federation of labor unions. labor unions at@@@"0iá >> the national strategy council will be replacing another -- a prevus group, advisor group in the office that was mostly made up of business leads and acadics. it was supposed to chart economic and industrial polcy. it appears that the new national strategyureau will have no business representation. so the business federation is out in the cold. that's not necessarily -- it's a bad thing in some ways. it's a bad thing because the dpj is talking about some policies that are very prolabor union and bad for business. like banning part-time laborers when the labor unions have complaints. and the business leaders hav

said, if you say we can't hire part-time workers, the result is not going to be that we hire full-time workers, the result is we'll set up shop in vietnam, indonesia and china. another one is climate change. it's a good thing that japan will be active on climate change but i object so aggressive that it will dri japanese manufacturersffshore and one of the problems in the economy is like our economy, ice the japanese erg haves of ohio, michigan and pennsylvania that are in trouble because it's easier and more productive to be building thingin china or vietnam. so it's not cler to me that these are good policies or sustainable policies that are a problem. but one thing they will have to rejuvenate too. it's typically like an industry like steel on petra chemicals, not exactly t economy of the

21st century -- the green economy of the 21st century. much more reflective of the heavy industrial economy of the 1970s. so the power structure in the business federation is probabl thirty, 40 years out of date. and it's an incredibly impressive organization. it's an expertise and its ability to hav business and policy proposals. it's also older japanese economy. and then finally in terms of japanese politics, one good thinthat i think will come out of this that will last is that the process, the policy process is going to be more opened up no matter when the lbd ces back or not. this was a vote for a ifferent kind of process in politics. and i think in jan whereivil society has been compared with korea, for example, or taiwan, where civil society has been slow to grow, the dpj is going to be very supportive in terms of tax laws and powering ngos.

that's a good thing, i think, for japan. i think women are going to have a more active role in the dpj. it's going to break open some of the old holes on political promotions and political participation. immigrants in japan, korean citizens living in japan or koreans with japanese citizenship, n immigration. i think the dpj is going to be more open in these areas and this will make japan a more dynamic and open up and that's good. although, it is entirely possible that this time next year i'll be giving a talk about how the lbp is back it's in a striking majority in the house and the economic forecast forjapan, the dpj is going to experience as a problem and it's quite possible in the upper house election next summer

the dpj and forcing the dpj to resolve internal contradictions and then unravelling them. i think these structure politics in japanese politics is likely to continue and it was anticipated. it doesn't mean the dpj will be in the end benefit from or implement them. policy, the dpj put out a manifesto, its policy campaign platform before the election. it was thehird one that was put out and it was by far the most moderate and fuzzy and centrist on foreign policy defense but it still had some things that are going to be a headache for the obama administration. revising the status of forces agreement that governs our our troops are treated and their legal recourse in japan. reviewing or blocking the agreement to change u.s.ases in okinowa and things like

declassifying nuclr agreements between the u.s. and japan. most of which date fro before i was bern. they are looking to find a bureaucrat to blame and they can't find one who's alive and who's around. not that anybody cares in the u.s. from nuclear agreements from 1959. the whole idea of throwing out unilaterally all the secret agreements is not going to build a lot of confidence in the about him administration about sharing intelligence and secret agreements so that will be a headache. proposals to -- this was not a manifesto but it's part of the earlier promise to pull japan's ships out of the indian ocean where they e fueling coalition forces in the effort against afghanistan. anynd all of these if really pushed will be a major headache

the obama administration doesn't have the bandwidth to deal with right now. not pushed hard, the dpj since being elected on these in his phone call, he was very general in his meeting with the ambassador. he didn't deal with any of the specifics. he sent very good sials. onhe other hand, a few weeks ago, he put an article in the "new york times" bashing globalization and blaming the economic crisis on the united states and promising japan would have -- promising japan would calibrate with asia if you're in the white house it does not look like -- although it's not specific does not look like a very ambitious or positive agenda for u.s./japan allice. the dpj has also got to manage it's coalition partners. it doesn't have a majority in the upper house around. it needs to rely on the

