would be a group of people i assume was being served with papers properly. ..

>> i think the prime minister once said in a different context that if he thought the first time he was aware of a difficult seed within the cabinet or people strongly opposed what he is the leader of the cabinet in the prime minister was saying or doing, at the first time in about it is when he got to the cabinet table you would think his political systems would not have helped much, so it is true there were lots of-- and i can see why sometimes people might have thought he is just going to bring it up to date. and sometimes that was all there was to do but i was certainly present at the cabinet meeting as well, really a pretty vigorous said-- conversation and obviously those people foreign secretary defense secretary deputy prime minister, the people who were involved in the

ongoing discussion that was 24/7, they probably would be taking the lead but then i think what others were doing where may be directly involved in the day to day formulation of policy were challenging, testing. we thought about where it was david blogged and margaret beckett and others who are raising questions. often, i think it was charles, often he and the chief whip getting very very frank assessments as to what people were saying, what people thought, what their concerns were and the prime minister then having to engage in that but i mean, you will know from your discussions with them as well that i think sometimes it is said that the last labor government used to have cabinet meetings that were went on for over two days as the prime minister would not think that was a very effective form of

cabinet government. he would know what his ministers or his colleagues were thinking, concerns they had and the cabinet table was off to where they were fresh out. >> why wasn't the secretary of state for international development included in this inner circle of people given her department was going to be the lead department on questions to do with humanitarian relief and quite a lot of the dealing with the aftermath of the conflict as well as with its humanitarian consequences? >> that is a very good question and in an ideal world the secretary state for international development would come and should and could have been in all of those discussions. i mean, how can i put this, i think it is fair to say that when i step back a bit, cav met government and people that talk about rumsfeld and america being difficult for the president sometimes to deal with, the cabinet in the end their

appointed from within a fairly narrow pool, certainly a small number and sometimes you have to make political-- cab nets sometimes reporting together different political factors. >> i did not work in the political-- >> know but you know how sometimes how difficult a was to reshuffle and put together a cabinet. the point i am making is to have a collection of individuals of variable competence, of the variable trustworthiness and the prime minister eyes, and sometimes he would want to have discussions with smaller group of people. >> are you implying in your deeply diplomatic way that the secretary of state for international development was not regarded as trustworthy, or as competent? >> when clear short was at your

department or in support of of a government policy or position, then i think she was both trustworthy and competent and i think there are people you can talk to say that she was terrific at every level. i can remember for example during the kosovo crisis, clear did an awful lot with pretty extraordinary work at the time but it is no secret. she was very difficult to handle the times. i think sometimes the military and i think that emerged in the evidence of witnesses, i think the bond it for quite difficult to deal with. i think sometimes they are probably work concerns at times about whether a very, very sensitive and tightly held conversations as to whether in a political environment, whether sometimes you may be a little bit worried that things would get out into the public demand you wouldn't necessarily want in

the public domain. >> because she was difficult, her department couldn't therefore be included fully in the work. they didn't receive, as we have heard from earlier witnesses, the iraq options paper of march 2001. she heard about it later and complained. >> i found that surprising. >> you found that surprising? it was sent out from number 10 but they were not on the distribution. that wasn't a sensitive document. she says in her book in september of 2002 and initially was told by fsis that she could receive the breathing on orders from number ten. a similar story at the military briefing. what were the consequences of this for the government's aso whole, the ability to plan effectively for the aftermath of the conflict?

>> again, i am no expert on that side of government policy and planning. i mean, i think it would be obviously, if you had a really good, strong harmonious working relationship across government then i suspect hopefully our government machinery and its operations would be improved, and i know that there were times when people who were out there and you have heard from some of them who said they sensed some elements were a bit to disengage from the whole thing, whereas in previous situations where claire short-- claire short was supported. i think it was something that was difficult but i hope correctable in a fairly short timeframe. i don't think for example if you get into the aftermath the don't think and say that is the reason why things went so as badly as

they did in the aftermath but would it have helped if we would have had better relations? certainly so. >> turning for a minute to the ministry of defense, were they affected by this inner circle factor as well? the cds that the time, admiral lord boys has told us he wasn't able latell a weatherly stage to talk to the defense logistics. will you conference---- >> they had not been kligman eclair instruction or approval to do things that might become publicly obvious in the autumn of 2002 when it was publicly fairly obvious that contingencies were being thought about. >> that would be because the prime minister has said, and a sense he has got his diplomatic strategy and possibly that is what he is trying to push the

