the hallways and to talk to people. nothing was posted online, and you never had any ability to the meaningfully comment and give your input, and it turns out people really want to do that. not just with the fcc, there's all sorts of agencies where you say, gee, now that i understand you're considering licensing this nuclear plant facility for nrc, whatever, i really want to be able to comment on that. and my thought is more power to you. that's, you know, it's wonderful to have that available to people. >> host: and finally, stuart benjamin, give us your impressions now that you've had a few months on the job. what do you think? are you having fun? >> guest: i am having fun, and i have to say it's really easy to take pot shots from the outside, and i will admit i did that as much as others have done. and when you get the on the inside, you realize there's an enormous number of really dedicated people who are really trying hard at thinking about

the issues, and it's actually quite inspiring. i mean, i can say i've never once heard anybody say, well, let's do this because it's the politically expedient thing to do. let's do this because, you know, this is what some powerful interest group wants. the arguments have all been on the merits. does this actually make sense in this context? so, again, as a citizen, it's been a heartening experience, truth be told. >> host: and, lynn stanton, final question from you. >> host: i'm drawing a blank, i'm sorry. >> host: all right, we will leave it there. lynn stanton the and stuart benjamin, thank you both for being on "the communicators." >> guest: thank you. >> host: thank you. >> "the communicators" also airs each monday night. if you missed any of this morns' program with fcc scholar in residence stuart benjamin, you can see it again tonight the at 8 eastern right here on c-span2.

>> in depth welcomes british historian paul johnson, author of over 40 books. his latest on winston churchill. join our three-hour conversation with your phone calls for paul johnson, live from london sunday at noon eastern on booktv's in depth on c-span2. >> and now joint chief of staff chair admiral mike mullen and a number of others discuss lessons for leadership and strategy. first, you'll hear a presentation about admiral arkansas arleigh burke. from the center for strategic and international studies, this

lasts about an hour, 30 minut. >> you know, people will frequently -- my name is john hammily, and people frequently say do you miss being at dod? i say, no, i don't miss being at dod except for one thing, i miss the ceremonies. because they are such a big part of reminding you what your life is about. and today is a chance for you to have a ceremony. now, it's actually a bigger day in many ways. admiral roughhead was just this morning up at fort meade where we commissioned the tenth fleet, so this is a historic day in many dimensions. and we're going to celebrate today a very great man who was a part of the history of the navy, made the navy so great, and also i hate to brag, but made scis --

csis great, and that was arleigh burke. now, this is the annual abshire lecture series, and david decided he would like to use this as an opportunity to talk about arleigh burke. before we get started, there are so many notable people here, i can't do justice. but jim watkins, it's great to have cno back, we're delighted to have you here. thank you for coming. yes. [applause] and i know that i haven't seen him yet, but i know that sean o'keefe, who was secretary of the navy, will be arriving, and dino is here some place. the undersecretary, and we're grateful to have dino. we're delighted to have you here

he wanted to come for that event because it's going to be a wonderful afternoon. david has asked and i'm just so happy that this is the case that pam shoal, a very dear friend, who was -- she came to csic many, many years ago, but it was a grade school work release program. [laughter] she's just going to give a little bit of a history of arleigh burke and can the abshire series. pam, why don't you come up and join me, please. [applause] >> thank you and good afternoon, distinguished guests. it is a pleasure to be back at my old stomping ground. i began my career here at csis. i'd like to give you a date, but you don't need to do the math. david abshire asked me to come here from chicago -- i'm sorry about the cold weather -- but he asked me to connect some of the

pieces and briefly explain how the abshire lecture came to be. and when your first boss, mentor and dear friend asks, you do it. like the great naval adage, loyalty up, loyalty down. in 1981 the center for strategic and international studies began to raise its first endowment funds by creating endowed chairs. it was logical to raise an endowment in honor of the co-founder, one of our military's greatest naval commanders in the pacific theater of world war ii. and then-president eisenhower's chief of naval operation, admiral arleigh burke. in september 1983 we celebrated a beautiful evening honoring admiral burke and his lovely wife, bobbi. i know many of you were there. howard k. smith, admiral thomas moore were among those who spoke about the admiral's he royic service. our team has spent countless hours at the navy yard working with officers on history and a

film to pay tribute. this afternoon we'll hear more about admiral burke's accomplishments, lessons we can learn about strategy and leadership. the story doesn't end here. many of us under the tutelage of the brilliant dr. abshire decided it was time to recognize his contributions to our country, a west point be grad, a korean war veteran, assistant secretary of state for congressional affairs and co-found ther of csis along with admiral burke and its leader for most of the 30 years until 1999 when dr. john hamre took the helm. the csis board at that time chairman was ann armstrong, another great patriot, first woman ambassador to the court of st. james and chairman of the president's foreign intelligence advisory board, helped us raise the funds for the abshire lecture. and we did something unheard of and surprised dave by announcing the creation of this lecture during one of the csis round

table meetings. the late beloved ambassador armstrong, bill taylor and many of you here today along with other csis staff and friends did this all behind dave's back. not surprising long after, senator sam nunn and, yes, dave, his side burns were quite long, nunn, gave the inaugural lecture in march of '83. since then lee hamilton, the duke of westminster among those who have given this esteemed lecture. perhaps admiral mullen can be persuaded to give a future one. i hope you have a better understanding of how these traditions began. having left washington to run our family foundation, i remain actively involved in two of washington's greatest institutions. csis, led by the exceptionally talented john hamre, and the center for the study of the presidency and congress where i serve on the board of trustees.

there david continues to have an idea a minute. sometimes our board meetings a trustee will say to dave, now, dave, don't you think we're doing a little too much? and i just smile to myself and chuck can l inside, and i thank good that some things -- god that some things will never change. we have some of the best and the brightest at csis and cspc to do just that. both organizations grasp the lessons of history to deal with to the today's challenges, all the time moving forward with fortitude and loyalty inspired by those who came before us. there's no better an example of this spirit than having dave share with us the lessons of admiral arleigh "31 knot" burke. [applause] >> pam, thank you. and while i was supposed to at this stage introduce david abshire, anything i might say would be a diminishment of what you just said. so let's ask david abshire to

join us on the stage. thank you. [applause] >> first, i want to acknowledge the army/navy club for lending us -- i wish we owned it -- this magnificent bust of admiral arleigh burke. it's just tremendous. you know, it's a deep honor for me to talk about someone with truly so many great qualities and try to figure 'em out. i dealt with arleigh ten years here, and it was never until i went back into this journey that i began to recognize his true greatness and extraordinary personality, the near misses, the nine lives he had. it is simply extraordinary.

what made him a unique leader, what made him a successful dissenter, how did a burke once placed under house arrest during the so-called revolt of the admirals and later stricken from the promotion list then get promoted to the highest position in the navy? and reappointed two times? how did burke get away challenging president truman on the entire strategy of the korean war? how did burke get away with telling president eisenhower that he should scrap, not scrap the draft? what made this personality tick? why was he not called out, sent back to his father's farm in colorado, then promoted over 92 senior officers to become the

chief of naval operations? figure it out. i've tried to. arleigh's story is as much more than about dissent, survival, promotion. his story provides lessons, lessons about leadership, about strategy, about tactics, innovative research that are as important to us today as they were in burke's time. burke shared a name with the so-called father of conservatism, the famous british parliamentarian. that burke abhorred the french revolution. indeed, arleigh shared more than a name. both burkes abhorred fixed mind sets and ideology.

both knew the importance of human factors in leadership and in governance. above all, our 20th century burke embodied the 18th centuries burke's concern can about a grounded, realistic outlook that still recognized the need to adapt. to changing circumstance. now, in preparing this lecture, i've been ably assisted by alex. what is alec? and he did graduate work under the famed military historian professor russell widely. while there are many books about burke, i also enormously benefited by my friend, professor potters. remarkable, he was at the naval academy for so many years. potter drew his own analysis of burke from many interviews where

burke himself allies himself to potter. most men of action don't have that capacity to sort of conflict with decision making. he possessed both, and, of course, my dear friend evan thomas and his magnificent writings beginning with john paul jones and the wise men and now about the pacific is an inspiration, and we're so glad you chair the meeting. our story will open with a slug fest between the united states and the japanese navies over quad l canal -- gad l canal. we find ourselves in the southwestern pacific, and many of these battles the japanese gave as good as they got. the new tactics had to be

developed to defeat the powerful japanese navy. commander arleigh burke suddenly came to national fame during the service of battles with his destroyer squadron named the little beavers. he loved the little beavers. he always loved the sailors that served under him, that's why the lone star sailor down on pennsylvania avenue symbolizes that love that he had for sailors. burke was an aggressive combat leader. his standing orders were to attack on enemy contact without orders from the task force commander. and the battle of empress augusta bay and cape st. george, he emulated among all people his strategy to defeat hand ball in the -- hannibal in the second pubic war.

here's how he described it himself. the plan was based on hitting the enemy with one sudden surprise after another. this was accomplished by putting two destroyer divisions in parallel columns. one division would slip in close under the cover of darkness, launch torpedoes and dart back. when the torpedoes hit, the enemy started shooting to the retiring first division, the second half of the team would suddenly open up from another direction. when the rattled enemy turn thed around, the first division would slam back into it. that produced a startling victory. following the battles around the solomon island, the japanese no longer held the initiative. the u.s. navy, therefore, free to launch an island-hopping campaign through the central pacific that led to the heart of the japanese empire.

in preparation for this offensive, admiral ernest king determined that all surface fleet commanders needed to have aviators, chiefs of staff or vice versa. this order helped to diffuse the growing rift between the surface and naval aviators. the command structure also resulted in admiral burke being sent as chief of staff to the prestigious mark minister, a pioneer in naval aviation. initially, burke refused. i will not go, i will stay with the little beavers, he stubbornly said. [inaudible] [laughter] he did not want to leave. reciprocated, he didn't want burke. in the first disagreeable

meeting, mitcher in said sarcastically, welcome aboard, take a shower and get some sleep, then come back up here after you sleep it off. infuriated, burke finally went back down, got clean clothes, came back up, reporting for duty, sir! well, you're on the job, they growled at each other. that's the way it was for two weeks. then it began to break, and this relationship of great affection when mitch was finally approaching his death. but the two were different, as you will see. by june 1944, the united states invaded the mare yang that islands. these islands were critical to japanese strategy because from there american b be 29 bombers could begin to exchange a bombing campaign against japan

itself. thus, the japanese navy through everything into destroying the u.s. invasion fleet in the famous battle of the philippines sea. even though the u.s. scored a victory shooting down over 300 -- 300 escaped. it had been badly hurt by one aggressive carrier air strike at the one time when it was within range, the fleet was not sunk. japanese planed in the so-called turkey shoot, burke was far from satisfied. the bull of the jalapeno -- bulk of the japanese fleet escaped, burke believed because the overall commander wasn't aggressive enough in pursuing the japanese fleet.

he had opted to play it safe to protect the invasion fleet. one of burke's tasks was to write an after-action report for the battle. burke's draft was blunt in criticizing the admiral. mitchner asked that burke tone it down. don't you think you should go back and rewrite those last two pages, arleigh, he suggested? no, sir, burke replied, but i will. [laughter] he know that mitchner loved to sleep, went up and didn't read his reports. so burke concluded, the enemy escaped, he was badly hurt but by one aggressive air strike, at one time when he was in range the fleet was not sunk when it could have been.

the pacific war story now moves to the largest naval battle ever if naval history which is so brilliantly described by evan thomas. in a sea of thund ther, i wish i could write that way, but when he gets into the minds of the opposing commanders with this enormous research he did, mr. ambassador, some in japan and some here. i don't know how he does all this and does what he does as "newsweek," he's a genius. by october 1944 the united states prepared to strike at lay today the island. it would fulfill general mcarthur's promise to return to the philippines. again, the u.s. fleet was tasked with insuring the success of this invasion. once again, the japanese threw everything they had at the

americans. the japanese divided their fleet into three task forces. one was composed of what remained the japanese once vaulted aircraft carriers. as the japanese no longer had enough trained pilots to compete with the americans, this decoy fleet would try to lure the powerful u.s. fast attack carrier fleet away from the leyte. this ploy, this separate judgement would allow the forces to -- it was a brilliant strategy. again, burke and mitscher disagreed with a vaulted fleet commander, bill halsey. you know, halsey and mcarthur were both brilliant, and both got so tied up with their ego, then they could make terrible mistakes. that never happened to burke.

by now halsey was a folk hero, in all of the papers. like mcarthur, nobody dared challenge him. burke and mitscher thought halsey would make a serious brunlder if -- blunder if he left unsecured the invasion fleet off leyte in order to chase what turned out to be a japanese decan coy fleet. burke argued that halsey had a chance to defeat the japanese decoy fleet and still turn south in time to deal with the japanese second task force. admiral's fleet at leyte if he played it smart. he didn't. the third smaller japanese fleet had already been destroyed. halsey neglected the tactical importance of the japanese carrier force and focused on the northern fleet as the biggest threat. he was suckered.

