>> the hearing comes to order. recently i noted that my friend and colleague from massachusetts who chairs the senate foreign relations committee, that is obviously senator john kerry, noted that iraq had become a forgotten war. well, i agree. iraq no longer commands daily headlines. and here in congress, the debate now focuses on health care reform. and there are multiple briefings and hearings on afghanistan. but just because something is forgotten those not mean it has gone away.

as former secretary of state colin powell warned former president george w. bush, before the invasion of iraq, you break it, you own it or and he was right. this hearing is about the status of that ownership. . .

ultimate agreement that was signed by prime minister malmaliki and president bush. while i continue off concerns about it however and one of those concerns is the subject of one purpose of the bilateral agreement was to replace the united nations security council mandate for u.s. troops and other international forces in iraq. this mandate was what is known as a chapter 7 mandate. chapter 7 of the u.n. charter concerns and i'm quoting, action

with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. in effect, the chapter 7 mandate means that the international community, via the security council, has passed legally binding resolutions regarding a particular country, irrespective of what that country's people or government might wish. now the u.s.-iraq bilateral agreement effectively ended the chapter 7 mandate, regarding international forces in high rack. -- in iraq, and this was welcomed in iraq as an acknowledgement of its sovereignty and national dignity. after all, a chapter 7 mandate essentially says that you are a

ward of the international community, but you're not capable or trustworthy enough to run your own country. and for anyone, but especially a people as proud as the iraqi people, this is profoundly insulting. however, a number of other chapter 7 mandates still remain in a force regarding iraq. most of them stem from the saddam hussein era. article 25 of the bilateral agreement committed the united states to working with iraq to address these remaining chapter 7 mandates, and restore iraq to full sovereignty in the family of nations. unfortunately, this is not as

easy as it sounds. thiesmann dates cover a range of issues from border disputes to compensation claims, from the first gulf war to the bank account, which protects iraq's oil revenue from lawsuits, to now obsolete provisions regarding weapons of mass destruction. depending on how they are defined, there are almost 20 different mandates. many of them require iraq to take certain steps, some of which they have not -- they have not accomplished. for them to be eliminated. each of these mandates must be debated and voted on in the security council and the reality of the security council is that russia, china, france and the united kingdom, as well as the united states, can veto any

resolution for phi reason. -- any reason, thus it's clear that this will require the expenditure of considerable political capital by the united states at the united nations. some might say that we have enough on our plate. it's time to move forward and address other pressing issues. but let me suggest that we have given our word in a form am document, -- formal document and as secretary powell observed, we have a moral obligation to the people of iraq and that simply cannot be denied. i would also especially note, and i think this is particularly important, that while it might be off the front page, in many

ways, iraq, its stability and its potential prosperity are essential in the middle east in the entire region. and a stable middle east is essential to our national security as well as world peace. so iraq is as important as ever, albeit it may be forgotten by some, so this hearing is an effort to find out what needs to be done to terminate thiesmann dates, what are the mandates under discussion, what is the process for eliminating them, what do the iraqis have to do to help us help them? how does this affect iraq's internal politics and its relations with its neighbors. what are the prospects for a possible referendum in january if we do not eliminate at least

some of thiesmann dates? -- these machin mandates? what are the implications for american forces remaining in iraq? this hearing and i think a most important briefing in which two distinguished parliamentans will come before this panel. before i turn to this panel, let me turn to dana rohrabacher for any opening comments he might have. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. let me note that the chairman has taken a special interest in the various legal and diplomatic

agreements that have been made concerning the ongoing conflict in high rack. the chairman was first one to take notice of the status of forces agreement. it could be the reason he was the first one to take notice is the fact that congress had been totally left out of the loop that we were going to have a status of forces agreement, and what the meaning to that was, and so the chairman did make sure that we looked at that issue and demanded that congress play its rightful role during the last administration as that agreement went forward. so i am here to learn about where we stand now, now that decisions have been made that our troops will be withdrawing and are currently and actually involved in withdrawing, and

what legal documents and agreements and mandates that we have, and i'm here to listen and to learn. i do know one thing, that we all need to ponder what the whole iraqi episode in american history means to us as people and as a nation. we have lost 4300 of our young people, some of them weren't young, some were in their 50's or 60's, still young, but we lost 4300 of hour american people. 4300 died in high rack. 4300 people. we -- and tens of thousands more wounded, many of them will live

lives for the rest of their life, they will live in misery. perhaps without a leg, perhaps half of their face has been shot off, perhaps they won't be able to walk or have children, thousands of americans and 4300 killed. a trillion dollars of treasure, a trillion dollars. what does this all mean, what is it all about? that trillion dollars, i might add, had it not been spent for that purpose, may well have prevented us from going into the economic crisis that we're through today. think of the price that we have paid. it's an incredible price. we need to ponder what this all means to us as americans.

what commitments we will make in the future, and i believe that the decision to go into iraq in the first place was a decision based on a benevolent intent. and i believe the benevolent intent was that the american people, all of us who participated in that decision because we did as a congress, believed that the dictatorship of saddam hussein was a vicious and bloody and evil, evil regime. and that we were willing to commit ourselves and risk the price that we paid in order to free the people of iraq from this dictatorship. again, we need to ponder to see if that is indeed the case.

was that worth it? we got rid of saddam hussein, and then of course, more and more casualties, more and more treasure trying to prevent radical islamists from taking advantage of the chaos and the confusion of what happens after the transition of a dictatorship into some other kind of government. was all of that worth it? what's it all about. and what are the remnants that are left behind that we have to deal with now? today, we're going to hear about the legal remnants and some of the agreements and i'm here, as i say, to learn about that, because that's something we have to deal with as well. we have to deal with some of the relationships and some of the situations that existed before our intervention in that

situation, and we now have to deal with that. one of the i think major issues is camp ashcroft and where we have people who have committed themselves to pose the islamic dictatorship in iran. and we have a group of people who were permitted to stage themselves from iraqi territory, and are now caught in a situation that had we not intervened, wouldn't exist. so the fact is, it is up to us to confront the issue of camp ashcroft and what happens to those people. i would hope that considering we spent all of this money and all of this blood trying to establish a country that would be more democratic and have more concern for human rights, that the government of iraq would

operate with some of those values instead of with an iron fist and try to exert its authority over -- in situations like camp ashkraw and i would hope that the 43 prisoners that we have taken will be treated well, which i doubt, but that the human rights will be respected, the human rights of those people will be respected. how the government of iraq acts from now on will be -- will determine for the people of the united states whether or not it was worth us to go in and spend the lives of our children and spend the treasure that we could have used in our own families here at home. if it is a democratic government and at the treat people with respect and human rights and

they perhaps try to solve their own problems respect being the rights of -- respecting the rights of various peoples within iraq, the kurds, the christians and as they treat each other, the sunnis and shiites treat each other, that will determine whether or not the american people will look back and say, yes, it was worth giving my so s life to see that that vicious dictatorship was removed, but if they make the wrong decisions in these areas, mr. chairman, i believe that there will be a deep resentment of the american people to the leaders and our government who sent them there, but also to the people of iraq who have not lived up to the opportunity that we paid such a dear price to give them. with that, i'm very interested in the testimony. thank you for holding this hearing today. >> thank you, dana.

>> let me begin by introducing our witnesses. they have become regulars before this particular subcommittee. they're all distinguished in their own right. and we welcome them back. first, we have professor mike matheson, he's a member of the international law facult factor- faculty, faculty, not factory, was that a freudian slip. he served from 2003-2006 as the american member of the u.n. international law commission. from 1972 to 2000, he worked in the legal advisors office at the

department of state, including two years as acting legal adviser of the department. while at the state, he led efforts to create the international criminal tribunals for yugoslavia and rwanda and the u.n. compensation commission for gulf war claims and headed the u.s. delegation with the rank of ambassador to the u.n. negotiations on conventional weapons. he has written the book on the u.n. security council in the post-cold war period on international humanitarian law and recent conflicts, as well as multiple articles and other pieces. i would note that professor matheson currently has a consultant contract with the state department if the am of $20,000, concerning the kosovo case before the international court of justice. however, he is appearing here today in his own capacity and

not as a representative of the united states government. next, we have dr. ken katzman of the congressional research service. he serves as a senior middle east analyst for the u.s. congress with a special emphasis on iran, iraq, and the persian gulf states, afghanistan and terrorist groups operating in the middle east and south asia. he's a busy -- he's a busy guy these days. he's also written numerous articles and various outside publications, including a book entitled "the warriors of islam, iran's revolutionary guard" and has given numerous official presentations and briefings at conferences worldwide. and last but certainly not lea least, steve radamaker, he currently serves as senior

counsel for the bgr consultant group. he joint bgr in 2007 following a distinguished career if all three branches of government. what's particularly interesting for the purpose of this hearing is is he served from 2005 to 2006 as a member of the college of commissioners of the you have nations -- united nations monitoring verification and inspection commission, commonly known as umovic, which was a u.n. machine dated operation -- machine dated operation -- mandated operation regarding iraq. he continues to serve on the u.n. secretary-general's advisory board in disarmament matters and has joined the u.n. commission on the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. in 2002, he became an assistant secretary of state, and from then until 2006, he headed at

various times three bureaus of the department of state, including the bureau of arms control, and the bureau of international security in non-proliferation. and we have to note of course for the record that he has also helped physicians on the staff of the committee of international relations of the house of representatives, including deputy staff director and chief counsel, and we welcome you all, steve, we welcome you back beings and let's begin with mike matheson. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i have submitted a written statement. i suggest it be included in the record and i give a summary at this point. my statement attempts to describe where matters stand with respect to the various chapter 7 measures, which are still if effect, with respect to iraq and particularly in light of the provisions of the u.s.-iraq agreement from last year. you've already noted that

article 25 of that agreement does recognize that the situation of iraq is fundamentally different now, than it was if 1961. it acknowledges that iraq should return to the legal standing that it had before the gulf war. and it pledges the united states to use its best efforts toward that objective. and the security council itself has agreed with this general objective, and in fact, over the past few years, it has itself taken a number of steps to revoke or to modify some of the more onerous chapter 7 measures that had been applied to iraq after the gulf war. in particular, a listing of the trade and financial sanctions, an easing of u.n. control over iraqi oil and gas revenues, the expiration of the multinational forsman date. now in july of this year, the u.n. secretary-general issued a report, which report on where matters stood with respect to those measures that remain, and it noted that progress had been

made on a number of points with respect to these matters. it supported the gradual restoration of iraq to its prior status, but it also noted that there were some unresolved matters which still had to be dealt with. now, the first area of these unresolved matters relates to the compensation for the losses suffered by kuwait and other countries suffered by the gulf war. as you know, in 1991, the security council created a u.n. compensation commission to provide compensation to the various victims of the gulf war, and to make payments for that purpose from iraqi oil export revenues. ultimately, the commission awarded a total of about $52 billion to claimants of various nationalities, including americans. to date, about $28 billion of that has been paid, which leaves about $24 billion representing unpaid claims by kuwait for damage to the kuwaiti

environment and the kuwaiti oil industry. originally, for this purpose, deductions were being made from iraqi oil exports to the tune of 30%. this was reduced in recent years to 5%, and iraq has now proposed that it be reduced to 1%, if not eliminated altogether. since the remaining claims against the fund are kuwait tee, hopefully this can be resolved by some sort of accommodation between iraq and kuwait. one suggestion that has been considered is that these unpaid amounts be used to fund investments in infrastructure projects in iraq. in any event, article 26 of the u.s.-iraq agreement says that the u.s. is going to support iraq in achieving a final resolution of these compensation issues. the second area of unresolved issues relates to other iraqi debts and assets. at the end of last year, the security council decided at

iraq's request to continue in effect the number of measures that had been put in place to handle iraqi funds and assets. specifically, the deposit of iraqi oil export funds into a development fund, which is now administered by iraq, and the operation of an interfat advisory and monitoring board to monitor the accounting and use of those funds. these funds and iraqi oil assets generally are made immune from attachments by security council decisions with some exceptions. now, in the secretary-general's july report, it said that iraq was now basically ready to assume these oversight responsibilities, but it did note that there were certain unresolved technical questions outstanding with respect to iraqi internal controls and the deposit of certain funds into this development fund. it's also important to resolve the large volume of claims against iraq and debts of iraq

that date back to the saddam regime. this includes claims of u.s. nationals and this is necessary so that iraq can resume its normal responsibility of a sovereign state for its assets and liabilities. and again, article 26 of the u.s.-iraq agreement says that the united states will assist iraq in trying to resolve these matters as well. next is the area of weapons of mass destruction. and as you know, after the gulf war, the u.n. security council required the elimination of iraqi wmd and also imposed some significant constraints on iraqi activities and iraqi capabilities that might be used in the future for wmd purposes. this includes chemical and biological weapons, it includes long range ballistic missiles and most importantly, it includes all nuclear items and activities except for certain limited medical and other purposes.

