attentive, very cautious, fine degree of probability on which he used to qualify his judgment. the world in which you are involved which is more desolate geared to the new cycle, so on. bringing these two into line is bound to affect in some way the way that intelligence and normal intelligence product would be presented. >> well, i'm not sure about that. think that -- look is it the normal stuff of intelligence office work to be engaged in that kind of production? no. but they weren't normal times. you were in a situation that in this particular policy as it evolved and develop develop -- it becomes. he's the prime minister, he's conscience of the fact that he's got incredibly difficult and serious decision that he's going

to have to make. a serious set of decisions that he's going to have to make as the process evolves. i think he was just in a position of say, well, here i am. i see this intelligence. i am becoming more and more concerned that we are going to have to face up to this. we are going to have to deal with it. we're going to have to stop turning a blind eye to it. we're doing to have to share that with the public. now, once he's made that decision, as the prime minister and ultimately the head of the intelligence service as well, where i sit, i have to do my part at the job that follows from that. and they have to do it. but at no point did anybody from the prime minister down say to anybody in the intelligence service, you have to tailor to fit this argument or that argument. that never happened. >> the pressure is on. you're trying to make a case.

now we've heard from a man that stressed how careful were officials to indicate that intelligence was sporadic and patchy. you want a strong case. but it has to be based on evidence. >> all i can say that document that was presented to parliament by the prime minister -- i think that -- if that have been the view. so when the prime minister said, for example, in the temples what he believed in terms of assessment. because he believed the intelligence. why shouldn't he? he believed what he was being told.

why shouldn't he? i think in a sense, i don't really -- i don't believe that the dossier misrepresented. i think it was cautious. i think it was aware of the unprecedented nature of it. for that -- in part because of that, two great care in the handling of it. and look, let's be absolutely frank. i think they would be having this exchange if it was not the control which cub wently is huge. which was may i say not an idea. >> well, i'm not talking about the control policy which subsequently ensued. that was the major case that was made at the time for the basis for stepping up policy which was mr. hands himself said. >> he said he set out the case. >> so, it was about making the

case. but it had to work with the intelligence that was available. >> yup. >> now just we've-ed the previous inquiries that have looked at this. what happened suggested that the jic might have been quote, subconsciencely influenced to make the dossier somewhat stronger than it if contained the assessment. might that have happened? >> no, not at all. i can see why they might say that. i can say where i sat seeing john scarlet and his team approach not just that testimony but every testimony they are involved in, i don't accept that, no. >> and the battle of committee was placed on more intelligence that it could prepare. and the dossier gave the impression that was fuller and firmer of intelligence.

>> again, all i can say. i can repeat myself that when the prime minister in his -- not just my exchange but also his own absolutely clear that they -- the jic, had to be happy with that document. and in terms of -- let me also say again because people now are not remoting suggesting you. the large part is media. they routinely rewrite the history around this. i think the way the prime minister presented it to parliament actually was on the cautious side of things. he said in terms, intelligence can't give you the whole picture. intelligence isn't necessarily going to be right. but the intelligence that he saw as it was explained to him and as he had repeated discussions about it, it led to the conclusion as we sit down forward that he did believe it was doubt. it was continued to produce the chemical and biological weapons.

and he's been able to extent the ballistics of the whole program. he sees wmd as a -- >> we'll come in a moment of the particular judgment that is were made. but i just wanted to -- just to conclude the section. you've described the process in which the intelligence agencies through the jic are keen to do their best to get evidence into the public domain in a serious way possible. they understand the policy context. you've told us how john scarlet's is is regularly attending policy meetings. maybe these are not questions for you. but it is -- it is an issue that they are being drawn into. helping make a case. and they want to help. they want to serve the government as much as you do. and therefore it's not necessarily that surprising if

lord put in that there wasn't the subconscience desire to push things beyond. >> all i can say is i think that the relationship that john scarlet has with the prime minister and the respect that the prime minister had for john scarlet and his integrity and his commitment and his professionalism, that i think -- you have to ask john scarlet, but i don't accept that he would have felt under that pressure. i think john scarlet has actually felt that intelligence really doesn't bare out the argument that you want to present in parliament. parliament just didn't accept that. but the reason why we got to this place in the first place, and in this process in the first place was the prime minister had become more and more concerned about the intelligence that he was seeing. >> tell me now to the question of the forward. could you draft this? >> yeah, i think what happened

was that -- a meeting of which -- this would often be the case. and the prime minister would give me a verbal draft. he would tell me what he wanted to say within the forward. and i would go away and write something. and then i would show that to people within the system before going back to him. so again i can't remember every step of the process. but that would probably -- i certainly remember as it was the meeting at which he said this is what the board should say. and he was very comfortable with the lines that you came up with? >> yeah. and almost certainly when identify rewritten them and a draft would have gone around the system and people would aboy comments in a normal way. he would have suched up the final version. >> master john told us he saw the forward something else from the dossier itself.

it was a work of the statement signed by the prime minister. and therefore, not something he felt he would change. >> he did change it though -- >> he changed it on the bit to the reference of jic. >> yeah. i think what happened is the forward went to john. and it was copied to all members of the jic. again, any one of them had a concern about any aspect of it. i know for a fact that the prime minister would have taken that on board. so i think john scarlet made a number of small suggestions all of which were taken on board. and i understand that he says. or understand what he means by that. he's got -- there's a forward by the prime minister. which in a sense was the part of the basis for the prime minister to statement of the parliament as well in a very high-profile, pretty politically charged

complex. john said, there is what as it were i've done. i think if john or any of his team would have any concerns of real substance about the forward, nay know they could have raised the prime minister. >> so when we take the sentence, what i believe the assessment has established beyond doubt is it's continued to produce chemical and biological weapons. nobody challenged the beyond a doubt? >> no. >> so the intelligence does not have that certainly attacked to to? >> i think the point you made there was general point. i think that was a perfectly fair point to make. but this is the prime minister presenting to this parliament. he is no doubt based on the fact that peach believed him clear that -- >> beyond a doubt. so like beyond anybody's doubt. >> yeah, but at that time if you'd have spoken to the -- maybe the french intelligence service or the german

intelligence service or even the countries that you want matily did not go with the united states and the uk and the oral a lies in this. they are really saying that saddam hussein did not have wepons of mass destruction. and he was not a threat to him. >> we can argue about some of it. it's very strong phrase. >> and, but again this is why -- >> but it supports the view that the case has been made. that it's irrefutable. >> okay. would it have been that weekend had those two words not be there? probably not. because if a sense what the document did was it set out a pretty broad range in case. attend had the history. and if you go to the --er i repeat the point that i made earlier. it was noted in the report about the major economy. at the time, it was pretty conservative. it was very cautious. there was nothing explosive

about it. the reporter who provoked the controversy later, actually said there's nothing new in this. we have lived for years. so what we can, you know what i can say about that. because i can't remember every part of every discussion about it. but i think that what we're doing, as i say, is making a case as to why the government why the prime minister had become ingrown much, much more concerned about this as a serious, credible, and current threat. >> do you think it was sensible to incorporate the forward into the document in the way that it did? because it did suggest the jic was endorsing the forward and the process you've -- >> i -- >> because it's moving jic into -- >> look it's the prime minister going on to parliament and standing up a making a statement. which is basically the contents of the forward.

