that's his fifth. i thought he traveled when he caught the ball. >> phil: they swing it back to him at the top. , he did. he picked up both feet before he put the ball back on the floor. watch both feet. yeah. >> steve: that's interesting, phil, because that's something they've called all season long but not in this game. >> phil: it looked like deshawn was the one has that had the contact with the hand check. >> steve: chicago takes the lead by 1 on the 3-point play. butler had it knocked out of bounds with 10 on the shot clock. under a minute to go in overtime no. 2. 119-118 chicago.

foye with salmons on a drive. shoots, misses, rebound noah. >> phil: still plenty of time. make sure you get the shot 1420,304 come to their feet. reverse layup, missed it, haywood with the rub and let's see what the call is. foul is called on chicago. it's on joakim noah. >> phil: more and more he impresses me with his play. he wanted that ball more than noah. had to reach back. he's on rose right here.

watch this ball come off. he goes after it with two hands. they call a foul on noah. [ indiscernible due to crowd noise]. >> steve: wizards have missed 10 free throws in the game. haywood 15 from the line -- 1-5 from the line tonight. career high 19 rebounds. substitutes for chicago, taj gibson, and tyrus thomas, both back in the game. haywood to tie it at 119. wow, somebody was in the lane,

but it didn't matter. he makes the free throw and ties the game with 27-4/10 seconds to play. so phil, do you just try to play good defense here? you don't need to try to foul. this team's got 4 seconds to shoot and still -- 24 seconds to shoot and there's still three after that. >> phil: i don't think you can foul. they've certainly been playing outstanding defense throughout most of this game. but no, i don't think you can afford to give a foul and have him shoot. but brendan haywood tying his career-high, foye having a great night. we've seen some exciting play and guys with some new highs.

>> steve: game that be tied 29 different times. chicago 11 games hiengd cleveland coming -- behind cleveland coming into this game tonight with second place in the central division. they've won three in a row, seven of their last ten, they're getting ready to go out and play seven games on the road while the wizards will come back and play a stretch at home beginning tomorrow night against sacramento. standing ovation for the bulls. 3-second difference between game and shot clock. derrick rose with a career high 35. spins, shoots and scores. >> phil: so nefs a straight 1-

4 offense, everybody pretty much had to stay home. foye was going on one un -- one on one. one-hand push shot from derrick rose and he gives his team a 2- point lead. here's the play again. forced him to turn around. you can see that's a tough shot. where i

hit this clutch shot. and chicago hangs on to win it 121-119. despite 34 from jamison, 27 from butler and haywood with another big game. so chicago wins it 211-1 -- 121- 119 in overtime. phil and i will join you tomorrow when the wizards take on the sacramento kings from verizon center, game time 7:00 on comcast sportsnet. 34 points, 18 rebounds for jamison. brendan haywood with a career- high 20 rebounds tonight and 16 points. chicago wins it 121-119 in double o-time. phil chenier, steve buck hans

hants -- buckhantz, so long from the windy city.

line people were accepted there and that was and i think they no longer are attainable and i felt what he wanted to do and it is a shame and away the controversy was subsequently followed about the dossier was intended as it was because in an exercise it had an openness and much more open government trying to share with the public information it's

quite sensitive but what she's trying to share with the public so they can be informed about all of the factors coming into his decision making process so the was the thinking behind it. >> was a political context as well in the diary for the third of september you say we went through some of the hard questions on iraq. the hardest was why now? why is it we knew what we knew now and we didn't before? it isn't that made us believe what we have to do now so it's about selling the policy as well, not just helping intelligence. >> it was also at the time, and this is again how things look so differently in the sense of the benefit of hindsight at the time i don't know if you remember but over the period until then things are relatively calm and denied it was jim baker and brent scowcroft made a couple of

high-profile interventions in the american debate on if you like the state department side of the argument and the neocons really corrected up by cheney and rumsfeld and their people making some pretty neocon type of statements and part of the thinking when the prime minister came back from from summer break and we went to mozambique and then decided to have a press conference that is where he said we were going to bring forth the process on the dossier and part of that was trying to call the situation. he made the point in the september 3rd press conference. again no decisions are being taken. conflict is not inevitable. people are getting ahead of themselves. but what he did want to do was to set out for the public in an

accessible way as possible the reasons he had become more concerned. >> so, there's very much then dependent on the newness of the information, the relatively -- >> partly. >> again just another context with the meeting that you then had a few days later and can't david if you've already been discussing where the question of presentation became a big issue between, and you discussed it with barkley your opposite number in the white house as well. so, was there -- was there a sense of needing to influence each other's the american debate as well as the british debate? >> i think as i said earlier the american opinion was in a different position to read on these big global issues -- >> you mentioned the neocon -- >> i was interested in chris

meyer's evidence when he talked about the assessment of opinion, and of went around the united states, not been terribly supportive of that frustration. i did not have the impression i must admit but i thought that was quite interesting. but i think -- we certainly -- it wasn't a question of trying to influence them, then influencing us, but we were aware that our communications had an impact on their positions and even more so i suppose their communications had an impact on knous to read to be fair to dan barletta and karen hughes and all the other people who were always very up for been told very, very frankly where sometimes their communications didn't help hours at all. so we did have those sorts of discussions. >> if we move to the actual production of the dossier the cells of the first time the issue of the dossier had come up? >> no. >> said there had been to papers

prepared beforehand? there had been one prepared by the jic in march, 2002. [laughter] >> i don't know if he's watching [inaudible] >> there had been one prepared by the jic march of 2002; is that correct? >> march or february. >> yes, it was past due november 10th on the 21st of march. >> right. >> why was it decided not to use that paper then? >> i think that the paper -- i mean that kind of work i suppose is being done all the time in terms of them making assessments. i suppose the axis of evil speech put up in mind all the countries that people might be -- might be focusing upon -- >> i think that's a different paper. >> is this the four countries --

>> yes, there was a four country club one in february 2002 which did look at -- >> been -- >> i'm happy to talk about not, because that's important. for the reasons that you have just given. so do carry. >> as i recall, there was a paper prepared within the jic process, and as it were, across the four countries, decided -- and just really put to one side, not for any great reason other than the fact that it just didn't -- it wasn't the sort of thing that was going to be in any way put into the public domain at that time. no rhyme or reason for it to have been done at that time, and then work began on the iraq-specific paper. >> there would have been one reason perhaps for caution on the february, 20021, is that by looking at iran, libya, north korea, as well as iraq, it would

have brought home the fact, as we have heard in evidence from tim owls and willie gerdemann, those other countries were actually further advanced and of greater concern in terms of nuclear weapons in particular, the iraq. >> yeah, and i think that's why -- i think when you talk about those questions that you read from my diaries in september when we were up in sedgefield, why iraq was a very, very important question as well. i think, or 20 blair here, what he would say to that was the reason why he was more concerned about iraq was partly because they had used chemical weapons, partly because of the nature of the regime and that is why the history of the regime is important in this, and also because there was no -- evin a semblance of being able to get any sort of dialogue going with him at all. >> but for the moment, there wasn't -- the wasn't a particularly good political

reason why to produce something -- that highlighted the significance of those other powers in february. but in march, there was a paper of iraq that was confirmed by the jic and passed on to november 10th on the third first of march, which i think covered some of the ground, but i think it was decided not to go ahead with that. >> yes. >> why not in march? >> again, this is just the -- i can't claim to remember every part of dustin hot process or decision making process, but i think at the time, because we -- it was the sense that actually been -- it was just for about an issue that at the time we did not particularly want to ramp up. >> so you were happy to ramp up in september, and then in april -- i'm not sure if this was before or after crawford, the counter proliferation department of the foreign office was asked to prepare the paper on the history of inspections and that

led to a document that was entitled british government reading papers on iraq. do you recall that? >> i don't recall being involved in that process. >> you weren't involved in that? >> no. >> the point is that by september there were two potential departments or agencies that might produce a dossier. one what be the foreign office and one would be the jic? >> yes. >> were both making bids? >> i don't think the jic were, as it were, making bids, making a bid. i think there was a feeling within the foreign office that this should be their product. now, the prime minister was absolutely clear -- and i think that he was right about it as well -- and john scarlett was very, very strongly of the few -- that -- john used the word "ownership." if he were saying this was a

document that was as it were the main interest of which was the intelligence base of eight, then he wanted to be 100% in charge of that process. that's something that i think it is fair to say there were people within the foreign office who wanted to have similar ownership and we just had to make it very, very clear that that was not willing to happen. >> and what your answers to serve roderic lyne use it was in your opinion in the intelligence agencies of the new communications better than others. to expand on that a bit by william and? >> that wasn't the criticism of the foreign office. what i meant by that -- when i talked earlier about the sort of another silo driven department by department communications really has to go back at the back of the queue. you have the ministers, you have these policy officials, and they

do ought really important stuff and then bring in the communications guy at the end and they all sort of write press releases, and that's kind of it. that was the sort of basic approach. i exaggerate to make the point, but not that much. what i was talking about, in relation to come in particular, some of these big international crisis moments is that there is an understanding i think the intelligence community, if you like, to use that phrase, and certainly the people in positions of leadership that i got to know, i think i understood that some of these conflict situations actually the way that the media will follow them, report them, present them to the public -- >> so you had a degree of confidence that the jic understood the media context in which they would be operating? so you wouldn't be taking them wholley into the unknown territory? >> i think -- i would step back a little bit from that first of all and say i think the reason why -- i mean, for it might you and this isn't the reason why

the prime minister was so supportive of the idea of them being in the driving seat of this is because he felt that -- i mean, i go back to the point i made earlier. there is him saying loci if you can see what the intelligence people are saying to me, you might actually have a different take on this and you see why i was becoming more concerned. so what he wanted to come in a sense, was put into the public domain there is what they are presenting to me. so actually, the whole strength, if you like, of that document is in its public communications and presentation and parliamentary terms was in its being a jic document. >> on the fifth and ninth september you cheered to meetings in the cabinet office with senior officials including john scarlett, to discuss the dorcy -- dossier. why were you sharing those meetings? >> because john scarlett, having done what he considered to be a

pretty advanced draft of the dossier, then said to me i think quite rightly, i think this spring to be a document the press to present to parliament. and there is massive global expectations around, and i need a bit of presentation will support and that is what i gave him. >> can i just clarify some that he said? use it scarlett had already been a draft. i didn't think a draft had been done? >> there came a point he said i have now reached the point i need presentation all advice on this. as we met on the fifth and the ninth. as a result of those meetings, a process was set up by me in writing around the system, which made clear what the dossier come in terms of its overall structure and content were going to be, but also emphasizing to everybody in the system that this was now john scarlett's work and anything that had gone before was redundant and irrelevant. this is where -- and then when he came back to me it was to say i have now reached a position i need presentational advice. i was cheering those meetings

because the prime minister was going to be presenting the paper john was working on to the parliament, massive media interest right around the world and i think it was entirely largest procrit but it was absolutely necessary i should have done that >> most organizations sharing authority and accountability. so you basically are saying you are the customer of the process as well as giving help with the presentation? >> i mean look, in terms of the -- just as a point of accuracy by the way, the meetings were in the downing street, not in the cabinet office. >> look, within the context of that meeting on was the person who was charged by the prime minister to advise him on all the presentational aspects and the dossier which was went be enormous i think on the day that the dossier was published the website crashed and interest was absolutely huge.

