that our command juries have with the funds so they can be

there and commit and provide some dollars to provide people to do that some work. >> i thank the gentleman. the gentleman from virginia. >> thank you, mr. chairman. as congressman taylor said, i'm going to ask some tough questions but i do appreciate you being here. there was a time in our country when words mattered, when laws and statutes mattered. mr. secretary, title 10, 230 of the u.s. code that you submit to us that you provide a ship-building plan when you sent our budget over so we'd know where the money was going to be built on our ships and you certify that the budget you sent over complied with that ship-building plan. you refused to do it this theory. title 10, section 230a says that we have a aviation plan that we have an assessment that the budget comply with it and you just refuse to do it. house resolution 477 was unanimously approved by this

committee on both sides of the aisle requiring that you would submit to us that ship-building plan that the law required by september 15th. you just refused to do it. 478 required an aviation resolution in that segment that you would comply with the law and submit it to us by september 15th. you just refused to do it. chapter 50, subchapter 1, paragraph 4 of 4a required that we have a national security strategy submitted to us by the president within 150 days after we took office. we didn't get. the guantanamo order issued on january 2nd, 2009, said that guantanamo bay would be shut down no later than one year of the date of the order which was january 22nd 2010. we know that's not going to happen. i disagreed with that order but that's what it said. so my question, mr. secretary, to you today is this, if we're

not going to comply, what confidence do our allies and our troops and our citizens have that the words we are hearing now are words that have meaning and are not semantics? and as you think about that question, admiral, i would ask you this question. you testified earlier today that general mcchrystal got all he wanted. everything he wanted when he asked for 30,000 troops. and the question i'd ask -- i've never known a general to get all he wanted. i've known them to get all they formally requested but not all they wanted. and i would just ask you, are you saying to this committee that all general mccrystal ever wanted was 30,000 troops to wage the war that he is having to wage now? so mr. secretary, i'd give you that time and then admiral mullen.

>> first of all, with respect to the 30-year aviation plan and ship-building plan, it was important for us to be able to get a five-year defense plan from the administration so that we had some predictability. and we are in the process of doing that. the five-year defense plan has been put forward. it was not for fy10. i can provide you that kind of -- i can provide you a list. it'll be meaningless because we don't know. we don't know what the resources will be until we get the -- >> mr. secretary, and again, i don't mean to bankrupt you. -- interrupt. the law is if you submit a plan, if we have a new plan we need to know it when we have a plan when we're voting for it. the reason the law requires it is because it's important that we know that, one, we have a plan and what this budget is trying to reach in that plan. so with all due respect, i would

have appreciated and i think this committee would have appreciated at least some response back as to why we weren't complying with the law on doing that. >> okay. >> what i thought i said earlier about general mcchrystal -- what i meant to say was the strategy that the president has executed and made a decision on with respect to 30,000 troops is general mcchrystal is going to get what he asked for in 2010. he's going to get those troops in some cases more quickly than he had originally asked for them. and to me that is significant because that will give him the thrust to turn them around, turn this insurgency around, which is his number one concern. outside that longer term --

>> and i appreciate i only got 8 seconds and i'll just say this, it is a difference to us when you say he got all he wanted than all he officially requested. >> i would agree that there are very view, if any, commanders that have ever gotten everything that they wanted. myself included. >> i thank the gentleman. dr. snyder? >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, as we anticipate this influx of troops into afghanistan and the normal of thing of planning of moving large numbers of troops around, there's some pretty good restrictions set in law by congress on the role that women can play. i'm not asking for an administrative position but would it be helpful if those restrictions, those legal restrictions, would be made so you can move troops around better given the nature of counterinsurgency in both iraq and afghanistan? >> i think admiral mullen is more familiar with those restrictions than i am but

certainly in the logistics side of it i'm not aware of any restrictions with respect to moving the troops to afghanistan and out of iraq and so then. -- so on. >> i guess, mr. snyder, where i'd go with that i'm not aware of any restrictions, restrictions which are really hurting us in terms of constraining our ability to do that. but i do think it may be worthwhile on a little larger level to look what we've learned over the last seven or eight years of war and assessing that fact, i've talked specifically about general casey about maybe it's time for us to review that to see if there are some changes that we should make that may not be applicable directly to what we're doing right now or they could be in the next couple of years but would be applicable based on what we've learned in the long term. >> secretary gates, over the last few years you had some pretty strong statements about some of the difficulties we've had on the civilian a side of

government of having the civilians following the surge into iraq. are you confident that we'll be able -- that the civilian side of government will be able to do what admiral mullen needs it to do to accomplish the missions in both afghanistan and iraq? >> this is clearly not a problem that can be solved in the short term. i think that -- i have confidence that every effort possible is being made to get more civilians into afghanistan. and there have been a lot of changes in policies and practices at the state department. secretary lew can talk about that. but the problem overall is that the state department, and this is my old song, the state department, a.i.d., other civilian agencies involved in national security have been starved of resources for decades. you can't turn that around overnight. when i left the government in 1993, there were 16,000 people

working in a.i.d. they were deployable. they were expeditionary. they had the languages. they were prepared to live in rudimentary conditions and even dangerous conditions. a.i.d., when i came back to government, had 3,000 people and they were mainly contract people. so building that cadre of people, building a larger cadre of foreign service officers, getting the kind of agricultural experts that we need for this task is something where the groundwork laid today may not pay dividends for five years or more but it's important to start. but as i say, just to repeat, i think everything that can be done right now to get people into the field as quickly as possible, civilians, is being done. and, frankly, it's a whole of government effort as jack would tell you. they got people from the department of agriculture and the justice department and various other departments for government participating in this.

>> mr. chairman, i have about a minute or and a half. i would like to yield the remainder of my time to you. >> thank you very much. i do have a question he. early in the testimony there was reference to the fact that if we pulled out now we would likely see a civil war occurring in afghanistan. what do you believe will cause that not occur as we begin to pull out in 2011 given the history in that region? >> the key is re-establishing traditional forms of governance at the local level and the districts and the provinces. it is having a credible government where we have at least been able to strengthen the capacity of key ministries such as defense and interior. we have high quality people in charge of them. the thing to remember that a very high percentage of the afghan people based on all the

polling and all the information available to us, like 80 to 90% of the afghan people do not want to see a return of the taliban. but the taliban intimidate, they murder, and until we can provide a security environment where people know that they will be subject to that kind of retribution, we will have the danger that the taliban will be able to continue the kind of momentum that they have had for the last year or two. >> thank you. >> i thank the gentleman. before i call on mr. miller, let me ask a quick question. has it been made known as to what troop increase, if any, the nato countries are willing to proffer? >> a number of countries are talking about making commitments. we have received some firm commitments in two twelve calls i received firm commitments of upwards of 2,000 troops.

but these countries haven't announced their willingness to do this to their own people. i think a number of countries will wait until after the london conference in january that chancellor merkel and prime minister brown have called on afghanistan. and i think that some countries will wait until then. the efforts that secretary-general of nato rasmussen and the rest of us have made, admiral mullen, the secretary of state, national security advisor and so then, i think, give us pretty high confidence that we will meet the numbers that we've -- that we've set forth. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. miller? >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, one of you in your testimony just a few minutes ago, and i don't recall which one it was, but i think the comment was there has been no pressure from the -- for the afghans to perform over the last eight years.

is that a true statement? >> i think there has been verbal pressure, but i think there has not been a serious exercise of leverage. >> you were secretary of defense. you didn't pressure the afghan people to perform? >> i had every meeting that i had with the minister of defense, every meeting that i had with president karzai, the subject of recruitment, retention, strengthening their military capabilities came up. but the leverage is more in the kinds of assistance that we've been offering not military assistance but civilian assistance, subsidies so on and i think there's some of that leverage. >> is that bypassing the karzai administration and some of the funds going to the local provinces and areas instead of giving them the money? >> well, i'll defer to secretary

lew, but i think, as i said earlier, i think that we're in the process of developing some procedures in terms of trying to tackle this corruption problem where we will not deal with ministries that we believe are corrupt. we will not deal with agencies or organizations that we believe are corrupt. and as i said just a few minutes ago, i think the more that we can get the money directly to villages and local authorities, the more successful we're likely to be. >> and to mr. taylor's point earlier, i hope that also means we will not deal with governors or mayors that are corrupt either either, even if they are the brother of the president of the country? >> i think -- there are certain provinces and certain ministries that are critical to our success. and i think we have to be willing to use whatever leverages that are at our

disposable to ensure the people who lead those ministries and who are the governors of those provinces are competent, honest people we can work with. >> yesterday, you had an exchange with senator mccain where you explained how the u.s. forces would begin withdrawing in july of 2011 and this was your response. i think it's the judgment of all of us in the department of defense involved in this process that we will be in a position in particularly uncontested areas where we will begin to transition by 2011. is that a correct statement? >> that sounds right. >> so if this is correct, the drawdown occurs only when the areas are uncontested. so in other words, we redeploy when we accomplished clear hold and build; correct; correct >> correct. can you name one province in where we have u.s. forces or intended to send u.s. forces that's currently uncontested? >> i would have to look at the

intelligence reports and get that back to you. >> admiral mullen? >> general mcchrystal's plan overall is to send the bulk of the u.s. forces to the east and to the south which are very contested. we've got forces out in the west where there well could be -- where there is not that significant of an insurgency, for instance, some forces out there and coalition forces as well. >> i think it's safe to say that we have very few troops where they are uncontested and i guess what i'm driving at is that 2011 -- it's going to be very difficult to find an area where our troops are going to be that's uncontested thereby beginning the withdrawal process. >> we see in helmand right now in some of the districts or provinces, you know, it's pretty quiet.

