>> martin, i suppose i believe

china rules the world when a chinese scholar gives a seminar paper on american decline at a chinese university at which about a quarter of the audience are americans. i mean, the very fact of your writing this book has something of a hegemonic quality to it in the old sense of anglophone hum jiminy. it's clear you by the goldman sachs tour that china's gdp is going to overtake that of the united states in 2027 at 4:00 in the afternoon on the 25th of december. but i wonder what you're telling us about china employs anything more than that. in other words, it's not clear that your civilization state with its tradition of tributary relations with its neighbors and yes, maybe some african countries today, have an

aspiration to rule the world. could you tell us if there is, in fact, some prospect of that? that doesn't seem to be in the tradition you're describing. and therefore, why worry? >> well, i think you put your finger on a very important distinction between the chinese tradition and the western tradition. they do share, they both are civilizations which have a strong sense of university. unlike japan for example, which it never did have a. but the way that's expressed is very different. whereas the century the european tradition sought to project it at the time across the world, and i suppose the colonial tradition was the most dramatic illustration of this, the chinese tradition have to do that. and by and large, except on the territory as it were of the

chinese continent, it's not tried to externalize itself. with the exception of the tributary state system. so the idea of projection has not really existed in the same sort of way as in the western context that a centrally the chinese idea of their superiority was the center of the world was china. and then the rest of the world existed in the consent, a crude oversimplification, but eccentric circles which became more and more living in the shadows defining different degrees of barbarism. and the center of the world was china. and so the attitude to chinese people who left, for example,

went to southeast asia from the 11th, 12 century, was that they were stepping outside of civilization and were deserving of no protection from the regime whatsoever. where as the western was completely different in terms of how the crown and country protected and saw western settlers. i think there is a very big difference in the way that it's likely to be express, but i wouldn't underestimate either -- i mean we're now a new global context. china in this world will protect itself not just in east asia but globally. it's got some interests for example, most vividly over the last 10 years, no doubt the next great as well, it's need for commodities.

and it will -- i think it will seek to project its values, however that we might see those, or however it might see them on a global basis. but i don't expect china to be a particularly military expansion forced. i will be quite surprised if it was. i think they're probably learned a lesson as well from the soviet union as well, disastrous approach that was. >> i'm interested to hear you say that because i was at annapolis recently at the naval academy. they regard china's submarine program as suspected aircraft carrier as evidence rather the opposite, but let me ask a second -- >> china is still extraordinary does not have an aircraft carrier. even italy has an aircraft carrier. i thought i would bring u.n. >> we will be doing, when a leave rules the world, next

week. [laughter] >> let me ask a different question. this is the confucian tradition which has been in china for centuries, is the real driver and any more recent cultural phenomena have been a femoral, and therefore china cannot revert to its pre-1949 or even earlier cultural tradition. i just see what that is attractive because the sheer time periods involved. on the other hand, there was never really quite the same effort to educate the masses in the confucian tradition. it was an elite cultural tradition, as i understand it. were as first western nationalism, and didn't even more important come in that great import of western civilization, marxism in need of

being taught to the masses. i mean, particularly after 1949 a really sustained mass education program. it may not have lasted so long, but it surely reached many, many more people, went far beyond the elites. you seem to discount any cultural legacy of mao and pay the picture in which it shine is really reverting to pre-1949 tradition. and mike is representing you? was that a sure hand and your discussion? tell me of this common spirit has been. >> i think you are slightly your that's because you read the earlier part of the book. he did take me up on this, and i think it was a good criticism of what i was doing. i think first of all you're wrong about confucius. it was a popular tradition. and/or example, during the meeting, there was a real attempt to convey confucian

moral norms to the population. i mean, i think one of the real characteristics of confucianism is the way it's embedded in a profoundly in the family, the family norms and the way in which the family lives at the heart of the way china will widely be seen, the country is seen and the role of the emperor and so on. i think that confucianism is deeply embedded, much more embedded within society because of that, then economy is tradition which comes along much later. but at the end of the day, the confucian tradition as expressed fail because it failed to modernize china. japan had the restoration and got on with the job of modernizing and learning from the west. china had this long traumatic

