street. there is a situation in even with our government as we want to have dialogue with iran as you have suggested, the question is being with home and if we reach an agreement, how stable? what i want to, i suppose from each of you is some idea of what is the stability of potential governance at the highest levels, quite apart from the regional levels and so forth, of afghanistan and in the offense led a say as europeans are quoted in the press today as saying a third have been invalid. that is a very significant charge, and it suggests that the balance that we heard yesterday prepared for a runoff might be used than others that you don't

understand, the difficulties of conducting an election are not the same in november as they are ing about stability now in afghanistan. and when we were originally talking about how afghanistan helps pakistan remain stable. finally, people are saying pakistan, all things considered, have been stable this past year. despite predictions that the president might have difficulties after three months, he seems to be sailing along. the one we have to worry about maybe for stability is afghanistan. perhaps the president says okay, his advisors he is talking to down there at the white house, we better hang on for a while before we get into a recommendation of troop levels. get into a national debate with

the public opinion in this country. it seems to have a different timeline. and what i'm wondering is, we are not kicking the can down the road in our decision-making. and i might have been hypercritical in my opening statement, but i observed general mcchrystal's report is always going to be there. we discuss it and discuss it, and suddenly we come along after an indefinite period and begin to talk about troop levels. does anyone have any comment? general kraddock do you have any thoughts of what i have suggested? >> thank you, senator lugar. indeed it's a bit of a conundrum, no doubt. i think senator kerry's opening comments said this is not winnable by military means, absolutely. i have said that for the past several years. the military, the security effort will set the conditions

for good enough governance for investment for development for the creation of jobs. as you go about the country, and i also have gone about, it's about clean water, education, a job, electricity. how hard can that be? obviously, takes some security to do that. i think from the security perspective, and this is again a nato perspective, security instability, and there are two fundamental issues there, one is the funding of the insurgency, whether it be the taliban, whatever the case may be, and that is largely, it's down somewhat from the narcotics business and it has to be addressed and continue to be addressed, and we have to take away the wherewithal and contributions after the value is added, and that is the processing of the raw opium paste to the heroin. >> let me interrupt that point.

many allege in addition to the insurgents getting their money, the government is getting the money. that there are two recipients. >> that is in my opening statement. indeed, it fuels the corruption. i know the numbers are down. the latest estimates, a $3 billion industry of which some $1 billion stays in country and $200 million to insurgents. where does the rest go? corruption, private and public. has to be addressed. security will only create the conditions for what rory stuart says the afghan people are morally bound to do for themselves, which are govern better. >> so that is the basis for our security then? the framework for afghan people to progress? >> i think it is protect the people, put an umbrella, security umbrella around municipalities, around the villages and towns so there can be investment, development, jobs created, and when the people get

that, they will push the insurgents out. >> my time is completed. i appreciate that answer. >> thank you, senator lugar. senator feingold? >> thanks, mr. chairman, for holding all these hearings on one of the most important questions facing our nation at this time. we are honored to have all these distinguished witnesses here. these hearings contributed to a much-needed debate regarding our efforts in afghanistan. while there may be disagreement on some issues, one point of consensus that is clearly emerged, and as the chairman just restated, no one thinks we should abandon afghanistan. u.s. must remain engaged in helping the afghan people resolve the many difficult issues facing their country through diplomatic means and ongoing assistance. however, i do believe we need to examine whether the current military strategy may potentially be counterproductive. i'm concerned our massive military presence may be contributing to instability in the region, and could be

unwittingly undermining our chief national security priority, which is, of course, a relentlessly pursuing al qaeda's global network. helping the afghan people build a stable nation for themselves is a long-term goal. we must consider how best to achieve this and whether this require as departure from our current overly military centric approach. >> ambassador crocker? >> admiral mullen and special envoy holbrooke acknowledged the at these hearings is there a danger u.s. military operations in afghanistan could drive militants into pakistan, and further destabilize that nuclear-armed country. and admiral blair testified no improvement in afghanistan is possible without pakistan taking control of its border areas and improving governance, creating economic and educational opportunities throughout the country. do you agree that the key to preventing the spread of militancy in the afghan/pakistan border region is improved governance of pakistan as

opposed to our military operations in afghanistan? >> senator, i would certainly join general craddock and most of the members in the strong view that there is no purely military solution to problems in afghanistan or, indeed, in pakistan. there is a military component to a broader solution. the military, and i apologize for treading into general craddock's area defining the task is essential at this point. again, mr. chairman, i commend the committee for its focus on this. what is it that we believe needs to be done to bring, as miss lockhart puts it so well, good enough governance to afghanistan, or to allow the afghans that opportunity?

that is where long-term stability will lie. the military then becomes a component of that. we need to define our goals, our end states, the milestones along the road to that end state, if you will. and then, but i think only then, can we really talk in a coherent way about force levels and force composition. >> recent polls have shown the majority of afghans oppose an increase of u.s. troops. do you think there is a danger our disregard for this preference could provoke more militancy? >> i think there is no question that there is a shade of public opinion in afghanistan that is beginning to see the security forces in afghanistan as an

occupation. my sense is that compared to a few years ago, there are more people now who view the security forces in a negative light. the civilian casualties have a very, very significant impact on that public opinion. that said, on balance, i think most afghans know that if the security forces were to leave, things would be a whole lot worse. and this is because they understand that the afghan institutions and the afghan security forces are not strong enough to assure the country and its people of a normal or even semi normal state of existence. at the end of the day, any state has to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and the greater interest of the civilians at large in the afghan

state at this point is not in position to do that. so do the afghans want foreign troops on their land? no. they would prefer there not be. they are independent, sovereign people. do they see it as a necessary thing still today? i think most afghans concede that point. >> as to the question, an increase in troops. >> i think when you speak to afghans on the ground, their fear is not more engagement. their fear is that there will be less engagement. there is a fear of abandonment in afghanistan. people have very long memory and they remember back to what happened at the end of the soviet invasion where for whatever, as you can put it, we decided it was no longer in our interest who ran afghanistan. at this point i think the afghan concern is with less engagement.