and so john's role within that, which was clearly understood by everybody -- and i think also in a wait hopefully was of assistance to john scarlett and the jic, that in a sense, we were so clearly having that relationship because to the rest of the government it was sending very, very clearly the message this is now the document that the pri minister is going to present to parliament and that guy over there, john scarlett is the man in charge of it. >> but it was quite an unusual thing. i accept that you estimate there wasn't president -- particularly for you chairing a meeting of intelligence professionals with intelligence professionals present? >> there had been meetings i had had before where intelligence people would have been there because they had legitimate inappropriate advice to give to me about presentation -- presentational and communications issues.

>> you sent out a memo afterwards which indicated the main headings to be covered, the importance of this being a jic product and john scarlett being happy with it. there were two additional points. you drew attention to the fact that the media political judgment will inevitably focus on what is new, and he expressed pleasure that the intelligence community was going to take a helpful approach in going through their material. what did you have in mind there? >> why had in mind there was the fact that there was these recordings, reports and parts of the media of rumblings within the intelligence community, and throughout the process, john scarlett, richard deer love and others made absolutely clear that the senior positions within the agencies of jic, the was not the attitude at all and that they understood why the prime minister wanted to present is in the way that he intended to.

>> and was a helpful approach and going through the material looking for material that perhaps hadn't seen the light of day before that might help to make an impact? >> i think it was -- it was making sure that all of the -- of the material that the prime minister might be referring to when he was saying i am seeing more and more intelligence, which makes me more and more concerned about iraq as a threat. that there was considered for inclusion in the dossier. >> and in the second you said that the team was seeking a established to review the document from the presentational point of view including john williams from the foreign office, which was to make recommendations. how did this team work during the production of the dossier? >> i think the -- look, that -- when i said hutton in query there were all sorts of people

putting in comments and putting in suggestions they were perfectly entitled to do that and i was in a sensible and all the people within my own, within the number ten operation but also people in the foreign office and elsewhere that when it came to the presentation of the dossier which i said several times is a pretty major communications event that they were fully brought into the process as well, so they were able to make comments and it was entirely up to in terms of any redrafting it was entirely up to john scarlett and his team as to whether they took any notice or not. >> that they were sitting in on some of the drafting meetings? >> i don't think i ever went to -- >> i think you did -- >> hutton eighteen's such. again, i wouldn't necessarily be aware of all the different meetings john scarlett and julie ann miller and the team might be having, but certainly this was a very, very significant piece of communications. as you said, although we have done the al qaeda document using some intelligence material

before, on this scale nothing like it had never been done before. certainly there were, within some of my colleagues at the number ten and those in the foreign office, they had a legitimate interest in understanding the preparation of this, but the whole way through it could not have been made clear to everybody that nothing would override the intelligence judgments and the john scarlett was the person who, if you like, had a single pen. >> people -- ayman, quoting from a memo to the prime minister from john scarlett of the fourth of june, 2003, he said, "with agreement of the agencies and representatives from the number ten, danny preus and the press officer is john williams and james fever were involved," so they were quite actively engaged in the operations. >> i was making clear to the prime minister this has gone through all the people he probably would expect to take a look at some of the documents

he's going to present to parliament. .. since that report, documents being released of the draft prepared by him with th%rbrbrbrb earlier. once we got to september the 5th an wednesday guide to september 5 in september 9, it was anything that anybody had written before, frankly, was to be used by john

scarlett as he sawfish. but i did not see that as a draft dossier. >> when sir john scarlett passed you the first draft on september 10, i think you referred to considerable help from john williams. >> can i just emphasize for the sake that i'm not remotely criticizing john williamson this. he was totally, legitimately wanting to help in terms of the building the arguments, in terms of making sure that the presentational aspects are right. but there came a point within the process environment at one point jack straw stood up and said, look, jack was very, very helpful and said if you want john williams full-time on this, writing it, then he is there. and it is in that spirit that was being offered, not as it were a kind of turf war try to grab this thing away from the

jic. >> okay. when this first draft was distributed, which john scarlett said had drawn on all the available intelligence identified so far, the response from the people on the presentational side was a bit disappointed. there is an e-mail string of september 11 that starts with ddl prouse, who wants to play it a bit more of the nature of intelligence sourcing, and broaddrick smith, apm spokesman, comes than worrying it a bit of a muddle needs a lot more clarity. and then it comes to fill bathgate, who i think worked for you. >> well, he was a special adviser to the prime minister. >> but it works for you and to agree they should be written in a bit more in official list unless journalistic. it feels like this is the least possible intelligence material

at the intel people are prepared to let go, despite the fact that we see this everything the government knows on this issue, which it clearly isn't. disorder breeds of that the presentation team couldn't believe that the intelligence material was so thin. >> well, that may have been there honestly held opinions. but i didn't agree with them. i actually thought that the paper was that john scarlett produced on a september tab was -- it's certainly not -- i thought it was a very, very good piece of work. so, as they sat at the hutton inquiry, they're all perfect entitled to make those points. but it's not their decision of what would nandor truitt your overall structure -- the >> but it's relevant in terms of being concerned about making the maximum impact. >> yes. >> if this was their reaction --

>> well, i think that is relevant. and i think it is interesting of course that when the prime minister wrote a note to -- i think it was one of his monday morning notes that i referred to earlier, and he said on the dossier, the expectations must be right. i indeed a day. it, remember the case we need to make us for the return of a tough inspection regime, not about to launch a strike. now, if we were expecting a document that said, you know, we are all going to be sitting cowering in our homes because saddam hussein is about to launch a nuclear weapon at peterborough, that was not what was being said here at and therefore, again i think the butler report pointed out that when the dossier itself was published, lots of the media said was very dull, very cautious, nothing much new. we never wanted it to be anything other than setting out,

people talk about it being the case of war. it was not a case for war. it was the case where the prime minister had become more concerned. now somebody in the press office thought it was and this was back, find pure but that is a very, very serious piece of work you >> it's not just a question of the nature of the threat that's presenting because of the sub this was a necessary threat assessments. it was an assessment of the evidence. but it was a sense that -- you could say that they were assuming that what they were seeing was the tip of an iceberg, in terms of intelligence material. but actually there was nothing below the water. so what they were trying attention to what the problem that, whatever the message, the intelligence on which it seems to have been based, at least which it had been shown in najaf to withstand. >> you are entitled to that view, but i didn't share.

>> but on the evening of the 11th of september, you met with john scarlett. and after that meeting, a no one around reporting i guess i'm your views. it says, it states that number attended the chairman, once a document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. so this is urging more to be done, looking for more material. >> i think there was a process, like any such publication where, as i said to you earlier that was the point which john came to me and said, look, i need presentational advice and support on this. and that's what i gave you but i think this john scarlett also make their many, many times the hutton inquiry and no time did i ever ask him to beef up, override any of the judgments judgment that he had so forth. so it was -- and what is more, i think that the jic wanted this

document to be as strong and complete as possible as well. >> one of the problems that comes into focus as you are taking an intelligence community which is normal workings is very tentative, is very cautious, verify and decrease the probability it used to qualify its judgment in the world in which you are involved, which is much more definite, geared to the news cycle and so on. bringing these two into line it is bound to affect in some way that a normal intelligence product will be presented. >> well, i'm not sure about that. love, is it the normal stuff of intelligence officers were, to be engaged in that kind of production? no, is the answer to that. but they weren't really normal times and you were in a situation where on this

particular policy as it evolved and developed, this did become -- the prime minister, he is conscious of the fact that she had gotten an incredibly difficult and serious decision that he is going to have to make as this process evolves. and i think he was just in a position of saying, well, here i am. i see this intelligence. i am becoming more and more concerned that we are going to have to face up to this and we are going to have to deal with it. we are going to have to stop turning a bar night to it. and you want to share that with the public. now, once he is made decision, as the prime minister and ultimately the head of intelligence as well, then where i see it i have to kind of do my part of the job and follow up on that. but at no point did anybody from

the prime minister downs a any of the intelligence services, you've got to sort of tailored to fit his argument, that argument. it never happened. >> but the pressure is on. >> yes, but if john scarlett -- the >> you're trying to make a case. we heard from sir william durham is just so careful the officials were to indicate that intelligence was sporadic and patchy, poor, limited. so there is a problem here that you won a strong case, but it has to be based on limited evidence. >> all i can say is that that document that was presented to parliament by the prime minister was -- it was a jic document with the prime minister is poured upon it. and i think that the -- if that had been the view of that, so when the prime minister said, for example, in the forward what

