i think from dis, but i can't be sure about that to come in and explain what that meant that i had a kind of improv to meeting in my office to really go through what was meant by a 45 minute claim. the explanation was very straightforward that saddam had guns that could fire shells containing chemical weapons. he had done that against iran. and could do so again. and 45 minutes actually quite a long time for him to be able to order these shells, be loaded into guns and five. so that part of it, was explained to me, and frankly, i seem, i didn't think much more of it. i know that thereafter, there was an issue about some newspaper reports. as it turned out, i had not seen those newspaper reports that i

didn't actually understand why, until shortly before lord hutton reported when panorama did a program about the report. and they put on screen the two newspapers that carried i think images of missiles that i realized at that stage that i had never seen these newspapers. again, i couldn't quite understand why, but we checked my diary the next morning. and i have been in kiev for a couple of days. >> so you didn't -- >> i simply hadn't seen those papers. >> you can get involved in the issue at the time. >> know. smack the final question on the dossier. is this phrase without doubt. did you see that, did you comment on it before? >> i saw the draft. i didn't comment on it, because

i mean, it did reflect my view of the intelligence and the information that i had been given. i first saw intelligence in relation to iraq when i went to the foreign office in may of 1999. i've actually asked to see some of that intelligence, bears out that the assessments were to the effect that iraq had weapons of mass instruction. and those assessments continued throughout my time in the ministry of defense. i actually asked to see some of that material to refresh my memory. john writing to david manning on the 17th of march. the view is clear, iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons. a means to deliver them in a capacity to reestablish production. the scale of the holdings is

hard to quantify. is undoubtedly much less than in 1991. evidence points to a capability that is already militarily significant. there was similarly the seventh of march, again just before the invasion, dis paper saying that iraq is assessed to possess stocks of chemical and biological agents and the means to deliver them. pose a direct threat to the united kingdom and other forces deployed in the middle east that i'm about to say he had stocks of sulfur, mustard and he could produce militarily significant quantities of biological agents within days. >> that's very interesting. and relevant to the discussion we will be having quite an honor preparations for that. finally, just on this question, as the armed forces moved into iraq, we have already heard from general frey, about a degree of

consternation, shall we say. that nothing was being found. when did you begin to suspect that those stocks were not their? >> i daresay that i'm prepared, probably when the last conceded in the sense -- i mean, let me be clear. there were stocks of chemical weapons. but those x. data from the iran-iraq war. and so i began to understand after a period how it could have been that those wanting to pass information back to the united states, to the united kingdom, might have been relying on those stocks that i'm in, some of those shells, for sample, would use as improvised explosive devices, without any understanding of what was in the shelter those shells were being used by some of the insurgents,

in the aftermath of the invasion. as i say, without understanding what the work and i'm not suggesting for a moment that they were of recent production. that they were there and clearly and store presumably in barracks and armories that were looted in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. >> so it took you a while. until the report of the survey group? >> yes, i think that was when it began to be clear that this was not the case. again, one of the issues that i've never quite understood, i think it's a straightforward issue, is why it's iraq, saddam, did not have access to the stocks, did he spend such an enormous amount of time and effort in trying to forestall the work of the expected that there isn't an entirely satisfactory answer to that that i'm aware of the.

other than i have speculated as to whether, for example, people around saddam knew this production had ended and no one dared tell him, whether he wanted to keep up a pretense in order to intimidate his neighbors that. >> these are indeed matters are interesting speculation, but i think i'd like, because of awareness of time, to move on. no, no. , it's fine. as a paramedic who think they, but i think we need to move on to questions. you inherited a strategic defense that was published in 1998, and one of its pain features was a focus on expeditionary warfare. is that their? >> yes, i think -- i think a series of white papers during my time we published a couple of

more, we're moving the emphasis of the ministry of defense away from that kind of static territorial defense of the cold war period, to a much more flexible, as you say, expeditionary capability. but that sounds straightforward to describe. you would be better aware that i, requires massive adjustments in capabilities. instead of having, for example, a single and relatively relaxed logistics chain, it was necessary to have a series of such support organizations that could move very quickly at very long distance so instead of having months if not years to prepare for the prospect of an attack where it was possible to see those forces building up on the other side of the border and have a similar amount of time to build our own capabilities. we needed to be able to move people as we did in a weekend to

syria. and so we took a decision i think on friday afternoon that troops would go to syria. and they were there on sunday morning. >> but if you're talking about moving a division, say, what were the sort of planning assumptions necessary to prepare a division for? >> i think i mentioned the planning assumption was roughly in the order of six months to be able to move a division and put in place. we had a considerable advantage before going into iraq, of an exercise called save sierra, swift sword. is conducted in amman. i visited that exercise and i came away with -- everyone rightly praises iran's forces. but i can wear with a huge appreciation of the ability of not just their ability to move this force from the united kingdom to operate in amman and to move it back again without any obvious other support other

than that which they carried with them. there was no base there that they move to. they move to a desert that they set up the camp. they did their training. and they went back again. i think it showed me in a very practical way the requirement for successful logistics, which is not something that is widely praised when people talk about the armed forces. but actually is a fundamental necessity. >> in deed. it also perhaps this exercise demonstrates the importance of exercises. >> it did because we also learned quite a number of lessons that would have been, frankly, catastrophic had we had not been aware, we had problem with air filters on the tanks, for example, that were clogging up with sand. so i think we purchased some skirts, essentially it was to protect the air in close. we learned a huge number of

lessons that were relevant and to the operation that was subsequently conducted in every. >> you mentioned the shift from the strategic defense that were quite substantial, quite, quite a lot. was the review fully funded? sufficiently funded? >> well, i can't answer that entirely from my own experience. well, i can say when i arrived in the ministry of defense, in october 1999, there was quite a strong feeling that it was not fully funded. and that the part of the way in which it was funded was by a commitment to a series of efficiencies in the way in which existing equipment was used in order to release cash, basically, for some of the new

acquisitions. i think everyone excepted that that was a pretty, pretty challenging target. >> we were told by kevin tebbit that the defense budget was too small. this was the case into the run up to the war. >> certainly, in the csr programs, we asked significantly more money than we eventually received, yes. >> and then in your discussion, negotiations for the 2002, 2003 budget, was it possible that these operations against iraq the feature in those discussions the? >> in the settlement -- i think july 2002, so certainly we were aware of the possibility at any

rate. but i think the answer from the treasury would be that in a sense there was a separate urgent operation or requirement process to supplement the overall budget, once actual war fighting was at hand. >> will go on to that in a second. what was your feeling when you look at your budget in 2002 -- 2003 that the still a budget under pressure? >> yes. >> now, generally speaking, you expect to fight wars on the defense budget. there are always going to be special costs of fuel, ammunition, placements of equipment, lost. so the idea that these came out of the treasury reserve? >> that was always the understanding, yes. >> this is where the agent operational requirements come

in. just again, because this is quite complex issues. the degree to which you would need the further operational requirements, to some extent would reflect the size of the defense budget. because if you had been able to purchase sufficient stocks beforehand, would less likely need -- >> that must necessarily be right. yes. one of the urgent operational requirements for iraq were desert combat and desert boots. i assume. i don't know but i assume that in the first gulf war such clothing was kept in store, ready and available for operations in the desert. desert combats were part of the uarts. and i know some of the soldiers resented having to wear their

green combats rather than their desert combats. >> i do want to come onto. i do want to get the background sordid. >> but if i can put the other side of the case, just, just for the sake of completeness, really. one of the problems with maintaining stores and equipment is they necessarily deteriorate. so i accept it's a judgment, but the judgment is how long you keep kits that you don't use knowing that at some stage it will have to be replaced. saved by passage of time. so that you are process while it obvious he does or can cause difficulty in an urgent situation, nevertheless, may be a sensible process in terms of avoiding the replacement of kids, never actually been used. >> but it puts a premium on timing. >> of course. >> one of the questions you talk

about logistics is tied logistics. >> that must be right. >> when did you start to have discussions with the chancellor or secretary i about the likely financial indications of operations for? >> i can't -- i can't precisely give you a date as to when we actually begin the discussions, but i think there were some -- i think there was some sort of exploratory exchanges before summer. the specific question of the list of uor went to treasury and i think was agreed about the fourth of october. we had to go through a process of identifying what were the urgent operational requirements. then to send that to the treasury for their approval and in a sense only wants the treasury had approved, the list then could we go out and let the contract's.

>> and how would these discussions handled with the treasury? were they questioning the uor? >> i don't recall having any difficulties, as far as the actual items were concerned, or indeed the overall amount of money. i think there was later, one of the problems which i think you're alluding to is once you acquire a piece of equipment, it has to be supported and maintained as to be trying. i think there was some discussions with the treasury about whether the budget could be increased to allow for that maintenance costs. and that was an area of difficult. >> there was a long-term application. >> i think one of the equipment was a machine gun. because they lay down a heavy rate of fire, and maintaining them providing the training for the soldiers and so on was a

continuing cost over and above simply the cost of acquisition of the machine guns in the first place. >> what was the lesson you talk about in terms of money, what was the likely costs? >> i don't think i have that figure at hand. >> in the region of about half a billion and a billion? >> i think it's probably not far out. >> so just to clarify we are, the position is that you have a strategic defense review, which is set in motion significant changes in the way that we organize our forces. you haven't quite or significantly got all the money you would like for that. so there's a limit on what you can do with existing stocks. in 2002, three. therefore, you go through the

process. this requires time. >> requires a different about the times, depending on what you require. >> but you mentioned you in require six months to get a division -- >> overall, yes. >> -- overall. so what the general sense did you have a very different items of different timelines associated, what sense did you have of how long you were going to need to get our forces ready for iraq? >> i mean, i didn't think -- i think we were working to the six-month timescale, roughly speaking. i mean, it might've been give or take a few weeks on either side. i think sierra was slightly we could have done it faster than could have been the case that i

think six months is the timescale we're working to. the reason i can say that is because part of the problem that we were discussing before the lunch break was at what point were we ask for going to make the decision in relation to option three and a sense it backwards from what we thought the invasion was actually going to begin. when without the invasion was actually going to begin in january, working six months back, means more than at risk of missing the start a. therefore, there is no point in offering option three because we couldn't get in there in time. is american planning assumptions began to slip, which i think most people in the m.o.d. anticipated it would, they wouldn't be in any better position to fix a date and they were bound to find, for both military and political reasons, the date would move backwards. that then allowed us to anticipate planning that would

get us there in time. >> but if your start date is march, the middle of march and six months back take you to the middle of september, and no decision has been taken. >> that's precisely why. that's why i was referring to the conversations. that's why we were saying it was a matter of urgency. i say we, my boss and i were saying on behalf of the ministry of defense, look, you've got to start taking this decision because otherwise, we will be -- we will miss the time date in anything, because we simply can't be ready. >> lord boyce told us that he was forbidden to talk to the chief of defense logistics because the government was not prepared to move forward on this. is that correct? >> i have tried hard to find out whether that was strictly -- i think perhaps he was describing,

i did not give a specific instruction of that kind. what was happening during that period though was that the prime minister, foreign secretary in particular, were fully involved in negotiating a security council resolution. and their ambition, which include shared, was that we should secure such a resolution and resolve this matter peacefully. therefore, the emphasis on the diplomatic process in september was paramount. at the same time, i and lord boyce were saying, but if you're going to bake a decision in time, you've got to get on with it. so the two things i accept were at odds with each other. and as a result, when we both went to meetings in downing street, say, look, you've got to get on with this, equally we were told in a sense, calm down.

we can get on with it while the diplomatic process is underway. expected to accept that? because part of the claim was that one of the bandages of an apparent readiness to military action was that it would affect the readiness of saddam to comply. it wasn't necessarily at odds to be shown to be ready to act. >> that is absolutely right in relation to saddam. but the issue was of the country and the united nations and on the security council willingness to support a last effort to persuade saddam to cooperate. and the argument that i was given very clearly from the prime minister and the foreign secretary was that if we were overtly seem to be preparing for

war, that would affect our ability to secure that revolution. this was a diplomatic process that it was not saddam that we are trying to influence by the combination of diplomatic and note the action. it were the countries on the security council that have to vote for this resolution. of course, that approach could provide because all of them, 15 of them, voted for, 1441. but the americans didn't seem to set in the planning. >> well, all i know is that mike and i went to meetings in september, where we argued the case. and that we will both made very well aware of the attitude in downing street towards the requirement for minimizing publicity, and for avoiding the visibility of the preparation that we are both there in these meetings. there was no doubt of the fact

that we could not go out, either of us, and overtly prepare, which is why we had to approach some of the uors in a particular way. >> that's covert rather than overt. >> i think the judgment that i had to do, and he had to make was the extent to which we could go on with preparations. without affecting that diplomatic process and the united nations. >> and did you make the prime minister, these other advisers, aware of the risks that this entailed in terms of readiness, should our forces because? >> that was central to what we were saying about the need to get on with preparations. and i think i referred already this morning to the letters that we said in october, pointing out that because we hadn't agreed to option three, the americans were some that we wouldn't be there.

>> so nonetheless, at this point, the view from downing street was the political gain of the u.n. resolution should not be put in jeopardy by overt military preparations? >> and -- let me be clear. that was also a view of significant part of the u.s. administration as well. i went into thousand two, i went to the united states for the anniversary of 9/11, when the pentagon was, not sure what the quite expression, but was installed within a year. and i had meetings with donald rumsfeld, but i also had meetings with armitage and i think colin powell dropped by in the american phrase, and the state department were completely focused on the need to get

further resolution. and for the president to go the u.n. track, as they said, but they were not clear on the ninth as to whether or not he was going to do so. and i think his speech was the next day and the united nations on the 10th. so even the u.s. administration was not wholly clear, our parser, as to what was going to be the outcome. again, back to sir roderic's question this morning, perhaps the best example of all the prime minister influencing the president of the united states into a particular course of action. because i doubt that without his advocacy of that resolution, that the president would have agreed to a. it was clear real doubt inside the u.s. administration as to whether he would even the day before. >> we've asked this question of another witness, quite the light of this question, but it's an interesting one. as to whether you think the british government would have

been able to take this matter any further if there had not been to take us back to the u.n. security council? >> to take it further? >> to move on the path we did fall in terms of military action, if this stage, that they agree to go back to the security council? >> so your hypothetical, if -- if there was no 14 for he was? >> if there was no 1441. >> looking at, having some thought about looking at the attorney general's legal opinion, he refers specifically to 1441 and how to express some previous doubts about unlawfulness of action without further resolution. so i assume that i am bound to agree with you. without 1441, there might not have been the ability to bring back into play, six, seven, eight.

>> i want to get back to the question of readiness for the conflict. that is the sequence, and we dealt with this before. before lunch. you mentioned this meeting in late october. and my understanding is that was largely to offer, in principle, a division to the united states. and that the question of uors was not decided until november. >> that's not quite right. i need to just check. the timing of this. >> as i understand it, the original request from within the ministry of defense, the uors came around the 13th of september. and there were a long list, such i don't know exactly how many. >> about a hundred and 19.

>> they were divided into priorities, first, second and so on. and there was also some indication, because of the conversations that we had been having with the downing street as to the visibility in terms of how much publicity this was likely to provoke. once we had the approval from the treasury, as i say, i think on the fourth of october, the overwhelming majority of those uors were approved. so the actual work was undertaken quite quickly. in the timescale. some of them, partly for reasons of visibility, but also i'm sure we'll get onto a, body armor, and a second, but in relation to that, that there was also another issue about how much we already had in stock at how much

we actually needed. . . once you get to the stage of booking space on ships to transport tanks and other heavy equipment then it is pretty clear what you're up to. >> so you saw that as even more politically sensitive than -- >> exactly. but that was a separate issue. >> but it has some of the same issues. >> of course.

of course. >> so -- >> i mean the timing in a sense the timing was much less acute, what we're talking about in relation to the uors is the time taking to manufacture them as opposed to, to hire a ship. >> so ideally how long would you like to mobilize, mobilization of reserves? >> again, i think, that will depend a lot on the kinds of people that we were concerned about, but, i think up to six months ideally from my recollection. but it can be done more quickly than that. there are, without being too technical, there are these days different kinds of reserves. there are people who actually are engaged in their daytime regular job but there are a increasingly a fair number of people who are almost full-time

reserves, who are available for operations and can move really very quickly. >> quite a lot can't? >> quite a lot can't. >> so the overall situation is that this is getting quite tight? >> yes. >> the, and you've told us before lunch that the actual decisions, were taken in start of january about going to the south, sending the division and so on, i think these, made announcements to parliament not long after that. so in terms of the planning assumptions by the ministry of defense, you were inevitably going to have to cut cornsers and push things faster than we would like? >> i'm not sure, i'm not sure i accept that the phrase, cutting corners. there was a process for getting the equipment that was required into place.

that equipment was prioritized. some of that, some of the uors were not necessarily for war fighting. some of them for the aftermath. so there is a range of equipment and the time taken for making it available, depended on, on whether there was some in store somewhere with a manufacturer or whether the manufacturer had to begin from scratch. i think some of the desert combats were made, some got to theater in time, some did not. >> so, does, this was a shorter timetable at the very least. we heard yesterday from jonathan powell that the government was seeking 1.9 weeks extra time for diplomatic purposes. would you after have found that helpful for military purposes as well? >> undoubtedly.

>> i mean how concerned were but the issue that has been raised about delays, meaning that troops had to hang around in uncomfortable conditions? >> i, i asked about that on a fairly regular basis. i was always told, although it would be uncomfortable, in a sense that was the benefit of a relatively late deployment because the six months time scale would take us, as i said earlier, into the summer. so, the answer was always that, they would be able to, to wait until the time to go. i mean obviously, you know there were considerations about heat, and about delay. but they were not, they were not central factors. had there been a nine-week delay i'm sure there would have been a help if you recall but that was not a --

helpful, that was not a factor. readiness or preparation was not a factor whether or not we went on a certain day in march. >> what sort of reassurances did you seek in march 2003 that our forces were ready and in a fit state to fight? >> well there was a very detailed process, which i believe to be bottom up, but, in the sense that each unit, each organization, up the chain would have to indicate that it was ready for, for the kind of task that had been allocated to it. ultimately, rather parallel in the sense to the legal certification, the chief of defense staff had to give me a certificate to say that they had achieved what it known as full operational capability, which is that they have the capability of conducting the operation ascribed to them, and that was achieved, i think for all units, two days or so before the invasion began.

