threat to the region and the world; that is true? >> i think these things were sort of conjoined really. i think the fact was it was an@d think that you can get a sense and some of this is in evidence as it were the americans regime change dealing with wmd, it is a

different way of expressing the same proposition. the americans in this sense were saying we are for regime change because we don't trust the is ever going to give up his tebeau mt conditions. we say we have to deal with the wmd ambitions of that means regime change so be it. so it wasn't that we can at this from completely different positions. >> in preparation for this meeting at chequers, what kind of conclusions did you reach and what advice for you being given by your advisers? >> well, basically we were obviously now going -- we had the military action in afghanistan. it was obvious the american system and indeed our own system were going to look at the wmd issue and there was advice on options as to contant idf regime change and so on and so forth so all of those options were being explored. and as i say following that meeting and before i went to see

president bush there was quite an intense interaction on this issue that sir roderick was raising with me about smart sanctions because i needed to get a sense of whether this policy was a runner or not. >> why was the chief of defence staff present at this meeting? >> a was obvious the american system certainly wasn't going to for world military action and, you know, from the very nearly stage i could see coming down the track street after september 11th frankly there were going to be very difficult decisions about this in the future. as a, one of the things i always try to do particularly if we were -- of military action was even possible the and the military paper made it clear it was a possibility to get the chief of defence staff right alongside the discussion and the planning and the policy. >> what advice did he give you at that meeting because i think that you asked the foreign

secretary and defense secretary to produce papers. >> yes, the defense -- >> but what advice did the chief of defence staff give up that meeting? >> he was laying out options on the military side and expressing his view i seek my boys to do about this in his evidence and -- >> does he remember being at that meeting as it is in mr. campbell's player resaw afraid we don't have that information. >> i remember him being at it. and as i said, we got the paper from the ministry of defence and that was looking at the various options. but one of the things happening at this time and i think it is quite important to reflect on this is that it is quickly becoming the key issue. people are moving on from afghanistan. it was always going to be on the agenda once you had a september 11th. and as i said a different sense for everybody that we had to act. and so we had, you know, a

perfectly good discussion about it and obviously i think from the defense point of view what cbs and the ministry of defence were concerned about was to make sure we got alongside any planning that was going on and did as quickly as possible. >> was the foreign secretary at that meeting? >> i believe he was but let me go back and check. >> because we heard from jack straw about the advice he gave in advance of that meeting, which is the one referred to. but we have heard that while there might have been some private distances the time between u.s. and foreign secretary or the desired final objective whether the regime change was objective you agree on the tactics, namely that it would be essential to go to the united nations because it would be not possible for the cabinet or anyone else to support the actions. is that a correct -- >> i think the other thing very important at the time was to try

to the international community on the same page with the threat in how we dealt with at industry after september 11th people came together behind america. but i was very aware from the early stages of this that also the american mind set had changed dramatically and frankly mine had as well, when i talk to other leaders particularly in europe i didn't get the same impression really. and so one thing i was anxious to do because we put together a coalition of afghanistan was to put together a coalition again to deal with saddam hussein and therefore the united nations route was then just important for all sorts of political

reasons, legal reasons and so on, it was to do with the internal politics of the u.k.. it was also important to me because i didn't want america to feel that it had no option but to do it on its own. >> are you saying to me that that was the kind of agreed policy with which he went to crawford on the eve of crawford? is that what you intended to achieve at crawford? >> what we intended to achieve was to get a sense from the americans as to what they wanted to do and this would be best done between president bush and myself and really to then get the sense how our own strategy would have to evolve in the life of that. >> been coming to crawford because you had discussions with president bush without any advice as president. can you tell what was decided that these discussions? >> there was nothing actually

decided but let me just make one thing clear about this. one thing that is important to think when you are dealing with other leaders is to establish and this is particularly important i think for the prime minister of the united kingdom and president of the united states used to launch a strong relationship, i had with president clinton and again with president bush. that is important, some of what you will do an informal meeting but it's also important to be able to discuss and i frankly with the issues were, and as i recall the discussion it was less to do with specifics about what we were going to do on iraq or indeed the middle east because the israeli issue was a big issue at the time. in fact i think i remember there have been conversations we had even with israelis, the two of us while we were there so that was a major part of all of this.