a place where it was really tough before the marines showed up. now, we got to build and transfer after the clear and hold which is where we are right now. and buy quiet, i mean, the bazaars are open and there's a significant amount of economic activity there in a place that a few months ago there was virtually none. so what we've got to do is connect that with the rest of helmand. for example, that's going to take additional troops. so would you say that's contested or uncontested? i mean, right now we got -- we've got -- right now it isn't but we've got to be able to -- we've got to assure that we can build and transfer it so that can be sustained and that's where the afghan security forces come in. >> thank you. i've got 5 seconds left. can either of you tell me why the president did not use the word "victory" in his speech the other night? >> he writes his own speech. >> ms. sanchez? >> thank you, mr. chairman,

thank you gentlemen, again for being before us today. let me paraphrase the last time i was in afghanistan or less than a year ago or sometime earlier this year or late last year that one of our people on the ground said to me -- they said we give dollars to the afghanis to do something, build a school, make a community center, et cetera. and then we check in with them and nothing is done. and we say something to what happened to the school you're supposed to build and they say, yeah, we need a school you build it. meanwhile, all the money is gone. and what this gentleman was saying to me was basically, if we want something done, we're building for them. and secondly, we're paying for it twice. this was the comment he made to our group. so my question for you, is that despite eight years of combat and billions in foreign aid and investment, the situation in

afghanistan has deteriorated to a point where president obama has already ordered troop increases that have almost doubled the size of the u.s. force there in the first 10 months of his presidency. 100% increase in force levels and yet, admiral, you just testified that the taliban has dramatically increased in size and tactical proficiency in the past 12 months. and apparently, nothing we've done so far has prevented the taliban from growing back in strength and effectiveness. so i have no doubt that we will have a new campaign planned for the military operations. and that additional troops will actually increase our tactical effectiveness against the growing taliban threat. but, admiral, you also testified that increasing the size of our force is an exercise in futility unless corruption is eradicated in the karzai government.

you stated that no number of troops will ever win this war unless the afghani people have better government and less corruption. and, for example, it was said that the american forces in vietnam won every tactical battle. and yet, we lost. in part because the south vietnam had plagued, weak and corrupt governments. there's a lot of parallels of vietnam, some substantiated, some not but one lesson that i think we learned is corruption and bad government is bad government. so i believe that we'll lose this war and that the deployment of these additional troops will be in vain unless and until we have a strong and respective government in kabul. so why should any of us believe that karzai will fight corruption or significantly improve the effectiveness of his government?

karzai has been in power for five years. he just got another five years. i want to know from you, what changes he's actually implemented this year that would persuade you that he's the will and the capability to eliminate the corruption and improve governance. i'm not asking what he's promised to do and i'm not asking what we intend to do. i want to know what he has done? and i want specific examples. concrete evidence. corruption prosecutions, increased transparency, high level firings, putting his brother in jail. what good governance has happened in the last 18 months? what makes you think that he's going to change his stripes and that things will turn around? i'd like the evidence because, as you know, hope is not a strategy. >> ms. sanchez, i think if you look -- there's clearly a lot of work to be done. everyone in the administration from the president on down has recognized that we need to keep

the pressure on the government of afghanistan to deal with the problem of corruption but there has been progress. you look at the ministries and the government, they're not all great. i'm not going to sit here and say they are all where they should be but there are quite a phone number of them which have tackled corruption in terms of of firing people and trying to instill a different kind of culture in their ministries. we worked closely with the ministries, like the ministry of finance and agriculture. we have to recognize that's significant progress. >> well, i would like a report on the specifics. >> we're happy to provide -- >> because i haven't seen much change. >> at the inaugural i think it's important to note the idea of tackling corruption, naming a major crimes task force is an action. we have to keep pressure on to make sure that's followed by further actions. but this was -- it was a different message than had been the message before. >> talk is cheap as they say in this town. >> but major crime task force is not just talk. it is putting in place a

mechanism to do something. a lot of work to be done. >> we've had task force after task force about changing social security in this city and nothing has been done. so a task force sounds good but i want concrete examples. so if you'll, please, send that to me in writing i said appreciate it. >> we thank the gentlelady. mr. wilson, south carolina. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank all three of you for being here this afternoon. admiral mullen, in order to win in afghanistan, i believe a withdrawal of troops must be based on conditions not an arbitrary date. what conditions do you hope to achieve by july of 2011 and what will be the course of action if we do not meet those victory milestones, which is most crucial, conditions or an arbitrary date? >> this is not an arbitrary date. it's a date actually that those of us in the military looked at what we need to do over the next couple of years from summer '09 to summer of 2011.

general mccrystal has said that we have to turn this thing around in the next two years or we very possibly can't win under any circumstances. we will have as i said before the marines there for three summers at that point in time. we think it's the right strategy. we think the force levels are about right. and we think we can succeed with respect to that. so it is a date at which we will start to transition. there's no size associated with that. there's no deadline. there's no withdrawal date associated with that. and it is important, and i believe this -- it is important that the afghan security forces recognize they've got to grab this as well. so that they are both motivated to train and equip as rapidly as they possibly can. and that decision -- the decisions that surround them, where, how much will be done, one, responsibly, and, two, based on conditions. >> and i want to thank you.

i think that's reassuring to our troops. to military families and also our afghan allies and our other coalition forces. so thank you for your response. i think that was very clear. and, general, secretary gates -- it's hard to imagine that you are getting to the point of your second anniversary of being in service december the 18th. third, oh, my god. >> that's exactly what i'd say. >> well, hey, i want to thank you. i believe you're playing troops where they should be. under your watch. there's been over a 90% reduction in the number of attacks in afghanistan. there were 1400 when you came in to office. now there are significantly almost to 100. sadly in afghanistan, you're placing more troops because there's been an increase to nearly 200 attacks a week. but i believe that you are

placing the troops where they are feed. -- are needed. my former national guard unit led by general bob livingston worked with the afghan police and army units. they developed a close relationship with their afghan brothers. and they saw the capabilities of the afghan security forces. with that in mind, i understand that the training program for the afghan national police is being transferred from the state department to the department of defense, which will involved a transition on the ground. how confident are you that the training program will not be disrupted? does this transfer put the mission of the afghan security forces at risk? >> no, i don't think it does. i think as admiral mullen has testified and i invite him to comment, we have put new people in in all of these training programs.

but the reality is both with the and the army that working together and partnering is the key to their effectiveness. you know, they can go through basic training but what we found in iraq and what general mcchrystal is intending to do in afghanistan is once those people get out of basic training, once those units show up, that they will live together, work together, plan together. that hasn't happened before and that's how you build trust between these people but it also is the way you give them competence and confidence and we saw it in iraq and that is certainly general mcchrystal's approach on all the security services on the afghan side. >> and actually i've seen it myself. in visiting in front kabul, i've been there nine times visiting with the 218th brigade. it was always extraordinary to me and they were spread out within the country in a mentoring program and it is and

it can and shall be successful and i want to thank you for your service, all of you, and i'm -- i just appreciate your efforts to protect american families by defeating the terrorists overseas. and i yield the balance of my time. >> i thank the gentleman. mrs. davis. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you to all of you for being here. we certainly appreciate -- i certainly appreciate the deliberate process that you've used. i know that it's been difficult. it's difficult for us, too. i feel quite conflicted around this. could you help us understand how you won over some of your own skepticism and others in looking at a few issues? and i guess i have -- pakistan, for example, we've made the assumption that adding 30,000 troops in afghanistan and partnering with a new hopefully

more afghan -- afghanis in the services and in the law enforcement will make -- help stabilize pakistan and yet we read in the press and we know that in many ways there will be a flow of taliban likely into pakistan. how does that help to stabilize pakistan? i think the other assumption that's being made is that we will be able to recruit the number of afghanis that are required through their tribal leaders and i'm wondering where do we see that happening in such numbers that you have the confidence to believe that that's the case? i haven't seen that indication. and then i think finally the whole issue in terms of the civilian, quote, surge that we've talked about and yet secretary gates, you've particularly said, that's going

to be years before we really have the kind of force that's required to do that. and i'm wondering are there plans already to have the civilians partnering and training with our military that are going over there together and then finally are we focusing largely on our reserves and the national guard as well as our active duty troops that will be deployed to afghanistan? >> if i could start with the civilian question you asked, secretary gates' comments about the long-term need to rebuild usaid and state we all very much believe that. but notwithstanding that, there's a very large effort underway to get civilians to afghanistan. we're tripling the number of civilians in place by early next year, we'll have almost 1,000 people on the ground. they're leveraged 10 to 1 because local nationals are hired either directly or through contract or ngo arrangements.