burke begged mitscher to relay these doubts to halsey, but be mitscher grumped, i think you're right, arleigh, but i don't know you're right. i don't think we ought to the bother -- ought to bother halsey, he's busy enough. he's got a lot of things on his mind. burke was despondent. during the night a report reached the u.s. fleet that the japanese center force was heading for leyte gulf through the unprotected straits vacated by halsey. the brilliant move was taking place. again, burke went to mitscher to force the issue by contacting halsey personally to change course can. mitscher said to burke, does admiral halsey have that report, arleigh? burke replied, yes, sir. then if he wants my advise,

he'll ask for it, mitscher replied as he went back to sleep. burke didn't sleep. stymied by his late itself attempt to get mitscher to challenge halsey, burke played one last card. technically, mitscher still had the operation and control of the tactical formations of the fleet, and he was asleep. he turned it over to burke be, so burke on his own orders increased the speed of the fleet. he hoped to engage the japanese in night battle and then sail back south in plenty of time to deal with korea. but halsey slowed his fleet. the next day while halsey's ships took care of the japanese decoy fleet, admiral's surface fleet was causing havoc around leyte.

finally halsey realized burke had been right, but then was too far away to influence the rest of the battle. luckily, the tenacious but almost suicidal defense of the invasion fleet escort carriers forced cree that to withdraw before he could attack the transport bees, save the invasion. burke felt that halsey had made a critical error and that the u.s. had averted disaster only because of the miraculous defense of the outnumbered s court carriers and destroyers. if halsey or mitscher had listened to burke, what if they had? they would have had the opportunity to completely annihilate the japanese fleet, bring the war to conclusion earlier. this is one of the many might have beens of burke. after leyte, burke and mitscher

continued to work together in subsequent battles around iwo jima and through the kamikaze onslaughts against okinawa. they were together with great affection until the end of the war, however different they were because burke could work with people different than him. our story now takes us, now that we got through that -- i need a sip of coca-cola to get me through the next scene. [laughter] our story now takes us to the period immediately after the war. 1949, captain burke -- by the way, when he was about to be promoted to rear admiral, he protested that at the end of the war. he said, you know, i won't be able to keep it, it's just not good. he had this habit of fighting promotions.

that's strange, i never had that when i was in the military. [laughter] i wanted to get 'em. captain burke was made head of the organization of research and policy division, op 23. there burke developed the first long-range navy plan or vision. this led him to become involved in what became known as the revolt of the admirals. and did he get into trouble. as you recall during this time of bitter competition, we did not invite any air force generals to this meeting. [laughter] a little competition between the different branches of the armed services regarding which service would take primary role in national defense. the so-called revolt was a controversy over the powers of the secretary of defense. many senior officers were

unhappy with the new austerity measures of secretary defense louis johnson. we were in a great period of disarmament. they publicly attacked the new service unification under the department of defense. sound familiar? it was also an attack on reliance on air atomic power as the country's first line of defense dwarfing the other two services. .. in the press and then characterized his

anti-unification as secretary of defense. in retaliation, and defense >> and since secretary lewis johnson and navy secretary francis matthews removed burke from promotion to rear admiral. this was it for burke. his career was over. he and petit petite bobbi got o old plymouth and figured out where they were going and were packing up. the solomon islands were packed out. meanwhile, back at the white house, a captain dennison, later an admiral, handed harry truman the list of promotions to rear admiral.

and god bless him, he spoke up and saved admiral burke. he said, sir, there's one missing. i think an injustice has been done. the colonel said, what's that? he says it's captain burke, arli burke. truman said, didn't i meet him down in norfolk? yes, sir, that's the one. oh, he's good. yes, sir. well, we'll just write his name back in on the promotion list. oh, secretary of defense and secretary of the navy were shocked. rear admiral arlie burke was saved for this country. now, the irony and the revolt of

the rear admirals that there was so many turn-abouts they had to give him a place to sort of cool down. in an uncontroversial position would be defense research and development board. ironically, this position was another step, opening to a new vista to admiral burke in introducing him and enthralling him with technological and strategic solutions to naval and defense issues. through creative breakthroughs. thinking smarter. we need that today. the seeds were sown for burke's monumental polaris breakthrough. we now move back to the outbreak of the korean war in june, 1950. the drama doesn't stop.

staff to commander naval forces far east and then his commander cruiser division 5. after macarthur's truly brilliant indo-china, which sent the northern koreans back to the north, burke flatly disagreed with macarthur's strategy to pursue the north koreans to the river ignoring reports of chinese intervention. and as was his custom, he spoke up and challenged. burke argued that macarthur should establish a line between one side from pyongyang and from that line, the u.s. army could continue to mop up north korean armies and if the chinese did intervene, they would be in an ideal position to deal with it. but avoid provoking.

burke knew to be aggressive and be careful. if burke's advice had been followed, the chinese would not have intervened. the line today would be the border between north and south korea. and two-thirds of korea would be free. another burke what-if. 1951 to burke's surprise he was made a member of the united nations truce delegation. the purpose was to negotiate with the communist armorists in north korea. as those tedious negotiations proceeded, burke became angered and frustrated by the fact that the american soldiers continued

to die while we wrangled over a few hills -- later i had to go fight for those hills. and people died and we weren't accomplishing anything. and he felt that the strategy was unsatisfactory. he learned a lot about the communists in those negotiations. particularly if he had to take a rest stop in the next room, come back and then take a new position on the line and the new negotiating position. but something else happened during this period. very remarkable, mr. ambassador. arlie burke lived in japan. he came to live the japanese. that japanese that came in and put flowers in his room. and when he left every night, he thanked the management. and they said she's done this on her own.

he got to know your admirals. and he became a powerful influence on the development of the early japanese maritime defense force. and when we set up csis and when i came back from the state department he said i've been attended these conferences in japan. this was in 1970, you got to open major efforts with japan. and it's for that reason we got together in these major congressional exchanges. later got to know dr. toyota. and the man who headed the leadership academy here and tied this center with your great country. after six months, burke returned to the united states. and he became director of -- let me say i wear my decoration from

your emperor really -- i think it came from what csis has done for japan today in your honor. after six months, burke returned to the united states. and became director of strategic planning division. now, after assuming this position, he boldly asked to see the president. you know, he's a rear admiral. [laughter] >> that didn't make a damn to him. well, all right. they granted him 15 minutes. he went on two hours. burke forcefully laid out his observations about the communists and why this war -- the whole strategy was wrong and later, you know, eisenhower moved to what burke wanted. but he was banging his hands on the table on this president who saved him.

i mean, he's just an amazing personality and truman listened. with his record of dissent, burke figured they had him tagged. he was shocked when president dwight eisenhower announced that he was going to be chief of naval operations in 1955. he objected. this was not a good idea at all. there were 92 active flag duty officers senior to him. it was going to cause bad feelings and make his job impossible. furthermore, he had -- did they think he was a patsy, yeah?

he had a bad habit of speaking his mind. did they know that? he was not going to change. objections overruled in 1955. my gosh, how did he do it? [laughter] >> the hard way. with the added press attention and with this war exploits written up again, you know, on the time -- many times, "time" magazine covered burke more than ever. he was a true national celebrity and he ruled. he was the 15th cno, burke immediately set about to inculcate individual initiative and responsibility throughout ranks. take the initiative and come up with me ideas. -- about new ideas. burke said he could not command anything in washington. he could only influence.

he could only inspire. he could only set an example and offer strong vision for national strategy and for the future sea power as the admiral much had at the naval war college. shortly after become cno book was at it again with the president. the very president that had done this for him. this time it was over the issue of eliminating the peacetime draft. burke believed that such a move would hinder u.s. ability to fulfill its defense obligations at that time. especially those of the navy. he disagreed with the secretary of the navy on this. he did -- he disagreed with the secretary of defense on this and then he demanded to see the president.

we're back at it once again. in those days it was a privilege of the cno. that's one reason we're so on this reunionification, mike? and in front of president eisenhower, the secretaries of navy and defense sitting there angry burke goes on laying out the reason for his position. and ike is getting redder and redder in the face. and finally after some time ike slams his fists on the table and he says, we're going to keep the draft. meeting over. burke, you stay back. burke had won but he got a bawling out. he said don't you ever create a

situation where with your two superiors in front of them i overrule them and disgrace them. never again, burke. yes, sir. the draft remained. well, burke figured he'd won that but he figured he was through with ike. and he began to get these invitations. come over to the white house for a drink. come over and let's have another little discussion. they developed this fast friendship. ike was dying at gettysburg when burke was here at the center. one of the last people he sent for to talk to. now, we mentioned earlier how burke treasured the value of science, the cutting edge, the

narrow edge in victory like we know at wake. that comes from those breakthroughs which are so -- so key. and his greatest achievement as chief of naval operations was the development of the polaris. burke felt that such a nuclear arm missile design to be fired from submarines would give the u.s. strategic flexibility in the cold war. burke contrasted this flexibility without -- of the air force dependence on bombers operating from fixed positions. sfr. furthermore he argued that it's on fixed launching strikes. he figured out the initial submarines could move anywhere around the globe with the with agility and from not one designated position. the polaris maneuverability

could also replace -- this really burned up the air force on the bombers on fixed sites. needless to say, burke's alternate strategy sometimes called finite control retaliation certainly greater agility was a devastatingly direct attack on the air force bomber in massive missile doctrine. this is one fight burke didn't win on the polaris but not on the larger strategy. just as he had not one the argument on the alternate pyongyang line in north korea. and increasing numbers, strategic bombers once escalation superiority was lost we had massive destruction which could have learned when nato

when we played these games each year a terrible miscalculation where we were using nuclear strikes for political signaling not thinking they might do a nuclear strike on boston as a political signal. henry kissinger challenged that at a conference we ran and csis in 1979, fred e. clay challenged it as undersecretary of defense. ronald reagan, jim watkins, admiral watkins was in the room when ronald reagan moved seeking strategic defense initiative as a flanking maneuver as a way out. burke had something going for him in adding an agility, which we lost. by the end of the secretary term as cno, burke stated it was obviously time for him to

retire. ike would have none of it. it was his third term, however, and burke had -- his deep disappointment with himself and his own leadership. he opened up to me here at csis he was a failure at the bay of pigs. he felt he had let himself down. he felt he had not performed the way he had performed previously. he went over this privately with me again and again. he would never write it up 'cause he said he didn't want to hurt anybody now that it was over. he served as acting chairman of the joint chiefs during this period. he would be invited into these meetings, allowed to take no notes. and there would be incremental change. and no capability to analyze whether this was a workable operation or not. burke regret that he did not go to president kennedy and pillow

the whistle. -- blow the whistle. this is not going to work with all these compromises. when he did speak up it was during that famous night in the oval office when the bay of pigs operation fell apart. he told president kennedy that he had a destroyer off the coast of cuba ready to fire. which kennedy replied, burke, we don't want to get involved. to which burke responded, hell, mr. president, we are involved. well, anyway, he was not allowed to fire. and he never wanted to talk about that after that except privately. a revered admiral burke finally retired in 1961. in his biography of burke, professor potter describes in

1962 how he first attempted to persuade arlie to join me as a strategic group as part of the georgetown university. i told burke it might be called the center for strategic studies. i received my doctorate from georgetown. i got the blessing from father edward bunn who thought i was a catholic but i was episcopalian. i could cross myself. [laughter] >> i came to know admiral burke when my stepfather and george w. anderson who replaced burke as cno -- burke turned me down the first two times. that didn't bother me. i had the experience of dating a navy junior who loved those white mitts and not those west

point with those gold buttons. there were four members of her family and john knows all this in naval aviation. so my wife turned me down the first two times. i got her on the third time. [laughter] >> i figured i'd get burke on the third time. and potter says, abshire hooked burke on the last go-around. i hooked burke on focusing on the need to foster a coherent national strategy. a challenge we face today. previously i had worked as staff director on capitol hill. i explained to burke my frustration with a committee compartmentalization there. i knew the admiral's frustration with compartmentalization in the executive branch. we both agreed that such mutual compartmentalization at both

ends of pennsylvania avenue was the enemy of strategic coherence. the enemy of the best use of our resources. burke said when i finally hooked him, if we can tackle that issue in this new center, it will be truly strategic. count me in. my working arrangement with burke was this. we would meet at 8:00 sharp every morning. he had a notebook -- a schoolboy with all of his boards. he was on four important corporate boards and boy scouts that he was leading. give me his view and other organizations. what worked and what didn't work. carry over to ours. i would give him a rundown of the fundraising, stay out unless he thought it was off-course. our first meeting he said to me, something is very telling about him.

i knew you would like this story because you like admiral burke. you call me arleigh but i want everybody else to call me mr. burke. i said, admiral, nobody is going to call you mr. burke. why do you want to be called mr. burke? and he said well, i'll tell you. there are a lot of big shots getting out of government or else they think they're big shots getting out of government. they think the world is going to come to them. that's wrong. they got to remake themselves. and i got to remake myself. and i'm mr. burke. he was mr. burke. but that told you something about his personality. our first conference in the hall of nations at georgetown had his imprint. councils of foreign relations -- i meant to bring that big book, 1,000 pages, a lap buster they called it. but it was a strategic awakening.