he was going to be saying there's not based upon this. he was going to be put into the political and public arena on a global basis. now that -- you can argue as to whether that judgment should never have been taken. but i go back to the point i made earlier about the changing nature of the media landscape and the political landscape and the fact that people no longer just prepared to say the prime minister said his intelligence here. okay. prime minister we'll boil that. that's fine. >> i just want to establish one point that we make. this regarding john scarlet and indeed other's ability to raise point on the text of a forward. so john told us that he saw the forward as something as a text of the dossier. that's not disputed. he also told us that he was in his of judgment an avertly

political statement signed by the prime minister and not something therefore he could change. and desmond bowen and his evidence while in a minute said much the same thing. now, they had the opportunity to intervene, they could. but they didn't because they felt they couldn't. >> i don't -- no -- i don't agree with that. i'm not disagreeing with how -- look. i'm not going to say anything remotely critical about john scarlet in that regard. i don't believe that had any of the jic in any sense overstated the case to a agree that would make the work that they had done his credibility. either they didn't feel they had the opportunity to say something or indeed that they wouldn't have done. i think as i said to you earlier, they were minding

changes, the jic did make changes. that text, we can't touch it. >> can i just follow up the point. one more. there were two references to doubt in the forward. one is the prime minister saying i'm in doubt that the threat is serious. fine. but it also says what i believe the assess the intelligence has established beyond a doubt. not fine. >> not fine. >> no, because assessed intelligence never establishing anything beyond a doubt. >> look. in order to say there is the prime minister presenting this document to parliament and him saying what he believes. and also that, you know, i had been in meetings with john scarlet and other intelligence officials. and is that what they were saying? yes, it is. >> just finding on the forward.

jonathan powell as you say, does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an eminent threat from saddam. and you replied saying that is why tv sets out the case that i'm making. and the intelligence assessment to threat assessment. >> no, i think jonathan was making, we were never saying that there was a setting out that saddam hussein was about to, you know, do something terrible to the british mainland. and that wasn't what we were saying. so i don't think the -- >> well, you can get the threat assessment without -- >> yeah, but the forward was really never anything other than the prime minister, yes, putting his stamp on this document and also in the debate that was

going to flow from it. and it was the -- it was i suppose the basis for some of the arguments that he then set out in parliament. i don't 71 that it changed the -- as it were two parts of an argument here and made it something different in the forward. >> well, it may be something different in the sense that it drew the policy implications. >> he's the prime minister. that's what he's there for. >> in the first draft, he had stated, the case is make is not that saddam could launch an attack. he could not. which reenforces the point that you've just made. then the sentence was removed for the final draft. >> again, no idea why specifically. but he made a very, very similar point in parliament. so, look -- you'll be aware of this. things get drafted and redrafted and written and rewritten. there was no sort of significant strategy call policy reason to

why it shouldn't be there. >> let me start with a nuclear issue. and what we've already looked at, on the presentation side, it was a concern particularly about the feeling of the material and the issue. not by me. and not by the prime minister more importantly. >> in our evidence from tim for a moment, they confirmed the nuclear issue was manageable and saddam's sanctions were in place. >> yup. >> on the 16th of september draft, it noted that with sanks -- sanctions in place, iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. without sanctions it would take five years. it went on to say they were proceed to obtain the role. taken from the jic i believe. basically the line that's been taking here -- put it this way, the iraq knew how to cook, but

they lacked the ingredient. as long as sanctions were in place, they wouldn't get the ingredient. it would take them five years to get the ingredients themselves. but self-evidently, if somebody just gave them the ingredient, then it would take them far less time. that's basically the sort of position that they are taking. but you've not got the particular problem with that. which was retaining some sort of consistency with the americans. president bush in the speech to the u.n. general assembly on the 12th of september said should iraq require the material which is the basic point about somebody somebody giving you. it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. >> yup. now that obviously begs all of the important questions about the material. so did you see that as a problem

of reconciliation between a rather relaxed timetable suggested by the jic and it's incredibly urgent timetable to be mentioned by the president. >> when i saw the -- the latest guardian conspiracy theory yesterday about the issue. and i had knowledge of any discussion about britain and america. as far as what i recall, the dossier and timelines was because one of the drafts i genuinely did not understand what they were saying. because they appeared to be suggesting that saddam hussein could get a weapon more quickly with sanctions in place than with sanctions removed. what they were not making clear was the question of legality.

when the issue was raised, the council qc took me through the issue in some detail and pointed out that the institute of strategic studied had said they thought iraq would get a nuclear weapon in nine months. now if we were in the business, i thought we'd been pressing for that. i'm afraid with the business about us trying to line with the americans, if that was going on in the intelligence level, i have no idea. but in terms of my role in the relations to the dossier, i have nothing to do with that. >> they share the worries about the paragraph, the one that was 16th of september draft. they were both like a timeline. nuclear bomb in one to two years. which is different what it's been over the 16th. that does start to align with the americans. but it makes much more specific.

>> maybe it does. but what i'm saying to you is the point that i'd be making in the timelines of the dossier is not a what they were saying be the american or jic. i understand one the drafts that he could do it more quickly without sanctions that with sanctions. >> that wasn't in the e-mail that is you sent them. there was one on the 18th of september that found the nuclear sanction confusing and nothing much to worry about. i'm sorry to bombardon this point, but i worry that it is not in great shape. >> it was unclear. that was the point that i was making. >> he had a weapon. but he had membered the section

to make it clear, on the section of the 19th of september graft does change. and it now includes this one to two year timeline. so something had changed. for some reason this was not in the initial draft. but now it's saying we asked if iraq obtains this material and other essential components from foreign sources, the timeline could be shortened. and iraq could produce a nuclear weapon between one and two years. that's quite significant. because in the evidence that we had, the focus was on five years after the lifting of sanctions. now we're taking a very particular scenario. which somebody is giving a lot of help. >> right, all i'm saying is i clearly taught you that what i know and what i did. all i'm saying is in writing, anything that flowed from any intelligence assessment, that

was not my role. that was not my position. so if it did change from draft to draft, then that is because john scarlet and his team have chosen, based upon the intelligence assessment, to write it in a different way. i pointed out, i think, the perfectly legitimate point which is that i did not understand it. if you like a layman's point, i did not understand what they were saying. as a result of that, -- >> this is not the only -- >> you may not have been the e-mail. the fact that somebody else, the e-mail that you read to me -- >> no, no, i'm sorry. it's impossible to get a description on cross conversation. >> sorry. the e-mail i was just quoting was you reporting somebody else's comment to you. >> yes. >> so you thought that was important to -- >> if e-mail is what i think it was --

>> it was somebody in your office. >> i took the stage -- quite a few people in the office have seen this every stage and every draft. i took it to somebody that had not been involved in the process at all. i said i'd like you to read this. you are now a member of the public. i want you to tell me what you think about it. they are making the same point. they couldn't quite understand that point. >> in your published article on the 19th of september, you say the nuclear timeline is just about thwarted. what do you mean by that? >> what i meant by that is finally after a bit of discussion about it, judy and john scarlet had written it in a way that i understood, and everybody else understood. >> i cannot stress strongly enough from anything that flows from an intelligence assessment, i think that's very, very cleared that the memos that you referred to is my memos and his

responses were not a single one of them at any time sought to question, overright, rewrite, let alone the phrase, the intelligence system is any way at any time on any level. >> what we're looking at is a process where the overall impression you get from the intelligence shifts. and we start off with a situation which we've had confirmed to us was the -- >> we just -- >> i'm not talking about john scarlet. it's a situation in which the overall view was that the five years after the ending of sanctions could produce a nuclear weapon. to one where the prime minister stands up in the commons, doesn't mention the five years. but says there'll be others who say i can get, for example, it could be several years before it requires the nuclear weapon. if you were able to purchase the material, it would only be a year or two. this is now highlighted --