but the principal part of my station was to try and say look in the end we've got to deal with various different dimensions of this whole issue. for me what happened after september 11th was i was starting to look at this whole issue to do with this unrepresented extremism in a different way and i wanted to persuade president bush but also get a sense from him as to where he was on the broad issue. -- what you're suggesting you were having general discussions in terms of getting reviews across to each other trying to understand and establish a relationship. >> yes but also from his -- >> during the course of the discussions do you think you gave him any commitments? >> the only commitment i gave, and i gave this openly in the meeting was a commitment to deal with saddam hussein. now -- >> so when you had to deal with

-- >> absolutely and that was public -- >> so you agree on the end but not on the means? >> we agree on both factually as it came through finally but we agreed we had to confront this issue. he had to come back into compliance with the international community and as i said in a press conference with president bush the method of doing that is open and indeed he made the same point. i just want to make one other point about this. this was about six months from september 11th. one major part of what president bush was saying to me was to express his fear actually that if we were not prepared to act in a really strong way we ran the risk of sending a disastrous signal to the world. >> there is so many people believe that you entered into a firm commitment because some undertakings were given that you were with him no matter what the

circumstances. i think it's important the discussions were taking place without anybody being present to understand what commitments did you make to him and why is there a feeling this was quite a critical meeting? >> i honestly can't explain why people have come to a view that there were different commitments given because i read from time to time people saying things like this is what was agreed at this meeting. what was agreed was set out in a very private note from david manning afterwards and what i was saying to president bush and i wasn't saying this privately i was saying it publicly was we are going to be with you in confronting and dealing with this threat. there was no -- the one thing i was not doing is dissembling in that position. in fact i actually have here i think the press conference president bush and i gave afterwards we talked about i think it was israel came up

first but then we went on to iraq and president bush said the premise in by of course talked about iraq and with recognize the danger of a man willing to kill his own people and harboring weapons of mass destruction and goes on to say that he has got to effectively prove that he is in compliance and i then say it's always been our policy that iraq will be a better place without some of his and there shouldn't be doubt about that for the reasons i've given. and the reasons to do with weapons of mass destruction also deal with the bortolotti -- so, what i say is an you know the reasons to do with weapons of mass destruction also to do with the appaling fertility and recession of his own people but how we proceed in this situation, how we make sure the threat posed by wmd is dealt

with that is a matter that is open. éyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéyéy your chief of staff told us that that crawford and subsequent you did not set any conditions for

britain's support for the u.s., but that your approach was to say, we are with you in terms of what you're trying to do, but this is a sensible way to do it. we are offering you a partnership to try and get to a wide coalition. but other witnesses who were also involved in the decision-making process of told us that you set a number of great condition for our support. which was it? >> it was the former. look, this is an alliance that we have with the united states of america. and it's not a contract. it's not, we do this for you, you do this for us. it's an alliance and it's an alliance icq very openly, i believe in passionately. i had been through with president clinton, xhosa though, and just let me emphasize you that 85% of the assets assets for american asset. i ago difficult to restraining

president clinton did was right to go all the way on kosovo and he was in a difficult position. the american people were saying to him, look, displaces thousands of miles away for america. let the europeans deal with it. it's on my doorstep. >> spitzer christopher my year he did say you were saying yes, but it was not being listened to. >> i don't think he was there at the critical meeting your >> any other correspondence. >> you as i can read it wider. in 2002, not just the meeting. >> yes, but the fact is that that meeting and there are other evidence given to you particularly by david manning. but i was just explaining about the american alliance because it's important in understanding my thinking on this. so i've been through this

process with resident clinton. when he, with a lot of courage had committed america. had committed america. september the 11th hbrbrb@ @ rbb

him now is absolutely clear because as i've set up publicly, not privately we have to confront this issue. it could be confronted by sanctions framework that would affect this. for the reasons i've given, we didn't have one. it could be confronted by a u.n. inspections framework. welcome to that. or alternatively, it would have to be confronted by force. i was going earlier -- but i won't do it, but i'm very happy to make it available to comments i made even prior to september 11, 2001, because we have been through this with saddam several times, 1997, 1998, and so on and so forth here you know, the fact is forced with always an option. what changed after september the 11th was necessary and there was no other day way of dealing with this threat. >> so would you say the commitment you gave for attack to go reasons became an