so that's a fairly substantial number of people. you're talking about 10,000 civilians. civilians don't come in battalions. they come in 1s and 2s. you have a dozen civilians in a district -- u.s. civilians they can organize an awful lot of activities. they can handle the disbursement of monies and they are on the ground and deal with some of these corruption issues because they are there to surprise the way the monies are given out in terms of the projects being funded. this is very hard work. i wouldn't sit here today and say that it's going to be easy to get enough civilians to do all the work that we have to do in afghanistan. but we are getting the numbers there with the specialization that we need. the agriculture specialization, and rule of law speciallation. for each of the functions that are identified by military and civilian planners working together. >> and i'm just -- do they have the staying power -- how long are they required to stay and when will you know he that perhaps you're not going to have those -- >> when we -- when we started at

the beginning of the year, there were just over 300 people, most of whom have commitments that were less than a year, three months, six months. we're bringing a thousand people in the vast majority of whom are making a commitment of a year or more. that's a very big difference and a very important difference and one of the major changes that we've made. >> thank you. >> let me just quickly, first of all, piggyback on secretary lew. he would never say this but i watched him work this problem over the last many months and he personally and his people have had a huge impact on getting the right skilled people there not just a body, which is a problem we had in iraq. but the right skilled people into the right job and the multiplier is just huge because i was with the marines right after they went into helmand and the one civilian that rolled in with them literally the next day had a huge immediate impact. and so the leverage that he talks about just can't -- you can't say enough about that. and i really appreciate that effort.

with respect to pakistan and there's a lot going on and i give general dave mckiernan effort, we tried several times and general mcchrystal has met with general kiyani several times. we are working to synchronize the campaign if you will so that we don't have the kind of impact. we sent the marines in marines in helmand and not many marines went across the border. we recognize the recruiting, retaining and retention problems we have on the asf and not unlike we have to incentivize that. we also have to create a security environment in which they can be recruited, trained and sustain that environment over time. >> thank you. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. turner? >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, i appreciate all of you being here today.

i think one of the things you can tell is that members of this committee are struggling and they're struggling because they are hearing a lot of things that are contrary to policies we've heard before. i mean, you yourself have heard that in the past you were adamantly opposed to declines yet we're dealing with a july 2011 deadline that, admiral, you understand by then we'll know whether or not succeeding or not by that date. we'll know whether or not we're succeeding by that date or not. but there's no trigger with respect to the date. it doesn't matter when you get to that date how you're doing. there has been a date set for drawdown. this is not a date for assessment. this is not a date to determine whether or not the strategy that you're currently implementing is something that needs to be changed. this is the beginning of a drawdown. secretary gates, you tell us well, but it's how the drawdown is done that will be the evaluation but nonetheless it's a date where we are saying july, 2011, whether or not we're succeeding as you've said,

admiral, that we're beginning to drawdown and i'm troubled by your statement over the past eight years we haven't exerted enough leverage and you acknowledged 3 of those 8 are your own. and i'm not comfortable with your conclusion that setting that date, which is an arbitrary date which is july 2011 is going to provide you with that leverage. and you turned to us and you said, well, you know, i think the american people want to know if there's going to be an end having eight years of this. mr. secretary, what the people want to know are we going to be safe? the reason we are in afghanistan we were attacked on 9/11 and we lost the world trade center from perpetrators that originated in afghanistan. this is not an issue whether or not we want an end it's how we want an end and that's really what i was looking for today was some answers as to how we're going to get that end, not an arbitrary deadline and what concerns me with arbitrary declines when you look to guantanamo this is an administration that said we're closing guantanamo in 12 months

which is something i opposed but now we're going to be drawing down from afghanistan in 18? we couldn't accomplish closing guantanamo with a handful terrorists that we have complete control but in afghanistan where there's certainly an innumerable amount we're going to begin a drawdown in 18 months. now, admiral, you said that -- i believe if i got this right that the taliban are making more than the afghan army. you know, several members have asked you questions about the drug trade and i have a chart i want to hold up, mr. secretary. this is looking at the drug trade from 1995 to 2009. i think this is important for us to look at because every time we take up the issue of what are we going to do, how is the taliban being funded, how is al-qaeda being funded? and we talk about the drug trade it should not be an issue of this esoteric impact of the drug trade. it's an increase in the drug trade. this chart goes from 1995 to 2005.

i'm going to fold it back when we look at the highest numbers going away from 1995. what do we find the last four years being an astronomical amount that's off the charts with respect to what has occurred in afghanistan before. 3 of those 4 mr. secretary as you just said were the time periods where you have served as secretary of state. now we all know that the afghan national army is competing against the taliban from which this funding is coming from. now, like other members of this committee, i am a member of the nato parliamentary asemment and they had a meeting addressing the drug trade and the russians came forward with the resolution calling on nato -- in the nato as a policy perspective to address the issue of the drug-related illegal activities. there were members of parliament from nato who said that it wasn't nato's responsibility to address the drug trade.

now, again, we know there has been in the last four years an astronomical increase and we know that it's funding what we're fighting. i would hope that your strategy includes addressing this issue and perhaps you could give us some information today that would give us confidence that this, which is funding what we're fighting might be something that you can address? >> you're correct about the reluctance of other isaf nations to tackle this problem. i would tell you that nato's policy on this, the isaf policy it off which the governments have acceded, i wouldn't say they supported enthusiastically but the isaf rules of engagement in terms of going after drug traffickers, drug lords and the drug labs was changed about a year ago. and so isaf, the commander of

isaf, now can deploy forces and engage forces in trying to deal with these groups. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. andrews? >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral mullen in his testimony says that south asia is the epicenter of global islamic terrorism. and i think this decision will have tremors well beyond that epicenter. my friend from ohio just mentioned guantanamo. i would like to ask admiral mullen and secretary gates, if they would still stand by their earlier statements which i believe are correct that closing guantanamo removes a symbol to the jihadists we are fighting. would you still agree with that. >> yes, i do. >> i said that in 2005 and i believe it today. >> and so the relationship of the guantanamo question of this it makes it more difficult for those whom we are fighting in afghanistan and otherwise to recruit those to fight against

us. i want to ask you about pakistan and the tremors that it involves in relationship to this. if we are successful in this military anything else substantially degrading al-qaeda and the taliban in and near the afghan-pakistani border, what impact do any of you think that would have on the stability of the pakistani government? >> i think it would have a significant impact. i think the pakistani government and the pakistani people pay an awful lot of attention to their neighbors. and their strategy is designed around what kind of governments and what kind of threats they have next door. so i think a stable, supportive afghanistan would have a significant impact on how pakistan will think of its future and the opposite is true as well. >> to what extent is the rising

tide of terrorist violence against civilians in pakistan attributable to the resurgent taliban? >> i would say that it is -- it is a result of the growth in the last year to 18 months of the ttp, the taliban in pakistan, or the pakistani taliban, i should say. we have evidence that al-qaeda is helping them pick targets, do operational planning, helping them in their effort to try to destabilize the pakistani government. the other piece of this that does not include the taliban -- or a part from the taliban is we he also know that al-qaeda is helping the terrorist group that carried out the bombings in mumbai. al-qaeda sees using the taliban in pakistan and groups like

l.e.t. as ways to destabilize pakistan and invoke and inflict problems within india. >> if the opposite were true, if we were to either fail in this offensive mission against the taliban and al-qaeda in afghanistan or not embark on it, what would be impact be on the stability of the pakistani government in your opinion. >> let me just ask admiral mullen, we've seen what happens when the pakistanis made deals with the tribes of various groups on the western -- on the northwestern frontier, it created a sanctuary and safe haven in which taliban which had been knocked back on its heels and nearly destroyed in 2001, 2002 had the space in which it could reconstitute itself to the point where it could become a major problem for the united states and a number of other

allies. if given the same kind of space in eastern afghanistan and southern afghanistan the ttp and pakistan could use it to strengthen itself and expand its ranks and be even more effective in its efforts to destabilize the government. >> i've spent a lot of time in pakistan and each time i go, i learn how much i still to have learn. and one of the messages that comes from there is a message of lack of trust and that's been -- that's based on not just what happened in 1989 but, in fact, what happened as early as the '60s. . we betrayed them three times. the question is are we going to do that again? >> i certainly hope not. >> and i think the worst case is, that that governments does get destabilized, they are nuclear-capable -- >> if i may, we certainly, i think, have a consensus that we

don't want a nuclear weapon iran. if god forbid we had one what would be a greater weapon to a nuclear weapon iran or a jihadist government. >> i think they're both pretty dramatic threats to us and to other nations in the world. >> thank you. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. klein? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service. admiral mullen, in response to a couple of questions you have affirmed that the 30,000 troops is of what general mcchrystal wanted for 2010. i guess we don't know what he wanted in total and perhaps when we see him next week we can see what that total number is. unless you can tell us what his total request was. but in the meantime, we have 30,000 that we're looking at. can you help us understand what the makeup of that 30,000 is? how many combat brigades, how