socialists who came in the government a decade or so ago. they changed all their policies to accommodate the liberal democratic party. dropped all their opposition to the u.s./japan alliance and u.s. bases and they were dumped and they had no political base because they had abandoned their earlier policies. their successor party, the socialist democratic party does not want to repeat that mistake so they are demanding that the dpj hold to its promise to kick out u.s. bases, pull out on the waon terror and these other things and in the intraparty negotiations, it's interesting to watch how the dpj has moved away from its earlier positions and promised to continue talkingbers things with the u.s. but not pressing that hard yet. but the socialist party and the japan party won't drop these. they got to manage their coalition and the number of senior parts in the dpj said

that they will pull out of the indian ocean and will block the u.s./japan bases in the indian ocean. barack obamaade a lot of policies on foreign policy that he didn't keep and that's okay. and many are advising the democratic party t keep moving to the center. what's striking is they are still remaining big. i think the general consensus in the party is not to push the u.s. on these issues right now but not to drop them either and to hope as he meets obama they'll develop a good relationship and barack obama will say, he's a good guy. okay, we d't need your ships in the indian ocean and he seems alike a decent guy, okay, we'll meet you in the okinowa agreement. it's wishful thinking.

it was negotiated by secretary of defense gates. who is the secretary of defense for obama, it's mr. gates. there's not much give on these things that people in tokyo are hoping. rather than coming out of e gate and demanding things in the u.s., they're at least going to try to deal a relationship with obama. a couple of things to keep in mind here. although the "new york times" article and some of the domestic speeches has put out these themes of antiglobalization and moving ay from u.s. towards asia, that is not why they got elected and it is not here the japanese public is. cabinet, the government polling most rdcently, 73% of japanese said they feel close to the united states. 66% say they do not feel close to china. 72% said a japan/carolina

alliance would be bad. you'll often hear people but younger japanese don't get it. okay, for 20 to 29 years old, 80% said the u.s./jap alliance with important for japan. so there is not a big, sort popular base or even push for the government to move away from the u.s. the japanese people in the most recent polls, 71% say they want him to succeed and they're backing him. that by the way is almost the exact number that those that were elected and all of them ended up with 15 to 25 at most 30% support before they went out. it's going to be a critically waning asset. but 71% isn't bad. how many japanese support president obama and like president obama? 82%. so there's very little political hay for him to make fighting with president obama.

so why are they doing this? are is this sort of theme out there? well, part of it is try to caur and cap the japanese resentment about their sittion economically and tryo sort of blame him for bei pro-u.s. and too much adopting american free market principles. a good campaign slogan, it's not mething they can govern on. also because they were out of power for so long and because there aren't strong think tanks in japan, a number of advisors have grabbed onto the leader who are shaping this narrative. the friends of ne, interestingly, they are all quit affectionateo the united states and were educated in the u.s. and spent time in the u.s. and they are not anti-american ople and they are fighting against gbalization and going

towards asia. and there was a statement after he graduated from the university of michigan with a degree of economics he wrote a book called "beyond capitalism" arguing that japan argued a new form of capitalism what he called athroprocentric proving that he went to an american university which was basically sayingsian values are different, collectiv goods are more important, free market principles don't work as well in asia and japan's economy, this is in the early '90s so still people, you know, had some validity had a new development model that took care of the people. they then throughout the course of the '90s had struggles with the clinton administration about the future of global finance. the united states was incredibly strong in the 1990s with the soviet union and when the asian financial crisis began, the

clinton administration was slow to summoned we don't need the imf. we're going to create our own asian fund. he's a product of the major ideological collisions between the u.s. and japan from the lat '80s and early '90s when we thought we had totally different models and we were adversaries. another prominent advisor who was at the brookings institution for a long time. again fluent in english, lots of american friends. i would not callim anti-american at all. he advis in the early '90s -- and i think it was based in part upon the time spent here that pan needed to continue its coverage vis-a-vis the u.s. at the time when the administration was 10 feet tall. in that context he started arguing that japan ned to align more closely with china to balance more influence. and for a while when he was