cardes doesn't work. and i can see why. i certainly was aware at times of the military willing to get on with things and i think the prime minister had a very good relationship with cbs. he was able to speak very very openly and frankly and gave the frank assessment of what was going on in what he might need. but i think i don't remember that in detail but i suspect what was happening there may be perfectly legitimate-- let's just hold on for now. but i can remember, before crawford, his team where at least thinking about planning. just because they knew the americans had been planning. >> so this is right back in march of 2002 that they were thinking about it? >> everybody was aware that the issue was on the agenda.

the prime minister was being pretty clear that conflict is not inevitable. it is going to be disarmed and i think in my diaries a meeting before crawford, to his credit and i read this the other night, i think he was right in there saying look at this is going to happen whatever timeframe, we have to start thinking about it now. >> are you encouraging him to be more optimistic in his assessments? he said without naming who said this, when he came to us, that he had never had any hesitation in making his reservations about what was going on and i think particularly referring to the state of planning for the operation and indeed i quote care was taken aside from time to time to say can't we make it more of a half full rather than a half empty assessment?

can you remember that that is the sort of raise you may have used with them? >> after that the "financial times" ran a story saying that was me. i certainly don't remember ever sang that to mike boise. there was a chitchat and you might say the prime minister hinote, in a bit of the mood or fed up with this are fed up with that but as you know i would never encourage anybody to be anything other than totally frank with the prime minister. that was the approach i always took. >> of fica just sort of maladjust turn a little bit to the aftermath. you obviously were in a central position where one of those were thinking about the aftermath, thinking about the communications aspects of this. and, i believe major-general tim cross at some point i think came and had a discussion with you about the way that the post

conflict was being handled and in particular the media team and you said that you were happy to see him and subsequently for you some support for the media team. would you like to say a little bit about your perspective from number ten about how the coalition prepared in the run-up to the conflict for what was going to happen after the military campaign and how up to the time that you left number ten and august of that year, you saw the post conflict situation being handled by organizations with names like-- which may ring a bell with you? >> yes. as i said, admirable-- admiral boise, the prime minister from very early on, before there was any real understanding that

there even would be military action it was plugged into the thinking that should there be military action, the morning after planning has to be done on an ongoing basis and i think there was a lot of planning going on. i certainly saw pieces of work that came down from different parts of the government system. >> where was this happening? >> well, within different departments of government and also i know that we probably were led to believe that the state department was taking the lead on a lot of this and of course they were taking the lead in a military operation and i think that would lead to an acceptance and understanding that they would be very centrally the dominant way involved in the aftermath and i think. >> when did you discover the americans hadn't been planning properly for the aftermath? can you describe that? >> for me, it was, i mean

certainly tim cross, to see me was a bit of a revelation. he was very, very-- he made a big impact on me and as i think i told you, whether there is any space in the prime minister's diary when he came and saw him, because he had been to the states and he had been to that meeting that he described to you with the secretary of state for defense and he just-- i think we have been constantly saying, is the planning, is it being done and getting reassuring noises back and they think with and what the british government could do i think there was a lot going on, accepting as everyone says that any immediate's situation is going to be lack of clarity, they are going to be difficulties and unintended consequences but there was quite a lot of work going on. >> is it fair to say the british government at this stage was allocating british resources to the aftermath because we were.

on the assumption that the united nations were actually going to take a lead on a lot of that? >> in terms of what discussions that were had at that time-- >> what was heard from earlier witnesses. >> i certainly think we saw both in terms of the political policies/diplomacy of this, in being sent to try so hard to take it down the u.n. route, the unperhaps understood that we would find easier to get the u.n. the vital role we thought they should have come it did not affect think in terms of financial planning. i don't think so but i was not really involved in that kind of discussion. but i think there certainly was an assumption, assumptions were made about state department planning and i think once we had realized that actually the pentagon appeared to be taking a