>> i mean how, when you hear the phrase, full operational capability, how do you understand it in terms of tolerances, margins for error within the -- >> i well, inevitably i accept there are going to be tolerances within that but the way i understand it, and this is very clear, and think very important, this is a military judgment, a military decision by those who are expert in the field, that they are ready to conduct the operations that have been specified and, you know, i played no part in making that assessment that was entirely a matter for the military chain of the as i say, not simply at the top, as i understood the process, working from the bottom up, giving an indication at every level that those military units and organizations were ready to do the job that had been assigned to them. >> as the senior political figure in the ministry of defense, if they were, being

overoptimistic, you would be the one who would still have to explain what had happened. were you, were you confident that the military were not encouraging you to believe this because, the alternative was the americans would go without? >> could i add a postscript. looking at the psychology of military commanders after every level from unit up, battle group, so on up the line, it will take a lot of moral courage to say superior commander, i'm not ready and i won't go even the rest of you do. >> i accept the fact that the armed forces with real can-do attitude they will go and do things but in the end the alternative is, and i'm sure if we were investigating something in a different way, it would not at all be appropriate for a politician to substitute his or her judgment for the military professional

judgment of people who were long experienced in the field. i accept there is that risk. i mean we spent a lot of time on insuring that we could, we could deliver this equipment in time. if anyone had said, look, we have some debts about whether we are ready and, then, that would have been absolutely, a show stopper. >> now we heard, from a number of the generals, giving evidence the reason they were confident that they were ready was because they were fighting iraqi troops in the condition that they were in after all those years since 1991 and the degradation they had faced. so, that against a different army, they wouldn't necessarily have felt so ready. is that fair? is that your understanding?

>> well, i think, in a sense i have described that. that there was a process for determining the nature of the task for each of the units involved. they had to satisfy they were fully ready for those tasks. so necessarily i assume in the professional judgment they would take account of the enemy they were likely to confront. but at the same time, these are hugely experienced, very successful professional soldiers who are making professional judgements, and, you know, back to the three-legged stool. i relied upon their professional judgment as to their military capability. i don't think you would, i don't think inquiry or anyone would be happy for, you know, a lapsed lawyer to come along, actually i disagree with your professional military judgement. >> no. i think it is a question of understanding what, what the risks were, that were being

taken at the time, and as we have already heard, the actual operation itself justified confidence of the, of the armed forces. but in terms of the readiness of individuals to fight, it may have seemed, like a different story. that, the soldiers being put into battle may not have felt that they were personally quite so ready as the unit as a whole. is that fair? >> there were certainly some complaints about, and i pension ined already, about desert combat. quite a lot of soldiers went into action in green combats and they didn't like that. i understood from some of the lessons learned, processes afterwards, that judgements were made by senior officers that did not affect their military

capability. it may have affected to some extent morale and a some sense being valued and appreciated but it didn't actually affect their ability to fight. >> but, i mean, if we just look at this question of clothing, look at boots as well, which was a related issue, i think the figure was that only 40% of what was needed, actually had been ordered was available in theater by the 13th of april. so, almost as the conflict. >> 40% of what? >> of the extra boots and clothing. >> well i, -- >> this comes from the nao report. >> i, again, what i don't know is what, boots were more important than clothing, in the sense that i recognize that hot conditions, having appropriate kind of desert boots is important.

i conceded already that the clothing wasn't always available to the extent that the soldiers would have liked. what cron can what proportion of that 40% was boots as opposed to clothing. >> i think it was quite similar. stocks were available for about 9,000 prior, and this goes back to our earlier discussion, why it was relevant. stocks were available for 9,000. i think orders were put in for 30,000 boots and, similar numbers of uniform. except you have to multiply it by three. and, because they need extras. so, i think the numbers are the same. obviously as you say, boots were a cause, always are, a cause of particular irritation. but if your boots melt in the sun, it is not a small matter. >> no. i think, we actually looked at that particular illustration.

i think that was one soldier who, i think he may actually have been in the royal air force but i can't quite recall, who took with him the wrong boots, but, there were not, there were not widespread problems of boots melting in the sun. >> but they weren't the right boots for conditions -- >> some soldiers i'm sure did not have the right boots. >> body armor, you've already mentioned this. what was the problem with body armor as you understood it? >> well, i think, again we need to distinguish something. sold, for some years prior to iraq had had body armor, a system of protecting their upper bodies. the difficulty that arose was in relation to something, a new system called enhanced

combat body armor which basically consists of a vest with a slot in the front and the back for a metal plate or kevlar plate, actually, that protected your vital organs. that was a relatively recent innovation. indeed, i think prior to the conflict, i don't think it was mandatory. it was something that was thought to be desirable. and indeed, we had, we knew we had stocks of around 30,000 plates. so up to 15,000 sets of, enhanced combat armor, prior to the uor process. the, one of the issues that arose as we went through this list was a suggestion that actually we had more than the 15,000 sets, but

they weren't, they weren't in stock. they were actually her been -- had already been distributed. that is one of the reasons why i asked for further advice in relation to enhanced combat body armor but equally in my mind also was the question about vizability and what this would say because this kind of equipment can only really be explained in the context of war fighting. this is not the kind of equipment which up until then had been routinely issued to british soldiers. it was available for, and i think the documentation makes this clear, for the fighting echelons. for those who were likely to be in the front line. and the advice i got in the course of september that we had enough enhanced combat body armor for the fighting echelon. the question was, whether we

needed more for all of the forces who were likely to be deployed. and, the request that we should, i asked for further advice, partly out of concerns about visibility. partly because of the suggestion that we had more already. once we got the agreement of the treasury to proceed with uored, on the fourth of october, we then sent out a further request basically saying, in the interim i trust will submit for any particularly urgent requirements. so my office asked that if there was anything at all in the list had not by then been approved that was an urgent or particularly urgent requirement, then we should be told. not too long after that, we were told that, that this was a tranche 2 requirement

so that this was a requirement that was described of being lower priority. >> who was this by? >> well, unfortunately my notes don't say that but it would have been from, it would be from the logistics team who was handling uors. >> so, tranche 1 is absolutely urgent, tranche 2, less urgent. so carry on. >> what i understood that to mean at the time we had enough in stock for the front line for those who were going to be fighting. it was desirable clearly to have more available but that the military judged this to be of a lesser priority and did not necessarily say at that stage as they could have done, that we had to get this equipment available straightaway. >> is that in terms of spending the money the treasury already allocated. >> means going to the manufacturer, saying please

produce another, 15 or so thousand sets of this equipment. >> so when was it decided to be issued? >> eventually it was decided in november once the, once the the usc r had been approved. the rest of the items were then agreed to, including extra, enhanced combat body armor. >> so we're back to this question of the political impressions being created because this was seen to be much more relevant to offensive operations. and, because it wasn't the first priority within defense logistics, the relevant decisions were delayed? >> yeah, well, essentially when they were saying to me, we have, as i say, 15,000 sets in store. we can use those for the, for the front line for the

fighting echelons. would like ideally more but that is lesser priority than other equipment we require. they were, they were asked about that. and that was confirmed in correspondence. and therefore, a soon as the approval of the u.n. resolution was agreed, the rest of those items, i suspect not very many by then were agreed to. >> and what were then the problems with the, with the body armor in terms of getting it to people who needed it? >> by then, i'm not quite sure of the figures, but i think something like 36,000 sets were shipped to iraq. again, from the lessons learned process afterwards, one of the problems was that there was not a very effective tracking system once the, once the

containers were unloaded. and i suspect probably what happened that some units ended up with two lots of everything and some units ended up with nothing. so the distribution on the ground in iraq was not sat fact tri. -- satisfactory. >> this question of distribution and issue, this was a question in 1991, a little disappointing it had not been resolved a bit further by 2003? >> no. i agree with that. and we, over the years we spent quite a bit of time looking at the kinds of solutions that, particularly the private sector adopted. i don't know whether, see i left the ministry of defense some years ago. one of the ideas was to embed a chip or something in each piece of equipment that allowed you to say, where it was in store, how it was being transported and where it was going. but relatively expensive solution.

but perhaps, you they, that is cost of that reduces, that might be a sensible way of proceeding. otherwise, the tracking necessarily, is a manual process, with people taking pieces of paper, which, in, in the circumstances probably unrealistic. >> one of the consequences of this problem was that in key places there weren't enough of the relevant body armor and so, local commanders had to make their own priorities who should get what, we know at least one case led to a tragic out come? >> to the deaf of sergeant roberts. >> yes. >> as i understand the process in theater, that commanding officers essentially made judgements, consistent what i have been saying that the front line, the fighting forces, would

have the enhanced combat body armor. they would then make judgments about the level of protection available to other soldiers. they already had body armor as such. and the distribution was made on the basis of was made on the who was most at risk. >> in the nature of this sort of operation which we found ourselves, the dividing line between front and rear became rather blurred? >> i think that is absolutely right. the point i made earlier about the rapid advance of the front line and sergeant roberts death. that is a perfectly -- they were being stoned by a man throwing stones at them. as i understand it, he refused to, to stop doing that. sergeant roberts's gun jammed.

the machine, the machine gunner fired a machine gun. and, i think i'm right in saying that was what killed sergeant roberts because the machine gunner did not entirely appreciate his machine gun was not accurate at close quarters. all i'm saying there was series -- >> obviously how a particular individual dice is going to be a very particular set of circumstances. what we've been trying to establish is the, if, that part of the story, which explains why he didn't have proper body armor. i'm conscious of time. just ask one more question about personal equipment and then i think will be a good time for me to stop although there are other equipment issues to get into. and that simply is protection against chemical and biological warfare, to the extent that you had intelligence that warned saddam might have these stocks and might use them,

were you concerned about the difficulties in getting the adequate equipment to the troops? >> as i understood it, everybody was equipped with appropriate clothing to protect them. indeed, one of the complaints i received was the, the fact that they, so often had to train to get into and out of these suits, and did so on a regular basis, even though, in the end, they did not have to wear them. we, we were very, very conscious of the threat. and, people were trained and expected to use the clothing to -- >> i think one of the concerns that there was a lot of the, it was out of date, the kit was an out of date kit. >> well, i don't, i don't recall any suggestion that any of this kit was ineffective. >> unfortunately was never

tested. >> i don't know whether there was sell-by date on the kit. there may well have been. as far as i'm aware, whenever this was tested, this equipment was fit for its purpose and -- >> -- told us, the quote i recall, biggest difficulty we had with these issues twas actually our nbc protection. >> i have to say i have not come across anything specific to suggest that nbc protection was not available to every soldier who needed i indeed, as i say, the most frequent complaint i received was number of occasions which they had to stop everything and get into this kit which wasn't entirely a straightforward process but nevertheless they were made to do it and it was part of the instructions that came down the chain of command. >> i, sorry to go on about this, but this was also a point raised by the committee on public accounts.

not receive sufficient supplies of a range of important equipment including enhanced combat body armor, nuclear, biological and chemical protection systems. >> that was not, i have, i have seen the relation to enhanced combat body armor. i'm not aware there was serious criticism for a lack of protective clothing for those who needed it. >> i will stop. >> this is definitely time for a break i think. we'll break for an. >> thank you. >> well we've come to the final quarter of the day and i ask sir robert to pick up -- sir roderic pick up

questions. >> i like to take a break from equipment issues although i dare say they may reappear but to look at another very important issue was how the coalition handled the security factor from the time of the campaign had been completed until the left your post as secretary of state of defense in 2005. so 2003-5. and this was obviously a period in which problems, quite serious problems began to arise. if we go back near the beginning, after the campaign had finished, there was a brief, period, hen orhor was dismissed and jerry bremer arrived as head of coalition provisional authority with a british senior --,er is jeremy greenstock working with him.

jeremy wasn't officially his number two as he explained. and, bremer finds that already the security situation is beginning to get fragile. the government is very fragile, so far as it existed at all. in his first week he takes some very big decisions on things like debaathification, which we've discussed with a number of other witnesses, and on disbanding the army. now the army had largely dissolved but, it hadn't been formally disbanded and there was a question as to whether it was necessary to do so or if you had actually offered pay to people to return to their posts, vetted them, you couldn't have had an army to work with, to deal with your security problems. what view did you take of

these decisions by bremer, which as we heard from sir john saws, had been agreed before he arrived? impression i have, if you think to correct this, we had been barely consulted on them at all. >> i referred earlier the paper i gave to donald rumsfeld on a visit to the pentagon in february. implicit in that paper as far as debaathification was concerned, although the phrase doesn't appear, we wanted, i which we described them iraqi technocrats who may have had gone on with the regime to be available to continue to administer the system. as i understood it, belonging to the baath party was a pre-condition of certain, certain jobs in saddam's iraq.

we thought, and the paper that i gave him emphasizes that there would be people who had joined the baath party because they wanted for example, to be civil servants. not because they were necessarily enthusiastic supporters of saddam hussein. we felt there ought to be a distinction between those who were enthusiastic supporters of saddam hussein and those who simply joined the party in order to gain position. not at least because we anticipated some of difficulties that ensued in administering iraq in the aftermath. i think is similar argument rises in relation to the army. we, as i mentioned earlier, saw the army as a force for stability. we had not attacked it in some places specifically in order to try and preserve its coherence. but as you rightly say, many of the people went home, but it could have been reconstituted relatively quickly. i think some of the security

difficulties, particularly in and around baghdad were the result of disaffected people along no longer receiving their salary, joining the insurgency and indeed putting their expertise to use in the sense that, there was clear suggestion to me that some of the attacks became more sophisticated as some military people became involved, or former military people i should say. >> so, these decisions not to put too fine a point on it were mistakes? >> i think they were. i think that, it would have been a better to, to have that stability and that immediate aftermath, i think to some extent, disbanding the army fueled the insurgency in a way that made it harder, much harder to contain. having said that, i, in some stage i did have a discussion about some of these issues and, i think,

the americans are very focused on the fact that someone loyal to saddam hussein could not be entirely relied upon and, and therefore they felt that a fresh start from scratch was a better way forward. i'm not saying the arguments were all one way. >> no. but should we have been given more of a chance to participate in the debate, influence the decisions before they were taken and advanced? >> i'm sure in due course the inquiry will look at paper i submitted and it demonstrates beyond doubt that those two points i've said already were matters in our minds at the time. >> and, you could even envision using the republican guard in sort of a sanitized capacity because it was an effective body of people? >> the sense i had about the republican guard that they were largely composed of professional soldiers. saddam was supposedly an admirer of stalin and he had

certainly political, the equivalent of political commissars in place. at one stage i think of the fighting one division surrendered, or at least the commanding officer surrendered. he then suddenly went back to fighting, partly i understood because his family were being held and he was told in no uncertain terms what would happen. there was that element of political involvement in the republican guard but nevertheless, our judgment was by and large they were, it was more important that they were soldiers than it was they were supporters of saddam hussein. so, hence, the argument they were a force for stability. >> okay, looking a area we were in charge of the southeastern box, initially as you described earlier things were very good. you could wander around basra in april. but they started turning nasty fairly quickly. there were riots in august. then as you go through to, to the spring of 2004, you

really start to get a big rise in the level of violence and the beginnings of shia insurgency there. now, how did we react to this? was there a question of sending more forces into reinforce the troops that we had there which we had drawn down to a large extent? >> well, there was certainly a discussion about that. there was also a discussion about getting more contribution from more countries. i think overall though, it was something like 30 countries involved in the post-conflict phase. as you have been aware, they were distributed in different areas of the south with each country taking responsibility for its part of the operation. so, it wasn't simply for us to determine that in the south. it was, work that we did in coalition. i think equally it is important that the, the

problems that have developed in the security terms were not all of one kind. the criminality, i recall someone blaming some of that on the fact that saddam released all of his prisoners prior to the invasion. some of the looting was clearly directed against institutions associated with saddam. so some of the public buildings that were looted, were looted i was told because, this is a way of some of the population getting back at saddam and his regime. equally, there were some tensions between sunnis and shia inside but not on the scale obviously of further north. as you mentioned there was, there was real tension within the shia community. al-sadr making a bid for

control and power probably under some iranian influence as well. so there were a range of range of different causes for the problems, and i think, the challenge for us really was how did we, how do we deal with that in security terms.

>> one of the reasons why iraq did not split into three smaller countries, was that there is a sense of iraqi nationalist. it has to make them whole. this is a sense on which people are iraqi first and shiite or sunni second. and that focus eventually never typically turns against foreign soldiers. the ultimate solution is to train iraqi security forces. that takes time. >> yes. >> and so in this period when the securities deteriorating, really increasingly, quite rapidly. and we're waiting for an ultimate period when we've got iraqis here to do the job. what did you feel we should be doing about it? >> well, we needed to maintain our ability to deal with the

outbreaks of violence, which i think we did very successfully, and to go on with the kind of training, police, soldiers, the reconstruction, rebuilding, ultimately, this is about hearts and minds about the attitude of the iraqi people. there was not a complete breakdown in law and a order. there were some pretty nasty incidents where some british soldiers died. nevertheless, this was an outbreak, it is was not a persistent disorder. the task and british and other soldiers was to contain the outbreaks. but at the same time to move forward in terms of reconstruction and training. >> but by 2005, wasn't there a situation in the area where we

led -- in which there was a feeling that there was slipping out of our control. we weren't being successful in containing what had become a pretty high level of attacks. >> i still say that it was important at that stage to accept that there was something targeting foreign soldiers to brutally -- there was some elements of al qaeda in the south, not as much as further north, foreign fighters who were trying to provoke violence both within and between the shiite and sunni community and attacks on people and so on. actually, i don't think that he has ever been given sufficient credit during that period. i developed a huge admiration. i've never met him. for a man who was their

spiritual leader. i think without him, and without his influence, his ability to restrain shiites from retaliating all in provocation and moreover his ability to calm people, i think we would have gotten to that stage. but he is an immense restraining influence. i developed an admiration for him because whenever the problems began, he seemed to be able to everyone down turn a period that it was understandable for people to result to violence. some of the incidents on mosque and distributely trying to inflame the situation, he simply accepted that was provocation and people should not retaliate. >> one of the problems was he couldn't do the hearts and minds work when the security situation got bad. as we've heard from many

witnesses, this is a visual circle. you can't win the population by do reconstructive projects. a lot of our develop work became impossible. because the security situation was slipping out of control. >> i wouldn't say that that was a consistent picture across all of the south. there were places where it was extremely difficult. and places where perhaps the world did not proceed equally. during those periods, there was still reconstruction work going on elsewhere. we turn to the training of the security forces to the police and the army, did you feel that the targets that in the early stages of this operation we were setting proved at the highest levels for numbers to betray? were realistic or where they ambitious? >> i certainly thought at the time we were not getting, we the

military defense, were not getting the kind of help we had expected particularly as far as police ratings were concerned. well, again, part of the plan was that there would be police from the united kingdom to provide the training, but not nearly enough. but we had the capability to provide that kind of training to the extent that we wanted. >> and we were in the lead on police training for this stage. was your ministry the right ministry to lead work on police training? >> probably not. in. but on the other hand, we were in the best place to at least coordinate that work. you know, all of the others, but we with didn't. we didn't get as many people in to do the training as we would have -- we we'd been promised. >> were the british the right people to be training the iraqi police work? >> i think so. being an iraqi policeman is

different than being british policeman. >> that's what the witnesses have said. but the style? >> having said that, this may sound over ambitious. but the ambition was to produce a different kind of society from the one that existed. therefore, trying to develop police officers who were not subject to financial or tribal treasures, it was a ambitious activity on if difficult to realize and practice. >> at what point do you remember the message getting back to you the police draining wasn't working. >> this came back with the one i've given you already. this came back really without more help from those who are more expert in this field. we are not the right people to do this job. but the army training, although

slow, inevitably was going better? >> and i visited both the training unit and several occasions army training. and i think some of that before. because we did similar sorts of things in sierra leone. and to some extent afghanistan. but i -- i mean there are several stables involved in this process. there was some very basic recruit training that began almost right away. and that was you know more than trying to give people a sense of coherence and discipline. i remember they were presented with uniform to one stage. that was a tremendous sort of sign to the men involved. they had made sort of progress. after that, there needs to be further training in terms of responsibility, how you organizize yourself --