prominent as the leader of the dpj ten years ago he sort of liked this idea, this triangular relationship. and you can see, i think, quite clearly in this new york sometimes "new york times," you can see especially those o you who lived throw it, you can see a really fascinating almost nostalgic replay of these old u.s./japan ideological debates from t clinton era when we really were clashing and disagreeing. the thing is, in th g20, and the g7 and apec, the u.s. and the japan are aligned. the japanese public sort of get this. i'm not sure, this is not a question not an answer. i'm not sure how much of this is campaign mode. i worked on john mccain's campaign. and without being specific, let's just say some academics gave in ideas to john mccain

that he put out were never going to be true and the same for barack obama. i'm not sure how much of this current flavor of antiglobalization and moving to asia i campaign rhetoric that will move away or how much he will have to put some meat on the bone. we'll see. he wants a good relationship with psident obama and a good relationship with the u.s. the public is not really interested in changing the lives that much. and there's, frankly, nothing that japan would do at asia that the u.s. would object to. if japan improves relations with china or the republic of korea, that's absolutely in the u.s. interests. the u.s. needs -- japan is our most significant ally in asia. we need to have good relationships with asia. there's nothing inherently bad about pushing and emphasizing relations with asia. so i'm hopeful that this will all sort itself out and these specific issues will not get in the way of the alliance but to be honest i'm a little bit worried at the margins because i'm not se the dpj has never

had to resolved these contradictions internally and i'm not sure how they're going to do it. briefly on the economy, this is frankly one other reason why i think foreign policy will change fairly little. because the dpj was elected to change politics first and do something to change the economy second. and the manifesto the party put out has 55 key recommendations. five of them are on foreign policy and defense. almost all the rest are about people's lives. that's what the voters care about right now, frankly. they're not unhappy with japan's foreign policy at this point. they're unhappy with what's unhappy with what' happening to the political economy at home. so the dpj promised an awful lot. they basically promised massive stimulus. they have a broad philosophy which is probably good abo the economy which is japaneeds to move away from export manufacturing toward more domeic demand. amican officials and scholars

have been calling for that for three decades. the specifics, though,re much more political than economic. the specifics are about giving people money. benjamin franklin warned democracies will start to faulter when politicians can stay in power by giving people money and it involves giving people a lot of money. cutting highway fees and school taxes fees. not raising the consumption tax which the pragmatist in japan said it has to happen. you can't get revenue from income tax. you got to tax consumer goods. it's aggressive but you got to do it if you want to maintain your revenue. they won't touch it the dpj. the stimulus paage money for children. the estimates vary but adding somewhere beten 75 and $200 billion a year in entitlements,

not in one time payment and leading many to expect japan's debt to g.d.p. ratio will go up to 200% whichill be -- people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones. and japan's debt is 80% of it is held by japanese where much is held by china and other governments but it is going to be a problem. it's not sustainable but it makes a lot of political sense. if you want to keep together a coalition that's badly divided on security and defense issues and you got to win an election next year in the uer house, you can afford for one your to just throw cash at people and make big promises and beat up the bureaucracy. so it's good news and bad news. the good news for foreign policy is don't create too much trouble on that front. they have to look like they can manage the alliance. make people happy as much as you cn. it may not work. the japanese economy may not turn around in time to do that.

that is going to be the real test fnkly is the upper house. and the man who's the real power behind the democratic party, the one who is calling him karl rove doesn't do justice, not because i like karl rove, nothing le that. but again, he's more powerful than karl rove. he had to step down because of the dpj because of a scandal. he's the architect of this electoral victory. 120, 130 of the now people brought in were picked by him. when people talk about his children. he's acting large cadre of people that owe their seats to him. he's clearly the power behind the thin. interestingly hose a veteran of the faction which is the power