the title of the conference national security political, military and economic strategies in the decade ahead. burke said you got to look 10 years ahead. nobody is doing that. we've got to have that in our strategy. and i think admiral mullen would agree when we locked into now we made progress with three departments in quadrennial reviews. they're looking four years ahead and each one is compartmentalized. furthermore, burke insisted in this conference that we bring together national security and national economics. sound familiar? burke quoted eisenhower, who often said that those dealing with the daily near term operational requirements could not look over and across the strategic horizon.

of the 30 odd scholars at the conference, he included some well-known older names like herman kahn and younger things like henry kissinger and others. burke insisted we put together the points of differences to find the issues. he said so often the problem is people jump to the problem and they're not looking at the issues from all angles. and that's what it is to be truly strategic. later i worked with arleigh burke on the lectures at princetons. -- princeton. he said so many presidents, general, admiral, ambassadors don't understand. he said that if you -- if you have mobilizing perfect power as was talked about, the perfect

battle, you didn't have to fight. you gained the will in your direction. without it through power. not with force. force always hurts your potential. csis grew throughout the 1960s as the vietnam conflict crew. incrementally we committed half a million men with body counts, incrementalism, light at the end of the tunnel. the national -- burke was beside himself with this strategy. national security advisor came over and we had the young presidents who's here. and he said, victory is just over the horizon. we're back to breakthrough. we had an after-action on tet. there was three-star general back from vietnam that came to

that. and he assured admiral burke that we actually won in south vietnam because the vietcong infrastructure had been destroyed. and burke said, general, it's not aimed at south vietnam. he's aimed at the battle of washington. and he's won it. the president's decided not to run again as commander in chief. burke knew that maximum napoleon, that the 3 to 1 the psychological and the human factors, napoleon thought they were more important than his armies. i was pulled in as secretary of state for congressional relations in 1970. he didn't like that. gave me an ultimatum to get back. and in the ultimatum he wrote -- he says i'm retiring in another year.

we got to make things really interesting again. that word "interesting" is the key to burke's personality. whenever he disagreed with his superiors or his presence, his arguments were interesting. and captured his opponent into what he was saying. he attracted them to what he was saying. he made them think anew. this became his unusual quality of persuasion, which ultimately became a key to great leadership. burke was a magnet. arleigh a. burke's funeral took place in a packed annapolis chapel on a very chilly day in 1996.

he nearly lived to 95. prior to his death i would visit him for a decade or more. at his retirement home. he lost his chronology. never his wit. as we sat in that packed chapel, you several would have been there, there was one place on the aisle next to the national security advisor. i don't think that would be bill clinton -- president clinton because when csis was founded, we got in the vietnam war. there were people at georgetown. i don't know that he marched. rotc marching against even csis even though we moved downtown. about that time the president of

the united states comes down the aisle. gets up to deliver the eulogy. he was right. magnificently with admiral burke. don, you were there. with admiral burke fighting the battle of solomon islands right along with him. what a great tribute from the commander in chief. our story ends here except that he's the godfather of this institution that john hamre splendidly leads. csis our counselor here, one of csis was d when we honored ig the first institution in washington that sought to be truly strategic.

arleigh burke was truly strategic. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you. >> i would ask our -- i would say our panel -- it just doesn't seem right to call this distinguished group a panel. every one of them is such a singular leader in america. and we're so proud to have them here. you all got copies of their resumes. so i'm not going to go through introducing anybody by personal background. because i think that would be a diminishment again of this afternoon. but let me just take the opportunity to say a sincere -- please, everybody sit down.

and a sincere thank you to admiral mullen, to admiral roughead, to admiral rondeau. and, of course, to the secretary of the navy, john warner, counselor here for being here. evan thomas has captured the spirit of these times in probably the most gripping of ways. we've asked him to take the lead. evan, can i turn it over to you. >> you bet. david's wonderful speech begs the question -- shouts the question, when do leaders, particularly military leaders in a civilian-controlled system, disagree, dissent, challenge higher authority? i want to ask that of each of the group. but first let me start with you, admiral mullen. could arleigh burke have survived today? [laughter]

>> i guess in the way david captures him so well, i would say he would have figured the way to do it. given those that he routinely challenged and the description i think of the word "interesting" and how he would draw individuals in -- even as they got mad and even at that level and clearly want to hear from him again. so i suspect he could. and that he would have figured out a way to adjust to the circumstances that exists today and very much so. >> but can you -- can you address the larger question of when particularly a military officer in a civilian-controlled system -- when and how and under what circumstances -- what are the rules of the road on challenging higher authority and dissent? >> well, i think -- actually i think not unlike what -- what

admiral burke did in the sense that in discussions that would be routine with your boss, your civilian boss, and then those that you could -- when you -- when you disagree and feel strongly about it, even as we can now right up to the president -- and it's not just me even though i have routinely more access to the president than the other chiefs. but certainly they have -- they have the option. that it's done privately. and it's done in a way that i think in a timely fashion, if you will. and that you have a president -- you know, the other examples i think that are there tied to what david is talking about is you had senior individuals who wanted to listen. president,wv]4ujájju officers, n if they maddend them they also were willing to listen and

that's important for anyone in the military and civilian and have that opportunity and give that advice and as was the case in a couple examples he didn't win them all. and i'm sure he marched off and did whatever -- you know, whatever the senior civilian leadership said and that's what we do now. and so that both opportunity -- certainly i have it. i had it with president bush. i have it with president obama. and i think it's a very important part of our system. and an opportunity to do that and when the president makes a decision, we're on. >> admiral roughead, what's the line when you don't go any further. how do you know when you're supposed to salute and keep going? what's that moment? [laughter] >> no. i really think that as you have thought the problem through, as you have tried as david mentioned of arleigh burke have

made the arguments interesting, that you have explored those areas and have had a thorough investigate of your position. and in the society and in the system in which we work, when the civilian authority makes a decision, that's it. i think you could go in superficially. you have to have thought the problem through yourself. but when a decision is made, that's it. if at some point it is contrary to your sense of honor or your ethics, then at that time you have other options. >> at one point -- at least one point admiral burke basically went over the heads of others in the military to make a point of the civilian authority as eisenhower took him to the side and said don't do that again. that -- can you imagine a

circumstance in which you're a senior military officer. military officers more senior to you have basically gone along with the president and you say, well, no. under what circumstances might you do that? you talked about honor and ethics but can you be a little bit more specific about a moment in which you think your senior military officers have just got it wrong or aren't challenging? >> not to -- to dodge -- i mean, i think it has to be driven by the circumstances that you're in. the issue that you're dealing with. and the receptivity of your arguments as you put them forth and you as an individual have to make that decision. and i do not believe that anything fits a mold because of the facets of the complex nature of what we're doing with. >> let me ask you one more question -- what do you tell your subordinates about this?

do you discuss this together when you're with senior admirals and talk about the limits of dissent? are these conversations that happen at the highest level? what do you say to that? >> i think it's very, very clear that the -- that the expectations of civilian control of military is unquestioned. i think everyone that is subordinate to me understands the strength of my convictions in that regard. i do believe it is important as a senior that you foster the opportunities for your subordinates to feel comfortable and free and having the open discussions. as opposed to having been held in check and then trying to release everything at the final moment. and i think that in the ability to have that organization comfortable coming forward, that there is an expectation. that opinions can be offered. positions can be taken.

and i think that is for the best of the institution. >> admiral rondeau, you are actually a teacher by -- admiral rondeau is a teacher. what do you teach about this whole obligation of duty or limitation on speaking truth to power so to speak? >> let's bring burke as our example to the answer to the question. burke absolutely was able to constantly refrain the problem. -- reframe around the problem. and to reframe the problem with an intellectual disposition that you have or you learn and what we learn at ndu and what any entity seeks to do is to help us reframe out from where we have

been to something more than we should be thinking about. and so what burke was able to do and what we seek to do in the spirit of burke is constantly seek to refrain mine sets about the issues that are in front of us. where burke was able to do was be comfortable to think 8 to 20 years out. it's about setting a mindset and the mindfulness about what you are in and the environment that you're in. if i might say, though, in echoing also to chairman encino, the admiral knew what he had. and so the respecting of the mind and of the leaders who are subordinate to you is also part of this. so burke was allowed to be burke. and one of the key things that we seek to teach is to be

respectful of the intellect of those who are junior to you because they may indeed have an insight or a reframing that you don't have. and so every good leader would seek that. we seek to refrain and to teach the ability to be comfortable in a different environment. >> senator, you've been watching this balance for a long time and whether you think the modern military has the balance right on its willingness to challenge the authority or even to challenge even in the military their own superiors? what's your sense of how that balance is? >> let's go back 40 years when i was at the pentagon. we used to get in the room with the chiefs. and larry would always start -- let's take off the stars and bars.

let's just have at it and listen to one another opinion. that's the same way i was privileged -- i say with a deep sense of humility to be secretary of the navy. i always asked everybody for their view. but i would like to return to your first question. but first you, david abshire, well done. as we say in the navy, atta boy. but you know as long as i've known you, you've made one mistake in life. rather than west point you should have gone to annapolis. [laughter] >> i want to go back to these many years. i'd gone to the sixth fleet in the mediterranean. and i met burke. burke had a protocol -- he would -- when you joined the navy secretary, there would come a time he would send a little note. now is the time i would like to meet you and you would go to his

home and meet his lovely wife and that's where i first got to meet him. so i did a little research. my aide at that time, a wonderful man, was tom hayward who later became chief of naval operations. but this one incident might have cost him that. i found that the ship that burke had -- his squadron was part of a more active fleet. and there was a boy who transferred the cruiser over to the ship and it's a custom that i always went down to the engine. and i was just with the senior chief down there. there was no chief petty officer boilerman down there operating the steam plant. i said do you think you could drive this at 31 knots like burke and he looked at me and he looked at others and he said you betcha you know what. i said crank it up.

[laughter] >> and he looked at me. and he said, i usually take my orders from the captain. but you're the secretary, civilian authority controls. [laughter] >> this is a true story. and for those of us who have been aboard a ship, it's an exhilaration when that steam plant goes full thrust of its cruise. and that rotating power train the ship trembles so i thought i better get up to the bridge because i thought there would be a little consternation and i got up to the bridge and i had this program that i knew where burke was. and i called him from the bridge. the captain of the ship is there and hayward was standing up there. i thought he would be exhilarated. i said admiral she's right at 40 knots right now. and ladies and gentlemen i

cannot tell you the response but it was a verbal heel-hauling. [laughter] >> i mean, he dressed me down. i turned to the captain. and the admiral said bring him back. and in later years we met. we had a warm relationship and i'm deeply humbled to join this panel and all of us here today. he's truly someone who's idolized to this date for anyone who's fortunate to be in the navy. >> let me ask you a history question. when you talk to your colleagues about these difficult issues about dealing with civilian authority and how far you can go, do you talk about history? do you talk about admiral burke? do you talk about how it was done in passed wars? are you informed by history? >> i think i'm formed by history. probably for me more recently than those times.

when i actually was -- much to my surprise selected to be the cno, i did some research then. on admiral burke. and i was actually stunned that in just that period of time, his time at cno, which i recall was six years was longest-serving and what he was able to accomplish. it was one of those things that i looked at that and i was wondering how i was going to even come close to matching up to anything like that. to be able to accomplish so much in that period of time. and i used that -- i use it from that standpoint. from the civilian control piece, i guess i'm much more driven and informed by current times. and by current times i'd say the last 20 years or so. and, you know, my goal as a leader is to be strictly apolitical. strictly neutral.

and, in fact, at the state of the union earlier this week, i had, you know, many -- many comments since that about, you know, the chiefs, when we stand up, when we don't stand up and the aftermath of the president's speech. but the goal there really literally is to certainly respond in a way that is supportive of those national security and military issues. but other than stay completely neutral in that. and so amongst my colleagues and actually with my juniors, i do talk a lot about the need to stay -- be completely apolitical. and where that has -- where that is different from burke's time, i think, is in the situation where there is this seeking of news. the vast exposure to media. certainly the media is, you

know, always looking for the kinds of differentials to in many cases sharpen issues, but where i think it has gotten out of bounds is, quite frankly, is when we take the uniform off. and there's tension between those who have worn the uniform their whole life. and then they -- they take it off and there's tension between free speech, which is nothing that i would certainly ever take on. but i think in ways it can be very difficult to understand and i frame a lot of this from -- in terms of the farmer in peoria who's really talking on the news cycle. or who's writing because generally speaking they're still called admiral or general on the one hand. and on the other hand we're training in that regard many of our young officers in particular but not exclusively that it's

okay to speak up. and it's okay to disagree publicly and constantly. and i worry a great deal about that in terms of the apolitical position that the military is in. and so -- and actually one of the things i've asked admiral rondeau to do is address this issue. actually all the -- in all the war colleges to our young ones because i think we do need to make sure we have it right. and -- >> because you're both encouraging them to speak up but at the same time say watch it. >> they have to do it correctly. and the treasure here is the apolitical military. and it is in my view what we have to, i think, ensure we guard and retain at all costs in this democracy. and it goes back to who we are, who we work for. very clear civilian control. and when -- and when as i think admiral roughead said and when

we disagree and when it get to the point of ethics or morals or when we're working for somebody and they don't have confidence in us, then our only choice isn't to speak up. it, quite frankly, is to move on. >> let me ask you more specifically and you've been asked about this before but the most recent example of this when it got in the news was general mcchrystal's statements. how do you think he handled that? >> well, i don't want -- [laughter] >> how do you think he handled it? [laughter] >> actually pretty well. >> it was, you know, a very difficult position. obviously very early in his tour in what was certainly if not then but rapidly becoming the most visible four star position in the united states military. and it was one that was made much more challenging because it was -- it was public.