>> i don't think somebody highlighted. although the institute is hugely reported body, they also said it could be nine months. i'm sorry to repeat myself. but i think we are in the part -- in this part having the discussion. i completely accept that there's an argument to be had about whether intelligence material should be used by an elected prime minister in the public decision-making process. i think it's a good think. i think it showed much greater openness. i think it was a genuine attempt to take the public into the confidence about why he was as concerned as it was. i really do believe that it's because of the policy that we are still talking about this line, that line, that paragraph, and some of the changes that took place in the drafting process. i'm sorry, i'll just repeat myself. when he came to it, i was not being accused of sort of moving

this line and moving that line. shifting this line and shifting that paragraph. i was being accused of forcing intelligence officials to do things that they didn't want to do. it was simply untrue. >> i mean on this process, you'll be delighted that i'm not going to turn a 45-minute claim. now -- this has been something of interest. the number of inquiries. it's been established that you didn't make up the play or insert it in the dossier. so that's fine. but important, it's still have been raised about the way it was expressed and viewed. now one view is that there's something particularly exceptional or surprising -- >> yup. >> you referred that it was something like rocket launchers. a sort of weaponnal delivery system that can be ready for the rapid deployment in the event of

conflict. so the key thing that this refers to the copper field systems. the jic assessment of the new intelligence used up the discussions on the 9th of september stated that quote, iraq is disbursed it's special weapons including it's cdp weapons. it could be with military unit and ready for firing within 20 to it 45 minutes. and after the dissemination, it was suggested that this new intelligence should go into the next draft. :

you or members of your team and were involved in the discussion of how the 45 minutes was going to be introduced in the draft and whether this distinction was one that was understood by your team? >> well, i think i can one of your earlier witnesses talked about this iconic 45 minutes and again and certainly wasn't made iconic. i noted in the baller report

that the butler committee wrote to senior journalists to ask whether the government had been promoting this one in five minutes as a major part of the september dossier and they said no, we have not. it wasn't within these discussions to be found, it wasn't that big a deal, and you may say it was mentioned here and the prime minister mentioned it. that's true, he mention lots of different things, lobs a bit and arguments, lots of the ramparts of the dossier. i made two points on this. the original intelligence as you say says 2245 minutes. and we had been in this game we would have said can reduce the 25 minutes rather than 45 minutes. i don't think that was taking place and i wasn't aware of that until quite later on in the process and likewise when the

prime minister set up in the house of commons and i think in terms of the public what they would see and the dossier i don't know how many actually read it but i don't know more would have seen a the prime minister and standing in parliament and when you said 45 minutes with in the same sentence talked-about against his own population so i don't think we were in fisa saddam hussein has these weapons and if one of the papers went down that line they were depressed by s. >> isaacs of fact, but if you are talking about the importance of bringing intelligence into the public domain and i am in favor of its, then could have been clearer? >> you can go back with hindsight and rewrite every single thing, but i am simply saying to you that that was not that big a point within the overall presentation of the case the prime minister was putting at the time.

>> can i make a couple points on this? first, there was a presentation question i don't want to spend a lot of time on a but if you look at the wave of 45 minutes claim was presented at the start of tapestry in the dossier, it appears some distance away from the point where chemical and biological weapons had been developed for artillery, bombs, sprays and so on. and then just after the peace -- after the peace had an the missiles reading eastern turkey and cyprus. so just one of the consequences of were the point was located it was encouraged with longer-range weapons and then was the case. the responsibility was that it was certainly -- >> and don't think -- and we are looking at this in such

microscopic detail in that way because it became such a controversy. nobody was saying that at the time. >> they would have in the sense of how it was picked up by the press which i will come to in a second. and then we have this question of which again was the discrepancy between the draft text which said that the iraqi military may be able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes it decision to do so and the executive summary says has military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons some of which are ready in 45 minutes in order to use them. and by the next draft the text is in line with the executive summary. now, you did make a suggestion that that should be. >> i pointed out an inconsistency which was what i was there to do it was expressed

directly into an places and i pointed that out and what i didn't say was you should write it this way. >> would you have been surprised if it rains have come into the executive summary? >> it was untimely end. i set out a serious, observations. it was there after after he decided how to resolve those and i think he pointed out, it is mentioned here and express a different made in this other parts of the tape. in as i understand it, again this from memory, they would have spotted it anyway. >> also would have been an inconsistency with a ford or it was stated the military planning allows for the some -- a wmd to be ready within 45 minutes. >> he expressed differently but is inconsistent.

he expressed it differently and again when he stood up and house of commons, but we don't all go around saying the same thing in exactly the same way on every occasion. i really don't think -- this is a point that has been gone over and exhausted not because of the decisionmaking processes in the dossier but the policy that followed a much later. >> and about to finish and will come to that but i wanted to check, were you are aware there were a number of intelligence professionals, dr. brian jones, who were unaware of the tightening up of language were creating a degree of certainty in the language that was not justified. he wasn't opposed to including the praise but he said that it should be intelligence that suggests. >> i was aware as i said earlier of some reports in the press of

some people within the agency suggesting, but as i said in with john scarlett and richard taylor, that did not represent the view of what the agency's number, indeed, their assessment of how most people in agencies felt. >> finally i will conclude, you mentioned already this footnote in the report to which comments on correspondence of letters and regional newspapers and what it says there is another suggested that the 45 minute story attracted attention because it was eye-catching in a document containing much that was not and a technical nature. so it didn't attract a lot of attention, not just because what happens with today story and it attracted a lot of attention at the time and. >> look, the big message and the big point that came out of that

day's events as i recall was the tony blair, prime minister was publishing and intelligence based dossier that explained why he believed iraq was the current serious and credible threats and then lots and lots and lots of detail, virtually every single point was getting some sort of attention. >> we did not see it and did not plan our communications around that particular point. >> i think jonathan powell sent an e-mail on the ninth of september, would be the standard on the day of publication, what we wanted to be? >> how did i replied? >> i don't know. [laughter] what did you want to do? >> look, i know that we have and maybe i have a reputation as a sort of wording and obsessing about headlines but the truth is i don't and never did. a very large time that i was on

dowling street because i reached the point of understanding this guy is back to the point about what strategic communications is. it's not about one headline a and is whether you are communicating all the time, your objectives clearly, your strategics thinking clearly, and whether you are getting your message through to the public so jonathan in inquiring like fats as to whether i applied or what i applied. >> so the evening standard 45 minutes from attack iraqis could have a bomb, 45 minutes from to reference to cyprus, express saddam hussein can strike in 45 minutes. were you surprised by those headlines? >> and not surprised by anything that most of the british newspapers put out on a daily basis but all i have to say is when we were preparing that to end it it really is why is so

unfortunate the delay -- debate developed as it did subsequently when the bbc broadcast as they did. actually i think it was a very important development in government communications and i think there is a real risk arising out of this. and that in future very difficult international crisis situations that develop, the politicians, they don't said the decisions that maybe they should. i thought i did attend every single word of the dossier. i did and every single part of the process and i think it was a genuine attempt by the prime minister and the government to engage the public properly in trying -- in understanding why

the prime minister was developing as it was. >> as a final point, i think from one of the lessons, we are about lessons and the importance is this. that we agree on your final observation in in terms of the government and they've done this sort of thing in the past, that it is and therefore important to understand why this particular product is now looked at so negatively and perhaps the lessons that ought to be learned and are about taking more care. >> i would like to go back on that. i don't believe it was -- at the time. insofar as you say it was negatively, it is looked at -- lee by the media that just

refuses to accept that when the lord hudson investigated it to in the detail he did he came to the only conclusion is that the analysis could get you. since when and they never tell what that report concluded, they simply say that it was a whitewash and this and that. but that's the point. >> that's not the point i'm concerned with here. in. >> not across talked. >> i would like to have the opportunity to respond to this because it goes to the hearts of it. you say the dossier is regarded negatively and actually a lot of people did not regarded negatively because they understand that the basis of a case the prime minister main is contained within the air. about a generally perceived threats. if you have a media culture that the signs that because a certain inquiry did not find as they

kept telling their listeners and readers there were going to do on the points you have been raising and day after day after day they tell people actually they didn't get to the truth, only we can get to the truth, then no wonder they end up thinking what was bad about and then when they deliberately conflate with the paper that will no doubt, on in february, they routinely say that the dossier we have been discussing was lifted off the internet. no wonder the public starts to think what is that about. >> the reason why the document became controversial and that issue arose in the end was because on the fortunately a lot of the material that was contained within its when tested against what was actually in iraq after the invasion, it turned out not to be there. the big problem -- >> then you have a debate about intelligence and that's what that was about a but my point i think actually therefore makes