behind the then for many japane minister. he wrote a book blueprint for new japan which argued for much which what was pushed for, a more dynamic japan taking more risk both abroad and at home. he's dropping some of which, but he has been problematic for the u.s. he never vited the u.s. as leader he visited china repeatedly and he was extremely critical of the u.s. but in my view that was all opportunist he's the ultimate machiavellian. he wouldn't poison or stab anyone. but he is the ultimate machiavellian. i worked for the local newspaper in his dtrict and i saw him up close in elections in the '80s and let's say he's the ultimate machiavellian and, frankly, that's very reassuring right now because he's going to -- he's going to do what has to do to get the upper victory but hs also in the long run going to, i think, have a very power-oriented view not only i

japanese politics but once he's secured a majority, if he does, he's going to have a power view of the international system and he's not going to fall for sort of dreamy idealisticdeas of the left. and my guess i if he wins in the upper house election he will dump the socialists on the left like cold soup or cold posa. -- pizza. so watch him. he's not going to help us, the united states, solve problems. he's going to want to keep distance from us. hose not -- he's not going to be the problemsolver. and for those who will not love him he's going to keep the government focused on practical solutions and good governance. identities the hope for those of us who watch the relations is the one enjoy who gave us the trouble in the opposition. it's because he's this machiavellian figure that we might be able to count on him. in the long run and i'll end

with this, i see this rev -- rev revolution in the country. i feel fairly well in predicting and if we were to gather what happened in retrospect that what we will see is that there's a tilt to the lefbecause as a reslt of the election. the socialists come into the coalition. their ideas are tested and fail and in subsequent elections, this party and japanese politics move back to the right or center or center right and th's, i think, the general trajectory and that you may actually in security policy in particular look back on this election and say, there was a tilt to the left but it actually was a poisoned carrot for theeft just as it was for the socialists in '94 when they came into government japan asserting ielf more in the international system using

the self-defense forces and it may be one of the this where people say, that election, it turns out was what really did on these in bringing in the coalition and doing to them what happened to the socialists in '94, '95 and forcing them to face reality and then kicking them out. that's where i'll leave it. i guess, i'm mostly optimistic. it's going to be a bumpy couple of weeks, months, maybe years but on a whole bunch of identities. thank you. applause masse [applause] >> do you wa me to call on people? [inaudible] >> i think we're going to 1:30. [inaudible] >> sure.

>> i'm curious, you'r describing it as a revolution and process. but in some ways there's some evidence that we can be optimistic that japan can develop a competitive party system or a much more accountable government? what would you say would have to happen structurally before we could japanese policies operating sayo a standard westminster model? >>t's a fair question. i think there will be more accountability and transparency. that's clear. the bureaucrats' ability to control information especially on social welfare, economic and others issues will be reduced to civil society and other groups. i think that will be a lasting chge that the japanese poem. expect. -- people will expect. the two-party system, everyone thought after 1993 -- one of the things that was done was introduced new legislation which

moved japan's lower house into the new system and it was something like germany politic but in one trickett, election district you would have throw or four seats selected. they shifted from that to a system tha looksike what we have. every district you're voting for one candide. and there's a list system, a certain number can get elected in a regional list system which was demanded by the smaller parties if they get wiped o but the expectations, i think, universal expectation from political scientists and journalists and others was this would foster the growth of a two-party system. because on the district with throw orour seats, it's enough to get elected if you have the agriculture vote but if you have the labor vote. and it re-enforces pork barrel spending to certain constituent groups and eliminates and

reduces national debate. where, you know, a single strict in thorough should increase the theory on big issues because you have to get, you know, over half the votes or plurality. but it's only been less than expected and it's been complicated because especially within the dpj there are very different policy views, very different especially on national security. you can go from someone like those on the right to former governor on the left and be about as far apart of the right wing and the left wing of the social democratic party and this new group, a lot of them are sort of -- who knows where it will go? so a lot of people expected that

big problems, the rise of china in some ways within each of these districts, the support groups for the politicianson't want their guys changing sides. in kyoto, for example, in many districts, the shinto and other mainstream religious organizations are backing the dpj candidate against the lbp candidate is being b backed by a new 20th century religion that the older religion view as a threat. so some of those politicians are contributing enough they might have shifted over to the lpb and the shinto group is not going to

work with them. so some of these rigid battle lines within districts between economic interests and religious groups are so rigid that national policy debate sometimes doesn't -- makes it almost impossible for politicians to switch. and that said, i sll think you're going to s some realignment and there's needs to be more politic realignment and some of it will ppen. it will not be the two-party system with the republicans and the democrats but we are learning with blue dog democrats we don't have a two-party syst, whave a three party system and we are not the model of two party democracy. thanks. next. >> i'm from japan. and thank you very much for your presentation.