that said, afghans have a concern. you take an 18-year-old from this country and send them to afghanistan, and what seems like a rudimentary and poor and unsophisticated society, is in fact, nuanced and sophisticated and the way in which customs, manners, speech, posture is transmitted and understood. there is a steep learning curve for the troops there. i think the current leadership is addressing that. >> of course i have tremendous respect for your knowledge and views on this. all i can say for the record is that these polling numbers that may or may not be accurate certainly reflect a view against our troops staying there for too long, and certainly against an increase. the heads of state of great britain, germany and france said it was time to discuss metrics and timelines of international activities in afghanistan. while i understand you favor

staying the course in afghanistan, do we at least agree making clear we do not intend to occupy the country indefinitely, we may be better able to build support among the american and european people for our efforts in that country? >> thank you, senator. yes. i would definitely agree with that. i don't think the intent there is to ever occupy and stay. the key has been pointed out is enabling and development of the afghan national security forces. for the last 2 1/2 years, i repeatedly told nato nations the very first thing we need are more trainers for the army and police, particularly the police. the issue is more a public security issue than a national security issue for the people of afghanistan. a police, competent, trained, noncorrupt police force is important. i think what we have to do is lay out then a timeline for development of the afghan security forces in whole of international support of that

and to the afghans to that so that we can, one, establish some parameters, some milestones and meet them. and then measure effectiveness. >> thank you, general. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator corker. >> mr. chairman, thank you. and thank each of you. this is an outstanding panel. as we had yesterday and each of you have unique contributions. ambassador crocker, i want to thank you especially for your tremendous service. i think the testimony that you and general petraeus gave as we looked at a new strategy in iraq was most important. i think you alluded in your opening testimony how having people from the field here may be the most important thing we can do to actually ascertain what is the next best step. so mr. chairman, i hope that's going to happen soon. i hope it's going to happen in the next few weeks. i notice there is a resistance

for some reason for that to happen, but i could not agree more. i would also say it seems before you move to our strategic interest in afghanistan, seems to me there are two things that sort of underneath na. one is that we're there. meaning that something for us, i think, to remember into the future. once we put our flag up in a country, our flag is up and we are very resistant to ever leaving so that's an underlying theme. number two, we are sort of trying to prove to pakistan and afghanistan that we are not fairweather friends. there are two underlying themes that make much of what's happening, before you even get into the strategic interest piece, and that's pretty prevalent in both countries when you are there. let me ask you this, ambassador

crocker. what expectations should we have in afghanistan? what worries me to some degree, we had a success in iraq based on a surge. we had a political movement that you helped create with the sunni awakening and getting them@@@@@r

my experience has been that terror can find a nest within a broader insurgency. in other words, i cannot see how, if we define our interests narrowly as eliminating a terrorist threat out of afghanistan, that we can do that with any real degree of assurance without also having a successful counterinsurgency strategy. and that, again, in my not very well informed view takes us into the range of issues that miss lockhart and dr. huzani touched on. i don't think there is much of a record anywhere in the world of successful counterinsurgencies

without good enough government, governance. now, how far does this go? there i am absolutely unable to state, but clearly there is, i think, an obligation for the administration to so state. that review is obviously under way. think the sooner it can be brought to the articulation. what are our goals, why they are important, how they will be achieved and how the different components link up i think is essential for the american people. >> i think in fairness administration has been rhetorical about this narrow mission to make it sound good. but in essence, all the things ms. lockhart has laid out are components of the counterinsurgency. ms. lockhart, i think you did --

basically you're talking about in some degree state building or nation building i think we all know those are the metrics that have been laid out. we have this very poor country that's been very poor for a long time. there are no resources like there are in iraq. we eke talking about building a health id case, water system, education system, security system, a police system. what are your thoughts about how we should view our long-term financial commitments. let's face it, on the budget we have now, they couldn't pay for a fraction of the just the police they have there. i'm wondering if you might help us there. i'm not sure if we see any future for resource toss do that there for the midterm.

>> certainly as i think we discussed, the civilian governance effort is beingunder resourced and an increase in sources is certainly going to be necessary. i think we probably need to look at two different scenarios for resourcing. one scenario is, if there is a process for rebuilding a legitimate government and a team of afghan leaders in place who can govern responsibly. i think in that scenario we're looking at far fewer external resources than what we needed because afghanistan will move more rapidly to collecting its own revenue. while afghanistan doesn't have oil, it does have the pe tenl to be raising somewhere between $5 billion to $10 billion in its own revenue because it has very rich mineral resources including copper, gold, lap pass, am thinks, iron. it has the basis for a successful agricultural economy, the largest exporter to fruit an

nuts to the region if not the world in the '70s. it has the hard-working population and potential vortex tile production, urban services and a construction industry is certainly there. i think we need to move to put in place an economic strategy. to answer your specific question, i believe we need to be looking at a medium to long-term commitment of resources of probably roughly a doubling of existing resources on the civilian and governance side. but that, if we move aggressively to raise afghan revenue or enable afghans to raise their own revenue that can take it in the second five years of the decade. >> i'll ask one more brief question. general krad dock, how many al qaeda are there in the world? >> senator, i have no idea.

card-carrying idea, i have no idea. sympathizers, financial support, i have no idea. >> card-carrying. >> i don't know. i think one of the reasons it's so difficult in the our search is because there's hierarchy that we would recognize. >> the number 2,000 has been thrown out and people dispute that. the reason i ask the question, it's somewhat rhetorical. our efforts towards al qaeda have now created a situation where we're involved in two major nation-building, state building efforts. iraq and afghanistan. and it's just a fact. i hope somehow or another we'll figure out a different strategy versus going around the world building states and nations

almost out of whole cloth. >> thank you very much senator cork kerr. senator casey? >> thank you. i'll thank the witnesses for the contribution you're making to this discussion and debate. i think we can have a real debate about these policies, and i think it's critical that we do. i want to especially thank general krad dock and ambassador crocker for your service to our country under the most difficult of circumstances. and i wanted to start with you, ambassador crocker about a conversation that you and i had. this was august of '07, senator durbin and i were were you at that time. we had a dinner meeting. general petraeus was with us as well. i was very critical at the time and still am about the language of washington when we describe

the conflict in iraq and also now the conflict in afghanistan. language like victory and defeat, win or lose, which in my judgment is both inaccurate and misleading. i think it's important as we get the policy right on troop levels and on nonmilitary commitments as well that we also get the language right because the american people have -- don't have -- will not and should not have patience for a political debate in washington that doesn't address some answer or ask and answer some type of questions. at the time you said something i'll never forget. i want to ask you if the language that you used then is still relevant here and what you learn in not just your service in iraq but other service as well. you said at the time -- the words you used to describe success in iraq were two, i recall, sustainable stability. i'd ask you in the context of

afghanistan and how we deal with the strategy with regard to of afghanistan and pakistan, are those words still operative? anybody else you can tell us about how you think you can achieve that? >> thank you, senator. i do indeed remember the conversation, and i would share your view about the use of language. language does count. i think if anyone cared to go through the interminable records of the testimony that general petraeus and i provided to the congress on several occasions, i don't think you'll find a single occasion in which either of us used those terms, to win, to lose, victory and defeat. in many respects those are not for us to determine. >> i said washington to leave

out some names. >> thank you, senator. yes. i believe the concept of sustainable stability is valid. although i may now shamelessly steal ms. lockhart's phrase of good enough governance which i think is another way of saying much the same thing. steps taken, measures taken that will work in terms of the society in which it counts, be it's rack, afghanistan or pakistan. it may not be our model, and it may be very far from perfect. but if it provides a situation in which the security forces of that country are capable dealing themselves with whatever challenges to stability there are, then i think you've got s

