>> so almost every book you read about is going to be bias toward the elite or the upper class and the leaders and all that. but there's enough out there still in diaries and letters especially that you get an idea that to some degree they are on the same page as their leaders. they bought into the rhetoric so to speak, in my opinion at least. >> and how did you choose to organize the book? >> well, i wanted this book to cur the whole revolution or so. it's about 20 years. i think -- i tend to be more of a military historian so the bulk of my attention is on the military aspect of the war itself. but i go chronologically. i give a good overview of the political events and some of the little things that said here in virginia that a lot of people aren't aware of anymore --

moving on through, the 1760s. 1774 is a year that is overlooked by everybody and some really neat things right here in prince william county and fairfax county write teach. it's chronological. >> we've been speaking from the author of the "great things are expecting from the virginians." >> from the hudson institute from washington, d.c. a panel discussion on the life and work of cold war strategist herman kahn. mr. kahn believed to be one of the models for stanley kubrick dr. strangelove worked at the rand corporation before cofounding the hudson inste in 1961. this event is an hour 40 minutes. >> good afternoon and welcome.

it's a great pleasure to see everybody here in the stern conference center of hudson institute. it's a great pleasure for me. i'm executive vice president of hudson. my name is john walters. i'm going to introduce two long time friends as well as important scholars on both the work and the meaning of herman kahn's work. herman kahn is the subject of panel, of course. there are two volumes in the lobby which you could buy, the media discussion is going to be on that book. a collection of works that was put together by hudson ceo ken weinstein. and then there's second book just recently published on escalation which is the -- one of the classics that you can purchase. several weeks ago i was at a swearing-in of some members of the department of energy.

and the person presiding announced at that point that secretary chu was being profound in "rolling stone" magazine and popular mechanics and they described him as the secretary to save the world. the speaker was not from the underpromise, overdelivered school of thinking but be that as it may, we wish the threats of the world are met by our current leadership. herman kahn is somebody who actually arguably did save the world by his work and by looking at issues that were both dangerous, difficult and complex for human beings to face both in the details and the cross currents but also in the difficulty of facing them directly.fíx i seon here. i couldn't help of thinking --

his mother wrote a book on the intelligence leading up to pearl harbor. one of the purposes of that book was to not only kind of show there was a lot of information showing the japanese attack on pearl harbor but the problem inherent in this is that people don't want to believe certain bad things so the information does not lead them to do the things they need to do and could do to prevent bad things from happening. we can't prevent all bad things but there's not problem of not just knowing but facing the abhorrent. of course, one of the most famous books by herman kahn is thinking the unthinkable. taking the abhorrent and thinking about what you need to consider in preventing it from happening understands even those things which are to that's herman kahn was more than that and i'm not going to take the time because the speaker is here. he thought of many things, many things with far-reaching implications and many things that he was right about a long,

long time ago in a way that is both striking and i think important to our work. herman was the founding of the hudson institute as many in this people know so this is not only a book about a great thinker and shaper of policy in history but a man whose legacy continues in this organization and that's why it's also a particular pleasure for me to introduce ken. a long time friend of mine as i say. but also ken weinstein as ceo of hudson has really shaped the way in which hudson has come back to washington. has been a bigger presence. has followed the example of herman kahn in front thinking about things in a way that is not limited by either partisan political interest or predetermined limits of what is is and is not permissible to consider but asked the people who are assembled here to do

first rate work and he has nurtured those about the affairs of today and think forward about the future not only of the united states but the world. we see this more of a discussion of herman kahn's work with you in the audience and so it's designed to introduce and allow a platform for that discussion. and again, herman talked about many other things and was one of those people who was larger than life and was an impressive figure, worked with people, influenced many people, some in this room. he was larger in life in more than one way. and, in fact, his kind of love of life probably shortened his life. he died at a much to young of age.

but again he certainly had great consequence for the world. we should all be grateful for his life and what he contributed. let me also introduce -- to not bankrupt the discussio-- let mee gary schmitt, and who's a friend for a long, long time. we're grateful for him being here. it's a former director on the senate select committee. he was executive of the president advisory's board during president reagan's second term. affair -- his work is focused on long-term strategic interest and american security. he's written widely many of you know his work and we're grateful to have his comments on herman kahn's work here today. we were supposed to be joined by two other people that we mentioned for their willingness to participate here and also to let you know why they weren't here. "washington post" indicated columnist david ignatius was

supposed to be here and former undersecretary of state william snyder, mr. ignatius as -- his journalistic duties to pakistan to be embedded and report on events there. sends his apologies to everyone here and his day job called him away. but he's been a very interested individual on herman kahn's work and has followed it so regret not having his comments here and mr. snyder was also -- was a kahn protége and he was fogged in at la guardia airport and won't be here until later on this afternoon and we want to send their regrets as well. without further ado, let me send you ken. >> well, thank you, john, for that kind introduction. i really have been blessed in a lot of ways by having you as a