lethargic period when it nibbled away at the problem but didn't tackle it. and it ended and a long period of, you know, the century of humiliation, the collapse of the chen dynasty. method of the 1911 revolution and affect change things, and then the warlord period and blah, blah, blah., and occupation by japan. in chinese terms, this was abject humiliation. and i think historically, the important thing about a mao period was the agency of modernization in china was the commonest tradition. which was a western tradition, as you rightly say. actually i think maoism, it's called marxism, really mao and digitize it in such a way that

it was very different from the marxist tradition more widely on. so i think it is more correct to talk about maoism bandages to talk about marxism. but one of the consequence of this is it was never a popular force. it was based in cities. it was always in the wake beleaguered which is one of the reasons i thought it was so authoritarian. the chinese, his party was not like that. the chinese communist party was based in the countryside. it had much more popular routes. and this is what you could have the history it's happened. much more flexible, pragmatic, able to reinvent itself, etc. the thing is what maoism did, i mean, he blew away some of the worst aspects of the hierarchical and inegalitarian nature of the imperial confucian tradition. for example, women were really

subjugated, and if you look at now, you can see extraordinary prominence of women i think in china given a relatively developing country. this is a legacy with the 1949 revolution. so there were certain fundamental things that mao did to change china, which created the possibilities of what's happened, especially since 1978. so i do regard, i think there's a direct line of continuity to what mao did and what's happened since 1970, even central central planning and all that has gone up in smoke. the other point i was going to make in this context was i think ultimately to succeed, the congress regime has had to align itself with a lot of confucian. the trick, the legitimacy as

bushy since 1978 of the congress regime has been its ability to articulate the confucian tradition into the modern period. and i think actually, i don't think this whole. could have succeeded if it had been rejectionist position, even though mao himself had a vision. but what was more confucian than the book? exactly, all confucian, populists are. >> thanks, martin. now going to invite you to raise hands and ask questions. and i said just that when you do so you introduce yourself so that our guest knows who is asking the question, please. >> rich mckeen, harvard institute. why can't the tibetans and the uighurs get on one country, two systems?

>> well, it's a very good, very personal question, and i think -- i mean, of course they do, the way to bet and it works is different from other provinces. you could say that's already the case, but -- >> the uighurs and tibetans -- >> no, they wouldn't. but i'm saying the way it actually is is very distinct from -- it's great distinct because the system of governance is a hand dominated governance which tries to incorporate an ethnic group to an ethnic group which do not buy in essentially to the way it works in these two systems at the moment. especially the tibetans have a huge subsidy, central government, probably the biggest subsidy of any province per

capita number but it hasn't solved the problem. so why? i think the reason is because, you see, hong kong and taiwan are han chinese. and tibet is not. and so for china the problem of these two provinces is about separatism and is seen as a real threat to the unity of china. so the traditional way in which the han, not just now, but have handled this is by very authoritarian means. this is not new. this goes back a long time. and was going to happen i don't know. historically i would have said to you if china carried on just like it has done, then the chinese will just eventually, han will get the way. there's only 10 million uighurs.

they are 6 million tibetans fear they will just ignore the problem. historically that's what's happened. the province was a much, much bigger problem. restructured. i'm not sure they can get away with it. because china becomes a global power, one of the responsibility of price, the price you have to pay to be a global power is global tension. it looks really bad for china in the developing world, especially which they are concerned about, when clearly the han do not respect this. >> i'm with harvard business school. i have a question, i want to push you back a bit on your vision of the chinese state.

he described as extraordinarily common, and to me it's extraordinarily incompetent. particularly i look at it today, i see increasing pollution, rising income, increasing illiteracy, inability to deal with diversity, at the same time they're trying to globalize. when i look at where they've been successful, it's been areas where they've allowed market forces to operate more freely. and let me give you a couple of examples. one thing local government officials and when they have gotten at the local government officials to do what they want, the incentive has been very clear, in terms of promotion. raise gdp, you get promoted. i look at how they say let's raise the funds for infrastructure and let's charge a premium, market dayspring for infrastructure so we can contain that infrastructure. i can, market forces. were i see them fail i see them doing things like arrangement where they pay in advance for

commodities through some kind of swap arrangement and then suddenly, something like copper prices go through the roof and they've already -- or copper prices drop. so i want to pose sort of a vision to you of a highly incompetent state that's trying to be a paternalistic vision you're giving and trying to control everything, and yet when it tries to control things it ends up with less control than it might other like. if there was as you say, the invisible has to be that they must allow more market forces to come in. if they can't control governance, of state-owned corporations they probably can't own 70 percent of the shares. they probably have to let more those chairs out in the public. if the chinese state and become his party more bluntly, is going to let market forces ultimately do the governance for them, how stable is that state? >> well, i don't think that is a correct picture actually of what