role, and i think from that moment on, the prime minister, he was-- asking for an awful lot of things to be done. [inaudible] >> yes, but not only for reasons that again and gets back to the point of there is only one simple thing. you can say it was all donald rumsfeld rick only claire short have been getting along better with the prime minister at the time-- what happened was perhaps it wasn't that grip in the immediate aftermath and again i am speaking way out of my knowledge and expertise but there wasn't that grip. the invasion, the people that talk about catastrophic success and it happened very quickly, and then it became a security problem and then once they think, once al qaeda and the

iranians in the way they did come alighted upon it in the way they did, a kind of lack of grip security problem became a really serious security problem and that then affected every aspect of what was going on there. again, tim cross, a lot of the concerns he talked about when he first came, i think they were real concerns, genuinely held but probably sort of bull at a fairly short timeframe, once he managed to get people who were capable of sorting. but once the security security situation developed as it did you didn't have this obviously philosophical difference in approach between the british and americans in terms of fighting wars and peacekeeping, and so for a period of time that it was clearly very difficult. on my side of things in the communications side, i did what

i could. i sent half of, one point i was going to go there, but i think there was a worry that it would be seen as-- the americans were sensitive of the britons taking over. tim cross, but he never-- what every needed, i eventually did they plan, which i've been trying to find we have not been able to find it but i did a plan for bremer of communications structures based on what we had done previously and adapted to it, and then the foreign office went out there. we put together a pretty detailed communications plan. we fill the beds that we want to fill then lots of the bets frankly did not get filled. the guys that we sent did an

incredible job in incredibly difficult circumstances but in the bigger picture it became a an incredibly difficult security problem that ticket long time to-- >> you have given support with very great conviction. do you consider now that it being a success and looking back on it, what lessons would you draw from it beyond the points that are already being made for example just know about the aftermath and what regrets, if any, do you have? >> d.w.i support it? c.s. i think as i said to you just before the break, i think that britain, far from beating ourselves up about this, should be really proud of the role that we played in changing iraq from what it was to what it is no becoming in the potential impact that has on the region. i think for example libya and

the moves it made in relation to wmd, i don't know because i wasn't involved in the discussions but i wouldn't be surprised and partnering to say that these guys were serious about this issue. i think, i saw the prime minister as closely and probably as often as anybody else and i saw some really deep conviction and integrity, who was making without a doubt the most difficult decision of his premiership, knowing there were going to be consequences but also understanding there were a lot of questions. had he taken another decision. i thought-- was glib about the relationship. >> in looking at the huge cost and loss of life over no six and a half years, and the effects on the stability of the middle eastern region, at the

development of international terrorism within iraq, do you consider that overall the policy has succeeded? >> i do, but not without reflecting often, and realizing the caveat that you just put into that. i think in relation to the middle east peace process, the road map is still, the outline and the prime minister did give the americans to go down there and-- for progress. i think in terms of security, yes the death toll has been high. in terms of iraqis, obviously any loss of in the british soldiers like this not just tragic, but obviously weighs heavily on anybody involved in

the process, most particularly obviously the prime minister come up but i still think-- i mean, he had and i saw it long before september the 11th. he was going on about a.q. khan and the potential link between wmd, the terror groups, failed states. this is the agenda that he saw that had to be addressed by leaders of the democratic world that he raised its. he raised it in his first meeting with george bush. this is going to be the number-one issue of your time. that was before september the 11th so i think good things have been done differently? almost certainly. any decision you can go back over it but i think on the big picture, on the leadership he showed, the leadership the government showed, i was privileged to be there and i am very proud of the part that i was able to play.

>> final question then. >> yes, can i just ask a couple of questions and reflections from you? the first question, you described to us before the break about the shock in discovering there may not be any wmd. when did you first realize how difficult the aftermath might be ended the strike even the same way? >> early, seven days, i think seven days after the invasion, there was a meeting in which john scarlett talked about sort of the real difficulties, the sense of the americans really not knowing, not appearing to have a plan that we thought they

did, really serious questions starting quite early. >> and what was the response to your concerns? what did you think you could do? >> there wasn't much that i could do. >> or what the government could do. >> from that point on, i have not read all the papers beyond my i i i i i i i i i i i i i i f them were very difficult to resolve and at that point there was a period when there appeared to lose focus and not have that staying on top of all of the problems, so there's no doubt there was a difficult period. >> and then, to reflect a bit on what you described to martin