my point, lord hutton stated in terms even in the intelligence turns out to have been wrong it did not justify the reporting of issue and my point is a the reporting of the issue and the controversy that cost and, indeed, that is what makes it viewed by some in the way you describe and i am sorry, that is my very strongly held opinion. i cannot see any other way. >> i think we're coming from a different direction in that but i will pass it over. >> thank you. i'm going to declare a lunch break at this point. we have occurred evidence so far on your communications on strategy, some of the key meetings in that capacity, and on the september 2002 dossier, i think one of to of my colleagues got a couple of all points on that after the break. then we would like to take further evidence on the february

dossier, your understanding of involvement in the development with government policy and iraq after that, and the coronation of the government's wider public information campaign. so i suggest we break until 2:00 o'clock and come back. can i bring to the attention to those of you who have been attending throughout the morning. if you wish to attend again this afternoon you will need to register and the reception desk will open for that purpose at 115. that's downstairs. so with that, we will come back 2 o'clock. thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> welcome back everyone. taking off from where we took from before the break, supplementary is of the september dossier. first, i'm going to ask one of two points.

when you're talking prime minister's press conference in early september of 2002, you said that this holiday time in which neocons in america had set up speculation about the possibility of military action in that the prime minister's purpose in that press conference had been to try to calm down the atmosphere. is that it fair reflection? >> not just to the press, but in the days prior two that with mozambican south africa, it is fair to say that media travelling in those areas was close to a state of frenzy with the decision made, what was going to happen, only a matter of time. so i think the tone at that press conference and the purpose was really to do two things -- one, as i say to call things,

action is being taken, there will be all sorts of questions that have to be answered and he listed some of those at the press conference. and then announced it was passed the ongoing debate and deliberation and then publish the dossier of. >> we have this morning of 45 minute claim in the dossier heating up a new frenzied and very big headline story is. and as you said in on the butler committee he established that this was not as a result of briefing by you, but never the less frenzied happened. >> there was a frenzied than at the time of population -- publication. >> sirloins freeman refer to a huge headlines on the front page of the evening standard and. >> and headline is not a frenzy. >> well, let's not split hairs over this. a number of newspapers covered in this in a very germanic way.

would that be a very fair --? >> when i talk about a frenzy, when newspapers are all chasing the same story, the television and radio talk about a 24/7, that's what a frenzy is. >> well, the 45 minute claim attracted some very big stories in a number of newspapers, i don't have to characterize that one way or another. did you take action then and to dampen down the speculation? did you get on to those papers to correct the misrepresentation of the story? >> i didn't specifically but so far as anybody else would have all of them up it would have been made clear what they referred to. >> you weren't pro-active you in your office and pointing out to them that they claim that had referred to munitions essentially battlefield weapons

was being represented in a quite different and much more alarming way by some newspapers and you just let that ride in didn't take action to strain the story? >> i didn't and so far as i can recall -- >> you were in charge. >> yes, i was and as far as i can recall discussion, bear in mind you have the prime minister with a statement and the dossier, the issue moved on pretty quickly. the 45 minute thing is a was a frenzy, it wasn't, it was one or two newspapers reasonably problematic and then it fell away. it was not that big an issue. so we go to the evening standard and say you've got this wrong. i didn't. where are the people minded to follow the story up and talk to our press office is about whether they deployed but i'm not aware that even that happened. >> you didn't think it necessary to take action to correct the story? >> now, bear in mind if we correct in every single store in

every newspaper that we knew to be wrong, we would be 24/7. >> bad as i think your area of business, not mine. i'm very glad to say. like other colleagues who have already referred to the point, i'm interested in a statement in the prime ministers or write to the dossier -- if i can find the correct quotation -- what i believe the incest -- is that the saddam hussein has continued to produce biological and chemical weapons that he continues to develop nuclear weapons and that he has been able to extend the range of ballistic missile program. now, the statement, the assessed intelligence has established beyond a doubt, it's a very strong statement.

and jic assessments used the words, beyond a doubt, in describing the intelligence about iraq? >> i don't know but i would have to agree read them. as i said to them this morning, that's the prime minister giving his assessment that has been given to him. so if he were two have sat around as he did many many times with the intelligence chiefs and said to them, are you pretty sure about this and this and this, and as john said and gave evidence he believed the intelligence. >> what i'm trying to establish is what is the basis that u.s. the drafter of this and the prime minister as the person who signed it had foreseen that the intelligence was beyond a doubt. those two words which are some definitive. >> not definitive. >> what was the basis? >> the bases was the

intelligence assessment that was presented to the prime minister and the bases was also the nature of discussion at the time with the intelligence chiefs prior to the dossier being published. >> i find that a little puzzling. i mean, isn't that the case that doubts and caveat were expressed in just about every jic assessment on iraq? >> there were an dowd also was expressed in the prime minister's statement that parliament about the complete picture and never be sure everything is right. that is his judgment and when it comes to which he can have all the advisers you want and all the military dreiser's and the diplomats and all the rest, he has to make judgments, strategic, political, he has to make those judgments and has to present those to the public and that's what he has done their based upon his analysis of what the intelligence chiefs are telling him and his analysis meeting with intelligence over a

time. through the time when the jic themselves talked about a staff change in terms of their assessment. >> is that a phrase they use? step change. >> jic in 2001 a. >> server william and his evidence said to us getting as a few of the things that were sent, the picture was limited on chemical weapons in april 2000, the knowledge of wmd and the ballistic missile programs was patchy, march 2000 to the intelligence on iraqi wmd and ballistic missiles programs is sporadic and patchy. going on now, august 2002, the very near the time we're talking about, there is i quote, a little intelligence on hyrax pc w doctrine that is biological and chemical doctrines, and we know little about iraq -- cdw,

iraq prime minister maliki chemical and biological weapons since late 1998. crucially the assessment of the ninth of september 2002, the intelligence remains limited. so in august the jic says there is little intelligence. september it says the intelligence remains limited. on the ninth of september. and about two weeks later this be one tells parliament in a document presented to parliament that the assessed intelligence has established beyond a doubt. now this is why i'm puzzled -- i can make those statements which together. >> we will have to speak to his statements. i can only tell you from the position i was then, not an intelligent person, as the communications director. the he has engaged in ongoing dialogue with intelligence agencies about the intelligence

presented to him and that is -- the way that he decided to put it to the public at that time. i suspect when he comes along -- one ever coming to the inquiry that he will stand by in again. >> so he was certain that they still stand by the words beyond a doubt? >> i do because at the time and that was the judgment that he was led to make. and i would also stand by -- i know that the butler report fell back to the rear things talking about expensive than detailed. i stand by that as well because i think that that document had it the full authority of the joint intelligence committee hearing it was detailed and wasn't just about intelligence that had come in in the last couple days and some of the caveat or in there. it concerned me make the point that to both you and sir laurence have no doubt that could have been more in terms of public presentation putting of the case why these caveat in there but i think of some of the

in terms of what the public would have taken out of it it wouldn't have made that much depends because it wasn't cautious. >> so if the jic assessments when we are able perhaps i don't know if we will be able to publish some concern the me read them, or not to correspond to the phrase beyond a doubt. and if members of the jic and we have already heard somebody who did serve on the jic, were to say that beyond a doubt was not a phrase that was justifiable, would you at that stage is in that parliament had been misled the by the prime minister saying beyond a doubt? >> no, i wouldn't. >> obey, thank you. can i move on to my final point. again, a broad points arising from what was said this morning there you use the phrase which i have seen used many times to describe the threat to the, the phrase the current serious and

credible threat from iraq. but when the prime minister that spoke in the debate in parliament on the 24th of september when parliament was reconvened in the dossier had just been put in the library of the house of commons, he used a different phrase. he said, his meaning saddam hussein, wmd program is active, detailed and growing. what was the basis, the evidence for him to tell parliament that saddam hussein program was growing? >> it was within the dossier, the story, the narrative he was sending out with in the dossier. >> but it doesn't use the word growing. >> it may not but again and that is the prime minister setting out what he read from intelligence he was presented to. >> but i can't find this concept of a growing at. >> a step change. in the ballistic missile program that is growing.

