of a mental journey to get there. but along the way in this book there are a couple of other messages about the female identity in this day and age. and how you kind of have to really push through a lot of things not to lose sight of this. . .

but the aim of the book is to inform public discourse. and so, it approaches these philosophers, not as, artifacts in the history of ideas but as participants in arguments in which we are still engaged. so a lot of the book, as bernie said, is about the contemporary moral dilemmas and political controversies that animate us and roil the public debate. the health care debate, for example. the outrage over bailouts and bonuses. the debate over affirmative action. the gap between rich and poor. debates about the role of the state vis-a-vis the

market. military con description. surrogate motherhood. a range of contemporary issues that raise philosophical questions the idea in the book as in the course is to persuade readers, students, participants in this enterprise, that the convictions and opinions we have, and we do care about these issues and we have convictions about them and sometimes we argue them fiercely, in politics. these opinions and convictions rest on, some of the big ideas about justice, and the common good that the fill loss percent have explored. so it is really an invitation to moral and political philosophy. an invitation to, or so i hope, to a richer, kind of public discourse than the one to which we've been accustomed. what i'd like to do this evening is to give you an

example. to start with one philosopher whose idea of justice i take up in the book, and to show how this philosopher's ideas, rumble just beneath the surface of contrary debate. to make the challenge, to change the challenge at its most difficult take aristotle. he wrote back in the days of ancient greece. the days of athenian. in many ways his ideas of justice is remote, strange and unfamiliar. these days we argue about justice, mainly from the standpoint of promoting the general welfare, what will create more economic growth, for example, or, respecting individual rights and freedom. aristotle had a different idea of justice. so let me start with a very short lecture on aristotle's

theory of justice and then we'll see how it applies. is that all right? [laughing] here's the lecture. according to arris to the he will, -- aristotle, justice means giving people what they deserve. that is the lecture. that's what he thought. now, you may say, well that's relatively uncontroversial. the real controversies begin when it comes to figuring out who deserves what and why. take the example of flutes, one he himself gives. suppose we have some flutes. we're trying to decide who should get the best ones. what would you say, what would be the first answer that would come to mind? with would be the just way of distributing flutes? >> [inaudible]. >> the best flute player. that's what arris to the he will also said.

here is slightly harder question, why should the best flutes go to the best flute players, do you think? what do you say? >> make best use of it. >> they can make the best use of it. what else? anyone? >> [inaudible]. >> -- enjoyment of the flute greater for all. >> that makes, right. if the best flute players are playing the best flutes that will make for the greatest enjoyment for everyone. that's a good reason. to give the best flutes to best flute players but it is not aristotle's reason. now, it's a good example after reason that is very familiar in contemporary moral and political argument. the utilitarian idea, the utilitarian says, justice means doing whatever will promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. the most enjoyment for, no

flute-playing. i remember this from when i went to hear, when my kids were in grade school, very young and go to the concerts and they play these plastic flutes, it sounds awful except when ire child is playing and then it sounds marvelous. so the enjoyment of everyone else is a good reason but not aristotle's reason for giving the best flutes to the best flute players. he had a different reason. maybe his view seems less familiar and accessible. anybody have idea, some other idea, some other reason for giving the best flutes to the best flute players? >> -- appreciate the good flute, the best flute player, one possibly appreciate the most best flute. >> he will most appreciate, he or she the best flute player will most appreciate and make best use of the best flute. that is aristotle's reason. which actually depends on a strange idea. the best flute should go to the best flute players because that's what flutes

are for, to be played well, by a virtuoso. now, this takes us really to the heart of what's puzzling and challenging about aristotle's idea of justice. to reason about the right way, the just way of distributing things requires that we first figure out what that good is for. what it's purpose, what is its essential nature. and closely connected to that idea, is the further idea that in figuring out the purpose or the point of a good, in this case the flute, is to figure out what virtues are worthy of honor and recognition. in this case one reason that the best flute player deserves the best flute, is that, musical performance is partly for the enjoyment of the listeners but it's also for appreciation and for honoring and recognizing

