to give us some quick hits on writing a blog. andrea? >> good morning. is this on? can you hear me? okay. i do things it'll differently. i don't like you typically use powerpoint presentation, and i also don't like to follow any set format. so we're going to switch things up a little bit today. i'm going to pass my camera

along. take pictures of people in the audience. i would like to contribute to the wiki and all are toldy actually popular in with content. so i'm going to pass this around. >> i also -- [inaudible] >> go ahead. >> i also have a little flipchart. okay. i brought this little flipchart. i have a new roommate, who knows nothing about government 2.0 at all. is a dj. so i try to explain to him what i do for a living. d we came up with this last night to kind of explain the

difference 2.0 that you hear. qaeda going back was. i will be talking about blogging but i wanted to throw some stuff back out there. so who is a little confused about all these 2.0 terms? are some of going over your head? some of his terminology? do you know the difference between what web 2.0 and government 2.0? i see some shaking of the head. do you know what enterprise 2.0 is? some not, some shakespeare feel free to interact. this is an interactive session. so i came up with this little prestation last night to say what is enterprise two oh and ran five and government 2.0. i find there is the internet and intranet. and you have that firewall of protecting information, i've heard people talk massacring government information today. but collaborating. i put it in the words cloud

computing. democratizing data. i put that appear above in the internet web 2.0 section. that section is basically saying this is everything that we can put out there on the web, free, you can put after facebook, your twitter. this is where that space operates. and then there is the internet. that is the stuff you do behind the firewall. and if you want to be a government 2.0 blog or airship blogger, you are probably going to want to work in this space first. it is behind a firewall. you a crossing your message. you are getting to know who your audience is. you are getting feedback from ur employees, and you are getting -- it prepares to put it outside,ad that message out there. so that his sub 20. what you learn that message and put it from behind a firewall, from behind a firewall into in front of a firewall and on in a bit. >> so while i'm talking ikeda

came up with these samples come and there is a bag full of markers. i would like you to come up here at random, get out of your seat, stretch her legs, and put what you think social media tool is next to the 2.0. so if it's web 2.0, you are probably thinking twitter. or you are thinking wordprocessor. something like that. so put that up here and then if it actually falls under multiple categories. you can draw a line. anybody want to start while i'm talking? so the natives going to start us all. >> i put this tother a while ago. i wanted to write a blog about this and i haven't quite donet yet. but everybody has a social circle. and i am in the middle here and i called out these five things as my social circle. i have my professional, my

friend, my family, my music scene, my cheeks. here i would call this my professional social circle, but i know there are a few geeks that i am friends it was in a crowd. i also have my music friend. and these people influence my life and how i want to write. so when i'm dealing with the social circles i have to figure out how my going to communicate with them? do i commuting via the telephone, text messaging, twitter, am my writing in a blog, sort of an e-mail? there is so many different ways we continued it with people today. and so you can see there is this line from last night. so when you're going to blog and reacher chimera, you want to ask yourself what is your mission that you want to get across in the blog? what is that action, the statement that you want to make? and you think about who your target audience is. if you are a general, you

probably want to talk to everyone underneath you in the chain of command and put out a broadcast message. that way you can put that message out there and actually get that feedback. i know general cartwright is very well known to do that. and think about, okay, how are my -- how am i communicating now? am i putting out a blast e-mail and i am getting a gazillion e-mails back. if i'm doing that, maybe i do want to put it on the blog because all those questions that are being asked, maybehey want to put that on the public anonymously or attributable, so that other people have the same question can see the answer. and so then how do i make that government 2.0? well, again, down to my car, go back up here, you want to craft that message behind a firewall. anthen what you start getting your practice, you are writing a

og, you want to put that out on the internet and actually start using that as your press release, or your public affairs. i mention enterprise and i got a couple shaky, i don't know what that is. it is really does play into the government 2.0 message. government 2.0 is encapsulating social media and that professional message behind a firewall. and we're taking that knowledge management there was a buzord it is in the early '90s and -- late '90s early two thousands of saying that we need to capture this knowledge, how do we get that information out there. so you want to create a wiki or a blog to capture the information you say all the time. and that is enterprise 2.0. and so outraged is what you want to do, i guess it's your output from the enterprise 2.0 ever.

so let's see. we have people i know have been writing. let's see what people think. who wrote that? what do you mean by generation? sorry. >> talking that there are a few that people have helped kind of throw ideas out there and then bubble up the ones that get the most agreement. so it's kind of a solution for finding and actually identifying d implementing some cool ideas that kind of sitting out there. >> how do you capture the idea generation? ivan, how do you capture this idea? do you write them on a wiki? go to gov loop, capture that.

but how do you make sure once you've gotten your message practiced in the wiki that you get it out? >> in tools like this a lot of times will happen is you will put an idea of there that you think is pretty good, and then hopefully it kind of gets around and you can kind of spread the word as well and get others to vote for it and get on board. and hopefully what you've got, and a lot of these platforms have become in some ability for folks who are in charge of picking which ideas to implement can respond and say yeah, we're doing this or no, we're not going to do that. so it's a good way to cast a wider net for innovation, but also keep some kind of process around it. >> i thought this would help with this necklace, but i guess it's not. i will bring it higher up. i really am disappointed, you guys. this chart is not filling out by it so. come on. someone get up there. there is a million social media tools and they all have a

purpose. i want to put this picture up on the wiki, and actually on flickr and tried to get it out there because i want you guys to feel like you have created something out of this conference. that you actually are not just participating in the audience, i mean you're up here. not just sitting there, you're participating. because if you need some help, here's some help. you can pick one of these tools. you know, there is a blogger. anyone familiar with blogger as a tool? how about word? how about social text? two hands. what about social cadge? i don't see any hands. there are different tools that you can use to crosser method, and i want you to think about what you're writing a blog for the first time, that you are actually just journaling.

don't worry about being professional in the first place. you just want to put your thoughts down on paper. radio guys, there is no set form. they did have some bull point of what they want to talk about that day, and then when they get on the radio, th actually just talk. and then the conversation goes from there. so that's where i want you to thin about when you are actually blogging. when you start for the first time, don't be nervous that you're actually not putting out what you want to say. because your audience will help you. this is behind a firewall because i want you t get some practice before you actually go out there and put it out on the internet. and a lot of thisappens, you know, this starts maybe some people have a natural talent and it starts right away. sometimes it takes months to practice. i personally have been blogging since 1999, before i even knew it was called blogging. i would go out every night with the music scene.

i waa professional marketer and promoter. and the next day i would come back home and i would write up my experience for the evening. and then i would post my pictures that i took. an i didn't realize that this is actually like the earliest forms of blogging. and so if you think about it, you want to recapture your thoughts of what you did the day before. start that we. just become very easy with what you already know. and eventually, you can take that, those thoughts and start practicing it to things in the future, and ideas that you have later on down the road, things that you would like to see if. and this is the way you can generate some content. i know mark is a big blogger. how do you promote with a blog? do you want to share your tips? no? [laughter] >> i think there's a trade secret. but we know that everyone has a different way of capturing their thoughts and putting it on what

used to be paper. we all used to write letters to each other, or postcards. now we are just doing it a different way. now maybe this is better suited as a blog. because it is a proprietary information that only these 50 people on my list need to know? probably not because they have a forward button. they can forward it on. unless you specifically say this information should go out anywhere, it probably will get forwarded on because they know this is a good point, a good message. and if you think it is something that should be shared, then you definitely are someone who should be blogging. are we getting closer on the chart? just? [inaudible] >> of a. you don't have to be a graphic artist. obviously i am not a good graphic artist. so i put others in social media tools that will help you, and some of them are