>> they're either going to have to lower their lending standards or they're going to have to lower the interest rate at which it injured. >> and that's the key point. that it does it through the expansion of the money supply but that's the reason why i offered to warn the simple antidote over what happened over the last several years. the federal reserve set the overnight interest rate at 1%. that's impossible for a market

to ever believe in because it was beneath the rate of inflation. that would not be a market determine fortunate interest rate. the interest rate was moving the one-year rate and it was setting the very, very low adjustable rate mortgage rate. sometimes it does control interest rates at the short end but more importantly as my colleague pointed out it basically affects interest rates all along because of its ability to expand the money supply because those loanable funds weigh on the interest rate. >> to sum up, i would simply say my colleague, steve moore at the "wall street journal" that the source of the treasury department says they're printing money 24/7. literally 24 hours a day they're printing money. so somewhere we're going to see that show up in the economy. that will give you an opportunity to have a great debate about the fed's role and its mistakes. you should have two plans when that debate happens. plan a is what you may really want and plan b is what you can get. and it's prudent and rational

for all of you to want your plan a if you wish it but also to have a plan b in your hip pocket and we tried to provide both of you today. >> well, the timer has been flashing indicating that our time is up. so i'd like to thank our panel very much for participating, and i think it's been a very informative and lively debate. thank you very much. >> warren coats served with the international monetary fund for 26 years before retiring in 2003. he's currently director of the camen islands monetary authority and an advisor to the central bank of iraq. john fund was a member of the "wall street journal"'s editorial board from 1995 to 2001. and writes a weekly column for opinion journal. gene epstein has been a columnist for barons since 1993. he's the author of econo spinning how to read between the lines when the media manipulates the numbers. thomas woods, is the author of

nine books, including the church and the market. and the politically incorrect guide to american history. this event was part of freedomfest 2009 held in las vegas. for more information, visit freedomfest.com. >> a discussion now about the virtues and limits of political compromise. the carnegie council for ethics and international affairs in new york city is the host of this hour-long event. >> good afternoon. i'm joann myers. and on behalf of the carnegie council i would like to welcome

our members, guests and book tv. thanks for joining us. today it's our privileged to welcome one of the world's most renowned philosophers, avishai margalit. he will be discussing his latest book entitled, "on compromise and rossten compromises." these essays were originally delivered as part of the 2005 tanner lectures on human values which are given in recognition of uncommon achievement and are meant to advanced and reflect upon the scholarly and scientific learning relating to human values. when we talk about compromise, we often use this word to mean a meeting of the minds, striking a balance, finding a happy medium between two extremes or meeting someone halfway. however, you may choose to express this notion, whether as a verb or as a noun, you may find conflicting views of what the word "compromise" entails. in political life compromise is often used in the context of furthering one's goals but

knowing when to negotiate, when to be accommodating and when to resist can have far-reaching consequences. "on compromise and rossten compromises," the professor has turned spotlight on the morality of compromise. using a wide range a of historical examples, particularly those arrangements made with the great tyrannies of the early and mid-20th century he introduces new discussion. and when is it permissible and something when we should never permit even for the sake at peace and at what point does peace secured with compromise become unjust? at the center of this book is the tension. the professor writes that he is particularly interested in the moral status of compromise made for the sake of peace at the expense of justice. our speaker is universally respected for his analytical skills and moral acumen. he was born in jerusalem and began his academic career in the department of philosophy at the

hebrew university. since then he has been a visiting scholar at harvard, princeton and oxford and currently he is the george f. kennan professor at the institute of advanced study in princeton. as the author of several books, maybe some of you have read, the ethics of memory, the decent society, or occidentalism and it's on a range of political and societital issues and making a significant contribution to the normative debate on society. so he it is not surprising that he is one of the founders of peace now the israeli peace movement that has called for the recognition of the rights of palestinians to self-determination in their own state alongside israel. at this time i ask that you please join me in giving a very

warm welcome to a very special guest, professor avishai margalit. we're very happy to have you here. thank you. [applause] >> thank you so much for your generous introduction. on september 29th, 1938, hitler, mussolini and others met in munich and reached a agreement to transfer the land, a narrow strip of land populated by ethnic germans from czechoslovakia to germany. in return hitler promised not to make any further territorial demands on europe. in march 1939, the german seized all of czechoslovakia, the rest is history. horrendous history. the munich agreement became the