now at the time iraq was required to accept a comprehensive and unusual regime of international inspections to verify its compliance with these provisions. in 2007, the security council decided that these extraordinary inspection regimes were no longer necessary, but it did keep in effect the restrictions on iraqi nuclear and other activities and the resolutions say that these will continue until the security council determines that iraq is if compliance with council resolutions and the international atom energy agency decides that iraq is in compliance with nuclear requirements and neither of these steps have occurred. apparently, there is some further work required on technical issues, particularly with respect to possible future iraqi peaceful nuclear activities and perhaps there's a policy or tactical question

about whether the complete listing of all of these restrictions at this point, how it would relate to u.s. and other non-proliferation injectors in the region, particularly with respect to iran. then there are a series of other issues on which chapter 7 measures remain in effect. for example, after the gulf war, the security council created a boundary commission to resolve the iraq-kuwait border dispute, which had been one of the ostensible causes for the gulf war and with that process of demarcation was completed, the council guaranteed the newly demarcated boundary, so the question arises as to whether it might be desirable to continue that guarantee of the boundary in force. there are also a series of measures to locate and to repatriate the remains of kuwaiti and third country nationals who were missing during the gulf war. the embargo on arms shipments to non-governmental entities if iraq remains.

there are measures to facilitate the return of iraqi cultural property and so on. the secretary-general's report this year identified a number of unresolved issues with respect to each of these high temperatures, so it -- items, so it may be necessary to continue these in effect until those are resolved. in conclusion, i think all parties are agreed on the principle that iraq should be restored to the legal and international status that it enjoyed prior to the gulf war, but as you said, it's not quite so simple. some measures apparently need to continue in effect for uninterim period until technical questions are resolved, that includes for example the administration of the oil proceeds and their protection from attachment. some issues probably could only be eliminated when questions between iraq and other states are resolved, and a good example of this is the compensation issue with respect to kuwait. and it might be that the council

decides that certain other matters should be kept in force for a temporary period for policy reasons, and the wmd and the boundary question may fall into that category. what i would stress on the whole is that this process of orderly resolution of these remaining chapter 7 issues need not be taken as any kind of derogation from iraqi sovereignty, nor should it be taken as any kind of statement that iraq is not a full equal state on a par with others in the international community. the security council has used chapter 7 in many occasions in the past, to deploy peacekeeping forces, other missions to take other measures, without dare gating from the sovereignty of states that might be involved and in fact, all states have certain duties under chapter 7, including the united states. for example, the duty to prosecutor extradite international terrorists found in our territory. so my point would be that iraq has already been relieved of the

great burned of the onerous restrictions from the saddam era and there's no reason why the remaining issues can't be dealt with and resolved in an orderly manner with the objective of restoring iraq to its full status prior to the gulf war. that's the end of my presentation. of course, i'd be glad to answer questions. >> thank you, mr. matheson. next we'll go to dr. katzman. >> thank you, mr. chairman, for having me back -- >> can you hit the button. >> thank you very much for asking me to appear. my primary responsibilities at crs are on iraqi politics, culture, history, u.s. policy toward iraq, rather than specifically the legalities of the u.s.-iraq agreement or the united nations. i'll summarize my comments and ask that the remainder be committed for the record. thank you very much.

in evaluating the implementation of the u.s.-iraq security agreement, including these provisions, committing the united states to support lifting the remaining chapter 7 resolutions mandates, it is useful, i think, to assess where iraqi politics stand. and that i think addresses the broader questions in several opening statements about where the u.s. mission stands, the implications of the u.s. decision to intervene if high rack in 2003. in general, iraq's political system can be characterized by peaceful competition rather than violence. however, sectarianism and ethnic and factional infighting continue to simmer and many iraqi views are to outmaneuver and outstrain rival factions. these tensions will only grow as

we head to the 2016 general elections in iraq, which may also concurrently include a vote by a referendum on the u.s.-iraq agreement, subject to -- that would have to be approved by the national assembly to have the referendum. that has not been -- that decision has not been taken yet. compounding the factional tensions is the perception that prime minister maliki is in a strong position politically. this is largely a result of the strong showing of his dauwha party in the 2009 provincial elections. his showing in those elections was in turn him benefit interesting an improved security position, and his march 2008 move against shiite militias that were virtually controlling basra and the port.

although maliki was the clear winner in these elections, he still needs to bargain with rival factions, including muqtaqda al-sadr, who is studying muslim theology in iran, with the intention of trying to improve his standing in the clerical hierarchy. possibly as a result of his strength in position, maliki is seen by rivals as increasingly authoritarian. he is widely assessed by u.s. and iraqi experts as attempting to gain control of the security services and build new security organs, loyal to him personally, rather than to institutions. some have accused him of purging security officials he perceived as insufficiently loyal. he has also reportedly been using security forces to politically intimidate opponents, including in dala

province. 4,000 special operations commander as part of the security forces, the official forces of iraq report to maliki's office of the commander-in-chief and not to the defense or interior ministries. some of maliki's opponents and critics say these political tactics mimic the steps taken by saddam hussein with he was rising to power to send he trillionize his rule. -- centralize his rule. maliki has also used the u.s.-iraq agreement for his own political interests to some extent, contributing to the perception of him as a strong leader was his insistence on certain concessions from the united states in the negotiations on the security agreement. first and foremost was his demand that the agreement include a firm timetable for the united states to withdraw. from iraq, and that was included in the security agreement, and president obama has delineated a drawdown plan that is -- comports with the agreement.

there is a specific stipulation in the security agreement, which pa laci had wanted -- maliki had wanted. by june 30 of this year, the united states would withdraw forces from iraq's cities. u.s. military leaders had advised maliki that there were certain areas of iraq, particularly mow constitutional in the north and sadr -- mosul in the north and sadr city, very large neighborhood, where u.s. forces should remain beyond june 30 and maliki refused and disagreed with that and the u.s., in order to fulfill its commitments under the security agreement, agreed to pull u.s. forces out of mosul and sadr city by june 30 and that was accomplished. there was also a demand purportedly urged by the iranians in the security agreement, that the -- there's a provision that the iraqi

facilities in iraq cannot be used by the united states to attack other countries. particularly iran. and that was a demand that was included also in the security agreement. on the other hand, maliki's political position is not unassailable and it is argued that he might sink or swim with perceptions of changing security situations. his position could potentially weaken even dramatically, if the security situation deteriorates, and there was some thinking that he was very much embarrassed by major bombings on august 19, which killed about 100 iraqis and severely damaged the finance and foreign ministries. because maliki still is politically strong, there are various coalitions that are forming to try to best him in the january 16th, 2010 national elections for a new parliament, and of course, the

parliament determines the next government. maliki would like to be -- continue as prime minister of after those elections, and a major development came just a few weeks ago with an iraq national alliance formed, which is a coalition of some former allies of maliki, particularly the supreme council, the islamic supreme council of iraq, a fairly pro iranian party, a small shia party mainlily in basra and advocates of shalibi shalibi's. so these various coalitions are forming, and some question why former prime minister alawi, who

will be part of this briefing after the hearing, did not form the alliance. he is generally a critic of maliki and has been mentioned over the last few years as agitating to replace maliki, but because of maliki's rivalry with chalabi, many experts attribute that to the fact that he is not part of the new coalition. maliki is trying to get his own block to counterveil against the new block that's formed. one person he allegedly is talking to is other sunnis and some would say this is a positive, because now we have shias allying with other sunnis. that was not part of 2006-2007 so we now have cross-sectarian alliances forming.

the main problem in iraqi provinces is the arab-kurdish dispute that is not getting any better. there have been some near clashes up in the north, very, very pro-arab party won its provincial elections in the north, and would like to push the kurds out of disputed villages in ninava province, mosul is the capital of ninava. general odierno has implemented a plan to involve u.s. forces. just to start concluding, the security agreement gives maliki students to burnish his iraqi nationalist credentials by allowing a cabinet vote on the referendum. he shows that he's taking other views into account. it is likely however that maliki, he signed the agreement, it is unlikely, i think, that he will try to agitate either for a referendum necessarily or if

there is a referendum, for it to be voted down. since maliki did sign on to it and he is to some extent, you know, coopted by it. it is unlikely he would agitate to vote down the referendum. if the referendum is held and votes down, u.s. troops might be required to withdraw by january of 2011, rather than the december 2011 under the current -- the existing security agreement and president obama's drawdown plan meets that time frame. i would just conclude by saying the iraq-kuwait issue is a major issue. obviously kuwait wants all its reparation funds, the main claims that are still owed are for the damage to the oil fields that was done by saddam's invasion. iraq wants to stop paying this compensation. the reparations that cost iraq

