my printer would not work. i am going to have to wing it to a certain extent. what i would like to do is talk for half an hour or so and open up for questions because i feel you all probably have a pretty good sense of what information you are trying to glean from this course. hopefully that will be helpful for you guys. i thought i would talk a little bit more about my background. professor griffin referred to it. i worked on the hole for 20 years and i'd never really started out thinking i would do that. up until pretty close to the time i left, i didn't have a plan to stay 25 years. i started out, got a master's in public policy. i moved to washington and worked

first for congressman durbin who is now the majority whip in the senate but at the time he had just been elected to the house in 1982. a very close election. 1982 you will hear me talk about a lot of political changes over the years and 1982 was one of those big political years, the first midterm election after president reagan was elected. the country was in huge recession in 1982. i don't remember the exact number but an incredible number of democrats defeated long-term republican incumbents in the house and they refer to it as the class of '82. congressman durbin was part of that class. ..

i went from the durbin office, i actually moved out to omaha, nebraska, with you i'm from massachusetts and had always lived in the east, so definitely a big change, but it was also fascinating. it was 1988 senate race, the incumbent was an appointed senator, the long-term incumbent had passed away and the republican governor had replaced him with senator david carn and

i was working for the democrat who ran against him, former governor bob kerry, and it was a very interesting campaign, i learned a lot about messaging and polling and, you know, what -- how to really get through to people and help them -- how to put things in a way that really resonates with people and helps them understand what it is you're really talking about. so he won, which was great, and then i came back to washington with him and i was his legislative director for about six years, which also, again, was fascinating. in that time period, was the first persian gulf war and he was one of the loudest voices opposing that war, and -- so it was just a very interesting time, sort of fashioning that position, working with him, you know, speaking on the floor, media, all that sort of thing. and he also was a very strong opponent, i don't know if you guys -- i hope you were born

when this happened, in 1989, i believe, there was a push to pass a constitutional amendment to ban flag burning, because there had been a couple flag burning incidents in this country and he was a former vietnam veteran, decorated war hero, medal of honor winner, had lost his leg below the knee and he came out completely instinctively in opposition to the constitutional amendment and i think made a huge difference in the debate, which was an extremely interesting and fun experience for me, because when you actually are participating in something that you feel like is affected being the course of affairs, it doesn't happen all the time but it certainly happened a number of times during my time on the hill. i'm sure pat has a billion examples he could give you of that. and i -- he also ran for president in the time that i work for him, so i took a brief leave of absence from his national office and went up to new hampshire and answered all

kinds of questions about his positions on issues that he probably hadn't really thought about, so when you run for president, basically everybody expects that you have positions on everything. and then came back to the senate with him and then left there in 1994, and went over and was senior foreign policy adviser for the senate democratic leader daschle and it was during the clinton administration, 0 a lot of what i did was helping explain his pol i -- the clinton administration policy on the hill, particularly in foreign policy, certainly not exclusively the case, but often, there is somewhat more deference given to the president in fashioning policy, so a lot of the work of the democratic leader with a democratic president obviously was in pushing you know, the clinton administration's initiative, and you know, trying to make sure that nothing got messed up, which sometimes, it was kind of

a tall order. it was a great job, it was fascinating, i got to travel a fair bit. i traveled with the leader a couple of times, and overall, it was a fascinating experience. i went from there and worked very briefly for the u.n. here in washington, one of their representational offices and then the election of 2000 happened and a whole bunch more democrats came in, and i endped up working, putting together a legislative shop for senator ben nelson from nebraska, which was a really interesting experience. he's a very different senator, representing the same state. so it was, you know, it gave me a really good handle on how members' personal differences and the way they approach issues can really, you know, have -- affect the way the office is structured, affect the positions they take and sort of the whole shooting match. and then i went from there to be

legislative director for senator tom harper from delaware, and he also was a very active, engaged member, so -- and that was also during the time, i don't know if you all remember this, but when it was -- 2001, when senator jeffords switched parties and at that time the senate had been 50/50, 50 democrats, 50 republicans, and because the administration was a republican administration, and the vice-president is the president of the senate, the republicans technically were in the majority, but then senator jeffords switched parties from republican party to democratic party, and when he did that, that shifted the majority, so that the democrats then were in the majority. 51-49, but as pat can tell you, because he was involved during these days, very difficult situation to maneuver and highly talk a little bit more about this later. the senate is much -- of much of

the work in the senate requires more support than 51. it is not just a simple majority. it ends up being you need 60 votes to do certainly anything controversial. and with just 51 democrats, it was tough, i think, for senator daschle, and the democrats in the senate to -- tech hi because they didn't -- particularly because they didn't have a majority in the house either, so it was tough to get things done and then be held accountable by the voters. so from the harper office over to help senator amy klobachur. and than in january of 2008, i went -- i went over to peck, madigan, jones and had a pleasure to work with a lot of colleagues i worked with on the hill.

it was one of those of things that, my background is a little bit different, i think, than the other mentors, both of whom have worked in the executive branch as well as the legislative branch. i had only worked in the legislative branch and worked for lots of different people over a long period of time, so i really had a very good, i think, sort of gut understanding of, you know, how things would work on the hill, how issues would proceed, you know, a lot of thoughts on strategy and that sort of thing, but it was applying it in an entirely different context. it was applying it outside of government, i worked for government my whole life. basically, you're running a business and you're trying to anticipate the needs of your clients, make sure your clients stay happy, make sure you can get new clients, you know, if old clients don't end up staying with you, so it really was a huge change and i think -- i've been there now about two years

and i think i'm finally getting to the point where i really understand you know, sort of in a way that it took me a while obviously to understand on the hill, how things work, what the, you know, rhythm of the work is, you know, how to actually get things done and how to have good ideas about what would actually work and what wouldn't. you know, i think i explained to a couple of groups yesterday, my groups, that one of our clients that we work a great deal on is an environmental defense fund and so i actually do a lot of work on climate change and so i have a real appreciation for the work you guys are going of to have to do in the next couple of weeks both on the pro and con side. edf is on the pro side, but it's -- being on the outside, i have found to be -- you have to have more -- it's called an outside game. on the hill, it's more of an inside game. you know, how do you generate

support for your boss's position, you know, work with other senate offices, other house offices, that sort of thing, whereas on the outside, it's -- i have found to me, it's a much broader picture. much better understanding of how grassroots and grass tops feed into issues, how coalitions work, and how effective coalitions can be, and i think that's particularly true in the case of climate change. there is a lot of strong support for climate change and there's also a lot of strong opposition and i would definitely suggest to all of you that you take a look at the major players in the outside world and how they've affected the debate and how effective they are or not effective. so anyway, it's been a fascinating experience. i'm a lucky person, and i feel like i, you know, now am really at the point where i can contribute and get a lot done. i thought it would also be helpful if i talked to you a

little bit, just because i was there for so long, about the structure of the house and the structure of the senate and how different they are and how that really feeds into really complex debates along the lines of climate change. the house, and i'm sure you probably all have a decent understanding of this, but the house tends to operate in a -- they call it the -- i can't remember who called it this, but it's the tee cup and the senate is the saucer that cools the tea that explodes over the top of the tea cup. the house often or can work very quickly. the majority party in the house is rolely this charge of the house. the minority party in the house does not have a lot of say over legislation that's going to be considered in committee, legislation that's going to be considered on the floor. the majority party in the house

has strong say over that. the speaker. miss pelosi has a great deal of say over committee assignments, which is an incredibly powerful position, because everybody wants to get good committee assignments. she appoints. members of the rules committee. and in the house, the rules committee is the committee that determines what form legislation will take when it comes to the house floor, and it's, you know, whether it's going to have a closed rule, which means no amendments will be allowed, whether it's going to have an open rule, which means any amendments can be allowed and there are modified which means certain can be allowed. and if you go before the rules committee and ask to have an amendment made in order and the speaker doesn't like your amendment, he's not going to make it an order. it doesn't make it easier. i certainly don't mean to say that passing anything in the house is easy, but it makes it

less complex in certain respects than it does in the senate to pass legislation and a perfect example i think is actually both health care and climate change, which have both already passed the house. the speaker had to deal with a lot of -- not divisions, but concerns within her caucus on both those issues, because note are both obviously incredibly sensitive issues. we talked yesterday about climate change, how it's a really tough sell for a lot of democrats, or said to be midwestern democrats, who have either coal industry in their state, or who have a lot of utilities that generate power with coal, so this speaker, who had actually a couple of years earlier, engineered might be too strong a word, but supported pa change in the chairmanship of the energy and commerce

committee, which is the committee that has jurisdiction over climate change, it was congressman dingle from michigan and he had been chairman for, well, ranking member and chairman for eons, i don't know how many years, and congressman waxman, the number two member of the committee, challenged him and won, and it was a vote within the democratic caucus, and you know, my guess is that he would not have won if the speaker had not been supportive of what he was trying to do. so he was chairman of the commerce committee, he bassically had to get together with different democratic members of his committee, because the republicans had made it pretty clear they were not going to support climate change, so he had to get enough support on his committee to get the bill out of committee and do it in a way that didn't create a long-term, you know, problems for passing the legislation through the house. so it was -- it was a tough job, and he has a number of moderate

democrats on his committee who are really concerned about the legislation, and he, you know, basically met with different groups, caucuses within his democratic members of the committee, cut deals, modified the bill in certain respects that address their greatest concerns, and it's a little bit like threading a needle, and he managed to successfully thread the needle to get the bill out of committee. he then worked with the speaker, the majority whip, and obviously other members of the democratic leadership in bringing the bill to the floor. again, you know, it took -- the big issue on the floor was concerns among democratic members from agricultural districts about how the bill would treat allowances, because they obviously wanted to represent the interests -- farm interests in their states and wanted to make sure that the legislation took care of that, so there was a huge controversy

and delay and then huge negotiations between the chairman of the agriculture committee and congressman waxman, colin peterson is the chairman of the ag committee and they ended up working something out to get enough votes to pass the house and they lost a number of democrats, but they ended up getting just barely enough to pass, so that's an example of how things worked in the house. it's culturally in many, many, many respects, the senate is very, very different. we joke about this all the time. the senate views the house -- or often views the house, an we definitely joke about this, as the lower body, and it's obviously not true, but the senate is smaller, it's 100 versus 435. staff tend to be a lot bigger in the senate. usually legislative staff, you know, for freshman members, they

tend to be five to six legislative of staff and as members get more senior, they acquire subcommittee chairmanships or committee chairmanships and the size of your staff grows. senator kennedy had an enormous staff, like 80 people or something, but he had been in the senate since 1962 or something, so over those years, he had put together a very large and very talented staff, so in the senate, climate change and health care are both good examples too. climate is going to be extremely difficult in the senate as all of you know. on health care, in certain respects, it was the same strategy as the house. figuring out ways to get bills out of the relevant committees, and then bring them to the floor, and you know, make whatever changes needed to be made in order to get the support, but in the case of the senate, it took 60 senators. now, this time around, there are 60 democrats. well, there's 58 democrats and two independents in the senate,

and so in theory, if you just look at it, it looks like it should be -- democrats should have no problem passing legislation, but in rehalt, the democratic caucus in the senate has very diverse interests, very diverse priorities, there are members who are up in 2010 who are very concerned about, you know, what the political environment is going to be like when they're up for reelection. the president obviously is up for reelection in 2012, so he has a different set of calculations, and you know, things that are important to him. so anyway, so it's -- the bill -- the health care bill in the senate, the two big committees were the finance committee and the help committee and the help committee, this past summer, was able to get a bill out of committee, but the really -- many of the most contentious issues, particularly the financing issues were in the jurisdiction of the finance committee and i'm sure you remember the talk throughout the year, there's this deadline, that deadline, to get the bill

