leadership lives in king continued to inspire and attract followers in funding. rolling back the taliban is now necessary even if not sufficient to the ultimate defeat of the al qaeda. at the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in afghanistan from the stability of pakistan, and nuclear armed nation of 175 million people now also implicitly targeted by islamic extremeness.

played with in a democracy, but there is that possibility that i think we have to recognize -- non-violent. >> i just want to say thank you for a thoughtful answer. i'm sure you would agree that we want to potentially minimize the feelings of the afghan people for extended presence there. i know you are aware that, but be so careful not to minimize the importance of that. >> thank you, and thank each of you for your service. i very much respect the positions that each of you hold and realize that there are no easy answers.

i know this has been very complex, and i know it is very agonizing to come before panels like this when you are part of the administration. i do hope -- and i see the chairman has left, but since this is so pakistan-centric, i hope that an patterson -- i know she is here -- will be made available and we will have hearings with her and others involved. my understanding is we are trying to set up mcchrystal and i can bury this next week. is that correct? >> that is correct, and we would certainly make any witness available. we might want to suggest that you plan a short, a public hearing and a longer classified hearing. i think that would be very useful to get out a lot of the issues that both senator luger and chairman kerry have raised. >> didn't have a classified briefing with the station chief in pakistan, and i think that

will be very beneficial, but you can make this decision. i hope we can at least have a public hearing with patterson, who is an outstanding ambassador and certainly knows what is happening in the area. you cannot help but be in afghanistan and know that part of what is driving what we're doing there is just the, the fact that we're there, and we are loath to leave before success, whatever that means. and the fact that we are trying to prove to pakistan and afghanistan's citizens that we are real friends. my point is that much of what you said, no doubt, is true, but there is an underlying current that creates an inertia, i think, for us to be there, and i know a lot of comments have been made about the fact that it is very clear what we're doing now. then maybe we were not clear in the past, and so there is no

doubt will not clear in the past. i have average intelligence, and i think it is still pretty unclear to me what we're doing. i know last march, the president announced a more narrow mission, supposedly. it was evident to me that it was anything but. on september 22, general jones came in and showed us the metrics used to measure what is happening. i do not mean to be pejorative, but it was evident that we were nation-building in afghanistan. the metrics there much layout and nation-building in afghanistan. richard holbrooke as a whole team of people that would call it a rebuilding a nation because he goes back in history to the times when afghanistan was more of a functioning country, but my point is there's no question that the metrics laid out in september were nation-building. i met with secretary gates, who might respect, at the pentagon, and we talked about a partial

nation-building, and now, we talk about coming home in 18 months with our troops -- i realize civilians will stay at that point in time, and i realize the coming home part based on testimony yesterday was really just throw it, to sort of a peace people -- throwaway comment to sort of a people who are nervous about the buildup. to me, it is not clear, and i think the american people, -- the civilian side in particular is going to be for decades -- the whole budget in a guinness and today is about $90 million. security troops we're talking about are about $10 billion a year. i wonder whether it would make sense to really lay of clearly what all of this means, that from the standpoint of support for the next several decades, the amount of civilian activity, and just from the standpoint of security, what we really anticipate doing

overtime. i know in 18 months, the buildup security-wise is going to be less than 400,000, but i know over time, at least unless it has changed again, that has been our goal between afghan police and army. i would say to you that it has been very unclear, and it has been like a sine wave over the last nine months as to what we are actually doing. i would love some edification. >> senator corker, i will do my best, and perhaps i could bring in some reinforcements on either side of me. first, let me just provide the context the best i can. in our view, looking back, we never adequately resourced the mission in afghanistan. that is just a fact. i think this committee's work in reports certainly give a lot of credence and support to that view. there were basically 30,000 troops for a number of years

with an additional, you know, 30,000, 40,000 nato troops, and we did not really have the kind of commitment that we were needing. we also transferred a lot of the assets that should have been used to support the troops we had in afghanistan to iraq. that is just the fact as well. when the president took office, there were backed up requests for additional troops that had been in the pipeline, and i personally know several of the people who were commanders on the ground in afghanistan going back to 2000. there were always additional troop requests, which, because of the move toward iraq, were never given what was requested. so that as part of the history. there was a pending troop request that the bush administration and secretary gates can speak to, that was

looked on favorably as they were going at the door. 17,000 troops. and then request the lead of president obama of 21,000. so right out of the bat, the president is given what is a 38,000 troop request, and he orders a very quick study at a very experienced intelligence professional headed up along with richard holbrooke and michele corridor from the defense department. as the president said when he made the announcement back in march, we are going to go forward with these troops. they have been pending. there seems to be an argument for them. our goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat at tight. we are changing commanders, something that is rare, but we are going to look at this again as soon as the election is over because the election season in afghanistan was taking hold.