$660 million from january to june of this year, so it's about $110 million per month that iraq is paying for this compensation. iraq views that as funds that could be used better for economic development. kuwait of course wants all reparations. i would say, president obama in his meeting with maliki on jul july 22nd made a clear statement supporting the iraqi position, saying the iraqi people should not be held to account for what saddam did, and -- but the kuwaitis so far are not backing down and this is an irritant in iraqi-kuwaiti relations. thank you very much. >> well, thank you. steve? >> mr. chairman, congressman rohrabacher, members of the subcommittee, it's a great pleasure for me to testify today before you on the continued

application to iraq of united nations mandates imposed pursuant to chapter 7 of the u.n. charter. i did want to note at the outset for the record that i am a registered lobbyist for the kurdistan regional government of high rack. i a -- iraq. i believe, how far, that i was not invited to appear as a spoke man for the kurdistan regional government but rather if my personal capacity, so anything i say today will represent my own personal views and not necessarily those of the kurdistan regional government or anyone else. as you know, i was a late addition to this panel and therefore i've not studied this issue to the same degree as my distinguished co-panelists. i do however share the view that as a general proposition, the struggling democracy that is today's iraq should, to the maximum, extent possible, be treated as a norm sovereign nation. restrictions that were imposed by the international community on saddam hussein's regime need to be reassessed in the vastly

improved situation that prevails today. i therefore support the bush administration's undertaking in article 25 of the u.s.-iraq security agreement to use its best efforts to help iraq take the steps necessary to regain its previous international legal standing. i believe that the main contribution i can make to today's hearing is to share with the members of the subcommittee my own experience, as an official of the bush administration in seeking to free iraq from one of the chapter 7 mandates that remains in place, even after the removal of saddam hussein. from 2005 to 2006, i represented the united states as a member of the college of commissioners of the united nations monitoring verification and inspection commission, which was known as unmvic. this commission was established in 1999, in succession -- that

was established by the security upon the conclusion of the persian gulf war in 1991. both entities were charged along with the international atomic energy agency with dismantling iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long range missile programs. i think the key points to bear in mind is that unmovic was financed using iraqi funds, funds held in the u.n.-maintained oil for food program account. this meant that unmovic -- there was no national constraint on the size of its staff or budget. during my time at unmovic, the national budget was $10 million, still a lot of money for an organization that had no real work left to do. shortly after i was appointed to the commission, i came to the conclusion that the -- appointed as a commissioner for unmovic, i

came to the conclusion that unmovic -- was to longer necessary and should be abolish and spent the remainder of my time on the commissioners to build a consensus in favor of eliminating the organization. i have to tell you though that this proved to be very challenging, and i quickly discovered that there were a number of competing agendas at work, and because no country other than iraq was paying for unnmovic, there was almost no pressure to restrain those agendas. one such agenda was that of the management and staff of unmovic. to be blunt, this was a collection of people who had very good paying jobs that they wanted to keep and as a result, they spent a great deal of time coming up with a -- coming up with rationales for preserving the existence of the organization. they were very good at identifying unfinished tasks that they proposed to finish, both inside of iraq and outside of iraq. they also were very quick to

propose new missions for the organization. missions in most cases completely unrelated to iraq. at various times, they proposed that unmovic could become a u.n. inspections commission for iran. they proposed that it could become a standby weapons of mass destruction mechanism attached to the u.n. secretariat to be dispatched anywhere in the world at any point they needed. at another point, they suggested that they could take over responsibility for running iraq's export control system, which was something that iraq and all other countries were required under u.n. resolution 1540 to establish. i post it's not surprising that -- i suppose it's not surprising that the employees of the organization would have as an agenda preserving their jobs,

but i was surprised to find out that there was a lot of sympathy for this among my fellow commissioners and the rationale or the explanation that my fellow commissioners would provide varied. in the case of a number of commissioners from less developed countries, i think the bottom line was that they were eager to ensure that nationals from their countries who had jobs at unmovic were able to keep their jobs. it was that simple. beyond this, there were commissioners from a number of g8 countries, in other words, large industrialized countries, allies of the united states, who were ideologically committed to the idea that the united nations should have some sort of weapons of mass destruction inspections capability, and since unmovic afforded that capability, they were attached to the notion that unmovic should be kept in business and used in the future however it might be convenient for the u.n. and frankly for them, the rationale made no

difference. they just favored the preservation of unmovic, even if in the near future it had nothing to do. then there was russia. russia had a very different agenda. it was determined as best i could tell to use unmovic to underscore that the bush administration had invaded iraq on the basis of faulty intelligence about iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, so russia took the position that it could only agree to abolish unmovic if the organization were given about a year to finish -- to write a final report on iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, and in their conception, this report was to be essentially a u.n. review of th of the u.s.-sponsod report and they requested that the unmovic commission be given all the information that the

delfar report had as they prepared their review of the delfar report. to me it was remarkable that none of these reports had anything to do with the best interest of the iraqi people and very few of the agendas had any relationship to unmovic's agenda to dismantle weapons of mass destruction in iraq. i was not able during my time as a commissioner to make much headway against these agendas. fortunately, after i have left the college, after i left the state department, i was succeeded by two very able public servants, fran both of wm shared my desire to dismantle unmovic.

they continued to pursue the abolition of unmovic during their time on the commission, and with the passage of time, they encountered less resistance to the idea. united kingdom and france joined them in providing leadership on this issue. and eventually, even russia came around. once consensus was achieved within the p5, members of the u.n. security council, it became possible for the security council to dismantle unmovic and that happened in july of 2007 with the adoption of u.n. security council resolution 1762. the main lesson i would day from this experience for the remaining chapter 7 mandates that we're discussing today is that we need to look -- or we need to expect institutional resistance to change in these mandates and we should look skeptically at rationalizations that may be offered for continuing to treat iraq

differently than other countries. with that, mr. chairman, i will conclude my remarks and i stand prepared to respond to any questions you or the other members may have. >> thank you, mr. rademaker. i also want to note the presence of our colleague from minnesota, keith ellison, an individual with great interest in issues involving the middle east and obviously clearly what is transpiring i in iraq. i want to thank you, mr. matheson, for really enumerating what are the outstanding issues or the outstanding items, if you will, that are still -- fall under the chapter 7 mandate. from your vantage point, and this is to everybody on the

panel, let me begin with you. what kind of progress is being made in terms of the discussions and the negotiations that are going on? would you give it a satisfactory? obviously we're going to have an opportunity to hear from two distinguished parliamentarians from iraq, but in terms of the process itself, what is the current status, what are the most difficult issues, the most thorny issues, and is there a time frame which is reasonable to assume that most or particularly the more difficult issues can be resolved? >> well, i think it varies, depending upon which area you're talking about. there are some areas in which the outstanding issues seem to be technical if question. for example, in the accounting

for deposits into this development fund and the iraqi controls, accounting controls and so on, which hopefully might be resolved simply by a greater, more concentrated effort by iraqis and others to resolve the technical questions. some involve more substantial interests. for example, the compensation question issue, which obviously is a question of whether the burden of these unpaid claims will lay upon the new iraqi regime or will be borne by kuwait and hopefully high rack and kuwait could negotiate a resolution of that, but obviously that involves some serious substantive interests on both sides. >> are those discussions ongoing? >> well, the secretary-general's report suggests that there have been discussions, and it expresses some kind of very guarded optimism about the possibilities, but i don't know whether to endorse that. >> ken katzman, do you have knowledge of the discussions and

how they're proceeding? >> well, the report that's referenced, there's a tantalizing statement in that report about a possible compromise under which iraq would not any longer be paying compensation, but the moneys, instead of being compensation, it would be an iraqi investment in kuwait. instead of paying money into this reparations fund. the same money would go, but it would be an investment that iraq could eventually earn a profit on, and iraq would still have equity. >> again, and i know negotiations, obviously are not necessarily transparent, nor should they be. but does anyone on the panel, are they -- is anyone aware of the american or the u.s. involvement in terms of encouraging those negotiations? >> well, i would just add, the

amir of kuwait was here a few weeks ago and this wasn't listed if the official communique, it was a brief communique after his beating with president obama, but if my discussions around town, clearly this was discussed and some compromises along these lines of investment, reducing the compensation amount, the percentage, these are all under active discussion, is my understanding. >> well, i think we can welcome that discussions are going on and that there appears to be significant or some american involvement, because clearly, according to the bilateral agreement, we have that obligation to assist iraq and help the parties reach an agreement. i would like to go for a moment to the referendum issue.

and clearly, it would appear that -- whether there is a referendum has not been decided by the council of representatives. and i think it was you, dr. katzman that indicated that that probably will not be decided until things sort out politically. in terms of the forth coming election. would the referendum and the elections in january be held simultaneously? >> that is what the iraqi cabinet has decided. now it's for the parliament to decide whether to endorse that or not have it at all or have it at some different time. >> i think what's fascinating is i hear you describe the shifting alliances. it's beginning to sound like a democracy.

particularly when coalitions that are non-sectarian based are coming together for obviously their own self-interests. but i dare say, that's a much more preferable situation. than -- and something that might be familiar here in this particular institution as well. can -- as i said earlier in my own remarks and let me just throw this at you, i think it's really important for the united states, not only to assist in terms of meeting its obligations under the bilateral agreement, but to continue to stay engaged, and i think it's clear that the

elections that will be held in january are of critical importance in terms of what occurs not only in high rack subsequently, but in -- iraq subsequently, but in the entire region. let me pose to all of you, and this is not directly on issue, but the possibility of the united nations with american support, with u.s. support, a substantial monitoring presence and effort in terms of those elections, to reassure the iraqi people of the integrity of the electoral process. clearly, what has occurred in afghanistan is profoundly disturbing.

and is potentially destabilizing in afghanistan. i had a conversation, in fact yesterday, he's not here now, but with a -- our colleague and friend from indiana, mr. burden, i haven't had a chance yet to talk to mr. rohrabacher about the united states and this congress pressing the administration and the united states to provide for a substantial presence, to provide for security, in terms of the electoral process, as it -- as it develops and hopefully, culminates in a free and fair and fully engaged citizenry going to the polls in january.

you know, i think that is something that we should do. i've discussed with mr. burton and i will obviously with mr. rohrabacher sending a letter to the administration to that effect and conveying to the appropriate united nations officials how significant it is. care to comment? :

>> in previous elections, the iraqi's were in the front line on security for elections with the u.s. available if there were a problem. and under the u.s.-iraq packed, there is not an exception for the elections for the u.s. to redeployed into the iraqi cities. so i suspect it will be roughly the same, where the u.s. is sort of over the horizon but

available if problem occurs. >> but again, i think my own sense is there is so much riding on these particular elections, at least from my perspective. particularly given what we observed occurring in afghanistan, where the election results are very much in doubt. they would be pressing both our own administration as well as the mala key government to ensure that there is a more fully engaged and visible presence of the american military, and a backup role obviously, respecting the sovereignty of iraq. because when i see occurring is, if there is not an election that has the confidence of the iraqi people, there is a potential for

deterioration in terms of what clearly is a very fragile situation. while elections certainly are not the essence, if you will, of democracy, you've got to have them to get to the point where you have institutions that are viable and mature. any comment box none. seeing that i am going to recognize my friend from california. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and again, thank you for calling this hearing. again, let me note that you were one of the first members of congress to focus on these type of agreements, status forces agreement and to draw the attention of the congress, the importance of what was being done, those treaties and agreements that were being made during the last administration. i would also congratulate our panel.

i thought mr. matheson gave us a very good understanding of the outstanding issues. and mr. katzman, of course, gave us what he always does when he testifies, very, i would say detailed account of where we stand at the moment and have the political issues where it stands in iraq and how they affect these outstanding issues. and of course, let me know that your testimony was very enlightening because it gives us an insight into some of the unseen challenges that we must overcome in order to solve, to deal with the outstanding issues. so all on this panel really was a top notch panel. thank you all for part dissipating. a couple of specific questions and points. let me know in terms of the iraqi debt to kuwait which seems to be one of these outstanding

issues. i think that when we deal, when we confront the issue, we must understand this. that kuwait was a country that was destroyed, destroyed by the invasion of iraq. the iraqi invasion of kuwait caused the equivalent of millions of lives lost in the united states. in a situation to our population and size of what happened to kuwait, it would've been the of killing millions of americans and the distraction of all of our major assets. and not to mention all the buildings that were gutted, the treasure that was looted. it would be the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pows that would have been taken, and murdered while in captivity. i think there is a totally

legitimate debt that is owed to the people of kuwait, and we should not in our efforts to try to just close the loop, bring an end to loose ends and to tie everything together, and then move on. we must not do that at the expense of a very honest and legitimate debt that is owed to the people of kuwait. and they have suffered tremendously, and needlessly. and we have visited, those of us who have visited that and saw the distraction, the utter, and we're talking about wealth, part of compensation. let's put it this way. when the iraqi troops withdrew, the destruction of the amount of oil that was burned and destroyed and infrastructure that was destroyed, was just an overwhelming percentage of their national economy.