he believed the intelligence that is fast, that's he believed the intelligence had assessed because to quote john sawyer's evidence to you, he believed the intelligence. why should make? he believed what he was being told. so i think actually in advance i don't really believe that the dossier in any sense misrepresented the position. i think it was cautious. i think it was -- i think everybody involved in this was aware of the unprecedented nature of it. and for that, in part because of that took great care in the handling of it and -- look, let's be absolutely frank. i don't think we would even having this exchange if it was not for the controversy for which subsequently ensued, which was, may as i said, none of our doing. >> well, i'm not talking about the controversy which subsequently ensued. this was the major case that was

made at the time for the basis for -- not for war, for stepping up, policy. >> which was hans blix himself said there he said it set out the case of intelligence that was available. >> yes you >> now, just we have mentioned the previous inquiries that have looked at this. lord had in suggested that the jic might've been subconsciously influence to make the wording of the dossier somewhat stronger than it would've been if it had contained the normal jic assessment. do you accept that might've happened? the >> no, i don't. he tells of the nature of john scarlett. i don't accept that at all and i can see why lord hutton may say that, but i just can't say from where i sat seeing joe john scarlett and his team approached, not just that task but every task i ever saw them

involved in. i don't accept that, no. >> and the butler committee, more weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear in the language in the dossier gave impression that it was fuller and firmer intelligence behind the judgment that was the case. >> again, i can say is that i repeat myself that when the prime minister and his, not just my exchanges with john scarlett but also his own, he was absolutely clear that they, the jic, had to be happy with that document and in terms of his son to they flow me also say, again because people are not remotely suggesting you in this that because the large parts of the routinely rewrite the history around this i think the way the prime minister presented it to parliament actually was on, if you like a cautious side of things. he said in terms intelligence can't give you the whole picture. intelligence is not necessarily always going to be right. but the intelligence that he saw both in terms of annecy was explained to him and as he had

repeated discussions of meetings about it, it led him to the conclusion as he sat on the fourth that he did believe it was established that saddam had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons. but he continued to develop weapons that he is then available to extend his program and he sees wmd as a sensual -- the >> will come onto some of the judgments he made. adjusted to include this section, you have described a process in which the intelligence agencies, through the jic, are keen to do their best to get evidence into the public domain in a serious way possible. they understand the policy context. you have told us how john scarlett is regularly attending policy meetings. maybe these are not questions for you, but it is an issue that they are being drawn to in helping make a case.

and they want to help. they want to serve the government as much as you do. and therefore, it's not necessarily that surprising if his lord hutton put it there was a subconscious desire to push things beyond which they might normally go. >> all i can say is that i think the relationship that john scarlett had with the prime minister and the respect of the prime minister had for john koller tennison integrity and his commitment to professionalism they got to rest on scarlett that i just don't accept that he may have felt under that pressure. i think if john scarlett had felt, look the intelligence really doesn't bear out the argument that you want to present in parliament. i think the prime minister would have just accepted that. but the reason why we've got to this place in the first place, in the process in the first

place, was because the prime minister had become more and more concerned about the intelligence he received. >> can we now turn to the question of the forward? db draft this? >> yes, i think what happened was that there was a meeting at which -- and this would often be the case in which an offense the prime minister if you like what gives me a verbal draft. he would tell me what he wanted to say within the foreword and i would go away and write something and then i would show that to people within the system before going back to him. so again, i can't remember every step of the process but that would probably be. i remember i saw were the meeting which is about this is what the forward today. >> and he was very comfortable with assorted lenzi came up with? the >> yes, and almost certainly would have rewritten them and almost certainly a draft will

have gone around the system and people will have made comments in the normal way, and then, ultimately he would've signed off on the final version. >> now sir john told us that he saw a ford quite different from the text of the dossier itself. it was an overtly political statements under the prime minister and therefore not something he thought would change. >> he did change it though. >> he changed on the reference to jic. >> i think what happened was the foreword went to john's and then was copied to all members of the jic. and again, any one of them have had a concern about any aspect of it, i know for fact of the prime minister would have taken none on board. so i think john scarlett made a number of small suggestion, all of which were taken on board. and they understand what he said -- i understand what he

means by that. he's got a foreword by the prime minister which is an basis with the prime minister's statement to parliament as well. in a very high profile, pretty politically charged by the context. sir john scarlett said quite rightly, this is the bit i have done. i think if john scarlett or any of his team had had any concerns of real substance about the forward, and they know they could increase is directly to the prime minister. >> so when we take the sentence, what i believe the assessment has established beyond doubt is that saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons. nobody challenged the beyond doubt? >> no. >> sir william or i'm noted to s. intelligence that does not have certainty attached to it. >> i think does a perfectly fair point to make. this is the prime minister presenting this department and saying that if he is in no doubt based on the fact that intelligent people have briefed

him. this is clear that this -- >> beyond doubt conflict beyond anybody's doubt. >> yes, but at that time if you had spoken to the head of the french intelligence service in the german intelligence service or even the countries that ultimately did not go with the united states in the uk in the other allies in this. nobody was released and it that hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction and that he wasn't a potential threat with them. >> we can argue about some of that, but it is a very strong phrase. it supports the view that a case has been made that it irrefutable. >> okay. would it have been that weekend had those two words not been there? probably not because an offense with the document did was sat on a pretty broad range in case and have a history. if you go to the -- i repeat the

points i made earlier that was noted in the report about the commentary is pretty conservative. he was very cautious and there is nothing terribly explosive about it. the reporter who provoked the controversy later actually said there's nothing new in this we've known this for years. so i don't know what more i can say about that. other than because i can't remember part of every discussion about it. but i think that what we were doing was making a case as to why the government, why the prime minister, had grown so much much more concerned about this as a serious credible current threat. >> do you think it was sensible to incorporate the forward into the document in the way that it did because it did suggest that jic was endorsing the process?

i mean, it's moving jic here is >> the prime minister is going to be moving on to parliament in standing up and making a statement which is basically the contents of the four appeared he was going to say it is all based upon this. there's not much difference. he was going to be living to the political and public arena on a global basis. you can argue as to whether or not that judgment should have never been taken, but i go back to the point made earlier about the changing nature of the media landscape in the political landscape and the fact that people no longer are prepared to save the prime minister's intelligent says the will buy it. >> i just want to establish one point if i may. disregarding sir john scarlett and others ability to raise points on the text of the form. d that is not us that he saw t

disputed. but he also told us that it was in his judgment and overtly political statement. signed by the prime minister not something therefore he could change. and desmond lwin and his evidence are rather in a minute indeed said much the same thing. now, they have the opportunity. they could, but they didn't because they felt they couldn't. >> i don't -- >> you don't agree with that? >> i'm not disagreeing with out -- look, i'm not going to say anything remotely about john scarlett that would have huge regard. but i don't believe that at any of the jic.but the foreword in any science overstated the case to a degree that would make the

work they had done hurt his credibility -- either they didn't feel they had an opportunity to say something or they knew it would be done. as is said to you earlier, albeit they are quite minor changes the gic did make changes. they said that taxpayer is sacrosanct. you can't touch it. >> can i follow-up with one other point? there are two references to god in the fourth. one of the prime minister saying i am in no doubt that the debt is current and serious. but it also says what i believe the assessed intelligence was established beyond doubt. not fine? >> not fine because assessed intelligence never establishes anything beyond doubt. >> look, all i can say to you is the prime minister presenting this document to parliament in and saying what he believes it tells it. also that i had been in meetings

with john scarlett and other intelligence officials and is that what they were saying? yes, it is. >> just finally on the forward, jonathan powell emerges saying the document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from saddam. then you reply saying, that is why tvs forward sets out the case i'm making. some understand, the importance of the forward was a deterrence and intelligence assessment into a threat assessment? >> no, i think actually jonathan was making -- we whenever saying that this was as setting out saddam hussein was about to, you know, do something terrible to the british mainland. and now wasn't what we were saying. so i don't think the -- >> what can be a threat

assessment without having -- >> yes, but i think the forward was really never anything other than the prime minister putting his stamp on this document and also won the debate that was going to flow from it. anyways i suppose the basis for some of the arguments that t. then set out in parliament. but i don't accept that it changed as it were part of an argument that made something different in the ford. >> will admit something different started better to the policy implications forward. >> he is the prime minister. that's in part what he is for. >> in the first after the dossier it stated i can't make that saddam could launch a nuclear attack on london or another part of the uk. that sentence was removed. >> again, no idea why

specifically. but he made a very similar point in parliament. so look, you'll be aware of this that things get drafted and redrafted in britain and prewritten, but there is no sort of significant strategical policy reasons to why defendants shouldn't be there. >> but let me start with the nuclear issue. it seems from our authority with that on the presentational side it was a concern particularly about the thinness of the material. >> not by me and not by the prime minister more importantly. >> and our evidence from tim dallas and will you earn and they the view of the nuclear issue are manageable so long to thought on saddam as sanctions were in place. on september 16 address noted that iraq would not be what you produce a nuclear weapon without sanction that would take five years. they conclude from this that the timescale would shorten with

iraq succeeded in obtaining material from abroad weird that is taken from the jic i believe. so basically, the line that's been taken here, put it this way come with the iraqis knew how to cook but they lack the ingredients. settles on this as sanctions were in place they wouldn't get the ingredients as sanctions were removed it would've taken five years to get the ingredients themselves. the self-evidently, to my plausibly if someone gave him the ingredients that it would take them far less time. that's basically the sort of position that they're taking. you've now got a particular problem with that, which was retaining some sort of consistency with the americans. president roche in a speech to u.n. general assembly on the 12th of september said should iraq acquire fissile material which is this basic point about somebody giving them the ingredients. it would be able to build a