assumption in washington and into some extent reduced your leverage for negotiations? >> when you say -- did you say for tactical reasons? >> that is what jonathan powell said. >> it wasn't for tactile reasons. what i believe was that if you wanted to make a real change to this whole issue and again this is very important to understanding certainly my strategic thinking but also the strategic thinking of many people who looked at this issue. and i would probably have a far greater understanding of it today and even back then. what i believed we confronted with the new threat that was based on political ideology, but i'm religious fantasist on. it was a complete of the proper faith of islam, but it was real and active and they demonstrated their intent to go very large numbers of us that they possibly could you whatever strength you set out, not for tactical

reasons, but deeps, strategic reasons is why did we need to do to make a successful assault on this ideology that was a dangerous? and therefore, the middle east peace process for me was not a kind of tactical thing, it was actually fundamental, still is in my view, to dealing with this issue. >> i think there rodrick wants to comments. >> eisai moment ago you had agreed with president bush, not only on the ends but also on the mean there is that the americans actually have a different view of the means and they were already planning military action and they had an explicit policy of seeking regime change. i mean, did you a crawford actually have a complete identity view with president bush on how to deal with saddam? >> well, we of course were pushing the u.n. route. so the american view is regime change, as i say, because they didn't believe saddam would never, in good faith, give up

his wmd ambitions or programs. >> and you are insisting ultimately successfully that this should be done through the u.n. route, so actually george view of the means was actually different from theirs because they would've been prepared -- they weren't that keen on the u.n. view untrimmed route. >> we did have to persuade them, although i think it's good to say that even at the meeting president bush made it clear that america would have let the inspectors in to function properly. >> another thing -- >> if i can just point this out, several occasions over the next few months president bush made it clear to me that if it would work, then it worked that we would've taken yes for an answer. >> you equally affected him as he just repeated in sf i said earlier they came to military action there would be no way of doing with his diplomatically that she would be with them. >> if we tried the u.n. route

and it failed in my view was that would have to be dealt with. >> we will come back to the question where that left you in terms of your legal base quite a lot later on, because i think it's best we take that as a single job checked in its own right and it would be easier for both of us. >> just one more point to rising from crawford, but not just from crawford. you said -- he reminded us that the arab israel problem was in a very hot state at crawford. he may have even had some conversation with israelis from there and obviously with something that was a part of your conversations with president bush. and i think it's right to say and jack straw said it do you worry that lists in trying to persuade the american to make more and faster progress on the middle east this process. ultimately, jack straw said it

was a matter of huge frustration that we weren't able to achieve something which you have been seeking so strongly. now, given the support that you were giving to president bush, saying i stand shoulder to shoulder with you, why didn't he repay that support back even more decisively on the crucial issue of the middle east peace process? >> well, first of all, as i say, i think we should certainly, in order to understand my mindset, avoid this language that trading this policy for that policy. i would not have done iraq if i did not think it was right, full stop, irrespective of the middle east. however, i believe that resolving the middle east, what a worker now is immensely important. and i think it was difficult and this is something i've said

before on several occasions. it was difficult to persuade president bush in america actually. the americans tend to regard these issues as somewhat separate. now, in mitigation of that, we did eventually other later than i want to get the roadmap adopted and the roadmap was extremely important. and secondly however, and again i know more about this now than i probably would've know them because of the work i do now. i think truthfully with the intifada still raging in palestine it would've been pretty difficult to have got this thing back together again. however, having said that i was very frustrated about it because they believed then and i believe now that when these are not divisible problems, is one problem with different facets. and one major facet of the whole problem is this israel palestine

conflict not because evidently the existence of israel has provoked this conflict. i totally disagree with people who say that that the resolution of the conflict would have been enormously beneficial impact on relations with the muslim world. >> i think, if i recall rightly, you were arguing very strongly throughout 2002 to the white house and making progress on this problem was that the state not a trade-off, it was because achieving progress on this was going to make a huge difference to opinion in the region, to reactions in the region, to the reactions in the muslim world if it came to the point where you had to take military action against iraq. says he just said, these two things were linked together. but the americans were not able to see the logic of this in the same way. >> well, it was a debate that continued and i think, you know, you've got a point actually,