china is like. i think that -- first of all, when you said look at the entire, of course it's true that china is an environmental mess and so on, in many respects. but the problems you point to are also problems of extremely large developing country. corruption is a serious problem in china, what corruption comes in many shapes and sizes across the world, including in the united states. and i think that the problem is, of corruption is what stops the system functioning well. that's when it becomes a real governance problem. and i'm not convinced that that stage has been reached in china. i don't think the system does

function in a rough and ready way pretty effectively. but where i disagree with you is -- on environmental question, you know, this is -- if you're a poor country, if you're a poor country and you've got very few resources apart from people, you use what resources you got available. the chinese have used coal. the coal is filthy coal. with very bad conditions. but that's what a developing country does. i mean, i think that we need a sense of historical perspective when we're assessing a developing country. but it will not surprise me in the least if actually china does it's usually major on climate change. and seek to set a good example as a global citizen. i would not be surprised that china presented very ambiguous picture of dirty coal and a hard

drive in areas like wind power and solar energy. because the chinese do, are feeling the effects of climate change in their own territory. more than anywhere else virtually. and also have always bought the site that they have no claim that climate change -- that's not the point i want to make. the real point out want to make is i think that, you know, i think that the rise -- in china and in it is a mistake to think these are simply market-driven transformations. i think this is a mistake. historical mistake. one of the reasons why the asian tigers have been successful, not the only reason, taiwan, south korea and so on is that the state has been an extremely important presence in conceiving

the process by which economic takeoff could take place. by the difference between the asian tigers and other countries is that they have always understood to be competitive, to the international successful in terms of exports, and in that context, the market is something to be used and not -- rather than planning. but the actual process is being, has been very state conceived and state design, and that's true in all those countries. but it's also especially true in china. the state has played a really important role in terms of setting limits to market force or allowing market forces in some industries to let rip in the most, you know, and competition in terms of competition which is as good as happened in america in the late 19th century.

you know, one of the interesting things i have to add to that is, and i don't know what the consequences will be in the longer run, but it has to be noted that the chinese state is much more present in the chinese economy that is true in any of the asia tigers. so for example, even, the big companies are still predominantly state-owned the privatizations that was introduced at the end of, in the late 1990s didn't go nearly as far as it went in russia. thankfully i think for them. and many other private firms -- well, yeah?

>> over and over, yes. i wish i didn't. >> but, you know, the main shareholder is the chinese economy. so it's a very chinese state solution to the question. and i'm not -- at the end of the day you have to say, over the last 30 years china has grown at over 10% a year, and has clearly and all sorts of way been remarkable transformation. it has been responsible on its own for over half the reduction in poverty in the world. now, this is an extraordinary achievement. and the state has been extremely important. and if you had left it just to market forces, it wouldn't have happened.

>> i am italian, retired diplomat. i'm a visiting scholar at the fairbanks center. i listen very carefully and read with great interest about your for characters it's about how china is different from the western world. one, two, three, four. and that after the fourth, i have been careful by myself of making a leap of understanding. >> i can't say everything. otherwise you will not buy. >> for less than $30. could you give us just a bit of a hint because the chinese tributary system, which imagined that in some new form, valuable

for parts of asia. but could you hit, you know, the chair, kind of hand that he is not 100% sure of goldman sachs and that prediction will work. can you hint as a little bit more as to how the future world would look like, because nobody has a crystal ball or i have to buy your book. i will buy. i will buy it. >> so what are you asking me? >> i would like to how you mentioned the future. >> just one point. i apologize for that. what i wanted to say is that i also think, just coming to your question, the chinese state tradition is very different from the western state debate over markets versus state.