sustainable stability. what that will look like in afghanistan and again what the steps are to achieve it, i'm simply not competent to provide. i do think we've got the people out there who can do that, and i think again that what the administration needs to do is to lay out that framework and then since i had the experience of testifying before congress, i would like to spread the opportunity to my current colleagues in the field to come and do the same. i do think that field view is extremely important. >> thank you. i have questions i won't get to both for both ends of the table. but i do want -- i probably have time for one more. i wanted to ask dr. lockhart a

question about what is sometimes referred to as a civilian surge, an increase in the number of nonmilitary personnel on the ground which is a low number now in afghanistan and is building. i was very impressed, as we always are, in august when i visited both countries and saw not just the respect general mcchrystal had for the nonmoyle tear folks and how central they are for the vision. department of agriculture, dea, i probably left some entity out and many others. but i guess i have the -- this is a hard question and answer. if you can do your best in the minute or so we have left. one, how many do you think -- do you have a sense and you may have addressed this because i wasn't there for the beginning of your opening. i was here for the end of your opening.

how do we get it right with regard to our international partners who candidly in some places are helping us a lot in a lot of significant parts of the world. they're not doing much at all to help us. if you can address that in terms of numbers or in terms of commitment. i know that's a hard one. >> certainly. i think one of the first principals to work from is that what we're seeking to build is the space and tools for afghan leadership and afghan ownership. i believe that while the key focus on the civilian side is institution building, it actually requires quite a small number of civilians. we need more civilians than there are at the moment. i probably wouldn't want to put a number on it. it probably isn't more than a thousand. >> in terms of a thousand, what what we would need eventually or where we are now? >> total, particularly if there's going to be u.s.

leadership. there are tens of thousands of foreign civilians in the country at the moment. most are among other agencies in those efforts. i think a total of a thousand. what is required though is a really thorough look at the skills gap on the afghanistan. i think we should regear or focus to building afghan capability. that does mean vocational training, secondary education and tertiary education. back in 2001 no -- you're not going to get a competent civil servants. in terms of getting the international partnership right, i think that relates to your earlier comment very much, that we should move away from the language of war, of victory and of loss to perhaps some of the original language used in the 20001-2 period of a goble effort to assist the afghan people, established stability or

legitimate governance. and then based on that, look at a division of labor and burden sharing. i think we need to perhaps look more to the economic multi lateral organizations like the world bank and the adb tho robu . we're supposed to hear some

definitive results. i'm told the afghan central election commission has released the result showing that president karzai has received 54.62% of the vote. now, the international committee is still waiting for the independent election commission to make its assessment. senator lugar raised the possibility that as many as one-third of president karzai's votes might be invalid. i wonder if any of you can tell me when we can expect to hear something from the independent election commission. in listening to the administration, that there's also a resignation that president karzai is going to be

the president for the next term and that somehow those results will be allow ed to stand to th extent that either he will be re-elected on the first go-around or he'll win a run off. i hope several of you can comment on this. let me start with dr. hosseini. you're hear on behalf of the unhcr i realize. but still, you've been in the area. you've talked extensively. i assume you've talked across the spectrum of the ethnic groups in afghanistan. so what is your assessment of the support among the populous for president karzai of their feeling with regard to the validity of the election results

and what might happen? >> well, i think when you speak to ordinary afghans, there's no question that they express some disappointment in the performance of the afghan government so far. i think many of them expected more. again, rightfully so. as far as the elections, clearly there have been some irregularities with these elections and they've been well publicized. precise scale of these irregularities and whether they will force a second round of the elections is up to the ecc and the isc to determine and they're examining the suspect ballots and doing a recount. in my view it's important obviously that this investigation be thorough, but

also that it be relatively expeditious, and i say this as an individual and not with my unfcr hat on. i think it's to the detriment of the country to have a long period of political paralysis. it's to the detriment of the legitimacy of the elections and i think it would exacerbate the afghan's people already high level of anxiety about the elections and cast doubt on the credibility of the outcome. so i think it must be done relatively quickly enough. of course, the outcome has to be acceptable to most afghans and have at least a semblance of credibility, a difficult task indeed. on the elections i do want to put the entire process in some kind of perspective and say that as flawed as the elections are, and we shouldn't compare a second ever presidential elections in afghanistan to the

process here in the states or in france, let's be clear about that. but it was an extraordinary low jis tick achievement to even hold the election, even more so that the last time around. 3,000 done kis carrying ballots. thousands of people who had to be trained in the middle of conflict in areas under the threat and intimidation of the taliban. hundreds of female searchers who had to pack down anybody in a berka to make sure it's not a man carrying a suicide jacket. from a logistic standpoint, it was an extraordinary achievement. the second point of perspective i want to offer is o for 30 years the traditional means of the transfer of power in afghanistan has been through violence, through the gun. with these elections, the afghans have an opportunity to demonstrate that those days are

in the past and that they can affect a peaceful transition of power. maybe we in the international community ought not to rush to judgmental and we ought to wait and let the afghans resolve this peacefully. >> ms. lockhart, would you like to comment about that? do you believe president karzai has majority support among the population of aftghanistaafghan? >> if the european union announced today they suspected that votes were invalid, then it will be demonstrated that the incumbent doesn't have majority support, and i agree with dr. hussein any that there's considerable anxiety amongst the population. what we're seeing on the moment in the ground is the electoral complaints commission investigating the irregularity,

a process that may take several weeks. i very much agree that that process should be resolved as quickly as possible because the vacuum in leadership will be problematic on the ground. i think there are four options very quickly from here on. one is to accept the victory of the incumbent. the risk of this approach is that the alliances with illegitimate forces that have been made i don't think will assure good enough governance over the coming months and years and may see a further deterioration in v governance. a second approach is to accept that and then have a robust counterinsurgency effort to build good governance bottom up. that hasn't been tried in the past. the jury will be open as to whether it can be successful. the third is to have a row best agreement on benchmarks on accountability going forward. i believe the afghan people will be looking for the international community to take a robust

approach on asking for standards of accountability and benchmarks of reaching good governance. the last option would be to go back to the drawing board. if the ecc is to invalidate a sufficient number of ballots or one or more of the candidates or the process as a whole, that will open the question of moving to a new agreement or bond-type agreement. >> i'm sure you agree it should be done expeditiously. do you have any idea when we might hear something definitive from the ecc? >> i believe that's specified in the ecc regulations, that they must report back within a specified amount of time after the 17th of september when results are declared. i believe that's a month. but i could check that. >> thank you. anyone else on the panel wish to touch on this? thank you. >> thank you senator wicker. senator webb? >> thank you, senator lugar. i would like to express my

appreciation to the chairman and to you for having put together this extraordinary variety of expertise in the panel today. i don't know any american public servant who has had more time on the ground, intellectual dedication and emotional commitment than ambassador crocker. it's great to see you here today, sir. dr. hussein any, as someone who spent a good part of his life as a novelist and also having worked in the dread hollywood off and on for about 15 years, i have incredible admiration for the literary achievement that you were able to bring with "kite runner." i've often said that you can communicate to people on an emotional level through a piece of literature in a way they've come to understand things probably better than any other way. just an amazingly powerful film.