sarah roderic. this is something i think it's difficult with the american system now and i think it was different actually at the end of president bush's time in fact. the reason he launched the annapolis process was because of this. but i think there was a tendency to see these things separately and i regarded them, as i said, all part of the one and the one thing. and yes i mean i said this at the time and i would say it now. i wish we would've made that are in faster progress? >> but you can make it a precondition with this? >> no, it wouldn't be right to do that either. you should only take the action in respect of iraq of using its intrinsically valid in its own terms. having said that, as i say my whole construct was to get as roddy coalition as possible, and i thought if we manage to get the peace process really pushing forward, were more likely to get

a broader and deeper coalition. >> but surely you must assent to them, look this thing is really going to have a chance of working well if we can make this progress down the arab israel track before we get there. >> well, i'm certainly santarem i think this is vital. you can describe it as a broken record through that. and it actually after september 11th i think after the september 11th the statement to the house of commons in a speech i made to my party conference in the end of september 2001, you know, i had and i have a few and it's i think if we want to deal with iran today and you've got very similar issues than the ones are discussing here which is why learning the lessons of this is so important. again in my view we are better place to do with the random this issue moving forward. >> when he said this is fido was

he just taken it for granted we were going to support him on iraq anyway? we are beginning now to join them in military planning. you said you were going to stand shoulder to shoulder with him. and so we would be there anyway, even if he didn't push hard and get the progress that you are asking for an arab-israeli question? >> when you say we would've been there anyway, i mean, we wanted to go down the u.n. route and i think if we hadn't it would have been very difficult indeed to it however, in respect to israel palestine issue, it's bayern in the record as to how important i thought it was. and to be fair to him, he would say that getting the israelis to agree to the roadmap, because it didn't happen until i think april 2003 was a major step forward. and it was a major step forward. it is so governing documents of

the peace process today. it was a big push to get that agreed. to meet with him and him at the israelis. but there was also as i say the intifada be an uprising in the palestinian side that israel was a difficult situation. israel was as a lot of people in terrorist attacks. there was retaliations against the palestinians. there was a very bloody situation. track this was obviously inflaming emotions in the region, so when it came time that the coalition took action, did the disappointing lack of progress notwithstanding the belated publication of the route map, how much of an element was that in the difficult reactions from a can from the coalition's point of view in the region and in the muslim world to the action that was actually taken? how much did he contribute, do you think? >> it is a difficult passion.

i mean, i don't know that a fundamentally would've altered things. >> if i put it together will play around, would've been much better if you got the progress? >> that's why was arguing for it and having said that, i think that had we once the conflict incurred and we had been in iraq would've been able to at that point i forward. i think that issue would have been taken care of and just to say really, because they may not get another chance to say it, about the reactions of the arab leaders in the region, most of them were glad to see the back of saddam. now, what they worried about with the consequences of doing so, but there was no great support. in fact, when as he is now, king abdullah of saudi arabia launched the crown prince -- peace initiative of 2002. he paid money to the families of palestinian suicide bombers.

having said all that coming as of course it would be better if we'd had the middle east peace process moving forward. the only thing i say since president bush was that it was a very difficult moment in that process. if you are trying to do it today, it would be a lot easier than 2002, right in the middle of the intifada. >> it was pretty disappointing to you that we can push that one further down the road? >> i was always disappointed them frustrated on this. >> i think this is probably the right moment to take aéyéyéyéyéy

questions. >> mr. blair, before the break he said the military options were discussed at crawford. >> yes, it was obviously a possibility of military action be in the outcome of what was going to happen and so there was a general discussion of the possibility of going down the military rate that obviously we were arguing very much for that to be at the u.n. route failed. >> i think for reasons we will come to later, i think it would be impressed by the minute ministry of defense to deciding on an 2002 west k-kilo package the u.k. would be prepared to contribute to the event in military action. i think we have also heard there were essentially for possible