so let's not discount that. i don't know, perhaps maybe the solution lies not in having the iraqi's now invest in projects in kuwait from which the iraqi's would eventually profit. maybe the opposite should be looked at. maybe we should look at a situation where the kuwaitis agreed that the money that they are being repaid could be spent in iraq, and then compensation, then the prophet eventually would then go to the kuwaitis while at the same time building iraqi infrastructure. maybe that's the solution, rather than just suggesting that we in some way diminish the amount of compensation the kuwaiti people will receive for what they suffered. i think it is a philosophical, and let me just ask the panel, and this is not a detailed philosophical analysis here. when we look at debt like this,

we have a people, iraq, people of iraq were not in control. this was not a democratic government that planned this invasion. how much in morally and legally do the people of one country have when they are controlled by a dictatorship that commits them to certain actions, that end up causing this type of destruction, is that a moral obligation? a legal obligation? want people to repay whether dictatorship has brought upon them, even though it had been a democracy at the time, iraq probably would not have invaded kuwait. >> well, i think the legal answer is straightforward. yes, iraq is still liable for those amounts of damage. under chapter seven ruehl itself, but that doesn't answer all your questions.

obviously both sides of equities here. the new iraqi government and the iraqi people have a certain legitimacy in saying why should we be held responsible for saddam's since. on the other hand as you point out, the kuwaiti people were not responsible for that either. so should they bear the burden that in the long run i think probably there is a need for some kind of pragmatic solution for this year as a matter of fact, it is a current situation goes on it would take 15 or 20 years for these amounts to be repaid in any event. so kuwait has an interest in a long-term satisfaction relationship. so does iraq with the way. so logically there should be some kind of a mutual accommodation. what you just suggested, as i understand, is a specific thing which has been under consideration. and that might be reasonable. but we're talking about $24 billion, which even today is not a small amount. so obviously this is a matter that has to be negotiated out,

with some kind of mutual understanding and pragmatic attitude. >> just briefly, i think one of the considerations that some of the international partners are looking at is some iraqi's are getting resentful of the compensation process. and this goes back even to saddam's invasion of kuwait. there is a lot of resentment between iraq and kuwait. a lot of iraqi's view of kuwait as well the end sort of getting very wealthy without a lot of work, or needing to work hard, and there is this resentment. i think what some international partners want to try to do is avoid a situation where the iraqi's feel they are being sort of, you know, continue to be get a bill for -- >> let us know this, and that is a good point. that is a good understanding of the sentiments in iraq towards

this, but let us note, the rebuilding of kuwait was not an easy matter. the kuwaitis -- their country was devastated and he could. rebuilding the infrastructure took an enormous amount of effort and money to rebuild kuwait. now, they are rich now because they went through that process, and i can understand what people would just look at the situation as it is now. let us not forget that struggle of rebuilding that country. that would be the equivalent, it would be the equivalent of people coming into our major cities in the store and all of major cities, and etc. mr. rademaker, your thoughts on that point? >> yes. just a few thoughts. i agree with what my copanelists have said. i think there's no question under international law about the responsibility of iraq for the damage that was inflicted on

the government and people of kuwait. i think there may be a question though that should be asked about the timing for payment of that debt. i think we should all be mindful, and i think the kuwaitis should be mindful, of what may be an analogy earlier in the last century. you know, the historical judgment is that one of the prime contributors to hitler's rise to power in germany was the insistence of france, in particular, on the repayment of owner is war reparations that basically crippled the german economy and created a situation where someone like adolf hitler could come to power. i don't think it would be inchoate interest or anyone else's interest for the payment of these reparations to be so onerous that a similar situation might be created in iraq. let me point out. a further analogy involving germany which is to this very day, 60 years, more than 60

years after the interval work to germany as to paying reparations to the state of israel basically because of nazi germany's treatment of the jewish people. i can, similar to sodom hussein and in the sense was not exactly democratic situation in germany to launch a holocaust. but now 60 years later german is still is paying reparations. let me just make one further comment, a personal reaction i had to this whole issue to. and that is to point out to the extent it is claimed this is an issue of iraq's ability to develop itself, constrain the resources available to the iraqi government and the complaint in the past year they lost $600 million that would've been available to them to develop their economy.

yes, they lost $600 million. on the other hand, they lost billions, probably tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue that they would have generated had they taken some pretty obvious steps to get their house in order to attract foreign investment to the oil industry. to the extent there is a complaint that iraq needs more money and shouldn't have to pay these reparations, there are things they could do such as pass an oil law to make it possible for them to generate a lot more money than they are losing. >> thank you for that point. let's note that as we analyze what is not only moral but practical, legal, moral and practical in terms of how to go about analyzing what we do with the debt and the policies, economic policies bear, let's note that i believe it's 3 trillion barrels of oil in reserve in iraq, 3 trillion.

i think that is the figure. is that what i've heard? is it not near that? that's high. there was testimony given to us i think the full committee. it with your full committee. i remember that testimony that $3 trillion -- let's say it is $2 trillion cash back or to clear and barrels worth of oil. whatever their reserves are, it is overwhelming. is huge. is one of the biggest, it is one of the countries with a small population that has one of the biggest oil reserves in the world, whatever exactly what it is. so let's note that i think iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world. whatever that number is. and that his trillions of dollars one way or another. so we need to keep that in mind, and i think the point mr.

rademaker makes is that yes, even though some of this, the timing of repaying some of these deaths or dealing with the outstanding issues that are left might be costly, this is a society they do what's right it will be able meet that challenge. one last area, mr. chairman, of questions i would like to ask mr. rademaker about that and maybe the panel could come is a well. where does it stand, where do we stand, we no mr. rademaker represents the kurdish regional government here to let's put that into perspective. i personally believe that the kurds have demonstrated a certain friendship towards the united states that has not been demonstrated by other people in iraq. and we have not, and we have repaid that friendship and loyalty while our troops were there by not having a counselor. we don't even have a council in

the kurdish regional area with 12 other countries do. what do you see? and i'll ask the panel what they see as the leftover situation that we have to deal with, and will be dealt with in terms of the kurds allowing the courage to be able to understand that they will have some modicum of security wants our troops leave. and if you could just get a couple of minutes of each one, and i don't want to have a long answer. >> i think you are initially directing that question to me. let me respond briefly because i think mr. captain can probably give us the most authoritative blow-by-blow description of the situation. i do think there is general recognition that one of the biggest challenges facing the united states during his remaining time in iraq is to prevent conflict between the kurdish people in northern iraq

and the rest of the country. general odierno any other u.s. commanders are very much focused on the problem here and that is that the security level. i think there are things, the diplomatic level that ambassador hill and his -- committed to work on it or to improve that relationship and hopefully lay the ground for a peaceful, stable relations within iraq. >> a one word answer, are you optimistic or pessimistic that we're going to be able to come to a situation where that challenge is met? >> i think the jury is still out. i guess i'm concerned. >> okay. mr. katzman? >> i would say the evidence would suggest pessimism on this issue. the united nations assistance mission in iraq circulated in july a compromise plan to how to

resolve -- the main issue was the territorial issue. the kurds believe there is certain sections of northern iraq that are under the central government that should be part of their kurdish regional government. and this has been the core of dispute. the un is trying to have a compromise. they have circulated a plan. the various parties have said they will use it as a base to start from, but it really has not jumpstarted any real serious copper might. >> so we need to change something and the status quo in order for it to happen. we are optimistic assessment that we have a chance to succeed here. so we need to change in the reality. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> let me go to the distinguished gentleman from indiana, the ranking member, senior republican on the committee dealing with the middle east. >> mr. chairman, thank you for allowing me to sit in today.

i really appreciate that. i think the only real questions i have deal with, and i'm not sure you are the ones i ought to be talking to, perhaps we should be discussing this at the briefing that is going to follow. but i would like to get your views as experts on the long-term stability of iraq, especially in view of the fact that iran is next door and you are still involved in some of the nefarious activities over there. and whether or not iraq is going to be able to come up with its own military and its own police force, be able to defend the new democracy that they have there. there's been a number of people with whom i've talked to who have some serious reservations and doubts about whether or not iraq will be able to survive if we pull out, i think is that next june, and whether or not we

ought to adjust that timetable. although mr. malki i understand it's pretty firm in his desire to have us leave by that time. so i would just like to get your assessment of that, if you think you are qualified to make that assessment. i know it is a prognostication, but i would just like to know what you have to think. >> i will start off on that. iran, according to the u.s. military, iran has lost some influence in the past year. most pro-iranian parties did not do well in the january 2009 provincial elections. and the shia militias in the south that iran was supporting have been diminished by iraqi military operations, and a general sort of rejection of their population of iraq to armed factions operate outside of government control.

however, counterbalancing that, the leading parties in the iraqi government structure are pro-iranian parties. they were started by the same ideology really that sport the islamic revolution in iran. ayatollah khamenei was in exile in the '60s, and a lot of his ideology about an islamic government, shiite islamic government are the ideology basically of the ruling parties of iraq right now. so there is a very close symbiotic relationship between the iraqi government and the iranian government at this point. >> do you think that because they have that relationship, there is a danger that that whole area could be controlled by more radical elements down the road? >> well, anything is possible, but what we are seeing, what we have seen recently is there is an iraqi nationalism and the

iraqi public, even the shiites in the south do not want to be told by iran or dictated to or have their affairs controlled by iran. so i think that gives some reason for hope that iran will not sort of take over iraq, if that's the application. but still, you know, maliki is doing a lot of things i read would like to see. that doesn't mean iran is telling him to do it and he answers. but the two thank a lot on many issues. absolutely. >> any other comments? if not, mr. chairman, what i would do is wait until we have a briefing and talk to them about it as well. >> thank, mr. burton. >> the distinguished gentleman from texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i track my questions first to mr. katzman, and the rest of you can chime in if you wish. i want to do it on camp ashraf. i want to know what the iranians really want to do with those folks in camp ashraf. what are their long range

intentions, and what is the united states first doing about it? and second, under the geneva convention, what is the rest of the world views, how do they do that situation? i personally am concerned about what happened to them based upon the fact of what is already happening to them. dr. katzman, if you would address the issue i would appreciate it. >> the camp ashraf situation out his odyssey a very difficult situation because the population of camp ashraf was basically invited by saddam hussein. there was a certain online with hussein at the time and in the u.s. all but threw saddam hussein and now the government of iraq is not aligned with this in ashraf and is more aligned with the government of iran. so maliki and the government of iran see eye to eye really that the population of ashraf need to go elsewhere.

now that said, iraq has agreed under our agreement and under international law to certain stipulations under international law that there are limits to what the iraqi government can do about the ashraf situation if they cannot just simply send them back to iran. there is a process to try to find other places for members of the ashraf to go. >> well, why send them to other places? why can't they stay in the camp ashraf? >> well, iraq is now a sovereign country, and that you is that the iraqi government has a right to decide whether this group can stay or not stay. >> and so what is your opinion? do you think the iraqi government will move into a place where the current government of iran will have influence over the camp? i mean, if you are a resident of camp ashraf, what do you think is going to happen to you? >> if i were a resident of

ashraf, i would be one pretty nervous person, yes or. >> so what are we doing to make sure, i mean other than saying iraqi government has agreed under international law, they told us they are going to be good guys entreat the iranians in camp ashraf nicely. how to receive this playing out quacks tell me how this is going to play out that i understand the politics over the years has changed, but what do you think is going to happen to these folks? >> it's very difficult to say. again, we don't really apply in one way or the other, but if indeed the u.s. completes a drawdown at 2011, december 2011, then the iraqi government could take various decisions presumably iraqi government is going to meet its obligations that is as a pledged to. stick with the gentleman yield? >> certainly.