musical excellence. so reasoning about the purpose of the good is closely connected to figuring out what virtues are worthy of honor and recognition. that's flutes. quite remote from the things we most worry about these days. let's take a contemporary case. the case about golf carts. there was a disabled golfer, maybe you heard of him, casey martin? you remember him a few years ago? casey martin was a very good golfer. he was on the golf team at stanford along with tiger woods. they won the championship. but he was disabled. he had a very bad leg, a con againtal circulatory problem so walking a course for 18 holes was very painful and even dangerous for him. and so he asked the pga, the professional golfers association, to be able to use a golf cart in tournaments rather than have to walk. they refused they said no,

everybody has to walk. that is part of the game. he sued, under the americans with disabilities act which provided, it is a law of congress provided that public institutions had to make reasonable accomodations for those people who have disabilities, provided the accommodation didn't fundamentally alter of essential nature of activity. and he sued, it went, believe it or not all the way to the u.s. supreme court. this case about the right to the a golf cart. now, before i tell you how the supreme court ruled, imagine that you are on the supreme court, what would you say? how many, how many think he, how many would uphold his right to a golf cart, how many would say no, the pga does not have to give him the use of a golf cart. see what the opinion is in the room. how many say, he's got a right to the golf cart?

>> you want him to. >> you want him too to. you're the justice. you're deciding here. how many say no, they don't have to give him a golf cart? interesting. almost an even division of opinion. so let's hear from those of you who would say he does not have a right to a golf cart. what would be your reason? who will get us started? who will quickly give us a reason? yes? >> might be another forum for those with similar constraints. >> he can play. maybe you would have him go play in the golf special olympics something like that? yes? so he can play elsewhere, in golf attorneyment for those with disabilities. is that the reason most of you would turn him down? yes? >> game defined for people who walk. >> the game has been defined for people who walk the course. you are agreeing with that? yes?

>> [inaudible]. >> yes? >> [inaudible]. >> right. >> pga tournament. >> the rules set up by the pga determine whether you wan walk or not. and they said no walking. they said you must walk. no ride, no riding. yes? >> -- i'm not strong enough to hit a 300 foot drive, 300-yard drive, there for that is handicap and i should have some kind of compensation. >> you say you're not good at hitting ball. he is very good at the golf stroke you're saying therefore you should have some kind of, a motorized golf club or something? [laughter] now, let's hear from those of you who say he should be given the rights to a golf cart. what would be your reason? yes? >> getting from tee to tee, hole to hole is not the essential nature of the

activity. and even if a group sets up rules, it doesn't mean those rules are legal, or -- >> here we're talking about just. >> or just. >> right. okay, that's interesting. what is your name? >> [inaudible]. >> she says that it's not, essential to the nature of golf, walking part of it. what is essential to the nature of governor? >> being able to hit the ball. >> being able to hit the ball. >> yes. >> a long way and get it into that little hole. >> well, eventually to do that. you can't do it a long way, you're not going to be in that tournament. >> right, right. okay. so, now, here maybe we should ask if there are any golfers in the crowd? in cambridge, massachusetts we don't have a single golfer? all right. what's interesting here now, in the trial, a number of professional golfers, the

golfing greats testified. arnold palmer, jack nicklaus, tom kite. they testified because the question came up, what is the essential nature of the game and would allowing him a cart change it? and what do you suppose they said? what do you think? >> [inaudible]. >> they did, to a person they said, this would fundamentally change the nature of the game. it's too bad but he should not be given a cart. what's interesting about, even the discussion, a little disagreement we've begun here, is, that it revolves around what is the essential nature of the game. you notice that? is the essential, is it essential to the game, walking the course, having the energy and strength, not to succumb to the fatigue on a hot day of walking 18 holes, is that part of the game, or is that just

incidental? is the real essence of the game, the point of it, hitting the ball and getting it into the hole? and insofar the debate, i mean we just found ourselves having this argument, and the argument about justice, about a right that seems to revolve around a disagreement about what the essential nature of golf is, what is the point of the game. now what do you suppose the supreme court said, do you remember? does anyone remember? no, they ruled in favor of casey martin. they said that he did have a right to a golf cart, but, in making that ruling, the court's reasoning is very interesting. justice stevens wrote the opinion for the court. he said, we do have to look into what's essential to the nature of golf, and he looked up the history of golf. and he said, from the beginning the essence of golf has been shot-making,