>> are you creating a new officer court? >> well, bremer had disbanned the old one. >> that is a much tougher process. before you can -- this obviously was the plan. before you can hand over an area or providence to iraqi control, it isn't just enough to have soldiers that were trained relatively quickly. you have to leadership, command, you got to have people who can take decisions. there are necessary at some time and quite difficult circumstances. that does take time. >> i'd like to turn to some questions about the balance between the uk military objectives, very much focused in the southeast after the invasion, and our overall iraq strategy. when you started, you started our day with a three-legged stool. but there is a bit of a sense of two-legged stool.

they are not equal legs. but our direct responsibility for the basra area and the accountability for the whole of iraq very much centered on baghdad. the americans have a military representative who is in the chain of the command. but frankly, given the disproportion for the american forces -- >> yup. >> not with the norths that might suggest. so there are several decisions that you had to make or endorse about sometimes an american wish to pull up british forces from the southeast, either for particularly or general reinforcement. i wonder if you'd like to say a bit about the fact that you had to take to account when you're judging, for example, a u.s. approach to send the air assault to baghdad. which you turned down, i think. what was in your mind, how did

you judge it? >> i think there was a balance. in some extent i'd have to recognize in a number of the questions today, my focus was basra and the south. because that's essentially where british troops where or where they were made engaged. i'm not avoiding my responsibility for the government on what was taking place in baghdad. i wasn't in the same way directly responsible for that in the way that responsibilities were allocated. but nevertheless, as far as the military part was concerned, when the request came i had to make a judgment consistent with the answers that i gave a moment ago. between what did we need to do in the south, and what was our primary focus there? and what contribution did we need to make as a good ally as part of the coalition to operations further north? i think that was not the only operation i turned down, simply because i felt perhaps our

priority still remained in the south and we had played our part. eventually, we did decide that because of the americans were conducting a major, very significant operation in and around flank somewhere i think an area known as north. >> have you suffered for the watch? >> for a limited period. >> to help us understand the kind of fact that you had to take into account for making that judgment. the political impact in iraq and the south having been seen or part of the american presence there? things like that? >> i think we outlined already the main factors. what impacted that on our ability to conduct operations properly in the south, what were the risk, what were the dangers, what were the consequences if we didn't do it for our relationship with the united

states given that we had made a great play of our working in coalition and, indeed had -- i think it's safe to say disappointmented in the attitude of other countries that hadn't been prepared to participate. so the sense was having turned at least a couple of these things down, we had to really look very hard at this further request. given that i think things did turn out to be the case, but the clearing was a huge turning point in the american operation by dealing with fluja they were able to make some real progress. >> exactly. the argument about them putting huge resources into the operation and providing them with some cover elsewhere was

quite power. >> still thinking of the two-legged stool. the unplannable impacts fallujah itself, actually. having an impact inside of our operations in terms of public opinion and attitude? >> again, in terms of the answers that i gave to sir lyne roderic a moment ago, those kinds of revelations simply demonstrated that we were deceived some more of the population as being occupiers, as being foreign, as being the enemy. and that presence made it harder to keep us on the side of the hearts and minds. >> we discussed very renally in this session deteriorating security situation quite

rapidly. april through august. and at the same time, there was a british ambition, a government ambition that our conduct of affairs in the southeast should be exemplary. at some point, that aspiration, noble in itself, has to give away to the reality. was that something that was consciencely managed? it wasn't simply a passive reaction to the events as we scaled down our approach? >> i think part of the -- one of the factors that led to the deteriorating situation undoubtly, i see regular reports about this. it is the sense that we were not deliberate. we were not providing the kind of support that people in and around basra expected. they thought things would change very quickly. we just couldn't make those big

changes in time. i think we did a lot of good work on the small scale. that undoubtly helped. i refer earlier to the pacific, it was clear very quickly the power station serving basra could not be repaired indefinitely. we could not guarantee it. therefore, there would have to be a new power station. that was a long and frustrating of getting the money approved, deciding which company, american or british company, there was quite a debate and the money in any event wasn't coming through. that kind of delay frustrated the population and certainly frustrated the guys on the ground who were having to deal with the consequences. >> i got one other question. it's very much about looking to the future and lessons to be learned. it's interesting to hear from you, throughout your time as

secretary of state and particularly or since or during the invasion, let's me rephrase, the situation awareness, how was your situation awareness for regular briefing, situation reports, general as they cycle through? can can you say a little about that? every now and again you had to make a big decision. >> sure. i don't think -- i don't think there's a single process that made it on the individual that's doing the job at time. but it is necessarily a mixture of expert advice from the people who have experience whether they be soldiers or civil servants from the m.o.d. or beyond. this is -- i mean i always felt there was a lot to be gained by going south, looking, asking questions, focus on what was going on at the time. and i made it how many times

that i went to iraq. quite a number of occasions. the time was there. i think there is some context. i think i was fortunate, if that's the right word on this particular operation came after afghanistan and came after sierra leone, it came after our revolt in kosovo. i think some of the decision that is had to be taken in information to iraq that were really very, very difficult than the risk to lives deploying, fighting soldiers, and potentially very dangerous conflict. so i do think that it is a mixture of all of the those things that allow you then to have some confident in those decisions that you take. >> the ministry of defense and the british mill industry, they made the organization in the americans. it would be very easy to have the whole of the situation awareness informed by their

input. can you give us a relative account of getting enough from outside the world in these two very big places of destruction. i think it unfolded politics inside iraq. >> the senior position at any secretary of state get thes a feeling of the sense of the departments that have always been in the cabinet. i think the cabinet's voice in the department. so that it is a two-way process. we've discussed the sources, and it was quite a balance to be loyal both to a government trying to set an overall financial position as well as to be loyal to a department necessarily wants to spend more money. and i think that applies a whole range of issues. and it is relevant in question. because there should be times when i would be saying to the ministry of defense, look, actually, the right people to deal with it are -- you need to

rely on the core office. i think for that, i made the comparison earlier to some extent. what the -- what the americans are not so good at is this sort of low level cooperation between the departments where i think the united kingdom has done any good. i can't tell you actually what the americans are quite good at. i think there are all sorts of reasons why they are better at it than we are. it's the kind of top-level clears of decision in the sense that they have fairly regular meetings on principal where secretary of state, secretary of the president, and secretary of the security advisor will get together. they will simply work through the various difficulties of the risk between the departments and souls. once they reached a view.

i think the constitutional arrangements are much forwarder for cabinet ministers of the parliament, and have therefore, responsibilities just to make the constituency but actually in terms of debate and question times. trying to get people together on a more regular basis is actually quite challenging. >> we've heard quite a lot of evidence that they did not feel that the top handler was on a war footing. is that in some sense the what you've been saying? >> i think it's much harder to say -- i can recall frustrations that you need to go with the prime minister in jacksonville or whoever was there afterwards and sort this out. the americans did that. the momented noted. i can recall being obviously the president wants to see. he goes. whereas, there were always some

constraints on our ability to do that. plus -- but i accepted it to be equally true for the u.s. there are also things going on at the same time. although we are understandably and rightly focused on iraq for the focus of the inquiry, at the same time, we are still conducting operations in afghanistan, and there are a whole range of issues for the foreign office what have absolutely nothing to do with iraq. but nevertheless, people are still having to conduct daily meetings, do the work that's necessary to keep those activities underway. >> thank you. >> the committee of principals the problem was they ran off two years. after the campaign, a lot of

meetings happen. we have the inspection. why was it possible to do after the campaign but not before the campaign? >> the things we were describing, there were in fact meetings and principals. i'm not suggesting that the prime minister, baxter, myself, cds did not -- from time to time, but certainly in other meetings as well. the meetings whether they were being meeting. there were large numbers of people present from not only the departments already mentioned but whatever this department was at the time. there were a whole range of people from the home office affairs. it was quite a big cabinet meeting looking at the contributions of different departments can make to be reconstructive. >> thank you. >> yes. indeed. i'm going to come back to, i

mean you paint a picture that things were obviously getting better. and there were meetings and a so on. but several witnesses have said to us that the military and the department from the particular visit failed to deliver what was required of them. and this is something -- sorry. yes, indeed. now what was done to actually deal with that. because in a way, the mission itself was successful. you found the situation on the ground, and the forces and the civilians were doing their best. they were who looking for support from the sector. what mechanisms did you put in place to make sure that these got better? i mean the relationships and so on. what steps do you take? the meeting is one thing, but the practicality of it. >> i play my part. but essentially the department is now recognizing that there

was a risk of strategic failure, and ensure that there were other kinds of meetings that we've been discussing where government was put on by war footing, or i think that's something of an exaggeration, frankly. but there was a sense in which we had to solve this problem, otherwise we risk wasting the progress that had been made there too. so a day to day interest in making sure that when people said they were going to do something, it actually happened. >> we want to keep looking at if there were a different set. i'd like your observations on that. he said the organization between different departments make me wonder where there's the need for some kind of hybrid civil military which we with don't yet

have. >> i think that's also an useful observation. if i may to some extent suggest the lesser provide certainly learned. one the things that the military had rightly emphasized and in the modern world, they emphasize the importance of getting quickly into situation on i gave the example sierra leone on the weekend. we face a series of conflicts in the aftermath is getting civilian capability there in anything like the same time scale. this m conducted by serbs who left. to some extent, sunnies left the south, and certainly abandoned their positions. even if they didn't go north, they went the home. so you've got to vacuum, not of the military kind, of the

administrationive kind. and i think there's actually a role for some kind of what i would describe as civilian reservist. they are the counterpart of military reserves. people who, they are not doing to wear uniforms. but they perhaps are trained, give up a weekend or two weeks or something, so that they -- their commitment would be that they would be ready to go into a situation as of when needed. so that, you know, they would be people who would expect to be called upon in precisely this kind of situation. because the real problem is that i think all -- >> that is something they could do. >> exactly. all of the departments for the defense are used to the concept that you have got to get people quickly into a conflict. even if some of the countries that i can think of can't do it quite as well as we can. that is part of the modern thinking. but then there's the sort of

gap. certainly that i've seen where, you know, we're looking around for someone to fill that gap. now i've described the military reserve as being that in the south in iraq. they ed actually need civilian expertise who can stay and go some quite important, but nevertheless, civilian jobs. >> what's this cultural differences? because the idea was military will have an impact projects whereas it was looking as if it was sustainable projects. >> i'm not sure i -- i characterize it in that day. because actually the money that was being sent on quick impact was coming from dfid if i recall. ultimately, what i was looking for was people from dfid on the ground not only offering the

money but helping to deliberate. the real distinction was not between the kinds of culture and different departments. the real decision was what i called long term. i think i've eluded already to the question of the power station. the real problem was that we could do so much on the ground with these kinds of project. i mean they were -- i wouldn't see some of the bridge building sorting out from different pasts, lighting for people in the dark and so on. very basically, but certainly helped the smaller community. but what we were sorting out were the big things. the big infrastructure projects, i don't think that's a cultural difference. it's a question of getting the situation taken care of and getting the money. >> can i -- sorry. >> i'd like to pull a side track ton this, if i may. we've heard from a number saying the southeast, looking to quicken the project, they couldn't draw around much in the way of funding from uk resources. now the american military had

quite large stores which were under military control. sometimes we managed to feed off of those. there was a different system. compared to the that if you can? >> yeah, as i say, i think quite a lot of the money did come from dfid directly or indirectly in the first place. there was certainly real frustration about some of these bigger projects was to where the money was going to come from in the sense that the assumption was that they would come through all of them. >> congress had voted $18 billion u.s. dollars. >> exactly. but getting it actually spent, getting ahold of it, it was enormously difficult. >> can i come back to the impact of this on your own department? with the mod? because given the fact that you

were there for the long haul, was there corresponding uphistory in effort and resources that you were allocated within the department? or was it business as usual for the mod? >> you mean in terms of the overall size of the budget? >> well, the budget but also the effort. how much effort in terms of people and the support you wanted to give. how did you manage the mod? did you make your gain to actually support the military long haul? >> i think that was -- i think that was well understood in the ministry of defense. there's always a planning cycle when people are destroyed that allows them to recuperate and to get back into their regular training. and that's part of the judgment that has to be made in relation to how long units can stay in a particular theater. so i think that is probably better understood in the mod than the most places.

and the biggest part of what they do on a pretty regular basis. and plans assumptions that are made in terms of how long it is possible for different units to remain in a theater. nevertheless, it does have consequences, particularly like we discussed earlier, fire strike, anything that adds to that burden. if you're operating at or near strategies isn't very difficult. >> because the planning post invasion was inadequate in iran, one gets the sense that you always sort of behind the planet cycle. you're planning as the events unfolded. did we ever get the initiative? did we ever get ahead of the problem that we're facing or always kind of responding as it arose? >> well, i think it's probably almost inevitable that minister of defense do that.

because they are always reacting to events. i don't think in this particular -- in this particular conflict, i was not aware in my time that this was causing huge difficulty. although, i am aware of what you were describing. when i first arrived in the mod in october 1999, we were simultaneously deployed in bosnia and kosovo. many, many particular support staff were simply being rotated from one to the other. we lost a lot of people during that period. they said look, that's not right. aye not doing that. it's the same thing over and over again. iraq and afghanistan, certainly the war-fighting part actually is popular is not quite the word i suspect. but that's what a lot of people join up to do. >> but are you then saying -- i mean there have been no opportunities to learn the

lessons? >> there were quite a detail as with any operation as detailed lessons learned process inside the ministry of defense. >> but you identified those. what was the lesson learned during the course of the time you were there? >> well, i think there's probably longer term consideration by lesson in 2005. but i'm sure that work would have fed into and continued to feed into the kinds of judgments that are being made. i think it's clear that that's going to be some sort of defense review after the next election, and i'm sure these kinds of issues will be part of that process. >> but did you personally make sure the lessons were learned as you went along? >> yes, of course. yes. >> what stipes did you snake >> well, i think i've given some examples of the very sophisticated equipment level. i was in no doubt of the importance of very sophisticated

technology. because i think that this is going to be the difference in war-fighting for the future. which means that it is necessary to equip our forces with battle-winning technology. if we are going to send them into conflict, i think that feeds through in all sorts of other respects in terms of logistic support that i talked about multiple chains of support for front line forces. it is a very different kind of world from the one that in a sense influence thinking up to the end of the cold war where far more territorial defense was in mind. so i think each of the -- each of the conflicts that i was involved in, i think demonstrated the importance of speedy response of having multiple logistics change, support change, being able to cooperate in a significance

distance away from home base. having smart weapons and having the kind of technology that allows us to work alongside the united states. i think those are the kinds of -- i can make a longer list of the kinds of challenges that the mod will have to go with when it goes into the defense review. >> thank you. we're coming towards the end of the a long day. i think we ought to take a short break. then we have a couple of questions. i think we can come back in no more than 10 minutes. well, it's a restart. back to the budget. what went into account and the assumptions in march 2003, we were there for six years. you obviously secretary for all of that period. but you were there for a period

after that. how did you find that you have continuing discussions presumably with the chancellor about how you manage the military position created by iraq. how did you manage that process? >> i think it's right to say that we did not have any difficulty at all in securing the extra spending, specifically for the operations. the treasury, i think, by then was used to the process that we've been through in afghanistan, see eyra leone, i guess prior to that. so extra money for capability was available. i indicated earlier some difficultyies over how you sustain some of that equipment thereafter. >> sort of an extra funding for

the actual operations? what we discussed earlier, the relationship between the general defense budget and what was necessary was specific operations. what about that side of the equation. how successful were you in maintaining the defense budget in providing the core foundation for a future operations? >> well, as i indicated when i arrived, there was a strong sense that the mill industry of defense has been underfunded. i do not believe that began in 1997. there was a strong sense that perhaps the so-called peace dividend has eaten do deeply into defense resources over a longer period of time and in sense the strategic commence review was part of the process of trying to recover some ground. be as not well funded as it could have been. >> and so this is a continuing

position you found yourself in. were you able to improve the situation? >> well, certainly, defense spending increased in the time that i was there. i dare say others in the department would question the extent to which it increased in the way that the departments budget increased. but nurse, there were extra spending available. >> i think there was a particular addition agreement with the treasury in september 2003. do you recall that? >> no. >> if you could explain what it was al about. >> i'll try. it is complicated. it is back actually to the settlement in july, i think it was 2002. here's the complicated part.