nuclear weapon within a year. now, that obviously begs all the important questions about how they would get the fissile material. so did you see that as a problem of reconciliation between a rather relaxed timetable suggested by the jic in this incredibly urgent timetable and chin by the president? >> well, i saw the latest guardian conspiracy theory story yesterday and about this issue and i had no knowledge of the discussion between britain and america on that. so far as i recall the only discussion i had on a particular section of the dossier on nuclear timelines was because in one of the draft i genuinely did not understand what they were saying. because there appeared to be suggesting that saddam hussein could get a nuclear weapon more quickly the sanctions in place

then with sanctions removed. and when it transpired was that they were not making clear in the earlier draft was the question of legality. so that is -- and another point on this if i may, when this issue was raised at the hutton inquiry mr. ding amends the council hc took me through the issue in some detail and pointed out the institute of strategic studies certainly got a record get a nuclear weapon in nine months. now if we were in the sexing up business i think we would've been impressed by that. if that was going on in the intelligence level, i have no idea. but in terms of my role and relationship to dossier i've nothing to do with it whatsoever. >> on the 17th of december he sent a minute to scarlett noting that prime minister shares your worries about this paragraph to one of us in the 16th of september draft and you would both like a timeline this is

quote, radiological devices a nuclear bomb in one to two years which is different from the 16th. and that doesn't start to allow with the americans. but he makes it much more specific your >> will maybe it does spirit a little ct was the point is the point i've been making to the timelines of the dossier was not about what they were saying, be they the jic are the americans a strategic study is is the fact that i couldn't understand how would one of the drafted it appeared to suggest that he could do a more quickly without sanctions than with sanctions. >> but that wasn't the only e-mail you sent around that time. there was one around the 18th of december reported comments they had found a nuclear section confusing and convincing. and lastly thinking there's not much to worry about. searchable murder on this point that i do worry that the nuclear section will become the main focus and is currently drafted is not ingratiate seroquel, and

was unclear. that's the point i was nicking. >> in response, john scarlett explained they had no intelligence to make it clearer. on the section on the 19th of september draft does change and it now includes this one, the one to two year timeline. so something had changed. so for some reason this would not be a mini initial draft but now say we therefore judge that if iraq takes her material or other essential components from foreign sources the time objections of the nuclear weapon and they could produce nuclear weapons in between one and two years. that's quite a significant change. because of the evidence that we had, the focus was on five years after lifting of sanctions. now, we are taking up a very particular scenario, in which somebody is having iraq and not

a lot of help. >> right. but all i'm saying is i can only talk to you about what i'd known what i do and what i did hear it and now i'm saying to you is in the writing, anything that of many intelligences estimate that was not my wrong, not my position. so what they did change from draft to draft the matters because john scarlett and his team have chosen, based upon the intelligence assessments to write in a different way. i pointed out i think a perfectly legitimate point, which is that i did not understand it. if you like a layman's point i did not understand what they were saying. and as a result of that, dashed >> as i said this was not the only -- it may not have been the only e-mail but by e-mail you read to me was written by somebody else. sorry it is impossible to get a transcription with cross

conversation. >> sorry. >> the e-mail i was just quoting was he reporting somebody else's comments to you. >> guess. >> so you thought that was important -- if the e-mail is what i think it is what i did was quite a few people in the office have seen this in every stage, every draft. i took it to somebody who had not been involved in the process about and that i would just like you to read this. you are now a member of the public. i want you to tell me what you think about it. and i think actually there making the exact point i am. >> in your published diary from september 19 deese said the nuclear timelines just about sorted here at what do you mean by that? >> what i'm meant is that finally after a bit of discussion about it, julian miller and john scarlett had it anyway but i understood and everyone else understood.

but i cannot stress strongly enough in relation to anything that flows from intelligence assessment. i think this is very, very clear from the memos that you referred to both my minister john scarlett and his response is that not a single one of them at any time thought to question, overwrite, rewrites, let alone the sex up phrase of the intelligence assessment that anywhere anytime any level. >> what we are looking at is a process where the overall impression you guys from the intelligence sheds and we start off with this situation, which we have had confirmed to us. >> well, you should master and scarlett about that. >> there is a situation in which the overall view was that five years after the ending of sanctions could produce a nuclear weapon to one where the prime minister stands up in the comments, doesn't mention the five years but says there will

be others who say rightly that for some example on presence going to be several years before requires a usable nuclear weapon. so this is now highlighted. >> i don't have stepped that is highlighted. you could've added on the end of that although the institute of strategic studies is hugely respected but on this issue could deny nuts. i'm sorry to repeat myself but i think we are in part having this discussion. i completely accept that there is an argument to be had about whether the intelligence material should be used by an elected prime minister in explaining to the public the decision-making process i think it's a good name. i think it showed much greater openness in government. it was a genuine attempt to take the public into his confidence about why he was as concerned as he was. i really do believe that it is only because of the subsequent controversy that we are still

talking about this line, that line, this paragraph, that paragraph, and some of the changes that took place in the drafting process. and all i can say i'm sorry i'll just be myself because when it came to it i was not to be accused of sort of, you know, moving aside a movie not to shiftiness amount. i was being accused of distorting her he intelligence of worsening intelligence officials to doing things he didn't want to do and it was simply untrue. >> on this basis to be delighted no i'm not going to turn to the 45 minutes claim. now, this has been a subject of great interest and a number of choirs have been established that did make up the claim that you didn't insert it into dissociate. so that's fine. but important issues still have been raised about the claim being expressed and used. now, one view is that there is nothing particularly exceptional

or surprising about this information and we have this from tim dowson as evidence. he recalls his gumption that this was quote referring to something like bolt terry rocket launch of. so the key thing is that this refers to battlefield systems. and the jic assessment of the new intelligence was drafting discussions on the ninth of september state that quote, it iraq is properly dispersed it weapons including its cbw weapons. intelligence also indicates the chemical and biological munitions could be with you later units and ready for firing within 20 to 45 minute. after the dissemination of the first chapter the dossier, the suggested that this new intelligence to go into the next draft. and that appears at the iraq military be built will to deploy

chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so. now, we can argue no ambiguity creeping in. this isn't just a question of distortion or misleading or anything like that. it's about the problem when you're dealing with quite met nickel issues of creating accurate sense of what's involved. because when you're using the word munitions, that really conveys battlefield use whereas weapons could be anything. they could be long-range weapons. i'm just wondering whether you were members of your team were involved in the discussion of how this 45 minutes was going to be introduced in the drafting and whether this distinction was one that was understood by your team or matter. >> well i think one of your

earlier witnesses talked about this iconic 45 minutes. and again it certainly wasn't what made iconic. and i noted in the butler report i'd forgotten this but the butler committee wrote to 60 editors and journalists to ask whether the government had been seeking to promote this 45 minute point as a major part of the september dossier and they said we had not. it wasn't within the discussions to be frank. it wasn't that big of a deal. and you may say well, it was mentioned here in the prime minister mentioned it in his forward and mentioned in the house. that's true. he mention lots and different names. lots of arguments, lots of parts of the dossier. and i've made two points of this. i mean, the original intelligence as eisai says 20 to 45 minutes. if we had been in the sexing up

game i think we would've said, on that discussion never took place. i don't think i was even aware of that until quite later on in the process. and likewise when the prime minister's death in the house of commons and i think in terms of the public with david c. out of the dossier i don't know how many people actually read it tonight or another more people would've seen the prime minister standing up in parliament. when he referred to the 45 minutes with the same sentence he talked about including gets his own share of population. so i don't think we would ever say, look, saddam hussein is got these weapons in 45 minutes and put it in the papers they would've pushed that in the dossier. >> i accept that. but if you're talking about the importance of bringing intelligence into the public domain, personally i'm more in favor of it. >> could it have been obviously.

you can go back with the benefit of hindsight and you could rewrite every single thing. but i'm simply saying to you that that was not that big of a point within the overall presentation of the case at the time. >> can i just make a couple more points on this? first, there's a purity presentation of question which i won't spend a lot of time on. but if you actually look at the way that the 45 minute claim is presented at the start of chapter three of the dossier it appears some distance away from the point where chemical and biological weapons have been developed for artillery bonds, sprays and so on. and just after a piece extend the deranged virgin of results capable of reaching terror in eastern turkey. food is one of the consequences of for the point was located it

was encouraged to link the longer range weapons from the case. it was certainly -- >> i don't think again were looking up to a microscopic detail in that way because it became such a controversy. >> well, they were in the sands of how it is picked up to the press. let me on this question which again was the discrepancy between the draft text, which said the iraqi military may be able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of the decision to do so. but the executive summary says, has military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, some of which can be ready within 45 minutes with in order to use them. and by the next draft of the

text of come in line with executive summary. now, you did make a suggestion that that should be done. >> no, i pointed out inconsistency which is the fackler what i was there to do. as you rightly say that that was expressed of them in different places and i pointed that out. but i didn't say was you should read it this way. >> would you have been surprised if the men had come into the executive summary? >> it was entirely then once i had referred to when i set out the series of observations it was there after entirely after john scarlett decided to resolve those. that one i simply pointed out was here and does the expressed differently in this other part of the paper. so as i understand it again this is remembering i think julian miller had arty spotted it anyway. >> and it would also been an

inconsistency with the ford wherewith stated that has military planning allows for some of the wmd to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. >> i think it is expressed differently. he expressed it differently again when he set up in the house of commons. you know, we don't talk going around saying the same thing at exactly the same way on every occasion. i really don't think. i think this is a point that it's been gone over exhaustively not because any of the decision-making process time because of the controversy that followed much later. >> i'm about to finish. i want to check were you aware that there were a number of intelligent professionals who were aware that this tape enough of language was creating a degree of certainty in the

language that was not justified. he wasn't opposed to including the phrase but he said intelligence should be intelligence suggests. >> i was aware as i said at some report in the press of some people within the agencies suggesting disquiet, but as i said to earlier john scarlett, richard dearlove made it clear they did not represent the view of the agencies nor indeed their own assessment of how most people in the agencies felt. >> can i just finally can i conclude with you have mentioned already with this footnote in the butler report which comments on correspondence from editors of national and regional newspapers and what he says here is, a number of suggested that the 45 minute story attracted attention because it was eye catching a document containing much that it was either not new or rather technical in nature.

it would get attracted by the tension, it wasn't just because of what happened with the today's story and so on. he was attracting attention at the time. >> it attracted some. the big message in the big point that came out of that these events as i recall with tony blair, the prime minister, was publishing an intelligence-based dossier that explained why he believed iraq was a curt serious and credible threats. and then lots and lots and lots of detail and virtually serious every point within the dossier was getting some sort of attention. we did not see it and did not plan our communications around that particular point. >> i think jonathan powell will send you an e-mail on the 19th of september. what would be the headline in the standard on the day of publication? what we wanted to be? what did you want it to be? >> what did i reply? >> i don't know. >> by then, i know that we have

and maybe i have her reputation about worrying and obsessing about headlines. they never did for a very large. that is in the downing street because i reached the point of understanding. this goes back to the point about the strategic medications is. it's not really about one headline. it's whether you are communicating over time your objectives clearly, your strategic thinking clearly, and whether you are getting our message through to the public. so jonathan inquiry like that fine. as to whether i replied i haven't got a clue. >> so when he saw a evening standard, 45 minutes and attack iraqis could have been bound in a year. there are some great 45 minutes from doom, a reference to cyprus expressed saddam can strike in 45 minutes. were you surprised by those headlines?