that is exactly what we have done. unfortunately, the elections last a very long time, and so thanks to the chairman, we finally began to bring it to a conclusion. so i do not blame you, and i do not blame anybody for wondering where we are because of the history we inherited and our effort to finally make sense and rationalize what is happening in to put into an integrated civilian military strategy. one of the first things as it was i am confused. you talked about how and mr. lewis appears to be doing countries also want to 2005. it was the war on terror. then, suddenly, started hearing people in the government saying we did not need to kill some of the modern, and it did not know what that meant, so there have been some confusion, and this administration has been trying to sort through it, and we think we have got it about as right as

you can get. there is no doubt that putting these additional troops in in our mind is necessary to reverse the momentum of the taliban to demonstrate clearly to both the afghans and pakistanis that we are serious about our resolve to work with them to try to stabilize their countries, improve their security situation, and that we know it cannot be just a military undertaking, and that is why we are emphasizing the civilian side of it. ultimately, senator, we are going to have to maintain civilian support for afghanistan and pakistan going forward. we think that is in our national interest to do so. but i just want to make one final point -- the july 2011 date is the date on which we began to transfer authority and responsibility afghan security forces.

what we have tried to demonstrate is that the pace, the size, the drawdown is going to be determined in a responsible manner based on the conditions that exist at the time. and if things are going well, a larger number of forces will be transitioned out, and the afghans will be expected to take on greater responsibility. so it is not contradictory to set a date certain, yet conditioned on the reality that we confront at that time. >> let me just say a word. i know that it is time to move on, but first of all, one of my concerns coming out of the decisions in march was that it was clear they were interpreted as providing for full-scale nation building and creating a strong, central government in afghanistan >> greater than as with a metrics. >> -- >> as were the metrics.

>> neither of which was possible in the times are more sustainable, so i would describe in just a few sentences what i believe our strategy is today, what these decisions represent. it is to reverse the momentum of the taliban, to deny them the taliban, to deny them control of territory in

let's see where we are. we have a time constraint. we will see what we can do. >> thank you very much, and thank all of you for your dedicated service to our nation. we all appreciated. in 2001, every senator voted to go against those who attacked us using afghanistan as the base, and president bush in a lot of our views turned away from afghanistan clearly and toward a

disastrous iran war. many of us repeatedly urged an end to that war and a refocus on afghanistan. here we are many years later, and secretary clinton is explaining the results of that neglect. so far months ago, when our president asked for 21,000 additional troops for afghanistan, i supported that request. it was not easy for me, but i felt it was important to give him no chance to refocus. we also included in that request funding for the women there who have borne the brunt of the taliban. the president said at that time he needed those 21,000 troops -- now, this is just five months ago -- to "take the fight to taliban in the south and the east and give greater capacity to partner and train with afghan security forces." that is what he is saying again now. i agree with that mission.

so i voted. we sent 21,000 more troops, and here's the thing -- we are told since we sent those troops that the situation has deteriorated, and i would like to put into the record an interview with general mcchrystal in which basically, it said the taliban, the fight against the taliban has gone downhill, and that was since the 21,000 troops were sent. so i would ask you -- why did the situation get worse in afghanistan after we send $21 and more troops? i guess i will start with secretary gates. >> first of all, the full number of firms that the president authorized did not actually ultimately arrive in afghanistan until late summer, early fall. the marines arrived in southern helmand in july, and the reporting we are getting is that things have begun to get better

in the southern province where the marines are, as a part of it -- first of all, i think when general mcchrystal that his assessment, at least as far as i'm concerned, it was really the first thoroughgoing assessment in the field on how things are going since i became secretary in december of 2006, and i think what general mcchrystal found through doing that assessment and traveling all over the country and looking at the situation, was, as you have just cited, that the situation was serious and deteriorated. we got his report in late august, and, as you know, we have had this dialogue and effort inside the administration to determine what to do on the basis of that assessment, but fundamentally, where the troops have arrived, the situation has stabilized, and in some cases,