and actually one of the things -- and this is part of us growing as an institution, growing as an individual. and general mcchrystal and i talked a long time about moving into the four star realm. it's different. and he was going to do it on the world stage. and that's a real challenge. and all in all i thought he did handle it well. it was a very difficult -- it made the challenge of the review that much more difficult and certainly i would have preferred to not do it as publicly as we did and we all learned a lot in that regard and certainly i would hope, you know, in further strategic reviews we can avoid that particular model. [laughter]5jy >> admiral, let me ask you a question about the navy. by tradition captain of a ship has tremendous authority. the old days, complete authority because there was no communication.

but even today where you can talk, there's a tradition of a captain of the ship has the tradition of authority but when he gets on land he's not admiral -- like nelson putting his spy glass up saying i really can't answer the signal. how do you balance this tradition of authority and command authority on a ship with deference to civilian authority. what do you tell your captain? >> one of my favorite burke quotes and i identify with it a great deal is -- you do have the autonomy in the ship and as he pointed out going to sea used to be fun and then they gave us radios. [laughter] >> and i think that even translates up in our current connectivity that we enjoy. but i think for me and one of the great things about our navy and something that i place tremendous value upon with all who serve and wear this uniform

and burke articulated this himself. and that the navy is a culture of command. it is not a culture of staff. and that simple concept makes us who we are. the willingness to step forward when something needs to be done. the willingness to accept accountability, which is oftentimes judged to be a bit extreme in the navy. but that is what our culture is. and i find that that culture of command translates ashore as well. because it is about the willingness to take on the hard things. the willingness to lead. and most importantly, when things are good or bad, you accept the accountability. and so i do not see a distinction. i see it as a great strength of disservice.

and i'm extraordinarily proud of the men and women who live that culture. >> senator, let me go back and ask you this question again 'cause you've -- you're in a position of having observed this for a long time. from the perspective you were dealing with it from the military. do you think there's any evolution here for better or worse on military willingness to stand up to civilian authority, either good or bad in that direction? or is it a fairly even progression? >> i found that particularly the individuals in the military that gets the flag right and then they have a general rank in the army. they know at that time to accept a special responsibility and to be very candid. throughout my career in 30 years in the senate, i had with the senate arms committee regular contact with the senior leaders.

and i often left the aides in the ante and none of my own staff and just exchange views. i found it very productive. i'm sure i had it with you and i had it with you in my office on that basis.wój i remember when you came up to cno, i asked you when i was navy secretary did we ever meet? and you rather defiantly said no. you said you added this -- you said i was a lieutenant jg. i was on the gun line. this is during the vietnam war. he said i did everything i could. i never wanted to get there. well, what goes around comes around. you own it now. but, evan, i got to tell you the american citizen should be grateful for the young men and women who all volunteer now and come up into these ranks and work their way up and give their lives and their career to the other families. and when they get there, it's always been my experience --

whether it's been in the senate or five years i was the navy secretary, they -- >> admiral rondeau, let me ask you really the same question. do you see any evolution here of the military getting more or less willing to stand up or to challenge -- again or better or worse civilian authority? is there any trend? >> i think that the question is framed interestingly because it's at the -- it's at the edge. i think that young people or older people -- i think what determines the leader who can do this responsibly is the one who's intellectually curious and one who is able to ask questions of him or herself and of the environment. so this is not at some edge of the first act. you go about your professional life. and you ask questions. you try to understand. you try to analyze. and at some point you come to

a -- to an aggregation point where you would say, this does not make sense. or this is a better way. and you come to that an analytical, mature and professional matter. then by the time you also have understood where you are on point. then you go through the chain and you bring it up to your leadership. and usually the leaders are going to let you air that because you thought it through and you've done a very good job at that. so our job is when we're educators is to try to help the individual officer or sailor or airmen, soldier, marine to get there. so that they can come to an analytical understanding of what's going on. once you do that, your boss, your leader is going to be grateful. and for the most part they're going to let you -- they will help you carry their argument. they may help you shape it

better so that it will be successfully argued. so in my mind, this is not -- not about the edge point of when you must take on somebody at some point of adversary. it's about being compelling and good and competent and coherent so that everybody else is then compelled. this was burke's gift. and this is the gift of good leaders is to be able to do that and know where you are intellectually. so the intellectual curiosity of a young person today is to understand. the access to information is without precedence. our job as leaders is to help them get there so they feel as though they're being heard. so that we are listening. this is about a conversation. and not just about being at the edge of being the adversary. if that is happening and it happens every day, then you have a really healthy military and a healthy environment. >> i had a point. >> you bet.

>> these fine officers are managers. but bottom line they are all commanders. and foremost in their minds at all times is the fact that they're responsible for the life and the lymph -- limb of those in the ranks. that's a special burden that none of us private life, politics or business or whatever -- we don't have that on our conscience. that's why i always feel they give it their best. >> amen to that. let's take a question from the audience. david, do we have time for a couple of questions from the audience? all right. anybody want to ask a question. there's mics there. just stand up to it. now is the time. yes, ma'am.

>> i have a question for admiral roughead. this experience in haiti with the military going in and offering relief, have there been any lessons that we have learned from it, from the future, on how we might get at that faster? >> i think there are. as you may recall, there have been a couple of responses that are similar to do so. -- to do this. the tsunami in 2004 in the pacific. the earthquake in pakistan and so we're always looking at how we can do this better. and at the end of the experience in haiti, whenever that may be, we will have learned much from how we respond, how we stage, the types of skills and equipment that we may need. and i think that's one of the great things about not just humanitarian relief or anything else.

that the military has a wonderful culture of learning from our past and from our mistakes. and we are willing to expose things that perhaps weren't done as well as we would have liked. and analyzing why that happened and how we can be better. we are constantly renewing and re-examining ourselves. >> any thoughts so far as to what you might change? >> i think that the -- one of the things that has been very important to me and what we've been working on for several years post-tsunami is the continued integration of nongovernmental organizations. in our military forces and other agencies. we have come a long way. i think that we have to continue to work on that because when you pitch into one of these relief operations of this magnitude, it

is not one entity that will pull the whole thing off. it's the integration pass. i see dick solomon here. we've been working very closely with his organization. i think there are going to be a lot of opportunities there to continue to develop those types of relationships and protocols that allow us to come together more quickly. >> thank you. >> can i just comment? i have been both intimately involved. i think the response has been remarkable given, one, the suddenness of it and, two, the scope of it. and the ability of us to both muster resources and get them there in the -- in the mass that is required as opposed to the individual piece. and i did. i thought some of the most remarkable stories were some of the rescue units.

i mean, there was a rescue unit from china which got there in 33 hours out of beijing. the israeli hospital that got there. and all of those are really an important part of this. and we had units -- you know, our coast guard was magnificent literally as the -- right after the earthquake. however, it has taken much more than that to get some structure in place to be able to handle the scope and the volume of the tragedy. and it really has come in many ways as a result of our assistance in indonesia and pakistan. even katrina here where you couldn't get there fast enough. you never can in these. and yet -- and i'll just use an example. the comfort which got there in record time -- you can't -- you

can't beam a thousand-foot ship in with all it's people. you'd like to do that. but based on previous experience, comfort got there in record time and look what he's doing now. and getting the other forces on the frowned. -- ground. we'll clearly learn and from my perspective the response has been magnificent from ngos, usaid. from our government and from many other countries as well in addition to the men and women in the military. >> sir? >> hi. i'm al from voice of america. i have a question for admiral mullen. on this theme of leadership and what you consider as you chart a course in a complex situation towards a destination that's been determined by the commander in chief. what sort of factors you have to consider. i'll give you two to talk about. one is don't ask, don't tell. and the other is relations with

china because the taiwan arms sale was just announced a couple of hours ago. how do you try to balance this commitment to taiwan and the decision is made but the imperative in remaining engaged with china but now that i talked about china don't forget about the first point that i made. [laughter] >> i'll actually be happy to second first and i'll answer the first question tuesday at the hearing. >> fair enough. [laughter] >> the issue from a leadership perspective with china, i think, is one that i have -- i and others have responsibility from a military-to-military perspective. and opportunities. as has been the case with many, many countries. i actually find it a little bit ironic that we're talking about admiral burke who put the polaris program in place. and i literally last week was in moscow in negotiations with my counterpart with respect to the

start follow-on treaty which has an awful lot to do with the vision he had even though he didn't win all of that. which speaks to decisions that we make and how long they last. sometimes we think of them in the short term. so i actually try to think about how i handle myself and approach this from the long-term perspective. after you're here in washington a while, at least there is an opportunity to look out more than just tomorrow. and what does it mean? and the reason i bring that up in china and particularly on the mil-to-mil because my thoughts are very much not anywhere -- not even close to just the senior leadership perspective because i really want our younger officers to meet each other. because that's the future. that's going to be the relationship. that's what we lost more than anything else in pakistan when we sanctioned them for 12 years. is those mid-grade officers who are now generals that don't know anything about the united states. and so i always have that in

mind even in the discussiongk earlier in terms of both accountability and being apolitical. and i'll save tuesday's answers for tuesday on don't ask, don't tell. i certainly recognize the question. and i understand that this issue is moving very rapidly. >> thank you. >> i'd like to make the comment that maybe john should wrap up now. a comment [inaudible] i think what is so overarched is the civilian military and burke understood this as the power of ideas and i want to take two examples, one who john with my navel had

because i served on the board of the naval war college and then my army at on a visit i had privately with david petraeus. but here are two cases of the whole change of strategic tactical doctrine won by the penn saver they tried to constantly sync as he went to history petraeus went to the lessons of iraq both learned, both got their acolytes. davis petraeus described how they got the bosnian, the puzzle they put together out at leavenworth. i remember mentioned at the white house petraeus was at leavenworth and they want to bring him back and he said are you in the penitentiaries and i said no.

[laughter] i would say he said that in the white house now, last administration. but the man got his acolytes and then became assistant secretary but before that were going to the naval war college, the chairman of the >> the chairman of the foreign relations committee, john became secretary of state, and when they came then to washington, there was a whole strategic vision move into the pacific. the only reason, the only thing we had prepared in world war i with the navy to support the army over there, was due to this one guy and his thought process. petraeus did the same. and you know, they changed the mindset in the way that you fight an asymmetrical war. and i told him, you know, this

is very similar, very different -- then when you get into this, it blurs so billion military, people are moving forward on ideas and doctrine. of course, the other thing that i party said this in my last book, civilian, george marshall, secretary state as well as defense, and our national security advisor, this mix is good. this military experience mixed with civilian. state department learned to appreciate that. we need engineers, former four stars and usaid today, and so forth. but i think this has been a wonderful session, and really, we are indebted to all of you.

i think we better wrap it up, but i really thank you all for being with us, and echoing the one and only admiral burke. thank you so much. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> and now deputy secretary of state james steinberg talks about ways to achieve peace and stability on the korean peninsula. he gave a keynote address hosted

by the woodrow wilson center. it's about 50 minutes. >> to the first institute for far eastern studies university of north korean studies forum at the center. it is also a pleasure for the center, the center's north korea international documentation project, and asia program, to be partnering with the institute for far east studies and the university of north korean studies, both affiliated with kyungnam university. we are honored to welcome a very distinguished group of scholars from the united states and korea. many of you in the audience, i know, have held high ranking positions in your respective governments. indeed, the combined expertise in this room is really quite remarkable. i want to especially to

recognize the republic of korea's ambassador to the united states, duk-soo han, who is with us this point. former republic of korea ambassador to the united states, jounyung sun. and former national security adviser to the south korean president byung-young kim. it is a very special privilege to welcome dr. jae kyu park. he comes back to the center after having visited here before, of course. he is one of the world's leading experts on inter-korean affairs. dr. park is a renowned scholar and a policymaker, a bridge between academia and government in the finest tradition of woodrow wilson, a tradition that the center seeks, of course, to uphold. he is the current president of the university of north korean

studies and kyungnam university. a former minister of unification and chairman of the national security council for the republic of korea. he is the current presidential adviser on korean unification affairs. in november of last year, president park received the jacques chirac prize for conflict prevention and recognition of his extraordinary forty-year devotion to maintaining peace on the korean peninsula. president park has been a great friend of the wilson center. and i am very grateful to him. i am pleased to welcome him now to this podium. president park. [applause] >> good morning. ambassador han, president,

deputy secretary steinberg, distinguished public, and ladies and gentlemen. it's a great honor for me to be here with you and make some opening remarks. today's event marks the beginning of the ifes and unks forum in washington. this inaugural report demonstrates the value of the growing partnership at the woodrow wilson international center of scholar, and the kyungnam university and university of north korean studies. for helping give this forum, and the partnership. i would like to thank you,

christian ostermann, president of the woodrow wilson center for his leadership and vision. i would also like to thank the excellent team of scholars of the center, led by christian ostermann for advancing the process of our academic partnership. today's forum brings together prominent scholars and experts to discuss peace and the security on korean peninsula. the theme of today's event. the korean peninsula has long been a source of instability in northeast asia and beyond. of course, the problem of korea is regional and crowd problem.