out of the finance committee. well, it took a long time and it took a lot of negotiating, talking, you know, all that sort of thing, and the bill finally did get out of the finance committee, but even once it got out of the finance committee, there still was a need to put together combination of the help bill and the finance bill, which again, took a whole series of negotiations and kind of long and complicated discussions and even then, it was not 100% sure that the bill would have the votes that were needed. i'm sure you all remember right of before the holidays, senator lieberman saying he would not support the bill there were talking about and they made changes and then he decided he could support the bill. so in some ways it's similar to the process the house goes through putting together bills, legislation, but it's kind of an added burden because of the need to get 60 votes to pass

something in the senate. the maker leader in the senate has a lot of power, he has a lot of say over who gets on which committees, he has a lot of a -- he basically determines which legislation comes up on the floor at which time and he can have a great deal of influence over, you know, how to limit amendments. there's no rules committee in the senate, but -- ric very muce senate operates on the basis of unanimous consent. it puts the minority party in the senate much in play in a much bigger way than in the house, so senator reid, the majority leader has to deal and negotiate can senator m mcconnell on a regular basis to get anything done really and to determine what the business of the senate is going to be, what amendments are going to be offered, all that sort of thing, but basically they passed the

health care bill in the senate without any republican support, which was a very tall order and in certainly respects, a taller order now that they have to put the bill together, the house and senate versions of the bill and have it be something that can pass the senate, because it will be -- as tough as it will be to pass a conference agreement in the house, they have to get 60 votes in the senate. so changing it significantly now from where it will be somebody tough. i'm going to talk briefly about one example of my work on an issue that i thought has a lot of similarities to some of the work that y'all are doing, and then i'll open it up for questions. when i worked for congressman durbin, he was on the appropriations committee. democrats were in the majority, and it was 1987, i think, and as a member of the appropriations committee, members can offer amendments in committee that are

riders, condition funding in the bill, and he decided that he wasn'ted to offer an amendment to ban smoking on airlines as a way to raise concerns about second and smoke and how it was affecting the health of people who didn't smoke, and people who did, so anyway, he offered the bill and this was something that was not very welcomed by the leadership of the appropriations committee, so he offered the amendment in subcommittee and he lost. he offered it in the full committee and he lost. he went to the rules committee, asked to have the amendment considered on the house floor and the rules committee offered him the right to have his amendment offered on the floor and he and we worked very closely with a really effective coalition. it was the coalition on smoking or health, which was the american lung association, the heart association, we also work with the cancer society, and the group that we worked very

closely with, who were incredibly effective was the association of flight attendants and they obviously, as people who fly a lot on airplanes, were very directly affected by the second and smoke, and has congressman durbin used to say, the house of representatives is the greatest society of frequent flyers in the entire united states, so they obviously understood personally, in a way that, you know, not everybody would, what it's like to be an an airline and have somebody lighting up next to you, so we worked very closely with all of these groups. they mobilized their grassroots entities, they all -- who all were incredibly effective aft contacting people in their states, who then contacted their members and the tobacco industry, this is -- this issue, it happened -- took place such a long time ago, so things are very different than they are now, but the tobacco industry strongly opposed to this. members who represented tobacco industry strongly opposed this, and it was a huge struggle, and

he offered the amendment on the floor, we ended up winning by a very small majority, but i think it was really good example of how, you know, one member, pretty junior member really, working with a very effective grassroots coalition, with strong ties in d.c., and also we also had a very, very good piece of scientific information that, you know, a lot of times in debate, scientific information is used by -- the scientific information put together by one side of the debate or the other side of the debate, so it's sometimes -- it's questioned, whether you, know, -- whether the information is legitimate. we had a national academy of sciences study that pointed out all the health effects of second and smoke. it was a good study, it was really effective and national academy of sciences was very effective.

it was a piece we could write dear colleagues on, senator durbin lined up other people on the floor, it was helpful to have the support both in d.c. and both in the house itself and also in the states of all the grassroots coalitions. it was at the very beginning of my career, but it was -- it was a lot of fun and it was a really great example of, you know, a lot of hard work and a lot of skillful putting together of a strategy that ended up with a good result from our perspective, not obviously from everyone's perspective, so -- i know i had a lot house of representatives things in my notes, but i don't remember exactly everything i had put down. so why don't i open it up for questions an we can get into a longer discussion about you

know, climate change issue, our the lobbying world works, how the senate works, whatever you would like to talk about. >> i want to ask you a question. we've been talking a little bit about values and understanding your own values and how you work in the lobbying world. i'd like to ask you, if you wouldn't mind sharing, has there by any situation either on capitol hill horin your work as a lobbyist, where you have not totally agreed with the work that -- the issues that you have to work on? and if that was the case, how did you process that? >> or you didn't agree with or care about? >> i definitely -- i think i have been lucky in that the members of congress i've worked for and the people i work with and the issues that we work on in my firm, while they're not --

not all of them certainly are at the top of my personal list of things that i care the most about, i have not really been put in a position where i had to work on something that i have real qualms about. you know, if i had been on the other side of the durbin amendment, that would have caused me, you know, some very serious internal inconsistencies, but because i was on the side that i was on, it worked out very well for me. you know, there certainly were issues that i worked on over the years and you know, definitely issues that i work on now that i'm fine with. i don't disagree with the position, but at the same time, i don't, you know, if i were to create my own list of top five issues that i wouldn't want to spend every single minute of my time on, that wouldn't be on the list, but there definitely are a lot of issues that i get to work on that i to care about. climate being one of them. it's like a lot of things in

life. there's the really important parts to you and then there are the other parts that you do as good a job on as you possibly can, but they're not necessarily at the top of your list. so it's not -- it wasn't like i had to work on something that i felt immoral because i work on, but it's more trying to balance what i really, really care about and then what i'm also working on too. >> can you imagine how you would react that you would be asked to work on an issue you didn't agree with? >> i think it would be very hard. you know, i can think of a couple of examples of things if i were asked to work on, you know -- the way i hopefully have dealt with that when i was on the hill and now is by working for members with whom i basically agreed, and who are not going to take a position different than an issue that, you know, especially on the core issues, the core moral issues that make you as a person. this happens most of the time on the hill and sometimes people

make the wrong choice and work for somebody who is not basically where they are, sort of philosophically and politically and everything, but i was enough on the wavelength of these members, that that did not come up, but i do think it would be a very hard thing and i think the way that i was able to not have that happen was to try to work with members that i basically didn't agree with on every single thing, but you know, the general morals, the general views were -- my views were consistent with theirs, and you know, i think in my firm, because of the people i work with, and who were, you know, who were not the same as me but have similar views and priorities and that sort of thing, that that has not been a problem for me thus far and hopefully won't. but i think it would be very hard. i don't know how other people have answered that question, but i personally think it would be a

hard thing to do. >> one thing that is interesting is everybody has to fine their way and one of the things we were chatting about, if you anticipate that and know how you might react, it may not make it any tougher decision ultimately, but the processing might get a little easier. >> right. or just try to avoid it in the first place. >> that's thinking ahead. >> which is the key obviously. yeah? >> i'm curious, because of your extensive experience in washington and the extensive interaction you've had with lobbyist, how those insights have given you -- how those interactions have given you insights into personal lobbying? >> there are a couple do's and don't's i would tell you, having worked on the hill for the years i did and obviously met with many lobbyists over the years, the first thing is, it's really important to put yourself in their shoes and try to understand the pressures that they're facing, so if you are

trying to get a meeting, you don't want to get it, you know, wednesday at 10:00 a.m., insist on having it wednesday at 10:00 a.m., with their boss has a hearing. you might be more flexible and agree to do it on a friday, when oftentimes they're not voting, so it's not quite as frantic on fridays and when you get in there and sit down with a staffer, that you be concise is. you don't just go in there and wing it. i'm not a good example of that. but you go in there and you say, you know, this is why we asked for the meeting, we appreciate you taking the time and you know, these are our priorities and go through your priorities, and make a fact based argument, not -- i think moral arguments tend to work less well, my observation, and then the other thing is you always want to have a leave behind, that has your contact information on it, or the contact information of, you know, whoever the relevant person is, and basically, puts

down concise hi and clearly on paper what it is, you know, your basic message, what it is that you were trying to meet with them about, and -- because you want to make sure that they have something in writing, when you leave, that says -- sends the message you want to convey to them, and you know, nothing drove me more crazy on the hill than to be sitting in a meeting and have a long conversation about something that wasn't directly relevant and, you know, have the person appear to be disorganized or not have their act together. very frustrating. and then the leave behind i think is key and that's definitely something that sort of, in my position now, i try to adhere to all those rules and i also try in each instance to have a leave behind that is a good summary of what your points are and what your arguments are and what you want the person to take away from the meeting. it's key.

and respectful i think of the people you're meeting with and the client that you're trying to get the job done for and all that kind of thing. >> [inaudible] -- let's say an environmental bill like the climate change when it comes up, let's say you size up the terrain and you say, well, looks like we got 43 votes here maybe, pretty solid and we've got 25 fence sitters, so 18 democrats, 7 republicans. what would you offer to those sort of people to try to get them on your side? what would be appropriate do you think? >> i would either have to be chairman of a committee or staff of a chairman of the committee or the majority leader or his staff or the majority whip, but i think what you want to do is try to understand the pressures that they face as a senator from x, as a senator from missouri, or you know, a senator from

michigan with the car industry in the condition that it's in, and you know, the pressures that they're facing at home, and not -- i mean, i think sometimes there's a little bit of a tendency to just say oh, you know, he always goes with the republicans or whatever, he always goes with the other party or she, but i think effective leaders, both in committee and in the leadership have a really good handle on what is really important to different members. and what they really need in order to get a deal done, and you know, it's different for different members, and so that's why it's so -- that process that you saw senator reid go through in the health care bill is so complex and many layered and you know, it is so important that there be good communication between the leader and the individual senators and their staffs, to make sure that, up

know, there's a clear understanding of where each one is, but one thing about the senate -- the house is definitely this way too, but the senate is very -- because it's only 100 members, members tend, you know, particularly members who have been there for a while, they tend to understand intuitively, the pressures that members feel, the things that would be effective or not effective, in arguing or contending to them, asking them to do one thing or another. and that's what it really takes. it takes a sophisticated understanding of each individual member and what they need politically, what they need for their state, all that kind of thing and it's a very tough call, and you know, senator reid had a tough job there, but at least up to this point, they got it done, so you know, so it varies a lot, but it just basically takes a real understanding of what is needed to get a deal done and making sure there's good clear communication. and that's where i think elect

if i have lobbyists can come in too, because they want to make sure they understand, people who spend some time in the senate also have a good intuitive understanding of where members are, what it takes to do certain things and they can be helpful in that process as well. make sense? >> sure. >> rachel. >> in your work on the hill and the senate, what do you think is good messaging or bad messaging that has gone around with the climate change legislation, what do you see has been effective communications and strategies in messaging or non-effective? >> without telling you how to do your project -- i know, i'm teasing. i think on the anti-cap and strayed side, i think some of the messaging about concerns about jobs particularly given this economy, have been -- have really resonated with people. jobs and the difficulties that

businesses, particularly small businesses face in succeeding when the price of -- particularly energy intensive ones, when the price of energy goes up, and that's a tough argument, and it's a tough one to counter. there are counters to it. and -- but it's, you know, the bottom line is i think for a lot of members is that jobs are incredibly important, how the economy is doing and particularly as we come closer to the 2010 midterms, it's going to be really, really important. on the pro side, i think the biggest thing that has changed and really, it just -- it's like a sea change in washington, and i'm getting that pat would agree with me on this, and that is the change between the bush administration and the obama administration. i mean, president bush obviously had real reservations about climate change, there was lots of resistance to doing anything

regulatorily through the e.p.a. or c.e.q., and just generally a real resistance to addressing the issue and a lot of argument that it really wasn't a scientific issue, that there really is no scientific basis for climate change and then the obama administration came in and he campaigned a lot on climate change, the science evolved in the eight years that president bush was president, and you know, so there's a lot of great scientific evidence, not great, i mean, but effective scientific evidence now that it is really a problem, and i think also, the really effective work that was done in copenhagen and trying to get the chinese and the indians in particular on board, because that's a big argument that the opponents make, is that, you know, we're going to do all this, we're going to, you know, raise our energy prices, we're going to make it harder to do business

and then china and india are going to go take advantage of that and use that as a competitive advantage and we're going to lose more jobs, so -- but there are lots and lots of examples on both sides of effective messaging and ineffective and i think professor griffin will talk about that later. he'll probably give you a lot more insight into it too. yeah. >> we talked about -- [inaudible] -- if so, why and if you've seen advantages or disadvantages to that or not being a federally registered lobbyist and working through them instead. >> well, i've only been doing this for two years and in the two years i've been doing it, the rules have been very clear, so you know, there is -- there's really not much gray in what i do. you know, i'm a federally registered lobbyist, it's just

not worth remotely not registering, and you know, basically doing what the law tells you to do very clearly because it's the law, so i think that would be -- i think talking to somebody who has been in the lobbying business a little bit longer, because i've only been in since this most recent law passed and i think things have changed quite a bit, but i'm not the best person i think to talk about that. yeah? >> you referred to the bush and the obama administration. do you think that the obama administration and the democrats have spent too much of their political capital passing the health care and stimulus package to get another ground-breaking reform true when it comes to -- through with it comes to climate change? >> that's certainly the big argument out there, is whether the till is empty now and it's just not going to happen. i mean, i don't know the answer to that, you know.