but it seems to me your presentations made by politicians, that so many groups, the factions have made the dpj but, you know, it's not so different from the social democratic party. and for the citizens. and also, you know, the ldp made a commercial with a dog, they could manage it. [inaudible] >> made your co point but are

being very optimistic on it? >> i'm not optimistic, i'm quite optimistic for all the reasons u said because of the basic public opinion polls, you know, when 80% of japanese, 20 to 29 think it's important. wh 75%f the japanese in almost all polls feel close ties to the u.s., that means something. you don't have to lk at the polls, y can step back what's happening with asia with the north korean threat, with china's rise the's a natural physics with the relations. there's nothing we fighting about big issues. worry not fighting about -- we are in general agreements about l the big issues. climate change. stimulating and recovering the

economy in the g20. north korea policy. closure japan alliance itself. what makes me less optimistic in the short run, n . stic, but a little bit worried about how well this will go, the dpj had the luxury of saying [speaking in a foreign language] >> saying yes, the alliance is importance. but they are saying we oppose you. we oppose sending troop to iraq. we oppose the agreement you made with the americans to move the bases to they want everybody out. they different configurations for the marines that stay. so all of these sort of policies they were against, these positiols developed, the ldp was

very strong. and they died on the popularity. sending ships to the indian ocean, let alone standing 600 engineers to iraq, these were hard decisions that were, i wodn't say unpopular, because most of the polls showed 49, 50%, but they were danger. if they lost anyone, his government probably would have fallen. or if anything had happened, he was taking big risks. the democratic party i think many member supported japan. but a lot of them, former socialists and others on the left, hated it. and i think for the dpj it was very natural and connient to say we support the alliance, but this is too much. they couldn't even agree on

whether to oppose it on the principals. we oppose the indian ocean because the consultation process with the diet was wrong and things like that. if the dpj had opposed it he had faultered, they wkuld have come into power. although for many, it was sin sincere. but it is in a time they didn't think they could win. they were threing to makeim pay a political price. especially when they took control of the upper house. so that to renew the operations or to pass a bill to do the relocation, they had to use the authority. and the japanese public don't like that. just the like the american public is not going to like it if the obama administration using 50%.

they inposed a cost on the lpd. now they have to govern. and they have to figure out what to do. the majority doesn't want to do damage to the alliance in the national and political interest. i don't think they figured out how to drop. that part makes me nervous. i'm generally confident that they will have a good relationship and they will find ways to deal with the socialists and sort of they'll say things like we're going to study the agreement or we'd like to set up a blue ribbon panel. they will find a way out, i think. but i'm not sure about that. i'm not 100% sure. i'm 75% sure. and it is posble that because they've never been in government, and they've never really had to arbitrate the

issues andecause he may have trouble, and the leadership is debilluated, it maybe they can't reach a conclusion. and you have mixed signals. on something like they have to decide on the end of the year, they can't decide and it pulled the ships back. he said he's like to, because he said he would. for the most hatoyama administration has been very careful. if weapon don't lay done some markers, the dpj is going to lay out positions. but it was delivered in the

pentagon to say we need the ships. that's going to force the dpj to have a whole nother round. they need to be thinking about something else that the credible that shows that japan is not retrieving with this new government. not just for the u.s., remember these ships are refueling coalition. we're talking australia, france. this is how the well world especially the advanced democracies through japan. and i don't think he will want to be seen as a retreating country right now. the pentagon by throwing down that glove, it's going to force them to have a lot more debates internally. and it's a tough thing for the obama administration. i think they probably see this in the long run as positive. they clearly don't want to provoke a fight. so they are being patient. but if they just wait forev, some of these decisions may not get made. sorry for the long answer.