symbol of a rotten compromise, a compromise one should not sign under any circumstances. appeasement became the label for the policy that led to the munich agreement. since that agreement was perceived as rotten, the term "appeasement" went through a total re-evaluation. it lost its positive sense of bringing calm and peace and came to mean surrendering to the demands of a bully just because he's a bully. and an appeaser became a term synonymous to delusional. from churchill one who feeds himself to a crocodile hoping it will eat him last. but is the munich agreement the result of a rotten compromise? my answer in the book the munich agreement is a rotten compromise. but not predominantly because of its content.

if the content of the agreement is not shamefully rotten, what is? it cannot be the motive for signing the agreement that makes it rotten. there was nothing shameful in chamberlain's yearning for peace as a motive for signing the agreement. even churchill not a great fan of chamberlain recognized his sin seater and i quote no one has been more resolute for peace than the prime minister, end of quote. so the purity of chamberlain's motive for peace was never in dispute. the agreement cannot be rotten just because it was based on an error of political judgment. putting britain's trust in the hands of the serial betrayal. for that is an empirical blunder, not a moral sin. so what is rotten with munich pact?

my answer, the one with whom it was signed and not what was signed makes it rotten. a pact with hitler was a pact with radical evil. not recognizing hitler as a radical evil was an error on top of bad error of political judgment. it was bellini who brought up the topic of compromise and rotten compromise by conveying to me both a strong sense in the importance of the spirit of compromise in politics but also by conveying the formative experience of his generation, the munich agreement is definitive rotten compromise. we're discussing the swiss affair and i complained indignantly of the misuse of the munich agreement by paranoid

politicians, those who see chamberlain's umbrella the symbol of defeatism everywhere. bellini said that much and editing the story. the men were hitting fiercely on top of a whistling boiling kettle. what are you doing? i can't stand steam locomotives, but this is a capital not a locomotive. yes, yes, i know but you have to kill them when they're still young. [laughter] >> i suspect the often-used analogy is saddam is hitler on the tigris. as much as i want to use the munich agreement as the paradigm case for rotten compromise, i'm acutely aware of its obnoxious role in political propaganda. now, two pictures. the idea of political compromise

is caught between two pictures of politics. politics as economics and politics as religion. roughly speaking, in the economic picture of politics, everything is subject to compromise. compromise is not always desirable, prudent but it is always possible. in the religious picture there are things in which we must never compromise. the religious picture is in the grip in the idea of the holy. the holy which is not nonnegotiable. one could not compromise of the holy without compromising the holy. conversely in the economic picture of politics, compromise -- it's the heart of politics and the ability to compromise is highly praised. that politics is a compromise is a tired cliche.

it's based on the idea of ideas. the exchange leaves room for negotiation and where there is room for negotiation, there is room for compromise. compromise is an internal, central relation to what is exchangeable and divisible. economic picture serving as the model for politics make it seem as if compromise is always possible. not so with religion. true, religions by which i mean, religious institutions make political compromises all the time. they routinely develop religious techniques to carry out their compromises. but ideally, the logic of the holy is the core notion of religion is the opposite of the idea of compromise.

the two pictures, the religious and the economic, have two different sets of motivations to explain political life. the economic picture explains human behavior in terms of satisfying preferences. whereas the religious picture brings the willingness for self-sacrifice into the picture. a key mistake in political thought lies in disregarding the working of either of the two pictures. in the belief that only one of the pictures sustains politics. now, let me dwell on one feature of compromise, which bears on my concern with compromise. for the sake of peace. it is the element of recognition involved in political compromises. a clear case of a full-fledged compromise suggests rather than implies recognizing the point of view of the other.