causing the ball to move from the ground to the hole in as few strokes as possible. that is the essential nature of golf. now, there was a dissent. there were two in dissent. it was 7-2 ruling. one of the dissenters was justice scalia. and, he, he took on this argument about the essential nature of golf. in fact he challenged the aristotlian premise underlying the court's opinion. he argued that a game has no essential purpose. that was his argument. here is how he put it. to say that something is essential, is ordinarily to say that it is necessary to the achievement of a certain object. but since it is the very nature after game to have no object accept amusement, that is what distinguishes

games from productive activity, [laughter] it is quite impossible to say that any of the games arbitrary rules is essential. so said justice scalia. this argument of scalia seems to me flawed for two reasons. first, no real sports fan would talk that way. [laughter] to say that the rules of the sports we care about are merely arbitrary, simply designed to boost the ratings or to attract people to the stands, misses the fact that the players that we admire, we consider that they have certain excellence at certain virtues, worthy of appreciation, and admiration, otherwise it would be very difficult, if we thought it was all arbitrary would be very difficult to care about the outcome of the game. but there is a second reason. i think that his reasoning is flawed.

and it's that it misses the honorific aspect of this whole dispute. what was the dispute over the golf cart really about? on the surface it seemed to be a dispute about fairness. would the cart give casey martin an unfair advantage? but if fairness were the only thing at stake, it would have been an easy and obvious solution. >> everyone -- >> let everyone use a cart. but what is interesting though, is that that solution, leting everyone have a cart, would have been more anathema to the pga and to the golfing greats even than making an exception for casey martin. why? what was at stake for them? for the golfing greats? could it be that really what was at stake was whether and how their excellence as

great golfers are worthy of recognition and honor. let me put the point as delicately as possible. golfers are a little bit sensitive about the act let take status of their sport [laughing] after all, it involves no running or jumping, and the ball stands still. [laughter] no one doubts that golf is a great, is a game requiring great skill, but so is bill ards. compare the honor and recognition we as society accord to the very best billiard players, to the honor and recognition and esteem that goes to the greatest athletes. so it is understandable that for the great golfers, the game at which they excel, if it can be played by riding around in a cart, it would be very difficult to sustain the social esteem that goes with being, with excel at an

athletic event, rather than a game of skill like billiards. now this is to show the aristotlian, that airries to the he will -- aristotle had a point even remote to a concern about a golf cart. one final example to bring this out. consider the debate we're having today in states across the country about same-sex marriage. what is that debate about? let's start with the two main alternatives that have been presented in that debate. there are those who favor upholding traditional marriage. they say the state should only recognize marriage between one man and one woman. there are others who favor same sex marriage who think states should recognize marriage between same-sex couples on the same basis as

it recognizes marriage between a man and a woman. and we have a debate. mainly between those two positions. now, how does that debate proceed and what is, what are the stakes in that debate? well, first, let's see what the range of opinion here is in this room. just as we did with the golf cart. that was divided more or less down the middle. how many here favor position one, the state should recognize traditional marriage only between a man and a woman. how many take that view? [laughter] okay. anyone in the back? we've got one brave soul. and how many, how many favor the second view that says a state should recognize same-sex marriage? and is there anyone here who has a third view, different from -- >> there is a third view that all marriage performed by the state should being civil unions and that if people want to have a

religious marriage they should do that in addition. >> that's interesting. so there is a third possibility. which is the state should provide civil unions for everyone. the legal rights the economic rights, inheritance rights, hospital visitation for patients and so on. civil unions are domestic partnerships for everyone but no state-sanctioned marriage. marriage should be left to private associations to, churches synagogues, mosques and so on? >> if they want more than -- >> if they want more than a civil union. and that, so in a way that is, that that's, what is your name? >> marilyn. >> marilyn has an interesting suggestion. there is third possibility, essentially to abolish marriage as a state function and, another way of putting this would be to say, to say that marriage should be disis established. disestablishment of marriage as a state function.