and the way the chinese state has grown up in relation to society is different. but that's another -- midwicket talk about that later. i know you not, -- the point of what i was trying to say, just in case it was lost on this as well, is -- my argument is not just the rise of china, but what the significance of the rise of china will be and how it will change the world. so the justification in the subtitle of the book of the end of the western world is not the demise of the west. of course it's not the demise of the west. but the world will be increasing -- will become progressively less shaped by the west and more shade, in this instance, china. now, the thing is that the assumption or two has been overwhelming i think about

china. i mean, can you explain to me why, if you go to a bookshop and the vast majority of bookshops on the shelves about china, about contemporary china are economical business. there's been an extraordinary neglect of the question which in a way is what my book is trying to address, is what will be not just the economic but the political and cultural and intellectual consequences of the rise of china. how will that change the world? i am therefore very interested in the question of what will chinese motrin at the be like. so these four characteristics, i've got eight in the book, but you'll have to read the book to find out the other four -- [inaudible] >> as soon as i think you start thinking of china in these terms, you may be persuaded by the points or half of them are

not. but i think as soon as you start thinking about china in these terms you can see the chinese and shape the world will be profoundly different. not completely different, but profoundly different in certain respects from a western shaped world. drawing on the traditions of western history. and culture and so on. in the future, i mean, i think this is a long -- long process actually that we are witnessing. even in terms of, even in terms of those goldman sachs figured that if you look at the standard of living per head in the united states compared with china and 2050, the chinese standard of living will be only a bit over half that of the united states. so it will still be a much less material economy and the

american economy in 40 years time. and so i think this is a long and very complicated process. we have never witnessed a process like this. this is completely novel. the western world has always been shape by dominant powers which are both very large economies, and have got very high living standards. the rise of china and india is a completely new situation where the largest economies will no longer be rich societies. and that i think is going to have you know, all sorts of implications which difficult -- all sorts of difficult things, all sorts of implications. so i think it's quite a long process we're looking at. but maybe certain stage that we reach quite quickly that i think the global financial crisis is really about the inability of the united states any longer to underpin the international

economic and has been, and therefore i think for a long period of relative instability in that context. now, and there's no success state. it's not ready for it. which is china that it doesn't want to. it didn't want to take over for great britain and it only did so at the end of the second world war. but i do envision, you know, something will happen quite quickly, which is over the next 10 years or so or maybe a bit longer, the dollar will lose its reserve currency status in the way it's been. the rmp will not take over the rmp will become increasingly important. the rmp is already -- if you look at trading east asia, i was acting so anti-chinese future when i was in beijing, what

proportion of trading east asia is now conducting a rmb rather than the dollar? it's a significant development. and they are talking, for example, about now, they're talking suzi about a nation monetary fund in the region that if that happens that will be significant because that will seriously weaken the role of the dollar in that region. japan is in favor. originally it was a japanese idea. so i discuss this in the book. there are many, many aspects to this. so i do recommend this book that's just come out today. [laughter] >> you win. >> i do? >> i'm a former fellow and a resident of cambridge,

massachusetts. i first would like to ask you if there is there is a lot of fear about china from a lot of different quarters, western, eastern and neighbors and so on. and i also would like to point out the fact that when vietnam collapsed, there was an article in the "new york times" in which it said the western powers had no patience, which the chinese were very, very -- he didn't name the chinese. he said the other supporters of vietnam were ready to match. and it is still studying the work and the rest of the world is too quick to pass judgment on them. and you just now said confucius still guides. i don't believe that confucian taught is still the most prevalent because the chinese young people are much more in common with the young people across the globe that inside of

china. and also, it is to say that confucian was probably the first theater is, is once again to exhibit the western inability to comprehend the world history and makes it as disconnected as ever. the contemporary areas of other parts of asia, there were thinkers far more profound than confucian. y. that we do that people do not make it is because there are civilization which are much more inward looking. i have one more thing to say. and china's trouble in the future, particularly when china's importing beginning to import far more than it's going to export, and that will be reached quite so big that china has already given controls over to the outside area than within itself. there's going to be a considerable amount of internal problem within china, which no civilization -- i do agree with

you. it is along with india is the only two of the world's oldest civilizations that's living with its own values, with its own streams of thinking. but despite that i think that china's problem is much more internal than external. >> the first point you made is there -- >> is there a fear of china. i mean, shouldn't we be taking china far more on a debate basis than dialoguing? >> is there a sign of phobia? obviously there is to point. actually, i might be completely wrong about this, but my feeling is, is a certain almost equanimity about the rise, it's not a sort of -- nothing like