gotten better. what general mcchrystal basically has said, that has stabilized the other areas, where additional forces are necessary. maybe admiral will look like to add to that. >> before he does, i just want to put in the record that a gao study shows that as we added more troops, the violence actually escalated, and this interview by general mcchrystal was at the very end of september. admiral, could you explain -- here is what i'm getting. i voted with reluctance because i believe more troops would help our situation. we added the troops, and the violence got worse. now, we are being told we should add more troops. i guess what i am asking you is how can we now lead to the conclusion that more troops will mean less violence when the opposite seems to have occurred?

>> general mcchrystal's assessment, and i have to agree with the secretary of defense that it really was the first thorough, comprehensive assessment that i have seen from a commander, one. two is we talk about under resource in this campaign for a long time, for a good four or five years. seeing the insurgency just get worse, particularly starting in 2006, it has been very evident we could not resources and get the troops there because of our commitments to iraq, so it is where we found ourselves. i think the strategy that the president laid out in march is significant in many ways in that it focused on the region, not just afghanistan. afghanistan, pakistan, and india specifically. i have argued, and certainly, it has occurred, many months ago, that we need to have a national debate and discussion about this because i think that has been lacking because of our focus on what was the top priority for all of us, as directed by

president bush. so we are all learning as we go. >> i would like to follow it up, and ask you, explaining this information. as i see it -- and i know this is correct unless you disagree, that we had a 68,000 american troops on the ground. there's 36,231 nato troops. that is 104,231. there is roughly 94,000 afghan troops, and we will not count the 93,000 afghan fleet. we will leave that aside. that is 200,000 versus 22,000 taliban and 100 al qaeda. my concern is -- and this is why i interrupt you, just to get your focus on this -- it does not seem to me to be a question of the numbers of troops. it is hard to say that 200,000 versus 22 gotten is that different than 230,000.

it is the mission. i guess what i am trying to probe here is how are we going to change the mission from what president obama said when i gave him my vote for the 21,000 troops, which seems to me the same mission he is talking about now. >> 3 quick thoughts. one is as we add more troops, the level of violence is going to go up. it did in iraq. it will do that here as well. and i want to be very clear that a very, certainly, tragic part of it is so what our casualties. that should not be out of the site of anybody with respect to this. but it is the path to reduce casualties and a lower level of violence. secondly, mcchrystal has changed the focus. specifically, the focus on the key population centers. secretary clinton talked about reducing the number of civilian casualties. complete change in focus from a

leadership perspective. third, he has changed dramatically how we partner with the afghan security forces, which we were not doing before. we were mentoring and training. now, we are in a field with them, planning, living, fighting, etc. so those are fundamental shifts to get at achieving the success that i think is possible with these additional forces. >> i really appreciate -- that is the best argument i have heard, but i still have tremendous doubts about the numbers. i just think what you are saying we ought to be doing -- the last question has to do with our forces, who are incredibly stressed. this is the last question. divorce is up. suicide is up. psychological wounds. so my question that i really need to ask is we know some of our men and women are going back six or seven times. are you confident that we're no

longer declining service members who are currently struggling with mental health problems from their prior tourists -- toward -- tours? >> the only thing i consign in response to that as we are trying not to do that. we have put in place some very intensive screening processes. we have hired an enormous number of mental health care providers. we are trying to do everything we can to identify those who have problems to encourage those who have problems to come forward to get treatment. army leadership in particular has been very aggressive in this area. can i say with certainty that we're not deploying somebody who has severe problems? no, but i can tell you we're making every effort to avoid doing so. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you for coming in today and being engaged in this national dialogue on this important issue that we really

need to do. i view this really not as a republican problem or a democrat problem. this is an american problem. after all, we were all americans before we were republicans or democrats, and as polarized as this country is politically, this is an issue that we really, really all need to pull together on, and i appreciate coming here and engaging in this conversation. regarding president's recent announcement on strategy, i think that obviously, he has choices as the commander-in- chief, and i think anyone who knows anything about this issue has to be -- has to have empathy for what he went through in making this decision. this is a problem that one could characterize only as a barbecue on steroids. i mean, it has so many facets it is difficult to wrestle with.