>> iraq is a signatory, presumably, to the convention against torture. and dealing with those particular provisions, if there is reason to believe, or more likely, that sending an individual to a country, even if it is a country of home origin, where there is a more than likely chance of torture or inhumane and degrading treatment, wouldn't the convention, the treaty, obligate the iraqi government to find another nation that would receive those that express concern? am i correct in that statement,

mr. katzman? i think by international treaty, we are in -- are we going to accept the assurances put forth by the iraqi government and in many respects that's why the elections, and i want to get back to that, are so critical in terms of their integrity, and i'm sure these are issues that will be debated in this democracy. in fact, we are having a similar problem in terms of relocating detainees that have been cleared for release from guantánamo. i am sure some of you are aware that mr. rohrabacher and i had a number of hearings on 22 chinese muslims from northwestern china who are uighurs, and because of

our obligations under the convention against torture, and given the history of the chinese communist government, vis-à-vis, the uighurs, we find yourselves in a position where we cannot legally by virtue of that treaty, and i would suggest morley, we turned them to communist china where there is a likelihood that they would be tortured and even they be killed. so these are tough issues. that have to be worked out. i yield back the. >> thank you, mr. chairman. so, dr. katzman, if you are a resident of ashraf you would be nervous about your future. what is your opinion of not the iraqi government, but the iraqi peoples kind of sense about camp

ashraf? can you kind of give me something about what the people are thinking? >> i would say basically if shiite muslims are probably almost certainly more opposed to the ashraf staying there, and sunni arabs are considered somewhat more welcoming and less inclined to try to ask them to leave. >> neither one of these -- either one of these other witnesses want to weigh in on that? >> would the gentleman yield? >> at coors. >> sing that we have someone who is representing the kurdish regional government here on our panel, might i suggest that one alternative that perhaps hasn't been examined is the possibility of moving camp ashraf into the kurdish regional area, rather than where it is?

and that might be acceptable as compared to leaving them where they are at, or repatriating them to iran. just a thought. regional government might think about that and perhaps make an offer in that regard. >> mr. rohrabacher, the first time i've heard such a suggestion. i will pass it onto others who might be interested. it is true that the kurdish region has served as something of a refuge for other groups in iraq that have worried for their safety, and the southern regions of the country. i think there is a practical dimension here with camp ashraf, which is that whoever finds themselves with these people in their midst will probably have a serious diplomatic problem with iran. and i think that's true for the government in baghdad today and it would be true maybe for the government -- >> may be easier, the shiite

population, the kurdish region area is what? >> i can't do the exact senators. relatively small. >> thank you very much. mr. capps and? >> the ashraf residents were operating after the 1991 war when there was a kurdish uprising. they blame the group for helping saddam put down the kurdish uprising here so i would say the chances of him accepting that are very, very slim to none. >> well, thank you for putting that in a historical perspective. reclaiming my time, i do you back to the chairman. >> i thank the gentleman for that rather interesting discussion. let me thank the panel for their testimony. and as always informative and a formal hearing today's

proceedings has ended. but we are not finished. because shortly, we will welcome and i am honored to have with us to love our fellow legislators from the iraqi parliament, known as the council of representatives, former prime minister prime minister allawi prime ministe.so we will recessr four minutes and then reconvene for the briefing. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> live picture now from the brooking institution here in washington for a bit with secretary of state hillary clinton this morning. on the u.s. agenda for the united nations general smb session with the heads that begin next thursday. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> we are live at the brookings institution on this friday morning. an event with secretary of state hillary clinton about to get underway. she will discuss the u.s. agenda

for the un general assembly session next thursday. a look at some of the other programming items that are coming up here on the c-span networks today here on c-span2 at the mayo clinic president and ceo will speak on health care legislation. live coverage from the national press club here in washington will start at 1 p.m. eastern. our companion network, a georgetown university network conference on global economy. that will begin at 1 p.m. eastern again on c-span. later, white house economic adviser larry summers. that conference at 330 thymic eastern also on c-span. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> good morning to all of you. it is my pleasure to welcome all of you here to the brookings

institution this morning. particularly to the distinguished members of the diplomatic corps who are with us this morning. is a great honor for brookings to have secretary clinton with us. the entrance that all of you came in this morning may have swinging doors, but it is actually figuratively speaking a revolving door. over the decades, brookings scholars have passed in both directions. as they have gone into and out of public service. since inauguration day, eight of our former colleagues have gone to work to embassies and other diplomatic missions around the world. i'm sure, madam secretary, that they are very proud to be helping you in the important task with what you are doing and all of us at brookings are proud to be associated with them. starting monday, the secretary is going to plunge into an

annual weeklong marathon, a bilateral and multilateral diplomacy at the united nations general assembly. somewhat unsolicited known as the un g-8. she will anymore give us a preview of the issues, challenges and the objectives that are most on her mind. i haven't read her speech, but this much i can predict. because it is already a signature theme of her stewardship of american foreign policy, and that conviction that promoting human security is integrally read boded to the strength of national and international security. from her first remarks at the department of state after her confirmation back in january, she has included reference to development almost every time that she refers to diplomacy and

defense. one other point. 13 years ago, she made famous and made into a personal motto the ancient african proverb it takes a village to raise a child. a variant of that might be it takes a strong community coming together to ensure the well being of its weakest members, including its children. who are after all the vanguard of future generations. the un represents that larger community of which we are all a part. our country is fortunate to be represented by secretary clinton at the unga next week. and we are grateful for her for being with us today. after her opening remarks, i will come back up here and join her while she takes some questions from all of you. madam secretary, over to you. [applause]

>> thank you. thank you very much. well, it is a great delight to be back here at brookings. through that revolving door, which really does go both directions near i spoke with strobe shortly after i was asked to take this job as secretary of state, and began thinking about who needed to be in this new administration. and he will flee said i know you're going to decimate the place. i said well, yes, we are, but that's all part of the revolving door. people who go in and out of administration, who do the work that is done here every day at brookings, such high quality work, in many respects,

visionary as well as analytical. and i am very grateful for this farm team that you have led so well for so many years, and the opportunity to work with them now in this new capacity i also want to just say a word of personal appreciation to strobe. as most of you know, he spends eight friend of my husband and mine. of course starting with my husband had offered, and then shortly afterwards, and he had a wonderful brooks, were dear dear friend over all of these years. and i am pleased to look at the adrienne and devon, the next-generation. i also want to thank martin and john thorton for their leadership as well. and to all the different backcourt, the ambassadors who are here today. i thank each and everyone of you. i have had the opportunity to do

bilateral meetings with most of you, with your foreign minister or in some instances the head of state. and i appreciate your being with us today. i also see some of the wonderful people who have joined the team at state and usaid who are here as well. and i express my appreciation to all of them. i think brookings for this opportunity to join you on the eve of unga. it is a strange acronym, and it causes a lot of moaning and groaning in some circles. henry kissinger was famously critical of unga, and others have been expressing over the years and their concern and disappointment with the united nations. but i believe that at its best the united nations is not only a

critical, central institution, but one in which the united states has a lot of equities. so i am actually looking forward. it has nothing to do with the fact it is in new york and i get to go home, but it is a personal as well as an official obligation that i am looking forward to. let me begin by echoing the president's statement yesterday, concerning his approval of the recommendations, not only of the pentagon but of his entire national security team, to deploy a stronger and more copperheads of defense in your. this decision came after a lengthy and in depth review of our assessment of the threats posed particularly the threat posed by iran's ballistic missile program. and the technology that we have today and what might be available in the future to confront it. we believe this is a decision that will leave america stronger and more capable of defending

our troops, our interests and our allies. let me be clear about what this new system will do relative to the previous program, which was many years from being deployed. with the president's decision, we will deploy missile defense sooner than the previous program. we will be able to swiftly counter the threats posed by iran's short and medium-range ballistic missile. we would avoid missile defense that is more comprehensive than the previous program, with more interceptors in more places, and with a better capacity to protect all of our friends and allies in the region. we will do to a technology that is actually proven so that we do not waste time or taxpayer money. and we will preserve the flexibility to adjust our approach to the threat as the

threat evolves. so make no mistake. if you support missile defense, which i did as a senator for eight years, then this is a stronger and smarter approach than the previous program. it does what missile defense is actually supposed to do. it defends america and our allies. now i know we have heard criticism his plan from some quarters, but much of that criticism is not yet connected to the fact. we are not, quote, shoving missile defense. we are deploying missile defense sooner than the bush administration plan to do so. and we are deploying a more comprehensive system. we are not reducing our capacity to protect our interests and our allies from iran. by contrast, we are increasing that capacity and focusing it on our best understanding of iran's current capabilities here and

most of all, we would never, never walk away from our allies. we have recommitted ourselves to our article five obligations under nato. we have sent that message in bilateral and multilateral settings from the president, my trips to every other encounter and they knew that we have been in over the last many months. we are deploying a system that enhances the security of our nato allies. it actually advances our cooperation with nato, and it actually places more resources in more countries. two of our allies, poland and the czech republic, were very willing to host parts of the previous plan system. and we deeply appreciate that. we will continue to cooperate closely with both nations. for instance, through rotation

of a patriot battery in poland, and close missile defense research and development with czech republic up his. as we explore land-based interceptors going forward, we have made it clear that those two countries will be at the top of the list. and let me underscore, that we are bound together by our common commitment as nato allies, and also by deep historical, economic and cultural ties that will never be broken. finally, let me reiterate what the president said yesterday. this decision was not about russia. it was about iran and the threat that it's ballistic missile program poses. and because of this position, we believe we will be in a far stronger position to deal with that threat, and to do so with technology that works and a

higher degree of confidence that what we pledge to do weekend actually deliver. now my main reason for being here today is to give you a brief review of our agenda next week in new york. but before i get into specifics, i saw a cartoon from the new yorker. it showed a delegate in his seat at the dedications passing a note to the delegate next to him. and the caption read, it is a birthday card for liechtenstein. sign it and pass it on. [laughter] >> well, comic relief is necessary in our work, especially now. but as with most humor, this cartoon is also commentary. it represents one view of the united nation, a caricature of what multinational, multilateral organizations spend their time doing. as president obama leads our u.s. delegation at this year's

general assembly, i hope we can demonstrate that the united nations does not have to be just a diplomatic talk shop on first avenue. at its best, it could be an institution that brings the world of nations together to solve global problems, through adherence to rules and principles set forth in the un charter. and it is the responsibility of the 192 member nations during the general assembly and beyond to capitalize on the opportunity for global cooperation and progress that the united nations affords to each of us. i outlined earlier this summer at the council on foreign relations, the obama administration's efforts to advance our interests and solve today's problems through a global architecture of cooperation and partnership. and we must begin by taking responsibility ourselves. something that under president obama we have already begun to

do on issues from climate change to nonproliferation. and we have called on others to do the same. by building and strengthening partnerships, institutions, an international regime, we can forge a global consensus and use that leverage to offer clear incentives to all nations to cooperate and live up to their responsibilities. and we can also devise strong disincentives for those who would act in isolation or provoke conflict. the united nations and this must general assembly offer us a venue and a forum for nations to work together, to live up to that founding charter and abide by and enforce international rules and service of global peace and security. i have in my office in the state department that picture of eleanor roosevelt, one of my particular heroines.