leave it entirely to private associations or religious institutions. that is a third possibility. now one of the interesting features of the same sex marriage debate, as it has unfolded is that relatively few of the advocates on either side favor the third option, as the debate unfolded. in fact, it may be that the third option, disestablishing marriage as a state function, is a little bit like the fairness solution in the golf cart case. leting everyone have access to a golf cart. let me see if we can bring out why this is so and what light it sheds on aristotle's theory of justice. it would help if we could begin, if we can find one or two brave souls in the

minority in this room, who favor policy number one, state recognition of same-sex marriage. we need to get some reasons. then we can see what is at stake in the disagreement. what would be your reason for favoring traditional marriage? >> the thing is, i don't think science is fully clear on whether a person being gay changes and stuff like that. there is still some, there is some science on penguins which started gay and turned straight and stuff like that. and other thing is even if it is biologically different, there are animals which are gay, it doesn't necessarily mean it is just because, in the animal community, the nature, there is lot of other things that go on between, there is -- and stuff like that that we draw the line. >> why should the state or the political community recognize marriage, and only marriage between a man and a woman? >> the thing is, it has

worked for the majority of the people for so long. and, there is not a compelling reason to change status quo. >> you say -- >> nobody hates it or -- or something like that. >> okay. who would like to reply? why, center of same-sex marriage, state recognizing same-sex marriage, what would be your reason? go ahead. yeah. >> i think that the best reason presented has been that we are enlightened about the, what shall i say that sex is not so carefully defined in nature, including beyond human beings. and that people are born with this gender, kind of, that is to say, you are not defined by the sex organs and in terms of gender so much. and we're --

>> biological -- >> exactly. >> be more fluid than we sometimes think. >> exactly. >> why is that a reason to recognize same-sex marriage? i want to get to the institution of marriage. >> right. because those pairing are therefore then, natural. they're just as natural as the traditional. >> so part of the discussion, so far is about what's natural, what form of unions are natural. are there any reasons -- >> own way you can make children. only way you can make children -- >> is what? >> by having traditional marriage. only way you can create an entity. only way you can create human beings. you can not create human beings with same-sex marriages. >> so, it is procreation and child-bearing. therefore, what, and therefore you take the view that, -- >> traditional marriage is -- >> traditional marriage honors the fact that, for,

procreation, for the sake of prokeegs, and child-bearing, you need a man and woman? >> yes, sir. >> okay. so there's a, clear argument in favor of traditional marriage, being, available only to a man and a woman. let's hear, and what is your name? >> michelle lupier. >> michelle, let's reply to michelle's argument that marriage is ultimately about honoring and recognizing people coming together for the sake of procreation and child bearing. so who has an answer to that argument? yes? >> no marriage then would be allowed if you're past the procreation age. >> or if you could procreate, right? >> what is your name? >> sandy. >> sandy, challenges the view of michel, that

marriage is ultimately for the sake of procreation by saying by pointing to a feature of existing, the existing practice of marriage, the state does not require the man and the woman who want a marriage license to be capable of procreating, of bearing children, or of testifying to their intention to do that. and in fact, that was one of the arguments that was made in the massachusetts state supreme court opinion on the same-sex marriage case. much of the opinion revolved around this question, of, procreation. is procreation central to the purpose of marriage as a social institution? and chief justice margaret marshall who wrote the opinion, took the view, that procreation is not the only or the primary purpose of marriage because we don't require that as a condition

now. so that's, one response to the procreation argument. yes, what would you say? >> i would say that the argument is not about whether or not what nature, what the nature is of procreation or the nature of our biology. i say rather the argument revolves around the idea that nature, sorry, marriage for me, at least, is based around a devoted, dedication between two people. obviously that dedication relies not on which gender they are but rather two people committed to each other for their lifespan that is all that matters. >> mutual, lifelong commitment, love, dedication, that is really what marriage is about, and, same-sex couples are as capable of that as a man and a woman. and, all right, so, did you have something to add? go ahead. >> i'm unfamiliar with laws on marriage, my understanding if you're married you tend to get a tax break if you have kids and stuff, by being married alone. goes back to the whole

arguement for procreation purposes. why benefit people who are married with no children because because they're married with no children. >> good, good. what is your name? >> laura. >> laura. if procreation is real point of marriage, is essential to marriage, why do we give tax breaks and other kinds of benefits to married couples, who don't, who don't have children? all right, what this very brief preliminary discussion, of the ethics of marriage as a state function, brings out, well a couple things. one very interesting thing. before we knew it, in debating same-sex marriage, for and against, we found ourselves arguing what is the purpose, what is the essential nature of marriage as a social institution.