-- a rubik's cube on steroids. the conclusion one quickly -- is there are no good choices. there are only choice is to be made that would be in the best interests of the american people. secretary clinton commented that we do not hear much about positives from there, and that is true. obviously, the media as much more interested in the negative, but our objective was to get al qaeda, al qaeda, slopes -- was to get al qaeda, stopped al qaeda, squelch al qaeda, and that really has been met. we have run al qaeda out of afghanistan. unfortunately, the taliban remain. the relationship that secretary clinton described between al qaeda and the taliban complicates the issue tremendously. the difficulty that we hear is

that al qaeda has now migrated into western pakistan, and there is a slow drip, if you would, of those people migrating into yemen and somalia, which is going to cost a problem in the future, i would think. but in any event, i think that is a positive that we should look at in the fact that we have driven al qaeda out of afghanistan, but we have to deal with what is left over. this is a question i have, hopefully, a brief question. as we build up now and afghanistan that the president has said we're going to do, and you look at what is happened -- what has happened in iraq, whether you agree or disagree with what we went there -- whether we should have gone there in the first place or whether the surge was good or bad, things off seemed to be generally better in iraq today than what they have been. when you went through this

exercise with any consideration given to stepping up the drawdown in iraq, as we build up more quickly in afghanistan -- that is, did you consider stepping up the schedule for withdrawal from iraq? can i get a brief answer on that? >> the answer is no. general odierno has a plan in terms of the drawdown to get our combat forces out of iraq by the end of august 2010 and all of our forces out by the end of 2011. he has found that the conditions, the improved conditions that you referred to in iraq have allowed for the withdrawal of at least one brigade, but that was based on a decision on the situation in iraq itself, so really are not in our discussions, either in the pentagon or in the interagency, was there a

discussion of a drawdown in iraq. >> thank you. >> if i could just add to that, in addition to the brigades, general od and has been very aware of the requirements for some of the key things -- general odierno. smaller things that he has agreed to transfer into afghanistan. so he has been very supporike@)"

have a commitment, and we are therefore the long haul, and yet, we say july 2011. we really need to be clear on this. the enemy is going to take the calendar out. they're going to circle july 2010 -- july 2011, and europe at that point. again, i know it is a difficult legal to thread because the american people, including myself, want to see success. they want to see us out of afghanistan, and at the same time, the people there have got to be convinced that somehow we are going to protect them if they cooperate with us. with all due respect -- and i don't mean this may be the way it is going to sound, but i heard secretary gates -- i heard you talk about a target yesterday when you were talking about july 2011, and yet, the

impression i got from the president was it is not a target as much as a hard date for starting to draw down. does two things are very difficult to reconcile. again, i am being critical here without an answer, but that is a difficult legal to the red, but you're going to have to do it -- that is a difficult needle to spread. >> through the course of the questioning yesterday, what i was trying to make clear is that the date of july 2011, to begin digging our forces and transitioning thin -- thinning our forces in transitioning responsibility to the afghanistan soldiers is certain, but the date of the drawdown in the pace will be conditions base and to use his words irresponsible drawdown as we have done in iraq. as i said in my opening

statement and secretary clinton said a few minutes ago, july 2011 is the time that the president has picked when we have to begin drawing down. let me just reiterate the balancing act -- the balance that we have tried to establish here. we are sending a signal of significant, i think, a commitment to be successful in afghanistan with the deployment of these additional forces. as i said yesterday, one of the things that became clear at the end of the surge in iraq was that the iraqis wanted us out of the country as quickly as possible. that is not necessarily the case in afghanistan. they live in a rough neighborhood. our sense is there are a number of afghans who like to have us hang around in united states army and marine corps and protect them for the indefinite future. so one of the purposes of this

date, an important element of it, is to put the afghans on notice and give him a sense of urgency that they must begin to except responsibility for their own security, and it will start then. they have to get them and recruited, get them trained, and get them into the field and into combat with us, so it is a combination of sending a message of commitment at the same time putting the afghans on notice that the time is coming when they are going to have to establish their own security or maintain their own security. >> i could not agree with you more. the sense of urgency really seems to be lacking there, and they need to be -- as the chairman said earlier -- they really need to have a sense of urgency instill in them. they think in terms of centuries. we think in terms of months, so it is a difficult proposition. >> can i just add one comment to that? this date has also been

described as arbitrary. it is not arbitrary at all. on the military side, we feel that that time frame between roughly july 2009 when the marines arrived at helmand and july 2011, we will know whether we're going to be successful not. believing this is the right strategy and we will be successful, we think that time the beginning to transfer secure irresponsibility in the transition is the right time. responsibly and based on conditions, but it was not an arbitrary date. it is the third year -- third summer, i if you will, that the marines will be our helmand. that will be three seasons at the heart of the fighting there that we will see which way this is going. >> thank you.