>> i am not surprised by anything that most of the british newspapers write on a daily basis. but all i can say to you as it was -- when we were preparing that, and it is really why it is so unfortunate that the debate developed as they did subsequently, when the bbc broadcast in the broadcast that they did, actually did was very, very important in developing and government communications and i think -- i think there is a risk arising out of the seven future very difficult international crises situations that develop, because of the controversies that have subsequently flowed, the politicians and they take -- they don't take the decisions that maybe they should. i still -- i defend every single word of the dossier. i defend every single part of the process, and i think it was

a genuine attempt by the prime minister and the government to engage the public properly in trying to -- in understanding why the prime minister was thinking he was developing otherwise. >> i'm sure others want to come in. just a final point. again, i think from one of the left and we are about lessons learned. and the importance of this -- maybe we agree on your final observation in terms of the government may want to do this sort of in the past. but it isn't therefore important to understand why this particular product is now looked at the negatively. they brought the lessons that ought to be learned are about taking more care with the dashed >> while i would really like to come back on that because i

don't believe it was like that negatively at the time. he was in the parties they looked at negatively. it is the negatively by a media that just refuses to accept that when lord hadn't investigated it and looked at it in the detail that he did, he came to the only conclusion that any analysis of evidence of the two. since when they never tell anybody what that report concluded. they simply say that it was a whitewash and this manifolds to granite and put through our paces. that is the point. >> that is not the point i am concerned with here. >> please don't crosstalk. >> i really think i should have the opportunity to respond to this because i think it goes to the heart of the year it you see the dossier is regarded negatively. naturally a lot of people do not regarded negatively because they

understand the basis of the case that the prime minister made is contained within their about a genuinely perceived threats. if you have a media culture that decides that, because of a certain inquiry did not find, as they kept telling their viewers and listeners and readers that were going to do, on the point that you've just been racing, and after day after day they tell people, actually they didn't get to the truth only we can get to the truth. no wonder people end up thinking what was that about and then when they deliberately conflate with the paper that will come out in february so they routinely say that the dossier we have been discussing was lifted off the internet -- it is no wonder the public started to think what was that all about. >> of the reason why the documents became controversial in the issue of rows in the end was because unfortunately a lot of the material that was contained within it, when tested against what was actually in iraq after the invasion it

turned out not to be there. the big problem was that dashed >> then you have to debate about intelligence which the butler inquiry was about. but my point -- i think actually that point makes my point for me. lord hadn't stated in terms, even if the intelligence turns out to have been wrong, it did not justify the reporting issue. in my point it is the reporting of the issue and the controversy that caused the tragedy of that cost that is what makes it viewed by some in the way that you described it. and i'm sorry. that is made very strongly held opinion and i cannot see it any other way. >> i think we are coming from a different direction to that but i will pass on that for now. >> thank you. i'm going to declare the lunch break at this point. we have heard evidence so far on your wall as director of communications and strategy, on

some of the key meetings you attend it in that capacity, on the september 2000 dossier. i think one or two of my colleagues have got just a couple of follow point, after the break. then we would like to take further evidence on the february dossier, your understanding and involvement in the development of british government policy in iraq after that and the coke ordination of the government information campaign on it. so i suggest we break until 2:00 and come back then. could i just bring to the attention of those of you who have been attending throughout the morning, if you wish to attend again this afternoon, you will need to reregister and the reception desk will open for that purpose at 1:15. that's downstairs. so without comment will come back at 2:00. thank you. >> welcome back everyone. picking up from where we left off before the lunch break, it

is supplementary on the september dossier. first off, you need to ask one or two points. >> when we are talking about the prime minister's press conference, it says in early september of 2002 you said that this followed a period in which neocons in america had stood up on speculation about the possibility of the reaction and that the prime minister's purpose in a press conference i've been to try to calm down the atmosphere. isn't that a fair reflection quite >> matches the press conference, but in the days prior to that when south africa, it is fair to say that our media traveled with us pretty close to it in a frenzy about iraq in the sense

that the decision had already been taken that was going to happen only a matter of time that kind of thing. so i think the tone is that the press conference and the purpose was really to do two things. one is i say just to calm things instead of you will get ahead of yourselves. no decisions being taken. they will be all sorts of questions to be answered and he listed some of those questions of the press conference. and then announced that as part of this ongoing debate and deliberation we published the dossier. >> as we heard this morning, the 45 minute claim in the dossier he had up a new frenzy and very big headline stories. msu said, on the butler committee established that this was not as a result of briefing by do but nevertheless a frenzy happened. >> a friendly untrimmed frenzy of the publication.

>> lawrence freedman referred to huge headlines. >> there was no headlines or frenzy. >> let's not split hairs over this. a number of newspapers covered this in a very dramatic way. would that be a fair fight >> when i talk about a frenzy, i mean the newspapers are all chasing the same story, the television and the radio talk about a 24/7. that is what a frenzy is. >> well, the 45 minute claim attracted some very big stories in a number of newspapers. i don't have to characterize that one way or another. did you take action then to dampen down a speculation? did you get onto those papers to correct the misrepresentation of the story? >> i didn't specifically. but in so far as anybody else would've followed the nafta would've been made clear what

that referred to. to be absolutely frank dashed >> you and your office are not proactive in pointing out to them that a claim that had referred to munitions essentially battlefield weapons was being represented in a quite different and much more alarming way by some newspapers. and he just let that right. he didn't take any action. teach straight in the story. >> i didn't. >> you were in charge. >> as far as i can even recall any discussion about. bear in mind you the prime minister to the statements you've had the dossier. the issue moved on pretty quickly. the 45 minute you say was a frenzy. it wasn't. it was like one or two sunnis rivers that reasonably kind of fell away. it was not that big of an issue. so to go to the standard and say look this is wrong. i didn't. where other people minded to

follow that story up? and talk about whether they'd overblown it but i don't know where that even happened. >> you didn't think it necessary to take action to correct the story? no. now, bear in mind -- >> if you looked at every single newspaper that was wrong it would be 24/7. >> that is i think your area of business, not mine. i'm very glad to say. like other colleagues who have already referred to the point, he interested in the statements come in the prime minister's foreword to the dossier that -- if i can find the correct one. but i believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that they will continue to produce biological weapons. but he continues in its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and that he has been able to extend the range of this dualistic

missile program. now the statement, they assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is a very strong statement. had jic assessments used the words beyond doubt in describing the intelligence about iraq? >> i don't know. karl rove would need to go and reread that. as i said to them this morning, that's the prime minister giving his assessment that the assessment has been giving to win. so if he would've sat around as he did many, many times with the intelligence chiefs and said to them, i'm pretty sure about this come about this, about this. he believed the intelligence in washington. >> what i'm trying to his establishes what is the basis the u.s. the drafter of this and prime minister, the person who signed it, had four saying the

intelligence was beyond doubt. those two words are beyond definitive. what was the basis? >> the basis was the intelligence assessment i was presented to the prime minister. and the basis was also the nature of the discussion of the dialogue he had with the intelligence chiefs prior to the dossier being published. >> i find that a little puzzling. i mean, isn't it the case that caveats were expressed in just about every jic investment on iraq? >> there were. and doubts also were expressed in the prime minister's statement to parliament about intelligence knowing the complete picture and you can never be sure that everything right. it is his judgment. and when it comes to it, you can have all the advisors you want another military advisers and the diplomats and the rest of it. he has to make judgments, strategic diplomatic come of

political purity estimate those judgments and yes to present those judgments to the public. and that is what he is done based on his analysis of what intelligence chiefs are telling him and his analysis of breeding intelligence over a period of time. three. where the jic talked about their assessment. >> is that a phrase that they used? ..