military packages under consideration with the main discussion focused on the too large and possible packages, the key should be whether we should contribute an armored division. i think her chief of staff told us that the entity had abdicated the largest package. the large land force option because they felt this was important to the relations of the u.s. military and often because they thought it would help army morale. now as he won't know a decision to commit troops to battle, but individual soldiers in harms way, cannot be taken lately. how do you weigh the risks of troops in lan operation as opposed to the one of the other packages against the importance of military operations with the u.s. and the morale. >> baroness, the first thing to do was to work out whether you

believe that you are right to be in this at all. then the next question is if you are right to be in it, what is your level of support? and in any occasion and i ended up on several occasions taking military action, kosovo, sierra leone, afghanistan and iraq. the first thing i do in a sense is to say to the military themselves -- the >> please be significant about iraq because i'm asking how to do with the risks to the troops involved in the situation in iraq? >> when i come to take this decision the first thing i do is that the military for their view and their view in this instance was that they were up to doing it and that they preferred to be right at the center of things. now actually i'm not hiding behind them because that was my view, too. i thought if it was right for us to be and that we should be there alongside our principal ally, the united states, i

thought that in afghanistan and i thought back in iraq also. >> said that was your view, too, so you read one with which you were being advised on? >> correct. >> did resident bush at any stage request a particular form a skill of the u.k. contribution? >> no, he very much like this to us to decide what wanted to do. but i had taken a few that this was something that if it was right to do actually matter to have bred mare. it mattered not simply for reasons to do with -- >> it mattered, but did the skill matter? to get their different ways in which we could have contributed, they didn't have to be in the large scale that we committed ourselves to? >> you didn't have to be. there were three basic options. >> why did you choose, you were advised, but you were of that view. why were you at that view?

>> my view is that it's best for britain to be in there right alongside. and i say that because i regarded this whole issue is a threat to our securities as well as a threat to the security of the united states of america. it's not simply that i value the alliance, although i do value the alliance and as they will say to people you can distance yourself from america if you want to but you'll find at the time way back. i believe it's a vital part of our security i believe if we think it is right, we should be prepared to play our part fully. >> but the reasons given by the chief of defense staff was about the relations in the morale. was there a question of how much influence we would he able to exercise if we contributed to that large-scale? >> it wasn't so much that. it was a matter of common sense, obviously. if you were there with the bigger force alongside the americans then otherwise, then,

of course, you will be more intimately involved, but that's not really the reason. the reason westies i hear we have this situation which we believe is a threat. america believes it's a threat to them are going to accurately. we've acted jointly before and were going to act again. and it doesn't arrive from the importance that certainly i attach and i hope the country does to the american alliance and also to the fact that our armed forces and the thing that is extraordinary about them in the innocent about them. they are prepared to do the difficult things. >> so you are saying it was driven by her sense of what was the proper u.k. contribution to policy? >> correct. >> and influence wasn't an important part of its? >> you didn't and shouldn't do it for influence. otherwise i say seems to reason if you're making a bigger contribution you're going to have more to say. >> thank you, very much. >> perhaps i can turn now to sir

martin gilbert. >> mr. blair, they could turn now to the weapons of mass destruction. when she decided in 2002 and was essential to pursue the u.n. route, and it was weapons of mass distraction rather than human rights or any other issue that became crucial to building the case in establishing a legal base for military action. we have been told by earlier witness says that the information available to you on iraq's period and in early 2002 showed that the sub on programs saddam hussein wmd programs have changed little since 1998 and also became a strong caveats about the above i see. was that your understanding? >> yes, the principal intelligence i think this has been disclosed in the butler inquiry, in march 2002, was that our knowledge was sporadic and

patchy. i think they went on to say it was clear that saddam continues his program. sir martin, can i just say one thing, though, in respect again of this? is somewhat troubles me is absolutely, as i say, almost binary distinction between regime change in wmd. it was always relevant to me because i think that it gives a different sense of the threat of the nature of saddam's regime. the fact that there are some accounts a million casualties in the iran iraq war, 100,000 kurds that were being killed, 100,000 killed by political killings. we had the kuwait situation were again tens of thousands died. the actual use of chemical weapons against its own people. it's always important to remember from my perspective the nature of the regime did make a