i congratulate you on what it took to put it together, all of that so rare to see a piece of literature that can hit all the issues of loyalty and respect and father-son-relationships and all those sorts of things. just an amazing achievement. i would like to begin by expressing my appreciation actually for what senator corker said. it does address the difficulty that we have up here in this particular issue. that is when you look at where we seem to be going here from a national strategic perspective, from a perspective of national interest, american national interest in terms of how we use our assets, where we put our expenditures in terms of national treasure, whether we should build up an

infrastructure to address an enemy that is basically a mobile enemy, and we saw this in iraq quite frankly. we built up a huge infrastructure to address two different sets of problems. one was the issue of international terrorism which is intrinsically mobile and decided to relocate after a period of time. but then also to have to pick up the pieces of what we had done following our invasion and try to repair relationships and move iraq forward, in terms of the advantage that the forces of international terrorism wish to have, that was pretty good for them long term. we spent hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, and they remained active. we're looking at something similar here in afghanistan. i know we've got national mission creep going on now talking about whether we really

are going to attempt to basically build a state here. there's going to be a debate about this. i look at what happened in somalia a couple days ago. if you're really talking about going after the forces of international terrorism, that was a pretty effective way to do it. coming over the horizon, hitting an element of international terrorism, leaving, not leaving behind an infrastructure and being able to have the same man ufability as your enemy has. on the other hand, we are moving forward with a different debate here. and we will have that debate. the question is not whether there is no military solution which is sort of been agreed upon. it is whether the military component of this solution is one that is going to work. i say all that because i would

like to ask you on your panel here to look at this from two different perspectives. first, at what point do we reach a tipping point with the united states military where the presence and the operations might actually be counterproductive. this has been raised before. but there's an additional component to this that i have a good deal of concern on, and that is to what extent in afghanistan can we actually build a national army. i've asked this question to general petraeus and general mcchrystal. i asked it of admiral mullen the other day. this is not a country with national experience with the army, a country with a lot of national pride. the best i can see is at one period in the mid to late 1900s, there was a national army of about 90,000.

if you take the police with us, we're talking about 250,000. on the one hand, at what point does our presence reach a tipping point where it's counterproductive, where people believe we are an occupying force or whatever you want to put on it. then, can we actually do the other piece of this in terms of the history of the country. dr. lockhart, i'd actually like to get your views on that as a starting point. >> i do believe there is potentially a point at which presence may be counterproductive. but i don't believe we've reached that yet i think the only way that can be tested and ascertained is through polling and observation of the population. i believe, like dr. husseini is why there is a criticism, they're very much in the minority.

the majority of the population seeks very much and hopes very much that the u.s. commitment remains and the international partnership remains for the long-term stability of the country. in terms of the possibility of building@@@@@ write the challenge of managing their own

institutions. >> thank you, ambassador crocker. you and i had an exchange several years ago with the situation in iraq. one of your strongly made points was that the iraqis of all different ethnicities had come together. your point had been that more than 200,000 shia had actually died fighting in the iran-iraq war. what are your thoughts about the situation with respect to afghanistan? >> well, the fortunate thing for me, senator, is i remember no one but myself these days. so as uninformed as my opinions may be, at least i'm entitled to have them. since you asked to express them, i do believe that what we have seen thus far shows us with all of the shortcomings in terms of

manpower, material and even abilities, that the afghans are capable of developing and fielding national forces. as i understand it, perhaps the army more so than the police. but even with the police. as you noted, sir, while afghanistan has a history of challenges to central governments, it also has a history of a national military. my sense is that afghans are quite proud of the tradition of that military in the country's history. i think it can be done. i think it is being done. but as we saw in iraq, this takes time. the early test that, as you know, that the iraqi security forces faced almost took them

apart. so i think that we and the afghans have to be careful not to put more of a burden on these developing forces than they can bare at this time. at so many points, this will take time. nowhere i think is that more the case than it is in the development of these security forces. >> my time has expired. i appreciate both of your answers. of course, the difficulty is the other side of that, that the more time we have with the size of the american presence, the more risk we have of being viewed in a different light. i thank you for your comments. >> thank you senator webb, senator shah heen. >> dr. lockhart, thank you for all the work you've done in afghanistan and especially in the post september 11th program when you were there on the ground helping to lay out the

foundation on which we can move forward in afghanistan. you laid out four distinct options for governance in this post election. but you didn't say whether you thought there was a preferred means of action. do you think one of those options is preferable? >> i think the -- thank you for your kind words. i think the first two options i outlined of letting the current governance arrangements continue unchecked or plus trying to build governance bottom-up while we have a vacuum in essence at the top are not going to be desirable, probably would not lead to success. i think the two other options, one of accepting the victory of the incumbent, but putting in place very sfrikt conditions,

agreeing on benchmarks particularly on financial accountability and asking for some deaf lugs of power and putting in place checks an ambulances would be one preferred option. the other would be to go back to the drawing board and putting in place a new transitional authority which would probably govern for a two to four-year period and one of whose central tasks will be organizing a morrow bust set of elections next time, which will require an inquiry into what went wrong, one of which will be a census. >> does that run the risk of creating a perception that the international community is making the determination about the future of the afghanistan and sort of erasing the elections, even recognizing that the elections might be flawed? >> i think that option would only be possible if the ecc which is a domestic afghan

institution, would first rule that either one of the -- one or more of the candidates, the process or a certain number of ballots were invalid. it would have to rest on that domestic determination. then a lot of care would have to be taken to ensure that the process moved forward in accordance with the afghan constitution. and there are provisions within the constitution that would allow that to take place. >> thank you for that clarification. dr. husseini, this question is both for you and dr. lockhart, i think. i, like senator webb, very much appreciate your books and think they're wonderful and have probably done as much as any po policy in this country to make americans care about what happens in afghanistan. so thank you for that. what do you see happening on the ground in terms of coordination of aid among the international entities that are in afghanistan and the un and several of you

have referenced that. what should be done better to improve that coordination and to deal with the corruption and the fraud that seems to be happening too much there? >> thank you for your kind words. i may have to defer a good chunk of this question to my more qualified colleagues on the panel. but there's a perception in afghanistan among the civilians that of the billions of dollars that have come to afghanistan, not a whole lot of it has reached the afghans themselves. there is disappointment that even though afghanistan has been focus of international attention now for several years, by and large for average afghans, quality of life has not improved significantly. most afghans are still lacking

for basic social services the same as they were a number of years ago. i will just say that only a fraction of it ends up in the pockets of the afghans themselves. so much of the money is spent on providing security for the foreign presence, the aid organization and the bureaucrats, to paying the salary of consultants. much of the resources and the services that are utilized in afghanistan are outsourced and, therefore, don't provide opportunity and employment for the afghans themselves. of course, the -- much of the money bypasses the afghan government itself, reenforcing the image of the government as sort of being an omnipotent bystander.