gilbert, this debate was taking place in january, the abari in march, the polarization in the country. did that make it difficult within government to have a re-evaluation of where you work, but because the stakes had been raised so high politically, that if you were standing back from it he might even be seen to be hedging back to the other side. >> you see, it is true that the country was clearly very, very divided. the parliamentary labour party very divided. actually within the cabinet there was a lot of genuine support for the position. obviously old robin cooke resigned and eventually claire short resigned. the questions that were constantly being put in the issues and concerns being raised, they weren't saying

let's fundamentally be of value with the position here. the position was said them his the threat. the british government had become a greater threat and it had to be confronted. he had to be forced to face up to his united nation obligations. did it mean that obviously the aspect of policy was look that at different times in different ways? that didn't really change the whole thing. did it make it more typical of the fact that there was so much public opposition? yes. >> did it also mean there was perhaps more the focus on the war itself then on the aftermath, and on the u.n. process, the big decisions he would have to face? should regime change take place? they were not given the same attention? >> do you mean-- my recollection

is that all of those issues were getting very, very large public debate. but it is true, after the invasion and windy inquiries-- again this could be my memory not being that great books my sense is that the aftermath and in a sense it not become as big a media and political issue at the time. i am being frank, i thought it probably could and should have them and they think maybe if it had, the corrections that had to take place might have happened a bit more quickly. >> this is a consequence of intense political debate that focuses on particular things. >> don't forget as well, within the british political media

system, once the bbc broadcast of the report that they did in may when the prime minister first-- that to a large extent completely took over the debate. it was another of the very unfortunate consequences of that. so actually there was probably less attention, less focus on what was then actually happening in iraq on the media level and a political level then there should've been. meanwhile those who were getting into iraq, military and intelligence guys and so forth but also those who were trying to restore some kind of civil administration and public services and so forth, they had a tough job and i tend to agree not is an expert nor somebody who knows about this much is the people on the panel but i do tend to agree with john straw's assessment that given the circumstances they did a pretty

amazing job of getting things u eventually the way that they did. >> i think we have pretty much come to the end of this session. a question to you mr. campbell, have we given you sufficient opportunity to offer us your reflections on the lessons to be learned, real-world lessons about the whole experience? >> real world? >> real world lessons. >> i would just say, as is lessons learned i think looking from where i am now which is out of government but obviously still full of things and closely in touch with people, my understanding is that i i i i ii

[ car starting ] >> allen iverson! >> i'm so far different from the guys. i'm very brief. >> you look at allen. you say, hey, there's a free- spirit guy. >> iverson. >> allen's life is a dream come true. . >> where i go, i hear about it the next day, like anywhere! >> a think a big part of al is he doesn't try to appeal to anybody. he does what he does. >> i heard the legend of bubba chuck. >> one of the best that ever played basketball. >> what's up? i'm allen iverson and we're in here talking. this is my life, 365. when you talk about allen

iverson it's better to talk negative. ♪ >> i took the team and gave it back to the fans. >> i put it in back. catch him again. >> people that don't understand -- i guess -- they probably understand it but they try not to understand it because, you know, when you talk about allen iverson, it's better to talk about something negatively. more headlines and bold print like allen iverson having a dispute with a coach or missing practice -- that's the big headline. but tand i it. a pers aepti you -- th e go to be anmyt nvinsomei' rsonate.

i care about if people think a good guy -- i would be lying if i said i want everybody to think i am the devil. >> right. >> but i don't go out of my way to prove that i am. >> right. >> you know, a good person. >> being a role model is not something that -- you can choose. you're chosen. >> yeah. >> you're chosen to be that. what i hear you saying is that as you have grown, you have kind of realized that a little bit. >> i'm 33 -- i don't do the same things i did, you know, when i was 23. >> right. you would be a fool if you did. >> stone cold fool. i don't do those things no more. i still make mistakes. still human. i still look back on things that -- damn, i wish i didn't do it that way. i wish i did it another way. >> as it stand, allen iverson is a convicted man, required by law to be in jail. >> that time was very southwesting. you talk about time where it

was a situation happening in a bowling alley and you know allen with his friend. and that bowling alley situation there -- he had one of the ggesproblems you could a gets sentenced to now he has to do jail time? what was the climate like in that time period?