with effective leadership, you know, if the economy ticks back up, you can make all kinds arguments on both sides of that issue and i think a lot of it is going to depend on leadership from the white house and i think if the president is determined and also willing to make changes needed to get something through the senate, which is going to take some serious changes, you know, and i think the group that's gotten together, senator lieberman, senator lindsay graham, and senator john kerry have really fundamentally shifted the debate in the senate and given it more hope than it had about. it was a bipartisan group, senator joe lieberman has been a huge supporter of climate change, so you know, i think that group coming together and you know, copenhagen, not being perfect, but you know, some positive results coming out of

copenhagen, there's a shot, but it's going to be tough. no question. yes? >> i'm actually really interested in this study that you used as a tool in getting the smoking on airlines amendment through. how do you go about commissioning such a study, how much does it cost, what is the time frame you allow for that in your strategy and how is that affected by the political environment, being in as much flux as it is today? >> well, we were fortunate in the case of the national academy of sciences study, because that just came out. i mean, we didn't commission it, they were doing a study on that issue anyway, and i think -- i mean, there are lots of examples in climate change of studies that are done by, pretty objective groups that point out some of the scientific concerns about climate change, so i think, you know, scientific studies, it definitely got more cynical over the years on that whole issue, because you know, there are lots of groups out there that have sort of, you

know, kind of vague sounding names that are actually very clearly on one side of the debate or on the other side of the debate. so i just think to the extent that you can get objective sources of information and use it in your strategy, i think that's the most effective way to do it. >> speaking from your experience on the hill, what are your biggest pet peeves about lobbyists and their interactions and when they come to meetings, what 18ers you the most about the -- 18ers you the most about the -- angers you the most about the way they interact with their members and staff? >> the things i talked about before, coming in, not being organized, not having your act together, that's probably what was my biggest pet peeve and i think also, coming in and making too many assumptions about where the individual member might be and how he or she might feel about something. i think you always want to come in, respectfully state your ca

case, you know, acknowledge that you understand there's another side to the issue, and do a good presentation and that does not always happen and i also think, you know, coming in and kind of moralize to go, particularly if it's not the position the senator or the congressman is taking, it's not great. yeah? >> in the area of climate change in particular, what do you think would be most effective, direct lobby, coalition building, media campaigns, and getting cap and trade passed? or is it a combination? >> all of them. >> it lies in the combination do you think? >> pardon me? >> to you have to have the combination? >> well, it's going to be really tough to get it done, so you're going to need all your ducks that you can get in your camp, you're going to need them all, i think. you know. and you need to be -- you knead to have an effective strategy and you need to be lucky, so

there's definitely some luck involved in all of it this too i think. >> would you say a person looking to get into the career of lobbying should have a few years of experience in order to be successful or can you enter the lobbying field without having worked on the hill. >> my own personal opinion, it's much better to have worked on the hill, because you have much more insighting in to how the process works and a much better understanding, you know, what pressures people really do fails, what's really not that big a deal, and you know, where you stand depends on where you sit and having worked for a member for a while, i think just really gives you a good understanding of the perspective that house and senate members take on issues, and what their constraints really are, which is not to say you can't do it, that you couldn't lobby not having

worked on the hill, but it gives you a lot more insight into the process working on the hill. >> what kind of -- what can you tell us, it's the main or most effective skill that you learned on the hill, that it's now serving you in your actual job and could you give us an example of it, that you apply this skill? >> yeah. i think the most -- to me, the most effective skill on the hill and this is true in many walks of life i think too, is just the ability to be resourceful. you're going to get curve balls thrown at you all the time and you have to just figure out, you know, how you're going to deal with it, you know, like, whether to compromise or whether not to compromise. and if you do compromise, how you shift your arguments in order to reflect the compromise. there just are lots and lots of examples of where you --

rigidity in general doesn't work out well in a legislative arena. i don't know if you agree with that, pat, but the ability to maneuver, be resourceful, come up with a new way to think about things. my former boss, senator carper used to say, no means find another way. you weren't always happy to hear as a staffer, but there's a lot of what it takes and there appears to be a lot of slammed doors as you maneuver your way through the process, but a big part of it is to look at that, analyze it and figure out where else are might be able to go and just be resourceful, which i have found to be incredibly useful in my current position and just in life in general. yes? >> all your experience on the hill, and years you have in hobbing, would dealing with members of congress in the senate and the house and trying

to lobby them or seeing as you were on the legislative staff, obviously every member is different, but could you maybe give one or two prime areas of focus that lobbying strategists would really focus on for members to get them for or against the bill? mostly the members who are persuadable, not the ones who have already made up their minds and like i said, every member is different, but maybe just one or two areas really to focus on when you're trying to persuade a member of congress? >> are you talking specifically about on climate? >> sure. absolutely. since that is an issue you know about, if you can there, that would be great. >> i think it's important when you're talking to members or their staff to indicate that you understand their state or their district, that you understand the different competing priorities, constraints, however you want to put it, and that you understand and you've done your homework and know where the

member has been in the past. and you know, what they've said and you know, what arguments they've made in the past. so that you kind of go to the table snowing all of that, having done your homework, and you know, having really thought through the most effective argument for that particular member, and you know, one thing i have definitely learned in my time on the hill is that it varies enormously from member to member. everybody is different and everybody has more effective ways to -- there are more effective ways to approach certain people than other people, and you think, you know, kind of going back to the resourcefulness argument, you sort of have to figure that out, and you know, oftentimes you're figuring it out as you go along, but there's a tremendous variation in personalities, in what's most effective way to present information, all that sort of thing, so you know, kind of either knowing the member or the staff, or, you know, having

dealt with them in the past often is very helpful guide to knowing how to present something. and the most effective way. yes? i'm curious to ask you, i guess, how your knowledge of the traditions and particularly in the senate have affected how you, i guess, go about lobbying now that you're outside the hill. >> well, i mean, i think, having done it for the time that i did, it just -- it kind of gives you an intuitive understanding of how things -- what's really going on, because often in life, hand in politics certainly and on the hill, there's, you know, what's in the paper and what appears to be going on and then what's really going on, and they're not always the same, so i think sort of getting -- having a gut sense of what that is and how you might, you know,

influence that, is i think a really good example of kind of the experience you have having worked on the hill. anybody else? >> yes? >> what was it like of a being on the hill for so long and being part of the in crowd, so to speak, and then being at the other end of pennsylvania avenue and now having to go back and interact with the same people you worked side by side with, but not as part of that crowd, and then having to ask them for information or whatever? >> yes. that's a very good question actually. and i actually worried a lot about that. i wasn't -- i wasn't sure how that was going to be, and i could, you know, imagine that that was going to be really frustrating, and you know, etc., but i think -- i mean, one of the things that you have on the hill and in life is your reputation and you want to strive to have a reputation as a

straight shooter, as somebody who, you know, was in it for the right reasons, who understands the process and who has integrity, and you know, hopefully that is, you know, that's what i try to do in my years on the hill and i think, you know, having, you know, done a decent job at that, coming out and actually working in the lobbying world, that has transferred fairly well and you know, i obviously have a lot, you know, my work friend are mostly people who work on the hill or who did work on the hill, so that, you know, i know a lot of people who are friends, and i have found that that's translated pretty well, although i was required about it. >> how important were those relationships, and is that part of why you said working on the

hill is more important kind of to do first before you move into lobbying? >> i think definitely working on the hill, you meet a lot of people and that's a very good and valid reason to work on the hill. i think there's an calmly vapid, if not -- or not valid, but important reason to do it and that's to understand the process, because there is no book that you can read or no person you can talk to, you can listen to me until i'm blue in the face, but until you do it yourself, it's one of those things, i definitely found that in life, certain things you have to do yourself in order to really understand them, and be effective at them. so, you know, it's the relationships, it's the people you meet but it's also really understanding the process. >> the strategy for our plans, we're trying to figure out how many senators were going to try to lobby.

in your opinion, would you say that it's in your experience, would you say that it's more effective to single out maybe a handful, maybe like five to 10 or focus on more, about 20, i mean, would you say that more intensive lobbying is more effective? >> i mean, i think you need to prioritize. but you're going to need a lot of support, so that's what you have to calculate, is you know, to a certain extent, this is a best guess, about who's in your camp now and who is on the fence, and who's pretty much opposed right now, but i think, you know, you're going to need all of them, so you have to have a strategy for each individual senator, and you know, in some it's going to beshoring up what they are most likely going to be inclined to do anyways, some is going to be addressing their concerns, but it's all a

priority. there's no room in this debate, you need 60. so it's a tall order. all right. yes? >> with all the advances in technology and the media, how do you think that's affected lobbying and what do you think is the best medium to go about trying to carry out strategy? >> well, first of all, i'm technologically challenged, but i will tell you, so i'm definitely not the best person to ask about that, but i think, mike mentioned this yesterday, the whole revolution in you know, e-mail, blackberry, all that kind of stuff, it's huge, and you know, definitely, i think sheila is going to speak to y'all next week and she works for an organization called one and they use facebook and all the new media formats very

effectively, i think, in their overall strategy, so she would be a good person to talk to about that. i mean, i understand obviously the important of direct mail and polling and you know, media advertising to the extent you have a budget, but there are incredible new technologies that really have really changed, not just the world of lobbying, but the whole world of law making, it's a lot different than it was. ok. how about start with you? actually, why don't we start with you. have you asked a question -- i don't think you've asked yet. >> i was wondering what you would do, if anything, differently now that you've had a little bit more experience, like is there anything in your past that you would have changed or did you get a chance to kind of fix that along the way? >> oh, man.

extensionial question. i think looking back on it, i am quite -- as i said, i didn't have a plan when i started out, it just kind of all evolved. but i think i have been fortunate in the way it did. i mean, the one thing that i might have done differently is maybe tried to go into the executive branch at some point, but you know, for a variety of reasons, i stayed on the hill and i think that's been, you know, that ended up being a good thing for me to do, but i think, you know, again, going back to the point i made about, you know, actually seeing how something works personally, being personally engaged in it, if i had worked in the executive, i would have that, an understanding in a way that i -- i don't have the kind of insider understanding of that that i do of the hill. so i don't really regret, but that would have made things different. ok, who else? yes. >> i'm not sure if you can answer this, but since you did work for senator nelson at some

point, is he one of the persuadables on this issue? and if he is, how -- what would you recommend and you know, in communicating with senator nelson, how you would kind of like him to vote on this issue? >> first of all, i would think a lot about agriculture and i would look a lot at how things -- his statement during the whole health care debate and just, you know, try to figure out what was, you know, where he really was, what was kind of strategic posturing, posturing is too strong a word, but you know, what ended up happening and what he said along the way, and just i think that's probably a good road map for how he tends to handle issues like this, which are incredibly difficult for him politically in his state, but also incredibly important to his party. yes? >> you mentioned being on and of off the hill, having inside and

outside strategies. as par of the outside strategies, it seems one of the most effective is grassroots movements and drumming up that grassroots support, and i think we saw that to a very large degree this past august, with regard to the health care debate, and it seemed that almost a grassroots movement nearly killed the discussion, a lot members were really worried about reelection, really worried about this grounds swell in opposition, however, we're sitting here now in december and looking at the president signing a bill before the state of the union address. what were some of the most effective strategies for democrats or those in support of health care to roll back that grassroots influence and to roll back those fears in the minds of members of congress in order to get us to the point now where they're about to pass a bill? >> that's a really good question. i think a big part of it was

augustnded and then members were not -- august ended and then members were not in their states and district having to do meetings and hear all of this information and i think also, i think the media did a pretty effective job at portraying that a lot of the efforts in these town meetings was orchestrated, that it wasn't sort of a spontaneous uprise, but there was orchestration behind it and i think, you know, and getting back to washington, getting back to work, you know, being able to more effectively stress the reasons are for supporting health care reform and the president engaging in the debate i think all helped get things back on track. you can't underestimate the importance of the president on a lot of those really big co contentious issues.