>> we have been through thousands of documents and intelligence reports and the idea of growing doesn't really appear in them. if i can quote from your diary for the 23rd of july, 2002, again, you recall that the foreign secretary jack straw as follows -- jack said that of the four powers posing a potential threat with wmd, iran, korea, libya and iraq, iraq would be the fourth. he does not have a nuclear weapons, he has some evidence of wmd capability. now, turning than from that statement by foreign secretary to the dossier, the dossier referred to iraq's continuing possession after 1991 of chemical and biological agents. it referred to the saddam hussein, his continuing capability to produce them.

referred to his covert attempts to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons. none of that describes his actual program as growing. so was an accurate and to represent a threat from iraq at this time as growing? >> i have said he many times this morning that the reason the prime minister wanted to say the dossier in the way he did was because he had grown more and more concerned about the threat that saddam hussein based based on intelligence presented to him. ..

the point i made earlier as to whether this unique threat would have actually been contained since 1991 -- scaap that is a

judgment isn't it. >> am i trying to figure out it's very important to this inquiry with the judgment was based on that it was growing. >> of the judgment -- look, the prime minister is a made the decisions and i will say what i think he would say were he here that the containment policy wasn't working as effectively as it had been, that the september 11th had changed the context in terms of how united states, britain, other countries were going to address this issue and the volume of intelligence that was crossing his desk about this issue was making him more concerned about it. >> that could be perfectly true without the intelligence saying the threat is growing. the prime minister becoming more and more concerned as he said in the four were increasingly alarmed the phrase he used is one thing. but seeing the threat is growing as he would understand is another. >> but ultimately, the -- you

can present as the intelligence people do, as the diplomats do and the advisers to, they could present all the factual analysis including the caveat and the rest of it and ultimately the prime minister has to make judgments about it and that is the judgment he made. >> mr. campbell during the course of the morning you said that the development was important in terms of communications. it was an innovation and you also said these were not normal times. now when the decision was taken to have this innovative approach to pushing information out in the public, was consideration given, was it a discussion about the constitutional propriety is that you would have to consider because the principal of keeping intelligence rigorously separate from those made decisions is a

very much in bed in the way the constitution proprieties operate. now, given your role because your trade is communications and que were advising these powers. but is getting the process for developing this, was that actually discussed, the ball would be the proper way of developing this? because you yourself said it is a pity because this happened, again because this goes at the heart of the public trust. these proprieties exist for the reason. was this actually discussed? did anybody draw this to the attention? >> was it discussed? yes. where people aware some percentage in nature and therefore did the increase the level of discussion and potential concern? yes. was the judgment and reached including the complete support in the intelligence agencies that this remained a right and proper thing to do? yes. >> who did you discuss that

with? >> the prime minister, other ministers, john scarlett and other people. >> was the cabinet secretary involved? innovation? >> what to do something significant was through the whole process. >> did anybody draw to your attention with the conventions are? >> it was unprecedented. >> the convention i'm talking about is keeping intelligence completely separate from decision making and good judgment to put one together with a political forward and the information because -- you blurred the lines. >> i didn't say you blur the lines between intelligence and decision making and i think you could say intelligence became more involved in public communication and public diplomacy the to have been. that is a development and response to the sort of changing political landscape i talked about earlier. were we aware that that was a significant change, of course we

were. were we are where people might have concerns about that of course we were. was it still, nonetheless, despite the unprecedented nature, despite the fact this was the intelligence financed to do something maybe they wouldn't normally be expected to do, will the prime minister and i hope intelligence agency still say the was the right thing to do i think yes. >> given that these were not normal times and this decision to want to go to the war, with africom having listened to earlier do you think he was rigorous enough? >> absolutely. i'm sorry to repeat myself. i think the process was utterly addressed. i think that the integrity was very, very strong and profound at every level of operation and i really do think having this discussion in large part because the subsequent control which was

disclosed by piece of agendas. that's the fact. that's the fact. >> okay. >> let's move on at this point to some others. >> given what you have just said about the quality -- before we actually get to this, i'm interested you obviously thought a good job had been done with the secretary to help the prime minister. was it in the discussion with john scarlett about the possibility of having more exercises of the sort? >> i think at this time it was seen as you would never do it again but i don't -- i don't

have any feeling that the minister wanted to do it again. it may be as the situation developed if it actually the diplomatic process had gone on much longer that perhaps there would have been with no such discussion. >> so, how will you then come supporting the prime minister and the dossier in terms of helping get all the factual background the evidence analysis to support the works and speeches and press conferences and the documentation around? >> there were periods even during this time when iraq was permanently controversy all and a high-profile issue. there were periods there were other subjects quickly taken over the agenda which would where most of my work would be

going a lot of the domestic policy related, some international issues and northern ireland was always there adults in terms of being a difficult and sycophant area. but so i think that the bulk of communications with actually have been the sort of thing you just referred to come speeches, exchanges and parliament, press interviews, the normal stuff of the day-to-day communications. >> the iraq communications group? >> that the fault in a way from the fact that -- my day for example used to be to see the prime minister first thing. i would then chair a meeting of most of the main government departments the obvious big government departments, the prime minister's office, treasury, home office, for an office and if there was any other issue on to other departments who would come and

that would be to go through as you were that day. now, what was becoming clear that a certain point was that iraq was dominated and we decided actually that although that meeting continued that it would also be useful just to have once a week -- the evolves into a once a week but then became more formally -- >> what is the time we are talking about here? early 2002, 2003? >> yeah. i've got it written down somewhere here when it started. but that became just tried to step out of the day today the whole time and just discuss, talk and think a little bit more strategically, and to be frank i used a lot of it for my own education, educational purposes if you like. we have people coming along and we would set up an islamic media for example. we had experts advising on the

way for example some of the messages we would be communicating very productively within the british context. often when you think you are gaining an understanding of what you are trying to do they would have somebody coming away and explain some of those measures jews were being received in an arab and muslim so that was that kind of discussion. on the discussions would be i can remember one to go back to the discussion of camp david we did have quite regular discussions about how we tried to help the americans address this business of anti-americanism which is fighting the premise said in his speech at some point it may be in a note i can't remember this anti-americanism up until now the americans have been happy to sit as an irritant the united states is related. it's those kind of decisions. >> did the narrative right if

you like. >> also what it was we were putting together by terms of the strategy, the elsewhere on the day-to-day basis. >> it was about getting the message is right and making sure you understood when you were doing on the day to day -- >> given that this is an area where -- and it's not my natural area of expertise or the defeat could their expert to the to expertise, it was to sit on my regular basis with his people expertise it was. some of them from the intelligence services, some of them from foreign offices, some of them every now and then bringing people outside. >> and what was the collision information center? >> that we've got to go back a few years. it started with relation to kosovo and what happened in the communications of kosovo there

came a point when president clinton and tony blair fault although the ministry campaign was clearly made to against molosovich, there was a very strict in terms of military balance, communications and public relations if you like, and public opinion that we were losing that particular battle because milosevic had complete control over his own over the media systems of those joining from those countries that were their britain and america and elsewhere. and so, i was asked to go and help me to put together different communications which we did. and we took elements of that and we've recreated a form of the different communications post september 11th and then adapted that began in iraq and the cic first incarnation was post september 11th, and that was

about having all the different nature time zones at the plant could be in islamabad, washington, london, information centers where we were linked up all the time understanding everything that every leader involved in the coalition was doing and saying and so forth and they brought forward for ths the of that based on the event and maybe the foreign office but working is very much part of -- >> part of your team were part of its? >> part of my team, part of the american team we had a system of swapping, we had a senior person from the american side who was there. we had different times, we had a french people, we and spaniards, poles, australians, dutch, people from all across.