>> tense. i mean, i don't know how else -- tense. the system and incarcerated this young, ambulance male. >> what was it like when you saw him walking out four in trouble.

at that time you would say no y. r cok fis. >> what was going on when you were in there? >> scary. any cos. scared of not having another opportunity to accomplish my goal. being a professional athlete. you know, i thought it was taken away from me and it was tough. just hoping for an opportunity -- i was in there for almost four months and for the first h, y lawyhad hinks goin homeery singa

moike,row ink l bethe yo com he got me out of jail. state of clemency. that's important, too, because he still had that on the record. i think he looked at the case, you know, saw all the inconsistencies. the unfair treatment. and he made a decision based on what he felt was right. >> did he make you promise him anything when you get out? >> no. you know what? he dlet. i ltthll hat b

ttinme ld e besit. etty that i had a chance to do something positive with my god-given aibilityd. >> announcer: coming up -- >> this is an educational institution and religious institution. if education and religious john can't give a person another chance, whwhwhwhwhwhwhwhwhwhwhwh

duct v ( bases ( ounois can m myar oas adent wh youtionveru wado yxes. >> describe your cause -- >> someone that actually saved

my life. we wouldn't be in here doing this interview if it n't fojohnson. dn't l- mill of do 't bnal firsteam allscoring titles. first pick. wouldn't have been -- none of that. >> explain how he saved your life. >> because he gave me an opportunity when everybody turned it back on me. >> how did allen get to georgetown? was it a recruiting process? >> what happened is that a committee of people from the area contacted me through boo williams and said they

mysit, in scht wa. elsevle sc ey. you had to have somebody strong enough -- first of all, they will come after you, the media. >> they were worried about his well-being and, you know, really, his safety because when they came up to visit me, there was an interesting thing that happened. i was not showing as much interest, obviously, as she would have liked me -- mrs. iverson -- would have liked me to have shown and asked the other people to get out of the

room. they asked them would they leave. i would like to talk with coach. when they left, she said that, you know, they're gonna hurt my kid. i don't think she meant in the literal sense somebody would shoot or attack him in that matter but i think she meant it was her life saving thing she was trying to pursue for her son and was in tears. >> my mom came up here to d.c. and met with them and -- you know, after that, you know, i had another opportunity in life. i think god put him into my life. >> people deserve a chance, as long as they take advantage of it. that's one of the things i said to allen. i'm willing to go along with this but you've got to respond. i'm not going to compromise the school. i'm not going to compromise myself if you don't do the things you're supposed to do.

>> mike, how much of a risk was it for georgetown, given everything that allen had been through, to take allen? >> i remember thinking at the time, you know, it is a risk. yet, yet i know from talking to coach it wasn't as much of a risk as for some places. it wasn't as big a risk for a state system. private schools have the support. >> once your dad made a judgment -- this was a young man we were willing to give an opportunity to and to have a say in his development, we were prepare to take on that challenge. >> to see him sign at georgetown and go play basketball for coach thompson was one of the most happiest days of my life. because i knew then that he would be okay.

>> what adjustment did you have to make from a coaching standpoint, coaching someone like allen iverson? >> i had to consider his well- being a person, how he played as a basketball player. because allen is a guy who is so talented you got to give him the opportunity to express his ability. >> he put me in a position to be on the basketball court, you know, before then talk t gewn eingbig ma hoola ow, ing tel cess hat em. so obviously he knew what he was doing. ♪ >> whoa! >> smooth! >> iverson, reverse lay-up. >> iverson has it. >> you're older w a ousll ave a

you know, but what people that see him from afar -- all they is, frong sket hn. dude heyell, at, an the . st hbei auc, , i is. >> sometimes what you say doesn't sound right. sometimes it doesn't fit into today's society because everybody in today's society are not going to be the first pick in the draft. they're not going to be a millionaire. so i couldn't afford to let him think that if he slacked back some that i was going to