>> thank you. thank you all for your service to our country. i think we are all added debt of gratitude. i heard you say that the under the sourcing of our engagement in afghanistan over the last four or five years has brought us where we are today, so that, to me, means that our adventure in iraq has created a set of circumstances where we have under the space resourced our efforts in afghanistan -- underresourced our efforts in afghanistan. >> the party, the direction i had was to resourced iraq. we were bound -- the priority, the direction i had was to resource iraq. i look at this -- >> i look at

this date, and i see it as clearly as operational. i think we need to be honest with the american people -- clearly as aspirational. i think we need to be honest with the american people. can anybody tell me we will not have tens of thousands of troops in afghanistan years after that date? >> i think the president and we have been clear that july 2011 is the beginning of a process of drawing down in afghanistan. that process will be based on the conditions on the ground, but the president is very -- i think i speak for him, and secretary clinton can correct me if i'm wrong -- the president throughout this process was very concerned about an open-ended conflict of just unending commitment of significant numbers of troops and dollars in this.

so i think that he has not put deadlines in terms of when our troops will all be out, but clearly, he sees the july 2011, as i said in my opening statement, and inflexion point where we begin to draw down those forces in afghanistan, and with the view to transferring this responsibility to the afghans over probably two or three years. >> i appreciate that, and you have reiterated several times. can any of you tell this committee that after july 200011 we will not have tens of thousands of troops for years after that date -- after july 2011. >> i can tell you what the intention is -- >> i do not want to hear what the intention is. can you tell the committee there will not be tens of thousands of troops after july 2011 for years after that?

it is unlikely, right? >> i can only answer the way that i am comfortable in giving you the best information available at the moment, and that is that there is a convergence of opinion between us and president karzai in his second term. in his inaugural address, he said he wanted their responsibility and would be prepared for the responsibility within three years for afghan -- would bwanted and would be prepr the responsibility. and within five years, the afghans would be responsible for their entire security. that is his aspiration. happens to be very much in line with what we want to see happen. there will be, starting in july 2011, troops withdrawn based on conditions.

sitting here today, i would believe that we will be able to start the transition as planned in 2011. we also know that there will be probably for the foreseeable future a drawdown and transfer out of combat troops, but a request for continuing logistical support for the afghan security force. that is the kind of target that we are aiming at. >> is it true that right now the afghan army only has about 10,000 soldiers that can operate without its being alongside them? >> it is a small percentage. >> what we're talking about is a massive increase that we seek in the afghan army, which presents a daunting obstacle, considering the fact that a separate finding

sufficient recruits is a huge challenge, something we have not done in eight years, we will do in 18 months. and a large national army also requires a strong and capable central government to command it. when i hear these dates, i believe they are as solid as quicksand and at best as operational, and i appreciate the aspiration, but the reality is as someone who hasted count that money that will be coming forth, i cannot tell the people of new jersey or this country that we are doing it clearly on aspirations. i think we need to be more honest about our assessments. this is putting a lot of eggs on president karzai, who has been there since 2001, first as a transitional president and then as an elected president, and what has he presided over? massive corruption where

anywhere between 20% or 40% seems to be the going rate of skimming off the taxpayer money, where members of his family and members of certain ministers families of police seem to do very well in business transactions. the trouble to some of the best places in the world. they have bank accounts overseas, edberg we want to say that we are really going to condition them? i would like to see us condition their travel and their bank accounts to make sure we're not going to see the continued corruption. that is a serious effort. i look at president karzai when he makes his speech about his brother taliban. maybe there will be a day of reconciliation, but first, we have got to fight the taliban before they get to the point of reconciliation. they understand there is the need for reconciliation, but it concerns me we are putting our eggs in someone who does not even speak in terms of fighting