the cold war. it's not reached the scale of a kind of china scare as happens in, that's happened in the past about chinese migration to the states and so on. so i think at the moment, i'm surprised. maybe i'm looking at it more -- more fear of china throughout so far. that might change. but maybe i'm just being too pessimistic and therefore, as i don't see it, you know, makes me more equitable about. >> the chinese from inside who are contacting the outside. i might get lots of e-mails but i was just wondering. >> on your second point about patience, i think you're

absolutely right about this. i think the chinese have got a very patient. they have a very, very different sense of time to the one that we are used to in the western and especially in the united states. and that, they are opposite. very opposite conceptions of time. the chinese think naturally long-term. the story about henry kissinger asking what to think of the french religion, and he says it's too early to say. and it's a nice tour because i think it does capture a kind of civilization state way of thinking, which is in a different sense of time, different notion of time. and i'm very struck by the way the chinese have conceived of, you know, their rise. i mean, by and large, they are playing for time i think. while the outgrowing actually every relationship that china is

involved it is moving with time in a more favorable direction. japan, well, if china continues to grow like this for another 20, 10, 15 years, strong voice, doesn't have to be at the present rate, but six to 8%, then japan will be in a different relationship to china. and i think it does view its relationships, likewise the relationship with the united states. it's certainly been true in the region. so they do, i think they are very patient, and they play very long game. but i don't mean that in a kind of, i don't think that's just a kind of ploy. i think that's a cultural facet of the way the chinese think. on your last -- you make several, the other one i will pick up on is, internal

problems. yes, i agree with you. i think that if you ask me what is the greatest threat to the rise of china, it is internal. i mean, historic -- the great strength of china is this enormous civilization state and the great weakness of china is also this great civilization state. because it is so difficult to hold together. it's a really complex and challenging problem. and basically china's greatest difficulty historically have been when they couldn't hold the country together properly. we just lead to a classic parody, and that was the humiliation when governments became ineffectual. and if you ask me, well, what will go wrong in china? i think problems like corruption, disparity in wealth and so on, i think they can be contained. but if they became all linked

together so governments became very difficult, that would be a different situation. someone asked me when i was in shanghai, talking about the book, someone made an interesting point. they said what do you think the effects of urbanization and so on will be on china? do you think china will hold together? i think it is true that, you know, one of the problems of letting rip with economic growth in the way that's happened, is many of the despairs with china have grown very rapidly. and it could be, you know, the mentality of a cities like shanghai is very, very different. i haven't been there for a few years and i went back to the real change in attitudes amongst the shanghai needs, a bit like hong kong, slightly like hong kong used to be. quite arrogant actually.

based on this extremely buoyant and increasing important financial center. and that's going to stretch, strengthen the fabric of china and make the problems of governance it seems to me maybe more complicated. in some ways more competent. >> we have about 10 minutes left. we have for, now five people raise their hands. i'm going to slightly break the order in order that we get at least one question from an east asian. we as europeans, americans, south asian. but i think would be strange not to have questions from at least one east asian. i would go there and do what i would like to all you do, formulate the questions quickly as you can and will give martin a chance to some of. >> my question is to use

proposed the rights of china,. [inaudible] -- two countries were allied in two wars. do you proceed a possible, a remote possibility of a military showdown between china and the united states over issues such as taiwan? order the territory disputes in the southern china's seat. if you were told the vice president, what would you tell him about china strategy? thank you. >> then we will go over your. >> there are two challenges before you. very much appreciate your bringing up to our attention the cultural issues that you point out are often lacking in

discussions about china. one is the challenge on the interpretation of outside and the other has to do with what you see the chinese state today. on interstate relations in the so-called chinese world order of the tributary system, i would submit that you grossly overestimate the stability of the system. and the degree to which this works over the last thousand years. i'm sure you're aware of the most of the thousand years china has been governed by non-han people. and as far as they're not being a competitor or challenge to the chinese state, i think that both the mongol and other conquests are evidence of that their conduct, there was quite sure his competition for who was going to be running a china-based state, whether would be the chinese people themselves or other outsiders. and then in terms of the way

this for characteristics that you have raise for us, seems to me, and perhaps you would agree, that there's a massive contradiction at the heart of the constitution of the modern chinese state, which is as you point out is ethnically totally dominated by the han. so demographically it looks very much like a nationstate that any nationstate that can claim 90 percent of our population, thinks of itself as one group. regardless of whether they would be or not, doesn't matter. that's pretty good. but the problem of course is the territory of the country is not so homogeneous at all. at least one third to one half of chinese territory is in fact governed nominally by means of different autonomous regions or counties are so on. so seems in terms of trying to