difference to the nature of the wmd threats. >> that actually is my next question and i put it in a slightly different way. but given the information available to you and given these caveats, were there no other aspects of the iraqi regime but to focus every better be safe for the u.n. route, as a better basis for the legality of the region? >> you mean? >> in terms of all the things you describe in your speeches and about saddam's brutality to which you were saying just now about aziza wmd on kurds, on the shia? >> i think i actually said it a.b. in the chicago speak unturned speech or else well. there were many regimes of actors due to the back of but you can't go through them and remove all the dictatorships. people often say to me about mukai beat in zimbabwe and the burma regime and so on. but you have to have a basis

that is about a security threat. so yester absolutely right. my assessment of the security threat was intimately connected with the nature of the regime. when you actually read the destruction descriptions of what happened with chemical weapons in halabja village and by some accounts of many as 5000 people died and there is some people in iraq but that the consequences of that. to me that indicated a mindset that was terrific. it's horrific whether or not he then uses weapons of mass destruction if there's any question question of using it, it's a mindset that indicates this is a profoundly wicked and i would say i'm a psychopathic man. we were obviously worried that after his two sons seem to be as bad as ours.

so yes it's absolutely true this definitely impacted our thinking. >> your contrasting in a way what was known about saddam's past use of wmd. he resorted to be not a wait and not given the same weight to the doubts and caveats about the actual situation in early 2002. no, i think very much we did give way to that and that's why by the time you get to september 2002 you got a lot more information. but, it's one of the things most difficult sometimes because people look at this in the light of what we know now. saddam and weapons of mass destruction was not a counterintuitive notion. you know, he had used them, and he definitely have done. he was in breach of, i think i'm a ten united nations them. and so, in a sense, it would require quite strong evidence the other way to have been doubting the fact that he had this program.

>> sarah lawrence freedman will ask you about the september dossier. i would like to move on for a moment to another aspect and that is you set on a number of occasions in 2002 indeed in early 2003 that iraq was a test of the international community's ability to deal with both wmd and terrorism. if i could just quote from your monthly press conference on the 18th of february 2003. the stance that the world takes now against saddam is not just vital in its own right, it is a huge test of our seriousness in dealing with the twin threats of weapons of mass distraction and terrorism. can you tell us how you saw those links, and again, what evidence you had that there were links? because as you know, the butler committee has established that there weren't direct links at that time between saddam and al

qaeda. >> the link was, in my mind, at that time, this, that there was a proliferation threat that was potentially growing, because we had in iran, we have north korea, we have libya, we had iraq obviously. but with a lot of emphasis on a.q. khan activities. my fear was and i would say i hoped this will be stronger today than i did back then as a result of what iran particularly today is doing. my fear is that states that are highly repressive or failed, the danger of a wmd link is that they become porous, they construct all sorts of different alliances with people and yet it's true we did not have

evidence that saddam was, for example, behind the september 11th attacks and part of the difference between ourselves and the americans was the always said we don't accept that. it is interesting and this is referred to in the butler report however. that actually zarqawi did go into iraq, in fact prior to the invasion. now when i look at because i spent a lot of time obviously out of the region today. when i look at the way iran today links up with terror groups and this is a different topic for a different day, but i would say that a large part of duty stabilization in the middle east that the present time comes for moran. the link between iran having nuclear weapons capability and those types of terrorist organizations, the combination of fat that makes them particularly dangerous. so you're absolutely right, margin, we were in a position back then were poor actually

sent to the americans, looks at him and al qaeda are two separate things. i was worried these two things have come together the notion of states proliferating wmd and terrorist groups. by filling that is a major risk today. mac weather indications in the information you're getting that there were links that there were somehow links between other terrorist organizations and hand him his potential to wmd. >> there is obviously saddam and the funding of palestine, the families of palestinian suicide bombers and so on. i think what's very interesting that we will come back to this later. when you look at what happened in iraq and what happened indeed in afghanistan today, and what happened in yemen today, somalia, many different countries around the region, there are very strong links between terrorist organizations and states that will support or sponsor them.

and the reason why i think this is a particular danger today is because there are these days, it ran in particular, that are linked to this extreme and in my view misguided view about islam. so i think )t@@ @ @ rbrb@

>> given that, was it wise to say that intelligence is ever beyond doubt? wasn't this setting yourself up for a higher standard of proof than it might be possible to sustain. >> i think what i said, at the -- in the