compromise may be an expression of such recognition. it confers legitimacy on the point of view on the other side. full-fledged compromise may even involve a measure of give-up from the strong side, not driving as hard a bargain as it could to get what it desires. the point of such give-up is indeed to confer recognition on one's rival and to dispel an image of domination. by meeting the other party halfway, one may suggest a semblance of equality between nonqueues. -- nonequals. the practice of political compromise suggest that one key form of compromise takes place when one recognizing the other side is a legitimate partner for

negotiation. sometimes recognizing the other is a legitimate site for bargaining is hard than an armed agreement. the shining by the government of peru or the party in turkey as partners for negotiation is difficult for spain, peru and turkey respectively than any confession they may be required to make in order to reach an agreement. dubbing the other party as a terrorist organization is regarding them as an illegitimate partner. removing an organization from a terrorist list and making it one side of negotiation is usually a major concession by the party who converse legitimacy.

that the legitimatizing side expects in return a major concession by the former terrorist organization. compromise may take place in the way of recognizing the parties in the bargaining. recognize a mortal army is a legitimate party of negotiation may play a transformative role in humanizing the enemy and in acknowledging the enemy as holding legitimate concerns. it calls for empathy in an effort to understand the enemies ease concerns from the enemy points of view. it calls for empathy, not for sympathy, namely identification with the enemy's concern. so this is an element of important -- recognition is an important element of compromise. but what is a rotten compromise? i see a rotten political compromise as an agreement to

establish or maintain an inhuman regime. a regime of cruelty and humiliation. that is a regime which does not treat humans as humans. i use inhuman in the sense of extreme manifestation of not treating humans as humans. inhuman in the sense of cruel, savage and barbaric behavior conveys only one element of my sense of inhuman. humiliation is another element. humiliation in my youth is already not treating humans as humans but humiliation intensified by cruelty equals inhuman. so fusion of cruelty and humiliation is what inhuman regime consists of. the idea of inhuman regime as a regime of cruelty and humiliation guides my idea of rotten compromise. the basic things that we should

be aware of cruelty and humiliation. in short, inhuman regimes. many bad things pop out of pandora's box. in choosing inhuman regime among the bad things coming out of the box is the thing to avoid at all costs calls for justification. inhuman regime, erodes the foundations of morality. morality rests on treating humans as humans. not treating humans as humans undermine the basic assumption of morality. morality is about how should human relations be in virtue of being human and in virtue of being nothing else. morality by its very nature is based on the category of belonging to humanity. in the sense of belonging to the human species. assault on humanity by treating

humans as nonhumans undermines the very project of morality. the project of telling us how relations among human beings must be. for the sake of defending morality we end up with a stern injunction. rotten compromise must be avoided come what may. now a tough question. was the great compromise a rotten compromise? the institution of slavery is a case of humiliation and cruelty. slavery based on racism is double at fault. for one, it's degraded as a human being both on account of being a slave and on account of one's race. so let me deal with the compromises involving slavery as a test case for my account of rotten compromise as a compromise that consists in establishing or condoning the

infliction of cruelty and humiliation. it looks ridiculously old-minded for charge got king for adopting slavery some 4,000 years ago but there is nothing in old-minding holding jefferson accountable for his acceptance of slavery. abolition for him was a live option. the live option is not necessarily the preferred option. it is an option which is on the horizon of its members. especially, if significant number of members in the society or in the immediate vicinity opps for it. there's no question that during the formation of the union, abolition was a live option. in my view, a historical society is morally accountable relative to its live options. this does not mean that the

wrongness, say, of slavery is relative but only that the moral accountabilities so asking whether united states was founded on a rotten compromise in accepting slavery is not an old-minded question. the issue here unlike the issue in the case of the munich agreement is the content of the compromise rather than who signed it. as a matter of fact, the agreement was signed by exceptionally remarkable individuals. who were also many of them noble people. what enabled the formation of the union in the acceptance of the american constitution by its framers was that the connecticut compromise hailed as the great compromise. the two issues that the compromise was meant to settle were political representation and slavery.

the sticky issue for us is the compromise on slavery. slavery was recognized maybe succeeded in keeping the word "slave" out of the wording of the constitution. the constitution did not ban slavery nor did they empower the congress to do so. the importation of slaves was agreed to 1808. and the article is particular hideous it orders the slaves who succeeded in escaping to free states to be returned to their slaves owners. this was a situation that the fury abolitionists william lloyd garrison faced. and he said, the conflict exists between the north and the south is the same with death and an agreement in hell. for garrison the constitution was pecked with the devil. the rotten compromise if ever there was one.