little intelligence on hyrax pc w doctrine that is biological and chemical doctrines, and we know little about iraq -- cdw, iraq prime minister maliki chemical and biological weapons since late 1998. crucially the assessment of the ninth of september 2002, the intelligence remains limited. so in august the in august he says with little intelligence in september it says the intelligence remains committed on the ninth of september and about two weeks later the prime minister tells the parliament in the document presented to the parliament the assessed intelligence has established beyond a doubt. this is why i am puzzled why can't make those statements together. >> we will have to speak to his

assailants and i can tell you from the position i was and not an intelligent person is the prime minister's communications director alongside the prime minister he is engaged in ongoing dialogue with intelligence agencies about the intelligence of represented to him and that is his -- the way that he decided at that time and i suspect when it comes along whenever he's coming to the inquiry is done by that again. >> so, he was certainly still stand by the words beyond doubt. >> i do and because at that time that was the judgment he was led to make and i would also stand by, i know the bigler report felt that it overstated things to a better extent served in detail and so forth and i stand by that as well because i think the document had the full authority in the joint intelligence committee it was detailed and it wasn't just about the intelligence that had come in the last couple of days and i think some of the caveat

is were there. you could certainly make the point as both you and officer laurence have done that there could have been more in terms of public presentation over the case about why the caveat were there but i think ultimately in terms of what the public would have taken out it wouldn't have made much difference because it wasn't cautiously putting case. >> of the jic assessments when we are able perhaps, i don't know if we will be able to publish them was certainly we read them, were not to correspond to the phrase beyond doubt and if the members of the jic, and we have already heard somebody who did serve on the jic were to say that beyond a doubt was not a three's test label would do at this stage seat parliament had been misled by the prime minister saying beyond a doubt? >> no, he wouldn't. >> okay. thank you. can i moved my final point again

in broad point rising from what was said this morning you used the phrase which i have seen you use many times to describe the threats the phrase current, serious and credible threat from iraq, but when the prime minister spoke in the debate in parliament on what 24th of september when the parliament was reconvened and the dossier had been put in a library of the house of commons, he used a different phrase. he said his manning saddam hussein's wmd program is active, detailed and growing. what was the basis, the evidence for him to tell parliament that saddam hussein's program was growing? >> it was in the dossier, it was a story in narrative associating within the dossier. spearman but they don't use the word growing. >> they may not but that is the prime minister sitting out what

he has read in intelligence that he has been presented to. sprick i can't find this concept of -- >> the preparations of ballistic missile program hasn't grown. >> we have been through thousands of documents intelligence reports and the idea of growing doesn't appear and if i can quote from your diary from the 23rd of july, 2002, you recalled the secretary jack straw as follows. jack said of the powers posing a potential threat to wmd iran, korea, libya and iraq iraq would be the fourth. he does not have nukes. he has some offensive wmd capability. now, turning from that statement by the foreign secretary to the dossier, that dossier referred

to the acts continuing possession after 1991 of chemical and biological agents. it referred to saddam hussein's continuing capability to produce them. it referred to his covert attempts to acquire technology and material which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons. none of that describes saddam hussein's actual program as growing. so, was it accurate to represent the threat from iraq at this time as growing? >> the reason the prime minister wanted to bring the dossier and the way he did was because he had grown more and more concerned about the threat saw hussein faced based upon intelligence being presented to him and yes there was the leftovers and so forth that had

been there for an awful long time which were not in considerable in quantity more in effect of the intelligence picture he presented to him he says did show a great threat and it certainly did to him and the government to be more concerned. jack straw was making is likely separate point and he may well have been right if you are going to say which of the four had the most advanced nuclear and chemical and biological weapons programs but as i said this morning the prime minister did see i think iraq has a unique threat in part because of the history and use of chemical weapons and in part the means it deployed to obstruct, to conceal the weapons program and also because there is no element that remotely anybody could get into in terms of putting any dialogue at all and he did see that as i assure you will see he will say when you see him he did see that as a growing threat.

>> as you will see this comes back to the point i made earlier as to whether this unique threat had actually been contained since 1991. >> that is the judgment. >> or whether it was growing. >> i'm trying to figure out it is important to this inquiry or the judgment was based on that was growing. some of the judgment was, look, the prime minister is the guy who made the decisions. i will say but i think he would say were he here, that the containment policy wasn't working as effectively as it had been. the september 11th had changed the context in terms of how united states, britain and other countries were going to address this issue and the volume of intelligence crossing his desk about this issue was making him more concerned about it. >> all of that could be perfectly true without the intelligence saying the threat is growing. the premise for becoming more and more concerned as he said in

the foreword increasingly alarmed, the phrase he used, is one thing, but seeing that the threat is growing as he would understand is another. >> but ultimately you can present as the intelligence people do, as the diplomats do as well as advisers they can present all of the factual analysis including the caveat and the rest of it and ultimately the pullen stress to make judgments and that is the judgment he made. >> thank you. mr. campbell during the course of the morning you said the development of the dossier was important of communications. it was an innovation and he also said these were not normal times. now when the decision was taken to have this approach to push information out in the public was consideration given? was there a discussion about the

constitutional propriety is you have to consider? because the principal of keeping intelligence rigorously separate from those decisions very much embedded in the way the constitutional operate. now, given your will, because your trade is communications and for special advising secretary powers, but is getting the process for developing this was that actually discussed, would be the proper way of developing this? because you yourself said it is a pity because will this happen again because this goes at the heart of public trust. these proprieties exist for a reason. was this discussed? did anybody draw this to their attention? >> was a discuss? yes. more people aware of its unprecedented nature and therefore to that increase the level of discussion and

potential concern? yes. was the judgment been reached with the principal of the intelligence agency that this remained the right and proper thing to do? yes. >> who did you discuss that with? >> the prime minister, other men nesters, other people in the process. islamic was the cabinet secretary involved? with these other things discussed? >> the secretary would have been brought on the discussions about whether it is right through the whole process. >> did anybody draw to your attention with a r? >> it was unprecedented. when we talk of the constitution -- >> the convention i'm talking about is keeping intelligence completely separate from decision making and the judgment to put a dossier together with a political for word and information because you blurred the lines. >> i didn't mean to say that he blur the lines. is it was decision making. i became the intelligence became more involved in public communication and public diplomacy than it had been.

that is a development, response if you like to the sort of changing political landscape that i talked about earlier. were we aware that there was a significant change? of course we were. were we know where people might have concerns about that? of course we work. was it still, nonetheless despite its some president maj, despite the fact this was the intelligence service being asked to do something may be normally wouldn't do with the prime minister and by the intelligence agency still see the was the right thing to do i think the answer is yes. >> given that these were not normal times and there was this decision to make you want to go to war what ever having listened earlier to you think the process was rigorous enough? >> absolutely. i'm sorry to repeat myself this morning i think the process was in reverse and i think it is

integrity what was very strong and profound, and i do think we are only having this discussion in large part because the subsequent control which is caused by journalists. that is the fact. that is the fact. >> let's move on at this point to the february dossier. >> given what you just said about the quality of the dossier -- before we get to the february dossier, i'm interested in you obviously thought a good job had been done and the secretary had put its helped the prime minister is in the discussion with the jic about the possibility of having your

exercise of the sort? >> i think at that time it was one that he would never do it again but i don't have any feeling the prime minister wanted to do it again. now it may be as the situation developed if it actually diplomatic process had gone much, much longer that perhaps there have been there was no such discussion. >> so, how will you then supporting the primm and mr. and the dossier in terms of helping get all the factual background the evidence analysis to support the works and speeches and press conferences there was more substantial documentation around. >> i think the bulk as i said this morning there were periods even during this time when iraq was a controversy all and whole

profile issue there were periods it was other subjects that have taken over the agenda which where most of my work would be going a lot of the domestic policy related in some international issues and their belts in terms of difficult and significant area. but so i think that the bulk of communications would actually have been the sort of thing that you just referred to come exchanges in parliament, press conferences and interviews, the normal stuff in the day-to-day political communication. >> and the iraq communications group? >> that he falls in a way from the fact that my day if you like it used to be see the prime minister first thing chair a meeting of most of the main government departments the

obvious big government prints, primm and esters office, treasury, office, for an office and if there's any other issue going on in other departments to come and that would be to go through as you well that day. now what was becoming clear is that iraq was dominating and we decided that chollet although that meeting continued that it will also be useful to have a once a week involvement to a once a week, start off we just met but then became more formally -- >> what is the time we are talking about here? 2002? >> yes. i've got one down where it started but the -- that became it really just tried to step out of the day today the whole time and just discussed, talk and think a little bit more strategically, and to be frank i used a lot of it for my own

education, educational services if you like. we had people come along and we would set up an islamic meeting, we had experts advising on the way for examples of the messages we would be communicating very productively within the british context just often wear if you think you are gaining understanding on what you are trying to do somebody would come and explain there are some of those messages to our being received in an arab and muslim audience. it was that kind of discussion and the discussions would be i can remember to go back to the discussion at camp david we did have quite regular discussions about how we tried to help the americans address this business of anti-americanism which i think is the prime minister said in his speech at one point it may have been in a note i can't remember he said anti-americanism until now the

americans have been happy but actually the united states has been related to the threat. it was that kind of -- this kind of discussions. >> to get the narrative right? >> i also analyze what was we were putting together in terms of the strategy, the elsewhere on the day to day basis. >> about getting the message is right and making sure you understood when you're doing on the day to day -- sprick also given that this is an area where it isn't my naturally read of expertise and it's not like team's area of expertise that was an opportunity to sit down on a fairly regular basis with people whose expertise it was. some of them from the intelligence services, some of them from foreign offices, some of them bringing people outside. >> what was the role of the coalition information center? >> for that we have to go back a

few years. started in kosovo. what happened within the communications on kosovo is there can a point where both president clinton and tony blair felt although the campaign was clearly nato against milosevic there was a strict in terms of military balance but on the communications and public relations if you like and public opinion we were losing that particular battle because milosevic had complete control over his media systems and that gave considerable control over the media systems of those countries that were there including britain and america as well and so i was asked to help me to put together different communications which we did. and we took aliments of that and recreated a different form of the same communications post september 11th and then adapted

that again with iraq and the cic was post september 11th and what was about was having different -- all the different major time zones that would be in islamabad, washington, london, information centers that were linked up all the time understanding every leader involved in the coalition was doing and saying and so forth and they brought forward post for the iraq conflict and the cic was the british element of that based mainly in the foreign office but very much as part of -- >> members of your team more part of it? >> members of my team, members of the american team. we had a system of swapping. we had a very senior person from the american side who was there.