it will require cooperation of all of the stakeholders nation's of the world, that along with united nations. our immediate task as a stakeholders is to find ways to bring north korea back to the six-party talks, and that north korea's denuclearization, even though the redemption of the talks that would mean the end of the problem. south korea's current policy essentially based on reciprocity toward north korea, confirms through the courts of making peace, developing cooperation and pursuing peaceful reunification. it puts precedence on denuclearization of the north,

but it has yet to induce the north's back to the negotiation. cooperation and consensus among the stakeholders, the united nations, united states, korea, china, russia and japan is essential. all of us must be prepared to work, not only to resolve the nuclear crisis, but also as a obama says to offer north korea a different future. in this endeavor, the rock u.s. alliance which has to be a pillar of stability in the region. will be a foundation in which to move forward. as well, peace and stability on the korean peninsula is of keen interest to china. and its role in cooperation will

continue to be important. if we can achieve a common view on the problem of north korea, progress on the nuclear issue will come forward, most swiftly. together, the university of north korean studies and woodrow wilson center have strived to bring great understanding of north korea, and of the problems surrounding the korean peninsula. the work we have done together so far to uncover north korea's cold war history has been an ongoing success, drawing significant attention from the korean public. i am sure that a partnership between our two institutions will continue to contribute to the research and the

policymaking communities of korea and the u.s., and others. on that note, let me again thank you for coming to the forum. i hope all of you will find that today's proceedings informative and stimulating. thank you for your attention. [applause] >> thank you very much, dr. park. my pleasure now to introduce this morning's keynote speaker, u.s. deputy secretary of state, james steinberg. one year ago today, secretary of state hillary clinton swore mr. steinberg in as her deputy. at which time, he took up one of the largest, most important and most challenging portfolios in our government. jim, happy anniversary to you,

after one year. i'm not sure this is exactly the best way to celebrate. [laughter] >> but it's one way to celebrate. gym, of course, is an experienced, dedicated and very able public servant. prior to his appointment by president obama, he served with distinction as being of the lyndon b. johnson school of public affairs at the university of texas, austin. from which he is currently on leave. prior to his leadership in austin, he was vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the brookings institution. during president clinton's administration, mr. steinberg served in numerous, important and vital positions, among them deputy national security advisor, chief of staff of the united states, state department, directory of policy planning, deputy assistant secretary for a

now says in the bureau of intelligence of research. he has held positions at the rand corporation and the international institute for strategic studies in london. he's also served as the late senator ted kennedy's principal aide on the senate armed services committee. he is the author of numerous books and articles on foreign policy and national security. a native of boston, massachusetts, he attended harvard college and yale law school. he and his wife, have two children. following his remarks, christian ostermann, who oversees our national creator, national documentation project project, and does so very ably, serves also as director of the wilson center's history and public policy program. christian will moderate a q&a session. ladies and gentlemen, deputy secretary of state james

steinberg. [applause] >> thank you, lee, for that kind introduction. and i want to pay tribute to you for your many decades of public service. you have been a model and inspiration to so many, including me, over the years and i have been grateful. it's a great pleasure to be here this morning, and thanks to the wilson center along with the university of north korean studies and the institute of far east as for hosting this event. dr. park, for your very thoughtful remarks. hasn't only been one year? seems like a lot longer than that. it is actually a good way to mark this year anniversary, because i think it's been clear from the beginning of this administration, the importance that the administration places on this region and our relationship with south korea and our other partners in northeast asia that he was almost exactly a year ago that the secretary and bark at her first trip as secretary of

state. i think you will recall her first trip was to east asia. a reflection of the importance that we attach to this region that i think as we continue our work, in the coming years in the obama administration, we will look to the wilson center and lee and our colleagues here today and those of you in the audience who are working on these issues for wisdom and insight going forward. this is a very timely moment for conference on peace and security in the korean peninsula. as this audience well knows, 2010 is an important year for anniversaries. including the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the korean war. and through these past six decades, the syndicate on the korean peninsula has been a central consideration for the united states. but even though our present state and our focus on the region has been enduring, this isn't an appropriate time to reflect both on what has changed as well as the challenges that we face in the years ahead. the course of these past six

decades in many ways is both a cause for celebration and at the same time, a cautionary tale. the divergent paths pursued by south and north korea exemplify the truth that the wilson center's name state recognized a century ago. nations that are fully engaged in the international community and the respect fundamental rights of their citizens prosper in progress. those who choose isolation and suppression do not. i don't need to remind us this distinguished group gathered here today of the remarkable story of south korea's achievements over the past 60 years. from the ravages of war, poverty, and arbiters of authoritarian governance, south korea has emerged as a vibrant democratic and increasingly prosperous society. offer an opportunity to its people, partnership to its friends, and leadership on the global stage. from its membership in the to his upcoming role of a host of e.g. 20, south korea has taken its place as one of the core

players in the global economy. from natural and antipiracy operations to its contributions to stability in iraq and afghanistan, south korea has moved from a consumer security to a provider of security to others. of course, north korea has taken the opposite path turning its back on the globalized world and the basic freedoms that would allow its citizens to thrive and prosper. despite the open hand offered by south korea and the entire international committee. and despite its vast headstart compared with the south, today its citizens face the ravages of hunger, fear and disease. the tragic consequences of placing its military rather than its people first. its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles deepens itself in post-isolation, although as i will discuss in more detail in a few minutes, we hope that these leaders will seize the chance to pursue a more hopeful engagement with the world in the coming months. a moment ago i observed this was

a year of anniversaries, and just last week we mark the 50th anniversary of our security alliance with japan. our bilateral alliances with south korea and japan, along with australia, thailand and the philippines, have played a crucial role in maintaining stability on the korean peninsula and throughout east asia. they have provided an environment in which korea, japan and other countries of east asia have had the chance to prosper. as secretary clinton made clear in her speech just two weeks ago in hawaii, these bilateral alliances continue to provide a foundation for our engagement in the region. our security commitment has helped the region overcome what we academics call the security dilemma. largely avoided the destabilizing spiral of mistrusts and militarization and instead allowing countries to grow, prosper and integrate in a context of reassurance, rather than and tidy and there. this reassurance will be more important than ever as we work to overcome the challenges and

seize the opportunities. on the korean peninsula today. of course, our alliances must involve. as the cold weather paradigm that dominate our thinking for decades, is replaced by a more complex but potentially more optimistic set of relationships among the countries of northeast asia. we've been working hard with south korea and japan to update and enhance our alliances in a spirit of partnership and the quality. which befits their own achievements over the past half-century. this spirit was very much on display and president lee's very successful visit to the united states last spring. and president obama's visit to south korea this fall. they strengthen an already strong personal relationship and president obama reiterated his support for the korea u.s. free trade agreement in his state of union address just two days ago. to build on and 83 billion-dollar trade

relationship, our seventh largest trading partner. to strengthen our bilateral bonds and bring new and needed jobs to our workers. later this year, south korea will host the so-called two plus two meeting. secretary clinton and secretary gates will meet with their counterparts in seoul to commemorate the 60 anniversary of the korean war and the progress in our alliance. one important part of this effort is the relocation of our troops. the headquarters of u.s. forces korea will move from downtown seoul to a new headquarters 30 miles south of seoul and the over 100 u.s. military bases spread across korea will be consolidated around to the strategic hubs. this will transform a cold war era military footprint into a better position. without sacrificing our commitment to the alliance. we will continue to work together on updating our command relationships to reflect our evolving alliance. this is an alliance which is

increasingly global, and we're appreciative of south korea's growing willingness to expand its global role commensurate with its political and economic achievements. on the full range of issues, that will define the coming decades for northeast asia and beyond. last june, president obama and president lee issued a joint vision statement for the alliance which serves as a forward-looking framework for increased bilateral cooperation. republic of korea of course is already demonstrate a firm commitment to international peace and prosperity. secretary general embodies the ideals that bind the niceties and republic of korea on the global stage. and soul is an active contributor to u.n. peacekeeping missions including lebanon. most recently, it decided to offer 200 plus peacekeepers and $10 million in emergency assistance to haiti. . .

south korea is helping bring broadband through innovative partnerships with groups, they are bringing broadband to african countries and they are integrated into the international community and not merely set pieces in global development efforts. we're looking forward to the november 2010 g20 leader summit in sole sole. -- seoul. seoul and south korea has played an important leadership role

during the financial crisis by joining the financial stability board and undertaking swift financial reforms to ensure its economy would be able to weather the economic challenges of the future. similarly, we're working with our partners in japan to sustain our crucial alliance. a few days ago, i had a chance to reflect on those challenges and opportunities. and today simply want to reiterate that we welcome the fiber of dialog with japan's new leaders as exemplified with secretary clinton. as president obama said in his tokyo speech the u.s.-japan relationship is not a historic relic but a relationship that is fundamental to our shared community. that means its essential that we work together to make sure the alliance repains the support and understanding of both the japanese and american people and that we implement a sound plan for sustaining our military cooperation. for the benefit of our two peoples and for the region as a whole.

the end of the cold war has brought with it the opportunity to supplement our security alliances with increasingly strong bilateral ties to the two other key nations of northeast asia, russia and china. and with both of them, the obama administration has set out to build new, broader, more action-oriented partnerships that are absolutely necessary if we are to overcome the central challenges in northeast asia and around the globe. with russia, we hit the famous reset button in relations. while this doesn't mean we're necessarily going to agree on every issue or resolve every source of tension in our relationship, we are making important progress. and we're now close to concluding negotiations on a new star treaty that will be an important step in u.s.-russian relations and for global nonproliferation efforts. with china we took an important step in institutionalizing a broader and more effective partnership with the first strategic and economic dialog

held here in washington, indeed here in the reagan building, last july. an arrangement that builds on strong working ties between president obama and president hu and secretary clinton and her chinese counterparts. those discussions reflected a mutual understanding and when it comes to our most urgent shared challenges from security in east asia to the global challenges of climate change, nonproliferation, terrorism and pandemic disease, that there's little hope for progress if we do not work closely together. as we look forward to the second meeting of the strategic and economic dialog in china next summer, we're having discussions on an unprecedented range of topics of common interest and common concern that we hope will ultimately yield common action. more broadly, we are also deepening our ties with other key partners in east asia. from our increasingly productive relationship with india, to our enhanced cooperation through our

accession to the treaty on amity and cooperation. our relationships cannot achieve the regional and global cooperation we need to meet the challenges of the 21st century. that's why secretary clinton set forth her vision of how to deepen multilateral engagement in east asia, for economic growth, security and to address transnational threats. as secretary gates observed several years ago, the united states is a resident power in the asia pacific. and the obama administration is determined to play an increasingly active role in working with the countries of the region. from our allies to emerging powers like indiana, indonesia and china, to shape a peaceful prosperous future for the billions who live in this increasingly central part of the world. this framework of security alliances, bilateral ties and multilateral engagement provides the framework through which we are approaching the most urgent

and dangerous challenge facing the region. the danger posed by north korea's nuclear missile programs. and the longer term challenge of peaceful reintegration of the korean peninsula. so let me conclude by saying a few words about our approach to this challenge. and where things stand in our effort to restart the six-party talks and move toward the goals shared by our four other partners in those talks the veverifiable -- verifiable denuclearizations. we want to make it clear that we remain committed to the full implementation of all elements of the 2005 joint statement of the six-party talks. these includes verifiable denuclearization, the establishment of a peace regime, normalization of relations and economic and energy cooperation. as president obama said in seoul, and i quote, our message is clear.

if north korea is prepared to take concrete and irreversible steps to fulfill its obligation and eliminates its nuclear weapons program, the united states will support economic assistance and help promote its full integration into the community of nations. that opportunity and respect will not come with threats. north korea must live up to its obligations. those are the president's words. pyongyang has in the indicated it will take the crucial steps to live up to those obligations. since agreeing to the 2005 agreement, it has tested two nuclear devices one in 2006 and last may. modernized its ballistic missile, proliferated sensitive technologies and weapons and engaged in provocative and destabilizing behavior. the international community and particularly our partners in the six-party talks have responded to these provocations firmly and clearly.