: >> we always used to comment that, you know, so many of the

health staffers were women. you can up with various theories as to why that is the case. also having worked in foreign affairs and national security issues it tended to be much more male-dominated. i don't know the statistics in the lobbying world, but my guess is that tends to correlate. people who have worked on a general set of issues in their lives in the government tend to work on the same issues when they get out, is my guess, but i don't really have any statistics. i did know there are more women than men. [inaudible] >> really? >> can i just follow up, do you feel as now being a lobbyist there is a level playing field with women as opposed to men, or is this the kind of an old boy's

back room? >> i guess the way of an answer that is i think i don't think there is an old boys' network like there used to be. in the time i have been in washington it has changed enormously. it is a lot more subtle. small things. like, you know, a bunch of men of going out and playing golf. women don't sent to play golf as much. that is something that a group of hill staff or lobbyists. so it is not like anybody is excluding them, but it is just more subtle and more, you know, not overtures, but things that happen. >> do you think about ways to compensate for that? >> yes. and i think a big part of it is because there are so many women now both on the hill and in the

lobbying world. so i think the best way to do that is, you know, with organizing in groups and doing things, groups make more of a difference a lot of times. a lot more effective. it is a group of women chief of staff and a group of women lbs. that is the thing. i don't really like saying we're only going to have one women or whatever. i've had this discussion with jonathan. i definitely don't think you need to by any means. it is a tough issue and one of those things that i think a pretty verybody will have to exe in their own way. and i think if you go in with a huge chip on your shoulder it's going to make it difficult. [applauding]

[inaudible conversations] >> and we will leave the last portion of this event. for updates on congress, the white house, and climate change legislation visit c-span.org. starting now on c-span remarks from joint chiefs of staff chairman admiral mike mullen speaking before an audience of college students about the mission of the u.s. military live right now on c-span. this afternoon conflicts that arise due to water scarcity and efforts to develop water resources. you will hear from members of the services group live at noon eastern on c-span. later today this photo of president richard nixon and elvis presley is the most requested photo in the national archives. we will hear from two people who were there when the photo was taken. see the program.

[inaudible conversations] >> a discussion next on expanding the u.s. south korea relationship beyond efforts to deter a north korean military strike. speakers discuss human rights, climate change, and other issues. from the brookings institution in washington this is almost two-and-a-half hours. >> why don't we go ahead and get started. i'm richard bush. happy new year to all of you. thank you for coming today. i am glad that i just had to come down a floor instead of coming across town. the weather is miserable. it is our great pleasure to have you here. as we look forward to a very complex and multifaceted world it is a worthy objective to

explore the ways in which the alliance can be adapted to new missions, and this raises questions of whether these new missions are a good use of resources, whether they will make a difference. and on that i am very pleased that scott snyder has taken the initiative to undertake this project and bring it to what is now a successful conclusion. that is enough for me. i would like to know invite scott to talk and the bit about the project and set the context for x t for this morning's discussions. >> thank you, richard, for your hospitality and co-hosting this with us and for your generosity to bring such a wonderful crowd

out. the u.s.-korea policy, this is our first major project. the focus and objective of our center is to promote new ideas for consideration by policymakers with the goal of promoting the effective development of a stronger alliance cooperation between the u.s. and south korea. to that and our first project has examined new areas of cooperation in the alliance. some of you, i think, were here in october at which time we had a first meeting of this project. we also had a series of presentations in november. essentially what we have done is to use a list of areas identified in the joint vision statement that was released last june by the two presidents in there white house meeting as a

litmus test for making an initial assessment about the prospects for expanded cooperation in range of areas that were identified in that statement. frankly, as you will hear today the results, i'd think, have been mixed, but i think it has been a very interesting exercise that has illustrated a whole new range of ways in which the united states and south korea may be able to cooperate more effectively with each other. i just want to mention the areas that we covered last october. we have presentations on pandemic diseases. we had a presentation on counter-terrorism corporation, and we had a presentation on space cooperation. then last november in seoul we also had papers presented on

naval cooperation between the yet states and south korea. we have covered the topics of peacekeeping. and our korea representative has written a paper on overseas development assistance. and then also we have commissioned a paper on u .s.-south korea and non-proliferation corporation. today we are going to be examining three topics together that i think each pose a separate but unique challenges to expanding a common vision. climate change, human rights, and posed conflict stabilization. the examination of prospects for u.s.-south korea corporation of climate change issues should provide a basis on which to judge the extent to which the alliance is equipped to engage in political and technical

cooperation on a non-traditional or human security issue. the discussion on human rights is a lens through which to examine front and center with whether the point vision statement really means what it says when it talks about corporation on the basis of common values and provides an understanding of whether or not it is really possible to extend the alliance based cooperation of the peninsula in ways that suits our mutual interest. i am grateful to each of our authors today and i am also grateful to you, the audience, for coming .. this symposium. thank you. >> our first speaker as advertised is professor heejun chang from oregon state university. you can speak from here or there, whichever you want.

i think you have the power point. >> thank you for introducing me. it was my great pleasure to see everyone. today i am going to talk about the climate change issues, why we should cooperate and how we can expand the relationship in the future. the last slide. okay. here is a brief outline of my talk. first time going to talk about the science of climate change, what is causing the climate change and why we should care about climate change. there are two different areas. one is private mitigation, and

the second adaptation. how they are different and how we can cooperate with each another in each area. and from there i draw some strategies, how u.s. and r.o.k. can make more closer relationship and finally draw some conclusions. this is a draft showing temperatures change in the past hundred 50 years. it has taken data from the u.k. from the 1850's to 2008. the blue indicated the temperature anomalies which average over. and the black line shows the temperature levels in korea. as you can see this is a departure from 1961 and 1990.

the temperature is appalling about 7 degrees celsius. in korea the rate is much higher. about 7 degrees celsius purse century. so it indicates if this trend is going to continue the temperature, in particular in korea there are some significant impacts. and what is causing the climate change, you can see the factors. the climate can change by nature. for example, the earth axis tilts and wobble changes. so based on the changes and exposure to a certain part of the sun changes. as a result the climate can shift. but also humans are contrary to the climate change.

the main cause of this climate change is increasing concentrations of green as gases such as carbon dioxide. and in these greenhouse gases primarily limited by a lot of human activities including combustion of fossil fuels as well as changes in land cover. the carbon can be released which will add to the concentration of greenhouse gases on earth. one so some people on the climate also has changed over the history of the earth. what is unique about the climate change, as you see from this graph their is a close relationship between the concentration of carbon dioxide and temperature. if you look at the figure you

can see since the industrial revolution which happened a round when 1750 the concentration of carbon dioxide has grown exponentially. so carbon dioxide and other in the ocean, the ocean or forests cannot observe additional carbon the concentration will increase. the lower diagram illustrates the process of greenhouse gas effects which says degradation and also releases an outgoing. but greenhouse gases are trapped. we irradiate heat back to the surface. that is why the lower atmosphere has warmed up in recent years.

so there have been efforts in terms of measuring carbon dioxide. the first figure shows the current concentration measured in a remote island in hawaii. they have been measuring since 1958. as you can see the concentration has risen from 315 to close to 400. you can also see in summertime when trees are full leaves the can at the sorbonne carbon. in winter when they lose the use the carbon is released. but the bottom graph shows the carbon dioxide concentration in korea. much of that increasing, eight years of data since 1999.

so this may be associated with them only what is happening in korea, but what is calling on an adjacent countries such as china because this garmin backside and pollutes may be transported. and this illustrates the close relationships between temperature and carbon dioxide levels since 1880. carbon dioxide concentration increases, the global temperature increases. there is some natural fluctuation. so a lot of scientists project what is going to happen in the future. the current car and backside concentration is around 375 ppm. and then if we continue the

current industrial economic the activities, the carbon tax the concentration could reach it close to 1,000 ppm. but we could also have different scenarios based on whether we introduce more efficient energy. so this is based on all these different economic and social development scenarios. a picture is taken from the report based on three different set of climate change scenarios to illustrate the high scenarios and low emission. and so the source of energy which means that you have both fossil fuels and also more clean energy.

it shows the changes from extreme events such as precipitation intensity which is measured by the amount of precipitation / the number of precipitation days. all increases and the future as we continue. the impact of these changes are not spatially the same. for example by highlight the pacific u.s. where i live. you can see the precipitation intensity is going to rise. this is based on nine different climate change models compared to the previous which is 1980-1999 and what is going to happen by the end of the 21st century. at the same time the number of dry dates will increase as well.

you can speculate. you have a very heavy torrential rainfall date. in the meantime more dry days. although the been condition may not change necessarily the more extreme events are likely to happen. but notice that the impacts on each region may be very different from one place to the other. that is by rear need a spatially explicit climate impact assessment. so there are two areas we can conceive what his client mitigation and adaptation. mediation is you can reduce the source. for example, you control the power plants one and ask them to use more clean energy or you can introduce a hybrid cars or electricity cars. at the same time we have to conceive the adaptation, which means we have to change the

human behavior or any ecosystem and they have to adapt to these changes. they now have to accept we have to live with water. so you can see how people have to live with water rather than try to combat with floods. but also most to migrate to other areas. so i identified these five different areas in terms of how the u.s. and r.o.k. can make a strong collaboration. i will discuss these one by one. so the carbon trading and how

these two countries have been implementing carbon trading. we can conceive carbon trading at different levels. we can first conceive a federal level or the central government level expects, the state and provincial level in korea, and the local. example in the u.s. in 2009 the u.s. climate action partnership, they recommended we have the national cap and trade legislation which still has not passed at. and r.o.k. in the meantime just released this news last week, they have been trying to implement a pilot carbon emissions trading system, which will be launched as early as late 2010. at the same time the mainstream economy, they introduced a cash bed system. so basically the consumers or

private industry which reduced the emissions. in the u.s. that have been some midnight agreements established in ten northeastern states from new hampshire and maryland. but interestingly from states like west virginia or pennsylvania, there were not part of these partnerships. they have a lot of power plants. one of the leading states in terms of reducing greenhouse gases. they also pursued the global warming solution act. and in korea there were over 100 municipalities that participated in the carbon coin system which

was introduced in 2008. basically if consumers use less energy compared to the previous period they can give some credit back. so they can get either cash back or some gift cards. so the difference between u.s. and r.o.k. is basically the u.s. is primarily lead by the state level. the state has economy and then you can make some changes. in rok it is driven from a top-down approach. and still more tested, some very fast movements of private-sector because they can make some profit as well. the second figure illustrates some image consumption rates by

type. about 7%. out of that the biomass is a major portion of this. but in korea the renewed energy is less than the u.s., which is about 2%. about three-fourths of them are coming from waste. so both countries have ambitious goals. the u.s. department of energy announced they are going to reduce our 50% of total electricity coming from the window will energy by 2030, but also the rok government announced they will use 6% of total energies by 2020 and they will address a five-year plan. at the national level the u.s. environmental protection agency also created some stood climate energy programs.