i think like most japanese in the poll, this is necessary and good for the politics, including the ldp. a little bit worried out about how it's going to work out. >> so people are n happy about the bureaucracy, however, they are kind of smart against their neighbors. we don't think it's made good politics. what do you think the idea of getting about the elections in japan? >> this is a dilemma. because while the japajese bureaucrats are very easy to beat up, they havehe training, the information, the skillset, to make policy and policy 15 lot moreomplicated now. all kinds of policies, climate change, technology, security,

it's more complicated than it ever was. in some ways itakes more leadership at the top. you can't solve problem like climate change in stove piped bureaucracy. you need national strategy. it is going to be a good thing. and i think it is a trend in japan politics that will now be accelerated. but you can't judge or make decion ifsour entire policymaking apparatus is made up of politics giving speeches, shaking hands, driving around in trucks saying i need your vote. that's necessary, you need civilian control, you need political leadership, but it's hardly sufficient. they are going to need the bureaucrats. if the dpj does it, the pure bureaucracy will destroy them. my guess is the press, including

shinzo. if they are miss managing, he's not going to say it's okay. he's going to turn the page and whack them. and the bureaucrats they are masters of information, and that includes leaking information. they will do in the party if the party tries to attack. it's going to be mutually assured destruction. and my guess is that the bureaucrats that deal with social welfare, pensions, that kind of thing, they are going to get the worse of it. the finance ministry trade, ty will probably be okay. because this is about the economy, and things that directly effect people's lives

by next july. we'll see. the other thing is japan needs, japan needs expertise outside of the bureaucracy. the politicians themselves will rely heavily as they do in the most demises. we in the united states, do you know how many think tanks there are? 1500. that includes like one guy widh a mailing address. but that's a lot. we probably have that many. maybe we can export some. [laughter] may for health care. but japan doe't have enough. it has a lot of small ones. bu it doesn't have a real independent. hopefully changes in tax laws and ldp experiencing opposition. politicians will support the tax lawsnd other things that empower civil society and think tanks more. it won't be like the u.s. hopefully it will be a bit more

like australia or canada that have think tanks independent of the government. >> my question is:what will japan's role be in the national stage? japan has done very well overseas in the past. i wonder what that will be ke? >> well, he was a rising star in the ldp he was deputy chief cabinet which is one of the key mosts. and in he was our go t guy for beef, citrus, he was smart, and he was an expert at finding what's called the falling down place. the place where the debates can end up. he cou watch the debate and figure out this is where this is going to end up and say to the bureaucrats, i think this is

where it's going to end up. and thereby sort of force resolution. so for t u.s. embassy and the clinton administration, bush administration, excuse me, georgeerbert walker bush, he was the fixer for the u.s. japan relationship. rethen wrote a book for japan which argued that the old style of japan decision makes was all messed up. he talked about going t the grand canyon and seeing that there were guardrails and in other places there weren't. and he thought about it. and he thought in japan there would be guardrails sing please be careful. and he said the americans expect risk. they accept a certain amount of individual risk. and this is the problem in japan. japan needsore accountability and needs to be more normal country.

ozawa has gravitated and he's now echng the logic about how important it is to keep the japanese -- it >> it makes me wonder ozawa wrote the book. it may say more about him that he's trying to capture the zeitgeist back on the machiavellia time. he does have a vision, it's basically conservative and nationalistic. it's about japan's reputation. japan's influence. and that's why i think he's not gog to -- once he consolidate dpj control next summer, he's going to pull the party to the center would be my guess.

a lot of thehots at the u. have been -- have be opportunism. and has been one like described. we have timef for one or two questions. >> many people point out that the question would be, who would -- [inaudible] >> and he is -- my question how can you predict the trajectory?