mentor, a friend and a colleague and also as a teacher.fsb so i'm really -- the introduction means a lot to me. gary, i want to thank you as well. on not getting fogged in. >> it was tough. >> glad you can make it over here. let me begin first of all by no great regret that my coeditor couldn't be here today. paul is a center research fellow at the institute and he's a remarkable scholar. he holds three ph.d.s. one in economics and another in sociology from universities in his native romania and he also has a ph.d. from political science where he studied with this year's nobel prize winner eleanor oststrum. and paul is in europe this week and couldn't be here for the event. but by way of biography let me tell you a couple of things about paul.

give you some insight as to why this book was important to him and why these themes are important. paul, who's romanian by birth, was a victim of centralized planning and communism in europe. and he brought about market reforms in post-communist europe in part because of his own personal background and his innate curiosity. he's dedicated much of his personal life to understand the role of intellectual politics. he's co-author -- a number of important books, a volume on international development, a volume on neoliberalism and post-cold war in europe and the impact of eleanor osttrum and vince osttrum his political advisors at indiana university and a volume of prophesies of doom and scenarios progress.w3+ which is an important book that appeared a couple of years ago which i recommend to everyone which looks at kahn's views of economic progress.

and it was really -- it was a privilege to collaborate with paul. and we -- obviously, he is missed here today along with a number of others. but paul and i approached the subject matter that of herman kahn if you will from a certain different perspective. hudson institute, as john mentioned, was in some sense the house or as some people would put it the tank that herman kahn built and we're approaching our 50th anniversary on 2011. i personally never met herman kahn. he passed away when i was 21 years old. but i do remember as a child in queens, new york, being messes mesmerize by herman kahn on his appearances on public television offering this dynamic, exciting vision of the future of possibilities mankind, the role of technology, how our lives would change, how the developing world would change. and i think kahn not simply for that vision he presented but for the overall vision he did and

for his creation of the institute most obviously he's had a profound impact on my life and the life of my colleagues here. herman kahn was simply put the alpha and the omega of hudson institute. the cofounder of the institute as well as with our wonderful clegg mark singer and it's driving intellectual force from 1961 until his sudden and untimely death in 1983. kahn's death -- i don't have people refer to kahn even if they don't know him as herman. i will refer to him as kahn. more comfortable with calling him that. his death was a deep personal tragedy for the kahn family and it was a deep tragedy for hudson institute and i have to say in all honesty that the tragedy still affects us every day here at hudson more than 25 years later. he was the guiding inspiration for the institute. he gave unity to our work and did so at a very high level that made hudson a truly unique think tank.

and as i will argue later on in my talk, kahn wanted hudson to think outside the box to try to understand public policy in the broadest possible perspective. he especially tried to make individuals think beyond what he termed "trained incapacity of academic subspecialties" that led scholars to ask the wrong questions, to give stock answers or prevent them from probing very thoroughly. to get a better sense of the kind of question one really needs to ask, the kind of way one really needs to think about public policy problems in order to betterwwo÷ understand phenom and how to better react to those phenomenon as they occurred. and the result was obviously very innovative, incredibly innovative age not of the thermonuclear age but as a whole. as i traveled around the globe for hudson institute is how often i meet people who still remember their encounters with herman kahn not only in the u.s. but in europe and asia as well.

and we're going to be hearing a little bit during the answer and question period from andrew pierre who's in the audience today. honored to have you with us. who remembers being up on the hudson you campus and interacting with herman kahn back then. now, i viewed the book project on a personal level as a chance to reacquaint myself with herman kahn, to take stock of his writings and do bring his ideas really to a broader audience as we guilty plea to approach the 50th anniversary of hudson institute in 2011. and so from our varying perspective, paul's perspective as i say as a child of communist europe with the role of public intellectuals as a perspective as ceo of hudson we decided to try to something that had never been done before which was -- which is to systemize thought. those who knew herman kahn

personally he had a fetteril mind and an incredible ability to make subtle decisions and he was a man of immense appetite but he was not a systematic thinker. he had a staccato manner of writing. he thought oftentimes in terms of lists especially in preparing the scenarios that would make him famous. he, of course, was the man who brought the notion of scenario planning to the forefront of defense planning in the united states. and scenarios were in a sense that he approached public policy but kahn almost never wrote by himself. and certainly did not present a coherent step-by-step philosophy, if you'll call it that. so we decided to try to bring kahn alive today by putting together what we termed "the essential kahn." the text that are considered for our role today. we didn't do this in an

ideological way and kahn says x and therefore y has to be wrong but we did so in the spirit of herman kahn whose great hope it was to stimulate what he termed the policy imagination careful if not at times very colorful analysis to make policymakers to make policy experts think more broadly about the challenges we face and the competing interests we face as we try to figure out strategic responses to the great challenges of the day. now, kahn was not a rigid thinker. he was not in any sense an ideologue. he was a truly reflective man. and as you read his writings, the first thing that i think is very striking is his utmost concern with methodology. how one approaches public policy problems. how you think of them, which i think in all honesty is particularly absent from so much of the policy discussion today here in washington. which often begins instead from first principles.