we had different times, french people, spaniards, poles, australians, dutch, people from all across the world. >> but this was the group commissioned to do the feb dossier? >> it was, yes. >> can you tell us how that came about? >> that came out from one of the sic people who was an advisor really. wasn't always weekly but it was fairly regular iraq strategic discussion group is what i would call it really. he informed us that there was intelligence that had come and was related to the iraqi campaign of construction intimidation of the u.n.

inspection process and he went through some of the things that were not necessarily that surprising given people knew the inspectors have been subject to certain amounts of intimidation that there was an awful lot of interesting detail. now within that discussion with him -- >> we don't get far into the sensitive detail. >> okay. fine. i think most of it was published. anyway, so that's the -- we then had a discussion of whether any of that could be used publicly. while the decision wasn't made then i think there were further discussions about that. at that stage we didn't really know how that was going to be done the commission that a

certain point the cic to do a paper on iraq and the issue of concealment, obstruction, intimidation and general messing around in the inspection process historically as well as currently. they started to work on that and produced a paper which i think was then discussed and fine. i made a number of changes i think the title, i made a number of textual changes. it went around the system and all that -- >> when it went around the system didn't go to jic? >> well, it went -- it went -- answer to that is i don't know. there were representatives of the jic at the meeting who discussed it. in the decision was made on -- i'm trying to remember which

visit to america this was. i think this was the one in would it be february to washington, we are meant to go to camp david with the weather was bad and we stayed in washington. i think it was that one where the decision was taken that we would give this as a briefing paper to the sunday journalists, the press, there were half a dozen of them traveling on the plane to washington. as it happened it got next to no coverage at all. it was interesting, if i was quite interesting. they were -- it was there, it may be informed some of the things they wrote or not i don't know. but contrary to the september dossier which fought massive global exposure this got relatively little. and it became much better known and rather unfortunate controversy when it emerged the routinely stated it was taken off routine and wasn't. i'm not apologizing, i'm not

defending alistair right away but it was taken from an article in the middle east journal. and then once that as it were process plant became exposed i think it was by 24 news frenzy. >> can i just go back to what you just said? there is a context in which this was being done what was it considered important to have a document on concealment of this point? >> because one of the arguments that kept being put is that just give the inspectors more time, give the inspectors more time to read it was a tough inspection regime, it was the fact in an ideal world, great the inspectors go in and do their job but actually the reason, and people say what if the weapons are their white with these guys never able to stumble across them as they wander around iraq, the answer is because there is this system of obstruction and

intimidations of it is just informing the part of the debate. >> but this cannot quite critical point under the process. it has been put to us by previous witnesses there had been the hope the smoking gun would be found so for the smoking gun hadn't been found so that had already been raised about credibility in the september dossier. it was published i think the third of february and the prime minister made clear when he told parliament about it. but a couple of days later colin paul was going to get a presentation to the u.n. security council. so this was not a trivial issue. this was one of the big issues of the moment and thus the 12th

doesn't describe it populace task we talked about i think 20,000 intelligence offices, 200 inspectors hiding documents and surveillance of hotels and offices and bugging -- etc. it's about was the point of it. something you said that this was given to generals because the pie minister didn't put it in the house of commons -- the point is the reason i said that is that was the -- we gave it to the journalists, it got very limited attention over the weekend i think in some of the newspapers. i can't remember but i don't think it was picked up by the broadcasters but the fact the prime minister had been away he was going to make a statement on his return to the house of commons and therefore has a was a document put in the public debate it was put in the

library. >> and you refer to that on the third of february and said we should further intelligence over the weekend about the infrastructure of concealment. it is difficult when we publish intelligence reports but other people have some sense of intelligent security services and it goes on in a similar way says the dossier published last year and again the material we put out over the weekend it's very clear a vast amount consumed and deception is going on. so -- >> with regards to the weapons in iraq it is december 11th or 19th. i have not been able to get all of the papers on this piece. whistlemac but the point i was making according to the prime minister though is this was presented as if it had a similar

status in process to the september dossier. it's obviously a much smaller document but the prime minister certainly wittingly or not give that impression. >> i absolutely accept that the integrity and professionalism and meticulous nature of the september dossier i would defend to the end of my days. in relation to this, somebody within the cic putting it together made a very simple but quite serious mistake which is he put information into the accuracy by which has never fundamentally been challenged was from a leading expert who was part of the historical section. it wasn't in the section that had the intelligence in it and that is what made it subsequently during controversy. we didn't know that until later in the process in fact we didn't

know that or the informers of that when the story first broke so that is where the mistake was and it is fair to say that when he talked earlier about trust that did not help to put it that way. >> you've made the point but i think it is worthwhile that the quality control and if you like of these materials is not there and although this was -- the question is whether the jic or the intelligence community were aware of the prime minister was going to present in those terms. >> can i say on that when the september dossier, that was the purpose of recalling parliament, the was the purpose of the prime minister's statement. the prime minister was bringing

the house up to date on a very important set of discussions with president bush and a very minor part of that was to refer to the fact it had released the document and was in light of the house. i don't think he made any reference to the content of what you've just said but i accept the point about -- i'm looking at the memo here on the seventh of february where the first sentence says high value the work of the cic but the controversy over the kokesh as the absolute necessity of quality control. this is particularly important in any document such as this when the intelligence to the concrete intelligence assessment and set out considerable displeasure of the fact that it happened and also as a result of that i spoke to richard and the john and i spoke to the secretary of the foreign office and jack straw and we agreed a new set of procedures whereby

basically nothing that had any intelligence whatsoever could be used in any form of public communications without going through the same rigorous process the september dossier did. one final question which is as time passes and respect with iraq and matters things are not found but there is an argument they were not found because the iraqis were very good at concealing them. but it must have occurred to somebody at some time that maybe they were not being found because they were on their. was that an issue for you and did you raise it as a problem for somebody concerned with strategic communications? >> that was an issue.

it was a big issue and i'm just looking for a date because there was a day when john scarlett actually stated directly how big a problem is it obviously the military were there and did what they had to do but also they were looking for weapons of mass destruction and i remember when people say we always knew they were not there when they run against us i remember being at one of the military briefings for the prime minister where the admiral said his team were explaining the preparations for the forces as to what would happen if chemical biological weapons could be used against them and i remember actually feeling absolutely chilled by the nature of the discussion, so

our belief that when the forces went in that they would find the biological weapons and all of the stuff set out in the september dossier it was real, it was profound. so knowing as we did that this was a hugely controversial decision that large sections of the british public had been totally opposed, huge sections of the parliamentary labour party had been opposed and to told it is perfectly possible that actually you might not be facing a situation where there are problems of that minister's place situation you're going to have to accept there are no wmd those a very big issue and difficult situation. >> this only becomes apparent after the fighting when we hear it general fried it to become

fry be real interested of the possibility occurred to you even before the fighting. >> i was -- again i can only speak for myself. april 28 john scarlett warned there may be no finding of a wmd with that i was never in doubt based upon -- what i saw, what i heard and the discussions i was involved in and so it was a considerable -- obviously as the invasion took place and that was the focus and i think as other witnesses far better qualified than i have said perhaps the outcome can more quickly than had been anticipated or planned for but certainly i fully expected and envisioned and i think the prime minister did within a reasonably short time

frame the military and intelligence said hears this and years that and here's the other apart from a couple of mobile labs there wasn't much to report. >> and those didn't last very long? >> yeah. so in answer to your question was it an issue? yes and had we thought about to the extent people had been suggesting it and there were those who were extremely opposed but as i said to you this morning for example when the prime minister was having discussions with jack he was fundamentally opposed to the decision of was finally taking there was never any doubt. there was no doubt in his mind that yes there were a weapons of mass destruction -- >> i think of a mer putin did suggested. >> he did in a very dramatic press conference yes, he did. he did. >> thank you. >> just one more point if i can come back to the feb briefing paper, the sir lawrence asked

what rate of the jic were aware of that and in your supplementary memorandum of the 24th of june, 2003 to the foreign affairs committee referring to that paper you wrote and i quote john scarlett attended the four meetings at which the issue of iraq's infrastructure of concealment was one of several items discussed he was not consulted on the paper nor did he see it in the final form. he was aware of the fact that sic authorized the use of intelligence material on the public domain, and of the quotation. isn't it a bit surprising that the jic chairman who had led or collide with you the work on the previous dossier was not consulted on a newspaper that was also using intelligence material and that it wasn't even

copied to him in draft? >> was copied to him in draft? >> according to your evidence of the foreign affairs committee -- i don't know actually. perhaps it wasn't in the draft, she wasn't consulted in the paper. perhaps i'm wrong inference from that he didn't see it in draft. >> at the time the systems we put in place subsequently as i say nothing like that would have happened without going through negative john scarlett the other intelligence agency leaders as to whether he did in that time as i said in my evidence he was in the meetings, he was not worried that it was being done. i just don't know whether those who were putting it together for with sic at the time would have sent them to do what we should have done.