and she is sitting at a desk working on the universal declaration of human rights. i have said this before, but i think that channeling eleanor roosevelt is not a bad idea. it reminds us of what is at stake as we move forward without responsibilities, as does strobes recent book, the great experiment. we have to have effective global institutions. that is not a choice. that is an imperative. it is up to us to determine how to make them effective. united nations is a building. it is not able to act in the absence of the decisions made by those member nations. we, in my view, it and walk away from it at our peril, especially in the 21st century, where

interconnectiveness gives voice and prominence to views that could have easily been either ignored or marginalized in the past. few issues reflect the need for a global architecture of cooperation, more than nuclear nonproliferation. no issue poses a more serious threat to our security or the worlds, it will be a main topic of discussion next week and beyond. now the president outlined a robust and ambitious arms control and nonproliferation agenda in prague earlier this year. and we believe that it sets the template for what we should aspire to, moving towards a world of zero nuclear weapons. would understand that will not be easy. we understand that it is a generational commitment. it might not happen in our lifetime, but as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the united states will maintain a

safe, secure and effective deterrent capability. but we want to both be on record and use our best efforts to move toward more effective nonproliferation and more effective cooperation towards hopefully arriving someday at that future goal. next week, the president will chair a meeting of the un security council on nonproliferation and disarmament. he will emphasize the importance of strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and a critical role the security council must play in enforcing compliance with nonproliferation obligations if the president has asked me to lead the u.s. delegation to a conference on the comprehensive test ban treaty. this'll be the first time a secretary of state has attended. it will give me the opportunity to underscore the importance of the ctbt, to the global nonproliferation efforts, and to

broaden u.s. security interests. strengthening the nonproliferation regime means working to bring other nations into compliance, and this of course includes north korea and iran. and let me take a moment to say a few words about iran, which will be another key topic on the president and my agenda next week. to begin is important to recall what is really at issue and what is really at stake. iran has refused for years to address the international community's deep concerns about its nuclear programs. those concerns have been underscored repeatedly by the international atomic energy agency and the un security council. iran's continued failure to live up to its obligations carries profound consequences for the security of the united states and our allies. for progress on global

nonproliferation, and progress towards disarmament, for the credibility of the iaea and the security council and the nonproliferation treaty. and of course, for stability in the persian gulf, the middle east and beyond your our concerns is not iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. but it's responsibility to demonstrate that its program is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. this is not hard to do. iran's continued refusal to cooperate has damaged the credibility of its claims that it does not seek a nuclear weapon. so i ran faces a choice. the international community has made abundantly clear what is possible for all iranians if iran lived up to its responsibility on the nuclear

issue here that benefits of economic connections to the rest of the world, cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy, and partnership in education and science. but there will be an accompanying costs iran's continued defiance. more isolation and economic pressure, less possibility of progress for the people of iran. the obama administration has clearly conveyed our readiness to engage directly with iran. we know that dialogue alone doesn't guarantee any outcomes, let alone success. but we also know that our past refusal to engage yielded no progress on the nuclear issue. did it stem iran's support for terrorist groups.

over the past eight months the president has reached out both to the iranian government and people. we have made clear our desire to resolve issues with iran, diplomatically. iran must now decide whether to join us in this effort. yet since june we have seen the iranian government engaged in a campaign of politically motivated arrests, show trials and suppression of free speech. the iranian government seeks a sense of justice in the world, but stands in the way of the justice it seeks. nonetheless, we remain ready to engage with iran, not as an end to itself but as a means of addressing the growing concerns that we and add our international partners have about iran's actions. especially on the nuclear issue. in new york next week, i will be meeting with my counterpart from

the united kingdom, france, russia, china and germany in the p5 plus one context. to discuss the way forward and prepare for talks that hobby are solano is arranging at the beginning of october. our message will be clear. we are serious. and we will soon see if the iranians are serious. this is not about process, the sake of process. in new york we will work with our partners to put iran's choice into focus, and to stress that engagement must produce results and that we have no appetite for talks without action. but the highlight a few other issues that the president and i will be addressing at the general and in the months ahead. iraq, afghanistan and pakistan develop and women. iraq has made important strides with the support of the united states international community

to build a more secure and hopeful future for its people. we look forward to the parliamentary election next january as an important milestone in this journey, and we pledge to work with iraqi's and the international community, including the indictable un envoy to iraq to make these elections a success. . .

recently returned to iraq to continue our robust engagement with iraq's leaders. the partnership between the countries will of course continue to build security corporation while strengthening diplomatic relations, but also it will help build stronger ties and commerce, the rule of law, with governments, education, science, culture, health care through our strategic framework agreement. i cheer a coordinating committee, along with prime minister maliki. we had our first full meeting in july, and we will continue to be engaged in working on this broader agenda. also on the pockets of the general assembly will be meetings related to afghanistan and pakistan. president obama has stated our core goal to disrupt the dismantle and ultimately de feith al qaeda and its extremist allies and to prevent the return

to either country. this is a goal we share with afghanistan, with pakistan and the international community. in fact pursuing al qaeda and the taliban was the basis of the original u.n. resolutions that authorized u.s. military action after the september 11 attacks and created isaf, international security assistance force of 42 nations helping the afghans secure their own country. our long-term security and data from our friends around the will disconnected to the security and well-being of the people of these two countries. to effectively squeezed the extremists fighting to destabilize both countries the afghan and pakistani governments must be better able to secure their territories from these extremists and meet the basic needs of their population. the recent afghan elections at once illustrate the promise and the challenges of afghanistan.

alongside our partners and the united nations we will continue to encourage all parties to respect the afghan electoral institutions charged with determining the final outcome of the election process. when the next president is inaugurated, we will work to step up the level of international engagement and expectations with that new government in a strong partnership to strengthen governments at all levels. as we address these urgent challenges we will also work on other issues that have implications for american security and interest. following up on my trip to africa last month when the president's visit to asif ali ge will host a lunch for leaders in sub-saharan africa during the general assembly. i will meet with costa rican president oscar erie else to continue efforts to resolve the crisis in honduras and help that country restore space constitutional order. i will also be meeting with donors and other stakeholders

committed to helping haiti respond to the economic dislocation caused by the global economic crisis for hurricanes and history of challenges. and i will continue discussions with our allies and other partners in asia about the situation in burma. now it is the global architecture of cooperation demands responsibility of us and our partners and also offers opportunities. just as we are focusing intensely on urgent challenges like iran, iraq, afghanistan, pakistan, so too are we pursuing a positive agenda devoted to expanding opportunities for more people and more places to fulfill their dreams and live up to their god-given potential. and i will focus considerable attention on two areas of opportunity. development and women. they go hand in hand but we are talking about each of them because each in and of itself is critically important to the

point of humans to become a national security, international security, ultimately hollis on development and the role and light of women. many of you heard me describe the plan to integrate diplomacy and development as to of the three pillars in the foreign policy along with defense. i talked in different venues about the obama administration commitment to leading with diplomacy and engaging other nations. next week i will outline how we will approach to the element in tandem with diplomacy to be effective and efficient delete coefficient and enable the state apartments have usaid and the millennium challenge to execute 21st century foreign policy goals. the foundation for our approach will be principles that will move loss away from top down assistance that too often fail to meet the needs of those we are attempting to help or as only a short-term effect. to solve the complex problems of poverty, hunger, health, climate

change and where they intersect we need to focus on those root causes and look for approaches that change talk, transformed an environment which people are making these decisions and in which governments are held accountable to a higher degree of performance and transparency. we will be looking for ways to not only explain our approach, but to highlight issues. i will be, for example, participating in any event with secretary general bon ki-moon. we have launched a quadrennial diplomacy and development review unfortunately that adds another acronym to the state lexicon, the que dee dee ar, led by deputy secretary of state, jack lu and cochaired by every and

the acting administrator usaid alonso. this is a broad examination of our structured policies and budget and leads to better accountability and measurable results. finally, our delegation and i personally will work to advance international efforts to recognize women as key drivers of economic progress and social stability. as well to address in pediments to women's in power and and advancement particularly sexual and gender based violence. i will chair a session of the security council and speak on behalf of the adoption of a resolution on women, peace and security which will endorse concrete measures to implement security council resolution 1820 and address sexual and gender based violence as a tactic of war. i saw this deal of misery caused by this violence on my recent trip to the democratic republic of congo. having met in many different settings around the world over many years with the women who

are the victims of the worse humanity offers, but also women who are the strongest exemplars of the best of all humanity offers. i saw that very vividly on this most recent trip. next week i will be speaking with other foreign ministers and heads of state about strategies to end this violence and ensure those who commit atrocities are prosecuted and not treated with impunity. i will work with women leaders, heads of state, foreign ministers of the general assembly to highlight the importance of raising the status of goals and women and investing in their potential for education, economic development and health care. if women are free from violence and a part of their rights they can contribute to local economies and become change agents for greater prosperity and stability our agenda is ambitious. it is pulled from northeast asia and sub-saharan africa to europe and the americas and we will remain vigilant and proactive about all of them.

at this time of the year as we contemplate next week it seems only fitting that it occurs at the time that we are celebrating the end of ramadan and the beginning of the jewish days. we will also obviously been focusing on the dream of a comprehensive peace between israel and the palestinians resulting in assurance of the security of israel and a state for the palestinian people. this is a time of reflection and renewal for hundreds of millions of our fellow citizens around the globe. the time when we can take stock and reassess and hopefully we commit ourselves to the values and ideals that moves forward. and it is in that spirit that i am approaching not only next week's general assembly, but the weeks, months and years ahead.