>> but this was commissioned to do of the dossier? >> it was, yes. >> can you tell how that came about? >> that came out from one of the sis people who were expert and pfizer's. it wasn't always a weekly but fairly regular iraq strategic discussion really. he informed us there was intelligence that had come in which related to the iraqi campaign of consumer obstruction, intimidation of the u.n. inspection process and he went through some of the things it would entail which was not necessarily surprising given that people knew the inspectors

have always been subject to certain amounts of intelligence but there was an awful lot of interesting detail. now, within that discussion as any of this -- >> we don't get too far into the sensitive details. >> i'm trying -- [inaudible] so anyway, that's -- we then had the discussion whether that could be used publicly. while the decision wasn't made and i think there were further discussions about that and then what can about. we didn't know at that stage how that was when to be done but i commission at a certain point the cic to a paper on iraq and the issue of consumer

instruction, and the general messing around of the pictures. historically as well as current. they started to work on that and produce a paper which i think was then discussed. i made a number of -- i changed the title and made a number of textual changes that went around the system -- >> went around the system, does that include into the jrc? >> went -- the answer to that is i don't know. they were representatives of the jrc at the meeting. what they then did i don't know. then the decision was made on her, trying to remember which this was. i think it was the one and would it be february to washington, we were meant to go to camp david but the weather was too bad and we stayed in washington where

the decision was taken that we would give this as a briefing paper to the sunday journalists and press traveling with us on the plane to washington. as it happened it got almost no coverage at all i thought was quite interesting they were -- it was there and informed some of the things they wrote or not, i don't know. but it wasn't -- contrary to the september dossier which a massive global exposure this got relatively little and it became much better known and much more rather unfortunate controversy when it emerged that actually it was taken off the internet and it wasn't, it was and i am not apologizing, i'm not defending it on these terms by the way that as a matter of fact it was taken from the middle east journal and then once that as it were process became exposed i think it was by four years it

was frenzied. >> but can i just go back to what you have just said? the context in which this was being done why was it considered important to have the document at this time? >> because one of the arguments that kept being put is about giving the inspectors more time, given the inspectors more time is the fact in an ideal world great the inspectors go in and do their job but actually the reason and people say with all of these weapons, why are there more, why have these guys never been able to stumble across as the water around iraq and so because there is this system of obstruction and intimidation so it was informing that part of the debate. >> but this cannot quite critical point in the process.

it has been put to us by previous witnesses that there had been a hope a smoking gun would be found and so far the smoking gun hadn't been found. so doubt was all already being raised about these a timber dossier. and it was published i think on the third of february and the pin minister made clear when he told parliament about a couple of days later colin powell was going to begin the presentation to the u.n. security council it wasn't a real issue at the time to read this was one of the -- this is one of the big issues at the moment. and the dossier doesn't describe facing a pretty hopeless task talking about i think 20,000

intelligence officers, 208 inspectors hiding documents surveillance of hotels and offices -- etc. so was the point of it and given what you said about this being something that was because the prime minister didn't put it in the house of commons -- speed the reason i said that is we gave it to the journalist. it got some very limited attention and i think some of the newspapers. i can't remember but i don't think it was picked up by the broadcasters but the fact that the prime minister had been away and was going to make a statement on his return to the house of commons and therefore as it was a document we put in the public debate it was put in the library and the house. >> the comments on february and

he said we should fill the intelligence of the week and all the infrastructure concealment it is for old when we publish intelligence reports that other people have some sense of integrity of security services and it goes on in a single way says the dossier published last year and again the material we put out over the weekend. it's very clear a vast amount of concealment and deception is going on. so >> it is december 11th or 19th. i haven't been able to get all the papers. >> the point i was making according to the prime minister was this was presented as if it had a similar status and process to the september dossier. obviously much smaller document. utter hadn't been the same

number unwittingly or not give that impression to the commons. >> i absolutely -- the integrity and professionalism and meticulous nature of the september dossier i would defend to the end of my days. in relation to this, somebody within the cic putting it together he made a very simple but quite serious mistake which is that he put information into it and in the accuracy which by the way hasn't been fundamentally challenged was from a leading expert by the name of doctor, it was part of the historical section and wasn't in the section that had any of the intelligence in it and that is what made it subsequently very controversial. we didn't know that until later in the process in fact we didn't know that until the mid year informers when the story first broke and so that's where the mistake was and fair to say when

he talked earlier about interesting that that did not help to put it that way. >> and you've made the point but it's worthwhile underlining that the quality control if you like of these materials is all there and there's no -- although this was -- the question is whether jrc or the community was where the prime minister was going to present on those terms -- >> can i say on that when these timber dossier that was the purpose of recalling the parliament, that was the purpose of the prime minister's statement. this event, the prime minister is bringing the house up to date on a very important set of discussions with president bush and a very minor part of that was to refer to the factor would

release this document and a was in the house. i don't think he made any reference to the content beyond what you've just said politely accept the point about quality-control in fact i read on the seventh february where the very first sentence says i value the work of the cic but the documents show the absolute necessity of quality-control this is particularly important in any document such as this with increasing intelligence assessment and i then set out considerable displeasure to like the fact that it happened and also as a result of that i spoke to john schuyler and david and richard and the secretary of the foreign office, and we agreed a new set of procedures whereby basically nothing that had any intelligence component whatsoever could be used in any form of public communications out going through the same

rigorous process as the september dossier did. >> if i could ask one final question of which his as time passes in iraq, matters -- things aren't found but there is an argument they were not found because the iraqis were good at concealing them. but it must have occurred to somebody at some time that maybe they were not found because they were not there. was that an issue for you and did you raise it as a problem for somebody concerned with strategic communications? >> that was an issue. it was a big issue. i'm looking for a day because there was a day when jon

schuyler stated directly how big a problem is it, and obviously the military for their, but they were looking for weapons of mass destruction and i can remember the reason why when people say you always knew what of the military briefings for the prime minister where the team is explaining the preparations for our forces in knous to what would happen if and when it can about what weapons would be used against them i can remember the feeling absolutely chilled by the nature of the discussions so our belief that when the forces went in they would find the would find biological weapons

and all the stuff being set out in the september dossier it was real, it was profound so knowing as we did this was a hugely controversial decision that large parts of the, large sections of the british public would be opposed to the huge section of the labor party being opposed to be told it is perfectly possible that he might now be facing a situation as if you have problems of the prime minister's plate the situation where you are going to have to accept there are no wmd that was a big issue and a very difficult situation. >> does this only become apparent after the fighting? we heard general fly. i'm interested in whether or not the possibility at least occurred to you even before the fight.

>> again i can only speak for myself april 28 john warned there may be no finding the wmd. i was never in doubt based on what i saw and what i heard and the discussions i was involved in and so it was a considerable obviously as the invasion took place and that was the focus and then there is a i think as other witnesses far better qualified than i have said to you perhaps the outcome, more quickly than had been anticipated or planned for. but certainly i fully expected and i think the prime minister did that within a reasonably short time frames the military and intelligence had become on the same role hears this and use that and the other end from a couple of laps there wasn't much to report.