what is marriage for. and we had two views. the view that says, marriage is fundamentally for the sake of procreation. and child-bearing. and another view, that contested that account and said no, what marriage is really about a loving, life-long mutual commitment between the partners. now, which account of the purpose of marriage, you ultimately find more persuasive, has a large bearing on whether you think that justice requires traditional marriage only, or, same-sex marriage. echoes of aristotle. because as with the flute, as with the golf cart, so also with marriage, the just way of allocating rights, distributing access to a

good, seems to rest on some conception, and, we have disagreements. some conception. about what the purpose of or point of or essential nature of that social institution is. not only that, what about the third option? abillionish marriage as a state function. get the state out of business of recognizing anybody's marriage? that is a kind of compromise that some would advance in the name of fairness. just as some suggested in the golf cart case, let everyone ride in a golf cart, but as with the golf cart case, so with the marriage case, the reason i suspect, that that third alternative, in a way, i suppose you could call it non-judgmental alternative has not been embraced by either side. may have something to do with the sense on both sides,

that, marriage is, it is a kind of honor. when the state, what is at stake in which unions the state recognizes? it's really the question of what unions, what family units, are, worthy of honor and recognition, by the political community as a whole. there's a competition over honor in a way and recognition. which bears out aristotle's point, that justice requires figuring out the purpose or and or essential nature of the practice and closely connected to that enterprise, is asking ourselves the question and arguing about the question what virtues, what excellences, what social practices are worthy

of honor and recognition by the community? so, whether we're talking about flutes, or golf carts, or marriage, there is a certain applauseability in an idea of idea of justice on the face of it seems pretty strange and remote from temporary concerns. aristotle's idea to argue about justice is to argue about the purpose of social institutions and to argue about what virtues are worthy of honor and recognition. what is the point, stepping back now, even from aristotle, what's the point of trying to connect the contemporary debates we have, about health care and affirmative action, and same-sex marriage, and income distribution, what's the point of trying to connect them, to these, what the fist loss fers had to say about the meaning

justice and rights -- philosophers. i think it is this. the political debates we're having these days are not going all that well. most of what of passes for political deliberation and political discourse these days essentially consists of shouting matches on talk radio, or idealogical food fights on cable television, and, for that matter, on the floor of the congress. now, you might say, the reason that our political discourse is so partisan and bitter and devisive, is that we are bringing into directly into politics our moral convictions. and our rifal conceptions of justice and the good life. i think something closer to the opposite is true. i think one of the reasons our public discourse, our

political deliberation, is so impoverished is that we rarely articulate the moral principles and the moral ideals underlying the positions we take and even more rarely, do we listen, attempt tiffly, and -- attentively and engage with moral convictions of people with whom we disagree. i think paradoxical though it might seem, finding our way to a morally more robust kind of engagement about politics and about the ethical dimensions of politics would make our political deliberation go better, not worse. and so, while the book is, nominally about justice, it is also about, in a wade, about democratic citizenship. it seems to me, that if we are to revitalize and

reinvigorate democratic citizenship and political deliberation, to live it up from the shallow, bitter partisan, often empty kinds of shouting matches that we, we see all around us, the way to do that, is to recognize that all of us, each of us, as a democratic citizen, needs also to be something of a philosopher. thank you very much. [applause] >> questions? >> i would ask if you have a question, come up and step up to the microphone. i ask we form a line best we can going in this direction to my right. if you do have a question, please don't wait for the person at microphone to finish asking. we'll try to get a line formed as best we can, thank

you. >> what do morals have to do with justice? >> come to the microphone, please and ask your question, sir. >> -- speak from back here. >> okay. topic of justice came up recently for me, i wonder whether, you had as much to say about justice in the sense of, say criminal justice or retributve justice as some other matters. there are discussions on internet message boards on shoots in fort hood and orlando. i said at least the suspect, at least the perpetrators, were not killed, did not kill themselves and so can face consequences of their actions of the a lot of other people scoffed at this idea. seem just as well that they died. i said well, it seems to be a matter of justice they should face the consequences but i didn't know how to defend that view. so i just wonder, do you think that it's, that the

general idea that you were putting forward a moment ago, that people's positions on these matters, require a greater articulation of their convictions applies to the issue of criminal just as and retributive justice. and also if i'm not mistaken not as much of a topic in philosophy as red tribute tiff justice? >> red attributive justice is. you're right to address, debates about distributive contrary political debate but there are very strongly-held views of retributive justice including in the case you just mentioned. think of the debates we have, for example, about hate crimes legislation. should there be enhanced sentencing for those who