many people we trainers -- what kind of enablers are going with it and particularly because you've already talked about the stress on enablers and the difficulty of moving some to iraq to afghanistan and their quick turn around, can you give us the idea of a 30,000? is the strategy complete enough for that? >> actually, with the decision as recent as it is, the details out through the 30,000 -- the further you get to the right and the timetable, we've got some more precise work to do. but up front, it's clearly regimental combat team from the marine corps specifically that would be at the front end of this. there is also a package in there that's a training brigade. focused exclusively on training

although in a combat environment and this goes to the partnership. we've got one we've sent in and we're going to send in another. with respect to the -- we're looking at other brigade combat teams and actually one the president gave to the general was the flexibility to put together the forces as he best sees fit and so we're working with him now to really look at the details of that. and we just don't have that at this particular point in time. i would expect certainly at least one more brigade combat team if not a second one. everybody has got a training mission and a partnering mission as they go in. and then we're very concerned about the enablers the kinds of things the secretary talked about earlier. those that protect our people, it's medical, its isr, its helicopters, engineers, ied-related and we've been focused on that for many, many months now to do two things. one, make sure we can get as many of them as possible. and they are a significant part

of the 30,000. and it's not just having them in the 30,000. it's where do we get them? to your point, mr. kline, because they've been turning pretty quickly. and we're very aware of that as we look at their turn-around ratios. all of it, i believe, -- all of it is doable in terms of what he needs, what he asks for and our ability to get them there particularly over the next -- over the next six, eight -- six to eight months. >> admiral, i'm a little bit concerned that we don't have more clarity into what the makeup of this would be because we've sat on 30,000 but i don't know how we got the 30,000 if we don't know how many of those are going to be combat teams and how many of those are going to be enablers. it seems to me that that number 30,000 -- i hate to use the word "arbitrary" again but i don't understand what -- >> it is not arbitrary. and i would only repeat since that word keeps coming up that july 2011 is not an arbitrary date either.

i mean, we certainly have a broad view of what this should be. the closer that they will deploy, the more specific it is. general mcchrystal has some flexibility that is tied to that and we're working the details of how those packages get put together. broadly they are brigade teams, they are enablers and trainers and the kinds of things that we know we will typically need. it becomes a question of identifying them, making sure they're available and then literally putting ourselves in a position to be able to deploy them in a timely way. >> all right, admiral, we'll be looking forward, i'm sure, to the committee to those details and we are anxiously awaiting general mcchrystal's arrival to testify here. i'm very concerned about those enablers. i'm very interested to see what kind of medical support we're going to have for this, how much increase is this going to be? are we going to build a hospital. there are a number of issues in terms of the force makeup that i'm really looking forward to getting details on.

and i know the other members of the committee are. just one other -- one other point. i think my colleague from florida asked why the president didn't use the word "victory" and as you said, you didn't write the speech. are we looking for victory in snag >> and i certainly -- in our discussions and we believe that this strategy is a strategy that will allow us to succeed. and that's to allow us to succeed to get us to a level where we can turn this over to the afghans. >> i thank the gentleman. before i call on the next, let me make an observation. in both iraq as well as in afghanistan, we have navy and air force personnel doing virtually army type of work. is that not correct? >> correct.

some of these enablers, very important enablers, are from the navy and the air force. >> is that part of the 30,000? >> i don't know the answer to that. >> i mean, i don't know specifics but certainly i think it would be. they'd been a significant part of what we've done in iraq and afghanistan and will continue to be. >> particularly, i would say the air force in terms of the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, i want to thank you for being here, for your testimony. i know you've had a busy week but we're certainly appreciative to have you here today to clarify. some of the issues of president's decision to increase the troops in afghanistan. we know there are serious security challenges ahead both in afghanistan and pakistan. i am certainly glad that the president's new strategy was developed arthur row deliberation and careful assessment on the conditions on the ground.

and while the president have made the questions on tuesday night, there's obviously many that remain some of which are going to require time and patience and others that they're going to require a deeper investigation and continued oversight by congress as the war moves on. i'm struggling with a few things. as the president discussed in his speech with the domestic challenges that we face at home, we simply can't commit our armed forces for a prolonged and costly attempt at faison-building. -- nation-building. and in terms of where we are right now and the way forward, i'm struggling with a couple of things. one centers around the footprint. the other is the counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism strategy. you know, clearly the taliban -- and secretary, i probably am now where you were and i haven't

heard a whole lot to convince me or move me yet but clearly the taliban are not overwhelming us with their numbers or their firepower. but yet they've been able to increase their influence significantly in afghanistan. and i need to drill down more on that because what i see is that as the -- as our troop levels have increased we've been seeing more by the afghani people perhaps as occupiers. and that is the real nexus which has allowed the taliban to increase their influence. so i need to have you drill down more on that and explain that a little more. in terms of how you got to where you are. and on the -- on the counterinsurgency, counterterrorism strategy after having reviewed the available options i would like to hear more about what the president felt could be gained

strategically by a counterinsurgency strategy. >> in terms of the footprint, the first point that general mcchrystal made this to me it's not so much as the number as what those troops do. and i think this also ties in with issues relating to civilian casualties. it ties in to the heretofore largely absent partnering with the afghans so that when we would go into a village, the person knocking on the door or knocking the door down was an afghan and not an american. and these are all things that general mcchrystal has changed in terms of how he is going to use the forces that he has been given, the ones that are there and the ones that are coming in

and if the afghans are truly partnered with us as is the intention, the civilian casualties are dramatically reduced since he issued new orders on this and that's having a difference. the reality is in part the reason that the taliban have been so successful is they are ruthless and they intimidate a lot of people. as we've said several times, this has long been an underresourced effort on our part. and we haven't had the troops or the partnership with the afghans to give afghans in villages and rural areas where most the people live the confidence that when we get a night letter saying if you cooperate with isaf or the afghan government you will be killed and your entire family will be killed so the key to getting the afghans who are hedging because they're not sure who's going to win is to give them the confidence that what we are trying to do is the winning side, but our behavior, the behavior of our troops, the

way we use those troops and the way we partner with the afghans i think have a huge amount to do with this reducing the footprint issue. the other side of this i think this is an area where people misuse history. the soviets did get defeated in afghanistan but it's important to remember that they were trying to impose an alien culture and political system on the country. they murdered about a million afghans. that they made 5 million more into refugees and they were virtually isolated internationally in that effort. none of those conditions apply to what we're trying to do in afghanistan. and where we are. and with respect to very quickly to coin nci you cannot do effective counterterrorism unless you have a presence on the ground and are able to collect intelligence that informs your targeting. and the only way you can do that is to provide some minimum level

of security for the population. so that you can operate there. so this is not a fully resourced coin in the original sense. we've tried to narrow and refine the mission so it is -- there are major aspects of coin associated with this. but also major aspects of counterterrorism and i would say having forces also outside the protected areas where we are protecting the population that are in fact out and about disrupting the taliban and making them feel very uncomfortable. >> i thank the gentleman. we have time for one question from mr. rogers and then the witnesses will turn into pumpkins. >> great. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my question deals with metrics. mr. secretary, you talked about transferring authority over starting the process in july of 11 and in august of this year you talked about beginning the process of building these metrics by which we're going to

measure succeed over there. can you tell me where that process is now? >> well, we have one -- we have a very detailed set of metrics that i think have been chaired with the congress that came out of the march endeavor. we have tried to narrow those and make them more price in terms of our expectations of the afghans, our expectations of the pakistanis and of ourselves and of our allies. those have been worked in the interagency and i will go back and see if we cannot provide those to the congress. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. chairman? i don't have a question if i could read back something that i think the most important point made by the secretary. if i could just re-read it again. >> without objection. >> mr. secretary, you said here the most important point today in this -- in the whole process and you said this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism.

are foreign muslims defeated one superpower. to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the united states and the world. i think that's the point we all need to remember as we go forward here. >> thank you very much. let me first compliment and thank the members of the committee for staying within the time limits for questions. and a special thanks to the witnesses for being with us. it's been very, very helpful and we wish you success in this most difficult endeavor. we couldn't have a better team. we couldn't have a better team. and we know that and you have our confidence. without objection, members have five legislative days to submit their statements into the record. and with that, gentlemen, thank you.

[inaudible conversations] >> senators are continuing their debate of the healthcare bill through the weekend. our regular book tv schedule will be preempted during these rare senate sessions. with book tv programs resuming after the debate. watch the senate debate on healthcare live gavel-to-gavel here on c-span2. the only network with the full debate unedited and commercial-free. to read the senate bill and the house version plus watch video on demand, go online to c-span's healthcare hub.

>> the house homeland security committee could issue subpoenas to the northern virginia couple who made it past security at last week's white house dinner. the moves after the salahis said they would not testify at this hearing. the committee did hear from secret service director mark sullivan. this part of the hearing is 90 minutes. >> the committee on homeland security will come to order. the committee is meeting today

to receive testimony on the united states secret service and presidential protection, an examination of a systems failure. good morning. i want to thank the witnesses for agreeing to testify here today. some people have asked me why we're having this hearing. . ..