>> i know him pretty well and many times he's a very attractive politician. he's actually in previous polls he was the most popular figure in the dpj so he has a definite future. if he stumbles one way or the other, it comes down to a choice okato or khan and he's an important figure and he will become more important. he has said some things that are -- that have gotte attention in the u.s. he has -- he's one of the dpj figures who talks about moving closer to asia. it's very vague what that means. i don't think people are too worried about it because there's nothing specific that goes with it and as i said if japan really works on japan works on strengthening it's ties wh

korea and china, it could be a good thing for the alliance. people are concerned about some specific things he said in the past, in the recent past. free northeast asia which sounds good. once you get north korea to cooperate. he's very specificall he's been doing lot of work on nuclear weapons and he's been interacting with the idealistic left. he's called for the u. to adopt the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. this will be problematic for the obama administration especially given north korea's nuclear weapons. so if he tries to push one or two, there could be some friction. on the other hand, i remember whene was the leader, he came to washington. he came to the white house. steve hadley, he was the national security advisor. he said, we'd like to really

develop a relationship similar to what we had at that time with britain and the australian labor party. foreign policy stops at the water's edge. there's a fat agreement that the two major parties labor and britain that we will not do harm. we will remain open tboth parties. and sure the opposition party may not t to see the secretary of state, but they will get to see the deputy secretary o state and work on all the issues and talk to them that we are working on it with the government. i was in charge. we did that when he was in the government. we had exchangening. we didn't make policy. but we were as opeas we could be. we'd like to do this. and excuse me, he said i'd very much like to do tha

and we'd like to develop that kind of capacity and that kind of alliance, and bipartisanship and so forth. we were very excited. and he lost his position. so we never really were able to follow through. that shows you he has some basic pragmatic views. also i've been watching with terest as he deals with the socialist party and the japan new party. and the signals he's been sending out are important. there are questions about how or whether he would try to implement the ideas. i also think he has a track record with at love american officials that give him some confidence that he undstands the big importance of the u.s./japan alliance. >> one last question perhaps and we'll wrap it up. >> thank you for your

presentation. and i'm very impressed about how you predict the department in japan in the near future. and my question is do you think that many policy natives in washington, d.c. now over the administration -- >> on the obama administration? >> yes. you heard earlier when i said i worked on the mccain campaign; right? >> yeah, i'm just curious how much they know about the japan and the situation and the politil background in japan? >> that is an important question. :

i went out and batthed all these guys for obama one at a time going up to level two and three and all of them are now in government for their sins. [laughter] so, jeff is the hd of nfc asia, eckert campbell, a good friend of mine is assistant secretary for east asia, chip is assistant secretary for asia d.o.t., derek mitchell work for him. we went at it in these debates.

there wasn't a whole lot of big disagreements on the foreign policy with respect to iraq, iran and issues like that. on asia, disagreements on trade the team supported the free trade agreement and the obama campaign didn't. differences on north korea we were a little tougher although now the obama administration is as tough as mccain ever sounded because thanks to the north koreans. but when it came to the u.s.-japan relations we had these debates and then it would become a love fest when it came to japan. there was total agreement. part of this is because japan is not a contrersial topic in mainstream american foreign policy. which is good for the nation and bad for japan scholars and away. part of it is because there had been enormous fights about japan policy in the late 80's and early 90's, ugly fights, which

when we were in grade school we checked our heads down as our seniors fought revisionists verses the chrysanthemum cluof fundamental arguments whether japan was a threat or japan's economic model was a threat or convergence was possible. huge debates that they found a way to take advantage of but not get killed. a lot of peoplwho lived through that who cared about the alliance wanted to make sure that we didn't repeat that. so in 2000 in the election campaign between bush and core richard armitage, a republican and jul formed a group i was in. republicans and democrats and independents and we kind of made a manifesto if you will, sort of an agenda for the alliance and essentially we didn't sign in blood or anything t we promise to ever won, the guyn power would support the guys in power of japan and bush won so

armitage, jim kelly, terkel patterson and i went in and kurt and frank on the democratic side of the senate and joe mauney, all of them were extremy supportive with ideas and energy on the u.s.-japan alliance, and that sort of bipartisanship i think it's still is alive. and when president obama -- when barack obama won the election and the asian jobs cld populated the more populated by people focused on japan and who knew and had a history with japan having worked in the clinton administration to strengthen the u.s.-japan alliance. i had been impressed with how much they know. they had been doing a huge amount of research poring over the poles. ihen asked to ta a couple o times in the administration. there isn't much i can tell them they don't know.