garrison had the sublimity of language and the fearless of independence and the spiritual nobility of the prophet but was he right? was the union based on a rotten compromise enabling the constitution to be accepted at the price of recognizing the political order that the systematic cruel and deeply humiliating to a distinct group of people. the union was preceded by a great moment. forming a more perfect union. a political order that would not just be more efficient but morally better. even i as a child in a far-away jerusalem understood as we were reading in class the stephan bennett's classic the devil in daniel webster.

that when webster keeps asking from his grave, neighbor, how is the union? it was the echo in the belief that the union is something much higher than mere political arrangement. one can sell his soul to the devil for personal gain and still be defended by webster but no one can betray the union and be defended. was the recognition of slavery in the constitution a fly in the ointment, something that spoils but does not destroy the moral status of the constitution or was it a cockroach in the soup? something that destroyed the moral fabric of the constitution rendeering it rotten. my short answer, it was a cockroach in the soup. [laughter] >> for the more interesting and more nuanced answer you can read more in my book. [laughter]

>> now, for tension between peace and justice. the tension between peace and justice is at the center of the book. compromise is the go-between. i am particularly interested in the moral status of compromise done for the sake of peace at the expense of justice. how far can we go for peace by giving up on justice? quite a distance, i say, but not the whole way. this is the short answer here again my long answer is the whole book. declaring the two terms, declaring the two terms on tension is often a way of muddying the way the waters and declaring deep. tension between peace and justice needs elucidation. we tend to view peace and justice as complementary goods like fish and chips. whereas in actuality, peace and justice tend to each other as

competing groups like tea and coffee. the tension is due to the fact of the possibility of tradeoff between peace and justice. to gain peace we may be forced to paying justice. a former prime minister of israel and the hero of mined the reputation of being a relentless compromiser. that when asked whether he would like tea or coffee, he answered half and half. [laughter] >> the idea being that the spirit of compromise may blind one to the fact of competing goods from which one has to choose. the tradeoff between peace and justice is no laughing matter. it can be tragic. in the sense of these tragic choice pervades my book. so here is the telegraphic message of the book. on the whole, political compromises are a good thing.

political compromises for the sake of peace are very good things. shabby, shoddy compromises are bad but not sufficiently bad to be always avoided at all costs especially not when they are concluded for the sake of peace. only rotten compromises are bad enough to be avoided at all costs but then rotten compromises are mere tiny subsets of large set of possible political compromises. thank you. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> i invite you to ask a question but before you do, raise your hand and wait for the microphone to come to you and please identify yourself. >> james starkman. i happen to be a yale alumnists. i want to make sure there's no

compromise in your affiliation with princeton and harvard. [laughter] >> i'll give you the benefit of the doubt. in a nuclear age where peace is on the line, could one in any instance go forth the enforcement of a rotten compromise? and i think what comes to mind is mr. mahmoud ahmadinejad and the north korean regime who have a record of suppressing people. i'm dealing -- i mean, first of all, it's a really tough question. i deal with it but not is sufficiently. not well enough because it's really hard. and what is hard here for me is

the case of nuclear weapon is tacitly, at least, or maybe avertly is a case of coercion rather than a case that calls for compromise. i don't deal in what should you do in cases of coercion. by coercion i mean, when you get a threat and all the options after the threat are much worse than the status quo. nuclear weapon, having a nuclear weapon without even declaring it as a threatening thing has the potential of being coercive. so how to deal -- should you make deals with someone with nuclear weapon if the one runs an inhuman regime. and my answer may be yes. it depends really on the

nature -- i mean, the element of coercion and noncoercion. if it's coercive, you do what you do and i don't have a recipe for that. if it's not coercive, then you don't make a deal. so a great deal depends here on the facts, whether it's coercive or not and that's really a difficult case to decide. and in the case of mahmoud ahmadinejad or north korea, a great deal really depends on the facts. given the -- i was immensely always worried, i think, that pakistani nuclear weapon is immensely threatening to its neighbors and to -- i mean, it was spread -- i mean, by others. it has the potential to be. how to deal with it? very difficult to say.