>> we are not concerned about agency embarrassment, discomfort, or shame cannot serve as a substitute for performance. the security gaps at issue cannot be explained away as missteps by a few front-line employees. there were undeniable planning and execution failures of the entire secret service apparatus. with the security failings that seem to hang over that evening like a fog, we are all fortunate that this diplomatic celebration did not become a night of horror. there is no doubt that this isn't it can be an enlightened case study, but it is not enough for us to merely analyze. we must dissect every fact.

we must learn the lesson and fix the problem. and after we do these things, we need to give thanks that no lives were lost. today, we've heard -- we will take a hard look at secret service actions and omissions that have been revealed and confirmed by this incident. this nation's response to terrorism threat at home and abroad demand that we maintain vigilance. the fact that unauthorized persons gained access to the white house complex during an official state dinner, mixed and mingled, and were photographed with the president, vice president, and the prime minister of india, is about as far from vigilance as one can get. it is simply unacceptable. the american people deserve a full accounting and full

accountability. and we must be assured that this will never happen again. i look forward to the testimony presented today, and i look forward to the actions that should follow. the chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from new york, mr. king, on opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me at the outset thank you and your staff for the level of cooperation have shown throughout this matter as far as scheduling a hearing, as far as getting us a price as what's been happening and also as far as agreeing with my request that desiree rudd to be called as a witness before this committee. i agree with you, completely mr. chairman, that we cannot have this covered or shame, it's also important as we said we dissect every fact. let me just say the secret service i believe is an outstanding set. mistakes were made to. i commend director sullivan for

acknowledging that in conducting an internal investigation, and for the level of cooperation is given to me. i not realized you as well, over the last several days putting everything on the table and holding nothing back. whatever decisions he has to make within the secret service, i am assured he will do the right thing. mr. chairman, the reality is social event at the white house, securities and missed shared responsibility between the secret service and the office of the social secretary. we've gone back to administration and have not been any event with a social secretary's office was not their standing with the secret service. there's reasons for this. one is in the event someone is supposed to be on the list and is not, the social secretary's office can resolve that. they can work to resolve it while the secret service continues to process other people in line. in this instance, for whatever reason, the decision was made not one person from the social secretary's office. not one. this reverses policies of at

least two administrations. the reason i ask or desiree rogers to come there was not in any way to make this a vendetta, not to go after at all. the same reason we asked director sullivan to testify. we want to get a complete picture. we have to learn from the sickness of what they do, what they did do, what the social secretary's office did and why they were not there that i. this to me is a real issue. we had during the week, we had initially the white house saying secret service was entirely to blame. mr. mussina, the assistant chief of staff of the white house saying the white house was now going to begin a policy of having someone from the social secretary's office there with the secret service. what he's not saying it's that this is the policy that was in effect of at least two previous administrations. and to me the issue is who made the decision, why was the decision made not to have anyone from social secretary's office there that night. i will say, and i have no doubt at all, someone from the social secretary's office had been

there, doing what's been done for at least the previous 16 or 17 years, that couple would not have been allowed into the white house. they would have been stuck because they were not on the list. secret service would have handed them off to the social secretary's office and he would have resulted. i know previous administrations they had a whole team of social secretaries. they had people from the diplomatic office. people from legislative affairs. people from the presidents own staff to avoid embarrassing incidents and to make sure that no one got him who was not supposed to be in. so for desiree rogers did not beer, for the white house, mr. gets offhandedly say at a white house briefing yesterday, may you receive an official notice from the white house, we didn't. he said that white house staffers don't testify before congress. that is untrue. i was on the banking committee in 1994 during the whitewater hearings when president clinton sent up george stephanopoulos, maggie williams who was clinton's chief of staff, said

of the presidents council and also set up the previous council, set up mark, the press secretary. all to testify before congress. and yet on this issue where we talk about the security of the president of the united states, the person who made the decision will not be a. i think it is wrong, stonewalling and a front or to be. this was a bipartisan request, mr. chairman. a bipartisan request to the white house which prides itself on being open, cooperation. but in this incidents they are stonewalling. for our committee to work with a white house that has to be an element of trust. they have breached that trust and i will do everything i can, mr. chairman. but i also believe that we should subpoena desiree rogers. this is not a separate policy issue. this is an issue with people of the white house advising the president on health care or cap-and-trade or afghanistan. we're talking about an administrative decision to have people are not had people stand with the secret service and the change of policy of at least 20 years standing to antony, mr.

chairman, this is an incomplete hearing. we are getting half the picture from the secret service which has acknowledged is responsible it but being stonewalled by the white house. i yield back. >> thank you very much. just for the record, they were not on the list that they were not stop. their party planners. they are not security personnel, and i think one of the reasons we brought director sullivan here is to explain the role of the secret service from a security standpoint. and he can answer a number of these questions, as we go for. other members of the committee are reminded that under committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record. our sole witness is mr. mark sullivan. mr. sullivan was sworn in as that's what he said attractor of the united states secret service on may 31, 2006.

mr. sullivan has been the recipient of numerous awards for superior performance throughout his 26 year tenure with the secret service. included a distinguished presidential rank award in 2005. welcome, mr. sullivan, and thank you for being here today. without objection, the witnesses full statement will be inserted in the record. i will now ask director sullivan to summarize his statement for five minutes. >> thank you, chairman. good morning chairman thompson, ranking member king, and other distinguished members of the committee. the u.s. secret service is an organization that maintains deep-fried for the work it does on behalf of our nation. based on a high standards which the men and women of this agency holds themselves, and the standards the nation expects, i

regret on tuesday, november 24, established protocols and procedures were not followed. allowing to individual entry into the white house. the moment this was brought to my attention on wednesday, november 25, i.e. immediately directed our office of professional responsibility to begin an investigation and a review into the events surrounding the previous evening. further, i directed the office of professional responsibility to contact the department of homeland secured homeland sigurd office of the inspector general in order to it buys them of our investigation. while the investigation remains ongoing, preliminary findings have determined that establish procedures related to inning to white house were not followed at the initial checkpoint. an error in judgment, a mistake was made. in our line of work, we cannot afford even one mistake.

in this particular circumstance, to individuals who should have been prohibited from passing through a checkpoint and entering the grounds were allowed to proceed to the magnetometers and other levels of screening before they were then allowed to enter the white house. offloads these individuals went through magnetometers and other levels of screening, their entry into the white house is unacceptable and indefensible. the u.s. secret service relies heavily on the professionalism and training of our men and women to make informed decisions based upon sound judgment. in this case, i fully acknowledge that proper procedures were not followed, and human error occurred in the execution of our duties. this flaw has not changed our agency standard, which is to be right 100 percent of the time. this event does not represent

the quality of protection that the dedicated men and women of this agency provides every day. this past year we processed more than 1.2 million visitors into the white house without incident. in our profession, however, there is no margin for error. i realize many people share our disappointment in this incident. as an agency, we will continue to remain our harshest critic. and take the necessary actions to remedy this issue and continuing to successfully carry out our critical mission. i am extremely confident and proud of the work of our men and women in the security measures we put in place on a daily basis at the white house, the vice presidential residence, and the thousands of venues located

throughout the world which are visited by those we protect. the men and women of the u.s. secret service worked 24 hours a day, seven days a week, every day of the year. their sacrifice and commitment make us the agency that the american people can be proud of and depend on. as a career special agent, i am confident in our men and women, and in our ability to successfully execute our mission. chairman thompson, ranking member king, and members of the committee, i am willing to answer questions at this time. however, any questions regarding our security procedures will need to be discussed in a closed setting. additionally, i would like to respectfully advise this committee that due to the fact that this is an ongoing investigation, i am unable to answer any question regarding the potential criminal aspect of

this incident here or in a closed setting. thank you. >> thank you very much, director sullivan for your testimony. i will remind each member that he or she will have five minutes to question mr. sullivan. i recognize myself for the beginning question. director sullivan, let me be clear that all of us support the men and women of the secret service. there is no question about it. our oversight responsibilities over is when situations like this occur, we have to look at the. we have to do our job. and it is in that pursuit of doing our job, this hearing is being held today. in addition to that, there are a couple of questions i would like to just get on the record. who is responsible for security at the white house?