it is a senior level so they are watching this very closely. they've also for the year leading up to the election there were a number of trips to japan of the various reseah and study groups and other things bipartisan. so jim steinberg deputy secretary of state, eckert campbell >> so they have made frequent tips with -- trips on the other side of the aisle to show that on the u.s. side there's bipartisan support for the alliance and to exchange views and so people like jim steinberg have had continued meetings oaf the past year or two and invested a lot in forging that bipartisan so they know them pretty well. the dilemma for the obama administration, i think, is the balance between balance of being patient an positive and optimistic on the one hand and on the other hand, the need to say this is the bottom line.

and the indian ocean dispatch is a classic example. the u.s. and the coalition need support in afghanistan. the problem is getting harder, not easier and it's not just a u.s. problem. canada, britain, france has taken casualties, large number of casualties for those small countries. there have been increases in efforts on every countries not decreases. and in that context if the japanese government, which has every right to do it, the japanese government says we're done, thanks, and just pulls back, it's not only going to be damaging operationally to the efforts of the coalition, it will be embarrassing for those who took risk for sarkozy, gordon brown or barack obama or kevin rudd in australia. if canada is the only country

without troops, it wi be embarrassing for the japan. the obama administration doesn't want to apply foreign pressure on japan and they don't want to say you don't have to do this and the dpj review policy and say here's a bunch of things we can do. the problem is if the dpj comes out and says, we thought about it. we got a big plan for afghanistan, we're going to make postage stamps that say afghanistan is important and sell them to the japan post or give a bunch of money to building an airport or, you know, if ty come up with something that's easy, it's going to look to the world like japan is pulling back. and so if they're in sort of a pickle and frankly in the bush administration we have thi problem and the myth is the bush administration ordered japan to send ships to the ocean, ordered japan to send troops to iraq. it's not true. we went in with a decision with the era of foreign policy is

over. we had these sort of new discussions in u.s./japan relations where we said here's a problem, here's a list of things we think would be helpful. what are your ideas? and, frankly, the foreign ministry and the defense ministry had never encountered this and for a while they were lost and the ship refueling, the troops -- that wa a mission generated on the japanese side after the u.s. and other coalition countries briefed on the problem said here are 25 areas where we're in big trouble and could use help. where can japan play a role? so it's a little bit like a first date, you know, a little bit who goes first problem and i think the obama administration is starting to wonder maybe they shouldn't do a liptle bit more laying down of expectations because if the dpj doesn't figure out its way of arbitrating the different views onsecurity, they may not iake

any decisions. and so that's their dilemma. and i think it's in that context that yesterday the dod said we need those ships in the indian ocean. in ainimum it will force the dpj, wow, ok. i think people are starting to think 'cause some u.s. academics were saying we don't need it. and it's going to force them to think wow if we don't want to keep doing the ships, what would be credible? and what i heard friends in the dpj don't listen to the u.s. -- don't just listen to the u.s., go to canada and talk to the indians, talk to the gulf states because i know what they're going to say. they're going to say we really want japan in the gulf and the indian forces and we want japanese diplomats. japan and b bshg-- in bbc are t most respected country. and these other countries on the

global scale, they want to see japan there. show the flag. so i encourage friends in the dpj, don't tak the management of washington. talk to the indians, talk to pakistan, talk to the gulf. talk to the europeans. talk to chile. find o what the world thinks of japan. absolutely have an independent foreign policy in u.s. interest for japan to have that kind of credibility andnfluence and the measure of that is not just what washington thinks. it will help get away from the narrow bilateral prism that they have been. thanks. [applause] >> thank you all for coming. [inaudible conversations]