i think those are all issues that have to be addressed. i'm going to defer to my other colleagues about more on the issue. >> thank you. i don't know. dr. lockhart, ambassador crock kerr, general krad dock, who would like to take a shot of that. >> a few observations. a terribly important, the failure to coordinate aid has fed into the corruption within the afghan institution. i think first is developing a robust -- not being afraid of butting a robust set of conditions for aid either through an ims program or u.s. or multi-lateral agreement. central to that would be insisting on transparency, particularly in licensing and revenue as well as expenditure and audits that should be released to the of a gan public. second is putting the of afghan budget and institutions central. the afghan budget is the policy coordination mechanism on the ground. i think we're making the mistake when we're asking them to

coordinate. we need roadmap for each ministry. we have o road map for the afghan national army. we need the same thing for the other institutions. i think we have a quord dplags effort, the afghan reconstruction trust fund is managed by the world bank and acts as a tool key system on the flow of money. using that or developing a parallel type of trust fund for u.s. resources would be essential. and then where agencies and pry company are contracted, we have to provide the same set of robust set of transparency which to date have not been in place. >> thank you very much. ambassador crocker, do you have anything you want to add to that? >> no, ma'am. >> thank you both ambassador crocker and general krad doctor your service as well. >> senator kaufman. >> i want to thank you and the ranking member for holing these

hearings right now. i think this decision that's going to be made right now is one of the most important decisions we'll be dealing with are in the senate where we're dealing with a lot of these things. having the panels have been excellent, just the right people. i cannot commend you enough for doing this. i want to thank everybody on the panel. just having the ability to listen to what you have to say is so helpful in trying to deal with this. i have a few questions. one is, it's been mentioned by a number of senators and also in the popular press, that the somalia rate is a model for u. operations in afghanistan. is it the some mall rate a model? >> complex question. i'm not sure it's a mod dell. i think it's a tool. it already has been going on in afghanistan over the past several years through the u.s. counterterrorism forces, not so much the nato counterinsurgent

capability with significant results. but again with a hierarchy that's amorphous, cells operating as opposed to a vertical hierarchy, it's very difficult to be able to make long-term gains because someone always then steps up. however, it is on going, day-to-day operation done very precisely. it's what you don't hear that's probably more important than what you hear. >> great. anyone else? >> senator, i think that's a very important question that certainly is beyond my expertise to adequately answer. but it is i think worth posing to those in the administration more qualified. my sense is that the somalia model, if you will, probably cannot be successfully replicated in afghanistan.

i think the dynamics there are more complex. i also think, frankly, that given that the commander in afghanistan, general mcchrystal, is perhaps the most capable special operations commander that this country has ever produced, that if he thought it could be done that way, i think we'd be seeing different sets of recommendations. >> great. thank you. there's a discussion about expediting the elections that senator wicker raised. i think that would be key to everyone. i met with abdul abdullah two weeks ago. there's always a chance he might throw in with karzai. for the sake of the question, can anybody think of a why to expedite the end of this election without considering the there's some kind of a coalition government?

>> senator, that's a very important question. i'm not sure there is a way to e expedite it. i think there will be a tendency to allow the ecc to complete its investigations and then make a determination on whether the process has met the standards of a fair enough election. i think the only thing that could bring it to a resolution earlier would be the coming together within the afghan political elite of enough of the candidates, critically abdullah and karzai, but potentially others within the political elite who would agree to form a type of unity government. >> i think it's key that -- this is the worst possible time for this to happen. so if anybody comes up with any ideas, i hear a lot of talk about expediting, but i haven't heard a single person to get us to where we have to get to. if you come up with anything, i would very much appreciate it. let's talk about civilian surge for a second. senator lugar has raised that a number of times. it's really, really important. one of the problems is

recruiting people. how do we improve recruitment of civil and foreign service officers to move away from -- as we move away from a reliance on contractors? >> senator, if i could just takr agencies and from the private

sector. and that still, frankly, does not work very well. it's called the 3161 process. i can tell you that it's painful in the extreme to make that work, work quickly, getting the right people in the right places. i know the administration has put more emphasis on building up what's called scrs within the state department as a means of providing a civilian reserve, if p you will. i would applaud that. but a great deal more needs to be done to put in place the structures that will allow an administration to identify and quickly bring to the field the numbers and the skill sets that simply do not exist within the established foreign affairs agencies. >> i think it's good you point out the difficulty of this. people glaze over this and senator lugar has been talking about this for quite awhile.

if we're going to be fighting wars of counterinsurgency in the future, we're trying to get enough people, but planning down the road is really, really important. can i ask you another experience, experience in iraq. two things. one is how is -- we're trying to get the taliban to come over, kind of like we did with the sons of iraq in anbar province. would you comment on whether you think that's possible in afghanistan? >> i do think it's possible. again, i'm not in a position to comment with any detail on the dynamics there. but once again, i think we've got the right people in this fight. both general mcchrystal, of course, with his substantial experience in afghanistan and iraq, where i had the privilege of serving with him and general petraeus, in many respects, the architect of the awakening

strategy, of course now has oversight of both campaigns. i have a high level of confidence that we do have the people engaged on this that can figure out what can be done and how to do it. all of that said, and again my colleagues, dr. lockhart and dr. husseini are far more qualified to speak to it. it is -- it's going to be a very different and more difficult process. the sunni insurgency in the iraq was not deeply rooted in time or in etiology. the taliban, of course, are both. >> thank you very much. i want to tell you i think everyone agrees that our success in iraq is based on the people we have there. one of the very best people was you and the people we have there, general mcchrystal,

holbrook, we have a good team over there, too. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator kaufman. let me follow up on a few things if i can. the sort of a parallel to a couple of questions. on the issue of the taliban which is central to this -- actually, before i get to this. i want to ask general krad dock, it's important to our understanding of what the options are in the taliban, as supreme allied commander, you were commanding nato forces, and you're very familiar where the tensions within that block at this point. my sense is that we are losing our allies' enthusiasm for this effort and that a number of them -- i won't go into the details there -- but have been very reluctant all along to engage. their troops don't engage.

and looking to them for additional support here, i mean i think essentially we're going to kind of be on our own here. we have -- is that a fair assessment? >> senator, i think that's a fair assessment from a military perspective. i would agree there is unequal burden-sharing among the alliance with regard to those who will and those who won't. i do think, however, there's opportunity with nato allies to ask for trainers in areas where it may not be as risky and they may have political viability. i think they should be asked for civilian surge capability. there's plenty of that in europe. if you knock down the wall between nato and the eu, you might be able to access a lot of that capability that we need there. >> i'd like to examine -- that's a good thought there. i want to examine this attitude a little bit. do they know something that we don't know? >> i can't speak for them in terms of what they know --