the treasury were moving towards a system of the resources account budgeting. which in a simple listic way meant that departments had to pay for existing equipment as well as new equipment. so there was an amount allocated for what you already held. now for most departments, i suspect two particularly effected by this were defense more than any other but transport probably as well. most departments, there was a meaned adopted from the private sector of bearing down on historic cost. using existing funding more effectively. what i think the treasury probably overlooked in the settlement letter in july 2002 is that because of a large amount of equipment that the mod held it was much easier for them

to bare down on those cost. and it's for the reasons why we judged the 2002 settlement as very favorable. because we would be automobile to use our asset base more effectually and effectively to release cash or ore spending. >> so essentially what was managed that the long cash parts and the budget it across to the cash? >> only -- i mean only subject to finding that means using the existing equipment more efficiently and therefore at a lower cost. that was the whole point of resource account budgeting was to adopt it from the private sector was to put pressure on the -- on the department to have look much harder at their equipment. if they had, for example, equipment that was no longer really there for it's purpose to get rid of it. and if they had older equipment that was expensive and tieing up a lot of maintenance time and money, make it tough decision as

to whether you really needed it. but i think what the treasury overlooked was that this gave enormous flexibility to the mod to do precisely what you've just described. it was not actually available. the treasury didn't like we were using the flexibility. probably around 15 months later they put the breaks on it. they said we had to stop. that cause add lot of problems, because we'd been spending at

higher rate. we had a lot of planned based on the flexibility. obviously this was something that would go forward as well as retrospectively. we then -- >> i'm sorry. >> my apologies. >> with we then had to look hard at our budget and make some rather difficult cuts in the future equipment program as a result. >> how was this argument played out? because it did -- it was quite a challenge not only to the budget but to your role as the chief of cabinet. >> well, i mean there were -- there was a fair amount of core response, i think it's fair to say in the immediate matter. and we resolve quite a long time. because we were clear as to what the settlement letter meant for reasons why i had welcomed the

settlement because i thought that this opportunity was going to be available to us. the treasury insisted that we should have some independent assessment of both the rules and of our spending. it's -- you're going to ask about this. but i'm confident that the accounts that looked at this said it was holy consistent both with private sector practice and indeed with the rules that the treasury had established. as i saying think any enthusiasm for applying the rules across the government the, i think they slightly overlooked the benefit that it brought to the mod. >> and part of one of the issues that was raised was whether the cuts, the reduction in your budget that would be expected of you would have any consequences

for iraq. >> i mean -- i don't think that is the case. in fact the quick program was effective. but i doubt that would have had immediate consequences for iraq. this was -- we produced a white paper on the interim on, i'm sorry about had the expression about network center capability and about ensuring that we could do all of the things that i was describing to the break to the bareness. this was about transforming to this kind of technology but technology warfare. >> given were in a conflict that seems to be going longer than what might have been anticipated. it is relevant, for looking

forward to what you'll be able to provide our forces in the future. >> again, i don't want to overstate the position. i don't believe that it was relevant to helicopters in iraq, no doubt this is going back to 2002, 2003, 2004, it's responsible to assume that by now, had that budget had been spent in the way that we thought we should spent it, and those helicopters were probably be coming into service any time now. >> so the budget was still under a revere constraint? >> to some extent more so because of the way we had interpreted the rules. >> that i guess was the point i was making. now can we just look at this particular questions of helicopters. it's critical resource of the

military commander always says they want more. and others where drawn down in iraq after the initial combat operations. was there pressure to keep them there? to find more? >> as you said, there's always a scarce resource. we didn't face the kinds of problems in iraq, at least to the same extent, and problems currently faced by british soldiers in helmand and other places. there were some i.e.d.s, but there wasn't quite the same pressure. i think that military commanders on the ground rightly and understandably always want more equipment. i don't anybody would doubt that. as part of the balance that has

to be struck when you're doing more than one operation simultaneously. >> the lack of helicopters meant that it was much more enforced on using ropes. you mention that the i.e.d. probably was not enormous. >> i said it wasn't great. i'm not minimizing. >> you said it grew. we're not going to go into the details. this is one reason why the forces were so relined on it. >> that's right, yes. >> again, bare in mind as well, overall, the security of british forces had to be paramount concern. also bear in mind that more in tradition, the british army is to get out amongst the population to interact to be

scene. not to be hidden in sort of a very heavily protected vehicles. so trying to get that balance right. it's an extremely difficult one. i don't envy those having to take those decisions today in relation to afghanistan. it wasn't really a chance that it could be used. it was that the single source of british deaths. this is one the most substantial. was this concept brought to you attention? >> well, i think it was beginning to develop at time that i left the department, yes. >> no provision had been made for an alternative that was going to take time? >> that's not entirely true. there was a program for a range of vehicles. i think included in that was

sort of a more heavily protected, comparable vehicle. >> are there areas in which you started to see extra resources, possibly immediate in iraq rather than sort of the what we talked about the specific episode. but the general security for our forces? >> i've always said as far as the day-to-day operations, we didn't have a problem in securing funding. as if you were asking about what would i like to see in the general budget for the administer of defense. i probably could give you quite a long list. but that probably would be true of every secretary of state of every government department at any time in history.

i mean there were specific things that, you know, we would hope to have procured. but for financial reasons -- >> so it's a question of trick levels as well? >> yes, i think the emphasis -- which is often misunderstood is -- was on specialist on holes and signals, communications, generally, those were the always -- they were the sort of shortage trades in the army. because most of the time, their skills were very attractive to the private sector. if you can put in a mobile phone system in a place where previously nonexistent, possibly in secure circumstances, you are very attractive to mobile phone company back in the -- united

kingdom. it was those that we were short of. as far as i'm aware of, yes. >> this is my last couple of questions. but when we started talking about the budget to the strategic defense, they had the planning assumption that there was a media operation enduring nature and they might be able to do other things as well. there wasn't much provision for two operations. >> one large, two medium was the kind of formula -- >> by large media. >> one large, not both. >> yes. in july 2004, they deployed what it up to afghanistan. did you envision that this would be a significant to uk forces at

that time? >> at that time, i didn't agree to it. >> would you like to say more? >> i believe that it was necessary to rejuice our commitment to the iraq before taking on what was a nato mission. and i thought that at that time, given our commitment to iraq, it was probably better to allow other countries to participate in that particular mission until we were in a better position to do so. and i felt personally that -- largely influenced by, i think, the experience that i had in the first part of my period in the mod while trying to conduct two operations. >> we're going to leave the last few minutes of this tape for live coverage of the u.s. senate. you can watch this any time at c-span.org. lawmakers about to gavel in to start the week.

first up an hour of general speaks. work resumes on the federal debt limit. then at 5:30 they will put that aside for final debate on judicial nominations with a final debate on 6:00 eastern. now live senator coverage here on c-span 2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the chaplain, dr. barry black, will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray.

our lord and our god, savior of humanity, thank you for commanding light out of darkness, for creating our world and calling it good. great and wonderful are your works, lord god almighty. today, bless our lawmakers. give them the courage to hold on to what is good and to return no one evil for evil. use them to strengthen the fainthearted, support the weak, and help the suffering.

lord, empower them to love and serve with exemplary faithfulness. help them to be as kind to others as you have been to them, as you empower them to transform their struggles into stepping stones. we pray in your sacred name. amen. the presiding officer: please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. the presiding officer: the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c,

january 25, 2010. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable al franken, a senator from the state of minnesota, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: robert c. byrd, president pro tempore. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the leader. mr. reid: on saturday, on public radio, there was a very, very nice piece on our chaplain, long. it must have been taken 10 or 15 minutes, an interview -- the woman doing the interview on public radio came to his office here, was various places with him and it was a very, very good piece historically about the history of the chaplain here in the senate and it spoke very well of our chaplain, the first african-american to become an admiral in the navy, our first

african-american chaplain. he's a person that is really accomplished. i so appreciate the work that he does for each of us individual individually, the work that he does with various groups. he has a number of study groups here that he works with on a weekly basis and i would just say here in the senate, we're very proud of our senate chaplain. admiral, doctor -- dl dr. barry black. we will be in a period of morning business with senators permitted to speak for up to ten minutes each until 3:00 p.m. i would ask that the first speaker during morning be the senator from california, senator fine stierntion and she be recognized for -- feinstein, and she be recognized for up to 15 minutes. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: following morning business, mr. president, the senate will resume the resolution of the statutory increase of the public debt. at 5:30, we will turn to

roseanna peterson to be a district judge. at 6:00 p.m., the senate will vote on her confirmation. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of morning business until 3:00 p.m. with senators permitted to speak therein for up to ten minutes each. the senator from california. mrs. feinstein: thank you very much. thank you very much, mr., and i thank the majority leader as well -- thank you very much, mr. president, and i thank the majority leader as well. mr. president, i want to say a few words in favor of the conrad-gregg resolution which will shortly be before us and in opposition to the baucus amendment. i have worked for some time to try to produce legislation that would create a commission which could be like a brac committing and deal with what i consider to be the most formidable problem facing this government.

and every wednesday during the summer and spring, i have a constituent breakfast, and one of the things i do at that breakfast is show them what debt and deficit really means. and one of the best ways -- and you learn this when you do a budget, and i learned it when i was mayor of san francisco and for nine years put together a budget, is look at what is actually spent, total numbers. and that gives you the real clue, and it's called outlays, federal outlays. so what have federal outlays been? in 2009, 50% of everything the federal government pays out goes to entitlements. now, what are entitlements? medicare, social security, veterans benefits, things that cannot be controlled that if you're entitled to them, you get them. and you look at interest on the debt is what -- is 5%.

if you look at discretionary defense, it's 18%. and if you look at everything else the federal government does that everybody talks about: education, agriculture, justice, education, the 22 departments in homeland security, it is just 16% of what is spent. so if you add together the 50% and the 5% of interest, you see 55% of everything the federal government spends this year cannot -- cannot be controlled. you have to spend it. and so all the rest that's discretionary is rather small in comparison. if you project that out ten years -- and i must tell you, new numbers are coming out tomorrow, so this is the latest number that i have --

entitlements go up to 56% and interest on the debt to 14%. so that is 70% of everything that is spent in the year 2019 if things are projected forward cannot be controlled. discretionary defense is 16% and nondiscretionary -- again, everything else -- 14%. so if you wanted to balance out, you could eliminate everything in discretionary spending and you couldn't solve the problem. that's what's happening. entitlements are expanding to an inordinate amount of what the federal government pays out every year. and it doesn't matter whether something is in the budget or

not in the budget. if you have to pay for it and spend it, it constitutes deficit and that translates into debt. so it is a very major problem. so that's why i rise in support today for the amendment offered by senators conrad and gregg to establish a bipartisan commission to tackle and look at this issue and look at these programs -- namely, social security and medicare -- and make some recommendations how they can be changed, amended, melded to essentially be able to maintain themselves over time. now, we know that both these programs are the third rail of american politics. past congresses and past presidents have failed to take the steps necessary to ensure their long-term viability.

social security will start running out of money in 2037, and medicare will start to run out of money before the end of this decade. in seven years, in 2017, medicare will begin to run out of money. so this is an opportunity to take a concept which has worked before -- namely, the greenspan commission, which in 1983 added years to social security solvency, and have a one-year commission, which is the conrad-gregg commission, to deal with this debt. it would be an opportunity to get our nation's finances back on track. if we could have done it, mr. president, we would have done it. if we could have done it, mr. president, why didn't we? why year after year after year do we refuse to face the issues?

now, the greenspan's recommendations, including a change to the trust fund revenue structure, actually won bipartisan support. those recommendations were adopted and they were credited for saving social security at the time. more recently, the base realignment and closure process, known as brac, and the homeland security commission following 9/11 made recommendations, and those recommendations were accepted. and the brac commission had a process which all of us sort of derided and didn't like but it got the job done. they presented recommendations to the congress. the congress could vote them up or down. and that decided the question, and that's what the conrad-gregg resolution would do. we all see the gravity of what's happening, and as we vote to increase the debt limit for the

ninth time in nine years, we're not able to do anything about the biggest consumer of debt, entitlements, because they are such valuable programs to people and no one wants them touched. this commission would be bipartisan. it would be composed of 18 members: 10 democrats, eight republicans. specifically, 16 members of congress split evenly between each party and two administration officials. and their charge would be to come to grips with this and make a series of recommendations on an expedited procedure that would come to the congress and we would either vote it up or vote it down. and everything would be on the table. the scope of the commission is broad enough to include all possibilities for improving our budgetary outlook. and the commission would issue this report before the end of the year.

14 of the 18 members must approve the report before it could be presented to us and congress would be required to vote on report, as i said, with expedited consideration before the end of this year. so the first time in a matter of months we would have before us some recommendations. how do we tweak social security to enable it to go past its doomsday? how do we handle medicare to see that it's viable throughout the next three, four, five decades? it doesn't circumvent congressional procedures nor does it exclude elected officials from shaping the final report. now, the social security trust fund runs of out of money to

2037. now, it will come faster, if we do do anything, it's going to happen sooner. today, 50 million people depend on social security, and by 2050, 82 mil million people, another 32 million people, will receive social security. now, most people don't realize that one-half of american workers today have no retirement or pension benefit from their company. i didn't know this. one-half of every retiring worker has no retirement or pension benefit from their company. social security is what they will have. and with the problems in the workplace today, with the increase in bankruptcies, you can be sure that social security is only going to become more important as the decades go on.

in 2007, social security alone kept 35% of older americans out of poverty. that's how important it is. 35% of our seniors would be living in poverty if it weren't for social security. and for almost and for almost two-thirdses of people, social security makes up more than half of their income. so social security is really the breadbasket, it is the opportunity for seniors and pensioners and retirees to continue to live and stay out of poverty. now, medicare is even in worse shape. it's experiencing trust fund deficits. by 2017, the hospital insurance trust fund will be gone, depleted, busted -- gone. and last year's trustee report,

insolves is projected in 2019. this means medicare is unsustainable over time, as it is today. now, that's something that northern us want to admit -- that none of us want to admit, none of us want to face, and the record is clear. none of us have faced it. none of us have done anything about it. and yet the time is ratcheted sooner and sooner. so once the hospital trust fund is exhausted, it will be necessary to reduce the amount of benefits payable. so what does that mean? that means, after 2017, only 81% of benefits will actually be paid. think of that. is it all right just to let that happen? is it all right just to do nothing? is it all right to say, okay, we know that come 2017 only 81% of

the benefit an individual should get will be paid? and it's because we're not willing to do anything about it. that's what we're saying if we vote "no" on the conrad-gregg resolution. medicare part-b and part-d prescription drug coverage will increasingly outpace beneficiary income over time. so funds won't be there to pay for prescription drug benefits. that's the simple result. so, without finding an adequate way to fun these obligations, these -- to fund these obligations, those funds will have to be borrowed or will be none existent, and this further adds to the debt that we see coming down the pike. and all of it adds together to the financial insolvency of both social security and medicare. so that's why a commission is

needed, because we haven't done what we should have done. we haven't made the tweaks, the changes, the adjustments. we haven't looked at means testing. these programs were founded on the belief that no matter how wealthy you are, you should get these benefits. my own view is that should change. they should be looked at more as insurance programs. if you don't need them, if you're a millionaire, why should you have these benefits? if you need them, if you're part of the half of america that has no pension or retirement benefit, if you earn under, let's say, $250,000 a year as a retiree, maybe you should still get them. but if you earn more than $250,000 with this picture facing us, maybe you should pay your own way. and these are some of the

decisions that have got to be made. and you can't keep putting them off because they're unpleasant. because the more you put them off, the bigger the troubles get. and that's been the case in the 17 years i've been here. i have watched this and it keeps going up and you were and up. -- going up and up and up. so the problem is apparent, but it's been ignored. it's been shuffled under the rug. it's never been addressed. and that's why we need a commission. ircosponsored a bill -- i cosponsored a bill two congresses ago with senator domenici, and i cosponsored a bill this congress with senator cornyn to create a social security-medicare commission. mine were not of members of congress. but there was opposition to them. people felt, well, if this body is going to have the ability to make a recommendation that may

result in having to put more money into the system, either by increasing the payroll tax or any other way, then it ought to be the member of the congress or the senate that makes that recommendation. so senator conrad and senator gregg took that as a kind of mandate and said, all right, we will do that, and here's what we propose. and the strong belief -- and i'm very glad the senator from florida is on the floor; we have worked as part of this group together, come to several meetings. i guess, it would be fair to say, there are about 16-17 of us that have worked together with senator conrad on the democratic side on this. and we do so because we recognize that doing nothing doesn't save medicare and doing nothing doesn't save social security. but doing something just may.

so that's why we need a commission. and this will never get done if we just follow regular order in the congress. for 17 years i've watched that regular order year in, year out and nothing has happened. i remember fritz hollings standing right there on the floor talking about keeping money from going into the trust funds and, as you know, now it's just an accounting judgment. everything goes into one fund, but there's just an accounting judgment. he advocated separating it out, so it couldn't be used to balance the budget. right now the trust funds are used to balance the budget. they're not set aside for a special fund to see that these -- that social security remains secure. it's a good -- it's the good faith and credit of the government that does that. well, i say that realcy isn't enough. so we have to -- well, i say that really isn't enough.

so we have to face the consequences, bite the bullet. find to find we have to find a e that our national credit card is fiscally responsible. so i understand my time is up. i just want to indicate my very sincere support and my thanks to both senator conrad and senator gregg for their work on this, for their leadership, and for their real strong advocacy. they have friends. we will support them. and i very much support this body will as well. thank you, mr. president. i yield the floor. mr. nelson: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from florida. mr. nelson: mr. president, i'm speaking today in favor of the conrad-gregg amendment of which i am a cosponsor also. and while the senator from california is here, i want to go back 27 years ago, and one of the times in which government came together and worked best on

a crisis, and it was 1983. i had come to congress a few years before, and we were suddenly at the point at which social security was going to run out of money within six months. and, obviously, something had to be done. the good news was, there were two wiley old irishmen that were leading the government. one was in the white house. his name was reagan. and the other one was the speaker, and his name was o'neill. those are the two that were great examples that they could fight like cats and dogs during the day, but they walk out the door, and they were personal friends. they had a personal relationship with which when it came time to cutting a deal, to get the

performance of the government, they could do it. so realizing that social security was about to be in financial cardiac arrest, they said, we're going to do this. and they appointed a blue-riribn panel, much like we're talking about here in this conrad-gregg amendment. the difference then and now is that you had leaders of both parties that were committed to make it work. and i'm just not sure what we're going to see out here on the landscape unless the american people rise up and say, a pox on both your houses. you guys better get together, which is what we're trying to do with this bipartisan amendment. and the good news was that because of the deliberations of that panel and because those two irishmen -- president reagan and speaker o'neill -- said we're

going to take this off the table at the next election as a club, a bludgeon to hit our opponents over the head with, that blue-ribbon panel came forth. it was presented to the congress. it passed overwhelmingly in the congress. and it made social security solvent from 1983 well into this century. now, that's the kind of example that we need here of us coming together in a bipartisan way, with commonsense solutions, and, mr. president, that's what i rise to talk about today. and i thank the senator from california for being so not only erudite but eloquent in her presentation.

mr. president, there's a simple reason for this, and it's our nation's budget is on a path toward crisis, and we've got to do something extraordinary, just like we did back in 1983. over the last decade, we've spent billions to wage two wars, but we still proceed with a tax cut for the wealthy and a prescription drug benefit that gave too much to the pharmaceutical industry as well as the health insurance industry. and what happened was that the debt doubled. so the obama administration, on the tail end of the bush administration, which started to stem this bleeding, the obama administration had to stop the bleeding, putting a tur tourniqt

on the pending nationwide economic collapse, so it pumped money into the economy, and that was primarily in infrastructure spending, teachers' salaries, targeted tax relief for small business, and targeted tax relief for the middle class. and that same economic collapse also did what you expect recessions, near depressions, to do: it lowered the tax receipts and, thus, it put us in an even tighter spot. and so now we've got to face the realities of this fiscal situation. due to the economic downturn, tax revenue, as a share of the economy, is at its lowest point in 50 years. it's less than 15% of g.d.p.