accommodate themselves to inheriting what it was a multicultural empire, the present-day movers of china faced the problem of trying to reconcile a conception of the nationstate with the fact of an old civilization state. i'm not sure of the difference of civilization state and empire, but it seems that is a much alive and is a problem that has yet to be dealt with completely. >> very pithy. >> i think all of us, even the most optimistic, the repeatedly of his economic progress of china for the last 20 years, but their argument and there's not many left, i accept that, but their argument is 60 to 70 percent of the growth has been by infrastructure spending. and at some point you just can't

continue to build factories. there is a surface a product out there already are to can't continue to build street in hospitals, etc. the manufacturing base in another state in europe has already been hollowed out, so what more industries can you take over? and using his huge pile of u.s. treasury bills, and at some point you as it is going to capitulate and devalue the value of the dollar. and the chinese are going to get stuck with the whole mess. i'm not saying i subscribe to that argument, but i would like to know from you in economic terms, how is this going to really play out. is there going to be a sustainable consumer society which also buys our products instead of just applying them? >> one last question. as short as possible. >> my question is with the influx of global capital, what new power structures, power

glove that you expect to emerge in china? do you think these new powers will have potential to destabilize the state of china? for example, people conspiring against the state, some order like that. >> martin, you've got five minutes to answer these four questions. off you go. >> no problem. right. okay. does the rise of china means the decline of the united states. yes, it does. in terms of global power. >> that's one down. [laughter] >> should i do them all like that? yes, it does. i mean, you pointed to the classic example of a case where the shift in power did not have disastrous consequences, which

was britain and the united states. not it's true of the things were going on, you know, and it's also true there was a particular relationship between britain which i think helped a certain shared historical and cultural and ethnic legacy, which continues to this day. in certain respects. so will it happen with the united states and china? i mean, i worry about it. i do. i don't think -- if it's a military showdown it'll be the last one ever. one has to hope to hell it does not end in a military showdown. will it lead -- i think it will lead to new conflicts and tensions between the united states and china. if you take the last 10 years in the way china has moved into africa, latin america, east asia in new kinds of ways and so on, the air is for conflict between

the united states and china of growing apace all the time. but so far they have been -- they have been the subject of a lot of cooperation and discussion. and environmental question has moved into this area as well. my aliment of encouragement about what's going to happen is that if you take american chinese relations since the mao-nixon actually the remarkable thing is how stable the relationship has been between not how unstable the relationship has been. now could go off the rails. but that will be my source of encouragement, but it won't necessary stay like that. the greatest worry is not actually china in this context. i think the earlier point about china's patience is important. what worries me is the reaction in the united states.

america is not ready, not prepared for this. it's not about about. it's not discussed. not debated it. it's been on the edges, and now it's happening. how in particular the american will respond to. i'm not going to advise president obama, because it's too late but i can't get the message through in time. on the question of -- your very interesting point, more than one minute to reply to. overestimate the stability -- perhaps we will chat about that. i mean, i mean, i like the way you look at the question, the chinese f. new city and pointing out the importance of -- this is also part of the picture. i think there has to be -- i

didn't talk about that. you're absolutely right. it is another aspect to look at it. and i think looking at, you know, the way in which you presented a certain auto conflict of discordant relationship between civilization state and chinese state is also interesting point. i respond positively to your point. there was one of the things i to say. >> don't have time. >> i don't have time. he is state power. state power. i can do anything. >> you have to address that their state. >> why should i add to that? that was a great sinner. i don't think i can -- [inaudible] >> no. [laughter] >> i think china will be obliged.