>> but you've had these conversations. i've had these conversations, and you have, too. there is an attitudal difference about the threat. there's a threat definition difference, isn't there? >> indeed. >> isn't that important for us to understand? >> well, i think it's been discussed here. in europe, terrorism is viewed as a police issue when it's visited upon their people. and you deal with it then as opposed to stopping it before it gets into your country. so the military generally does not deal with terrorism to the extent that we do here because of the attacks. >> but i think their perception goes actually deeper than that. i think there's a sense -- there's a different sense of how you manage this over a period of time. you're nodding your head, ms. lockhart. do you want to share your perception then? your body language got you in trouble there. >> i think twofold. i would agree that there is

absolutely a winning enthusiasm amongst public opinion in europe. i think that's partly because there has yet to be a credibility articulation of exactly what the strategy is going to be and particularly the failures in homeland in britain is infecting the public debate. that's again partly because in helmut there was not a credible articulation of a governance and development strategy. that remains open. i do believe public opinion could be reconvinced if that strategy is to be articulated. >> your strategy involves a pretty significant commitment of resources, investment personnel, civilians -- it really is a nation-building strategy. >> it is. and i believe that there will be more appetite in europe and other countries for engagement on training, as general krad dock articulated, and on the

civilian surge elements, particularly in areas like capacity-building and economic investment. so a sensible division of labor going forward may be to look to support from allies particularly in europe and japan for that civilian type of assistance, recognizing the europe will continue to bear the brunt. >> general krad dock, we'll get more folks that are hopefully more operational with afghanistan itself as we go down the road here. from a military perspective, in order to do the kinds of things that ms. lockhart and others have talked about doing in building the governance, building -- the capacity building and so forth, you've got to have some security. is it possible to do the security without the kind of current engagement in civilian collateral deaths that we currently have? or are the insurgents always capable of guarantees that you have that even if you don't want

it? is that a great danger here? >> it's my judgment that in irregular warfare and given what we know about the insurgents, that they were always capable of arranging that situation. i can give you chapter and verse over and over again of operations and targeting that looked fine but didn't turn out that way for a meriad of reasons. again, the use of civilians as shields is very difficult to combat. now, having said that, i think we can continue to work to min niz. i think that the tactical guidance put into place by general mcchrystal recently has gone a long way and will continue to do that to minimize that pushback. if i may, a point that ms. lockhart raised. the british strategy in helmut, the dutch strategy in ar ruse gone, the u.s. strategy in pack teek ka or nang ga har, one of

the strategies we face is the arrangements in nato. they deal with that at the expense of dealing with that with the country as a whole. it's caused us problems overtime. >> i agree with that. one of the most significance problems is the absence for almost eight years of a unified command and unified strategy. in fact -- people need to understand this. this is important as we think about afghanistan. we have traveled this journey for almost seven years without a strategy. there was sort of a -- just a continuum at the expense of iraq. and i think most people have agreed that troops were diverted, resources were deserted, so it's only been in the last few months that people have begun to hone in and say how do we adjust? the challenge as i wrote back last february is the clock ticking, the amount of time lost to the corruption, to the other

things and can you make it up. i want to come back to that for a moment ambassador crocker if i can. with respect to the taliban, you made a very perceptive observation in answer to senator kaufman's question. you noted the historical, cultural depth of the taliban versus the insurgency in iraq. there are different -- however, we keep hearing about sort of different shades of taliban. can you share with us perhaps, you know, to what degree can the taliban be sort of divided in a way here? is there a diplomatic/civilian ability to reach out to them and, in fact, give them something that they want more than being taliban? and, therefore, isolating the really hard core taliban? is or are we dealing with a monolithic entity? >> mr. chairman, i would make a

few observations on the methodology, if you will, and then perhaps dr. hosseini or dr. lockhart will have some comments more on the nature of the taliban as they see it. that's not my area of expertise. the principal we've followed in iraq was exactly what you suggest. it was talking to anyone who would talk to us without regard to what they may have done to us in the past, trying to find splits, fish chers, differences of view, people who would be susceptible to whatever we might offer to break up an insurgency, if you will, to pull people either to our side or at least into the neutral zone. we did that without spending a

tremendous amount of time trying to figure out what etiological persuasion might exist here or there. we just kind of went at it. we got if the word out that we're open for discussion. it seems to me that a similar approach has great potential, also, in afghanistan. the taliban is not a monolithic organization. they are not card-carrying members. there have to be many different motivations and levels of commitment. so it's by seeking ways to engage, to discuss, direct, indirect that i think we'll find what the limits are of shrinking an adversary down to the smallest possible number of irreconcilables, as we put it, in terms of iraq. you want to reduce the number of people who absolutely have to be

killed to the smallest number possible. i think again the same methodology will work in afghanistan. but my colleagues would be far more knowledgeable on the nature of what we're dealing with there. >> do you want to comment, either of you? just quickly, i want to try to -- >> sure. i agree with the ambassador. the taliban are not a monolithic movement. the term taliban refers to a cluster of different groups that more or less answer to different leadership. so part of the challenge of -- again, i'm sort of out of my element here. part of the challenge of negotiating with these people is that there's no -- in the absence of clear leadership structure is difficult to determine who exactly you speak

to. and in addition, at the present time it seems to me the taliban have no incentive really to negotiate because the perception is they've managed to frus street the @a& pragmatic people, and if certain

elements of at least the afghan movement can be convinced that it's in their self-interest and pragmatic interest to come over to the other side, they may be interested in doing that. but i will say that on my recent trip to afghanistan, i spoke to a lot of people on the street, and my sense is that by and large a lot of people, although they don't feel any -- necessarily any kind ship with the taliban, they are in favor of some kind of negotiation between the west and the taliban. >> thank you. senator lugar, do you have any more questions? senator casey? >> i know we have to move on. i felt guilty i hadn't asked the doctor and the general a question. at the risk of delaying things, two quick questions. one is, dr., with regard -- first of all, i want to commend the work of unhcr across the

world. we had hearings at the tub committee level on refugees in both iraq and pakistan. i was very interested in what you said about the refugee challenge in afghanistan. i guess i'd ask you this question. what's the guess i would ask yo question, what's the short-term and near-term are challenge with regard to this question about you refer to it as reintegration. first and then second, what is the -- what is the likelihood that there's going to be a dramatic increase in the number of refugees in afghanistan, which becomes in all refugee situations, i saw this firsthand, not the problems with it, but just a good example of what's happening on the ground in pakistan where you visit an idp camp there where internally

displaced people seemed to be for the most part treated well and seem ed to be moving back t their community, but if it doesn't go well, you have both the humanitarian and a security problem. but i guess i would ask you, first of all, on the sense of increase that may occur in afghanistan in terms of the number of refugees. and secondly, the of reintegration. >> just before you answer, i need to go down to the finance committee for a few minutes on the health care thing, but i want to thank the panel for your contributions today, it's been very, very helpful. we have a distance to go yet, but i think we're beginning to shed some light on it and we're very grate fful for you for bei here today and i want to thank my colleagues. whoever wants to be the last questioner, just close it out. thanks. >> thank you, chairman kerry. >> reintegration of afghan ref i didn'ts continues to be very difficult challenge.