a relationship between the federal government and 16 states. and also in the obama administration they introduced the loan guarantee program. and the korean government have been searching for new sources of renewable energy, particularly since 2008 when oil prices skyrocketed. they also trying to introduce some incentives to private sectors. this is also part of the package. and so they also introducing more foreign investments from u.s. companies such as j.p. morgan. collaborate with other developing country such as indonesia in terms of biofuel generation. at the state and local level once again the u.s., the state

has an autonomous power. they can develop their own clean energy plan. some requirements for new construction. they attempted to do the first in korea, and they also have some plans. they are going to reduce more renewable energies. they will increase the portion by 20%. and also because of the compact nature of the city development they can use some building materials to generate some energy as well. and the other area we can also consider urban spacial structure, urban development. so we need to consider the different history of the development in both countries. the u.s., most cities are less than 200 years of history compared to correa, much older cities. for example, the city of seoul

has more than 600 years of history. you can see the urban development, people have to travel a lot. you may have to commute more than 10 miles one way. but the inner-city has a challenge for the nearly development. so in the past there was some vacancy in our cities, but nowadays people try to use this more wisely. in korea there are new towers surrounding the city. there is a new urbanism. they used energy and water and smart growth. they're going to make their neighborhood more levels of that they can work around, shop, and

talk with their neighbors more closely. one thing you notice in korea, a very well-developed public agitation system of subway and public bus and they also have some bus. you're not allowed to enter that land. in terms, and urban planning is mostly men aged at the municipal level or the city level. basically this city can do what they want to achieve. and so there is a trend for the more intensive development. some u.s. cities they implemented. as a substantial decrease in travel. so he need to elaborate this more closely, but also have new

plans. and in following also the ministry of land and transportation in korea now say they want to be more energy-efficient and urban planning. they use zero energy construction. they regulate energy consumption for all the buildings. so as you can see the transportation sector is one of the leading causes of greenhouse gas emissions in both countries accounting for over 20% of emissions. so there are two different strategies. one is you have to reduce the travel and increase the renewable sources of energy. so both countries introduced the hybrid car approaches.

they have similar tax rebates. we have to encourage the public transportation system. when they construct new roads or bridges they can use more eco-friendly technologies. so basically when you want to implement any transportation you have to have a land-use planner. and can absorb more than 10% of carbon in both countries, and we have to provide financial incentives to preserve these trees. in the u.s. department of agriculture they can buy farms and pay for the farmers to preserve the land. so there is a growing concept of how we can make payment for these ecosystems services, which have been developed by environmental economies. and where are the most

appropriate places to preserve these lands? this is one of the questions we have to address. and also we have to consider the forest may have some changes, particularly more drought and severity among forest fires. we have to consider these potential changes in climate change when you make plans. there are some areas we can incorporate in adaptation. so one way we can do this, we have to make more decentralized system of consumption and production. maybe people have to produce their own food or locally rather than importing foods from a distance. and we also have to consider preserving these natural lands, particularly maintaining

ecosystems. they can mitigate. they have to maintain those lands. and then in terms of the implementing adaptation is the local level. at the municipal level they can make a change in more dramatic ways. and the citizen participation is crucial. scientists have to communicate. so one can conceive with alliances at the municipal level, maybe between u.s. and korea. they can exchange some ideas and technologies. so i want to draw some common areas that we have interest. the first, we can provide more incentive. we have emissions. unless there is some tax credits it may be harder to implement this. also safe and convenient public

transportation system because people will travel more. there is no doubt about that. and also we have to continue to invest in renewable energy and consider more compact and development. at the municipal level we can also provide more specific adaptations strategies, what each city can learn from each other. there is also an increasing city alliance in the u.s., mostly supported how each municipality can adapt to climate change. some this is a general level of how we can make this tighter within the u.s. and rok. not only business, but

government. without communication between these two it might be hard to implement because associated with economic security and eventually he and security. we can also, many different strategies working at different levels. as you can see the one strategy might be the most appropriate. the other thing is we have to also consider what other countries such as china and japan and these countries are doing. there has also been alliance established between japan and korea and china and india. so we have to consider those other corporations as well. so thank you. [applauding] >> thank you very much, professor chang. i am sure that your presentation generated a lot of questions, but i ask you to hold your

questions. you will have probably a full hour to get, here for you. our next speaker is peter beck with the walter h. shorenstein center for asia-pacific research. peter. >> i guess it is very appropriate they will have a picture of polar bears behind me while i am doing my presentation. i had forgotten how cold it can get here now that i am out in california. i want to congratulate scott and richard for putting this program together and tell them what an honor it is to be the weak link in a strong chain that they have put together of papers on areas of corporations that we don't

typically look at when we think of u.s.-korean relations. i think this is a project that takes out of the box of issues we should be concentrating on. one of those issues is human rights, something that gets a lot of attention in our press, gets a lot of attention in the korean press, but often there is not much we can do about it. we are certainly not doing much bilaterally. so there is a lot of area for potential cooperation. as scott mentioned, in the joint vision statement at that hour to presidents agreed on last june here in washington there is a statement, we will work together to promote respect for the fundamental human rights of the north korean people. it is a fairly short document. they said this, but it is not clear what they actually intend to do in terms of cooperation. as you may know, we have a new

special envoy for north korean human rights, robert king, who is going out to seoul next week. we now have a full-time envoy, and i have every expectation that he will do a wonderful job. he has a big job because i think almost everyone agrees that his predecessor was an unmitigated disaster. not only was he invisible most of the time, but then when they did get the attention it was not so much for american human rights, but criticizing the bush administration's approach to north korea. but i think we are definitely making progress in the right direction. south korea has a human rights envoy. north korea has a human rights envoy. they never met before. one of the challenges that we

have faced is that we had for the previous ten years until 2008 liberal governments in seoul. liberals take this very critical approach of focusing only on human rights in south korea and virtually no attention to human rights in north korea. they are silent on the issue for a variety of reasons. and at the governmental level as well there was a reluctance to take up the human rights issue and abstain from both the united nations. and there is this fear that by pursuing human rights and raising the issue to promenade that it would bring a chill in north-south relations. and that is still a concern today. as you may be reading about rumors of the north-south summit that could take place sometime this year, i am sure that human rights will take a backseat in any public discussions that the korean government has.

but i think we do have real areas for potential cooperation because i think we have two presidents that take a fundamentally similar approach to human rights. my paper is looking at human rights more broadly, but i will focus my discussion on north korea this that is the area where i think there is the most potential for cooperation. if we look at the position of the two governments on the dali lama, for example, of both presidents making decisions to not meet with them for fear of upsetting china. that there is a recognition that global politics and international security and national interest takes priority sometimes over human rights as much as we may think that there are important. we have to try and negotiate with north korea. that has to take priority over pressing human rights concerns.

so i think that, you know, with governments with fundamentally similar world views, particularly when it comes to dealing with human rights and human rights in north korea i think there are great areas for cooperation. unfortunately, when we look at the experience in south korea and the united states, south korea remains very polarized on the issue of human rights. you have liberals remaining largely silent on the issue, and it's conservatives that take up the cause of north korean human-rights. here in the united states i would say it is increasingly becoming a bipartisan issue. particularly with the passage of the 2004 north korean human rights act. it was a unanimous vote, and it was renewed again recently unanimous once again. so there is no real fundamental

difference with liberal and conservatism in the unitd states when it comes to human rights. so it is certainly more possible to work more closely together. and really this was impossible until we have the election of lee myung-bak as president. as human rights in north korea remains a polarizing issue, besides impeding past governments in south korea on the left have relied on two main arguments to justify their hands-off approach. one columnist insisted that he had too few facts about what was happening in north korea, that he really couldn't write, which i don't find very possible. and also the second is the fear that raising the issue will make

negotiations, north-south reconciliation impossible. and the second justification that the government used quietly was that, look, all of our project, economic projects with north korea are a trojan horse. the way we are going to bring about changes to economic engagement. it is not beating a drum. it is finding areas of cooperation. industrial complex, improving the lives of north koreans, exposing them to south koreans and the rest of the world is really the way to bring about change. so those are the arguments that you saw most commonly used as to why the south korean government could not raise the issue. lee myung-bak has change that approach. and for starters the mandate of the national human rights commission, which before the government-funded national human rights commission could not to work on north korea. and now they can. amnesty international even has a

seoul branch. they have done zero work on north korea, which is really quite amazing. now the government is looking at this issue and starting with the abduction of hundreds of south koreans during and after the korean war that are still being held in north korea. it is the dozen japanese that get all the attention in the media because of the japanese government and the families, but it is seoul that really has the overwhelming number of abductees. and again the previous governments were silent on this issue. the commission recognizes that china is the key to improving human rights in the north. it is very clear that seoul is not afraid of raising the issue with beijing and has done so on several occasions, but i think there is a recognition that it is a delicate issue for china

and has to be raised delicately by south koreans so that it will bipartisan behind-the-scenes work. but as long as china is repatriating koreans there can be no fundamental progress on the human rights in north korea. but the reality is that thousands of north koreans are getting out through china every year, and that is continuing. the point person in the south korean government for number three in human rights is a law professor by the name of jay fueng. a wonderful man. unfortunately he only serves part time. he still has a regular teaching load. he is not as looking at north korea, but he is looking at all of human rights. he has a full plate and a

limited amount of time to work on this issue. so like washington, seoul needs a special envoy for human rights who can focus full-time. at the non-governmental level the two biggest ngos chose to ignore the human rights issue in north korea and focus only on a human rights in south korea. but over the last ten years we have seen the emergence of ngos in south korea, the first and most active is the citizens alliance for north korean human rights . they make regular visits to washington and host conferences and commission papers and research on human rights conditions in north korea. they were really working effectively alone for several

years. and then, i would argue, in 2005 there was an event that really changed public perception in south korea. that was the seoul summit for north korean human rights. that brought together dozens of ngos from major international gathering in seoul that gained a great deal of press attention and really helped mainstream the issue of north korean human rights. it is also about this time that in addition to people assistance coalition for human rights, you also have a whole host of ngos being created by north korean defectors. several north korean radio stations that are broadcasting every day. there are at least a dozen ngos that are being run by north korean defectors focused on north korean human rights. they are all living very much

hand-to-mouth. even the big two are only big in a relative sense that they have ten or 12 or a dozen people working. they are still very small organizations, particularly in comparison to the largest ngos in north korea. south korean ngos are still toiling in obscurity and touring with very limited budgets, but finally we have a government that has attached a greater priority. in the that united states againe have the passage of the north korean human rights act in 2004, but congress and even the bush administration often did not put its money where its mouth was in terms of actually allocating the funds that were set aside in this bill. president bush talked a good game on north korean human rights but often did not have, was not able to marshal funds to actually act. fortunately we did see an

expansion in the service of voice of america and the radio free asia. of course they are here today. they are now broadcasting five hours a day to north korea. clearly we could do better. we should be having 24-hour coverage to north korea. so very little progress is made at the government's level in terms of advancing. president bush did meet with family members of abilities, did meet with defectors. i have met with several defectors, and he did, when he appointed his special envoy, give the enjoy face time so that the world saw the enjoy had the fear of the president. it wasn't until the very end. the north korean human rights act, and now we are up to about 100 north korean defectors residing here in the united states which, of course, is