this is an important reflection of this determination and we have taken together unprecedented steps to implement them. the new measures include a total ban on arms and related material exports from north korea. and a major expansion of the ban on arms imports. strict financial restrictions and enhanced provisions for inspection of suspected transfers prescribed cargo. last month following close consultations between us and our allies and partners, ambassador steven bosworth the u.s. special representative for north korea policy led a delegation to pyongyang. there north korean officials expressed a willingness in principle to resume six-party talks and reaffirmed their 2005 statement including the goal of denuclearization. they did not reach agreement, however, on the specifics of when and how to proceed. ambassador bosworth made absolutely clear to the north

koreans that concrete action through the six-party talks through verifiable denuclearization is the sole path to improved relations that north korea claims to seek. we believe it's important that the six-party talks resume expeditiously. and that north korea begin to take those irreversible steps to eliminate its nuclear weapons program. in the meantime, neither the united states nor our allies will provide incentives or material benefits for north korea simply to return to negotiations. the terms of the u.n. security council resolutions will continue to be enforced. and our determination to see that enforcement was made clear in the recent seizure of arms and related material from a north korea chartered flight that was targeting thailand. that incident clearly demonstrated the resolve of the international community encountering the proliferation of destabilizing technologies for north korea. meanwhile, we will continue to speak out clearly for the basic

human freedoms and dignity to which all north koreans are entitled. secretary clinton's designation of bob king as a special envoy for human rights in north korea and his recent travel to south korea and japan demonstrate the importance we attach to this issue. secretary clinton has described the approach our administration has taken with our six party partners as one of strategic patience. that doesn't mean we're not doing anything. on the contrary. we are working closely with our allies and partners in the region to offer north korea a different future. strategic patience means that north korea must live up to its commitments and its international obligations. there's a clear path open through the six-party talks and denuclearization to achieve the security and international respect that north korea says that it seeks. and once it returns to the six-party talks and begins to make progress on

denuclearization, we will all be prepared to discuss including where appropriate in bilateral talks all the other elements of negotiation including with our south korean partners a permanent peace regime for the korean peninsula. but we will not defer the core nuclear issue. as secretary clinton has said, current sanctions will not be relaxed until pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps to complete denuclearization. their leaders should not be under the illusion that we will have anything. of unity that we see in the past year with the unprecedented action by the u.n. security council and cooperative implementation of sanctions has been an important achievement. both for the future of this process and for future cooperation in northeast asia beyond this challenge. that's something i want to emphasize.

that even as we work together on overcoming the very difficult challenge posed by north korea, we can take advantage of our joint action to build a new capacity for cooperation and collective action in a part of a world that will become more and more important in the years to come. while our cooperation today is focused on denuclearization, we are also paving the way for cooperation on the broader challenges and opportunities of northeast asia and the entire pacific region in the years and decades to come. thank you for your time and i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> thank you. the secretary agreed to take some questions. the floor is open but please wait for the microphone and please state your name. questions, yes, the microphone, please.

>> i'm janie. the reason' north korea demand peace treaty with the united states before the six-party talks for them to give up to the nuclear weapons, what is the u.s. position on that? and also does north korea want -- i'm sorry. >> let me try to answer your question. i don't want to try to characterize the north koreans' position. i will let them characterize their own position. i will be happy to characterize ours, which is as i said in my remarks we believe that there's an appropriate time and place to discuss the issue. of how we replace the armistice going forward. but the first step is to return to the six-party talks and to begin the process of denuclearization. within that framework, we have a clear path forward to discuss the full range of issues including the potential for a piece agreement.

but as we do so, of course, we will do this in close consultation with our south korean allies who are the principal parties. so there is a path forward. certainly we accept the fact that there's an appropriate time and place for those discussions to take place. but it should be very clear to the north koreans that the/ñ wa to get that, if that's your objective, is to return to the six-party talks. and to begin the process of implementing their prior compliment under the 2005 joint statement. >> excuse me. i'd like to take some other questions. over there, yes. >> what's your assessment of the chinese interest in engaging in the human rights part of the portfolio that you described? if you do assess it in a positive direction, how do you envision them taking some independent action along those lines?

>> i think, you know, the chinese have made quite clear that they are concerned about stability in north korea. and that instability in north korea could affect their interest. so we've been=?q trying to encourage them to see that the lack of human rights and the appalling conditions in north korea contribute to that instability so that if china really is serious about wanting a stable peninsula and a diplomatic and political process to move forward, that it should use in its own way its influence to try to improve the situation of the people there, both economically and politically. i think it's hard to judge whether the chinese are prepared to take on that role. sometimes the chinese do things without necessarily sharing their intentions with us. but we will continue to make clear to them that in their own interest, china ought to work with the north koreans to create much better conditions of living for their people. and to recognize that the kind of human situation that prevails in north korea is contrary to the interest of all of north

korea's neighbors. >> thank you. yes, the gentleman on the right side. >> good morning, i'm foster with the associated press. how does strategic patience take into account that north continues to produce nuclear fuel while the u.s. and the partners are being patient? >> i think what's clear as we took office was that a lot of water had passed under the bridge. and that north korea had made some progress in developing its nuclear program. we need to make sure that as we deal with this that we don't repeat what we saw in the past, which is rewards for actions that can be easily reversed because interim measures that don't lead to a significant resolution of the overall crisis not only don't achieve our national objectives and the objectives of our parties but actually are inducing a set of behaviors that are contrary to everyone's interest.

and that while we remain concerned about china's -- north korea's actions we're working with china and others to make clear there are cost for that. if north korea continues to proceed in violation of security council resolution, they will continue to suffer the consequences of strict implementation of 1874. there's a cost to the north koreans to the fact that patience is not inaction. we're continued to enforce those sanctions until and unless north korea takes meaningful steps to implement its obligations. >> thank you. over there. >> bill jones, eir nose. -- news. i have questions real estates with south korea. the south korean have a very ambitious energy program and they're considering the possibility of reprocessing nuclear fuels. and, of course, there's been restrictions on that i think dating back from 1976 legislation. and just over the last couple days kurt campbell has indicated

that there would be a possibility of discussing this issue so they'd be able to do that. i was wondering what is the u.s. position on this particular issue? they agreed to all of the nonproliferation restrictions. they were cooperating in every way. would it not be a possibility to allow them to do this reprocessing? >> well, as most of you know, the korean vice foreign minister was here a few days ago and i had an opportunity to have an extensive discussion with him on that issue. we both agreed that we have a very strong mutual interest in strengthening the global nonproliferation regime. and that there are deep concerns as more countries move to develop civilian nuclear power about the risks of proliferation of the risks of civilian nuclear power. and you heard the president very viggiously support the other night our own interest in civilian nuclear power we have to make sure it's done in ways that don't foster dangerous proliferation behavior.

and i think we're all very cognizant of a very real term challenge not only from north korea but also from iran. and so as we move forward with civilian nuclear power we have to be cognizant of the impact of activities involving the complete fuel cycle on the dangers of proliferation. and we've agreed to work together on the basic principle that however we strengthen our own national civilian nuclear power programs, we need to do it in a way that doesn't encourage dangerous proliferation-related behavior. we have an agreement with south korea. we're having discussions about how modern technology can be applied under that agreement. but i think that core understanding, that shared understanding with the vice foreign minister very vigorously shared with me and my colleagues was a clear determination that whatever we do to enhance civilian nuclear power, we must be cognizant of the proliferation consequences. and so our discussions will take place on that shared

understanding. and we'll look forward ways to see how we adapt it to those circumstances. >> thank you. let me take a question from one of our participants in the overflow room. south korean president li wanted to meet with kim jong-il this year. do you have any comment on this i guess on the north/south relations? >> we strongly support president lee and the clear path that he set forward to achieve peace and stability on the korean peninsula. we have great confidence in our relationship and close consultations. and whatever form of engagement the south korean government will do we will do it in close cooperation and we will do it in the framework we've all agreed on. if north korea wants to make meaningful progress it's going to need to return to the six-party talks. and this strong sense of shared approach is something that i think has characterized our relationships from the first days of our administration.

and so we would be very supportive of the measures that president lee takes because we know we're pursuing a shared goal. >> thank you. the gentleman all the way in the back. >> thanks. sam king from voice of america. i want to ask you about china's role in six party talks. how satisfied are you on china's current effort to persuade north korea and resume the six party talk. thank you. >> from the outset of the administration we recognize that china is an important actor in the effort to achieve denuclearization of the peninsula. and we've had intensive discussions in a variety flora and strategic dialog and secretary clinton's visits to china. president obama's visits to china and my own visits and i'm quite confident that the chinese share our strong conviction that a nuclear north korea would be an enormous danger to all and very destabilizing for the region. we continue to have a vigorous

dialog how we think the measures we adopted under resolution 1874 should be adopted. there are many positive steps that china has taken to implement those things. and there are issues that we continue to work out together as we try to resolve some of the ambiguities around particular transactions or activities. but i think we have seen a clear indication on china's behalf that it takes this seriously. that it understands the importance of sending an unambiguous signal to north korea about the need for denuclearization and we look forward to continued dialog on these issues in the future. >> the gentleman two rows down. yep. >> thank you very much. vladimir with rti television. what's the reaction to the small military incident between the north and south on tuesday. and the second question, you mentioned the reset button with russia in your opening remarks. and many in moscow have taken the difficult circle -- the difficult issues of democracy and human rights will no longer

be part of the u.s.-russian agenda. >> clearly we continue because it's a universal preoccupation of the united states to address those issues within the framework of this broader dialog that we have established with russia, that is one of the issues that we continue to discuss. we think it's quite important for russia's own future that it continue to offer its own people the benefits of an open society with open media and freedom to discuss and debate. and so that will an important part of our relationship. the nature of the reset allows us to have these conversations without jeopardizing the overall relationship. because what we recognized we will have areas of disagreement as i said. and we're not using this to say that somehow we're going to paper over differences. but also to recognize that constructive partners can have differences, vigorous differences on some issues but still work together on common challenges like north korea, like iran, and others. and so i think that's been one of the positive results of the way we've approached this is we can have these differences where

we have them and yet still work together on common challenges. so i think that that really sort of characterizes how we're going forward. on the recent activities near the northern limit line, we've been concerned about these. that we think they are provocative. and we've urged the north koreans to exercise restraint. so far we can tell the military activity has not actually crossed the boundary there but there are risks associated with this kind of behavior and it's simply unnecessary and so we would caution and urge the north koreans to restrain and refrain from that. >> thank you, gentlemen. the gentleman to the right. >> in the past our japanese friends have had various attitudes towards north korea from promising substantial reparations which would be very big by their formula now. and other times not wanting to engage with the north koreans until they had returned people

who they had kidnapped. now, they have a new administration, which is neuralgic for our friends in the pentagon who don't like democratic changes. my question very simply is, where do you think the japanese stand on the various positions towards north korea at this point? or is it simply too early to tell how a new, very new, japanese administration will approach these things? >> it won't surprise you that i won't agree with your characterization of the pentagon's views of its interpretation of pentagon. we had a great opportunity to discuss with the new government to its approach to north korea. i think it's been quite reassuring how much in sync we are on this overall question. there's no question that the humanitarian dimension of the abducted japanese citizens is a concern to the japanese government. and why not? any government would be concerned about that just as we would be concerned about american citizens who are held in north korea.

so we don't see that at all as inconsistent. and indeed as many of you know, during her visit to tokyo, secretary clinton met with some of the family. so we share japan's concern and yet we're also on the same wavelength about the importance of moving forward on the six-party talks. of the central role of achieving denuclearization. and our common determination to take measures to strengthen our security alliance including concrete security measures so long as north korea continues in that direction. if it's going to continue to test ballistic missiles and if it's going to continue to test nuclear devices we're going to continue to work with both south korea and japan to provide defenses and assured deterrence against the dangers that north korea represents. and there's been no daylight i think between us and the new government in tokyo about that issue. >> okay. i think we'll need to wrap it up shortly. we'll go to one final question here up front.