and to put it in perspective, let's remember that afghanistan, even in it's heyday ranked at or near the bottom of the global index for human development, now put that country through 30 years of successive civil conduct and increase its pop lagts in a six of six years by 20%. if we increase the population of a developed nation like france or the uk by 20%, how would they be able to hand it? frankly it would be kay ychaotit in afghanistan, the lack of public administration and lack of effective governor governance has allowed that to happen. so what we're seeing in afghanistan in regards to the refugee reintegration is the stresses and strains of a government that is more or less puckling under the strain of reabsorbing the millions of people who have come back.

so reintegration in afghanistan is a serious challenge. for some, there is more or less been able to resume their lives in a relatively settled fashion. but for many refugees, they continue to face the lack of basic social services. fo foremost among those, land, shelter, jobs. and then water, education and access to health facilities. i believe that the era of spontaneous voluntary vurn over. we saw 5:00 million people coming from since 2002 last year, 280,000 afghans returned home. this year, a fraction of that, only 50,000. the reasons for that have to do with partly with low absorption capacity in afghanistan, partly with the security, par

particularly these to originated from the pashtun belts and are concerned about returning to the places of origin where the insurgency is very strong. part of it has do with the lack of employment opportunity. this is particular the case with the ref i didn'ts in iran who have relatively better living conditions in iran they've been able to make a life for themselves. so 2.6 afghans still remain abroad. 1.6 roughly in pakistan and 1 million in iran and it is far from clear whether or if they will return from afghanistan. they don't feel any kinship with afghans and the idea of uprooting their lives to settle in a rae mote region of the country is not particularly attractive for them. it's a major challenge for the

government of and particularly with iran to negotiate and couple to a resolution as to the ultimate fate of the refugees. as far as the increased number of refugees, we are seeing far more displacement than we were a few years ago. we are now, over a quarter of a million afghans who are displaced. the reasons for displacement within afghanistan have do partial with the conflict, particularly in the south and southeast, where again the insurgency is strong, but part of it has to also with land disputes, lack of economic opportunity and so on and so forth. so for the foreseeable future, i think this will be a challenge for unhcr. >> one of the more interesting parts of the challenge or the results, i should say, in pakistan was you about 80% of the internally displaced people who were displaced because of the military conflict in places like the swat valley and other

places. you had about 80% of those internally displaced people go into home, people would take them in based upon both, i think, pashtun tradition and the welcoming way they bring people into their holmes and secondly because of the experience of the 2005 earthquake. so you had -- of the 2 million plus in pack tan who are displaced. 80% of them were brought into homes, so maybe the challenge there was different than it might in other places including afghanistan, but i know we don't have a lot more time. general, the last question and then we'll wrap up, you may not have an opinion about this yet because it's about 24 hours as we do in washington, we want opinions about something that's barely out. but the administration has put forth now a draft or at least a starting point on met strings. what they call evaluating progress with regard to afghanistan, both military and

nonmilitary. i know you may not have had a chance to review it yet, but what's your sense? do you have an opinion on what they produced? if not, what's your sense about how do go about that? because we need people to weigh in on what metrics are valid, what metrics are ones we should use and with have to have -- i believe, we meaning the congress and administration both, have to give a lot of frequent, frequent, frequent reporting on progress if we want to sustain support for any kind of an effort. >> thank you, senator. i have not seen the metrics, i know it's been a work in progress for some time. i am a strong supporter of metrics. what we have done to date and my judgment has been measured performance. how many miles or kilometers of road, how many children are in school, how many vaccinations but we haven't measured the effect of the performance. and these met strings have to go

to the next step. what is working, how do we measure it, do we measure what we can measure? because it's easy to measure even though not relevant or do we measure what's fortunate determine the effect and then e reinforce success, stop failure and find something else? nato has struggled with this, they're still working on it. the isaf forces are working on metric metrics,ie i think we need to pull together some good analytical minds and critical determine are what it we'll focus on both in security, governance and just the development process. they all bleed over into each other's field. you can't get one without the other. so i will be looking for this closely, i think it will behoove us in the coming very near term here, to come to grips with this. the hard part will be going out and getting the data and then the critical objective analysis. >> i hope all four of you will

weigh in on as time goes by. we need your help. thanks very much. this hearing is adjourned unless senator kaufmann has something else. we're all set? hearing adjourned.0000 mr. specter: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from pennsylvania. mr. specter: madam president, i have sought recognition to comment about u.s. policy in afghanistan. during the course of the august recess and of course with my customary practice, i traveled to pennsylvania's 67 counties to take the pulse of my constituents. and while there are many problems, there is considerable concern about what our policy is going to be in afghanistan. i note that at this time, according to yesterday's "new york times," there have been 821

american service members killed in afghanistan, some $189 billion has been appropriated for afghanistan. by the end of this year, there will be 68,000 american military personnel and an additional 38,000 nato troops from other countries in afghanistan. i ask consent that an extensive floor statement be included in the text of the "congressional record" at the conclusion of my statement. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. specter: and i intend now to summarize the substance of my concerns. the approach on our policy has been outlined in testimony earlier this week by admiral

michael mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, in these two statement statements. our policy -- quote -- "is to provide sanctuary to al qaeda and the taliban now and to generate a stable and secure afghanistan capable of denying al qaeda a return after the withdrawal of 0 our combat forces and while we sustain partnership and commitment to political and economic development in that nation." admiral mullen told the committee -- quote -- "a properly resourced counterinsurgency probably means more forces, without question, more time, and more commitment to the protection of the afghan people and to the development of good government." while i think it is laudable to want to protect the afghan people and to provide good

governance there, it is my view that that is not a sufficient national interest for the united states to put our troops at risk or to expend substantial additional sums there. the principal question, as i see it, is whether afghanistan is indispensable to be secure to prevent al qaeda from launching another attack against the united states. if that is the purpose, that is the necessity, that we must undertake anything, whatever it costs, to stop al qaeda from again attacking the united states. but i believe that there are a series of questions which have to be answered before we can assess whether that is an indispensable part of u.s. policy. and toward that end, i have

written to the secretary of defense, secretary of state, the director of national intelligence, and the director of the central intelligence agency on a series of questions, which i think require answers before we can make an informed judgment as to whether the expenditures in afghanistan are in our specific national interest. these are the questions which i have posed for these leaders: what are the prospects for military success in afghanistan against al qaeda and the taliban? what will the requirements be in the next year as to additional u.s. troops and the cost of our involvement in afghanistan? what may we reasonably expect nato or other allies to contribute in troops and dollars