>> the u.s. secret service is responsible for that security, mr. chairman. >> the u.s. secret service. who is responsible for access control at the white house? >> we are, sir. >> how many checkpoints are we normally manning from an access control at the white house at any point, at a state dinner? >> you know, for this particular event we had three vehicle checkpoints, and we had to pedestrian checkpoints. >> okay. at each checkpoint, did those individuals have lists of the guests that would be in attendance? >> yes, they did, chairman. >> the two individuals in question, salahi's, were they on any of those listed? >> they were not? >> and it is your testimony before us today, that they

should not have been allowed entrance to this event because they were not on the list. >> that is correct. >> just for the record, if the individual is not on a list, what is the procedure of? >> the procedure would be that they should not be allowed entry. at that point. for this particular event, the protocol would be that that officer should contact their immediate supervisor, the supervisor would get together with an individual from the white house staff. they would determine, if in fact that individual was cleared to come in. additionally, we would call over to our control center to see if these names had been provided for clear and. >> did any of this over on the evening in question? >> it did not. >> have you identified all of the personnel who would have

been responsible for this not occur in? >> sir, right now that is ongoing. we have identified three individuals right now. we continue to investigate. we have done -- this occurred ,-comsomewhere done numerous interviews. we continue to go back and re- interview people. but right now we have three individuals who have identified, that i am not -- i'm not sure if that will change or not. but right now -- one sure we are sure of, checkpoints with this did occur. >> so they were not on the list. have you determined how an individual not on the list could gain entrance to this event is? >> i have comments or. >> is that something you're comfortable in sharing in this setting, or you would like to do it in another sitting? >> i would be happy to share the. we have established protocol.

they were not followed. what we find is that if the protocols are followed, we won't run into this type of situation. close this protocol was not followed. a mistake was made, an error in judgment. and that allowed these two individuals who should not have been allowed entry into the white house. >> can you tell us whether or not any other individuals may have gained entrance to the white house in a similar manner this evening? >> sir, that was a concern on my part as well. and i can tell you that our investigation indicates that no other individuals were allowed entry that eating that should not have a been allowed to come in. >> and the one question, because these individuals were not on the list, they did not get padded or anything like that. do you think this not occurring, provided any risk for those individuals who attended the

state dinner? >> sir, like everyone, i am extremely disappointed that these people were able to enter the white house. however, i would say that these people went through every layer of security that every other individual went through going into that building. and again, i would be more than happy to talk about what those levels of security are in a closed briefing, but i would say from a risk perspective, i feel confident based on what i've heard, based on what i've seen, based on what i've been briefed on that they did not provide a risk to the president. >> so you are comfortable in making that statement? >> i am comfortable making that statement, sir. >> thank you. i yielded to the ranking member. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. director, my understanding is that the salahi, when they went to the first checkpoints and their name was not on the

list -- i'm sorry. >> when they came to the first checkpoint, their name was not on the list and they told the secret service agent that they should be on the list and they had been invited and the talk of himself through, is that a fair analysis of? >> you know, it's part of the investigation. what i would say is these two individuals to chill up at the list representing themselves to be on the list. how're officer looked at the guest list, did not see their names there. and allowed them to proceed to the next checkpoint to have their names checked out there. >> my understanding is and i've seen personally myself, certainly at times people who should be on the list are not. when they say they are on the list, should be on the list and they are not, somebody from the social secretary's office is there, secret service agent hands the guests over to the social secretary and goes back to processing those who are next

in line. is that the way it's been done in the past? >> sir, for everything that we have at the white house, we have a planning meeting with the white house staff. and we did have a planning meeting or this particular visit. during a planning meeting, we all agree about what our predetermined responsibility will be for the particular event. in this meeting, we agreed that that particular checkpoint, we would take control of the list. >> if i could just as the. in any other event, at the white house, certainly one of the significant as a state dinner where there were no one from the social secretary office with the secret service. >> sir, i've asked our people to go back and look at the. we have seen other events where that has occurred it does not happen often but we have seen other events, mr. king, where that doesn't factor. >> do you know if this happened at any other previous state dinner? >> i do not know that but i can get back to you.

>> a hypothetical. if when they come to the security checkpoint and they said we are on the list, secret service says you are not. if there had been somebody from the social secretary's office there, with the agent had referred them to the social secretary's office and continue to process those online? >> i believe what they would have done if they would have worked the issue together. i don't think that the officer would have totally just dismissed it to that particular person. i would think -- >> i don't mean to specific would they wait to see what the social secretary's office could find and then come back to the secret service agent, rather than secret service agent stop the processing of you in line ahead of him and just deal with this individual or these individuals speak with mr. king, i think that is one of the things we talked about an hour after action review of this, as we talk with the white house staff. i believe we both recognize that there is a need to have somebody there from the white house. and that's what as we saw

yesterday, new guidelines were put out for all of these events in the future, without exception there will be somebody there from the white house staff. >> and will those guidelines be similar to almost everything that's been done before, other than last week? >> you know, again, mr. king, many of the events we have done over the past nine or 10 months, there have been people from the white house staff at this checkpoint. for this particular event, prior to this event, we agreed that we would control that and they would be somebody from the white house staff -- >> my time he started to run. who initiated that? did you ask the social secretary's office that to be there, or did they ask not to be their? >> i just know that's what the result of our meeting was, sir. >> but isn't unusual, through all these events, i think i've been to over 40 of them, whether it is christmas party or barbecues, and occasional state dinner. we always see somebody, whether it is the social secretary's office, president staff,

legislative affairs, there's always someone there with the secret service did it interesting to me that for this one even, the most important one of the year, a prime minister of a country which was attacked by terrorists last year, that this event which also was a larger crowd, the social secretary's office just left and the secret service was there by itself. listen, i thank you for accepting responsibility, but the only way we can find out is who initiated this change in what the real procedures going to be in the future white was done this way last tuesday. to me, we can do it unless we have somebody from the white house testifying instead of hiding 90 phony claim. >> the only thing i would say during that meeting, it was agreed upon that would be people from the white house staff available in a roving capacitor again, i take responsibility for the fact that we did have that available to us. that is what should have been, those people just should have been stopped there and we should have called for someone to come

out and help to expedite. >> if there had been someone next to the secret service agent this would not happen. if somebody from the social secretary's office, the salahis would not have gotten in. >> thank you very much. just for the record, again, no one would've been allowed allowed in that event, if they had not been vetted. am i correct? >> that's correct, mr. chairman. >> whether they talked to the social secretary or whomever. >> mr. chairman, if you would use you for a moment, -- >> no, let me -- >> that's the purpose of the social secretary. >> i'm sorry, chairman. always going to do is there have been occasions where people have shown up that had not been

vetted. where we will have conversation with the white house staff, and those people have been allowed to enter. that's very red, but on occasion people have come in and get both the white house staff in a survey, and visit not just this administration, other administration, where we feel there's a need for those individuals to be let through that haven't been vetted. and we and the staff of an agree with that those people will be allowed in. but that's to answer your question. not what happened to. >> thank you. the gentle lady from california, for five days, ms. sanchez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you, mr. sullivan for being here today. first let me begin by saying the secret service does a great job. in the past, i know there's always been close communication between the social secretary for the white house, legislative

affairs, for example, if are going to have the congress people are going to come to the christmas party. and every single time that i have entered the white house, there has always been somebody from the president's -- from the white house there at the very first point before you ever even get to the checkpoint where they check your purses, etc. every time. even if it's just in a meeting with the president of a particular policy. there's always been somebody out there. so my question -- the first question i have for you is, in this preplanning meeting, did you all decide that no one would be specifically assigned from the social secretary's office, or legislative affairs or what have you, at the first checkpoint? was that a decision made? because i heard you say there were going to be roving people, but was there a definite

decision that nobody would be standing next to the secret service as people first made entry, or attempted coming to the event? >> you know, my understanding, congresswoman, was there was agreement that the initial checkpoint we would have that list on our own. and that if any discrepancy did come up, that we would then call for somebody, you know, that person was to call for their supervisor. and they in fact would get in contact with somebody from the staff, who was down around the main entrance point at the east wing. and they would be available to come out and help with the issue of. >> so you're feeling is that your first secret service agent who was standing there with a list and realized that the couple in question was not on there, that in fact, their purpose was then to call over

somebody from the white house and confer as to what to do with that person? >> correct. ma'am, everyday we have people show up to various gates of the white house, who are too short -- >> who are not supposed to be their. >> who want to come in. and everyday our people will make the appropriate phone calls, appropriate contact to see if maybe we have missed something on our list. and if in fact these people are expected to arrive. and i look at this no different to me, this began and ended at the checkpoint that it was a simple protocol, simple procedure that we had in place that somebody came up was not on the list, make contact with somebody who could come and help to expedite that individual in or determine if in fact he should be turned away spirit and that white it surprised me because every time i have been to the white house and i've had a guest who has been vetted ahead of time with a social good number and everything else we need to supply, and showing ids,

there is still times when we are set aside and said wait, we don't have your guess on the list. let's talk about this. but it has always come not in conjunction with somebody from the white house. so why in this particular instance, because i have never seen this incident before. and under three presidents that i've been going to the white house, democrats and republicans, that i have never just seen a secret service agent. in particular, with such an important process, with so many important people waiting in line to get through. why do you -- why would you -- i will agree that no person from the white house would be standing there, first of all, to greet you guess which is one of the most important things that the social secretary should be doing at that point, but at the same time if there were problems to be really be able to take care of them and start some

chain of line to figure out. why i had time for one of the -- i've never seen this happen before. why would you all agree to this because i wouldn't know what i believe that is very rare. i haven't seen that happen myself all that often. and i do believe that the statements, the memorandum that was put out by the white house yesterday, i believe that it recognized that as well. and that they stated in that memorandum that we are to work as partners to make sure we get everybody in who should get in and prevent people from getting in the shouldn't get in. and i do believe that because of this particular issue last week, i think there's a recognition by all of us that that is the way things should be done. and i think going forward, or i know going forward that things are going to be done. >> i thank you for taking responsibility, but i think there's a lot of responsibility that should be spread out on