the enemy. the afghan police that is so rife with corruption and is cooperating with the taliban. i look at the disadvantage of having karzai there. creating opportunity for the afghan government to have the space and time to fulfill what is ultimately nation-building, we still will have the security issue at the concern that karzai does not perform 18 months from now. we still will have that issue. whether karzai performs or not, we will be stuck in that set of circumstances, and that is a real problem. i did not get a sense we have a clear counterpoint -- even general mcchrystal wants to know who is his civilian counterpart. finally, i get a sense that we have to pakistan strategy. we have been talking about

offering them a strategic relationship. they do not seem to want a strategic relationship. . >> and i know the last thing you

want to talk about is july 2011, but i want to focus on something. i have been impressed of what you said yesterday and what you said today with regard to this july 2011 date. secretary clinton said we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into the -- taking into account the conditions on the ground. tda'á,)rrrr

the july 2011 date said the president told me that it is locked in, there is no flexibility, and troops will be coming home. that type of statement is not helpful to that constituency being the al-qaeda and the

taliban, who do not need to be encouraged of a deadline that we will not go past. as we speak to our constituencies, the americans and the afghanis, we have to understand that we are also talking to the taliban and al- qaeda. i am not asking you a question. i do not want to put you between your testimony and robert gibbs, but i think that is the question that needs to be dealt with in delivering the message. two questions for me. on the taliban and al-qaeda, are we tracking their source of weapons? do we know where they are getting there -- you referred to the skill level of the

encounters we had most recently with them, which tells me they have both of the equipment and the leadership that they can fight a good battle. where is this coming from? is it coming fromrun, and we kn. >> thank you. >> there is going to be a vote in the next 10 or 15 minutes. >> in terms of the third question, i will leave it as an observation so we can move the hearing on. >> thank you very much. in addition to that, secretary gates has to leave at noon sharp. secretary clinton needs to leave for brussels, so we want to wrap it up if we can. >> chairman, i would be glad to stay. i am kidding. [laughter] >> we would have loved to have

had a second round, but this is going to be an ongoing conversation > i do not know why we have a hurricane above us today. >> we thought it was a senate bowling alley. >> i want to applaud each of you and the president every one that has been involved in the very thorough review in afghanistan. these are mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, and we owe them and all of the men and women serving there and mission that they can understand and

support, and i think it is appropriate that we continue to have a rigorous debate in congress and in the senate about congress and in the senate about what we are go) á/@@ @ @ @ ih @

guys to think differently about the future. this is really about getting the foot soldiers to decide that they do not want to be a part of the taliban any more. we have some very limited, anecdotal information about people deciding they did not want to fight for the taliban any more and going back to their villages. the key here -- we think there is some significant percentage of these foot soldiers who actually are doing this for pay or who have been contaminated in

doing this. if we can provide economic opportunities to create more opportunities for them to earn a salary, but the security piece is absolutely essential because there are too many stories of people who have wanted to quit the taliban that not only themselves have been killed but of their family has been killed. the security environment in a village or district has to be such that these people that want to put down their guns and pickup day plough can do so without the fear that they and their entire families will be massacred. this is a matter of establishing security and also a sense of more of a hedging on the part of the afghans because of the uncertainty. if the winners are the other

side, and they picked our side, they will be killed. they are waiting to see where the momentum is shifting, and frankly, it is this shift that we think is important and fundamental purpose behind this surge of troops to push the taliban back and to create an environment in which these people as they look at this situation in deciding which way to go, go our way, to the afghan government. >> i know you are on your way to a nato meeting. i had the opportunity a couple of weeks to go to be a part of a forum on global security with a number of our nato allies. i was impressed with the german minister of his willingness to look at germany's role in their nato mission. i just wondered what message you

are going to take to our nato allies to encourage them to talk to their publics about the importance of the mission in afghanistan. >> senator, we have been reaching out vigorously to our counterparts, certainly the president has spoken with a number of heads of state, the vice president, secretary gates, myself, national security adviser jones, and we have got a very encouraging response. secretary general rasmussen at nato has been very positive about the president's decision and has carried that message to capitals across europe. i think as the weeks ahead unfolded, there will be significant announcements of additional troops. our hope is that the aggregate of the troop announcements will be between 5007 thousand.