[inaudible] [inaudible] >> in your view the mood between the relationship between russia and beijing will affect progress? thank you. >> as i said, i actually look back on the past year as a very positive year in the u.s.-china relations. so we've had an opportunity from the very beginning from really the first weeks of this administration to signal the importance that we attach to u.s.-china relations to our strong commitment to a

constructive cooperative relationship. and to build on the positive development that had taken place in previous years to broaden and strengthen the relationship. it's been manifest from the first weeks. in president obama's phone calls to president hu in london in april of last year to president obama's visit to shanghai and beijing last fall. we have differences with china on some issues. and china has differences with us on some issues. that's to be expected. and we don't believe that overnight just discussing the case with our relationship with russia that these are going to go away. but i think what is critical that we have a common commitment to manage those differences, to understand that the interest that we have in common are critical. and that neither of us are going to be able to achieve our fundamental objectives without the cooperation from char. in providing opportunity to its people. that depends on healthy global economic system and it depends

on cooperation between us and the other major economies of the world. china is concerned about proliferation. whether it's in north korea or iran. we have to work on those problems together. we have common interest in dealing with the problems of terrorism. we have problems in common interest in global public health. and these are all issues -- and climate change. these are all issues that we have provided a strong basis for the relationship. again, we have some differences. and we'll hear more about those differences in coming days. but i think it's in the nature that we can speak clearly and candidly what our positions are. and yet understand that our long-term interest will be vastly improved on both sides if we can work through these differences and try to find a common way forward. so i'm not pessimistic. i don't dispute that we'll have some bumps. but that's the nature of an evolving relationship in these circumstances. and we're very committed to work through them. i believe the leadership in beijing is, too. and we look forward to finding ways to build on the relationship. as i say with the upcoming second round of the strategic and economic dialog will be a

good opportunity for us to view the relationship in toto which i think is a very important perspective to keep in mind as we handle the individual issues going forward. thank you very much for your time and attention. it's been a great pleasure to be with you. >> thank you very much. [applause] ....

>> now a group of journalists who have covered the health care debate in congress on where the legislation might be headed. they spoke saturday at an annual conference hosted by families u.s.a. this is about an hour and 40 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning. good morning, and welcome. it's great to see all you bright eyed and energetic and -- we have a great session this morning for you. before we start, i thought i would do two quick things of business here. last night, jonathan vanderburg from the illinois campaign for better health care decided he was going to be a little

creative, and he wrote out the words budget reconciliation process. and then he tried to figure out the letters in the budget reconciliation process, what words can you not make out of those letters and what words can you make out of those letters. so i'm going to read what you can't and what you can do. so what you can do with those letters is you can't spell the word filibuster. [laughter] >> you can spell out the word pass and pledge. you can't use those letters to spell out lieberman. [laughter] >> you can use those letters for pelosi, reid. you can't use the letters for the word wait.

you can for the word urgent. you can't for the words lobbyists win. you can for the words poor do gain. you can't for the word apathy. you can for the word action. you can't for the word wimpy. you can for the word bold. you can't for the word pansy jellyfish. [laughter] >> you can for the word get a spine. [laughter] >> for those of you more hispanic incline, you can't use the word. you can't for fail. you can for results. and you can't for give up, and you can for get it done. [applause] >> so we have some creativity.

and one last thing before we start the panel. you know, we have talked a bit about the pathway to getting this done, and we talked about the reconciliation process. you know, we had our rally on thursday was the first time i heard our rallying cry using reconciliation as part of the cry, too and two, four, six, eight, let's reconciliation or it's gone a little far. but i did want to say there's a wonderful memo that has been prepared by our good friends in college at the center and budget and policy priorities. that has been circulated throughout capitol hill. and it describes how frequently the reconciliation process has been used. and there have been nine bills

-- 19 bills, 19 bills enacted into law through the reconciliation act. there were three others that passed, but were vetoed by the president. just to give you an idea of some of those, the welfare reform law of 1996 was passed through budget reconciliation. probably the things that people remember most, because they were most recent, were the two major tax cuts by president bush in 2001 and 2003. and interestingly, the budget reconciliation process is designed to reduce the deficit. and yet, in 2001, was the only reconciliation bill that passed that increased the deficit. you can wave lots of rules.

and you know, just with respect to health care, so many of you care about the children's health insurance program, that was enacted through reconciliation. and you all know about cobra. people who are laid off and continued to get coverage by paying in for all its deficiencies, but people around the country know about cobra. do you know what cobra stands for? the consolidated omnibus budget reconciliation act. remember that. cobra actually has the word reconciliation. it was passed in 1985. so anytime you're going to hear opponents talk about this, this extraordinary process of reconciliation and how this is devious and terrible, please remember, in republican and democratic administration, this has been used.

now turn to our wonderful program and terrific guests. we have three of the most thoughtfuljournalist and people who really care about america's health care system. who have joined us, thankfully, on a saturday morning. so i'm going to, no particular order, i guess i will start on my left. ezra klein is a blogger and write periodic columns for the "washington post,." he was formerly associate editor for the american prospect. his work has appeared in washington wizards, "the los angeles times," the new republic and slate, and many other publications. he interviewed, a few years ago,

a couple of years ago paul krugman, and paul krugman said the following about ezra. ezra is very, very good, and very, very young, because when ezra interviewed him in a restaurant, he was carded. [laughter] >> that was -- paul was just jealous about that. >> i think that ezra is actually even prouder that quite recently a fellow by the name of rush limbaugh called him a rising star. i don't know how to take that actually. [applause] >> what came after that was somewhat less complementary, but you'll never see that -- you will never see the rest of that on the back of my book. don't worry about it.

>> next, seated to my immediate right is susan dentzer. susan is the editor in chief of health affairs, the nation's leading journal of health policy. she has been for quite a while the on air analyst on health issues with the news hour with jim lehrer on pbs. she is formerly the chief economics correspondent and economic columnist for u.s. news and world report. she's been a senior writer covering business for newsweek. our work on television, included appearances as a regular analyst or commentator on cnn, and the mclaughlin group. she was a nieman fellow at harvard university. and if i read to you all the accolades and prizes she has won for her terrific work, we won't have a plenary here this

morning. so we are delighted to have susan dentzer here this morning. and seated on my far right, he's normally not on my far right, is jonathan cohn. jonathan is the senior editor at the new republic. he is a contributing editor for an american prospect, where he served previously as executive editor. he has been a media fellow with the kaiser family foundation. he has written for numerous publications, the "new york times," the "washington post," newsweek, mother jones, rolling stones and slate. is the author of the book "sick: the untold story of america's health care crisis and the people who pay the price." and he is a senior fellow with the think tank demos. so please give a warm welcome to these wonderful folks.

[applause] [applause] >> actually a privileged to be with them this morning. so i am going -- when we first -- we thought we would have a couple reform already ever going to talk about the future of the health reform movement after help -- will talk some about that, but we got some other things i guess we need to address first. so i'm going to ask each of you first to give your own take about where you think we are today, with respect to like to get health reform legislation through the finish line. so i'm going to start first on my left and go in of the orders on other questions. so ezra. >> i think, first of all thank you for having me. good morning. i think you could say there's good news and there is badges. and as has been happening recently in the news cycle, begin with the bad.

the democrats don't really know how to move forward. we can tell them, but for reasons that escape rational thought, they don't see to themselves know. the good news is that what they do know is they can't move backwards. that there be dragons. and this is not, they will know, 1994. they cannot pretend that the bill never came to the floor, that it collapse, that it wasn't their fault that they all voted for it. passed their chambers. even though they brought david fluffed back to run the campaigns and he wrote an op-ed in my paper saying you've got to pass the bill because if you don't, you are still running on this bill. and the difference between passing a bill and not passing a bill is you either get to run on the bill or you get to run on eight part of the bill. but i think that is basically where we are, that the outside of the situation is that all

logic, all moral decency, all disinterested observers say you have to pass a bill. you have votes to do. here's how you do it. the downside is democrats, and they can be tricky lottery. >> susan, what's your take on a? >> wrong, i saw your core just guessing the initial reaction of the democrats was one of grief, and if i remember my elizabeth cooper ross well enough, they have to move from grief through denial first before they get to acceptance. and i think that we are in the denial phase of this point, which is they really are still not only paralyze, but how to move forward. but just a denial to make a decision fast, which they do. the legislative time clock is tight. this is an election year.

they really have to move very, very swiftly to get anything done. whichever course they take, i suspect that where they will once they move on to denial to acceptance is kind of a two track approach. one of which will be the look to do that reconciliation business. the other, it's pretty clear, as you can see this from obama having gone up to me to republicans yesterday, at least in terms of the popular perception, they have to look like they are negotiating with the republicans to find some kind of a compromise. they just do, because of the polarization of the political environment, and unless they do that, they can't keep quietly negotiating how to do the reconciliation. which is in effect the one that is going to be bill because anybody who tells you that there's going to be some meeting of the minds around a network proposal that the republicans and democrats can agree on, it's just garbage. it's just garbage.

there just is not, i mean, we had a breakfast a couple of weeks ago and day camp is the ranking number on the ways and means committee who kept talking about common ground. and david brooks from the times was there and said, i hate talking about common ground that i don't even see common pebbles here. there's really not a meeting of the mind. but i think perceptually they have got to continue this notion that there is some kind of discussion while they work on this negotiating through the reconciliation. i think that's probably the only realistic strategy, and i just hope they move through the nile to the acceptance of that as quickly as possible. >> jonathan? >> let me preface this by saying as you and i were talking about the way we go, follow this debate lately that i tended to be a bit of the ago, just never really about is what he. and i remember last week, i don't know how many remembered what day thursday was a very bad day last week. house democrats, it was bad. i was getting on a plane with my kids and to go to florida.

i was hiding the blackberry so the stewardess is don't try me down. and i get an e-mail from someone who i talk to, and the message is just, did. so i said, i.e. go back and said only mostly dead? hopefully. [laughter] >> and i got back know, dead bleeping dead. and i found on the plane, and my kids, my tenure was like are you okay, dad? and i sat there staring at a seat in front of me. i hadn't felt like this since the red sox lost game seven. then i got off the plane and i didn't check my e-mail that night i was so depressed. the same person e-mail me back and said alive. [laughter] >> so you know, the caveat that i'm all over on the map on this. i actually just being here

yesterday and talking to people, relatively cautiously but relatively enthusiastic compared why was last week. and the reason i am enthusiastic is there is more work they have done that i really. we're not seeing a pic i don't know much about or i would be writing about it. but there is more work going on behind the scenes among the people in congress who really want this to happen. the leadership, the committee chairs, they have made a lot of progress on figuring out this formula. the hard part is, once they get this, and we all know how this is going to happen. there will be -- they want to pass the senate bill and they want to get to the reconciliation process. they had to come to agreement on what that says and then they have to go through this long process of convincing all their members to do it. they have to get it scored. they have to deal with the senate parliamentarian and we're now learning the reconciliation, yes, 60 votes, you don't need 60

votes but it can go slowly. the other party can abstract. so there's a long process. what i think the great unknown here is, i don't know if it's collective action problem, but if you look at the three actors, each one of them has to be willing to kind of take that leap. at the moment like all three of them are looking over, they aren't like, maybe for the back and i would like them to be. the house democrats have to understand they're going to have to do this. they have to take this vote on the senate bill. they don't want to do. the senate democrats need to understand yes, they need to go through the reconciliation process. the white house needs to understand that neither of those two are going to do it unless the white house tells them they have to do it. and i feel like everybody is still holding back right now. and i don't know how that plays out, but i do know, i do feel like there's an opportunity there. i feel like pressure on all

three of them makes potentially some difference in this, not to be giving you guys an idea what to be doing in the next few weeks. i feel like there's an opportunity there, a definite opportunity more than i would have thought at this point, but they need to be pushed. >> the other thing that would really help here is if the public opinion numbers, at least in the polls, started coming up, up for the president of easy but also just over around health reform. and too fast for to the part of what do you all do next, i mean, it's pretty darn clear that kaiser family foundation, harvard, tracking poll or -- not their tracking poll, the tracking poll shows, specifically the poll they did in the massachusetts voters after the election, show that if you start taking the pieces a part of what's in the bill, they have very high favorability ratings among the public. so i think a very important agenda at this point is to educate people as to the

specifics of what's in the legislation. people like the specifics. they hate the whole thing. go figure. right? that there's an opportunity i think there, such that if you could at least start bumping those numbers forward a bit. and frankly, rebounding of the economy probably is going to produce a little bit more satisfaction of the public not withstand what's happened with the job numbers. but if they can just at least the sort of a light at the end of the tunnel on the public opinion side, i think that's going to plug them up. the other thing is, frankly, if christine ferguson were here, christine was john's health person for a long, long time. christine would say there's nothing that it helps more than starting to get people lots of awards and recognition for things. you know, so this is the time to go and throw, you know, think of, you know, best congressmen ever on, you know, something.

and just are giving people award and recognition. and telling them you've got their backs for the election. because for the democrats in the house, this is all about the election. this is all about november. and they can't see beyond november. so anything that tells them that you're going to be there for them during the course of the campaign and help them along the way, and help them, give them cover to vote for this, can only hope that it can't hurt. >> i want to -- is a good segue to question i want to ask. if you were thinking through the political consequences for democrats in the congress, and perhaps less so for the president, what do you think the political equation is in terms

of passing or not passing reform? you've got certainly blue dogs in districts that are more conservative, or less amenable to health reform, but they are the ones in the tightest margin districts. i'm just wondering, how do you each assess the politics for democratic members if they fail to pass health reform? so i'm going to go this way and start with you, jonathan. >> well, i mean, i mean, like as a was saying before, i think the political logic of this is unbelievable compelling. the way i would put it to all that is they just have to decide what that one word is, is it you voted for that horrible, awful, liberal government takeover of health care the past? or is it, you know, you voted for that horrible, awful liberal government takeover of health care that almost passed? it's the same.