whereas spending is now above -- it's at 26% of g.d.p. and, you know, when you take in less revenues but you spend more, that difference that we call the annual deficit means you're headed for trouble. well, the anists are telling us, by 2019 -- the analysts are telling us by 2019, the debt could be 114% of the g.d.p. and you saw in the senator from california's charts how just the interest rate in 2019 would balloon up to quarters of $1 trillion. and the rising trend continues at an alarming rate, even after 2019. a former fed chairman said, the challenge to contain this threat

is more urgent than at any time in our history. our nation has never before had to cofortto comfort so formidaba crisis as is just over the horizon." so said alan greenspan. and this is not mention in this also affects our national security. guess who is the biggest holder of our foreign debt? it's china. what happens if they suddenly want us to pay off all of those bonds that they hold? do you think china is an adversary? well, if you don't, do you think that they are an economic adversary? do you think they'd like to be a military adversary? do you realize what they're doing in space in order to become a world power? well, i came to congress a long

time ago, and i've been talking about balanced budgets. but now this problem is so massive that it just can't be solved, as the senator from california said, by regular order. we're going to have to take a gd look at the whole picture. we need some commonsense folks that will work together, that will respect each other. did you hear what i said? respect each other, and to recommend the tough decisions that must be made in order to get this nation's fiscal policy back on track. now, i realize that on the one side you've got folks that are saying, does that cut social security? does that cut medicare? then on the other side you've got folks that say, does that mean you worry about raising

taxes? and those are legitimate concerns. every one of us -- everyone, every family member in america has to deal with this, these kinds of questions in their own family's budget. when we spend more than we bring in, we have to make choices. we have to make adjustments. it's the responsible thing to do. and be it won't be easy. it won't be easy politically, especially with people holding that club of the next election over their heads and say i'm going to beat you into the ground and beat you politically to death if you make these tough choices. but in the end, i trust that the understanding of the american people about their government,

the understanding of their own family budgets that they will trust a group of bipartisan lawmakers accountable to the american people who have examined the budget, hashed out their differences and agreed to a plan. that plan will make us solvent again. and without drastic measures, we risk saddling our children with debt that can never be repaid and credit that can't be restored. so we've got the opportunity right now to try to fix it. mr. president, i urge our colleagues to support this amendment. and i yield the floor. mr. alexander: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from t-pb tennessee

mr. alexander: i look forward to the president's state of the union address. there is talk about how the president might reconnect with the american people. the president himself said after the election of the massachusetts republican senator, he said perhaps he had not been talking to the american people directly about core values. so if i may do this in a respectful way, i'd like to make a suggestion about what the president might say on wednesday evening. to reconnect with the american people, i would suggest that in his state of the union address, the president talk first about creating jobs. second, about reining in the national debt. and make terrorism his third subject. then it wouldn't hurt my feelings one bit if he stopped right there and focused his unswerving attention on jobs, debt and terrorism until he had all three of them headed in a

better direction. after all, in my view, the president struggled in his first year not only because his agenda veered too far left, but because he took too many big bites out of too many apples and tried to swallow them all at once. years ago i learned as a governor that a governor can, who throws himself into a single issue with everything he's got for as long as it takes can usually wear anybody else out. i think that's true for presidents too. in 1952, president dwight d. eisenhower said, "i shall go to korea." then he focused on that one problem, ended the conflict, and americans thanked him for it. i would hope president obama would focus with eisenhower-like intensity on jobs. in the 1980's, i found that the best way to do that was not to

try to turn my state -- tennessee -- upside down all at once -- we were then the third-poorest state in the country and my goal was raising family incomes. i didn't try to turn it upside down all at once, but i went step by step, sometimes learning as i went. amending banking laws, defending right to work, keeping debt and taxes low, recruiting japanese industry, then recruiting the auto industry both from japan and from the united states. then building four-lane highways so that the auto suppliers could get to the new auto plants. and finally, a ten-step better schools program that includes centers and chairs of excellence for higher education and helping our state become the first state to pay teachers more for teaching well. in my view, a step-by-step jobs strategy for the country should include tax cuts, less

regulation certainty, so people can make their plans, free trade, a balanced labor climate, good educational opportunities, and clean but cheap energy. unfortunately, the president has too often proposed higher taxes, more regulation, uncertainty, protectionism, expensive labor policy, higher college tuitions, as medicaid costs are passed on to states, a national energy tax, and new costs for the businesses that we count on to create jobs. as for debt, democrats in congress are trying this week to raise the national debt limit by $1.9 trillion, an amount that's more than the total federal budget in 1999. to be sure, president obama in. mr. inouye: hurted some of this, but he's -- president obama inhurted some of this, but

in one year he's run up the debt nearly as much as president bush did in eight years. mr. alexander: the solution for a boat sinking because it has a hole in it is not to put more holes in it. finally, the president deserves credit for his decisions on iraq and afghanistan. but bringing terrorists from guantanamo to illinois, trying the 9/11 mastermind in new york city and failing to interrogate the christmas eve eve underwear bomber in detroit shows dangerous confusion about how to deal with terrorists. when i became governor of tennessee some years ago, ned mcquarter, then the democratic house speaker, said, "i want to help because if the governor succeeds, the state succeeds." in the same way, i want president obama to succeed. the best way for him to do that, i respectfully suggest, is to declare an end to the era of the

2,700-page bills and to work with both political parties step by step on jobs, debt, and terrorism to help washington reearn the trust of the american people. mr. president, i yield the floor. mr. conrad: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from north dakota. mr. conrad: tomorrow we are going to vote on the question of whether or not we establish a bipartisan debt commission, a commission empowered to come up with a plan, a plan if 14 of the 18 members could agree, that would come to the senate for a

vote. mr. president, this story ran recently in "newsweek." this was the actual, the cover of "newsweek": "how great powers fall: steep debt, slow growth and high spending kill empires. and america could be next." inside the story reported, "this is how empires decline. it begins with a debt explosion. it ends with an inexorable reduction in the resources available for the army, navy and air force. if the united states doesn't come up soon with a credible plan to restore the federal budget to balance over the next five to ten years, the danger is very real that a debt crisis could lead to a major weakening of american power." mr. president, it's not hard to see how that could happen. since 2000, the debt has exploded. in the previous administration,

the debt doubled. it's increased again with the economic downturn. and we are now on a course to have a gross debt that will be 114% of the gross domestic product of the united states. mr. president, that's the short term. we can handle a debt of 114% of the gross domestic product. we've done it before. we did it after world war ii. japan has a debt right now of 189% of their gross domestic product. the real challenge confronting america is we are on course, according to the congressional budget office, to have a debt that will reach 400% of our gross domestic product over the next 50 years. mr. president, nobody believes that's a sustainable situation. not the head of the congressional budget office, not the head of the office of management and budget, not the former head of the general accounting office, not the head

of the federal reserve, not the secretary of treasury. all of them have said that a debt of that magnitude poses a systemic threat to the economic security of the united states. the "national journal" in an article on november 7 of 2009 reported this: "simply put, even alarmists may be underestimating the size of the debt problem. how quickly it will become unbearable, and how poorly prepared our political system is to deal with it." mr. president, that's not just the view of the "national journal" or the view of "newsweek" magazine and their cover story piece. this is the considered judgment of some of the budget experts in the country from both the republican and democratic side of the aisle. alan greenspan, the former chairman of the federal reserve, said the recommendations of senators conrad and gregg for a

bipartisan fiscal task force is an skphrepbt idea. i hope -- is an excellent idea. i hope you succeed. doug hegan, political advisor to senator mccain in the last election said this. i am a reluctant convert. i always felt this is congress's job. and quite frankly it ought to just do it. that attitude has earned me no friends. so i've come around in point where i'm in favor of a special legislative procedure to get this legislation in front of congress and passed. mr. geithner, the current secretary of the treasury, said this before the senate budget committee on february 11 of last year. "it is going to require a different approach if we're going to solve the long-term fiscal imbalance. it's going to require a fundamental change in approach because i don't see realistically how we're going to get there through existing

mechanisms. and mr. walker said i think the regular order is dysfunctional as it relates to all these types of issues and it is quite understandable because you're talking about putting together a package that across many different jurisdictions. the idea that it would cross the regular order is totally unrealistic. and leon panetta, former chief of staff of president clinton, said this: it will never happen. the committees of jurisdiction will never take on the kind of challenges that are involved in this kind of them under their own jurisdictions, that will never happen. mr. president, senator gregg, the ranking republican on the committee, and i came to the same conclusion. two years ago we started an effort to come up with a process that could assure a vote on a series of recommendations to meet the debt threat. all task force members are directly accountable to the american people.

they're all elected members of the congress or, in the case of the secretary of the treasury, the representative of the administration. there are 18 members: ten democrats, two from the administration. and eight republicans. they are currently serving in the congress and the treasury secretary and one administration official who i assume would be the office of management and budget. mr. president, the bipartisan fiscal task force has broad coverage. everything is on the table. spending and revenues. mr. president, i hear some on the left say, well, spending shouldn't be considered. and some on the right saying revenues shouldn't be considered. mr. president, both have to be considered. i don't know what could be more clear. the green line shows revenues as a share of g.d.p. since 1950.

that's over the last 60 years. revenue the last two years is the lowest it has been in 60 years. let me repeat that: revenue as a share of the gross domestic product is the lowest it has been in 60 years. a precipitous decline in revenue. and look at expenditures. expenditures are the highest they have been as a share of the gross domestic product in 60 years. whoever says, well, you don't include revenue our don't include spending, well, guess what? if you don't deal with spending and you don't deal with revenue, you don't deal with the mr. president, let's get serious. and let's get honest with the american people. the current status of social security and medicare trust funds are as follows: social

security is cash will be permanently cash negative in 2016. it's already cash negative today. t me repeat that. social security is cash negative today. it will be perfectly cash negative in 2016. that is six years away. it will be completely insolvent in 2037. medicare went cash negative in 2008. it will be insolvent, according to the trustees in eight years. anybody who says, we don't have to do anything. we can just keep on doing what we're doing has got their head in the sand. social security and medicare are both cash negative today. they are both headed for insolvency. those who say we don't have to do anything, they are guaranteeing a disaster.

mr. president, some say, well, the health care reform bill shows that we can do this through the regular order. no, that isn't what it shows. it shows just the opposite. it shows we will not do this through the regular order because here is the long-term debt trajectory that we're on and while the bill that passed the senate will help a little bit, it is only a little bit. it does not fundamentally change the tra secretory that we are -- trajectory that we are on. that is the reality. that is the fact. mr. president, bipartisan fiscal task force promises an expedited process with recommendations to be submitted after the 2010 election with fast-track consideration in the senate and the house. no amendments. with a final vote before the 111th congress adjourns, and a requirement before you ever get

to that point of a super majority necessary of the 18 members to even report a plan. it would require 14 of the 18 members to even report a plan. if the plan is reported, then it takes 60 votes in the united states senate. it takes 60% of the house of representatives and the president reserves and preserves his ability to veto. so anybody that says this is somehow unconstitutional, it is fully constitutional. anybody who says we're farming out the responsibility to come up with a plan, that's what we always do. we always have committees come up with plans that then come to a vote of the congress. and if you look at fiscal crises, as the one that we're in today and the one that's rapidly

approaching, that will be far more serious than the one today, we have always had a special process. whether it was andrews air force base in the 1990's or the greenspan commission in the 1980's, we have repeatedly, when we faced fiscal crisis, resorted to a special procedure. the bipartisan fiscal task force, as i've indicated, requires a bipartisan outcome. 14 of the 18 task force members must agree to the recommendations. the final passage requires super majorities in both the senate and the house. mr. president, this weekend the president endorsed the plan that we will vote on tomorrow. this weekend the president released this statement: the serious fiscal situation our country faces reflects not only the severe economic downturn we inherited, but also years of failing to pay for new policies including a new entitlement program and large tax cuts that

most benefited the welloff and well connected. the result was that surpluses projected at the beginning of the last administration were transformed into trillions of dollars of deficits that threaten future job creation and economics growth. these deficits did not happen overnight and they won't be solved overnight. we not only need to change how we pay for policies, we also need to change how washington works. the only way to solve our long-term fiscal challenges to solve it together democrats and republicans. that's why i, the president, strongly support legislation currently under consideration to create a bipartisan fiscal commission to come up with a set of solutions to tackle our nation's fiscal challenges and call on senators from both parties to vote for the creation of a statutory bipartisan fiscal commission. with tough choices made together, a commitment to pay for when we spend, and

responsible stewardship of our economy, we will be able to lay the foundation for sustainable job creation an economic growth -- and economic growth while restoring fiscal sustainability to our nation. mr. president, the president got it right. and he is also representing the views of the american people when asked: would you favor or oppose creating a bipartisan commission as a way of reviewing and addressing our federal budget problems? 70% of the american people said they would. 25% were in opposition. 5% not certain. this is a poll taken by peter d. hart research, well-known pollster, well-regarded pollster, taken november 16 to november 18 of 2009. there's no doubt in my mind if this poll were taken today, these numbers would be even

strongerhe need for a bipartisan fiscal commission. mr. president, let me just close in the time remaining to me to thank my colleague, senate gregg, the ranking republican on the committee. we have a group of cosponsors of this bill, equal in number, equally divided between republicans and democrats. mr. president, senator gregg and i have not always agreed on every fiscal issue. and we have debated those issues sometimes in a way that's animated and full of energy. but there is one place that we are in absolute agreement. i served here now 23 years. i am absolutely persuaded that if we do not adopt a special procedure like the one we have proposed, the chances of facing up to this debt threat in a

timely way is remote. is remote. this is our chance. tomorrow will be a defining vote. are we going to take on this question of the looming debt, the threat it poses to the economic security of the country? and let me be quick to say that doesn't mean that i believe you raise taxes or cut spending in the midst of an economic downturn. that would be unwise. but it would also be unwise once recovery has presented itself and is firmly rooted for us to fail to face up to the greatest economic threat this country faces, a runaway debt, one increasingly financed from abroad. last year, mr. president, 68% of the new debt was financed by foreign entities: china, japan,

oil exporting nations. they have told us publicly and privately that we are on an unsustainable course and they will not long continue to extend trillions of dollars of credit to us absent our taking action. mr. president, the warning is clear. the time is now. i urge my colleagues to support our effort tomorrow. i thank the chair and yield the floor. and i want to thank, again, my colleague, senator gregg, the ranking republican on the committee, for his leadership in this matter. he has spent two years on this effort. you could not have a better partner. i thank you. mr. gregg: mr. president? the presiding officer: the nator from new hampshire. mr. gregg: i ask the assistant leader on the floor, does the assistant leader want to take his 10 minutes? i thank the assistant leader. mr. president, let me first

thank the senator from north dakota. he has been -- first he was a voice in the wilderness, that's what we say in new hampshire. that's the motto of one of our alcohol engs. our -- in college. now he has become the clarion call. the simple fact is his -- his statement, which really summarized it all, the debt is the threat. he in the statement that he just made, he outlined the implications of the debt. can't deny it. it's there. it's coming. it exists and it's been added to. the numbers simply can't be ignored any longer. we are as a nation on a path where if we continue to spend and run deficits as we have and as are projected, our nation

will not be able to maintain its standard of living. we will not be able to finance our debt, the value of our currency will come under acute threat. the burden of taxation to pay for the cost of government will overwhelm the ability of people to live productive lifestyles. and, inevitably, and this is not hyperbole, unfortunately, inevitably we, as a nation will go into insolvency of some form. we will have to inflate our economy radically or we will have to bear a burden that simply stifles the capacity of our children to have a high quality of life because of the cost of the government and the cost of the debt. the senator from north dakota cited the figures. we go to 100 -- a public debt that is 100% of gross domestic

product. we cross the 60% threshold, which is the tipping point. we're like a dog, we have trouble catching our tail because we have so much debt on the books. potentially this year, but certainly by next year. these numbers are staggering. they're hard to understand. trillions and trillions of debt. and, as the senator from north dakota has also pointed out, the debt is owned not by americans but by foreign nations. today china owns almost $1 trillion of our debt. the oil-exporting nations own, as a group, almost $1 trillion of our debt. we are shipping overseas our -- the dollars which we should be reinvesting in the united states to create a more productive and vibrant economy and a better lifestyle for our nation.

by the year 2017 or 2018, the interest on the debt alone will exceed every other account in the federal government. it will be approximatel approximately $900 billion a year. almost $1 trillion a year. more than what we spend on national defense. massively more than what we spend on education, on building roads, on doing the things that a government is supposed to do. where does that interest go? it doesn't stay here in the united states to benefit americans and make us a stronger nation. it is going to go to countries like china -- not that i have anything against china. but, i mean, countries that have bought our debt. so we are on an intolerable path. a path of unsustainability. a path which leads us down the road to a nation which is less prosperous and has a lower standard of living than what we received from our parents.

and that's -- that's simply not acceptable. so how do we address this? well, for years we said, let's do it by regular order. let's come up with ideas and run them through the committee process. run them up the political flagpole. let the community of interest who want to speak out on issues speak out on it. and then we will involve solutions that work on these very difficult problems. most of the issues, by the way, is driven by the cost of entitlement programs. and for years it -- nothing has happened. nothing has happened. and there's a reason for that. our political system is inherently pre prejudice on doig substantive activity on issues as big as entitlement reform. rehave a system where whenever anybody puts a policy on the table, a substantive, thoughtful or -- even a policies that not thoughtful -- on the table as a presentation is the way you

should address the cost an burden of our government, it is immediately attacked either from the left or from the right. and they almost never even make to the starting line. we have instances after instances of seeing this. and so senator conrad and i decided, you can't do this by putting policy on the table. there are too many interest groups in this town that make their living off poisoning the well either frer the right or the left because that's how they generate their income. they send out the letters to their constituent groups. if it's a social security group, they send it out in a social security type envelope and say if you don't send us money soon, tomorrow, somebody is going to ruin social security for you. or if they are a tax group, they send out the tame type of letter. it's like an i.r.s. form letter. if you don't send us money tomorrow, your taxes are going to go up radically. so as a very practical matter,

nothing gets past the starting line around here. regular order has not, does not, and will not work on these issues. so we decided rather than using that process which we know leads nowhere, let's set up a process that does lead somewhere. and so we came up with what is basically to thumbnail it a procedure which is totally and absolutely bipartisan and fair where neither side can gain the other that leads to a policy position, which then leads to a vote on that policy. and that's the task force we have. the key components are that it is totally and absolutely bipartisan. neither side can gain the other. it takes 14 of 18 people to report the program -- the proposals out, and theyroposalsr everything, but the proposals that are agreed to have to have a supermajority. i think that's 78% of the people

on this task force have to vote for it, and since the membership of this task force is appointed by the leadership of the two parties, a majority of the party membership, of both parties that are on this task force has to vote for the final proposal, and one presumes that whoever goes on this task force, if chosen by the leaders of their party here in the senate, whether senator reid or senator mcconnell are leaders in the party or the house, senator pelosi or senator boehner, is going to reflect fairly aggressively the viewpoints and the philosophies of the different parties. and so it will be a bipartisan report or it won't be a report at all. and then it comes to the congress and it has to be voted up or down on a supermajority vote. so once again, it basically mutes the ability to game it. one side can't game the other.