>> they should have done. thank you. >> and i think that that is -- i think that is a lesson that was learned very quickly from that and there was a very difficult episode. >> they should have sent it to him and he knowing it was happening should presumably have asked to see it to make sure he vetted before it went out in public. >> it may well be because i can't remember exactly who apart from john scarlett and this other person from sic was at the meeting but there may have been i think john steam -- of don't know. sprick the difficulty is even john scott plagiarized a section. >> subsequently -- that is the point he probably would have been i suspect quite content and maybe there was somebody from the jic who was content but said

the sic were happy to be used the way it was. again it is the choice that can later that if you like contaminated the whole thing. >> i'm only just surprised obviously the foreign affairs committee asked you to go back and check and you wrote a supplementary memorandum so you must have checked at this point and must have at that point established that he hadn't actually been in the poll. >> he had been in the meetings. >> he knew it was happening just not consult on the paper and as you said it should have happened. >> yes. >> just for the record you used the term john's team. and you are referring to sic. at the time he was still jic. >> i was talking about jic. the assessment team, yes. >> all right we are going to turn the questioning now to a different topic. >> i would like to turn from the intelligence aspect and ask you about your work in the period 2002 to 2003 with regard to

communicating the government's iraqi policy to the medium public and answering the public's considerable concerns and questions. immediately after crawford the prime minister set out certain of priorities sometimes called conditions of supporting the united states of the top three taking the ulin route advancing the middle east peace process and gaining support of public opinion in your diary the beginning of september 2002 you write it was clear that public opinion moved against us during august. i'm wanting you to tell us how you set about dealing with this beyond the dossier well was your method, were your methods of dealing with this problem? >> there was nothing terribly fancy or we were not able to see

at the time. the most unprecedented move was the publication of the dossier where we had at one point what the prime minister came to call the masochism strategy which was basically to take him out to hostile audiences because his view was and i think he said this in these terms at one of the speeches it might have been sedgefield you've got some people opposed to what we do, there will be some of those and there will be some people saying you know, why didn't you go after saddam a long time before this? there are people in the middle who had a genuinely legitimate questions they were asking i can refer to general coffin and another i forgot who it was but he said they both made speeches

with a series of genuine legitimate questions. what he saw the communications as trying to do was answer some of these questions. so obvious question to you then. obvious question is this just about regime change come of this question are you going to do this, may. what is the impact for the middle east peace process and where is this in relation to the broad what george bush called the war on terror so well parliament have a say? so what we are trying to do was answer these questions over time and the thing about the communicating you can't -- there is no one thing that will get through any one point. you have to keep at it so we plan this -- i don't think he thanked me for that much but we have things that i'm going to go out and take on the people who disagree we set for example the day that i discovered about the february dossier and it's

unfortunate problems were up against a long extended program with an audience we have a thing with trevor mcdonald will lead to the caprice was literally to find women totally opposed to what we were doing, fill a room and the prime minister will sit down and take your questions and try to answer them. so that was a part of the communications and the rest of the fact every week that he is in parliament once a month he has his press conference charley regularly up before the committee out and about. there is nothing i would say that we have added beyond realizing we are now trying to bring in a more internationalized communications trying to tie it much more closely to the americans because the reality is their communications can affect hours and they did understand that i think some more than others. i think it is fair to say under

donald rumsfeld same it's been mentioned a few times that this committee and i think there were times when you thought he could have maybe thought about a bit more about impact in public statements of other countries but -- is back again almost exactly a month after your september intrigued you note iraq is still tricky just wish the americans would do more to put over a message to the world. you have those you were able to focus two? >> i did and to be fair they were always very -- when i go back and i actually like if i can i would like you to say that he persuaded runge kosovo september 11th that developed in this way because the was the basis and those relationships were very good. i spoke most of today's we have a system whereby if anything -- if any of us felt difficult for equating immediate attention any

of us could instigate a confidence call. >> with the aspects of american presentation that you found disturbing war on helpful? >> i suppose they have a very different political system, you can't choose the leadership of another country. but it's just that question of not always understanding that the statements and positions have been packed way beyond their shores they felt very comfortable with the idea just saying saddam is about to it that regime and has been a long time it was clinton's policy to go and is our policy to. referring to george bush i think he got this more than others in his administration if i can put it like that. there wasn't at least an understanding there were other countries out there and they had other interests. so flexible to give you one

example where people talk about what was he able to do in relation to george bush i remember at hillsborough i think it was april 7 or april 8th where the u.n., the issue of the u.n. aftermath was piled agenda for whatever reason that time and condoleezza rice was very quite insistent any words that were agreed at the meeting at hillsborough were not too forward in relation to the role of the u.n. and she wanted to say it would be an important role and i can remember saying that sounds a bit grudging and this kind of meant to be and the prime minister said look this has got to be stronger than this and i think if i'm right finally agreed there would be a vital role for the u.n. and i was important but subsequently the u.n. did become involved the

aftermath sliding fee exchanges, the relationship at the top level between the president and prime minister very frank they were able to have a very open discussions. i think it was the same. david manning had a very close and professional relationship with condoleezza rice, and i tried to do the same with communications so most days i would speak to the opposite numbers in the state apartments, white house, pentagon and if there were problems i would say to them there's a problem here, and if they would say to us like why do you guys keep going by the u.n. the whole time when you know what we are trying to do is keep our republican for this and that and that is where the political exchanges or i guess. >> one of your problems with americans was perhaps -- you describe your discussion with vice president cheney and say

how cross he was you said when you talk about democracy coming to iraq people just say that is americanization. how did you deal with that? >> that was candidate. the real substance that day was minister persuading vice president cheney to go along with the president and any subsequent visits to the united nations taken down that road but it was in this broad discussion where and again i think out of a genuine sense not only hurt but i think they were quite -- after september 11th for a while i can remember the prime minister saying it is the exchange we refer to earlier so for the rest of the world september 11th was a massive event and massive

moment but it passed. for the americans it isn't we to pass. it is now a part of their psychology. so they can understand why there's this anti-americanism so we had i felt a quite serious discussion about -- we were giving our assessment what it was about. i for example believe this strongly i think it is about the fact people have grown up on the idea of these two poles, russia, soviet union and america, two great superpowers that can both sort of battle that to the death but that is the sort of geopolitical framework. some women have only got one superpower and the other countries say okay you've got the power but we want you to understand that that means engaging us and involving as as well so that is the discussion and i just made an observation that i felt in the communications that when they talked about we've got to spread democracy back to the point about how the message in america

or britain pointed out in a totally different way in the middle east and the gulf they are hearing that they want to bring america here and he was as you eloquently put it sic pissed off. secure expressed concerns at different times that for the british public there's a feeling, sometimes a strong feeling that britain was only embarking on this course of action with the united states number one because it does what the americans wanted us to do and of course to protect our relationship with the united states. how were you able to establish that there was a specific british agenda with regard to iraq and was that agenda? >> with a difficulty because once -- i mean, this was in a sense the problem with the whole

attempt to communicate on this because you had i guess to put in this term the left of the media it basically was opposed to the whole thing and very aggressive blair is bush's poodle line, there was a political hit on that, and on the right i think there is the sense that i don't know, once you got into the whole dossier and that kind of thing and the bbc became very hostile in its coverage of iraq it was quite difficult to get out any messages undiluted on your terms as it were other than just through the prime minister getting out there that talking but it was difficult. it was very difficult in the sense of all you can do -- all the primm ministers and ministers can do is explain we are not doing this because george bush wants us to do it, we are doing it because we think

it is in the british interest. >> there was went to be a problem at some point if it was to go before parliament it would have a parliamentary support to and this would depend on some groundswell of public support. at the end of 2002, du proposed a more active strategy and one in which he wanted the prime minister become even more actively involved. can you give some indication of what that was and in particular what it involved the prime minister of having to do? >> by that time i couldn't tell you what proportion of his time this was taking up but was considerable obviously, and i think that he accepted and the americans i think also realized there was a benefit to their communications in the sense from tony blair been very pro-active in terms of communicating the

issues, the background of the issues and the case we were trying to make so it really just involved him having a regular and sustained set of activities around the speeches, visits, interviews, press conferences and so forth. >> how did you assess the effectiveness of this heightened strategy? >> i think in the and you have to rely on instinct to a large extent. i don't know whether the government if any polling was being done. i didn't see any as it were other than the polish opinion polls but my sense is the debate went on and this is often the case in these really difficult ongoing quite long debates there is always a period at which you sense deeper public engagement in them, reflection upon them. it is now routinely stated that there was massive opposition and

hostility. it's true there was opposition and hostility but there was also a considerable amount of support in the position and i actually still think there is that there isn't much air time. >> any kind of work that you did on the presentation and communication? and i know this is a topic you were concerned with, how did you assets and deal with the relative impact on the public mind of the threat some of weapons of mass destruction where at one point he said there was the word fatigue on the public mind on the word wmd and the other hand when you call the unrivaled barbarity of saddam hussein's regime itself, what was the balance between the two? >> i think they went together all the time. yes it is true if you actually look at what is in 1441 and the arguments the pri minister is

putting up the time it was about disarming saddam hussein with his robins of mass destruction but it's linked into that, to other issues. when is the relationship and importance of preserving and maintaining that and second the history of the regime. that was an important part of the communications and i think that people have short memories and you have to keep reminding people when we just talk up the iraqi war and save 1 million casualties people here that and then you have to kind of find ways of saying listen, rather than just saying that you might look for a list of all the towns and have a population of 1 million people and people go oh yeah, forgot about that. i think it is just one of the incidents where the impact at the time was profound but now we

say saddam hussein's chemical weapons and if i remember that. so it is in a sense you are trying to get over to people when we see these things come at war, death squads, intimidation, taking the tunnels out of people who speak against the regime it is worth listening to some of that and worth understanding that is why the prime minister is so concerned about this regime, the regime that has used chemical weapons before what is to stop them from doing it again particularly if the united nations walks away from this. sprick and were enough people listening? were you getting any sense of this? >> i think in the end it is public opinion, that just means what people think and we all think different things. i remember for example the day of the debate itself i think more than any other debate

specific parliamentary debate you just get so many messages from people not to survey the political circle but you have the sense of the country following the debate as it is on a folding. i will never forget sometimes i used to run to work and sometimes i would get on the 24 bus, and i can remember listening to a conversation of two women on a bus about resolution on 1441 on their way, they would talk about what resolution and i thought people are engaging on this now on a deeper level. it's gone beyond what really represents what passes from the gate and media today. people were engaged in the debate. >> my last question on this relates to the extraordinary demonstration of the 15th of february, 2003 in which vast numbers of people including two of my three children walked

through the streets of london protesting about the iraq war and was said to be one of the largest demonstrations of recent times. what count did you take of this public opinion and how did it in the form the pamela starr preparation for what was going to be this very important parliamentary debate? >> one very specific way i think the day before the march, i think i'm right, we were in scotland -- the march was getting huge publicity in the bill the band was clearly going to be an enormous event. you must remember this is a bureaucracy. the prime minister was intended to stand for the reelection. he knew this was a deeply unpopular policy and not