commit crimes against people in virtue of racial or ethnic discrimination? or discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation? that is a debate about the retributive justice. and, in fact, to go back, even to the formula of aristotle, that justice means giving people what they deserve, this idea can be applied not only in distributing goods but also in determining punishment. we are familiar with the common phrase, that the punishment should fit the crime. this idea of justice as fitting, in this case, punishment, to a crime, or in the case of goods, fitting rewards to virtues to achievement or contribution, is another instance of this fundamental idea of aristotle's that

justice means giving people what they deserve. it very much applies to retributive justice in the criminal law as well as to distributetive justice. so a good question. yes? >> i guess, two parts. what do morals have to do with justice, especially in a country which a lot of people come from different religious backgrounds. >> yes. >> a country about separation of church and state, how do you reconcile different moralities based on different religions when it shouldn't be part of the justice system?. >> that is a great and difficult question. whether it is true that we live in pluralist society where people have very different moral and religious convictions, and so, one approach to those, to that pluralism, would be to say, that when designing basic social and political institutions, when we're determining what the law should be, and we're identifying people's rights and duties as citizens, we

should set aside, and ask them to set aside, their particular moral and religious convictions. there is a strong tradition of liberal political philosophy that says just that. and, that's one of the ideas of justice that i explore in the book and i also in the end challenge. for a couple of reasons. first. it seems to me in many case, in many of our most fraught debates about justice and rights, it's not possible, really to be neutral with respect to the underlying moral and even sometimes religious controversies. take the abortion debate or the debate over embryonic stem cell research. is it possible to decide either of those questions without having a view about the moral status of the developing fetus in the case of abortion or of the early embryo, if in the case of

stem cell research? i don't think it is. when we pretend to be neutral say, no, no, keep moral questions and religious questions out of it, often what we do is decide the question implicitly resolving without arguing for the underlying moral question. and i think that generates a sense of resentment and bad faith because people feel that their moral and religious views haven't been listened to, haven't been attended to or engaged with. so i think it is better to address these questions explicitly in our public debate. difficult though they are. the second reason i think is that even where it may sometimes be possible to avoid, trying to take a stand, on a moral or religious conviction, to do so, can create, an emptiness, a moral emptiness, a void in public discourse, that i think is filled very often by the most narrow and

intoll rant -- intolerant moralisms. the worry by bringing morality and religion into politics we run the risk of intolerance and coercion. but i think that a higher kind of respect for pluralism and for the different moral and religious views that citizens espouse is not to avoid those differences, but to engage with them directly. i think part of the appeal of, barack obama as a candidate is that he acknowledged, gave a speech on religion actually just before he announced his candidacy, he said it has been a mistake for liberals and proguess i was to try to keep moral and spiritual questions out of politics and he pointed out that martin luther king, brought them in, hadn't always been that way. back to the abolitionist

movement. some of the most earliest effective abolitionists were evangelical christians who argued slavery was a sin. so bringing moral and religious convictions and arguments and reasoning to bear on political questions and questions of law is not only the province of the cultural conservatives or religious right, seems to be the case in recent decades. so i think that, that barack obama as a candidate was on to important insight. and i also think his ability to speak to broader moral and spiritual questions in politics answered a yearning a hunger, broad in the land for politics of larger meanings that engages more directly with moral questions. but it's a hard and very difficult question. thank you for raising it. >> you snengsed -- mentioned i think twice health care

just in passing today. to me the health care challenges, seems like a very complicated issue partly because the status quo is so entrenched but could you say a few years about justice dimensions of the health care debate? >> right. we haven't heard, we haven't heard a very sustained and strong articulation of the moral principles and principles of justice underlying the health care debate. and i think that's one of the reasons that debate has been so frustrating and, generated a lot of mistrust. very often the health care debate has been cast in terms of technocratic, arguments and reasons. i worried a lot over the summer when i was watching c-span actually, my favorite network [laughter] and, listening to president obama at a town hall meeting, and, explaining his health

care policy saying things like, we have to bend the cost curve in the out years. i heard him say that, i thought, if is talking that way about health care he is never going to rally the public to support this. his great strength, through the campaign had been the ability to speak to the moral dimensions of big public questions. i think when he went before the joint session of congress, more recently, in the last few minutes of that speech, the speech about health care, he read from a letter from senator kennedy, for whom health care was always a moral question, a right and not a privilege, senator kennedy said. and then president obama went on to speak in his own voice, acknowledging the principle moral argument against a greater government role in health care. having to do with a certain idea, and tradition of individual freedom, making, making it on one's own and