almost nothing compared to the 17 or 18,000 that are residing in south korea. at the ngo level there are really three organizations that have been active that you're probably aware of. the most grass-roots oriented organization, liberty north korea was very active, but they moved to california and have taken a bit of a lower profile. it also you have the north korea freedom coalition run by suzanne solti. she won seoul peace prize last year. very, very active individual. extremely committed in trying to bring different groups, leaders, and tibetans and other groups and individuals that have an interest in human rights, to bring them together to try and press for human rights. she has the most important annual events in north korea each year, freedom week, which is a wonderful gathering of

events and sharing of information in north korea. and then you have the committee for human rights in north korea, where i work, which is also doing important work and complementing the work of the other to a publishing reports on north korea, the most famous being "hidden gulag" looking at the prison camp system in north korea. but all three of these organizations combined roughly have a budget, combined, of not much more than a million dollars. so, again, really small underfunded organizations that are struggling to try and advance human rights. so again, you have a commitment of at least a verbal commitment at the government level, but not much action. and then you have ngos both in south korea and the united states struggling to advance human rights with very limited budgets with very small steps. i think we can see there is

common values, a common approach being taken in north korea, but to date there has been a failure to coordinate activities. this raises, then, the question of what is the most effective vehicle for advancing human rights in a coordinated manner between seoul and washington. one logical vehicle is the united nations. after all, the u.n. has been passing resolutions every year in recent years condemning human rights in north korea. the u.n. human rights commission just held last month. their universal review did not receive a lot of attention, but the north koreans had to submit a report and were subjected to a lot of criticism, even on the commission that has friends of north korea, including libya and other regimes that we don't necessarily think very highly of. but the commission issued a long

report with 150 recommendations of how north korea needs to improve their human rights. north korea agreed to at least look into about 100 of them. they rejected about 50 of the recommendations. they said they would look into 100 of the recommendations. so there is some attempt by the united nations to try and press north koreao on human rights. there is a special repertoire. south korea is a member of the human rights commission. unfortunately the message is not. the bush administration decided they thought the commission was too harsh on israel. they have not been a member of the commission. that is obviously one change that the obama administration should make is to join the

commission. i still think given that the u.s. isn't a member of the commission, and these bodies aren't meeting on a regular basis, i think the most effective means for our two governments to coordinate is bilaterally. the first i think is for our human rights envoys to have regular meetings with each other, and i am glad their first meeting will be next week because already they will be ahead of the progress made over the last ten years really in terms of coordination. so that is the first step, to try and have regularize meetings. the first is having regular bilateral consultations. the second is one that i am having in the trouble getting positive response to from the u.s. officials i have talked to, trilateral consultations. i always thought that the

trilateral was a useful mechanism. but a whole range of issues. a number of current and former u.s. officials told me we don't need t-cog. we don't need this formal mechanism. japan has such attached a high priority to the human-rights issue it makes sense to have a trilateral coordination to share ideas and pool resources and come up with a joint strategy. because often japan has been working on in isolation on pressing human rights. the third area of cooperation is expanded and coordinated in outreach. given the limited abilities of ngos and washington that there is a need for extended outreach

efforts. this could be very effective in raising public awareness. the average korean just doesn't care about human rights. and the average american is just totally unaware of human rights in north korea. so it is very disappointing when i attend north korea "freedom week" and there are only, this is the biggest national event on human rights. and if they get 100 people, they're doing very well. this is a nationwide effort that they are undertaking. so it has been hard to mobilize, even just korean-americans, let alone average americans to get involved and to care about human rights. the fourth area of cooperation is in radiobroadcasting. south korea, again, has their own government channel, but they also have religious and defectors stations that are targeting north korea. we have voice of america and radio free asia.

by south korean law south korean government transmitters can not to be used to transmit foreign radio broadcasts. so rfa has had to get the broadcast. recently there were allowed to use religious station's transmitter, but there is more potential for cooperation. we do know that radio is getting through the north koreans. the defectors that come out the same one of the things that has influenced their world view and their decision to defect is the fact that they can quietly at that listen to the north korean radio. i was personally skeptical about this until a few years ago. then i noticed that a couple of friends of mine who grew up in the soviet union and romania commit time every week to broadcasting for radio free asia in korean. it's wonderful to hear korean

with russian and romanian accents. .. there are a whole range of treaties and conventions that north korea has already signed on to.

the sixth area that i would recommend is to upgrade the human rights discussion at the six-party talks. now we know that the six-party talks are rightfully focused on the nuclear issue but human rights have always been a part of the six-party talks. and that's taken the form of japan raising the issue and its working group with north korea on a regular basis. but it should be multilateralized instead of bilaterally being raised only by japan. the seventh area that i would propose is that over time that we try to transform the six-party talks in the helsinki process. there's several people that have been trying to -- and jim goodby has lead the effort and rebecca. it worked with the soviet union to try and, you know -- to bring together security and humanitarian and human rights issues together in one discussion.

that's the direction that we need to move the six-party talks in. particularly, as scott has called the six-party talks, i agree with scott that they're not -- they are unlikely to resolve the nuclear issue. the best we can hope for their crisis management mechanism and if we're not really going to solve the issue, then at least we should be able to use the talks to have a wide range of discussions with north korea. and than if, my eightth and final recommendation is the boldest and that is to establish a north korean protection and resettlement group to assist north koreans trying to leave north korea and resettle in the united states. we had informal cooperation. this is an area where the cooperation has been very, very quiet for understandable reasons but we don't have any formal cooperation between our two agreements when it's helping north koreans leave and resettling. there was a sense of competition of seoul not wanting north

koreans to come to the united states but the fact is that we are not in a very strong position to debate potential defectors and potential immigrants to the united states and really rely on the knowledge and experience of south korea a particularly in the intelligence agency in evaluating north koreans and the veracity of their stories. and so there's really a need for cooperation. and again we're approaching 20,000 north korean defectors. and even in south korea, a whole book could be written on the -- and books have been written on the struggles that north koreans face in resettling in south korea. it has to be that much more difficult for the 100 that are here in the united states. and we don't have the formal assistance program that south korea has for resettlement. so there would be -- i think there would be a great deal of

benefits to help north koreans resettle. now again, i don't want to -- i'll close by just pointing out that there are obstacles to cooperation. that there's still going to be a reluctance in washington and seoul if we move forward in the nuclear talks. there will be a temptation to step back or ease off of pressing north korea on human rights. unfortunately, that's just the reality that there's this -- often this false choice that i think seoul -- that north korea tries to force the u.s. and south korea to make this false choice. either you're going to focus on human rights issues and we need to focus on both at the same time and that's going to be a challenge. the second dilemma is whether or not future economic development and cooperation projects with the north should be tied to concrete improvements in human rights. and that's something that i'm not sure either the obama or the myung-bak administrations.

it didn't matter if north korea tested a nuke. it didn't matter how bad the human rights situation was, there's still this support for the complex but should future improvements be tied to human rights. the human rights situation in north korea is grim and there's every indication that it will get worse if famine returns to north korea in the not too distant future. having spent the last few years, i'm not sure the situation will improve until china changes its policy. but there's much more that washington and seoul and the world can do to improve prospects for the north korean people. the security and economic benefits of pursuing human rights in north korea are vigorously in the short term and could have significant costs. we have an obligation to north korea's 24 million people to do better. thank you very much. [applause]

>> thank you, peter, very well said. our next speaker is mike finnegan, who's going to speak on post-conflict resolution. do you want to speak from there or here? >> i would like to speak from here. >> okay. before you start i would like to note that mike is certainly not a one-trick pony. he recently disseminated a really outstanding paper on the u.s./japan alliance which i recommend to you all. mike? >> thank you, richard and thank you for all coming out on a brisk morning here in washington. i also like to thank scott for putting together a very interesting project, a very eclectic group of areas to explore. i'm going to take us -- peter said we were kind of out of the box on some of these areas of cooperation. i'm going to take us back what traditionally might be the box

for cooperation between the u.s. and the rock and that is security cooperation. but a corner of that box that is not explored well enough and that's the area of stability operations and reconstruction. and i'll get to why that hasn't been explored. but for several years, while i was in the pentagon and previous to that, i spent a lot of my military career looking for ways to expand cooperation and find ways to broaden, to deepen this alliance. on the one hand alliance managers have struggled to give the alliance more heft to provide -- to give it more versatility. more applicablity, if you will, as a tool of national policy. on the other hand, we've looked to diversify the portfolio somewhat and to provide that broader rationale for the alliance so that if we were to suffer catastrophic success and north korea was to disappear on us, the alliance would still

have some applicablity after all the investment we put into it. at the same time, we've obviously been very focused on ways to enhance and increase our capabilities to carry out the current mission of the alliance, which is the primary role of defending the republic of korea. and ensuring stability on the peninsula. there's a certain tension between meeting that near term need of building capability and capacity for the current mission and looking at the broader mission. but as i looked at this, it seemed to me that cooperation on stability and reconstruction operations was something of a natural area for expanding cooperation. as it seemed to meet several of the alliance's needs. and indeed, our political leadership in summit, and the most recent vision statement on the alliance, has identified

reconstruction operations as an area for cooperation. so i was very pleased when scott asked me to take a look at this area. in the interest of time, what i'd like to do is make four brief points that kind of summarize the paper. the first point is that when looking at the republic of korea's capabilities, there is broad agreement that the rock is one of the few countries that has the political, economic and military capacity to make a meaningful contribution to international stability and reconstruction efforts. the rock military, for example, now has a wealth of experience to bring to bear on such challenges. and has done so in a remarkably effective and sophisticated way. the performance, for example, as well as the performance of units that were in afghanistan up

until 2007 has been exemplary. both of those activities were looked at by coalition partners as models for how such operations should be done. and as i wrote in a recent piece for the center, the u.s. military looks at rok participation in any coalition operation very favorably because of the capabilities they bring. the professionalism that they bring. so the bottom line is that the rok is a valued partner and is fully capable of the types of cooperation required for stability operations and reconstruction operations. my second point, though, is that despite this great capacity on both the rok and the u.s. part, combined stability and reconstruction operations have been given fairly short shrift in our discussions and in our actions. the single most challenging operation the u.s. and the rok will likely face on the peninsula is a situation of

instability in north korea to which they both must jointly respond. unfortunately, that mission area has not received priority within the alliance. indeed, during the previous rok administration, the entire process of planning a response to instability in north korea was halted. think about that. if this is the most dangerous mission and may be the most likely mission for the alliance on the peninsula to halt, that was a serious statement. but tension in this critical area of cooperation has always existed. it's been seen as sensitive, politically charged at both the domestic rok and the inter-korean political level. finding a way to address that tension and thereby allow us to address the shortfall in this mission set both at the operational and strategic level has been an elusive goal for alliance managers.