and is accordingly less concerned about teaching policymakers how to think than about teaching them what to think. and kahn sort of spoke to bill snyder as he was trapped in the -- i won't mention the airline at la guardia. he was trapped at the marine terminal for that shuttle but as he was trapped in the lounge there and, you know, he just said one of the great things he learned from herman kahn was kahn always taught him try to imagine if you are the president of the united states. try to think through the balances you have to make, the competing interests you have to deal with and the challenges you have to face. and when you think from that perspective across a whole array of issues from economic to security to some degree -- a little bit about politics you can sort of try to imagine how kahn sort of tried to educate people and tried to teach them rather than do x, do y, do z. now, that being said by way of a

very general introduction let me talk about the super "dr. strangelove," and that's in quotes speaks to strategists. now i must confess i look at grace and our vice president for communications over there, that was not a she knows. -- that was not as she knows a super title. dr. strangelove, of course, was a title character of stanley kubrick's classic plaque comedy about nuclear holocaust starring peter sellers and george c. scott. kubrick paced the title part in part but not wholly on herman kahn. and if you saw the film and looking around at the average age of the audience i think the odds are pretty -- i'd say we have 85% maybe 95% of folks here saw the film. dr. strangelove, of course, was the former nazi scientists turned demented with the american president who is

obsessed with fighting and winning a nuclear war. as stanley kubrick had the essence of making a much more gray film and the details -- but he came across herman kahn and met herman kahn and became completely enthralled with herman kahn in so many ways. the details about stanley kubrick's interaction with herman kahn can be found in two recent kahn biographies one by a former hudson called "super genius: the mega world of herman kahn" and the other biography is "the worlds of herman kahn." both of these books give you a sense of herman kahn as a colorful individual. bruce griggs is a fan of kahn and rather than than placing him in a cold war culture milieu and those who are personally sympathetic to kahn but less so

to his ideas. kubrick set out to make a serious film about the nuclear threat until one day he came across herman kahn. now, herman kahn was -- if you know anything about kahn personally, he was a quick-witnessed neo-southern californian you could say born in new jersey and grew up for his first part of his life in the bronx. his native attire as you can see in the picture of herman kahn over here is the white short-sleeved shirt worn in the dead of winter and he had this ability to tell stories. and he very quickly captured the imagination of kubrick who had an idea of a much more dour, imposing figure, gruff which kahn was a lot of things but he was an absolutely endearing, charming individual. i'll go through kahn's personality in a bit and kahn by the time he met stanley kubrick was a major intellectual celebrity. he was a huge intellectual

celebrity in his day. in part due to the success of his 1960 classic on thermonuclear war. in the book kahn urged to take seriously the possibility of nuclear war not because as he noted he was in favor of nuclear war. but in order to consider ways to prevent it or to limit the damage it would cause. now, just because millions would die in the unspeakable horrors of nuclear exchange doesn't mean mankind shouldn't take steps on how a war should be fought in order to save as many lives as possible. kahn's reason he had a moral obligation to engage in these speculative scenarios about absolutely and total horror in order to try to limit his damage and kahn also wanted an emphasis on civil defense. the book when it appeared, when it was published by princeton university press was deemed scandalous. a review from the scientific american, the book editor of the

scientific american -- he took the book completely out of context. imagined it was somehow a book that was somehow in favor of thermonuclear war he essentially called herman kahn a monster. he said -- and i'm quoting there, is there really a herman kahn? it is hard to believe. doubt crosses one's punish from page one from this deplorable book. perhaps the whole thing is a staff hoax and bad taste. the review reminds me of -- when alan bloom "closing out the american mind" came out saw the prize winning writer had written a preface to the book and one was suggested alan bloom was a fictional character that was invented to write this screed. but he would write a fictional account of the political life but we'll leave it to that. there are others such as noted pacifists including the british

philosopher bertram russell who understand the leading western pacifist who better understood kahn's motives and the scenarios could be a better to prevent the loss of life in a holocaust. stanley kubrick drawn upon a composite, henry kissinger and werner von brunn and the scientist and the father of the hydrogen bomb among histories but more than anyone else kubrick cited herman kahn in the movie. that is to say some of kahn's thought experiments -- and these were potential scenarios, thought experiments, devices as kahn put it designed to expand the mind and to eliminate the kind of conundrums policymakers had to think when they had to