really you have to -- you can come up up only with -- i can give you only -- i don't have a wholesale answer on a regular basis. just case by case. that's the best i can do. >> william? >> >> thank you. in keeping with your philosophical threat on compromise and tradeoff, there's a third word "concession." which word -- how would you use u$e unfolding consequences of our world? and how do you deal with iran or north korea or venezuela for that matter? thank you. >> concession is what you have an initial positioning in a bargaining and whatever you

renounce is a concession that you make to the other side. usually the other side tries to minimize -- you try to the concession and the other side is trying to minimize the significance of it and that's part of concession and part of bargaining. so concession is obviously part of the vocabulary of compromises. i don't use it that extensively, but it's there. now, the case -- i mean, the gain, what to do in particular cases as i said -- there we should really be very careful about the facts and just more rhetoric can be dangerous as it was in the case of iraq. namely blinds us from what actually happens. for example, iran is not just mahmoud ahmadinejad.

it's a very complex society. and i won't define the rules of the mullahs in iran. as an inhuman regime. i don't believe that's true. i think it's -- i mean, it's too trivial to say that i'm against it. but i don't -- that's in my vocabulary. i think now is the real turning point. what to do with iran, what to do with them? this calls for lots of full discussions and what are the options? what i tried to devise is a vocabulary and moral vocabulary to deal with the moral aspects of those. that's basically what i took on myself into account.

and maybe you're wrong in many historical judgments, factually wrong. the point is whether i provide the right vocabulary and not whether i give the right historical analysis. i may be wrong about what formed the union and what was the nature of the compromise there. what were the options there? but the point is the test for me is whether i provided the right vocabulary, the moral vocabulary, to deal with those questions, even if i'm wrong empirically, namely that i just got the facts wrong. >> do you see a distinction between a compromise and an agreement specifically with respect to the issue of agreements underlying requirement at least as i understand it of trust?

and trust being an element either in terms of the -- of morality of the bargaining power or the complexity of the bargaining power as is the case that you cited with iran? >> i make a distinction between anemic compromises and sanguine compromises. i was struck by one fact. the books that deal systematically and mathematically was bargaining. namely game theory. the word "compromise" is not there. and i was struck, how come? concession, yes, but not compromise. you would have expected it to be

part and parcel of the phenomenon. what they believe -- every agreement is a compromise. you start with -- you want to sell high. i want to buy low. and whatever we agree on is an agreement and a compromise between our initial positions and what we agreed on. and that's the -- that's the anemic use. what i try to describe is something more akin to our ordinary use of compromise, when there is a deadlock, when there is a real more textured and more sort of -- more structure to the phenomenon than just mere compromise. you won't say that if you go here and buy a pair of shoes and

agreed on the price that there was a compromise between you and the other. and when it's more series that we compromise. so agreement for me is the covering term for all the cases. the anemic and the sanguine. and i describe what goes into the sanguine case. one element that i describe here was recognition as an element of the sanguine case of compromise. >> could you discuss the religious and economic motivations in the compromise or some certain arrangement between the arabs and the israelis?

>> there are two conflicts. there's a conflict between israel and the arab states which is an ordinary conflict amongst states about territories, water, security. and that's more in the line of the economic model. and there is another conflict between israel and the palestinians. which is an intercommunetive strife, which is what is at stake is the community of the two communities. and, therefore, they use -- they make things holy or unnegotiable because they -- both sides

believe that it touches the very basic idea of the community. it's true that actually the word "holy" was actually used by president sadat in the knesset in his visit -- his visit to israel. he said the land of sinai is unnegotiable. that means it's holy land and you don't. now, you see, for example, in the hamas interview, they declare israel -- the whole palestine namely a religious endowment. religious endowment is not for goes. -- negotiation. you can make truth. you can make temporary ceasefire. you can make all sorts of deals in time but in principle you cannot.

and both sides, the israelis and not necessarily the religious. it's a fusion of nationalism and religion here, both sides, i think, create and change the nature of the conflict from a nationalistic conflict that still could be resolved in a religious conflict that would be impossible to resolve unless the two sides are too tired like after 300 years of religious wars in europe. then you just give up because you are too tired. but as long as you can keep the struggle, you keep. and i think there was a major change. it was a continuous change, but i think there was a constant change from a national conflict to a religious conflict.