my third point, expanded global cooperation that is off the peninsula, cooperation in the area of stability, reconstruction operations away from the peninsula would allow the two governments to develop an alliance capacity. the individual and organizational skill sets necessary to better deal with instability on the korean peninsula. it's a bit of a bank shot. such cooperation would be useful in and of itself because we're cooperating on the international level but it would also be useful, real experience that would translate into save lives should we ever need to carry out stability operations in korea. on the one hand, there would be real value in taking the cooperation to the strategic level and developing a whole alliance -- whole of alliance approach disability and reconstruction operations. the u.s. approach is a whole of government approach. and interagency approach. the rok has taken a similar

approach in its internal or ulateral approach from north korea. if the allies believe that this missionary, that this area of cooperation warrants the expenditure of resources, will develop a generic if you will whole of alliance system to deal with, to assess, to plan, to implement stability and reconstruction operations would go a long way to filling critical gaps in both our mutual understanding of how we would jointly approach stability from a strategic level as well as provide additional heft for our operational plans. exercising such a system off the peninsula would to an extent depoliticize a very sensitive area of north korean stability

planning and perhaps allow the necessary room for bilateral -- for meaningful bilateral thinking and planning to occur. taking this one step further and institutionalizing to the tactical level, we might consider a rok-led combined interagency center for excellence for stability and reconstruction operations in korea. perhaps leveraging the rok's already outstanding training center. such a center could develop for the alliance combined procedures and policies translating the strategic whole of alliance approach to the operational and tactical level. and a fourth point to the elephant in the room, afghanistan. if as it appears korea has made the decision that redeployment to afghanistan to help stabilize

and build that war torn country is in korea's national interest, an argument i hope president li would embrace, for example, the discussion of a rok pushing rt in the province is a great starting point. embedding u.s. support into that prt. thinking of it something like a plus unit would go a long way to building an alliance capacity for reconstruction operations. obviously, the primary mission for that prt must be stabilizing the afghan situation and assisting the afghan people. i'm not suggesting otherwise. but arguably a rok-u.s. cooperation in afghanistan can serve additional purposes of

both preparing the allies for potential combined operations in north korea as well as broadening, deepening and strengthening the overall security alliance. it's an opportunity i hope our leaders will explore, will recognize and will exploit. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much, mike, for getting us back on time. we now turn to scott snyder for some commentary. scott? >> my job here is to be a discussant but i do feel a little bit of an obligation to also provide some framework through which we can understand how these papers hang together. mike used the word "eclectic" to describe the offerings that we've had as part of this project. and i think that is true but maybe i can try to, you know,

answer the question for any of those in the audience who are still wondering what -- you know, great presentations but what do they have in common with each other? i think the way of doing that is by going back and looking a little bit at the joint statement that was released last june by the two presidents at the white house. and the key phrase from that statement is of, quote-unquote, together we will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope based on common values and mutual trust. i think this is a very ambitious statement of purpose. because it magnifies the importance of the alliance in two dimensions. one is geographical and i think mike just touched on that. you know, issues are a bilateral relationship as having a

regional dimension and also a global dimension not just a peninsular dimension. that means the bilateral relationship between the united states and south korea can now be related to what goes on almost anywhere in the world. the second is functional. and i think that heejun's presentation on climate change, you know, illustrates some of the functional challenges. essentially, according to the joint vision statement and some of the topics that were listed, there's in theory nothing -- no functional issue that would be outside the bounds of u.s.-korea cooperation. every issue can and arguably should be examined through the lens of the question, how can we address this shared challenge together? so the joint vision statement could be interpreted to mean that alliance cooperation is relevant to almost anything anywhere. but do both countries really have the capacity to live up to that standard? and is it in their interest to do so?

and so i want to highlight some of the aspects related to that. i think it's clear that there's a gap still between the scope of u.s. interest and capabilities and the scope of south korean interest and capabilities. but at the same time, the reason why we are able to do this project is that a korean capabilities have increased. and that there is considerably greater potential for u.s.-korean cooperation than there used to be. so there's new capability in many new areas. so i think that the real importance of the joint vision statement is that it identifies and pledges both sides to work more diligently to realize the potential inherent in the relationship. and that this framework drives a broader set of forms of cooperation that has existed, than has existed between the two

countries in the past. now there's a second aspect of the joint vision statement that i think iser that the second danger in presuming that the alliance is based on mutual trust is that it gives the impression that it cannot clear in the absence of trust. yet the institutional structures that support the alliance in many cases have composed the infrastructure that enables effective coordination despite a lack of trust. i think that we can look back on the alliance and see numerous occasions where that proposition has been tested. and thus far there has not been an abandonment of the institutional mechanisms of four coordination despite severe interest of -- instances of lack of trust between the two countries. another way of putting this is the institutional and political commitments on both sides are necessary to survive moments of mistrust.

if commitments are based solely on trust, they may indeed be capricious. now, the second aspect is this idea of shared values and this really gets, i think, in many respects to the human rights paper that peter gave. the standard axiom and also by the way this issue of shared values is new. in the obama administration's formulation. in the april, 2008, u.s. summit, the phrase that was used was to develop the current u.s.-korea alliance into a strategic alliance that seeks to enlarge common interests. it doesn't talk about values. i think one of the interesting things about this project that, you know, i've wanted to explore is this question, well, what do common values provide? i don't want to say they are not important. but traditionally, the rationale for the formation of alliances

has been on the idea that alliances are based on shared interests. common threats have effectively served to form the basis for alliance cooperation between states with very different systems. at the same time, it's absolutely true that south korean social and political structures have much in common with those of the united states and a common commitment to democratic and economic freedom has enabled the two countries to see eye-to-eye more easily than would be the case elsewhere. i think the history of alliance cooperation where we have a context in which south korea's own political system has evolved validates the fact that we can cooperate more effectively now when there are common systems than was the case when south korea had a different system. but one of the core challenges of the project that, in fact, was raised in our october meeting by the resident here at brookings especially as it

relates to nontraditional security or functional cooperation is the question of what value-added does working within an alliance offer compared to the potential for cooperation with nonallies? and to put this in starker terms, if china is the country that has the potential and willingness to cooperate on peace keeping or post-conflict stabilization in x country, while u.s. allies in theory are unable or unwilling to do so, does it mean the united states would not seek cooperation from china? because it has a system founded on different values from those of the united states? or flipping it around, is it fair to allies to create expectations that their contribution to an out of area challenge will always be higher than that of nonallies? i think these are some very practical questions that the project has raised as part of its effort to evaluate in

specific terms that was mentioned in the joint statement. in some cases, the studies that we have commissioned also reveal that there are considerable asymmetries between the representative capacities of the united states and south korea to tackle some of the items on the international agenda. i think that to a certain extent although heejun didn't explicit didn't mention it, climate change is one and overseas development is another. but that doesn't mean there isn't a potential for limited cooperation in these areas in ways that re-enforce mutual interests. and so maybe the best way of illustrating that is to make some specific comments on each of the presentations. i think that the paper on climate change provides really an excellent test of whether the alliance can cooperate on newly emerging functional issues.

and i think that actually climate change presents an issue where the situation is very mixed. at the same time, the paper underscores that climate change is truly a human security issue. it's a common security challenge. but the manifestations of climate change may pose differing challenges that countries may need to face with differing levels of priorities. and i think heejun's graft that shows the rising temperature in seoul, in south korea, compared to the world average shows geography matters on this issue. just yesterday seoul received i think it's largest snowfall in history. geography matters. we're concerned about the cold but we're not concerned about snow today. and so this means -- i think this poses a potential challenge

to how one coordinates effectively on this type of issue. second issue, i think, that is interesting that a heejun didn't touch on but that i want to highlight president myung-bak has made a pledge on the developing nations on the issue of climate change and we just had the copenhagen summit. but i don't think that south korean president was in the room with president obama at the end of the day. and i don't think that south korea was involved in meetings together with south africa, brazil and india, which were really the key players in terms of brokering a broader climate change deal. on the other hand, myung-bak has taken on the plan of low carbon growth that may create a new set

of opportunities for u.s. or private sector cooperation and some of these were referred in heejun's presentation. these avenues need to be explored more aggressive, i think, given that south korea is poised as both the competitor and a partner in a newly emerging sector where there's a host of opportunities to be exploited. another aspect that i think came out of his presentation is the difficulty of managing policy coordination in a context where south korea is pursuing the issue from a centrally led approach while in the united states it's really more of a bottom-up approach. the question i have for heejun, given the multidimensional and multisectoral set of challenges that he laid out, what does he think is the most important area where the united states and south korea have a chance to

cooperate together with each other in addressing climate change? and also, what are the specific areas where the united states and the south koreans have the most to learn from each other in their experience thus far in dealing with climate change. now, peter's presentation, i think, illustrates both the promise and the disappointment associated with new opportunities for cooperation on human rights as i've suggested. on the other hand, those who remember human rights issues in south korea from the 1970s will know that human rights used to be the issue that posed the greatest threat to the sustainability of the alliance. from that perspective, it's truly remarkable to see the implications of south korea's political evolution. but on the other hand, as peter point out, south korea's public debate over human rights has been politicized and really limited to north korea. and so the question is really,

can human rights -- can shared values be a basis for policy coordination not just related to north korea but related to other parts of the world? human rights is a universal value. it's provided a limited basis for alliance coordination. i mean, peter outlined the difficulty of that. but i just want to ask peter what is his projection about whether this might change in the future? and finally, mike's paper really explores the broadening of the geographical scope of the alliance in a core area of security cooperation. and the administration has shown a willingness to rejoin the united states in this area but it remains to be seen how the deployment will play out and in particular, whether or not the deployment can win public support. i see this as kind of a direct challenge to one of the catchphrases that the myung-bak

administration has uses the idea of a global korea. the idea that the south korean government is willing to incur obligations and responsibilities proportionate to the benefits that it derives as a major economic player in the global system. and so the question i have for mike is, whether or not he thinks that the south korean public is really to support off-peninsula deployment. and then also if they are, in what ways can the alliance serve to enable a more active role for south korea? in pursuit of a more -- a higher profile in the area of post-conflict stabilization. thanks. >> thank you very much. what i propose we open up audience questions. the speakers are smart enough to

weave their answers into questions of others. the floor is open. please wait for the mic. once you've been recognized and once you get a mic, please identify yourself, your affiliation, and to whom your question is posed. i see a hand back there. >> myles from the james center for nonproliferation studies. i have a question for dr. chang. i was intrigued that in your presentation dealing with how the rok is dealing with climate change, they didn't mention nuclear energy which is in the largest low carbon source of power that korea has by far. i mean, something about more than a third of its electricity i believe comes from nuclear

power and its plans for expanding that even further. at the same time, you mentioned that alternative energy only supplies about 2%, i think, of the energy needs. and i'm just wondering how much of this is a conscious policy decision by the government to favor nuclear power versus what you hear from the nuclear industry and people in the nuclear establishment that korea does not have a lot of sources of potential alternative energy. so i'm just wondering this is geographic endowments and how much is government policy. >> dr. chang? >> sure. yes. you're very right. the nuclear energy is about a third of energy comes from nuclear power and as most of you korea can export the nuclear energy to other countries including the arab emirates they have an agreement to contract with korea. and the people's perception have

been maybe changing that they are concerned with the nuclear waste. it's not a safe source of energy. but as with other countries and there's no doubt that the nuclear energy can reduce the carbon dioxide emissions dramatically. the carbon dioxide emissions is lower compared to other countries. my point is we less rely on the fossil fuels like coals or oils while maintaining this nuclear energy but they want to diversify the source of renewable energy at the same time. i think that is my understanding. >> yes. mike billington from executive intelligence review. i'd like to expand on that question. i was struck that nuclear wasn't brought up either in terms of

climate change and in cooperation between the u.s. and korea. and that there wasn't really any reference to the huge shift in asia over these last couple of months and especially in korea. you have dramatic agreements between russia, china and india to use the chinese dollar reserve to build mass infrastructure in russia. russia will be building nuclear power in china. russia is going to build nuclear agreements in india. these are a real shift generally and korea is very much involved in this. this government is committed ane rest of the asian countries in what i think is the new frontier for the human race right now which is the development of the eurasian legion and i'm concerned what you and scott have to say. >> any other comments? >> i think also -- talking of a nuclear weapons but in terms of energy security i think you're very right. there's also -- traditionally

korea import a lot of technology export from u.s. but now korea is trying to export this knowledge to other developing countries that there is a place in how the u.s. can have a relationship in that area. >> mike, do you want to comment? >> yeah. i'll take your example one step further. not only is the u.s. involved because of westinghouse. japan is involved because toshiba owns westinghouse. it really is -- just the uae deal really starts to illustrate how these -- the nuclear energy industry is so tied together now globally. and it's ripe for some regional cooperation strategy. i think northeast asia for me has for a long time been a keen example of how energy security, environmental security and traditional security, if you will, kind of come together. that's sort of a nexus.

and this is an area that is ripe for cooperation. finding a way to expand nuclear power because as the point was made, it is the proven low carbon energy that's out there. so could we expand nuclear power in northeast asia to meet energy security needs to deal with some of the environmental issues? could we develop cooperative strategies for handling spent fuel? to keep it out of the proliferation. -- proliferation area. there's several areas where the chinese government, the russian government, seoul, tokyo, the united states could find a way and have expressed a desire for cooperation. whether we can bring it together in a meaningful way is a good question.