that would give us a lot more leeway -- our hope is that the aggregate of the troop announcements will be between 5000 and 7000. we are encouraged. there will also be an international meeting at the request of prime minister brown and chancellor merkle at the end of january, which is a very important event for our nato allies. i think we will see, in real terms, the delivery of the support that the president's decision has engendered. >> will your discussions also include better coordination of the different nato forces who are in afghanistan? >> that is certainly a conversation that we are in the

midst of. i held a meeting with about a dozen of the nato foreign ministers that were there for the inauguration. one of the points that i stressed is how we have to do a better job of coordinating our civilian aid, how we would like to see a counterpart to general mcchrystal. not all the members are in nato, so trying to structure this the right way is challenging. there is a great and growing understanding why we need to do a better job of the partners. obviously, the united states believes we have to play a major role in this because of the burdens that we have assumed, but we want the international support as well. >> i just wanted to urge a follow-up on what we heard from the senators, that the measures

of how we are going to determine success over the next 18 to 24 months, i think, will be very important to make sure we understand and the public understands what we are looking at the shows that we are being successful. thank you. >> senator casey. >> thank you very much and i want to thank secretary gates, clinton, and the admiral for at least two things. your public service at this time in our nation's history as well as the review that you just conducted along with the president which was both thorough and is central, contrary to some of the commentary around washington. i wanted to return to a topic that some have the explored to some degree already, and that is president karzai and his government. we have heard on a number of

locations, in order to get this right, and we have to get it right, you have to get the security it right, the government's part of this right as well as other development. to get government right, president karzai has to be a full partner in this. i was in afghanistan and pakistan in august, and i know when you are on the ground in a country for a couple of days, those few days it in any country does not confer on nations -- omnitions. in both instances, but more immediately or more urgently in august 2009, i came away very troubled by answers thafrom the

questions that i and others posed. i keep returning to this question, among others, when we analyze our strategy. i want to get a sense of, in a very specific way -- i know secretary clinton in your testimony said the afghan people of the united states in the international community will hold the afghan government accountable for making good on its commitments and the recent pledges. i want to get a sense of, and then you understand the importance of this, what specifically will we do to hold him accountable, both in personally but also his government? >> there are a number of steps. we have been working closely with the afghan government in support of a major crimes tribunal. we have enhanced our cooperation between law enforcement and

intelligence, fbi, dea, the department of justice, in order to clearly and unequivocally present evidence of corruption that we expect action to be taken on with respect to charging, prosecuting, and removing from office and seeking restitution from those against a case can be made. we are also working to certified ministries as to which will or will not receive money from the united states, and we want that to be a part of our overall coordination so that we can have an internationally accepted standard for transparency and accountability and these governments. we are working closely and encouraging the right decisions to be made about the members of the new cabinet, governors to be appointed, and the like. i would think that the

ambassador and other members of his team spent many hours every day in direct consultation and a conversation with not only president karzai but with others in position of responsibility. we are moving on all these fronts, senator. it is not easy. we think that our intentions are clear, and we expect to see progress made. again, i do not want to paint some utopia that we are attempting to achieve. that is not in the cards. the u.s. has been deeply involved in other countries going back 60 years which often combat troops on the ground where there was instability and fraudulent elections. you have to have a certain level of the strategic patients in order to see things through.

i think president karzai and his government have been under more scrutiny than probably most ever have been. we do a lot of business with a lot of countries that have elections with the leader is reelected at 98%, and we keep going. the difference is, we have our young men and women in a combat situation, and we have to expect more. the kind of efforts that proves successful in keeping with the national security needs of the united states. >> i want to commend the work that you have done and others. i know it is not easy. we are dealing with a sovereign government. there are limitations with what we can do. i wanted to raise another issue.

part of getting a ride in terms of governance would be, can we haven't impact -- can we have a positive impact on local leaders? one thing that was disappointing to me was that the two ministers that we met with, army and police responsibilities, were said to be and gave evidence that they are very competent and they have a lot of skills. we also met some capable local leaders. what is the strategy with regard to engaging local leaders and how does that factor into getting this government's peace right? >> from the time i -- from the

time of my conversation -- my confirmation hearings, my concern is that we were too focused on the central government in afghanistan, and the notion of building a strong central government in a country that never had one, and we were not paying enough attention to the local and tribal leaders and the traditional institutions in afghanistan. one of the tragedies is that many of those local institutions have been significantly weakened as elders have been executed and their authority under mind. the taliban go after them specifically. i think it really important part of the president's decision and our discussions7÷7÷hd@d@d@dhd÷÷d