the proposal must be bipartisan and fair. why do we choose that path? because the american people have shown very difficult intively that they -- very definitively that they will not accept proposals in these very big areas, especially social security and medicare, that are not reached on a bipartisan agreement. they want fairness. they want to make sure nobody is gaming anybody around here. so that's why we have these supermajorities. and then it's on fast track. so the proposal has to be voted up or down, and it can't be amended. why is that? because, ladies and gentlemen, as we all know around here, amendments are for hiding in the corners. amendments are offered around here not for the purposes of accomplishing anything, but for the purpts of -- purposes of giving political cover. in fact, we'll see a couple of amendments just like that on this bill, on this issue. one from our side, one from the other side so the people will have political cover if they vote against this task force approach. but the simple fact is that if you really want to do something

here, you've got to have an up-or-down vote on a fast track. and everything has to be on the table. all entitlement and tax reform issues. why is that? well, because this has to be bipartisan. it's that simple. i would be happy to have a commission that was just spending reductions or adjustments to the medicaid and medicare and social security programs, but there isn't anybody on that side of the aisle that is going to agree to that. and they would be happy to have a proposal that just addresses task force such as has been proposed on occasion by the senator from north dakota which is to try to collect the the $300 billion of taxes that are owed and not pay -- paid in this country every year. but nobody on this side is going to accept that. everything has to be on the table. but the key to protecting both sides' interest in this exercise, so the social security isn't treated inappropriately and so the tax increases aren't done inappropriately, if there are tax increases, is to make

sure that the product has to be bipartisan and that it has to be reported on supermajorities, which this does, so that issue is addressed. so we're here again, and i don't know that we're going to get the 60 votes needed to pass this. it's obviously been attacked from the right, it's been attacked from the left, which usually means you're on a pretty good course. and regrettably, the president put out his executive order proposal which i think undermined it, but then he has come to support it, but it may be a little late to the dinner here. and on our side of the aisle, some of our major interest groups have come out against it. but i know this much. that we're getting -- getting to the point where we don't have too much alternatives around here. that if we don't do something like this fairly soon, i genuinely believe that somewhere between five to ten years from now, probably between seven and ten years from now, we as a

nation will find it very hard to sell our debt. countries will look at us and say you cannot sustain your situation. you have run a debt up that you cannot pay back, and i am not going to want to lend you money. or if they do, it's going to be at a very high price. at that point, the options will be very, very few. very, very few for us as a country. and they will all be horrific options for our children because they will all lead to a lower standard of living for us as a nation, and they will all make our country less competitive than the -- in the world economic competition which is obviously very aggressive and totally global now. so we can wait. we can punt this thing one more time as we have done year in and year out now. we can say there is not a problem out there or if there is a problem out there, if you want to address it the way you want to address it on your side, we want to address it on our side,

then we will vote for it. in the end, we will not be as responsible as people who have been given the mantle of government. we will not be fulfilling our responsibility to govern. instead, we will be the postwar baby boom generation will be the first generation in history to pass on to our children, a country of less prosperity than we have received from our parents. that will not be a very good testament to our responsibility as people who are in charge of governance. and so this is the chance. this is the closest we have ever gotten to this opportunity. i don't believe we'll get this close again at any time in the future, and we can either take it or we can allow it to pass. i have often said that congresses are good at handling the next election but they are terrible at handling the next generation. unfortunately, for years this issue needs to be over the horizon. it's not any longer. it's not only on the horizon. it's closing fast. the red flags are everywhere,

everywhere. we have even seen moody's, the rating agency, put the united states in a special category with england. we're not on a watch list but they have given us new definition compared to the rest of the industrialized countries. there is no question but the clock is ticking and the hour is late, and if we don't proceed to action, that leads to actual activity, that leads to actual policy, in my opinion, we will not be fulfilling our responsibility as people who are elected to govern and to pass on to the next generation a stronger america rather than weaker america. mr. president, i yield the floor. the presidinficer:he mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. i think it's time for the people in the united states congress to be sure we're listening to what our constituents, the american people, are telling us. if it was unclear before, i think the massachusetts senate race should put to rest any doubts about what's really

frustrating americans. americans have had it with the soaring level of spending and debt. they know that enormous spending and skyrocketing deficits take a bite out of the economy, dragging down our gross domestic product, our standard of living, and making investors and job creators very nervous. they are concerned about the unfathomable amounts of money now being spent. for the first year of the obama administration, the numbers are eye popping. consider, one, a wasteful wasteful $1.2 trillion stimulus that was a failure, according to the administration's own yardstick. two, a $410 billion omnibus federal spending bill that increased nondefense spending by 10%. three, a $2.5 trillion government takeover of health care that the senate passed on christmas eve. now, hopefully, mr. president, this will actually never become law. we have had two huge increases in the debt ceiling, with the third being debated now. a massive dught that doubles the

deficit in five years and triples it in ten. think of that. that doubles the deficit in five years and triples it in ten. it's not necessary, it's not inevitable. we can and we should prevent it. remember, we have to borrow most of this money. americans are very concerned about the amount of money we're borrowing from other nations like china to help finance our exploding debt. now, the administration and its defenders are still blaming president bush for out-of-control deficits and debt , even though the other party has been in control of the congress now for three years and the president has been out of office for over a year. here are some important facts. president bush's deficits run an average of 3.2% of g.d.p. while president obama's spending plans call for deficits that will average 4.2% of g.d.p. over the next decade. in other words, an entire percentage point higher. from the day president obama took office until the last day

of the fiscal year 2010, debt held by the public will grow by by $3.3 trillion, according to the office of management and budget. we can't blame that on president bush. president bush added less than that, about $3 trillion to the debt during the entire eight years he was in office. so in just 20 months, president obama will add as much debt as president bush ran up in eight years. this administration needs to take responsibility for its actions. start listening to what americans are saying and stop talking about the mess that they inherited. americans want congress and the administration to stop their grand spending plans and focus upon what's really needed for an economic recovery. december saw another $85,000 -- excuse me, 85,000 jobs lost. this is the last month, december.

85,000 jobs lost. unemployment has not gone down. it's holding steady at about 10%. in my state, it's over 11%. mort disukerman recently wrote in "the wall street journal" -- actually friday -- "the problem in the job market going forward is not so much layoffs in the private sector which are abating but a lack of hiring." mr. president, that brings me to concerns over our tax policy. americans look ahead and they see new taxes on the horizon. unless congress takes action this year, taxes are set to go up by $2 trillion over the next decade, starting in 2011. the child tax credit would be cut in half. marginal tax rates will go up. dividends and capital gains taxes will increase. it's no wonder that businesses are timid about hiring and investing and consumers are more cautious than ever about their own spending. even if economists say we're technically out of the recession, dollars have not begun to flow because people and businesses are uncertain about

what their tax burden will be in the coming years. they are very nervous that it will be higher. we can eliminate some of that uncertainty and instill some much-needed confidence in the economy by extending current tax law. again, unless congress acts, taxes will increase automatically. and if the president is looking for a job stimulator, i suggest that this is where to start. if he were to announce on wednesday night that he's calling on congress to keep taxes right where they are -- in fact, if we can cut them in some area, that would be even better, but at least keep them where they are, i think he would see businesses react immediately and positively to the news. but instead of increasing taxes, we need, as disukerman says, to draw up credible plans to bring downloaded budget deficits without triggering another downturn. let's keep in mind something about the american people. they know you can't spend what

you don't have. the message that this congress and this administration have been sending to americans is that even though they are bound by limits, washington is not. so as i said, mr. president, it's time to start listening to our constituents and then act on their instructions. stop spending, keep taxes where they are, reduce them where we can, and stop running up deficits. the presiding officer: the senator from montana.

mr. baucus: mr. president, dr. lawrence peter, the educator who came up with the peter principle, once said -- "democracy is a process by which the people are free to choose the person who will get the blame." mr. president, in a sex, that's the people's right. in a democracy, the people elect us to represent them and in a democracy, the people lejt us to be account -- elect us to be accountable. but the chairman and ranking republican member of the budget committee have come up with a process to shift the blame. they have come up with a process for congress to punt our accountability away. they have come up with a process to outsource congress's central

fiscal responsibilities to a new budget commission. i can see that a commission may be attractive to some. it's the easy way out. senators can blame everything on the commission. senators can say, the commission made me do it. but we should not shirk our responsibility. rather, we should do the job that our constituents sent us here to do. and we already have a process for doing so. it's called the budget process. the chairman and ranking republican member of the imughtf the budget committee have proposed a new budget process. no one has shown greater zeal in take on the budget deficit than the chairman and ranking republican member of the budget committee. i commend hem for their good intentions. but we should reject their new process, not their intentions but their new process. senators conrad and gregg have said everything needs to be on

the table, including spending and revenues. but why stop there? if congress is going to outsource its central fiscal responsibilities, why stop there? why not cede to this commission all of our responsibilities? why don't we just outsource all of this year's work and general jon for the year? if we don't cede all of our powers to this comirks what's to stop them from inserting anything and everything they choose into the commission's one, nonamenable omnibus vehicle? they can insert anything they want. anything. that's the catch with this commission. if we were to cede all of our responsibilities to this commission, if we were to tie our hands so we could not amend its recommendations, then we would risk setting in motion some truly terrible policy. under the proposed fast-track

procedures, we would not be able to add the proposal. but what if we do not like the recommendations? we would not be able to replace the commission's recommendations with our own. it is clear from the statements of senators conrad and gregg that they have painted a big red target and social security and on medicare. that's what this commission is all about. it is a threat to social security and medicare. and that's why the first amendment that this senator offered is to protect social security. senators conrad and gregg have proposed a system that will not allow the senators to offer amendments to protect social security later, after the commission has come up with its recommendations. that's why we have to vote to protect social security now while we still can offer amendments. mr. president, we already have a process to address the budget. it's called the congressional budget process. any time that we wanted to, we could use this budget process to address the budget deficit. and since the creation of the

budget process, it has been the process that congress has usually used to address fiscal challenges. the chairman and rank #-g republican member of the budget committee should skip the commission. they should go straight to the recommendation they should bring it up in their committee. that's exactly why congress created the budget committee. the budget resolution and the reconciliation bill in the first place. that was the purpose. we don't need a commission to do our work. we don't need a new process to shift the blame. rather, to address our fiscal challenges, let us just get to work on it now. let us do the job that the people sent us to do and let us reject this commission. mr. president, i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call thel. quorum call:

quorum call:

mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the democratic leader. mr. reid: i ask tni quorum be terminated. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: mr. president, what is the pending business? the presiding officer: morning business is closed. under the previous order, the senate will resume consideration 5, h.j. res., resolution 4 which the clerk will report. the clerk: h.j. res. 45, joint resolution increasing the statutory limit on the public debt. mr. reid: mr. president, is amendment number 3305 the pending amendment? the presiding officer: it is. mr. reid: i have a cloture motion at the desk with respect to that amendment. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: cloture motion: we the undersigned senators in accordance with the provisions of rule 22 of the standing rules of the senate hereby move to bring to a close debate on the

reid amendment number 3305 to the baucus-reid substitute amendment number 32 99 to h.j. res. 45 a joint resolution increasing the statutory limit on the public debt signed by 18 senators as follows: reid, baucus, leahy, dodd, kaufman, warner, kirk, udall of new mexico, inouye, merkley, menendez, dorgan, reed of rhode island, stabenow, harkin, buries, rock -- burris, rockefeller, reid: i ask the clo report the substitute motion. the clerk: cloture motion, we the undersigned senators hereby move to bring to a close the debate on the baucus for reid substitute amendment number 3299 to h.j. res. 45, a joint resolution increasing the statutory limit on the public debt, signed by 19 senators as

follows: mr. reid: ihe names be waived. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i have a cloture motion and joint resolution which is at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: cloture motion: we the undersigned senators in accordance with the provisions of rule 22 of the standing rules of the senate hereby move to bring to a close the debate on h.j. res. 45, a joint resolution increasing the statutory limit on the public debt. signed by 18 senators as follows: mr. reid: mr. president, i would ask reading of the names be waived. the presiding officer: withoutmi also ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum with respecto each cloture motion be waived. the presiding officer: without objection. the senator from montana. mr. baucus: today is the senate's fourth day of coid debt limit. i remind my colleagues that this is the legislation which allows

the government to honor its commitment to pay its bills. four amendments remain pending. the substitute amendment raising the amount of the debt limit, this senator's amendment to protect social security, the conrad-gregg amendment to create a fast-traft process to consider the budget committee's recommendation and the majority leader's amendment reinstituting the statutory pay-as-you-go budget law. up to seven other amendments remain in order to the joint resolution. the senator from alaska has a right to offer an amendment on the environmental protection agency endangerment finding. we expect that she will seek to address this subject matter through a free-standing resolution of disapproval rather than an amendment. the remaining six amendments in order are a coburn amendment proposing a package of rescissions, a sessions amendment creating caps on appropriated spending, an amendment by the republican leader's designee relevant to any on the list, an amendment by

the majority leader relevant to any on the list and two amendments by this senator regarding the baton -- budget resolution. every subject of the resolution will be subject to a 60-vote threshold. the senate will not conduct roll call votes on the amendments today. under the previous order, at 5:30 this afternoon the senate will return to the nomination of rosanna peterson to be district judge for the eastern district of washington. at 6:00 this evening the senate will conduct a roll call vote on the confirmation of the peterson nomination. under the previous order, at 11:30 tomorrow morning the senate will proceed to a vote in relation to the following two amendments in relation to the debt limit. first this senator's amendment to protect social security. second, the conrad-gregg amendment to create a fast-track process to consider a budget commission's recommendations.

so, the senate is open for business this afternoon for senators to offer their amendments. we will work toward developing an agreement for the offering of all amendments by a time certain, perhaps as soon as tomorrow and hope to conclude action on this action as soon as possible thereafter. i thank all senators. mr. president, i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerll call the roll. quorum call:

ga. dor? the presiding officer: the senator from north dakota. mr. dorgan: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the call of the quorum be vacated. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. dorgan: mr. president, this weekend there was some discussion and writing in the papers and elsewhere in journals about the nomination of mr. bernanke, the chairman of the federal reserve board, for another term at the federal reserve board. "the washington post" had an editorial entitled "scapegoat at

the fed." tpho -- i don't normally come to the floor to respond to "washington post" he editorialst i do want to respond to a portion this have editorial and describe in a broader way why i think this is important for the senate. "scapegoat at the fed. is there many ways to interpret the election results in massachusetts last week," the editorial begins. it says, "but one thing massachusetts did not represent was a mandate to make a national scapegoat out of ben bernanke, the the federal reserve board chairman. yet two senators seeking reelection in november plus another planning to retire appear to have read it that way. they took the occasion of last week's political ufp haoefl to announce -- up thaoefl announce their -- upheaval to announce their opposition to mr. ben

bernanke. *f by making mr. bernanke the fall guy for all the sins real and perceived of. that has already produced troubling attempts to conduct audits of its monetary policy. that is a partial recitation of the editorial. i can condense the editorial by saying the editorial board at the "washington post," as is always the case, has taken the position that if anybody wants to know anything about what the federal reserve board is doing, it's none of their business. it's none of congress's business, none of the american people's business. stay out of it. keep your nose out of the federal reserve board. that's kind of the position of "the washington post." it is not since the massachusetts election, however, that i have expressed reservations about the the federal reserve board. in fact, on six occasions i've given speeches on the floor of

the united states senate just since december 10, 2008, that day plus on five additional occasions i came to the floor to talk about the issues that persuade me to say, as i did last week, i don't even believe we should vote on mr. bernanke's nomination until he has decided to provide the united states senate and the american people with information that he is now withholding. let me describe what that is. this is a bloomberg report. it says "the u.s. has lent, spent or guaranteed $11.6 trillion to bolster banks and to fight the longest recession in 70 years." i've not come to the floor of the senate critical of the fed's policies by which they have lent, spent or guaranteed $11.6 trillion, although it's fair to say that $11.6 trillion is not theirs. that represents the the risks of the american people.

th the full faith and credit of this great country of ours. the federal reserve board has taken a number of actions to try to address this economic crisis, an economic crisis i would suggest that has been caused, at least in significant part, by the malfeasance of the the federal reserve board and its previous chairman and in some respects this chairman who are content to take a long slumber, a very long nap while the predatory lending was going on, the housing bubble was growing, and massive amount of bad securities were finding their way through the payment of a lot of generous bonuses and fees, finding their way into the financial background of a lot of financial institutions in this country. it says that the fed last year began extending kred to companies that aren't banks for

the first time that it was created in 1913. and it has refused to divulge the details of the company participating in the lending program. for the first time in the country's history the federal reserve board, which previously has only lent money directly to fdic insured commercial banks. that's the only group of interest that could come to the fed and get direct money from the fed. for the first time in the history the fed said during this crisis, we will open that window to allow investment banks to come and get hone directly from us. -- get money directly from us. first time in history. so i began coming to the floor of the united states senate, and i didn't come here criticizing the fed at that point. because i don't know whether -- what they did was necessary or not. but they did it and i wasn't critical. we were in the middle of a

crisis. i began coming to the floor of the senate saying, all right, now, that we some amount of stability, let's at least make sure that the federal reserve board tells the american people who got the money. who ended up with the money and what were the terms of its being made available to these investment banks. well, the federal court, as a result of a foya request and a suit that the fed withheld niftion. the federal reserve must for the first time identify the companies in its emergency lending programs after losing a freedom of information lawsuit. the judge said the central bank improperly withheld agency records and essentially said, you have to disclose. you got the money. now, mr. president, the federal reserve board said we're going to appeal the judge's ruling.