>> i just want to mention as part of this project, we did have a paper on u.s.-rok nonproliferation. we have a version that focused on some of the challenges related to the upcoming renegotiation of the u.s.-south korea bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement that's available outside. his paper doesn't go into much detail about the idea of nuclear energy cooperation. but that's also an important area of interest for us. >> do you have anything to say on the renegotiation of the nuclear agreement in terms of myung-bak's request that the u.s. drop its provisions preventing their processing and reprocessing so that they can have a fuel -- a full cycle nuclear? >> fred's paper addresses some of those issues and tries to

explore possible ways of managing any differences between the two governments on that issue. >> questions right here. >> thank you, richard. rode, asia house london. i was interested on peter's comments on the gradual impact on the radio and communications to the north. on breaking down barriers and on increasing the understanding of population of the north of what it is they are not getting. and we have a unique opportunity here to hear from this panel about the extent to which there is beginning to be a breakdown in the north and the extent to which the realization of what else is available may be leading towards a reputation of what happened in germany. from the military and from the environmental communications of human rights standpoint and the panel's view on that.

>> excellent question. the fundamental challenge we face when we're looking at radio to north korea is assessing listenership. and we don't -- obviously, we can't have a representative sample of the north korean people. so we have a very self-selected sample so it's very -- even though surveys are being done of north korean defectors of their listening happens prior to leaving, it's anyone's guess as to how many north koreans are actually listening anywhere from 1% to 10 or 15% or even higher but we just don't -- we just can't say with any confidence. when we look at the terms of the spread of information whether it's through radio or through dvds and cds that are going back and forth across the border, i've met with young north korean defectors they knew which house

was quietly selling movies, american and south korean movies and friend -- if you really trusted your friend, you could trade movies with each other. and that they are listening to radio stations to the point where the north korean government has had -- publicly criticized the radio stations for their slanderous activities and told north koreans not to be influenced by the west so we know that the information is getting through. but on the other hand, when we look -- so in absolute terms for north korea, information is starting to get in. but when we look at, say, other regimes that seem very -- that are oppressive and closed, if we look at burma and iran, for example, you know, it was amazing to see these almost real time images coming up from the demonstrations in iran. burma, i was in burma a few years ago and was, you know, meeting burmese who were hooked on south korean dramas and i was

traveling freely and meeting with whoever i wanted to meet with in burma and meeting monks who were disgusted with the regime and were wanting change and were pessimistic about change coming. north korea still has a long way to go before it even reaches the point, say, burma or iran and i don't think we see those regimes falling too soon or not soon enough. and that makes me, you know, a bit pessimistic at least in the short term. you know, it's a long-term project that i don't think will necessarily yield short-term results. to quickly answer scott's question about how do i see cooperation evolving in the future, it's always hard to prognosticate but i would say there's three factors that will determine the extent to which washington can still effectively cooperate on such issues. the first is how is the policymaking mechanism going to

work within the obama administration now that we have -- we have a part-time nuclear envoy. we have a full-time day-to-day envoy and then we have a full-time human rights envoy. and it's not clear to me how all these pieces are going to fit together. so what voice will robert king have in the policy-making process in north korea i think remains to be seen. the second factor i think really is the nuclear talks. for the time being i don't think the obama administration is going to try and insert human rights actively into the nuclear talks, into the six-party talks if the talks get bogged down, then i think there will be more of an opportunity for the voices to be raised on human rights. and for south korea, i think it's going to come down to a summit. if it looks like a summit is going to move forward, i think a summit really depends on how much money south korea is willing -- the myung-bak's government is willing to put up. if they're willing to put enough money, a summit can happen. but if it looks like a summit will happen, then i think south korea will get laryngitis when

it comes to human rights and so those, i think, are the three factors that will shape what happens. >> mike, do you want to talk about the security piece? >> yeah, just very briefly. i think we've seen pardon the pun mixed signals on how the radio broadcasting is going, the effect it's having in north korea. there are6- defectors who tell that they did hear these broadcasts and that it did affect their decisions. however, i've also had many discussions with defectors that their main motivation in what they were thinking was just get to china because china is better than north korea and once they got there, then they became more exposed. so i think it's kind of a mixed bag right now. it's not having a great effect yet, but as peter put it, it's a long-term investment and it may

over time begin to have a significant effect. we've not seen a great effect on the military side of this here. military defections still remain few and far between. that has to do with the control mechanisms, obviously, that are in place. if we were to start seeing significant numbers of military defectors and being able to tie that to what they were hearing on voice of america, then that would be a significant finding, i think. but as i said, it's a long-term investment. i would like to try and answer scott's question about the rok's public support for a off-peninsula deployment to afghanistan. as i wrote in a piece just the other day, what the public support really comes down to is the argument, i think, that the myung-bak administration decides to make.

will they make a strategic argument about why it is in korea's global interest to be in afghanistan to be working with the coalition there, to be seen as contributing on the global level. or will they fall back on the tried or true for the alliance argument that going to afghanistan is a good thing just because it's for the alliance. i would hope that he does the former. that he makes a strategic argument. i personally believe it's in korea's interest. as scott put it, it helps korea's brand if you will. it puts them on the global stage in a role they are quite capable and worthy of playing. but that's an argument that he has to make that the korean government needs to make to the south korean people.

i think the south korean people are open to that argument, to hearing that argument, to understanding it. my argument -- my reason for saying don't use the alliance as the rational is despite the positives it would have on the alliance, obviously, is that doing things for the alliance tends to not carry the day for a long-term commitment. i think korea went to afghanistan the first time for the alliance and when things got tough, it was easy to pull out, unfortunately. if it goes there for its national interests, i think that's a much easier thing to commit to for the long term. so i would hope that's the argument that they would make. having said that, the alliance obviously gives them a leg up. in a deployment to afghanistan. there are tremendous alliance capabilities that can be

leveraged. there is a culture of cooperation between the united states and rok militaries, between our two governments that can be leveraged greatly to increase south korea's chances for success in a deployment province. as i suggested, a prt that is rok-led a robust prt that is rok-led that has embedded u.s. support that would leveraging the alliance and ensuring success. thanks. >> i would like to make a question to mike. i think one of the difficult issues between alliance -- you haven't touched today is the concept that there is strategic flexibility which allows the u.s. forces operate out of korean peninsula.

and mike, you were the main architect of the concept of strategy of flexibility. so i'm wondering, when do you think the pentagon would like to apply the concept flexibility 100% to u.s. forces in korea? and if afghanistan's situation is being deteriorating, do you think that there is u.s. forces, there's some possibility, some forces in korea will be dispatched to afghanistan. thank you. >> you want to take that hypothetical? [laughter] >> given that i had the strategic flexibility rose pinned on me, yeah. when would we apply -- when the the u.s. government apply strategic flexibility 100%? that seems to -- your question seems to apply when would we leave in entirety. i don't think that's the case.

that was never the thought behind strategic flexibility. the idea of strategic flexibility -- it's a double-edged sword, if you will. yes, you might pull some forces out of korea to meet another contingency, another contingency that the u.s. has to deal with somewhere else in the world. but the other side of that sword is that you would bring forces to korea. and that's the part that the koreans have not focused on enough. that strategic flexibility for u.s. forces globally means being able to meet commitments in south korea. i think you could see for any number of contingencies units be pulled out of korea temporarily, to be used in other parts of the world. whether it's afghanistan, whether it is another mission somewhere else, it's all hypothetical.

but i think the pentagon's approach to this and i realize i've been out of the pentagon for a little bit. the pentagon's approach to this would be that there are forces that are available, if you look at that entirety of u.s. forces in korea, there are pieces of that that are available for global deployment. under the idea of strategic flexibility. but there are core pieces that are not. there are core pieces of u.s. forces to korea that are needed for the defense of korea. today, that has to do with the headquarters which forms the u.s. side of the combined forces command. in the future, that headquarters will form the u.s. supporting headquarters to the rok war fighter. so i think at that headquarters level you would never anticipate a deployment off the peninsula. but there are units under that. there are smaller units, whether

they be an infantry battalion an engineer company, an explosive ordinance detachment that might be deployed for various missions around the world. so i think when you ask when will we apply this 100%, never is probably the answer. i do think, though, that this is an area that we should begin exercising. and i've argued this for a long time that the pentagon should exercise this. move people in and out of korea. to, one, attenuate koreans to the coming and going, but, two, building up that confidence when something leaves itbk@11e comes back or it -- it's replaced with another capability that the deterrent and defense capability on the peninsula is not degraded by strategic flexibility. thank you. >> excuse me. i'd like to take the prerogative

of the chair to address a question to each of the three. the premise of our leaders in the united states and korea and the premise of this project is that we can increase the alliance's value by working together on a broader set of problems than has -- than we've worked on before. butpgñ i suspect the contrary i also true. that if we work together on problems and fail, it may decrease the value of the alliance in the eyes of the public's at least or maybe in the eyes of the officials. and we've talked some about, you know, capacity and interest as factors governing success and failure. but i would like each of you to step back and think a bit about the nature of the problems that are trying to be addressed because the nature of the

problem is also a factor in governing success and failure. so the question for professor chang is, what are the circumstances under which collective action has worked to address major environmental problems that have a global impact? the question for peter is, what are the circumstances in sort of the last 50 years where we have seen a significant improvement in human rights in a totalitarian systems and what does it say for the prospects of cooperation. for mike, the question is, looking at the problem of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, what do we know about what works and what doesn't and whether this is a problem that can be solved even with those who have the best will in the world?

who wants to start, professor chang? >> to echo scott's comments about based on multi or dimensional challenges the u.s. and rok face so what are the most important areas for collaboration. i think we can consider two different areas. the first are the technology transfer aspect and the policy aspect although these two are not mutually exclusive. first, though, in the technology aspect, we need to encourage the government and private sectors that i already mentioned in my talk together more explicitly. for example, the private sectors can monitor the carbon dioxide emissions in both countries. i know china rejected a u.s. monitor there covering those emissions at the copenhagen meeting so i think we need to be very transparent and build a trust which also echoes the president announced last year

based on mutual trust we can monitor these in a more objective way and which can serve as a role model for other countries. this is one area that we can collaborate. and the other aspect is more like a private sector investment. how we can develop more green technology, green jobs. the korean attempt to create about a million green new jobs in the next coming decades. and i know that also u.s. tried to attempt to do a similar job but i heard the other day from npr that china is also taking a lot of this green technology, a lot of the solar panels are now being created in china rather than in the u.s. so main the u.s. is exporting all these energies to other countries so they have some implications how we can collaborate in mutual ways. the other aspect is more like a policy aspect. as i mentioned before all the global climate change is a local place. it's a local area. people can actually manage and

implement some concrete actions. there was a report written by the aag. the global changing in local places. how each locale have different unique characteristics and they can mitigate and adapt to these climate changes. we can take some lessons from a lot of the u.s. cities. as part of the clean climate initiatives, some of the major world cities they have been collaborating in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and also there have been parties supported by the u.s. green building council which use more of renewable materials and use less energy and the clinton climate initiative we can expand that relationship among other cities, both in u.s. and korea and they can also learn from each other. there are some cases, for example, the city of portland in

u.s., they have a sister city relationship maybe we can encourage -- establishing those sister city relationships. in the past they just focus on the economy aspect. but now we can broaden the aspect to include more environmental aspect. we can also make the city more echofriendly but at the same time create more green jobs and how each city can learn from each other. and the other -- finally, in terms of more direct policy implication, it is actually the consumer who can actually feel they could make some changes. i know as gasoline prices increases, the u.s. customer immediately responds to these changes so that's probably one of the reasons why the u.s. government tried to maintain the gasoline price low compared to