national conflicts or all secular vision is usually goes by five years' plans. religious conflicts, the stake is much higher and the day of payment is postponed. and i think that's basically the perspective that now we face. and, therefore, to answer your question, yes, the religious conflict took over. and the religious picture of the conflict took over between israelis and palestine. i think very much. >> thank you. this lady over here. >> thank you very much. i'm from the czech republic. i have a question regarding a recognition, a recognition as part of compromise maybe.

among the european union diplomats we had a lot of discussion about recognition of hamas. like the election. but on the other side, of course, it is a terrorist organization. what do you think about this? it doesn't mean if you recognize a terrorist or inhuman regime or organization, will it become more human or less terrorist? thank you. >> no, i didn't say -- i mean, you don't -- i don't advocate recognition in all cases. it depends on what to recognize and sometimes the nature of the organization is such that there is nothing to recognize. namely, they disagree for what they stand for. all i said that there are cases when you can strike a deal and you can achieve something by

recognize. then don't make it taboo. as to the hamas -- the hamas is more complicated one. there's the outside hamas. there is hamas of the prime minister of the hamas in gaza. and there is the hamas of the military wing with others. and instead of answering your question, i'll tell you a story. and see if it works. when israel left gaza, two weeks

before arafat came from tukneesa to gaza. we got a phone call and i went to gaza to talk to the hamas people. i went with a friend. now i know it was a crazy thing to do. i was utterly -- but i did it. and i met the one who is now what is called the foreign minister. so he was a doctor. and we went to his house. we were well received. there were a few people there. from the leadership. so what's on? so he said, look, in two weeks arafat is coming and he's going to slaughter us. namely, the hamas, and we want people of good will to know about it.

all right. so i said it's a humanitarian appeal or there is politics to it? what's the politics, i said? he looked to me utterly mystified and said what do you mean is the politics of it? under islamic rule, you jews will be utterly secure because you will be protected by us in an islamic state. people of the book and you'll be protected because that's the islamic way so if you are worried about security you will be secure. he didn't hide anything. expecting us to slaughter him and yet when he said it, he gave the whole thing. i mean, the whole account. whether he represent the hamas or not, i doubt it.

he's an element, an important element. the hamas is more complicated and just to lump together all those three factions of hamas and take the most representative, that's easy for propaganda purposes. for politics i think one should really be more nuanced. >> thank you. at the end you say on the whole part of the compromise for the sake of peace are good things. do you mean peace in short term or in the long term? taking to account the irish treaty last century why we achieved some sort of peace the rest of the century there was not whole peace. and in a -- and just a quick question of kosovo is being

asked to compromise. can freedom be compromised on a return to oppression or do you consider that the word compromise. >> you ask me successful question. -- successive question and each one is a chapter in the book. it's as if you advertised a set of advertisements because exactly i'm dealing with those questions. i'm talking about exactly about compromise for the sake of lasting peace. and against the element and keeping the element as an option. and giving up namely even if you have just claims for territories or something, giving it up for the sake of a permanent piece.

-- peace. not about truth or ceasefire. and what is the difference and actually -- and obviously the case of kosovo was very much on my mind. so i think -- all i can say now is you have to read the book. [laughter] >> there's a lady -- yeah, you had your hand up before. >> i hope this comes out well. i'm from new york city. what i'm thinking of is the what and the who. and how you began. and what i'm thinking of is, how do we really ultimately appreciate who becomes evil and how they become evil? for example, when you open a question on the terrorist, for me they become a label.

it becomes dehumanizing? and how do we then recognize and deal with the sources, the history that makes the evil? where is morality? you know, in a sense i'm asking and where is -- where is justice? it's a hard and murky area to find the true cockroach. >> well, two approaches to morality. one the psychology of morality. one thing that morality is about shaping better human beings. working on the character. another is you should -- people don't have really characters. they don't have stable traits.

it's just a lazy way about talking about people. and what you have to shape is the environment in which they are. scandinavians may behave better not because they are a better people. they have a better environment. i'm all for the situationists, namely, those who talk about the environment, not about characters. sort of i didn't say that someone is evil by character. which of the third was evil? well, that's for shakespeare to tell. but most people are not of that kind. and actually it's an interesting question where people -- whether it's a coherent idea of doing something because it is evil. so even lucifer rebelled against god because he wanted to rebel, not because he wanted to do the evil thing. and that was a way of rebelling.