this. thank you, mr. sullivan. thank you, mr. chairman,. >> thank you very much. the gentleman from indiana for five minutes, mr. souder. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. sullivan, you have used checkpoint repeatedly, were there points, two or one that had a less? >> there were two comments are. >> so it wasn't a point that it was checkpoints that failed? >> yes, sir. >> and the list you are referring to was the list provided to you by the social security, or is this a list that's been social security numbers have been vetted. there's been background checks on individuals that might turn up some of the questionable things in this couple's background that they were associated with. a social secretary list of who they invited, both was it a vetted list of? >> i believe i had the right. and if i don't we will correct it. but what happens before the event, the white house staff will give us a list of all the people that have been invited. we would then take that list and

they will also provide us with name and date of birth and social security number. we will then run all those through the appropriate record checks for all those individuals. if anything does come up that would lead us to believe that somebody should not be led into the white house, we would get back to the white house that on the. once all that begging is done, we will get back to the white house have on that, and they will get us back a complete list of who is going to be attending that event. so for the social secretary's office, for any of the deal to walk up and say this individual should be allowed in, you said you think that's been done in the past without bedding are what else i to say this individual has been vetted before? >> i would say that would be very, very rare occasion. i was and perhaps it was a member from the hill or if it was some other individual whose family friend. this would have to be somebody who was known to them. we would talk through it, and we

would allow them into the white house. but again, that would be when all of us are comfortable and we know who we are dealing with. >> the salahis have been flashing all over the national media, e-mails that suggest that there could have been the potential of a mistake showing that they had exchanges to be asked on the list. they were supposed to be called back. then they claimed that they were gone and hadn't heard it and they have shown those e-mails that the whole country knows exists now. >> sir, that gets into the elements of our criminal investigation. and again, i cannot based upon information from conversations with the u.s. attorney's office, i would just prefer not to talk about that. >> one of my concerns, because this feels like, as i say, déjà vu all over again. when i was first elected in congress and became in, and i

was elected in 1984. we came in an oversight committee, we started a whole round of investigation in 1995 in 1996 about white house clearance is. and the question was dick morris and the thomases were not on the list but they were coming in the white house regularly. that led to a whole question of having clearance less and people on it, with people who shouldn't have been on the list, withholding those lists. that led to questions the coating on the list was. that's how we found albina lincoln bedroom. we have been through this before with the secret service. we ask this to be clarified and fixed. and the question was, in looking at a casual visit of some individuals and the slipup on the list, it led to a fundamental question about how and when these lists are changed or because you said well, they went through all the check -- they want to all the checks and there was no danger to the president or the prime minister of india.

if there's no danger, why did you do background checks of? that is a fundamental question, because casual visitors from indiana to see the white house christmas tree are subjected to background checks. you just said here that it didn't matter really that you didn't do the background checks because they have been vetted as somebody pointed there was no danger to the president. was the danger to the present or not? if there is danger because you're all these always difficult to see that they don't have a gun, to see they don't have these things, why do you bet every visitor that wants to see the white house christmas tree? >> sir, doing background checks are one level of our security potential because we do a background check on somebody and it comes back they have the record, to me that does not mean that there is no danger. >> but my question is that you said there was no danger to the president because they went through all these things to show that they basically didn't post a threat. is that correct? was there a threat to the present or not?

>> we have countermeasures in place and i'm prompted to take there was no threat to the president. last week we took into a basketball game with 5000 people. and he was surrounded by those 5000 people. >> i understand that. but why do you then run a background check on every individual that's coming in when they aren't even going to see the president, not going to get their picture taken with the president or vice president. they are not going to see all these other people there. one on one type of thing. why do you bun less of a background check on individuals they are than you would on a casual visitor? because you said sometimes it is way. you said there was no danger. the presumption is you're doing a background check because there is a potential danger. >> sir, would i like to have stopped those people at that checkpoint? i would have. do i think those people should have a name checked? i do. but does that mean there was a danger to the president because two people came in who were not name checked? i don't believe it does. i believe that our levels of

security, i believe that, you know, we keep agency in close proximity to the people that we protect. if we thought that doing a name check was going to secure his safety, then we wouldn't have any more security in the white house. we would to all of our people we couldn't stand them. with all due respect to the 400 people that came to the white house last week, we continue to look at all those people even though they have gone to name checks, no matter who those people were. and our agent, when people walk up to a photo shoot, we are looking at those people as they approach. we are looking at their body linwood, looking at the gestures. we are looking at any type of action here we don't rely just on any one level of security here. week look at multiple ways as he could. again, i would be happy to talk you about that in a closed setting. but we do do backer and check. >> pajamas time has expired. the gentle lady from california for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

mr. sullivan, i applaud you for taking full responsibility for this incident. it's not an easy thing to do, but you haven't pledged. and you are right as you said, quote in our line of work we can't afford even one mistake. as you can see, everyone on this committee on a bipartisan basis views this as a security issue, hopefully none of us cares whether us weekly is covering it. we care whether the life of our president and high level officials from our country and from india and others were protected after last weeks event, and we care very much going forward whether there are lessons learned. i think that i could be clear. certainly, that is what i care about. i focused in a terms of congress on security issues. that's my passion. that's what i do. i chaired the intelligence subcommittee and this committee and on numerous occasions, i have been briefed by hugh on threats to the president of the united states and what the secret service is doing about them. and i've been to your

headquarters to see firsthand what you do. and i want to thank you and the people who work for you for your service. and again, i want to thank you for taking responsibility, full responsibility for this incident. my questions are about what we do going forward. what will we do differently. all of us remember the so-called purple bottle of doom at the inauguration. that was i thought a demonstration of poor crowd control by your agency and other agencies at a large outdoor event. that's not the same as this event. but it causes me to ask some questions. i think that entering the white house should not be like shopping in a big box retailer the day after thanksgiving that i am sure you agree. going forward, tens of thousands of people are going to be at the white house in the summer looking at the christmas decorations and attending a number of receptions. we are all going monday night with guests, and we have

submitted social security numbers and the date of birth is of those guest. and we know they are being vetted, and think they should be. so my question is, should we have a better business model here for large crowds and smaller crowds? i attended recently the bruce springsteen concert in washington. it was quite wonderful. just want you all to no. [laughter] >> some of you may have gone. but it was also a very smooth security experience. tickets were received well in advance that they were printed on high-tech camper proof paper. they came with barcodes that were quickly scan for authenticity. there were no lines. there was no confusion, and there was no security problem. i am not suggesting that christmas at the white house is a bruce springs teen concert, but i am suggesting that there may be more modern techniques for screening people who are trying to get at the white house building. and let me finally suggest that as this committee knows, layered

security always works better. ms. sanchez and i have collaborated for years on port security, and that's what we have put in place. and so in that regard i very much applaud her comments about the social secretary's office. the social secretary participation in screening people add to layered security, and i sure hope those lessons have been learned. so my question to you is, do we have the rights to carry models here? are the things you could improve immediately with respect to screening people who will come to the white house next month? and are the things this committee either legislatively or informally should be working on to make your job more effective? >> thank you. i agree with you. you know, one of the things we do is we are continually looking at our methods and our procedures. that's not to because of this event. we do that continually. we are continually looking at how technology can help us out. you know, x-ray machine, a type

of technology. we have a technology working group which is not just our organization, but it is other, you know, federal organizations. you know, the academia. we are dealing with all those people up there in a partnership to see we can come up with the best methodology to expedite people through, and to make sure that we do it in a way that is going to be not interested and make sure it is very efficient. i would say that in this particular case again, i don't think any level of technology, i don't think any level of funding is the reason for why this happened. pure and simple, this is a human error. we could've had the best technology. we could have had all the funding that we would ever want. but this still would not have prevented this from happening. if people don't follow the established guidelines, it's going to track something like this is going to happen. as i said before, we put 1.2 meg

people in the white house this past year. and all those people were put through without an incident because we did follow procedure. so i do agree with you that we need to continually look at technology and whatever methodologies are out there to ensure that we get people in sa for as we can. i do think that that did matter in this particular situation. >> think you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much. the gentleman from california. >> thank you, mr. chairman i would just say that it is too bad it takes a royal screw up for us to regain the urgency we need about security in this country. i wish the press were as attentive to the issue of the sunsetting of three major provisions of the patriot act that will occur at the end of this month unless we act on it, including the lone wolf provision. which the judiciary committee deemed should be dropped on the very day that we had a lone wolf

attacked, a domestic lone wolf attack at fort hood. i hope we don't happen to have a royal screw up with respect to security in a larger sense for us to get the attention of the media on something like that. let me just ask you, mr. director, first of all, from the testimony, you do not make up the list of the invitees, correct? >> that is correct. >> the white house to? >> yes, sir. >> you vet the names given to you on that list, correct? >> that is correct. >> so your office, your officers are not responsible for the list, and would not now why someone is on the list were not on the list from an invitation list rather than a vetting situation, correct? >> that would be correct. >> so it would be hopeful to have someone from the white house with your personnel at the time the decision is made when someone presents themselves to the white house who was not on

the list. >> yes, sir. i believe there is an acknowledgment. >> so let me ask you. dog you said it was a decision made before hand but that would not be the case here. was that your recommendation? >> that was a recommendation that we made together. >> so it was a recommendation? >> it was a joint recommendation. >> by what you've make that kind of recommendation? >> we look to the issue of last week. we sat down and talk about this. and when i say my recommendation, we had our people get together with the white house that. they look at the events surrounding last week -- >> sir, i don't need to know the process. i want to know why. that is the question. why would you or members of your staff decide that it would make sense not to have somebody from the white house after both of those, however many points they were, with your personnel? >> you mean why do we make the decision there was nobody -- >> why would you make the recommendation? why did you make the recommendation?