to our efforts in afghanistan? what other areas around the world are open to al qaeda as potential bases for another attack on the united states? what will be done besides military action, such as nation building and stabilizing and developing afghanistan, so that they will be prepared to handle their own problems, so that we could withdraw? what assistance can we reasonably expect from pakistan in fighting al qaeda and the taliban and stopping both from seeking refuge by moving in and out of pakistan? how does the questionable legitimacy of president karzai's status as a result of allegations of proof of election fraud impact on our ability to succeed in afghanistan? how does the illegal drug trafficking and alleged involvement of high-ranking officials in the karzai

government in such drug trafficking impact on oifortses in afghanistan -- on our efforts in afghanistan? what does u.s. intelligence show has to any possible plans of al qaeda to attack the united states or anyone else? what does u.s. intelligence show as to whether india poses a real threat to attack pakistan? what does u.s. intelligence show as to whether pakistan poses a real threat to attack india? what does u.s. intelligence show as to whether pakistan could reasonably devote additional military force to assist us in the fight against the taliban? what does u.s. intelligence show as to whether the government of pakistan or influential officials in the pakistani government would consider negotiating with india for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to diffuse the tension

with india if actively encouraged to do so by the united states? what does united states intelligence show as to whether the government of india or some influential officials in the indian government would consider negotiating with pakistan for reducing nuclear weapons or other confidence-building measures to diffuse the tension with pakistan if actively encouraged by the united states to do so? we have learned a bitter lesson from iraq that we do not have answers to important questions in formulating our policy there. had we known that saddam hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, i think the united states would not have gone into iraq. these questions were posed by me when we had the debate on the resolution for authorizing the

use of force. on october 7, 200 it i said the following: "what was the extent of saddam hussein's control over weapons of mass destruction? what would it cost by way of casualties to topple saddam hussein? what would be the consequences in iraq? who would govern after saddam was toppled? what would happen in the region, the impact on the arab world and the impact on israel?" close quote. the president, as commander in chief, as we all know, has primary responsibility to conduct war; but the constitution vests in the congress the sole authority to declare war. regreregrettably, the congressil authority and responsibility has been dissipated with what we have seen in korea and in vietnam and in the

authorizations for the use of force in iraq in both 2001 and then in -- in the two incursions into iraq. we do not have the authority under separation of powers to delegate that authority. and had we asked the tough questions and had we gotten correct, honest, accurate answers, it would have been of great help to president george bush yogi berra in form late -- to president bush administration in for formulating policy in ir. and now i think it would be a great help to barack obama for the united states congress to exercise our persistence in finding correct answers to these kinds of tough questions.

we have a situation with pakistan today which gives us great pause. the united states has advanced $15.5 billion to pakistan since 9/11, some $10.9 billion of that money has gone for security. and there is a real question as to whether we have gotten our money's worth. the comments from the "new york times" on december 24 raise these issues: money which has been expended by the united states in pakistan has been diverted to help finance weapons systems designed to counter india, not al qaeda or the taliban. the united states has paid tens of millions of dollars to

inflated pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel and ammunition and other costs. dr. anthony cordesman at the center for strategic and international studies, wrote on april 10 of this year -- quote -- "far too much of the military portion of the past aid to pakistan never was used to help fight the taliban in al qaeda or can't be accounted for. future aid should clearly be tied to clearly defined goals for pakistani action, a full accounting for the money." "the new york times" on august 30 of this year pointed out -- quote -- "the accusations have been made of pakistan illegally modifying american-made missiles to eng expand its capability to

attack land targets, a mow tension threat t -- a potential threat to india." the questions which have been posed in the series of letters which i have outlined go to the issue as to whether india poses a threat to pakistan. it is hard for me to contemplate that that is a really serious problem, but we ought to be informed. and we ought to be putting puttr efforts to seeing if we could not broker a peace treaty between india and pakistan, which would enable us to get really substantial help from pakistan in our fight against the taliban. in 1995 when i was chairman of the intelligence committee, senator hank brown of colorado and i visited india and pakistan. when we were in india, we went

with prime minister rao, who brought up the subject of a potential nuclear confrontation between india and pakistan and said that he would like to see the subcontinent nuclear-free. he knew that we were en route to pakistan to see prime minister benazir bhutto, and he asked us to take up the subject with her, which she did. as a result, i wrote the following letter to president clinton a day after we left india. and i think it is worth reading in full. august 28, 1995: "dear mr. president: , i think it important to call to your personal attention the substance of meetings which senator hank brown and i had in the last two days with indian prime minister rao and pakistan prime minister benazir bhutto. prime minister rao stated that he would be very interested in

negotiations which would lead to the elimination of any nuclear weapons on the subcontinent within 10 or 15 years, including renouncing first use of such weapons. his interest in such negotiations with pakistan would cover bilateral talks, a regional conference, which would include the united states, china, and russia, in addition to india and pakistan. when we asked prime minister bhutto whether she had last -- when she had last talked to prime minister rao, she said she had had no conversations with him during her tenure as prime minister. prime minister bhutto did say that she had initiated the contact through an intermediary but that was termtded when a new controversy arose between pakistan and india. from our conversations with prime minister rao and prime minister bhutto, it is my sense that both would be very receptive to discussions

initiated and brokered by the united states as to nuclear weapons and also delivery missile systems. i am dictating this letter to you by telephone from damascus, so you will have it at your earliest convenience. i am also telefaxing a copy of this letter to secretary of state warren christopher. in my letter to secretary of state clinton, which i sent her last week, i asked her what efforts have been made to broker such a peace treaty between india and pakistan and sent on to her a copy of the letter which i have written to president clinton. if we could ease the tension between those two countries, if we could persuade pakistan that

india does not pose a threat so that pakistan does not have to marshal their forces along the india border but instead aid the united states in our fight against the taliban, it would be a very different proposition. the suggestion has been made now to extend $7.5 billion in additional funding to pakistan. it seems to me that it is not a good use of our money if it is to follow the same trail as the $10.5 billion which we have expended in the immediate past. if we can get the assistance of pakistan in fighting taliban, it would be one thing. if we could be sure that the money was used for the intended purpose and not diverted for the other purposes, as it appears the other $10.5 billion was, it would be a very, very different

picture. in sum, it seems to me that before we ought to commit additional troops to afghanistan, it ought to be a matter of paramount importance, really indispensable, as a matter of stopping another attack by al qaeda. if al qaeda can organize in some other spot, the issues raised by my questions, it would bear heavily on what our policy in afghanistan should be. madam president, in addition to the full text of my statement being included in the record, i ask consent that copies of my letters to secretary of state hillary clinton, secretary of defense robert gates, c.i.a. director and the director of

national intelligence dennis blair all be included in