when an area is ready, when the local forces are ready to assume their responsibility. but local charity forces and local governments is going to be a big part of that equation. the caution that we have is not to cross the line in reestablishing war lords and local militias that in fact are operating independent of the government, whether at the district, national, or local level. >> i am out of time. >> we have a grace period, as you know. if you want to truncate it did little bit, it is your choice. >> i want to thank you very much for rustling with one of the

most complex problems i have ever seen, and one of the most difficult because it involves lives of the best among us. i want to thank you for the infinite patience of rustling with us on this issue and the ability to do that. i cannot think of three people that i would rather see dealing with this problem than the three of you. i think the number one problem here, there are a lot of problems. the number one problem, do we have a partner in the afghan government for success proof that, to me, is the really key question. i spent time in afghanistan. there are a lot of other problems but that is the number one problem in my mind. one of the great things about the president's proposal, he gives me some hope that we can do something with the present

government. people came in and talked to me and said we should use our leverage against president karzai. i do not think we have any leverage until we set a date of when we can leave. i think it is really important. i want to make a clear to send a message to the afghan government. you have no doubt the president has a deadline of transferring troops out of afghanistan in july 2011. is that fair to say? is it fair to say to deal with the other problems we have, you have no doubt that we will not be adding more troops to afghanistan after this deployment proo? >> that is the commitment we have made to the president. >> this is not like comparisons with vietnam or like iraq. this is a firm commitment by the

president of the united states, agreed to by the strategic planners in our government, that in july, 2011, we are going to be withdrawing troops and not adding more. i think that is the only message to help the government be successful. i will yield the rest of my time. >> i want to thank you because i have to take off and vote. i really appreciate you coming in. i know it takes a lot of time. it helps the process work. we thank you very much for doing that. i wish you well on your journey. >> thank you to each of you for being here.

you have provided such extraordinary leadership to our country. i agree with my colleague that this is the most difficult issue that any of us can face. i would like you to touch briefly on the issue of al- qaeda. the last time we spoke, we talked about why why would you care if al-qaeda has a foothold in afghanistan. he provided a detailed analysis of why that foothold would be a launching ground for similar terrorist attacks like 9/11. the could pose a great security risks to the united states. what is to stop al-qaeda from moving to somalia or any other place? to the extent that you can talk about this on a non-secured basis, what are some of the things you intend to do militarily and in other operations with regard to other places that al-qaeda will create potential strongholds?

>> very briefly, as i said in my opening statement, the is the epicenter. -- the afghan-pakistan border. is the epicenter. it is where the planning and the inspiration -- certainly the inspiration, much of the training and planning for al- qaeda operations emanates from. wherever people have been, whether somalia, yemen, where the united states or the united kingdom, almost always the roots traced back to this border area. it is the home base, if you will, of this operation. it is interesting how other terrorist groups, including al- qaeda, gravitate and look to

that area for leadership and inspiration and to the legitimacy of their efforts in the context of terrorist aspirations. all i can tell you is that we are very aggressive in going after al-qaeda, and we have the authority of the president to hunt them down wherever in the world we find them. >> al-qaeda has a very deep roots now in this border area. they have operated in the case of osama bin laden in and around this area going back 20 years -- well, 30 years. they have a degree of protection from both the afghan side and the pakistan side. if you read the long articles

that david wrote when he escaped, there is a governmental presence in the on covered areas of pakistan that gives them every reason to believe that they are secured. it is not just one or more people picking up. they have extended families, networks of connections that would have to be disrupted. i do not see that it would be very attractive or easy for them to leave with a car. i am not sure there is any terrain anywhere in the world that is more hospitable for them. for all of those reasons, i think that is where you will find them. >> we would love to see them leave their. >> this would be seen it to

defeat the only remaining superpower. that is an inspiration for recruiting. it is an acceleration for global extremists' capabilities, and it is in the long run, what i worry the most about, if they are able to do that. even if they are more diminished -- but they are very deadly and they seek the same kind of behaviors. >> thank you for your testimony and your time. >> secretary clinton is aware that we have had a vote going on the floor in the senate. i want to thank secretary clinton and secretary gates on behalf of your patients here today and your service to our country.

we will stand adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2009]

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