>> they didn't last a very long. >> so in answer to the question was it yes and had we thought about it to the extent people have been suggested and as it were those who were very strongly opposed as i said to this morning for example when the prime minister was having discussions with jack he was fundamentally opposed to the decision that was finally taken there was no doubt on his mind that yes their weapons of mass destruction -- >> i think vladimir putin did suggest -- >> he did it in a very dramatic press conference is, he did. >> thank you. >> just one more point and i can come back to the february paper. sir lawrence asked you to what extent of the jrc were aware of that and in your supplementary memorandum of the 24th of june,

to those in three to the foreign affairs committee referring to the paper you wrote, quote, john scarlett attended the meetings at which the issue of iraq infrastructure of concealment was one of several items discussed he was not consulted on the paper nor did he see it in the final form he was aware of the fact that sis authorized the use of the intelligence material in the public domain, in that quotation. isn't it a little bit surprising that the jrc chairman who had led or co-lead the work on the previous dossier wasn't consulted on the new paper that was also using intelligence material and wasn't even copied to him in the draft? >> was copied to him in draft? >> according to your evidence to the foreign affairs committee i

don't know perhaps i was -- i didn't see it in the final form he wasn't consulted in the paper. perhaps i'm wrong in entering from that he didn't see it in the draft. >> it's just at the time the systems we put in place subsequently as i say nothing like that would have happened without going through, not as the other intelligence agency leaders as to whether he did as i said he was at the meetings and was aware he was being done. i just don't know whether those who are putting it together whether he was with sis at that time would have sent it to them. >> right. they should have done. >> and i think that this -- i think that is a lesson that was learned very very quickly from

that and was a very -- that was a very difficult episode. >> they should have sent it to him and with him knowing it was happening should presumably have asked to see it to make sure he vetted before it went out in public. >> it may well be because i can't remember exactly who apart from john scarlett and this other person from sis was at the meeting but there may be another member of john's team who were. i just don't know. >> the difficulty is even john scott wouldn't have picked up a plagiarized section. >> no, and when subsequently -- that is the point. they would have been i suspect would have been intent and maybe there was somebody from jic. there were happy for it to be used in the way that it was. again it is the control that came later that if you like contaminated the whole thing. >> i'm surprised that obviously

the foreign affairs committee asked you to go back and check and then you will then a supplementary memorandum so you must have checked at this point and must have thought that we'd clearly established that he hadn't actually been in the loop on this and -- panicky had certainly dannel the meetings. >> he knew it was happening -- as you say it should have happened. >> definitely. >> thank you. john's team. i think you are referring to jic. of course of the time he was still the jic chair. >> i was talking about jic. the assistance team, yes. >> we are going to turn the question now to a different topic. >> i would like to turn from the intelligence aspect and ask you about your work in the period of 2002 and early 2003 with regard to communicating with the ever met iraqi policy to the media and public and answer the public's considerable concerns

and questions. the meeting after crawford the prime minister set out certain priorities sometimes in the course conditions of supporting the united states. the top three were taking the u.n. route and advancing the middle east peace process and gaining support of public opinion. in your diary at the beginning of september 2002, you write it was clear the public opinion moved against us during august. i want you to tell us how you said about dealing with this beyond the dossier what were your methods of dealing with this problem? >> there was nothing terribly fancy. the most unprecedented move was the publication of the dossier.

we had at one point with the prime minister came to question as the masochism strategy which was basically to take him out to very hostile audiences because but his view was, and i think that he said this in these terms at one of the speeches it might have been -- people are asking -- you've got some people opposed to what we do there were some of those. there would be some people saying you know why haven't you gone after before this. there were people in the middle who had a genuinely legitimate questions they were asking. i can remember he referred to general kaufman and another. i've forgotten who it was but he said they both made speeches with a series of genuine legitimate questions. what he's all the communications trying to do was answer some of those questions. so obvious question the u.n..

obvious question is this just about regime change? obvious question are you going to do this, may. what is the impact for the middle east peace process. where is this in relation to what george bush called the war on her so will the parliament have a say. what we are trying to do was answer these questions over time and the thing that decapitating there is no one thing that will get through any one point. you've got to keep sitting of the documents. so we planned this, i don't think he thanked me for that much but we, having so i'm going to go out and take on the people who disagree with us we sort of for the example i discovered about the feb dossier and its province we were doing a very long and extended program a field with an audience. we had a thing with trevor

mcdonald will literally the brief was to go to find women totally opposed to what we were doing, filled the room and the time mr. sits down and takes all of their questions and tries to answer them. so that was a part of the communications. and the rest of it was just the fact every week he is in parliament once a month he's got his press conference fairly regularly before this committee out and about. there was nothing i would say that we had a beyond realizing that we were now trying to bring in a more internationalized communications, trying to tie in much more closely to the americans because, you know, the reality is their communications can affect hours and they did understand that and i think some more than others and it's fair to say that under donald rumsfeld's name mentioned a few times of this committee and i think there were times when you thought he could maybe have bought a bit more about the impact of public statements and

other countries but -- >> again, almost exactly a month after your september by reentry you note iraq is still tricky and just wish the americans would do more to put over a proper message to the world. did you have -- were you able to put this through? >> i did, and to be fair they were always very -- i go back and actually i would like if i can i would like you to see the papers we did our around kosovo in september 11th that developed in this way because i think there was the basis and those relationships were very good. i spoke most days we had a system whereby if any of us felt difficult requiring immediate attention happened any of us could instigate a confidence call at any time. >> what are the aspects of american presentation that you found disturbing were unhelpful?

>> i suppose -- the have a very different political system. you can't choose the leadership of another country. but i think it's that question of not always understanding the statements and positions would have an impact beyond the shores. they felt very comfortable with the idea saying saddam is a bad regime and has been for a long time. was clinton's defense policy to go to the regime change mac. to be fair to george bush, i think he got this more than others in his administration if i can put it like that. it was at least an understanding there were other countries out there and they had other interests. so, for the simple to give you one example people talk about what was he able to do in relation to george bush. i remember at hillsborough i think of was april 7th or 8th,

where the u.n., the issue of the u.n. trawl and in the aftermath was on the agenda for whatever reason at the time. and condoleezza rice was quite insistent any words that were agreed at a meeting of hillsborough were not too forward in relation to the role of the u.n. and she wanted to say it would be an important role, and i can member saying that sounds a bit grudging. it is meant to be and the prime minister said look this has got to be stronger than this and if i might finally agreed there would be a vital role for the u.n. and that was important when subsequently the u.n. did become involved in the aftermath. so i think the relationship at treetop level between the president and the prime minister

very frank, able to have a very open discussions i think it was the same, he is very close and professional relationship with condoleezza rice and i try to do this thing with the communications sold most days i would speak to the opposite numbers in the white house, state department, pentagon and if there were problems say to them there's a problem here and if they would say why do you by skilling about the when the whole time, we try to keep our republican on board for this and that, that is just the way the political exchanges are i guess. >> one of your problems with the americans was perhaps one which only you could result in your communication strategy, and you described your discussion with the vice president cheney and said how you used the word pissed off in your diary, you said how cross he was when you

talk about democracy coming to iraq people just say that's americanization it's not democracy at all. how did you deal with that? >> that was at camp david. the substance that day was the prime minister persuading vice president cheney to go with the president and subsequent visit to get on that route but it was in this broad discussion and again i think out of a genuine sense not only hurt but they were quite -- after september 11th the world loved america for a while and i can remember the prime minister saying the exchange we refer to earlier said for the rest of the world september 11th was a massive event and the moment but it passed. for the americans it's not really past. it's now part of their psychology. so they couldn't understand why there was so much of this

anti-americanism so i thought we had a quite serious discussion when we were getting our assessment what it was about it for a simple i believe this strongly i think it is about the fact that people have grown up on the idea of the two polls, russia, soviet union and america, two great superpowers that can both battle to the death but that is the sort of geopolitical from work. suddenly you, got one superpower and the other countries say okay you've got the power but we want you to understand that means engaging and involving as well so we've had that sort of discussion and i just made an observation that i felt in the communications that when they talked about we've got to spread democracy back to the point out a message in america and britain might be heard in a totally different way in the middle east or the gulf that they are

hearing that they want to bring america here and he was as you put it a little bit pissed off. >> he also expressed your concerns at different times that for the british public there was a feeling, sometimes a strong feeling that britain was only embarking on this course of action united states because it is what the americans want us to do and of course to protect our relationship with the united states. how were you able to establish that there was a specific british agenda with regard to iraq and what was that agenda? >> with a difficulty because once -- this was the problem with the whole attempt to communicate on this because you had i guess put it in this terms the left of the big media