understand that. >> he would talk -- straight face -- you up here. eating three times a day. you sleeping in your warm room. you got a light. warm water. >> your mom is down there in tidewater wondering where the next meal is coming from and where the heat bill coming from. >> they might not eat today. they don't have lights or warm water. >> this lady who loves you dearly is down there suffering a hell of a lot of hardships than you are so don't bring that [ bleep ] in here to me. >> you want to ruin your opportunity? you know, and right there i was -- you know, i was about bawling because it was reality. if you mess this situation up, after she ere and she 't c , you dn't is tuat goin is opity be a ke o -- e yoherli

d yoosed -- lit. i can get myself right on that straight line. >> announcer: coming up -- >> i worked real hard to get here. contribute to coach thompson, my family and friend. without them i wouldn't be here. i'ming. at'sreak gute ids: hanrah i bring you -enr rtifwith creaest reatoble solskil it's good! fand or y bosuzy don't w s ju pow of t anno fee kid the arts. for ten simple ways to learn how, visit americansforthearts.org

>> the first pick in the 1996 nba pick, the philadelphia 76ers select allen iverson from georgetown university. >> i see how excited fans get all over the world. nothing like philly. that's what sports is about. when you think of , yo of philadelphia fans. ns sbe philly fa as thetionand theyfeelat --love their sport and stick with their team till the end. >> you coach two number one picks in the draft, two guys

that were multiall- stars in that league. that has to make you proud. >> well, it makes me real proud because i think a lot of the thicks you do are segmented. you want people to graduate and be good students and decent human beings but successful in the profession they're in. >> the people that play in philadelphia should cherish that, man, and should really feel good about the sport they have. it's definitely thick in that gym. i had my ups and downs towards the end. i realthiaf thos ars,w, s th thaedmetode wereng f witall e but ing invome, ow. i think some my fall. >> i have been through too much to let somebody with a pen and paperer and a microphone

and a camera kill me or dry allen iverson crazy. >> some people in the organization. >> if allen feels you know, he doesn't want to practice and watoplitt workanlong >> k hesthing azy nt. you r. . w itsodit. i'mve ia atio sut i thcoming for me and they will ask questions that

will make me mad but it's about being intelligent enough and experienced enough to know how to handle the situation and do it the right way without making one story bigger because of how you reacted to, you know, the situation. >> announcer: coming up -- >> visit authenticness -- there's an authenticity about allen that really catches people.

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the first time it was rough. it was rough. just for the fact that my kids had been accustomed to being -- my two older kids -- had been accustomed to philly. that's all they ever knew. and this time it was even tougher. on me, it was tougher on my kids. after awhile, they had got accustomed to being in denver but for me as a player quick always look at it like, you know, the team that trades for you, they want you. >> right. >> no better feeling to have an organization that wants you. and 20,000 more fan that embrace you. it was cool to leave but as far

as my family, my kids, they struggled with it. my wife was cool with it. and after awhile, once my kids got better, i'm cool with it. >> the point guard position in basketball is a posi hoitn leavpo d tem plac

s what it takes to win. and as a person, you know, a good all- around cat, you know. st phav conc ar ev cat 15yehen i met you now you neve d le'sptio u. thathu i make mistakes. >> there's an authenticness, an authenticity, about allen that really catches people. it really attracts them. it's not, you know, a singular appeal. it doesn't appear to one type

of person. you can't just say, allen iverson appeals to the hip hop community. that's wrong. has people's tastes and sensibility change and tolerance changes, the appeal became this guy plays 100 miles per hour every night and brings joy although he is not smiling irvine johnson so there's aparentls d ame ppipe >> a scholarship program where you have endowments set up with colleges and also you have given over hundreds of thousands of dollars to the gun buyback program in newport news, virginia. people don't always want to know that aspect of allen iverson. >> i have a chance to make a difference. if i changed one life, i didding many. if i put somebody in school, help themselves and their family and buying a gun back

and get a gun off the street, $100,000, $100 a gun, you can get a lot off the streets. >> once he turned allen iverson. >> just for the fact i'm able to do that, you know, for somebody else, and tha

thinfor don'd wriuphe ing. st a youfromtho t en they appreciate >> i just carry it out to the fullest. >> practice? what? [ laughter ] we talking about practice? >> you have to look at somebody in your family and the mistakes they made -- look at the mistake you made in your life and look in the mirror and say,

well, why judge