china will be obliged to shift its economic priorities. it's been, you, a very intensive period of economic growth in the early stages of economic takeover, early and middle stages. have the population is still in the countryside. but as it's reaching this point already it's faced with problems. it can't keep relying on huge levels of investment to parrot its economic growth, your point about infrastructure and so on. so it's got to raise productivity. it can't rely on exports in the way that it's been relying on exports. it has to develop booktv.org. ore the name of the author, boubject i t sea of the page. select the watch linked. now you can view the entire pro-grand.lo the

recent on tv box to find and view recent and future programs. >> we are here at the regional library speaking with michael cecere talking about hisook, "great things are expected from the virginians." mica, to start off with, can you tell us about what exactly virginia's role was in the american revolution? >> gladly. virginia's role, i tell my students, virginia played a crucial role in the revolution to a lot of folks that are knowledgeable of the revolution understand the role of people like washington and jefferson and such. but militarily speaking, virginia's role was gigantic, was huge. even though when you look for

battlefields and you look for key events, military event, you don't find many except of course what happened at and at yorktown. nevertheless, virginia and served anywhere from canada all the way down to georgia on battlefields throughout and every huge part of the american army. including out less. so they played a crucial role in the war. and of course, and the revolution, and this is something in my research for other books, i've been kind of learning more about, the revolution was just the war from 1775-81. is also a lot of events that led up right you. 1760s, virginia played an important role in the opposition to british policies that led to combat in 1775. we played a leading role politically speaking, and of course militarily speaking. how did you come up with a title for the book? >> the title is something i came

across about five years ago when i was doing research on my first book, which really happened by accident. as a reenactor, as a revolutionary war reenactors, some of my friends and i were trying to create a new unit. we wanted to get the impression correct. want to have the right color uniforms and such. so i was doing research on the color of the hunting shirts of the third virginia and i came across the letters and diary of a captain, captain john smith, and in it he writes a letter home after arriving at harlem harlem-1776. and there was a passage in the letter that just struck me as this kind of a neat quote, and essentially he says, we've arrived in virginia. and by the way, this was the first virginia regiment to join the continental army. that only been a couple of companies, rifles before that. so now the virginians are

arriving in force, and he writes great joy was expressed at our arrival. and as a result, great things are expected from the virginia's. and we expect to go through a great fatigue. and i went wow, great things are expected from the virginia tech that's a neat little to. i kind of stored in the away for a while and a few years later when i decided to expand my research on virginia's role, that was the natural title that came to mind. >> virginia produced some of our countries most noticeable leaders, people like mason and jefferson and george washington. is a something about the state itself that brought out great leadership in people? >> i don't know about great -- if there's anything about virginia's self that brought a great leaders. i know what a lot of people forget is the importance virginia played. we were the biggest most

prosperous, we were the largest colony of the 13 colonies. i think a lot of folks forget that. including my students. they are almost oblivious to the fact -- there's a phrase they used to use. virginia was the bomb they used to say. we were it. i guess our sheer size contributed. i'd like to say there was a special quality about virginia's. i've been here 20 of myself and i love the state, but i really couldn't account for what it was, what cause, you know, why virginia. i will say though, you are right, the names you mention. washington, the father the country. jefferson is the father of the declaration. and of course, later on he will have mattison and mason, important leaders and other political areas. unit, virginia get produced some great leaders spent what are the everyday virginians think about british and also the revolution?

>> while, it depends. you've got to have some tory or loyalist support. but it wasn't so greater in virginia. as maybe in new york where you've done quite a bit of loyalist support. that's what my book focus a lot on. more of the everyday virginians that i have a lot of courts on that. what i think is need is you can see, as you see the whole dispute kind of percolate and develop, more and more everyday virginians buy into what their leaders are saying, that their rights are threatened and they may become absolute slaves to the people 3000 miles away in england. you read the virginia gazette and such like that, and you get this -- i mean, we're at a disadvantage. were always at a disadvantage as researchers, because there's not a whole lot of research material

of everyday virginians. that's difficult. so almost every book you read about is going to be biased toward the elite or the upper class, the leaders and all that. but there's enough out there still, in diaries and letters, especially that you get an idea to some degree they are on the same page as their leaders. they bought into the rhetoric's, so to speak, in my opinion at least. >> how did you choose to organize the book? >> well, i wanted this book to cover the whole revolution. so it's about 20 years. i think, i tend to be more of a military historian, so the bulk is on the military aspect, the war itself. but i go chronologically. i kind of give a good overview of the political events, and some of the little things that happen here in virginia that a lot of people aren't aware of any more, moving on through the

17 '60s. 1774, that's a year that is overlooked by almost everybody. some really neat things right here locally. and the fairfax county. so there's a lot of -- it's chronological. to answer your question, i go chronologically or speak with been speakwith micel, author ofs are expected from the virginians." >> thank