imagine what the future might look like. and one of these devices was -- as he called it was the doomsday machine, a kahn thought experiment about a device who's only purpose was to destroy all life. and it was essentially designed to teach military strategists the limits to what an ideal and fully capable deterrent could do. he's never meant as a real concept and almost immediately after raising this thought experiment of this fully capable deterrent on thermonuclear war kahn explains why it's an acceptable but kubrick instead shows literally to cite verbatim passages from a book talking about the doomsday machine which he noted was based on a study what kubrick called the bland corporation which was a pun as you'll occur on the rand corporation where herman kahn had worked and had produced thermonuclear war without any concepts such as a doomsday machine. other less speculative notions

that some individuals would survive the exchange and possibly reproduce. were also highlighted at the conclusion of the film. now, kubrick's selected citation of kahn was a gross caricature of herman kahn but herman kahn who had nothing if not a wonderful sense of humor in some sense enjoyed it. and he was -- he was as i said far from the brooding figure some imagined. he was known for his sense of humor. he saw comedy and irony in the grimmest of things from mega death to sexual relations after nuclear holocaust. there was a wonderful portrait of herman kahn that appeared in the village voice. unlike the energy secretary i guess herman kahn -- herman kahn probably did appear both in popular mechanics and rolling stone but he was also in the village voice. and the village voice said herman kahn should stop wasting

his time writing about thermonuclear war which follow his real talent, stand-up comedy. the voice said who could laugh as heartily as thermonuclear annihilation. kahn's multihour and multidaily briefings and this picture is a picture of kahn giving one of his famed briefings kept diverse audiences on their toes for hours if not days at a time with kahn's mix of brilliant insight, pop culture references anecdotes from ancient history and his wicked sense of humor. kahn, in fact, was once described perhaps not all together unfairly as the thermo nuclear rostel you may remember who played max in the wonderful original film version of the producers. that being said by a little bit of a -- let me turn a brief biography of kahn that before turning to his major themes of work and i'm doing it in the

spirit of herman kahn 101. trying to make this accessible to a specialized audience but more importantly to our book tv audience and to those we're very appreciative to have here today and also to a more general audience. herman kahn was the most noted and undoubtedly the most controversial nuclear strategist of the cold war. he was a polymath who's area of expertise would not be gee ostrategy but physics, mathematicss, economics. in addition to the new field of future systems and field studies, both of which he would pioneerain his later life but he came from very humble beginnings. he was born in 1922 in new jersey to polish jewish combrabts. he -- immigrants. he and his mother and siblings went out to los angeles. in high school kahn worked in menial jobs to support his family. he started college at the university of southern california but put his education on hold during world war ii to enter the signal corps.

now, during kahn's induction into the u.s. army, his genius received as it were its first official recognition from the u.s. government. he received what was then the highest score ever recorded on the army's mental aptitude test. after world war ii he finished college as a physics major at ucla and went on to graduate school at cal tech. he abandoned his doctoral studies because of a family financial crisis and he was about to embark in a career in real estate believe it or not. not stand-up comedy. [laughter] >> when he was recruited by his close friend sam cohen and would later believe it or not become one of the inventors of the neutron bomb to joined the newly formed rand corporation in santa monica, california. rand was created by the air force and the douglas aircraft aircraft company as a think tank designed to enhance military decision-making in the rapidly evolving post-world war ii strategic environment.

and kahn really thrived in the intellectual and collegial and sometimes eccentric atmosphere at rand and there was a whole array of fields from physics to systems analysis to scientific and philosophical inquiry and cold war strategy. it was there where he first came across john's uncle the great strategist albert as well as roberta at rand. kahn was friends with andy marshall at and other great intellects at the time and kahn met rosalie whom he later married in 1953 and had -- they had two children together one of whom deborah kahn cunningham maintains very active ties at the hudson institute and serves on the board of trustees. kahn started working in the physics department where he was quickly recognized as a brilliant mathematical physicist. his deep curiosity and his

interdisciplinary outlook his wide ranging some especially in politics and economics soon let him outside the physics department and the mid-1950s they created a new post at rand specifically for herman kahn allowing him to take part in whatever in-house projects there were called the special consultant, kahn was also being compared to thermonuclear fascinate clause and popping up in sem narrows and activities that interested to him and whatever false assumptions he noted were whatever insights developed further consideration. and as he once remarked with the work going on at rand they were making integrated studies on important questions and pontificated at important issues. working at rand at the height of the cold war kahn began to gravitate on the emerging field of nuclear strategy. by the late 1950s kahn had become a regular part of high level discussions on