you said it was a shared recommendation. why did someone from the secret service decide that make sense of? >> i believe in looking at what happened last week, again, sir, we have done this would not only this administration but with previous administration would've taken the responsibly for that last. this is the first time we had a breakdown based on our people accepting that responsibility. so it has been done in the past. hasn't done when you have had a state dinner speakers as i mentioned earlier, i don't know that but i would be more than happy to get that information. >> legal weather has been done where you have a head of a state of a nation that has been subject to the recent terrorist attacks because i do not know that. i want to say for the record, -- >> if your folks made a recommendation, if you made that recommendation, it is inconceivable to me why you would do that. all you need to do is have someone from the white house standing there. that is too much to ask. that's what they're supposed to do. frankly, i don't understand the.

>> i think is a misunderstanding. did you say we made that situation two weeks ago? >> yes, that is the question. >> i apologize. i said they had a planning meeting prior to that event. >> i understand that. i am asking if your folks made a recommendation that you are not to have somebody from the white house there. >> sir, i don't know the recommendation. all i know is the planing an agreement that was made is that we would take that list and that the other individuals would be a little from white house staff would respond to the checkpoint to help with any discrepancy. >> i'm just trying to ask, did that come from your side of the house? >> i don't know that. >> will your investigation revealed that? >> it will. >> locator to talk about layered security. i am absolutely live in layered security. thatcher one of the letters was not there, correct? >> i would say, sir, that the

protocol was not adhered to. >> i would say one of the letters was not there. >> i would say there was a breakdown in that letter. that's what i would sit. >> use a human hair repeatedly. you say proceeded are not follow. you say it was unacceptable and indefensible. normally when you have an organization we have a screw up like that, there are consequences that flow from that. and what i mean by that is this. the only way you're going to assure that you don't have screw ups in the future, and you've set yourself, we can't afford to have a screw up that it doesn't matter how many millions of people go through, you can't afford to have a screw up. or has been said many times, terrorists only need to be successful once. we have to be successful all the time. the consequences after the review takes place, are they going to be consequences for people who made the human error? on which is going to shrug our shoulders and say it is human error? the. >> right now the individuals

have been identified have been put on administrative leave, and beyond that i would prefer not to go further but i would say that we are going to look at this. we're going to find out what the culpability was calm and we will take the appropriate action. >> the gentleman's time has expired. the gentle lady from the district of columbia for five minutes, ms. norton. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate that you so quickly accepted responsibility, mr. sullivan. that's what we expect from a great police force. that's what the secret service is. that's what the salahis have done. they continue to indicate they've were invited. where they could have explained themselves fully as you are doing today. you indicated earlier in your testimony, i think i'm quoting you, no others injured. but how did you discover that the salahis had entered?

did you discover that through their facebook or was it your own discovery that some interlopers had entered? >> we did not discover that on our own. we were advised of it the following gay. >> and advised by whom, sir? >> facebook. >> so for all we know there were other interlopers there, because this mistake was made. these con artists so hungry for publicity exposed and revealed themselves. you see the danger i'm speaking of comments are. >> that was a concern of mine as well. that is something we have focused on. i cannot talk about the setting, but i believe i can satisfy you in explained that there were no other people there that night that should not have been. >> mr. chairman, i am going to have to be satisfied in private. i was at the state dinner. once you cut through that checkpoint, i don't know how you could say to this committee that you were sure that no others got

in, especially since we have it someone who got in. i think the committee needs to know how they can assure us there were no other interlopers. for all the twittering about social secretary and these serial con artist, what i see is that this couple has pioneered a new way to breach security. forget about all your barriers. forget about your ids. that'll get you in quicker than anything else. then i would say what my concern is. mr. sullivan, it is well known, and the press over and over again, that this president has received far more death threats than any president in the history of the united states. an alarming number of death rhetoric i'm not going to ask you for the details on that. but here we had the first state

dinner. not just any old president, but of the first african-american president. was there any attempt, increased security given all you know, which was more than we know, about threats to the president of the united states? >> ma'am, no matter who the president is, -- >> i'm asking about this president. and my russian is very specific. given death threats to the president, was there any attempt to increase the security at this event, yes or no? >> man, i can't talk about that. number one, i will address the threats. i have heard a number out there that the threat is up by 400%. i'm not sure where the number speeded it up at all? >> i think i can answer. it is net 400%. i'm not sure where that number came from. >> we can't hear the gentleman.

>> i just ask you if the threats were a. on the threats up or not? >> they are not. the threats right out in the in the appropriate interest we are seeing, is the same level that it has been for the previous two presidents at this point. >> this is very comforting news. let me ask you. reportedly there were as many as three or four times as many people at this state dinner had to be held in a tent like building. is that not the case? >> i believe there were 400 people, yes, they. >> and only about 100, 120 plus? >> right. >> do you have extra forces, asked the people on the ground to assist you with this state dinner? >> ma'am, we will always adjust our security plan depending upon -- >> were the extra people given the fact that there were three or four times as many people at this state dinner? what would you have gotten them from? i asked you that because a

recent internal report of the congressional research says if there were an evaluation of services missions, it might be determines that is a ineffective to protect its mission and investigate financial crimes. were the d.c. police there to help you? >> i do not believe so. >> well, do you need more people? do you have enough people who aren't secret service people, when you have two cover three times as many people or perhaps more, at a state dinner? >> ma'am, the number one priority of our organization is to protect the president. will always have enough resources, enough people to protect him. we had the appropriate level of staffing at that event last tuesday. >> when you question the salahis, were they under oath? >> ma'am, i can't get out of that. >> you can tell us whether they were under oath or not?

you have submitted a transcript, i am simply asking you where they under oath or not? >> you are talking about where when they came to the checkpoint he? know, when you interview them. >> man, identified by the u.s. attorney's office that i cannot talk about any aspect of the investigation. >> we plan at the end of the hearing to go into a more structured setting so we can get some of these questions answer answered. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> naked very much. >> i apologize for the budget can't go into those owners of the investigation. >> didn't gentleman for alabama. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to go back to his brief planning event with the white house that you said that you all mutually agreed to not have a person from the white house staff at the checkpoint. who suggested that at that meeting? >> i don't know that, sir. >> do you know who his enemies because i do not.

>> can you give us the information of who was in that meeting for the preplanning? >> yes. >> also, i would like to ask, ms. norton's question about when this came to attention that it is my understanding from a "washington post" story that the night of the event during the state dinner, a roxanne roberts who was at the event went over to a white house staffer and told them that they didn't believe -- when the salahis were announced that they were not supposed to be there. were you aware of that? >> i am aware that. >> did you read that story? >> yes. >> and you tell us anything about that conversation, what a yielded? >> we did read that. and that is part of our investigation, which i cannot get into. >> so you don't know, or you can't tell us if that white house staffer that was informed about the salahis did or did not go to a secret service agent and communicate that information? >> sir, i cannot comment on that.

>> of a. you talked earlier about not being on the list that in the passer have been events were a staffer would come over and say yeah, we want to go ahead and let them in. >> again, that's not as much about the event but just somebody might come to the white house. again, congressperson or a friend of the family may come to the white house at some time during the day wanting to get in our officers will always call the appropriate people to find out if in fact this person has been invited. they may not be on the list, but clearly because of their friendship, because of their position, because that they are known to the family or that they do have a legitimate reason to be there, we're not going to turn those people away. we will work with a staff to make sure that we get those people in. i mean, i think we need to have some level of common sense you could argue that have a legitimate reason to be there. the staff wants them and appeared to have a meeting and they just somehow didn't get on a list. were going to ensure we get

those people through. >> i understand and a daytime setting, but in a larger venue event, and you would think that the white house he would be the easiest to adhere to those protocols that you talked about earlier. but as you mentioned, there are many venues away from the white house where the thought of somebody being awakened by a staffer is frightening. because we don't know who that staffer is and what their background is and what their connections may be. >> again, this would be, again, this is more the exception. it is for those people that we both agree is in fact that they should come in both parties have are both confident that that person should be. and if i gave the impression that we did this for parties or a state dinner, i apologize because that wasn't my intent. my intent is that there are people who show up at the white house on occasion mainly during the day, mainly for a business reason that if they need to get and we're going to work with the staff and were going to ensure that they are allowed to get in. >> i think ms. norton raise a good point a little