and i very much appreciate the excellent work and contributions of many of you in this audience in the capacities in which you, too, serve in dressel with these difficult problems that confront us, and i hope that we will not only continue to have a partnership that enables us to speak of our hopes and aspirations put together produce solutions to the problems that we confront. thank you very much. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> thank you so much, madame secretary. we've got a little over 15

minutes or so. why don't we go immediately to martin who will ask the first question. >> thank you very much. madam secretary, welcome to brookings and thank you for your strong leadership as the secretary of state. you see in your speech to make clear to the iranians that they have a choice to make. today president mahmoud ahmadinejad said the holocaust was a alladi and the -- also made clear that the nuclear programs are not something for discussions, that he wants to kind of talk to the p5 plus 1. so how do -- what is the

strategy for actually getting him to understand that he has to address the nuclear program, has to reassure the international community of iran's peaceful intentions? >> well, martin, as i said, there are no guarantees with results that alone success in these difficult engagements that we are undertaking. but we do believe that the opportunity presents itself for the kind of face-to-face discussions the p5 plus 1 with our full participation with undersecretary bill burns, leading our efforts there to explore a range of issues as you i'm sure notice the iranians said they had a lot of issues they want to discuss the did mahlon could their nuclear program. we obviously said that is the issue we want to discuss. i am not going to prejudge this. we made it clear we are on a

dual track. that track is the process of engagement that we have said we would pursue. we are about to commence that. but the other are the consequences. so i am not going to speculate what comes of this effort. we have underscored, as i did again today, that we are not in this just for the sake of talking. we don't check a box by saying we are engaged in some process and are going to keep talking forever. that is not our intention. the president said we would take stock of where we are with respect to iran and the international community response around the time of the g20, which is the end of next week and we would want to see some movement by the end of this year. i am well aware of all the problems that you have briefly elude it too. but we are going to move forward, see what if any changes

in approach, attitude, actions the iranians are willing to entertain, and continue to work with our allies many of them are represented in this room for their ambassadors on the consequence side. >> i am pulling on you as a virtual member of the brookings family. >> this is pretty real, not for sure. if i may follow up on ambassador , but are the consequences? are their deadlines? because we have seen this kind of diplomacy before with all due respect be it secretary rice tried to negotiate with iran, and there are objections by russia yeah and other success with the security council's that meant the threat of sanctions would never be carried out as aggressively as the united

states wanted so i know you said the missile defense mission wasn't about russia but is there any indication that russia might to another view towards iran? >> i think it is fair to say that there has been a much more concerned about reached to both the ibm leadership and the irony in people under president obama ban we have seen in 30 years. it's all that other presidents did not look for ways to engage iran, but from a variety of reasons it was never carried through in a long-term consistent manner. we, as you know, did not participate fully as a member of the p5 plus 1 until very recently. for many years we outsourced

policy and concerns about the nuclear program to others to try to intervene with and persuade iran to change course. so we were on the side lines, and we were pacing up the -- up and down the sidelines extremely and activated and we were trying to figure out how to get to the people to go on the field and deal with these problems and look where we are today. we are nowhere. the potential of the ivory ne nuclear program being perceptive other than peaceful is obviously of great concern to us and increasingly to the international community. so again, i don't want to prejudge this. i think that we have been very clear about what we are looking for with the two tracks we are proceeding on simultaneously. we have certainly begun conversations with a number of international partners and with

all of the p5 plus 1 members i think if you had asked us six months ago could we get the strongest possible sanctions against north korea that have ever been implemented against a member state of the united nations with full cooperation not just on paper of china and russia but active enforcement of those sanctions as many of you in this room would not have thought that possible. why did happen? because we have spent enormous time listening and working with our partners on some issues and maybe not all issues but looking for ways to broaden that sense of cooperation, and looking to understand how our nunes can be more effectively communicated instead of walking up and down the side lines being agitated. but looking to find common ground in our assessment of the

threats we all face. i think that we have proceeded in a very thoughtful way, no guarantee of any particular outcome, but we are determined to preserve. >> madam secretary, you have always to my mind very admirably focused on issues of domestic governing capacity. there has been a lot of attention in recent weeks to the issue of corruption in afghanistan and the political and social consequences of that. what do you think we can do concretely to make a difference on that issue? >> this is something i'd want advice from those of you here at brookings. corruption is as big as national security threats as i can imagine. we have never posted quite that

way before the this is all i am seeing it. it is not only corruption in afghanistan which i will come back to, corruption as an epidemic of undermining governments, undermining the capacity of countries to make progress in ways that would grow a middle class that would create stability and prosperity. corruption's us negative national resources should be extracted for the benefit of all of the u.s. people instead of a very small elite. corruption that has eaten away at the fabric of so many countries. i saw throughout africa where it's tragic as wangari mathai said god must have loved africa because africa was blessed with so many bridges but then one has

to ask why are we so poor. and you go to countries which are immensely rich in natural resources from oil and gas to diamonds and gold and so much else and the corruption is endemic but it is now a security problem and mauney view on this is that the international community has to be much more focused and it is no longer we pass bill law in the united states saying our companies can't like other companies and countries say that is how you do business how are you going to be with these people otherwise because we are looking at a tipping point when it comes to the impact of corruption in so many of these countries and so many of these places. specifically about afghanistan we have to take some of the responsibilities, not for the fact that corruption was there predating us, but we aided and

abetted in implicit ways by not demanding more and not demanding more earlier. so i am very conscious of the difficulties that corruption poses, but it is one of my highest priorities because i no longer see it as a good government. couldn't we stop people from their own people and extorting from international companies? yes it would be very nice. but isn't absolutely essential that we figure out more effective ways to do that? you can look at energy and no with the possible repercussions of the rampant corruption of the niger delta is in terms of human misery and in terms of production and disruption of supplies. that's an issue that comes close to home. and there are so many examples

of that. so i am looking for ways that we can take the very good initiatives that have been already undertaken and bring them to scale and expect more. in order to do this, we have got to get a critical mass of major economies to be willing to work with us. and to see this as if not an immediate stretch of their interest as at least a medium and long-term storage of their interest. so that is what we are going to try to do. >> thank you for the opportunity at brookings institute. i am looking forward to hearing from you more about the issues of peace efforts. you -- your husband, president clinton has created in the past bringing peace to the area.

now president obama has also brought that same kind of hoping of peace in cairo. but now what we are seeing is the problem of peace through israel down to the issue of settlement, and freezing of settlements where it is a much bigger issue and what we see now settlements. we see that israel is digging in the second holy shrine of islam and there is arab incentive getting very high along. [inaudible] one of your alliance in the area

call was a lawyer for the peace efforts would lead to a result they would want to see. now i would like to hear from you that what seems to be efforts to not making any progress. so how are you going to be with this issue in order to keep the credibility, the hopes that the united states has produced? >> i understand the emotion, and i understand the great hope that is at the heart of your question. and i want to just make several points. first, this president start on the very first day with a commitment to pursue a

comprehensive peace agreement, promised on the 2-cd solution, and i can guarantee you that president obama and i are very patient and very determined, and we know that this is not an easy road for anyone to travel. i have personal experience about how difficult this road is. i remember a sunny afternoon impact on the side lawn of the white house yasser arafat shook hands and i remember the disappointment of camp david despite enormous efforts to try to finally forged a peace agreement when it was not successful. however i believe kepplinger the commitment evidenced by my has spent and commitment by

president obama to be in this from the very beginning never to be toward and never expecting both sides caught just one side impetus but both sides and to pursue that comprehensive peace agreement is the best way for america to demonstrate koppel absolute is that the corn coffin many of her and has states and therefore we are going to do all we can to persuade a and encourage the parties themselves to make that agreement. the united states cannot make it, the arab nations cannot make. it is up to the palestinians and israelis. and to that end, we expect both sides, not just one side, but both sides to begin actively

engaged and willing to work for that resolution. .. >> let me just reassure you. we're going to continue to do

all that we can, working with everyone involved, but most particularly the palestinians and israelis to reach a comprehensive peace agreement that we think is in the best interest of those countries. >> madam secretary, as a last question, i would like to ask you about another question that you know very well from your personal experience. i would only put that question to you as secretary of state because many are concerned that it actually has implications with foreign policy. >> nice try, strobe. [laughter] >> a bit of a stretch? >> that's all right. >> actually, not. [laughter] >> let's talk about are in national health in the following context are a lot of well-wishers, yours and a president obama's and around the

world, are concerned that if the health care debate goes badly and ends in a defeat for the president, it will have serious implications for his ability to get a cap and trade bill, that he can take a copenhagen in some sense or make progress on global warming. you mentioned you're going to to be playing a role with the test ban treaty. if health care goes down, it will be bad for start ratifications, insofar as you feel inclined to do so, we would be very interested in your views on the issue but also the connection between the president's domestic agenda and his foreign policy agenda since you are in charge to carry out. >> strobe, based on my own acquaintance with this issue and

my previous experience in the white house, i don't accept the premise of the question. i think everyone here probably recalls that we were not successful in 19831994. but i don't think that in any way undercuts resident clinton's ability to deal with the rest of the world, to make tough decisions in places like bosnia and coso, and lots of other challenges. and even on the domestic front, you do welfare reform to end up with a balanced budget with a surplus. so i don't see that. i just don't accept that. but i don't think we're going to face that because i think we will be successful. i think that the work that is being done and the expectations that people now have, you know, 15 years from our unsuccessful effort back in 1984 means that more people know what is at stake. more people have seen us try

other things. i mean, i remember one of the argument that was made 15 years ago. you know, let the hmos and the. will do manage competition. that will control caustic that will eventually cover everybody. of course, that was not to be. so i think there is much more real-world experience that people from all walks of life have that in the absence of what is being proposed, costs will continue to go up for those of us who are injured. coverage will continue to shrink for those of you who are injured. a number of people have access to any form of insurance will continue to diminish. and therefore, i think we will be successful. now, will it be everything any one person would want? no, of course not. that is not the nature, the compromise required in legislative setting. but i am quite optimistic. you know, we really have an opportunity now to do an outcome

that will significantly improve the important aspects of health care reform. controlling costs, increasing quality, expanding coverage. and it is interesting that, you know, what we are proposing is fundamentally so conservative compared with so many of our friends and allies around the world who do much better job than we do in covering everybody and in keeping costs down. and yet, some of the political opposition is so overheated. so we just have to calm down here, take two aspirin, go to bed, think about it in the morning. but i am very optimistic. i think that it will not be pretty. is like sausage making, but we will end up with a bill for the president to sign it will be an advanced. and that is what i think is in the best interest of the country.

and of course, it will have political benefits to the president, but i think what's most important is getting it done for future budgetary demands of our government or future well being and health of our people. that's what is going to happen. >> thanks for that. let me ask everybody please remain seated here we will thank the secretary in just a second i want to explain the protocol for ending the meeting. i'm going to ask everybody to please remain in this room seated while she leaves. i'm going to escort her out. i'm going to ask all the brookings scholars to stay here because if you follow her out on going to get nervous when you are heading back to foggy bottom yourselves. [laughter] >> please join in thanking president clinton for a terrific hour. [applause]

>> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> later today the mayo clinic president and ceo will speak on health to legislation. will have a line from the national press club at one eastern here on c-span2. on our companion network c-span, conference on the future of global finance. securities and exchange commission chair mary schapiro. that will begin live at 1 p.m. eastern. later white house economic adviser larry summers at that same conference. that will begin at 3:30 eastern also live on c-span. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> defense secretary robert gates at an air force event on wednesday. topics include an aerial refueling planes. this is about 45 minutes. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> please welcome chairman of

the board. [applause] >> good morning, everyone. on behalf of the air force association. our forum speaker is the 22nd secretary of defense. is the only secretary of defense in u.s. history to be asked to remain in that office by a newly elected president. secretary gates joined the central intelligence agency in 1966. and spent nearly 27 years as an intelligence professional, serving six president. during that period, he spent nearly nine years at the national security council serving four presidents of both political parties.

he also served in the air force as an intelligence officer at the premier missile wing in the air force, the 351st missile wing at whiteman. [applause] >> i may be a bit prejudiced there. secretary gates has been awarded the national security metal, the presidential citizens medal, has twice received the national intelligence distinguished service medal, and has three times received the cia's distinguished intelligence medal. the secretary will make his remarks and then has agreed to take a few questions. so if you would, please write your questions on the cards and pass them to the proffers in the aisle. i would like you now to please give a warm afa welcome to the secretary of defense, robert gates. [applause]