strategic -- on the strategic air command installations, bomb targeting and deterrence strategy. having widely discussed potential options with his colleagues including the maintenance of a credible first strike the avoidance of certain cities and installations and it included only one option a single massive retaliatory nuclear strike which was referred to as the, quote, sunday punch. expressing his critique graphically and with mocked sincerity and upon detecting a soviet action deemed intolerable would immediately launched enough nuclear weapons to kill billions of people and turning propping the soviet union to launch their own weapons to the hundreds as expected and as intentionally thought through by herman kahn the military planners immediately disliked his plan but as he pointed out it resulted in virtually the same scenario as their sunday punch. better thinking he noted was

really necessary to help limit catastrophic deaths as far as possible. after the release of his 1958 report a study on nonmilitary defense which included a civil defense of kahn's writing and important part of the early work here at hudson institute kahn was invited to givep a series o lectures at the center of university studies. and they began to form the basis for on thermonuclear war. it would make kahn famous and was accomplished in 1960 by the princeton university press. the book was an enormous sprawling volume on strategies for thinking about nuclear conflict. it's core idea with proper and realistic planning the consequences of nuclear war, however, tragic and catastrophic could be reduced. kahn argued that the prevailing wisdom of the time that any nuclear war would annihilate both superpowers was false the existence of scenarios in which one or both sides necessitated

the thoughtful abilities of the consequences of nuclear strategy. so kahn spoke about issues that others left behind the closed doors at the pentagon and at rand. there was a review of kahn's book back in 1961 and it was noted and it's quoted in a book that, quote, kahn does for nuclear arms what free love advocates did for sex. he speaks candidly of acts of which others whisper behind closed doors. and on thermal nuclear war or otw as it came to be called sold 30,000 copies. and while there's clear sighted analysis others condemn the book as making nuclear war more likely simply by discussing it as a possibility. names newman whom i referred to earlier described kahn written

as a pornographic book a moral track on mass murder, how to plan it and get away with it and how to justify it. and although kahn's ideas were highly controversial, he did stoke a major national debate about nuclear strategy. now, kahn maintained and even encouraged this reputation for controversy and for provocative statements and ideas. his lecture style -- he would carry out his lectures in a way designed to really shock listeners to thinking about the perils and the subjects at hand. john was a larger than life figure over 6 feet tall. 300 pounds. i guess about twice my weight. a little bit more than twice a weight, a little bit less than twice my weight. i take it back. but it was more than twice my weight in 1983 it was more than twice my weight exactly. he loved to have audiences with what some considered emphasis some considered perverse optimism about the effects of

nuclear war which i think is a gross misunderstanding. , for example, noting the immense and unbelievable scale of human tragedy after nuclear conflict kahn nonetheless noted it would, quote, not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendents. now, on thermonuclear war it provoked a huge controversy at rand. i suspect herman kahn probably took some delight in the characterization of the bland corporation in kubrick's film and rand became extremely uncomfortable with the conventional ideas as well as the air force and rand and kahn parted ways and with his collaborator, a young harvard law graduate went on to cofound hudson institute designed to be a think tank involved in interdisciplinary research which term canned important issues not just urgent ones. max, as many people here know today continues to play a very vital role at hudson as a senior fellow and a trustee emeritus.

kahn wanted hudson to be a more open and creative operation that would avoid academic hierarchy and bureaucracy which you saw endemic to rand and at hudson kahn responded to his critics by publish two peeks. -- books. in the first kahn took a softer tone that unless nuclear war was impossible it had to be thought about. and on escalation kahn prompted a complicated set of signals which the superpowers could convey their intentions without an misunderstanding leading to immediate annihilation. in person kahn was supremely confident and quick witnessed. -- quick witted. he had scant care for appearance. he was unable to maintain a diet regime for any period of time. he did have an i.q. said to be in the 200 range and he had an almost -- his entire life a photographic memory able to

recall anything he heard. yet despite his amazing intelligence he had no area a of superiority and provoked by curiosity and sought out conversations from all walks of life from hot dog vendors to taxi cabs. kahn was no social conservative and he often found offbeat individuals more fascinating than their more button-up. spent hours with figures amazing on the committee on nonviolent action a grape frankly a bit too close to some of the soviet front groups in the nuclear disarmament movement and then california governor jerry brown when he had a full head of hair. the counterculture hero with whom he would discuss history and culture at the governor's mansion in sacramento as well as with his sister-in-laws sons who were hippies and college dropouts. kahn frequently openly admitted he found it boring and had no interest in having his daughter marry one.