weept don't intend to comply -- we don't intend to comply with that. the federal reserve is refusing to identify the recipients of $2 trillion of emergency loans from the american taxpayers or troubled assets the central bank is accepting as collateral. so the federal court says you've got to do it. they appealed the court ruling and got a stay and said we don't intend to do it. in the mean time i and senator grassley authored a letter with nine of our colleagues to the federal reserve board last june and said we want you to disclose to the congress and american people who got the money and how much and what were the terms? and we got a letter back from the federal reserve board dated september 16 and it has a lot of paragraphs, but you can pretty much summarize it with no. now, it is interesting to me that the chairman of the federal reserve board has said we believe one of the hallmarks of

what we're doing is transparency. well, i don't understand if transparency means you're going to disclose things and give people the opportunity to understand what has happened here, why is there no transpains here even -- transparency here even after a federal court said that you improperly withheld records, even at the united states senate said make the information available, even after the american people, we need to know who got our money. the federal reserve that we don't intend to tell you. we don't intend to tell you a thing. there's a couple of trillion dollars out there that the fed made available. there was a risk to the american taxpayer. $2 trillion is not a small. a it's a very large amount. the fed says, that's our business. not yours. that's the business of the federal reserve board. and we, in effect, have a right to operate in secret and intend to continue to do that. now, my problem with

mr. bernanke, especially my problem with him as i said last week, i don't think his nomination should be voted on the floor of the united states senate until and unless he discloses us to and the american people the details about this $2 trillion, who got it. what were the terms? we now see some of the investment banks reporting the largest profits in their history, preparing to now provide bonuses, we are told, of $120 billion to $140 billion. these are firms, by the way, that would no longer exist were it not for the federal government. these are firms perched on the edge of a financial cliff ready to -- to go under except for the guarantee of the federal government in all kinds of ways. now, of course, they are the first to get well. no, it's not a company back on main street. it's not a company back in my hometown. the first to get well in this new economy are the investment

banks. did they get well because they were able to get a couple of trillion dollars from the federal reserve board, probably at zero interest rates? i don't know. and then invest back in to treasury securities and get paid in interest on it? were they arbitraging money on it? i don't know. i think we ought to know. i think we have a right to know. and so, mr. president, the -- the issue here is, from my standpoint, especially, we have a right to know and the chairman of the federal reserve board has a responsibility to tell us and the american people. i noticed last weekend when these writers, including editorial writers, and some others, were having a seizure over this issue. oh, my gosh, somebody might vote against mr. bernanke. and then they say, you know what is this more than that -- more than that being what they call fed bashing -- it is not -- it is also the says that this congress is thinking of

tightening the rules on financial regulations to prevent those that were doing what they did to create this cries fris ever doing it again. shame on them. that's antibusiness. isn't it interesting how this morphed into a situation where if we want to shut gate, close the gate here, if we want to create rules that prevent the kind of nonus from happening that will never happen again that drove this country into the ditch, that that is somehow antibusiness? i don't think so. i think what is antibusiness is this notion of alan greenspan, and let me put up mr. greenspan's quote -- alan greenspan who came to congress after the fact, after the collapse. and heed said, well, i made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their own equity in the firms. his point was, we don't need to regulate. we don't need to oversee

anything. self-regulation will work best. they'll be just fine. leave them alone and they'll come home. well, what an unbelievable tragic mistake by the chairman of the federal reserve board. i made a mistake in presuming that self-interest -- self-interest were best capable. it's a suggestion that somehow, you know, capitalism works and count need any regulatory oversight at all because the free market is best left to its own devices. the free market is the best allocator of goods and i'm a big supporter of the free market. i also understand like any other area of competition, you need a referee, someone with a striped shirt to blow the whistle when there's a foul. you need a referee. you need regulation. that's not a four-letter word. it's called regulation. effective regulation to make sure that the free hfl market

system works the way it's supposed to work. there are a whole lot of interest that want to clog the arteries of the free market and cause some sort of substantial market in the free market as long as it exists in their self-interest to do so. so there's plenty of interest wanting to do it. that's why effective regulation is so important. i'm not talking about overregulation. i'm not talking about underregulation. i'm talking about effective regulation that's anticipated which for about eight years took a vacation by the hiring of regulate hors actually boasted they would be willfully blind. you all come and do what you want to do in this system of ours because we won't look. mr. president, i brought once again, and i know it's repeating and repeating. here are some of the things that nobody looked at, our own self-interest. the biggest mortgage company in the country that helped to setup the subprime scandal that fed itself into the balance sheets

of the commercial banks and investment banks and caused a massive collapse. a $15 billion loss in value to the american people. countrywide, the biggest mortgage bank says in their advertisements to people. do you have less than perfect credit? do you have late mortgage payments? have you been denied by other lenders? well, hey, come to us. what an unbelievable -- and you look and then you think how on earth could that be a business model? advertising out there to say, hey, are you a bad credit risk? we've got something for you. we want to do business with you. if you missed payments, come see us. or zoom credit. zoom credit. here's their advertisement -- and all of us heard these an saw these on television, radio, newspapers and we would think, house does this work? what kind of business model is this? zoom credit says that credit approval is seconds away. get on the fast-track at zoom credit. at the speed of light we'll

preapprove you for a car loan, home loan or credit card even if your credit is in the tank, zoom credit is like money in the bank. zoom credit specializes in credit repair and debt consolidation too. bankruptcy, slow credit, no credit? who cares. can you imagine that? here's an advertisement from a mortgage company saying, you were bankrupt, have slow credit? no credit? who cares. and, finally, mr. president, millennia mortgage. 12 months no mortgage payment. that's right. we will give you the money to make your first 12 payments if you call us in the next seven days. no payments for 12 months.hese y were creating this -- this rot at the bottom of this system from which the house of cards finally collapsed.

and, by the way, all of this put mortgages out there in the country and -- and the result was those mortgages were then wrapped into securities and then securities were then sold for mortgage companies up to hedge fawndz then to invest -- funds, then to investment banks, selling the risk north, so they didn't have the risk anymore. no underwriting at the bottom because you don't have to underwrite if you sell the risk ahead. and then we saw the spectacle of some very large commercial banks with their financial belly loaded with this rot. i mean, c.d.o.'s, credit default swaps, you name it, securities rated triple a that were worthless. and then we all stood around scratching our heads wondering, well, how did this happen? unbelievable, unprecedented greed while a lot of people at the top made massive amounts of money. by the way, the guy that ran

countrywide got away with, i believe, $200 million now under investigation. but a whole lot of them got away with a lot of money. and then this country and the american people got stuck with a bill of about $15 trillion and an economy that's been limping ever since. and so one asks the question: is it really fed bashing? is it really antibusiness? fed bashing to sigh that the fed owes the american people information about who got the $2 trillion and what were the terms? is it really antibusiness for those of us who are trying to put together rules an regulations -- and regulations that say this can't happen again, we won't allow to happen again? i want to just close with one additional quote and this is from almost 10 1/2 years ago on the floor of the united states senate. united states when we passed legislation at the request of all of those big

financial institution, the investment banks, you name it. they all wanted it. strip away the protections put in place after the great depression. strip away all of that. let's compete better with the japanese an asians and others in commercial finance. one-stop financial service are centers. put it all together. put commercial banking, investment banking, securities in one big tub, put up fire walls, you'll never be hurt and we'll able to better compete. on the floor of this senate 10 1/2 years ago i said this -- this bill will raise the likelihood of massive taxpayer bailouts. it will fuel the con sol a indication of members of the juriers in the banking industry at the cost of customers and others. and it certainly did that. and some of us decided to put some of the pieces back together. let's begin to provide protection for this country's

economy. let's get rid of the orgy of speculation, this unbelievable greed. this bubble of incompetence of people who were supposed to be regulating but didn't? and, yes, that includes the federal reserve board. an let's do this right. let's put it back together. that's not antibusiness. that is pro-business. because the business people in this country who go to work in the morning and put a key in the door and open that door and are going to work all day risking everything they have, they want an economy that's working, not in collapse. but an economy that's lifting and providing opportunity. that certainly can't happen and doesn't happen when you allow this kind of unbelievable speculation and the rancid behavior of the things that happened at the bottom with predatory lending and exotic things like c.d.o.'s and credit default swaps, instruments so clever and so complicated that those on both ends of them in many cases didn't understand them. i think it was will rogers who once described a long, long time ago the people who bought things

they will get from people who never had it and both smiled because both made money. that's the sort of thing that was going on in this country, and that doesn't work. the real economic health and the real wealth of this country is what we produce, not trading paper, and especially not trading paper as a matter of speculation to try to build the bubbles that we saw in the last decade or so. so we have got a lot to do to fix what's wrong, and i would just say to those that wrote "the washington post" editorial, the smallest amount of reporting could have avoided that mistake in terms of the six speeches i have given on the floor of the united states senate on this subject. this is not a revelation since the massachusetts election. this for me has been a long, long time coming to the floor, talking about these inherent problems. and let me just finally say that i think as we move from here to the issue of financial reform, aside from the bernanke nomination, from here to the issue of financial reform, the question is are we going to do that right? are we going to allow the kind of pressures that have built

from the outside to influence what we do? we should know by now -- we certainly should know by now that if you are too big to fail in the financial instrument, then you are too big, and we ought to do something about it. and we ought to know by now that putting together commercial banks that are insured by the taxpayer with investment banks is a recipe for disaster, and there is a way to separate it. mr. president, that ought to be our business as we turn to financial reform in the years ahead. mr. president, i yield the floor. mr. udall: mr. president, i speak recognition. the presiding officer: the senator from new mexico. mr. udall: thank you, mr. president. and let me say to my good friend, senator dorgan, first of all, we all know that he has served his state for 40 years, and many of us will be talking about that service and applauding him, but i -- i just want to say it's been a real

pleasure to have him chairman of the senate indiana affairs committee while i've served on that committee, and i think there will be many more things that i will say about him and his fine public service, and i want to thank him because i think what he has said about the fed and transparency is something that really needs to be said, and i look forward to debating that with him. so thank you, senator dorgan. mr. president, it is with great humility and respect for the institution of the united states senate, reverence for the many great men and women who have served here, and affection for my colleagues that i rise today to discuss what i believe is an issue of great importance. reflecting on my first year as a member of this body, i have come to believe that we are failing to represent the best interests of the american people.

we as elected representatives have a duty to our constituents, but partisan rancor and the senate's own incapacitating rules often prevent us from fulfilling thaty. fault, we have the authority within the constitution to act. article 1, section 5, of our constitution states in clear language that -- "each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." this is article 1, section 5, of the u.s. constitution." each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." in the house of representatives, every congress, they have a vote on the rules. in the senate, there are only -- let's talk about our major rule

that is of issue here, the filibuster rule, rule 22, the senate on rule 22 has only had -- has only had three of the present senators, three of the present senators that have voted for that because we have not voted under the constitution. yet, at the beginning of the 111th congress, we implicitly aquahe is to the rules -- we implicitly acquiesce to the rules dopped decades and sometimes a century ago, rules that most members of this senate have never voted to adopt. today these rules put in place generations ago make effective legislating nearly impossible. specifically, under rule 22, it's not possible to limit debate, end a filibuster, and invoke cloture without 60 votes. such cloture votes used to occur

perhaps seven or eight times during a congressional session, but in the 110th congress alone, there were 112 cloture votes, and most of these were occasioned simply by the threat of the filibuster. this -- this chart right here shows the rise of the filibuster in the senate in congresses starting back in 1919 all the way up to the present, and you can see by this in the 96th congress back in 1979-1980, there were only 20 of these filibusters or votes to invoke cloture. in the 100th congress, just seven years later, it had doubled. here in 2001, another decade or more, it had gone up to 61. and then in the 111th congress, as i just said, it doubled again to 121.

the american people spoke loudly in the 2008 election. they clearly desired a president and a congress that would set a new direction. it was not necessarily an endorsement of one ideology over another, but instead a call for us to put partisanship aside and to take care of the country's business. although this chamber was able to pass historic health care legislation last year, we are far from finished. more than anything, what the health care debate has demonstrated is how difficult the rules have made our legislative process, and it's not just health care. other important pieces of legislation still languish. federal judicial vacancies remain unfilled, and many of the president's appointees to key positions are still not confirmed. the american people deserve

better. i applaud leader reid for what he has been able to accomplish given the way this chamber's rules have been used to impede progress. senate rules are designed to allow for substantive debate and to protect the views of the minority as our founders intended. but they have been used instead to prevent the senate from beginning to even debate critical legislation. protecting the views of the minority makes sense but not at the expense of the will of the majority. indeed, as the rules are being used today, a single senator can hold a bill hostage until his or her demands are met. this is not the spirit of compromise and collegiality our founders envisioned for this body. even worse, the rules as they exist today make any effort to change them a daunting process.

under the current standing rules of the senate, rule 5 states that, quote -- "the rules of the senate shall continue from one congress to the next unless they are changed as provided in these rules." end quote. as adopted in 1975, rule 22 requires two-thirds of senators present and voting to agree to end debate on a change to the senate rules. in most cases, 67 votes. taken together, these two rules effectively deny the senate the opportunity to exercise its constitutional right to determine the rules of its proceedings and serve to bind this body to rules adopted by its predecessors. many of my colleagues will argue that the senate is not designed to be efficient, that the use of filibusters and delay tactics was what the founders intended.

they will quote george washington's comment to thomas jefferson that the framers created the senate to cool house legislation just as a saucer was used to cool hot tea. while i understand their argument, i do not believe that the framers envisioned that the senate -- they did not envision the senate as the graveyard for good ideas. we can have lengthy debate about the merits of legislation, but there should come a time when we actually vote on the bill. we can discuss the qualifications of a judicial nominee, but each nominee deserves an up-or-down vote. to quote one of this body's most esteemed members, senator henry cabot lodge, "to vote without debating is perilous, but to debate and never vote is imbecile." this is a bipartisan issue. i express my opinions today as a

member of the majority, but they will not change if i become a member of the minority party. we are all too aware of the power of rule 22. the filibuster rule adopted in 1975. yet, except for the distinguished senators byrd, inaway, -- byrd, inouye, and leahy, none of us, republicans or democrats alike, have ever voted to adopt this rule. opponents of rules reform argue that the senate is a continuing body, and therefore the rules must remain in effect from one congress to the next. i disagree with this assertion. even if the senate is deemed to have continued because two-thirds of its members remain in office, there is no reason that the rules must remain in effect. many things change with a new

congress. it's given a new number. all of the pending bills and nominations from the previous congress are dead, and each party may choose its leadership. if the party in the majority changes, the new senate becomes substantially different from the last. senators of both parties have argued that the rules may change with a new congress. as my esteemed colleague from utah, senator hatch, stated in a "national review" article in 2005, and i quote -- "the senate has been called a continuing body, yet language reflecting this observation was included in senate rules only in 1959. the more important and much older sense in which the senate is a continuing body is its ongoing constitutional authority to determine its rules. rulings by vice presidents of both parties sitting as the

president of the senate confirm that each senate may make that decision for itself, either implicitly by acquiescence or explicitly by amendment. both conservative and liberal legal scholars, including those who see no constitutional problems with the current filibuster campaign, agree that a simple majority can change senate rules at the beginning of a new congress." and this is exactly what senator hatch said in the "national review" article. both conservative and liberal legal scholars, including those who see no constitutional problems with the current filibuster campaign, agree that a simple majority can change senate rules at the beginning of a new congress." i agree with senator hatch, and i agree with our good friend

senator ted kennedy who said, and i quote -- "the notion that a filibuster can be used to defeat an attempt to change the filibuster rule cannot withstand analysis. it would impose an unconstitutional prior restraint on the parliament procedure in the senate. it would turn rule 22 into a catch-22." the early history of this body suggests that the use of unlimited debate as a tool of obstruction was not an issue. the original senate rules adopted under article 1, section 5, of the constitution included a provision allowing a senator to make a motion for the previous question. if passed, the motion allowed a simple majority of senators to halt debate on a pending issue. this simple rule for limiting debate was inadvertently dropped

in 1806, perhaps for lack of need, and the senate entered a period with no means to limit debate. it wasn't until the 1830's that the senate saw the first filibusters as members recognized that the lack of any rule to limit debate could be used to effectively block legislation opposed by even a minority of the minority. it was not, however, until 1917, that the senate adopt add formal cloture rule. woodrow wilson's armed ships bill had just been filibustered by 11 senators. the president was furious, demanding a change in senate procedural rules. in response, montana senator thomas walsh, citing article 1, section 5, of the constitution, introduced the constitutional option. walsh argued that a newly convened senate was not bound by the rules of the previous senate and could adopt its own rules,

including a rule to limit debate. he reasoned that every new senate had the right to adopt rules, saying that it is preposterous to assume that the senate may deny future majorities the right to change the rules. in response to walsh's proposal, the senate reached a compromise and amended rule 22. the compromise permitted cloture on any pending measure at the will of two-thirdses of all senators present and voting. back then, the toxic partisanship we face tad had not yet poisoned the system, but the manipulative use of the filibuster had already taken hold. it was used to block some of the most important legislation of that time: antilynching bills in 1922, 1935, and 1938. antirace discrimination bills were blocked almost a dozen

times starting in 1946. by the 1950's, a bipartisan group of senators had had enough. on behalf of himself and 18 other senators, new mexico's clinton anderson, my predecessor, attempted to limit debate and control the use of a filibuster by adopting the 1917 strategy of thomas walsh. just as senator walsh did almost four decades earlier, senator anderson argued that each new congress brings with it a new senate entitled to consider and adopt its own rules. on january 3, 1953, anderson moved that the senate immediately consider the adoption of rules for the senate of the 83rd congress. andersons motion was tabled, but he introduced again at the beginning of the 85th congress. in the course of that debate,

senator hubert humphrey present add parliamentary inquiry to vice president nixon presiding over the senate. nixon understood the inquiry to address the basic question: do the rules of the senate continue from one congress to another? noting that there had never been a direct ruling on this question from the chair, nixon stated that -- quote -- "while the rules of the senate have been continued from one congress to another, the right of a current majority of the senate at the beginning of a new congress to adopt its own rules stemming as it does from the constitution itself cannot be restricted or limited by rules adopted by a majority of a previous congress. any provision of senate rules adopted in a previous congress which has the express or practical effect of denying the majority of the senate in a new congress the right to adopt the rules under which it desires to

proceed is, in the opinion of the chair, unconstitutional." end quote. nixon's opinion was consistent with the long-standing common-law principle upheld in supreme court decisions that one legislature cannot bind subsequent legislatures. nixon went on to explain that under the constitution, a new senate had three options to deal with the rules at the beginning of a new congress. number one, proceed under the rules of the previous congress and, thereby, indicate by acquiescence that those rules continue in effect. number two, vote down a motion to adopt new rules and thereby indicate approval of the previous rules. and, number three, vote affirmatively to proceed with the adoption of new rules. despite nixon's opinion from the

chair, anderson's motion was tabled. in 1959, anderson raised the constitutional option at the start of the 86th congress with the support of some 30 other senators. this time he raised the ire of then-majority leader johnson who realized that a majority of senators might join anderson's cause. to prevent anderson's motion from receiving a vote, johnson came forward with his own compromise, changing rule 22 to reduce the required vote for cloture to two-thirdses of senators present and voting. clinton anderson relied on the constitutional option as the basis to ease or at least reconsider the cloture requirements laid out in rule 22. as he said in 1959 -- quote -- "my motion does not prejudge the nature of the rules, which the

senate in its wisdom may adopt, but it does declair in effect that the senate -- declare in effect that the senate of the 85th senate is responsible for and must bear the responsibility for the rules under which the senate will operate." that responsibility cannot be shifted back upon the senate of past congresses." end quote. to appease a small group of senators, johnson had included new language. this language stated that the rules continued from one congress to the next unless they were changed under the rules. it was a move that would effectively bind all future senates. in 1975, two years after anderson left office, the senate adopted the rule we operate under today. it takes the vote of three-fifths of all senators duly chosen and sworn to cut off debate or the threat of unlimited debate.