>> is an honor to have the opportunity to speak to the air force association. for more than six decades, this organization has been a tenacious advocate for air men and u.s. air supremacy. without which as have arnold once said, there can be no national security. general arnold was of course a formidable advocate for air power long before there was a u.s. air force. his dealings with president roosevelt also showed once more that a little sizzle military tension is nothing new in his stream of republican arnold recall the time when he said

some things in congressional testimony that were known to pleasing to fdr. at a white house meeting, sooner after the president looked pointedly at him and observe and military officers who were unable to play bar with his administration might become available for duty in guam. but later that year, general arnold was invited to another white house gathering. a small dinner. and he arrived to discover that roosevelt awaited him with a tray of cocktail mixing is. good evening, half, said the president. as if nothing had happened. how about my mixing new and old fashioned? well, i'm afraid the early hour precludes our breaking the ice, both literally and figuratively, in a similar manner this morning, but it is a pleasure to be here. did a lot to talk about air men and airpower. about what the men and women of the u.s. air force do every day to serve our country and about

the range of things the service must be able to do in the future to protect america against an array of lethal and complex threats. i do so keenly aware of what the air force has experienced, endured an accomplished in recent times. above all, waging two major wars, protected air campaigns that have accelerated the wear and tear on the services people, and aging inventory. first, words of thanks to those men and women whose achievements we cherish and whose interest you represent. since 9/11, hundreds of thousands of airmen have gone about their duties, usually unheralded, and unrecognized by the usual metric of metals and media coverage. often there on the ground, in the dirt, and sometimes under fire. doing their jobs without fail

and without complaint. more than 100 have made the supreme sacrifice in iraq and afghanistan. as result of airmen's efforts, dangerous men looking to attack our troops in harm our country have met their just and, usually without warning. a distant buzz followed by a bolt from the sky. some of those drives that come from the 74th expeditionary fighter squadron, the flying tigers who trace their lineage back to. to deploy to afghanistan from moody air force base about seven months ago. since then, they have completed more than 2800 combat missions spanning over 12000 flight hours, of reconnaissance and close air support. a record for this historic unit. our enemies have also been under the unblinking eye and precision fire the 214th reconnaissance group in the arizona national guard, which recently received

the air force outstanding unit award from secretary donnelly after its predators lost more than 17000 hours over afghanistan and iraq. over all common air force has increased the number of predator and combat control in the theater by more than half than last year, and the number of cabs will grow to 50 by the end of fiscal year 2000. for america's fighting men and women on the ground, the efforts of airmen have made a life or death difference. take the example of tech sergeant benjamin orton from hill air force base in utah. sergeant horton destroyed more than 7 tons of enemy explosives while deployed to iraq in the hair-raising location of eod technician. is equities with the tactics of enemy bombers led to the capture of six bomb makers in the region. in one instance he pulled for injured soldiers from a vehicle

after an ied attack, and included the extraction to medevac the wounded earning the bronze star for his efforts. on a visit to afghanistan earlier in may, i had a chance to meet with some of the search and rescue aircrews from the 34th weapons squadron and the 38th rescue squadron supporting the marines in the helmand province. over a three-month stretch in the spring, they recovered or treated more than 320 casualti casualties, both military and civilians. and then there was the crew of shocker to when one of the 305th expeditionary rescue squadron based in kandahar. they were called in after an american special forces team and afghan soldiers came under heavy attack. in four successive passes over a hot landing zone, shocker 21 picked up two groups of wounded troops, lay down fire and delivered badly needed in the nation. all told, the expertise and

courage of the air force search and rescue teams are making the goal of the golden hour a reality in afghanistan. in the coming months, america's airmen will be tested even more. the war in afghanistan is entering its decisive phase. in a landlocked nation with mountainous terrain and few usable roads, we and our allies are far more dependent on airpower to protect troops and move supplies. this year the air force is on track to deliver over 22 million pounds of cargo within afghanistan. more than double the amount of two years ago. a c-130 touching down on a dusty improvised landing strip is a welcome sight at many remote outposts that may be running low on food, fuel and ammunition. and then of course there is the c-17 and c-5 crucifying thousands of tons a day in and out of theater.

and the tanker aircrews and maintenance personnel keeping planes in the air that are often older than their parents. without these efforts in the exertions of tens of thousands of airmen, including engineers security forces, medical personnel, explosive ordnance disposal experts, and those protecting our lines of communication and space and cyberspace, the entire u.s. war effort would simply grind to a halt. many of these tasks in high demand today have been core service competencies for decades. others are no doubt making curtis lemayspin in his grave. all told, the full measure of potential airpower kinetic and non-kinetic, stability operations, and irregular warfare is getting the focus and attention it deserves. both within the service and in the wider public. for example the number of airstrikes in iraq in 2007 was

nearly five times the total from the previous year, playing a key role in the security gains of the search eric within the air force, these combat lessons have been deceived the future acquisition decisions and institutional change. a couple of weeks ago i visited the texas factory where mc 12 liberty aircraft are being outfitted with reconnaissance and intelligence here before shipping off to the battlefield. the air force is considering bringing online a fleet of light fires and cargo aircraft, inexpensive, rugged platforms that can be used to build local capacity and with reconnaissance and close air support missions. and are also usable and affordable by partner nations. with regard to isr, the production of the most advanced uavs across the military will increase to 48 annual, and i'm told we are currently training more pilots for unmanned systems than for fighters and bombers.

and an air of visors koolhaas is now open whose graduates are helping our partners overseas confront the threats within their borders. as you know, institutionalizing these kinds of capabilities wass year. their goal was to give these critical capabilities a seat at the table when priorities are set, and budget decisions were being made. but contrary to what some have alleged the purpose was not to reorganize and regard the entire united states military to hunt insurgents and do nationbuilding. or to fight wars just like iraq and afghanistan. specific programs specific to these kind of missions will continue to make up a small frightened of overall defense spending. for example, over the next few years the air force is planning to devote an extra $175 million annual on programs dedicated exclusively to irregular

warfare. a significant commitment at a time of tight budgets. but not exactly an existential threat to account which in the case of the air force will total $64 billion for the next fiscal year. with hundreds of thousands of troops deployed in to major combat theaters, fielding these tape abilities and putting them into the hands of the war fighters as soon as possible are the most important thing to deal. it is not, however, the only thing we must deal. it would be unwise to assume the conflicts of the future will be like those of today or the past. the fatal conceit of military planners since antiquity. crumbling remains of the line and the cemeteries and flanders fields are monuments to that tragic following. with regard to airpower, it would be irresponsible to assume that a future adversary, given

enough time, money and technological acumen, will not one day be able to indirectly cashback to directly threaten u.s. command of the skies. as an allied commander for world war ii said, airpower is like poker. the second best hand is like none at all. it will cost you know and when you nothing. with his admonition in mind, consider the capabilities the united states has or will have over the next 20 to 30 years. at the high end of the spectrum, of course, is the f-22 which provides critical hedge against the possibility that another country could someday field enough advanced fighters to directly challenge the united states. it is far and away the best air to air fighter ever produced. and will injure u.s. command in the skies for the next-generation. our commitment to this aircraft is underscored by the nearly six and half billion dollars provided over the next few years to upgrade the existing f-22

fleet to be fully mission capable. the largest piece of the u.s. air dominance portfolio, designed to span a wide range of the conflict spectrum, is the f-35's joint strike fighter. it lacks some of the high-end air to air attributes of the f-22, but its fifth generation stealth aircraft has cutting-edge capabilities in electronic warfare, and in suppressing enemy air defenses. without question, the f-35's program represents an ambitious effort. more than 3000 aircraft, counting all military services and foreign partners. 22 million lives, over $46 billion for development. plus an estimated $300 billion in total acquisition costs. a truly massive investment in the future of u.s. airpower. as with every advanced military and commercial aircraft, the f-35 has seen its share of

rising costs, delays, and other development issues. and no doubt we'll see more challenges in the future. three weeks ago i had a chance to do with the f-35 plant in fort worth. i made clear to the manufacturers our expectations with respect to cost and schedule. and they assured me that earlier problems are being aggressively confronted and addressed. next years budget reflects a major commitment to accelerate in the government and production of the f-35, with nearly half a billion dollars added to the fy10 budget to support the flight test program. our objective continues to be to equip the first training squadron at edwards air force base in 2011 and achieve initial operating capability of the marines and air force in 2012 and 2013 respectively. i consider the f-35's program a major leadership priorty. with all that entails with

regard to funding, oversight, and accountability. as you know, the air force modernization program includes accelerating the retirement of more than 230 of its oldest fighters, just under 13%, of the total fighter inventory. leading some to allege a looming fighter gap. in my view, such a conclusion is based on dated assumption about requirements and risks. assumptions that also predate thinking about thinking of some of our land, sea, and amphibious forces as well. the definition of the requirement should be untethered from the current force structure, and instead be defined by what is needed to defend potential adversaries and plausible scenarios. what we can find is that the most more compelling gap is the deep chasm between air capabilities of the united states and those of other nations. for example, the united states is projected to have more than 1000 f-22's and f-35's before

china fielded its first fully capable -- first operational fifth generational fighter. a gap which only grow into the 20 '20s. the disparity with other countries is even greater when it comes to product quality and logistics. last year the united states air force devoted one and half million hours of flight training. not counting ongoing operations. and conducted roughly 35000 aerial refueling missions. the russian air force, by comparison, conducted about 30 refueling sorties. all told, the combination of f-22, f-35's and legacy aircraft will preserve american tactical air supremacy far into the future. moreover, a key additional and yet untapped part of this mix of capabilities is unmanned aerial vehicles. today because of their effectiveness in iraq and

afghanistan, these systems are mostly thought of as counterinsurgency platforms. but they have enormous game changing implications for conventional conflict as well. in future years these remotely piloted aircraft will get more numerous and more advanced with greater range and the ability to fight as well as survived. the director of the air force is unmanned task force has compared judging uav potential base and use a at a system to judge and manned aircraft based on the right brothers flyer. large numbers of increasingly cute google uavs would integrate with our fifth generation fighters, potentially give the united states the ability to disrupt an overwhelming and adversary using mask and swarming tactics, adding a new dimension to the american way of war. at this point, it is not clear what the fourth strategic impact could be. whether it could become comparable to the impact of carrier aviation on naval

warfare. and we surely don't want to engage in the kind of techno- optimism that has muddled strategic thinking in the past. but we cannot ignore the shift -- we cannot ignore the wider application of this profound shift in battlefield technology, especially since they are low-cost and high utility make uavs very attractive to other nations. in fact, when considering the military modernization programs of countries like china, we should be concerned less with the potential ability to challenge the u.s. senate tickly, fighter to fighter, or a ship to ship, and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options. their investment in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, and i air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could threaten america's primary way to project power and help allies in the pacific. in particular, power forward air

bases and carrier strike groups. this would degrade the effectiveness of short-range fighters and the more of a premium on being able to strike from over the horizon. whatever form that capability might take. i am committed to seeing that the united states has an airborne long-range strike capability. one of several areas being examined in the ongoing quadrennial defense review. but what we must not do is repeat what happened with our last manned bomber. by the time the research, development and requirements processes ran their course, the aircraft, despite its great capability, turned out to be so expensive, $2 billion each in the case of the b-2, that less than one sixth of the plans fleet of whatever bill. looking ahead, it makes little sense to pursue a future bomber, a perspective b3, if you will, in a way that repeats this

history. we must avoid a situation in which the loss of even one aircraft, by accident or combat, results in the loss of a significant portion of the fleet, a national disaster akin to the sinking of a capital ship. this scenario raises our cause of action and shrinks our strategic options. when we should be looking to the kind of strategic -- to the kind of weapon systems that limit the cost of action and expand our options. whatever system is chosen to meet this requirement, the man, unmanned, or some combination of the two, it should be one that can realistically be produced and deployed in the numbers originally envisioned. that is why it is so important that what aircraft as with all of our major weapons systems, schedules are met, cause are controlled, and requirements are brought into line with reality. . .