and his belief for intellectual diversity and conversation to hone his arguments meant that hudson institute was often the home to a diversion group of thinkers of various political positions. it was tradition we have kept to some degree today. in some sense frustrating to those who would like to have some sort of a greater intellectual unity to us. kahn was intellectually generous and quick to give others ideas which he called his gems of wisdom. after his third book on nuclear strategy kahn shifted his efforts to other fields economics, politics and the influence of new and undeveloped technologies. one of the most remarkable studies he ever produced was the 1967 study he co-authored with anthony weiner of hudson called the year 2000 a framework for speculation on the next 33 years. the study that was commissioned by the august american arts and sciences which attempted to lay

out what the world would look like by the end of the millennium. now, as gary knows, as john knows and as we all know here in this room a think tank world is often working on very sort of -- there are the agenda for impact is often very limited. it can be trying to shape reaction to an event at that may be happening on capitol hill that afternoon or a presidential speech that evening and here that kahn's vision went so much further going into 33 years in the future a kind of study no one sees coming out of think tanks today. and these kind of studies were important because kahn's belief was that by shaping the big picture and getting the big picture correct, the smaller details can fit much better into place. and kahn's writings were really an answer to many a of the doomsday scenarios and grim predictions of the 1960s and 70s. the fear of overpopulation, overpollution and a lack of natural resources. and kahn's guarded pessimism -- i'm sorry, kahn's guarded

optimism against these pessimists proved correct. in 1970 kahn wrote the emerging japanese super state challenge and response a book that drew on kahn's work really since the mid-1960s which proved the economic boom and rise of japan as an important actor more than a decade that japan would become so in the 1980s. kahn, of course, was no one -- was often very -- was just very frank with his ideas and did not believe in tailoring his ideas to a political audience. and in 1979, as japan was emerging as the model for economic development and there was rising american anxiety about japan, kahn surprises his readers particularly in japan with a new book, the japanese challenge, which presciently without serious reform the japanese system would be unable to sustain the growth it had enjoyed for many years. in the 1990s, of course, kahn's predictions proved true when the japanese economic bubble burst leading to a severe downturn in economic growth.

but as the u.s. hit the big recession in 1981, 1982, kahn optimistically responded with his final book the coming boom and this and other books kahn expresses firm belief unless poor management or sheer bad luck prevented it that technological advancements would lead to a massive increase in worldwide prosperity and he thought there would be a whole host of new technologies and technological improvements in the 1980s and the 1990s that would change the way we lived and would breed significant efficiencies into the economic system. if you -- herman kahn died suddenly of a massive stroke on july 7th, 1983. he was praised by many including president reagan after his death. and if you read the obituary of herman kahn in the encyclopedia britannia yearbook for 1984,gñr you'll notice kahn was obsessed at the time of his death by the possibility electronic transmission of mail and the

impact of the postal service and this was a decade and a half of us in regular users of email. but kahn's most important legacy was not in the specific studies of events or the specific predictions that he had many of which came to pass. and as we try to argue in the book and i'll turn now to the last section of my talk, kahn's most important contributions were the mindset and the methods with which he approached problems and challenges. now, kahn popularized and drew attention to a method of scenario-based thinking which allowed a clearer look of the future's possibilities by removing the prejudices, conventional wisdom, taboos and traditions that tended to cloud people's visions. and let me now turn my attention to -- directly to our volume on herman kahn before turning it over to gary schmitt for comment. now, herman kahn left a truly massive legacy. he was a key figure in the field

of strategic field.wxz and he made a debate over global economic development and the impact of societies and the environment of economic development. and had a massive impact on that field. he also had an incredible impact in numerous other fields despite his death some -- a quarter century ago. kahn was an incredibly prolific author especially with his numerous collaborators. significant lines of reasoning and diverse fields of poverty. it was a difficult challenge to capture the core of his thought. and his writing style as i said earlier did not lend itself easily to the systemization. i was very fortunate that paul a, someone who really knows kahn's writings quite well coedited the volunteer. in someñ' sense, the challenge made even more complex by the fact because kahn had so many great insights, some of his most profound insights today are part of the perceived wisdom so it's obvious hard when you look at

his text to try to figure out what is really original there because we have been so influenced by his thinking. so paul and i tried to pull together this anthology. we decided to let herman kahn himself speak in a bridge segments focusing on the key and consequential segments of his work. this was a her klean task. obviously by bridging a author you lose a great deal but we felt in this case it was worth it to try to separate the essential from the accidental and the contextual. and the volume really does attempt to reconstruct the logic of the system in order to revitalize the legacy of this great man. now, there are clear foukal points -- focusal points and the necessity of broad and future oriented studies the tension between the academic approach and the decision-makers approach.