so i'm not assuming anything about characters or there are evil terrorists because they have this character or this suicidal or inhuman and whether or the others are civil. i don't assume it for a moment. what i do assume that there are different environments and what we should do politically is shape their environments so as to create better behavior. i use the word "evil" but not as a human trait or human character. but as a behavior. and i even tried to psychologyize hitler. >> matthew olson. i would find it instructive if you would revisit munich and whether it was a rotten compromise.

i follow your logic clearly but it seems to me that the party that paid the price of the compromise wasn't invited to participate in negotiating the compromise, which it would seem to me would indicate a rottenness. >> that's very true. and most of the compromise -- the rotten compromises are an expensive third-party. that's almost -- most cases. to hear it was the expense of czechoslovakia. they even came to munich and weren't allowed to participate or even present the case. so the compromise here was definitely on the expense of the third-party. and that's, i think, almost the usual case. but there are cases, of course,

of compromises which deal with only two parts. i don't know if that's what was your question or i missed something. >> yes. >> when you say -- >> could you identify yourself, please. >> mike. >> thank you. >> when you say "we should" could you identify the "we" and how do you go about accomplishing that happy state? >> well, the way you do, we the people. we the human beings who care about morality. we the human beings who care about decent behavior. it's that way. i mean, who i am to speak on behalf of anyone can barely speak for myself. it depends on day with you ask me the question. [laughter] >> but the "we" here is a fiction but an important fiction.

there was a minister in israel actually, a minister of education, a rather charismatic and he said i know that i'm crazy half of the week but i don't know in which days. [laughter] >> yeah, my name is mack de-ford. the question i have goes back to the slavery issue because a lot of what we've been talking about you have seen and i hope you won't get exception at this characterization but flexible. but the slavery thing -- you said because it's a moral issue, it's essentially nonnegotiable. is that what you mean? >> yes. >> suppose the issue had been well, we can't solve it now but the union is very important, so we will agree that slavery will be accomplished in 50 years. now, you would still have these people that are being treated in human fashion, et cetera, et

cetera, et cetera. what would be your position on something like that? >> i have a position and it's in the book. [laughter] >> no, no. no, no. it would be too cheap just to force to you read books instead of answering a straight question. so i'll answer the question. and the answer is the following: you can postpone and sometimes you cannot implement something right away. the point is what is the extent in which you can postpone a political solution? my claim is -- it's what i call the desert generation test. it's not i'm against moral feudal jame. this generation will pay. in your life you won't see justice at all. but the next generation we leave better. that was, i think, lenin's line

and sort of moral utilitarianism. there will be a great deal of light in the future, now it's dark. but that's only a generation that should pay the price. if a solution doesn't meet a generation, a prospect for a generation at the end of the generation, to have different life, then it's untenable. now, in the case of the american constitution, basically the idea was that in 1808, just about the end of my test, there will be a change. it didn't abolish but there was a change. so had they said at that time there will be an abolishment, then i can see a very strong case for the youth but that was the case.

so the main a point, is the desert generation. it means moses wasted a generation in the desert because they are incapable as slaves to go to the promised land but then the next generation will go to the promised land. it's all right for a generation, for you and me to tell -- we are willing to work and sacrifice our life for the better life for our kids. but it's not good for anyone to impose it on us. that's the claim. so if people -- immigrants come to this country and sweat in order to have better life for the kids, it's their decision.vx and it gives meaning to their life. but if it were imposed on them, look, you'll be oppressed but your children will have marvelous future, that's no good. >> last question, this young lady here. >> i'm samantha steinberg, sorry.

i was wondering what your thoughts were with regard to more national issues, particularly bad human rights and the -- one could say compromise between gay marriage one could say and a civil union? >> i don't have a theory of everything. [laughter] >> i have a view about the question that you asked me, about gay a marriage and civil union. i think the state has -- the state has nothing to do with marriages. marriage should be namely sanctifying relations between humans is a metaphor, i don't know, churches, synagogues. the church should only be for the civil unions.