as the junior senator from new mexico, i have the honor of serving in senator clinton anderson's former seat. and i have the desire to take up his commitment to the senate and his dedication to the principle that in each new congress the senate should exercise its constitutional power to determine its own rules. let me be very clear. i'm not arguing for or against any specific changes to the rules. but i do think that each senate has the right, according to the constitution, to determine all of its rules by a simple majority vote. as my distinguished colleague, senator byrd, the longest-serving member in the history of congress, once said, "the constitution in article 1, section 5, says that each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings. now we are at the beginning of congress. this congress is not obliged to

be bound by the dead hand of the past." end quote. it is time for reform. there are many great traditions in this body that should be kept and respected. but stubbornly clinging to infectively and unproductive procedures should not be one of them. there is another way. the resolution i'm introducing today is simple. it would enable the 112th congress to carry out its responsibility to determine the rules of its proceedings in accordance with the constitution. this is not to say that between now and the beginning of the 112th congress we cannot use our political will to find a way to avoid the gridlock of 2009. it is to say that at the beginning of the 112th congress, the senate can exercise its constitutional right to adopt its rules of procedure by a simple majority

vote. the senate may dhoos adopt new rules or it may choose to continue with some or all of the rules of the previous congress. the point is that it is our choice. it is our responsibility. as clinton anderson said, it is a responsibility that cannot be shifted back upon the senate of past congresses. as anderson said, "it is a responsibility that cannot be shifted back upon the senate of past congresses." and i would ask at this time unanimous consent to include my resolution in the record,nd i would yield the floor. the presiding officer: without objection. collins: mr. preside? the presiding officer: the senator from maine. ms. collins: mr. president, i rise today in support of the amendment offered by senators conrad and gregg to create a

bipartisan budget commission to address our nation's long-term fiscal crisis. mr. president, the conrad-gregg amendment would create an 18-member bipartisan commission, which would be charged with developing a specific plan to correct our government's long-term fiscal imbalance. all options would be on the table. the commission's legislative recommendations would require expedited consideration by the congress, a supermajority vote in both chambers, and presidential approval. mr. president, while i would prefer that members of congress have the ability to offer revenue-neutral amendments to the commission's legislative

recommendations, it is imperative that we move forward on this proposal. for this reason, i am pleased to be a cosponsor of the legislation. mr. president, i would note that i have not always thought that the creation of an independent commission was the right approach. i was hopeful that congress could tackle the issues of the looming fiscal catastrophe that we face. but, mr. president, i have concluded that the only way we are going to achieve urgent action on the very serious fiscal problems that we face is through the creation of this independent commission. the fact is, america's out-of-control debt is a grave

threat to our future 0 -- to our future prosperity. just last month the senate voted to increase the debt limit to an astonishing $12.4 trillion. and yet here we are again today considering another increase in the debt limit, this time by $1.9 trillion to $14.3 trillion. mr. president, earlier this year this body approved the president's budget, which will double our debt i in five years and trip it will in 10 years -- and triple it in 10 years. in other words, we are facing an explosion in the federal debt. as bad as that sounds, our nation's debt problem is actually far worse. america also has nearly $60

trillion in unfunded liabilities for programs like social security and medicare. these unfunded liabilities amount to $184,000 per person living in our country or $48,300 per household. by contrast, the median household income is just over $50,000. as david walker, the former comptroller general and now president of the peterson foundation put it in recent testimony before our senate homeland security and governmental affairs committee -- quote -- "it doesn't take an economist or a mathematician to realize that this is unsustainable." we are talking about debt levels

that are unsustainable and threaten the very future economy of our country. 0 our problem in a nutshell is that government has promised more than our citizens can afford to pay. one columnist described this as "the collision between the high and rising demand for government services and the capacity of the economy to produce the tax revenues to meet those demands." historically, americans have paid about 18% of gross domestic product in federal taxes. but with the explosion in entitlement spending tied to the retirement of the baby-boom generation, plus interest on the national debt, americans would

need to pay taxes equal to 34% of g.d.p. to keep pace with spending 25 years from now. that's right, mr. president. the tax burden would have to soar to 34% of our gross domestic product. mr. president, i'm look at the young pages who are on the floor right now. it is their future that we're talking about. they are the ones who are going to be faced with this enormous debt. even if it were possible to raise taxes in order to finance this rate of spending, that remedy would do tremendous damage to our economy. it would crush job creation, devastate our already battered

small businesses, and dash the aspirations and can-do spirit of our people. thus, our decision-making must begin by reconsidering spending that although popular, simply cannot be justified during this fiscal crisis. it is wishful thinking to hope that we can simply grow our way out of this problem. economic growth helps. there's no doubt about that. but in itself, it is endangered by the enormous debt. becoming more efficient and productive helps reduce our long-term financial challenges, but economic growth alone will not rescue us from the predicament that we face.

if we fail to stop this approaching tsunami of red ink, then the futures of our children and our grandchildren will be swamped by our negligence. the american dream as we know it, where each succeeding generation can achieve a higher standard of living and quality of life than the previous generation will be over. it won't be easy, mr. president, even with this commission, but we must confront this conflict between what we want and what we can afford. it is time to reassess our priorities to make the hard decisions and to set a new fiscally responsible course for

our country. the budget reform commission proposed by senator gregg and senator conrad would begin to move us forward as a nation in facing these serious financial challenges. i know that it is not easy for many of my colleagues to give away some authority to this commission. i would remind them that the commission's recommendations would still come back to us and could not become law without our voting for them and without the president deciding to sign the recommendations into law. but i have concluded, mr. president, that the only way to jump-start the process, to do

what needs to be done, to right the fiscal boat, to help us face these challenges, to help us move forward as a nation is to enact the gregg-conrad amendment. so i urge all of my colleagues to support their effort. thank you, mr. president. the presiding officer: the senator from montana. mr. baucus: mr. president, i notice other speakers who wish to speak are on the floor tphourbgs -- now, and i'll make a short statement and defer to those senators. mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the pending amendments be temporarily laid aside so i may call up one of my amendments under the previous order. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. baucus: pursuant to the previous order, i s an amendment to the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report.

the clerk: the senator from montana proposes an amendment numbered 3306. mr. baucus: mr. president, i ask consent further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. baucus: let me briefly explain my amendment. this amendment would achieve all the objectives as the conrad-gregg amendment with one exception, and this is an important exception. the amendment that i just offered, there are no fast-track procedures for consideration of the commission's recommendation. thus, for senators who want to have a commission consider our fiscal situation and report back to us, this is your alternative. this alternative would protect the rules of the senate and the prerogatives of senators. i urge my colleagues to support this alternative. i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from new mexico. mr. bingaman: mr. president, i want to speak for just a few moments -- few minutes here about the upcoming confirmation

vote on chairman bernanke of the federal reserve board. i shall begin by stating very clearly that there is no way to overestimate the severity of the economic downturn that began in this country in 2007. to date, our nation has lost 7.2 million jobs. in my home state of new mexico, unemployment is now 7.8%. that's more than twice the rate that it was at two years ago. but even at that, it is considerably lower than the unemployment rate in many states; in fact, in a majority of states. american households lost $12.6 trillion in wealth, more than 5 million american families have seen their homes foreclosed. many have lost their businesses and many have lost their farms.

in short, there are millions of families across our country who are and have been experiencing severe economic pain and dislocation. and while indicators suggest that the recession has officially ended, our economy is hardly out of the woods. in the face of such pain, it is tempting to grasp for ways to demonstrate disapproval of the economic downturn or to put distance between ourselves as elected officials and the policies involved with the economic downturn. it's tempting, particularly in this political climate, to want to seize on a particular individual to take the brunt of the criticism. and i rise today to urge my colleagues not to use federal reserve chairman bernanke's renomination for any such

exercise. i rise to offer my strong support for his reconfirmation. with the benefit of hindsight, it now seems that the fed might have done more to prevent the economic downturn. some appointed to financial institution bailouts and have argued that the fed should not have provided financial support or guarantees to vulnerable financial institutions. some have argued that the fed support should have been structured differently. and historians with 20/20 hindsight will be able to argue those issues for years to come. but hindsight also tells us that without the bold and aggressive actions that chairman bernanke in fact took, the outcome of this economic downturn could have been considerably worse. i can imagine no fed chairman since the great depression who has faced such a herculean task,

if ever there were praise for averting a disaster, then, in my view, chairman bernanke deserves that praise. he deserves praise for working effectively with other domestic and foreign agencies to ensure the continuity of our global banking system, for taking significant steps to boost banks' access to funding and for establishing targeted lending programs to restart the flow of credit in critical markets. it's because of this skillfulness and aptitude that chairman bernanke demonstrated that he has had the strong support of president obama for reconfirmation to his position. president obama said the chairman's -- quote -- "bold persistent experimentation has brought our economy back from the brink."

similarly, in nominating chairman bernanke to his first term, president george w. bush said he was choosing chairman bernanke because of his reputation for intellectual rigor and integrity and the deep respect that he enjoyed in the global financial community. it would be shortsighted for this congress to second-guess the judgment of our current and our former president in this regard. president obama's call for the reappointment of chairman bernanke is echoed by some of our nation's most distinguished economic thinkers: our former fed chairman alan greenspan, paul volcker have both said it would be irresponsible not to extend chairman bernanke's term. douglas eken, the former c.b.o. director who was senator mccain's economic advisor in the 2008 election campaign, says -- quote -- "it would be a disaster not to confirm bernanke. warren buffet has said that if

he could vote for mr. bernanke's confirmation he would. twice. mr. buffet explained -- quote -- "we talked about the economic downturn being an economic pearl harbor, and he did what should have been done in response to that pearl harbor." these respected economic thinkers know that emerging from our nation's deepest and most protracted economic downturn since the great depression will require continuity of policy. financial conditions might now suggest that our economy is in fact turning around, but a complete turnaround will require that families and businesses, investors and financial markets see consistent policy actions. and central to that consistency and that continuity is leadership at the helm of the federal reserve board. if we were to change chairmen now, we would add considerable

uncertainty to our already fragile business and financial markets and trigger a sell-off of the dollar and a sell-off of equities. this could have the unfortunate effect of prolonging the economic downturn that we are now experiencing. finally, while i rise to support chairman bernanke's reconfirmation, i also renew my call for policy-makers in all positions -- ourselves included -- to make job creation the centerpiece of any economic recovery agenda. if we -- and we in the congress must also press forward with the urgent task of reforming our financial regulatory infrastructure whose cracks and holes have been exposed by this recession. mr. president, our nation faces considerable and urgent challenges, in my view. that's why it is essential that ben bernanke be confirmed for

another term as chairman of the federal reserve board. i yield the floorofficer: the senator from ohio. mr. voinovich: i rise today to urge my colleagues to support the conrad-gregg amendment. i believe the issues this amendment is designed to address -- our national debt and deficits as far as the eye can see -- are two of the most important issues congress and our nation face. our failure to address these issues will damage our economy, our nation's security, peace in the world and the kind of future we leave to our children and grandchildren. the graveness of the issue has resulted in the chairman and ranking member of the senate budget committee -- senators conrad and gregg -- coming together and introducing the bipartisan task force for

responsible fiscal action -- act -- which is supported by 29 senators, 14 democrats and 15 republicans. and i'm pleased to say that i am one of those 15 republicans. i think that those that follow the recent operations of the senate will appreciate that in this balkanized senate, where nothing seems to get done on a bipartisan basis, this commission has significant bipartisan support. the conrad-gregg proposal would create a statutorily based commission of 18 members, 16 members of congress who will study the long-term fiscal imbalance of the federal government and submit recommendations as a legislative proposal that would have expedited consideration by congress resulting in an

up-or-down vote. the commission would consider all options on both sides of the ledger and would require the approval of 14 of its 18 members, ensuring a bipartisan product. i want to emphasize to my republican colleagues, who may be skeptical of this bipartisan commission, half of the congressionally appointed members will be appointed by the senate minority leader and the house minority leader. which guarantees that the conrad-gregg commission will protect the concerns of my colleagues. for example, large tax increases are likely -- are unlikely given the makeup and procedures of the commission. and, finally, three-fiftsd of the senate and three-fifth of the house must vote for the representation ensuring strong

bipartisan support from both chambers. bipartisanship is the key to success because this is not a democratic or republican problem. it affects everyone. and i believe this special process is the most practical and effective method to deal with the looming debt crisis that endangers the economic future of all of us. a commission to address our nation's fiscal issues has been recommended by outside budget experts from across the political spectrum. these experts have declared that the regular process is incapable of dealing with long-term fiscal issues. just ask me. this is my 12th year in the senate and the regular process doesn't work. in february 2009, groups including brookings, the urban

institute, the peterson peter foundation, concorde coalition, a.e.i., progressive policy institute, and the heritage foundation, issued a statement calling for the establishment of a commission to address our fiscal issues. mr. president, i ask unanimous support to insert this statement in the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. voinovich: recently on pbs' nightly business program, the president of the committee for the responsible federal budget -- he's been working on this problem for a dozen years -- made a strong statement in support of a commission. mr. president, i'd like to submit her full statement for the record and would highlight that in her statement ms. mcginnis notes her early opposition to such a commission. but she has changed her mind based on the urgency of our

nation's fiscal situation. and i ask that to be submitted in the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. voinovich: david walk he president and c.e.o. of the peter c. peterson operation and comptroller of the united states has advocated to get our nation's fiscal house in order. mr. walker has testified -- quote -- "clearly escalating federal deficits and debt levels combined with our growing dependency on foreign lenders and the deepening federal financial hole represents challenges that must be addressed. a commission could make recommendations in connection with needed statutory budget controls, social insurance programs reforms, tax reforms, additional health care reforms and other appropriate areas. importantly -- and this is the most important thing -- everything must be on the table with the commission to be

credible and to have a real chance of success." end of quote. recently mr. walker released a book entitled, "come back america. turning the country around and restoring fiscal responsibility." in his book mr. walker explains the nature of the crisis and why we must act now. rather than describe all the frightening statistics myself, and many people have heard those statistics, i'd recommend this book to my colleagues if they have any doubts about the seriousness of this fiscal crisis facing our nation. of course, throughout the debate on their amendment, senators gregg -- and i heard them earlier today -- dre gregg -- cd and gregg described the

financial future. i heard my colleague from the state of maine. i have in hi prior floor speeches on this topic, which probably are a dozen, described the significance of this fiscal crisis our nation faces. and for any of my colleagues or members of the public, you can assess these speeches on my website. i would note that the american people agree -- this is really important. the american people agree with senators conrad and gregg. in fact, latest bipartisan public opinion poll commissioned by the peter g. peterson foundation this past november indicates that 80% -- 80% of american voters are concerned about escalating debt and deficits. voter concern about debt and deficits exceeded concern about health care access and affordability by 24%. by 24%. and 70% of americans believe

that the regular order in washington is broken. they think the regular order is broken. and it's fier it's time for a fl reform commission to become a reality. i was pleased that the distinguished minority leader, senior senator from kentucky, spoke eloquently about the bipartisan conrad-gregg commission. senator mcconnell said -- quote -- "this means that in order to face our problem head-on, we will have to address the problem of entitlement spending. and the only serious option on the table is the conrad-gregg proposal which would provide a clear pathway for fixing these long-term challenges by forcing us to get debt and spending under control. he goes on to say, i have had a number of good conversations about this proposal with the president. based on those conversations,

i'm hopeful it will be given serious attention. for the safety and security of our nation, the conrad-gregg proposal deserves broad bipartisan support. that was the minority leader of the united states senate. senator reid has been silent on his support. but based on conversations that i've had with him, i believe he also appreciates the dire financial situation our nation faces. still, i want to say that i've been disappointed that there has not been more after recent effort by the leaders of both parties to embrace the conrad-gregg commission, which is one of the most bipartisan pieces offings that we have seen during -- pieces that we've seen during this session of congress. i think it is the most bipartisan in this session of congress. my question is to senators reid

and mcconnell, is you're not in favor of the conrad-gregg commission, what bipartisan proposal are you for? in other words, if you don't like the commission, then what bipartisan proposal are you for? i was also disappointed that the president initially threw in the towel on the conrad-gregg commission on the grounds that he understood that the votes to pass this proposal were not there. instead the president proposed issuing an executive order establishing a debt commission. an executive order commission, i believe, will be looked important by many on my side of the aisle as nothing more than an exercise in political messaging. but i said to my colleagues on this side of the aisle, if you're not for the conrad-gregg proposal, what are you for? what are you for?

and i'm grateful this saturday the president has changed his position an stated -- quote -- "the only way to solve our long-term fiscal challenge is to solve it together. democrats and republicans. that's why i strongly support legislation under consideration to create a bipartisan fiscal commission to come up with a set of solutions to tackle our nation's fiscal challenges. and call on senators from both parties to vote for the creation of a statutory bipartisan fiscal commission. the president of the united states made it clear he wants this bipartisan statutory commission to pass the united states senate. the beauty of creating the commission through legislation that it would force congress to deal with the nation's looming fiscal catastrophe. rewarding the work of the commission members by ensuring that if their proposal gets 14

out of 18 votes, the bill will not be placed on a shelf to gather dust. i can can tell you, as i've watched this senate during the last 11 years, that if someone would ask me to sit on a commission and spend the time that i'm going to have to spend to deal with the problems that would be confronting the commission, i want a guarantee -- i'd want a guarantee that if the majorit majority -- 14 out of 18 members were for it, that it would get expedited procedure and i would get a vote up or down on that labor of work that i have participated in. i think the president understands that if we're going to respond to the fiscal crisis facing our nation, it's got to be bipartisan. and i'm prayerful that he will use his political capital with senators reid and -- senator reid and senator mcconnell to

secure the 60 votes needed for this landmark legislation. and then urge our house colleagues to do the same. now, some of my colleagues have other proposals. many of them are worthy of consideration. however, none of these proposals are bipartisan. in the end such proposals might result in great messaging. an, boy, we do a lot of messaging around here. and for some to provide a way to cover their behind or more tactfully, mr. president, provide a fig leaf to cover their unwillingness to cover something to support something that is bipartisan and ultimately good for the country. and, moreover, of course, these folks, you know, would save themselves from heartburn -- heartburn that they might suffer when special interest groups

complain and perhaps give ammunition to someone who might be running against them in a republican or democratic primary for the senate. since the responsible passage of this commission has become a reality -- this is really interesting how this starts to work -- special interest groups on both side of the aisle have avialed that a terrible, terrible tax commission will commission actions -- taxes or it will result in cuts in social security, medicare and other government programs. you know something? if the left and the right are so unhappy with this, this has got to be good legislation. others, frankly, want to use the debt limit issue to embarrass our friends on the other side of the aisle because of the large increase we have approved particularly as a result of the recession and the collapse of our financial markets. other members continue to blame president bush and earlier

congresses. the truth is, mr. president, none of us, republicans or democrats, have clean hands. since 2002, there have been nine votes -- nine votes to increase the debt limit. and they have occurred both under democrats and republicans when they controlled congress. in that time our debt has gone from $6.4 trillion to roughl roughly $12.4 trillion. all of us -- all of us do not have clean hands. mr. president, the american people know that the chickens have come home to roost. and we better understand that. that's what i hear when i go back to ohio. if one thing came out of massachusetts, the people are tired of the -- to put it in the vernacular -- b.s. coming out of congress. congress's numbers continue to be the worst they have ever been because the folks back home

think we're more interested in protecting our political hides and who will control the next congress than working in a bipartisan way to solve our nation's problems. they know that when their elected representatives are scrapping their interests are scraps fallen off -- falling off the table, they know, as i know, that even when you work together, it is often difficult to get things done because many of us have sincere differences of opinion. i learned both of those lessons as mayor of the city of cleveland and governor of ohio. mr. president, the eyes of the american people are focused on what we're doing here. the american people will be watching to see if we got the wakeup call from massachusetts. they're telling us they are mad as