and the morality and feasibility of global economic development. and these themes i think are as relevant today and you remember in some cases even more so than they were in kahn's lifetime. the book is not heavy on explicit interpretation. we let kahn speak for himself. and so as part of what i'm calling here herman kahn 101, i'll present a broad outline of the book with a fairly broad brush knowing that we'll get down to details more thoroughly during the discussion which i guess we call a 200 or 300-level seminar. the topic that made kahn world famous and the purported model of dr. strangelove's kahn's assessment of the revolution in military affairs, brought about by the atomic bomb pitfalls over the debate of thermonuclear strategy and the moral and political dimensions of that debate. kahn called for a new kind of hard thinking that would allow us to rationally face reality especially with regard to

hypothetical nuclear attacks and especially keep in mind the very deep impact the horrors of thermonuclear war would have on all aspects of our society. the second section of the book look at kahn's breakthrough in future studies, his analyses of the problems of economic growth and cultural change. here kahn was as always a champion of the broadest possible perspective. the long view as he put it and he had a clear philosophy of history which he termed the great transition. the 4 1/2 century historical movement which he argued began in early modern europe which he posited would end in the 22nd whereby in essence all the world would become modern and eventually post-industrial. kahn did seminal work on economic development, role of technology as a key engine of prosperity and the impact on these two and the environment. kahn challenged the malenthusiasts of the group advanced by the club of rome and others and he made a strong case

for the feasibility, desirability and yes the morality of global economic growth which, though, not without some costs that kahn did recognize both human and environmental he saw as overwhelming. he also analyzed the link between economic growth and affluence and culture and ideological change especially in the west. his work on geo strategy which could be used as a better guide in the present and kahn became the pioneer of future studies. the third section of our book presents the key text to finding kahn's perspective on the methodical problems of dealing with the future. the focus is on methodologies for building future scenarios the objectives of future oriented research, scenarios, scenario-building the importance of variables and predictions and how to deal most critically with the dynamic impact that technological innovation has in trying to predict the future and the direction of the future.

now, kahn in the section reminds us that research -- that the research process is always action-oriented and, therefore, future-oriented and the question in this endeavor as you'll note by looking in the book is the relevance of this future-oriented activity for policy and for social action. and kahn was very clear when damaging in scenarios and damaging in his future-oriented work to make a distinction between the academic approach and the policymakers approach. unlike academics who can slice reality along disciplinary lines policymakers had no such luxury. and that they need to look at a relevant range of possibilities even unlikely ones that might have catastrophic consequences. policy has to plan for that which is more or less predictable and hedge against the uncertain. kahn was a big believer, no pun intended, in the role of ideas as a driver of social change. his aim was always to have an impact on the debate shaping the

future. the last section of the book, observations, recommendations and parking lot polemics pulls together some of his most eloquent materials. we see his vision of futurology as a culture bulwark for economic development, which he describes explicitly as a growth-oriented ideology based on futurology. in short, kahn argues we need a realistic yet positive model of future to help keep us focused on what is important to challenge -- and also tooling what the opponents of growth especially in the rising new class as he termed it. kahn sought to have the broadest possible vision of the future through future studies which he saw as a collaborative endeavor involving specialists and generalists people of varying ideological stripes out of dishave different disciplines in an ordinary manner to bring together analyses from very different disciplines. and he tried to make the hudson institute the living embodiment of this approach. kahn firmly believed that argument and insight would be

refined and enriched through intellectual partnership and dialog. and that was why so many of his own work and so many of his own ideas and studies were presented as hudson institute projects or products rather than kahn's own work. now, in my brief set of remarks here today i couldn't possibly do justice to this incredibly prolific thinker, a man who's influence ranged from nuclear strategy to development economics to future studies and a range of other fields we didn't begin to explore. herman kahn was, i think, by reading the book you'll see this, he was a unique figure, a true visionary who greatly enhanced strategy and policy around the u.s. and around the world in manifold ways. as we look at the challenges now, international terrorism, the potential threat of a nuclear iran, politics that focuses more on the redistribution of wealth and than promoting economic growth, international movement of scientists, bureaucrats and the

ream due to the so-called concept of global warming i think we really need herman kahn's skepticism, his broad mindedness and his sheer policy imagination to help us deal with these challenges more effectively. herman kahn has left an amazing legacy and it is an immense challenge every morning here at hudson institute as we try to live up to that legacy and i think paul and i hope "the essential herman kahn" reminds us and others around the world of the legacy and help point the way out of some of our contemporary thought. thank you very much. [applause] >> first, i want to thank ken and john for inviting me today and thank you for coming out on a day that's quite cold outside. i apologize.