not relying on the government, and seeing this as kind of a freedom, individual freedom, not to be mandated by the government to buy health insurance. if i'm young and healthy don't want to. not to be required by law to pay part of my earnings to take care of other people when they become sick. there is an individualist conception of freedom that underlies that opposition to a greater government role in health care. and it should be addressed. and he addressed that and then he spoke about another tradition of to do with the american character, having, that involved recognizing our mutual obligation as citizens to care for one another. provide at least a decent minimum which includes, care, care for the sick. i thought when he shifted his political argument to the moral principles at

stake, as he saw them, that he got, he regained his footing. so essentially i think the health care debate is between those who have a certain view of individual freedom, that opposes, as coercion, government mandates. and, a conception of citizenship in the common good, that says, for purposes of health, we are all in this together. ill health is for the most part, not the doing of the personal who suffers it. and therefore. therefore we should appeal to common ethic or ethic solidarity as sometimes called to look out for one another, as obligation, one of the mutual obligations of citizenship. i think if we cast the health care debate in those terms, that it would not only make for a better set of arguments, but it would also be a moment of civic education. it would use the health care

debate as a moment of civic education in a way that we really haven't done so far. >> we have time for two more questions. >> yes? >> just want to ask you how aristotle would answer this solution to the flute. that the best players could make even fairly mediocre flutes sound beautiful, and that, you know, lesser players could become better by having really good flutes. that is one, and for the other argument, i thought you were to say but you didn't in terms of the golf cart debate, it was interesting it me that the focus was on the game, rather than on the human beings and what is the disabled person's life like and how do we as a society make it better by providing access? >> right. in the case of the disabled person, it's possible to, the pga could say to casey

martin, look, we feel your pain. we sympathize. we admire what you've achieved, go play golf to your heart's content. we bless you, using a golf cart but not in the tournaments for the highest honors. now, casey martin didn't want to do that. he didn't want to go to the golf version of the specs olympics. he wanted to play for the highest honors. that was the issue. so it wasn't a matter of making his life easy or, trying to alleviate his pain. he could play golf. the real issue is whether he would qualify for the hons norse which takes us back questions about dessert and what golf is really about at the tournament level. what about the idea, what would aristotle say to the idea that the best flute should go to the mediocre players because the really good players can make pretty good music even with a

kazoo? maybe they could, but, he would say, wouldn't you agree, take the example of a stratvarious violin. now, you would say give that stratvarious, not to, it talk perlman because he will play pretty well on ordinary fiddle, give it to my fifth grade beginner of violinist because he needs it more. you would say, well, there is something a little wacky in that because the not so good player is really not going to be able to realize the potential of the stratvarious. and realizing the highest potential is really what aristotle has in mind when he talks about honoring the essential nature of, in this case the muse call -- musical instrument. i think that would be his answer. i think if you consider the

stratvarious example, we would consider it kind of a waste, loss, failure of appreciation if that stratvarious went to some ordinary fiddler, or even to a wealthy think, might say, shouldn't it be bid at auction? suppose the auction were won by a wealthy collector who wanted to display the stratvir just on -- stratvarious on his man he will at home as a kind of a trophy. we would probably consider it the great vial linguist lost out to a collector. kind of wrong or injustice. why? why would we be uneasy? i think it has something to do with the intuition that great stratvarious is meant to be played by someone who can really appreciate it and bring out its fullest potential. i think there is something

in that. all right? one more. okay. >> thank you. -- justice is concept, philosopher ever dealt with. i wonder if the aristotlian concept, what observe as human nature or power of reasoning as is the case with kahn, trying to create universal concepts so everyone could reason the same? and we won't have this kind of different approach to it. >> right. you've brought in, a rival to aristotle's idea of justice tonight, you brought in idea of emanuel kant. brings us back to the introductory remarks of bernie steinering about. kant sees things differently. he thinks that the highest

principle of morality is, not certainly not to maximize the general welfare of the utilitarian would, but, or even to try to realize the good of a particular practice, like, sports, or musical performance. it is to treat persons as persons, as bearers of reason with respect. to treat persons as ends, not only as means. now, there are many cases where, aristotle and kant might point in the same direction. there are also cases where they point in different directions from morality, and for law and for the way we reason about justice. but,