basically was opposed to the whole thing and very aggressive front blair is bush -- there's a political hit in that, and on their right i think is the sense that once you got into the whole dossier and that kind of thing, the bbc became very hostile and its coverage of iraq. it was quite difficult to get out any messages on diluted on your terms as it were rather than just through the prime minister getting out there and talking. but it was difficult. it was very, very difficult. and the sense of you can do it, the pri minister and all you can do is explain we are not just doing this because george bush wants us to, we are doing it because we get is in the british national interest. >> it was meant to be a problem at some point if the matter was to go before parliament. it would have had parliamentary

support and this would depend on some groundswell of public support. at the end of 2002 you proposed a more active strategy and one in which you wanted the prime minister become even more actively involved. can you give some indication of what that was and in particular what it involved the prime minister having to do? >> by that time i couldn't tell you what proportion of his time this was taking the was considerable obviously, and i think that he accepted, and the americans i think also realized that there was a benefit to their communications from 20 blair being very pro-active in terms of communicating the issues, the background of the issues and the case we were trying to make savitt involved him having a very regular and

sustained set of activities around speeches, physics, interviews, press conferences and so forth. >> how did you assess the effectiveness of this heightened strategy? >> i think that in the end you have to rely on instinct to a large extent. we didn't do. i don't know whether the government, i didn't see as it were other than the public opinion poll my sense was and this often is the case, but in these really difficult in ongoing quite long debates there is always a period which you since deeper public engagement and then, reflection upon them and it's now sort of routinely stated that there was massive opposition and hostility it is true there was opposition and hostility but there was also a considerable amount of support and i still actually think there still is that there isn't much

air time. >> in the work you did on the presentation of communication, and i know this is a topic that you were concerned with, how did usis and deal with the little impact on the public mind of the threat of weapons of mass destruction where at one point you said there was the word fatigue in the public mind on the wmd and on the other hand when you call the unrivaled barbarian regime delete the -- saddam's regime in self. what was the balance between the two? >> i think they went together all the time. that's why is it is true that when if you actually look at what the -- what is in 1441 and the arguments the prime minister was putting that china was about disarming saddam hussein and his weapons of mass destruction but it's linked into that to other issues.

one is the relationship and importance of preserving and maintaining that and seconded the history of the regime. that was an important part of the communications because people have short memories and you have to keep reminding people when we just talk about the early war and say a million casualties people here that and then you have to find ways of saying less than so rather than just say that you might look for a list of all the towns and have a population of 1 million people and it's just one of those incidents of that's the impact of the time was profound. but now chemical weapons, i remember that. but in a sense you are trying to get over to people that when we

say these things, the death squads, intimidation, the taking tonnes out of people who speak against the regime it is worth listening to some of that and understanding that is why the prime minister is so concerned up this regime. the regime that has used chemical weapons before what is to stop it from giving again particularly if the united states runs away from this. >> cory of people listening? were you getting any sense -- >> we are just people it is about public opinion. that means what people think and we all the different things, no to people think alike on any issue but i certainly had a sense. i remember for example the day of the debate itself i think more than any other debate specific parliamentary debate you've got so many messages from people not necessarily in the

political surface you had a sense of the country following that debate as it unfolded i will never forget sometimes i used to run to work and get on the 24 bus and i can remember listening to a conversation not to women on a bus about resolution 1441 on their way they were talking about what resolution, and i thought people were engaging on this in a deeper level. it's gone beyond the kind of flimflam that really represents a lot of what passes for the debate in the media today. people were engaged. >> my last question on this relates to the extraordinary demonstration of the 15th of february, 2003. and which vast numbers of people including my three children walked through the streets of london protesting about the iraqi border and was said to be one of the largest demonstrations of recent times

what account did you take of the strength of public opinion and how did it in form the prime minister's preparation for what was going to be this very important parliamentary debate? >> well, one very specific way i think the day before the march i think we were in scotland -- the march was getting huge publicity in the build up and was clearly going to be an enormous event. but you have got to remember this is a democracy the prime minister to stand for reelection and she knew this was a deeply unpopular policy with -- not just on a popular like the other issues on popular, tuition fees or whatever it might have been. this was deep. i always have a rule of thumb if someone goes into a march so there's a lot of people who were

opposed and i think what it definitely -- there was political consideration. there was a big protest and he thought about that a lot and he was seized of its significance. but ultimately i think it made him think more deeply about issues and the day before i will check this but he did a speech, we met iraqi exiles in a hotel in scotland who got in touch with me and said because they sensed that the human thing going wrong and they came and said look, please, he has got to see this through. he's got to see this through. we know what iraq is like. you've got all these people. no doubt well-meaning but they do not understand the reality of this regime. and i actually took some of them to see the prime minister. and he then made a speech where the line taken out by the media

he made what he called the moral case for the war because people were talking about the moral case, those on the march, the moral case and the prime minister set out there is a different view to take and ultimately he always used this word, he said i don't disrespect those who've come to different conclusions but he is elected as the prime minister and i saw the seriousness and how much weight upon him but equally ijssel somebody who fundamentally really deeply believed unless the world confronted saddam hussein at that time ultimately in another way because the the blood eckert field than there be a bigger day of reckoning later on and i think he still believes that now. >> was this moral case one that you were then able to in the

short time remaining before the debate? you were able to promulgate in some way through your own efforts? >> he made a speech and the speech got considerable public attention and then up to the -- i think i would say at this time that in terms of the big moments yes we all drafted and chipped in and had sources and so forth but when it came for a cable to the speech in parliament that was very much the prime minister's hand and his people would feel what forces and so forth but yes that is why i always think look like him people reached a different position. you have members -- i remember the monday after the march there were several people within the group who had members in the family who had gone on the march. i think a majority. some people move from within their own household how divisive and how difficult this issue was and that is why i say yes,

people can reach the different conclusions but for heaven's sake, let's do away with all of the conspiracy theories about oil and was about george bush telling tony blair what to do. somebody who is been elected prime minister wants to get reelected does not do something as difficult and controversial as the really believe they should be doing. >> you yourself had no doubt about the case? >> i supported him through. i won't pretend i didn't have doubts about all sorts of things throughout the process. of course he did. and one of the doubt is whether he would survive. i remember myself saying are you sure, are you so sure about this you will put your entire reputation on the line we using to be and i record saddam has been a threat for far too long sometimes you just got to do the right thing regardless of what people around you may be saying

and he believed that and i respect him for the we did that and i supported him the whole way through with doubts in on the we of course i had doubts and sometimes did you think that the americans were being and possibly difficult to deal with on this or that? of course you did. but the british government in my view has to stand up for its own policies in its own ways and i think it is wrong for people to say the rest of it and actually i think britain as a country should feel incredibly proud of the world that we played brutal regimes in history and now you have a few weeks down the line elections which are going to go well. >> i'm going to call a short ten minute break i think to give a solid research and then we will come back for about a final half-hour if that is ok with you. >> what is to go? >> some tidying up. and sir roger i think as a

question set to do with government process and whatever. and that should finish it. >> thank you. >> and i will turn st off -- >> the moral case speech was the day of the march. >> thank you for staying on this long. i've just got a few questions to finish off with. on the question the way the cabinet was involved in the policy as a whole in your diaries are pretty eliminated on the cabinet discussions on iraq straw i think said that iraq -- the cabinet discussed iraq 28

times between some timber, 2002, and march of 2003. but the butler report commented that there was a remarkable absence of papers for these cabinet discussions. why were to their papers for th discussions? >> i don't know. >> you don't know? >> my job isn't preparing papers for cabinet. >> but you are in adviser. he might know why these discussions didn't have the sort of papers of the normal in cabinet, but you don't know? >> license is there was a lot of debates and meetings with vigor we talked about earlier, prime minister prescott, jack straw, and then there was a blot once the wall cabinet came in to be gordon brown,