i actually have a cold. i was going to bail on ken. he really sounded so pitiful. [laughter] >> i always sound pitiful. >> but anyway, i should begin with something of a caveat. i didn't know herman kahn personally. and by no measure am i an expert on his work. and i also want to apologize a little bit in advance for repeating some of the points that ken has already made and what i think is a very comprehensive overview of kahn the thinker. i'm here today because i wrote a favorable review of "the essential herman kahn" for the weekly standard which goes to show you no good deed goes unpunished. [laughter] >> but seriously it was favorable in two senses. first i thought ken and paul did a remarkably good job of pulling

together kahn's writings in an intelligent fashion which is no small fee given his writings and how prolific he was and also the complexity. so bridging those and making sense of "the essential herman kahn" was really a remarkably difficult task, one i think they pulled off quite well. i do remember -- this reminded me when i was reading the book the first time when i was a child, my mother was a subscriber -- maybe some of you remembered these condensed reader digest novels, you know, you get 5 novels, you know, and one volume. and i remember trying to actually read some of those novels as they were, you know, digest. i remember trying to read the spy who came in from the cold or something like that. it was completely un-intelable and putting kahn together and it was a successful task on your part.

the second reason i wrote a favorable review is kahn the thinker should be remembered. that's just -- it should be both our starting point and our end point. so, you know, we have about 11 days before christmas. i think today is the 14th, yeah. so i just wanted to suggest that, you know, as you're thinking about, you know, stocking stuffers, you know, nothing says merry christmas like a volume of -- you know, of kahn. >> the check is in the mail, gary. >> now, as ken suggested, you know, it's really quite a difficult task to get a handle on all of kahn's contributions. he lectured and he wrote on a vast array of public policy issues that no one can hardly do justice to and he developed concepts and approaches again as ken pointed out that today we sort of take for granted.

in some ways when you're reading through "the essential herman kahn" you'll run across passage and you'll think well, that's obvious or that makes perfect sense. and then you realize he'd written those decades before they were, in fact, matters of commonsense. but kahn did address the bigger issues of the day. in the late '50s it was the issue of thermonuclear war and in the '60s it was limited wars and in the '60s and later on it was all matter of issues including japan in the future. on the issue that brought him, of course, his initial fame was thermonuclear war and there he raised three core issues. how do we avoid such war. and if we can't, do we conduct it to minimize its impact and finally how do we survive it? and those questions he answered in an incredibly detailed fashion raising issues not correctly but raising issues that had been long hidden.

i think some of the key contributions he made in asking those questions was raising the issue of how, in fact, deterrence was a far more complicated matter than many had thought. and as the cuban missile crisis brought to our recognition. or today when you think about situation in india and pakistan. the terms are not so certain and certainly there were a lot of thinkers back then or at least in the public realm including president eisenhower who certainly believed it was, in fact, fairly symbol. -- simple. and he raised the possible of accidental interrational behavior in deterrence. subjects that had been somewhat hidden and, of course, he also brought up the issue that, yes, there was a small chance of a war. but how will we survive it. now the two issues that he put on the table most directly on how to survive such a war were

civil defense and limiting the effects of the advery's attack. -- adversary's attack. kahn's views never took off but the issue of limiting the effectiveness of an adversary's attack and certainly during the reagan administration the very logic behind what kahn was arguing became our public policy starting in the late 1979 with presidential directive by the carter administration in '79 and the reagan administration took in the 1980s. while it would be a stretch that those policy changes led directly to the end of the cold war, i do, in fact, think kahn's intellectual contribution in those policy changes had, in fact, had a major impact on the soviet union believing that the trend lines were no longer in its favor thereby bringing about a crisis and legitimacy to the

soviet union that eventually led to the efforts by gorbachev to both reform the soviet union but, in fact, bring its collapse to fairly rapid end. now, i want to now talk a little bit about some of the criticisms of kahn and answer some that "the essential herman kahn" brings out. the first is kahn the amoral physicist, the dr. strangelove. ken i think covered dr. strangelove elements pretty thoroughly so i won't repeat that but when you actually look at the movie and read kahn it's very clearly whether kubrick suspended it or not the underlying point of the movie re-enforces kahn's own point of view which is that the prevailing military strategy the prevailing nuclear military strategy that the u.s. had was absurd. whereas as he once famously said to the folks in the air force,

gentlemen, you don't have a war plan, you have a war orgasm. [laughter] >> and by writing the book that he did, i think he directly and by talking about the doomsday machine as the paradoxical logical parity of that strategy i think brought far greater clarity of what the strategy ought to be along with his colleagues at rand. but the other point i want to get to get at is this idea that kahn, the amoral physicist. i'm not convinced he was a physicist. he was a physicist by training but he wasn't a physicist by intellectual demeanor. as ken noted he fell in love with rand when as he says he first came into contact with the philosophy which is willing to ask any question and tackle any problem. he roamed the hallways of rand always in search of interesting activities and he fell in love