you're going to run against it anyway. i'm thinking of the campaign. i want to go into that campaign being able to defend that, because we all know how well works when i was forced to do something before i was against something. we've all tried that. and i think you keep hyping the early stuff and is not too much early as i would like. the irony is on the -- in order to make them more conservative voters have you had to cut the bill down to size, because it was cut now there is less to run an. okay, whatever. i will get over that. there are things to run on, and i think that is a straightforward just on the obvious, that's the case to make is that you're going to get attacked on this, and this is -- you know, you are going to be painted as, you're best off of having something to show for it. by the way, i think i'm surprised more people don't --

the mechanics of a signing ceremony are always good. passing a law is going to mean a lot of this, the media, it's a failure, we're going along, trudging along, this endless process. bring it to a closure, having the bill signed. that will help the poll numbers a bit and i think i'm surprised more don't see that. but you know, whatever. these are members of congress, not human beings. [laughter] >> susan? >> i tend to agree. i think that a really interesting question -- first of all, we all know that success breeds its own sense of success. success is just a better come and even if people -- since we can assume that a large portion of the american bubble will still not understand what's in the bill, they will, nonetheless, there will be this sort of aura if things are passed, if things are accomplished will be the sense of victory, which is the other key words which unfortunate

those words don't spell. but that's a critical word here, victory. so that will be -- that will be very helpful in energizing obviously all the democrats in getting people to turn out. i think there's an interesting -- the interesting question for me is, you know, if you look at what the republicans are saying, even those the house republicans who put forward a bill, you know, that bill basically says we don't care about universal coverage. because that bill at most, i think the cbo scored it as picking up 3 million, right? so there's of course, the concerns the middle-class have about premiums, about stability of insurance coverage, but for those who still care about universal coverage or getting toward it, the republicans have nothing to say on that subject. and so, to the degree that there is the capability of routing a

lot of people in america who frankly don't vote, because that's why the republican can walk away from this population. a lot of them don't vote. but a lot of you represent those communities. and if there can be some sort of marshaling of that so that you can get a turnout in november that will reward people for having delivered on this, that is going to be extremely important. and i know that the white house is still in this mode of, we are calling this health insurance reform. i don't think they can do that anymore. i think they had to go back to sort of ted kennedy universal coverage and speak to that population. i do think they have to talk about health insurance reform for the middle-class. in the other thing they have to do is talk about the delivery system reform pieces that are in the legislation that are going to slow the rate of growth of health spending. because it easily put together the coalition's of people who care about health reform, it's

the people who care about universal coverage. about insurance reform and the people who care about not having a fiscal nightmare at the end of this whole process. and you've got to speak to all of those constituencies and say, you, this is not a perfect bill for any of those purposes, but it is a whole lot more than anybody ever expected across the board in those three areas. and the time is now. >> so how many of you all are on the fence? on dark there's a lastly, my friend was up on the hill and he told me he just wanted to run around like sarah connor, shaking people saying you don't understand. you are already did. everybody dies. [laughter] >> and that is the political logic of passing health care reform. if they don't do it, everybody dies. all of them. they all go down. the base doesn't move. the base sees losers, which they are.

the other sides hate the bill. i just want to do one thing. went health bill was fading lastly, my friend who is a very nice guy, even if he has a tennessee to write articles like this one, wrote a piece about if i think barack obama did wrong on health care reform. and i went over to newsweek, and michael hearst had written the five things barack obama did wrong in his first year. and one thing to know about the media is my colleagues are very, very, very bad at their jobs. is you work backwards from outcomes, right? oh, so he fail. what contributed to failure. well, the overreach, too liberal, whatever. if you succeed, my god, how did they make that happen? now five things barack obama did write. we amplify outcomes. we can to keep things in perspective by definition of the way we do our work. we amplify outcomes that if this bill they will fail in a much worse bill than it was. if it passes, albeit maybe not

at this point, but generally speaking it will have been a better built than it was. two other quick points. one, we should not mr. the fact that health care fails then the people who actually die our real people. that if all the congressmen did not get health care insurance, and let some version of this bill went through, i guarantee you we would strike a deal. frankly, we can probably strike a deal -- [applause] >> sometimes you can strike a deal if you just give somebody an ipad. the distance between here and there is not that great. so there is also a moral case which i think people miss. i remember evan bayh last week speaking about, he was saying that these guys, they might need sort of armageddon. they might need such a calamity to get this into their heads. and he wasn't talking about hundreds of thousands of people dying necessary, of the election going the wrong way for democrats. for them to become more moderate. so i think these are individual human beings who at some point here have to be held accountable

on a moral calculus. and whether or not they are, and whether or not at the end of the day when they sit down and think about what's happening tomorrow, they think my god, i can live with myself if i let these people down, is a genuinely i believe going to play a part in this. but the last real quick thing, we have to be very clear on what they are afraid of. it is not the bill. they know they are tied to the bill. it is a process. if you ask them why they are not ready to do reconciliation, is because they are afraid of being seen to craft. what has made americans, the reason all the component parts are popular is the process. there is nothing human beings hate more than congress. they are probably right in their judgment. but this is something president had a lot of trouble to get out, and so too has congress. the only way you can pass is to go through this process and make everyone hate you legislation. how do you pass? i think the answer that i think the bush administration, when

they were being able to pass things, was you just bear it. you just get through it and you will be more popular when you're done. that may or may not work but it is frankly the only chance they have because there is no, as susan said, there is no tear back bill. there's no magical pony that will save the democrats you. it's this bill or everybody dies. >> i want to ask each of you a question, no probably sound like a rhetorical question. if there was a role reversal and it were the republicans who were pushing the legislation, what would they be doing right now? >> well, we saw it in 2003 with the passage of the medicare modernization act, exactly what they did. and as we know, that barely squeaked through with the famous three-hour vote. which is the other important point to make your, which is that no matter what anybody tells you what the rules are, they make up the rules as they go along. right? ansell particularly on the senate side.

they can pretty much figure out a way, if they want to, to do what they want. so that said, what happened in 2003, you know, there was not even support within the republican ranks to pass that legislation. there was a huge dispute over whether it was an entitlement or whether privatization of medicare, whether it was good or bad, there will was some democratic support, but clearly the bulk of would not going to vote for. so what did they do? they just kept at it. and they did, you know, a dark of night series of backroom deals. >> and what about the budget? >> and no pay for it. and there's a lot you can do in this town if you aren't -- if you're going to pass a 400 billion-dollar plus benefit and not pay for it. i mean, it's amazing. even among republicans, who arguably should have been crying foul, and some of them obviously were, but they just did it.

and basically the calculus that was just discussed was the one that prevailed, which is once it's done, people are going to like it. you know, once you have a benefit in place, the money is flowing, and look, you know, i have to say for all of the democratic opposition, and all of the argument about repealing that that you heard from the democratic side, they haven't done that. and they haven't even done that now. i mean, nobody is talking about undoing medicare part b. they want to modify some of the board and pieces of it, get one of the donut hole, all that. but the structure having passed, even though many democrats wouldn't do that is why, again, they're going to leave it alone because it is done. and it's something to build on. and they recognized at the end of the day it's better to get people to the covered rather than that. so i think you just -- it's exactly as was saying, and as

jonathan said, you tough it out. and basically you get it done fast. you know, because the longer it drags out, the more as one of the cartoons in the post this morning has a picture of a dead fish, and it's labeled health reform. up on a single day, rabbit, i will take it. [laughter] >> the dead fish is just going to smell worse and worse, unless you turn public opinion around and get this done fast. >> yes. what the republicans would be doing if they were here now is they would have moved on their agenda because they would've passed the six months ago. they move fast. and actually, we are kicking the democrats around a lot. they deserve a lot of kicking. i plan to keep on kicking them. a lot of us will be kicking them. i do think in fairness and to give them some credit, you know, they did this the hard way. in some ways how this turns out,

it's weird to be second-guessing. it's very weird to be second-guessing because it's not done yet and because michael was the massachusetts primary and what having something like a victory let. there's a fair amount of chance at the end of lee's this outcome are not out, or where ever we are. you think about the medicare part b and the games they've played. this administration, this congress, i mean, they have produced a bill that they were determined was going to be scored by the congressional budget office as paying for itself and many the curve over the long run, in some way, shape, or form. at the. at the end of the date they did do a whole lot of her bending, and that barely pays for itself. that that's a pretty high standard to me. they made a hard on himself. believe in, there will be no excise tax if they were determined to do that. that is the huge sticking point.

i remember and it goes to the broadway of the approach, obama getting an interview, a loud you may have read it. are in the process when he was talking about how to save money and health care. he had this long discussion. he would get many more times about his grandmother, when she was dying and how you decide what treatments work and don't work. and we spent so much money on things. i remember reading that and thinking that is an adult conversation try to have with the united states of america. [laughter] >> and i was thrilled because, yeah, i thought that was a great thing. and i don't think i was the first to say this but i wrote, not too far leap from that to you are pulling the plug on grandma. i think this whole thing is the way you can do it this way. i guess i'm not really answering the question now, but thinking about the democrats and as much as we're beating up on them, i think this is important to get through. in part it shows you can do.

you on a secret policy in united states of america. that's what they try to do. what ever they did wrong and whatever people don't like about the bill, to their credit they stuck to that. i admire that, and one of the things one of the many things that worry me about what's happening out if this doesn't pass is will have a conclusive verdict that you can't do that the only way is to do what republicans did under medicare part d, and just throw out the rules and did it know responsibly. i prefer to think we don't live in that kind of world. but i'm not sure. >> ezra as a lifelong republican what would your colleagues to? >> i like to sort of thing that, i was talking to jonathan about his or her, but i'm sort of a liberal. i think we do live in that world. i think the primary impediment change is the rules of the united states senate. i think the idea of democrats had this absurd notion that there is some principled way to

save hundreds of thousands of lives, and whether not you make it -- you do it that way is more important or whether you do it, a shocking, absolutely shocking. and so i think that one thing you have seen, i think johnson's question, we will go with that. is that they put a lot of time, as john says, into constructing a policy that would work for what is fundamentally a broken dysfunctional, dilapidated political system. so it is structured in most industries bought off. they made it very, very moderate. the joke about the fact we were talking about huge transformation and have incremental. we're talking about 4 percent of the annual spending in a given year. and we're not touching insurance of 90 percent of americans. we really are not. we're doing much, much less that we need to do. you have to do that. you have to build that you have

to be instrumental. they try to create this beautiful, delicate copper might between visions of the left and the right. what they don't get i think is what they did not do is to figure out how to create a process. and that was i think as we look back, the truly problematic mistake. that they didn't i think existed in of what time does to legislation in the united states congress. that it is unstoppable trend towards unpopular it doesn't matter what legislation you're talking about. they didn't realize with everyday that goes by, the people who care about this bill are making another copper my so they like it less. so that by the end of it the people who hate are at maximum level of enthusiasm. and it just what goes on and on like that. that more time for just that it's more time for my colleagues for process and back rooms.

scandals, and infighting. it's all about speed here. and i think what they need to understand going forward, and not only this, the end of this process, but the next one and one after that and the one after that and the one after that, is that the american people hate american politics. and that if they're going to get things done they're going to have to prize getting things done over the bodies in which they get them done. and i think republicans, to the great credit, get that. and i say that without it a trace of sarcasm. they are right to think that it is more important of what they do instead of how they do. i don't think medicare part d was a really good bill, but if they get, granting them that premise they were dead right on how they did it. and it's a lesson democrats should learn. >> so i want to ask each of you, i think that passing this bill

probably the biggest political impediment on capitol hill, are those in the more moderate or conservative districts, the so-called blue dog. i don't mean to suggest they are the only impediment. there are folks on the left and the right who have concerns about the process that we thought as the pathway to get this done. but i think at the end of the day, it's the blue dogs that are going to be probably the last and most difficult to come over and vote for this bill. assess their interest and how you would speak to those interests. so i don't know who wants to go first on that one? >> well, obviously the number one issue for the blue dogs, other than surviving november, the substantive issue for them on health reform is bending the curb by and large. in some way out of the fiscal

armageddon that awaits us. so i think that, again, these are complicated issues, let's just look at what's at stake here. we have 70 percent of the gross domestic product devoted now to help there. you cannot possible that moderates the growth of that. there is no law that could be passed that would do that. that the american people would accept. so bending the curve itself is going to be a long, long process. and the point of this bill, what is good in it, is it lays the groundwork, assuming the secretary seizes the reins because all of this is contained in the magical work of the secretary shall. by the secretary shall set up these pilot projects, etc., etc. that has to be the peace that is played up for the blue dogs. you know, so if i were at the

white house, what i would be doing his thing out a way that once a week for the next six weeks, secretary sebelius and others get up and launch a new pilot project already with whatever executive authority they have to start doing this, and start laying of the systems that do exist in this country that have already met the curve in terms to the system. and they are out there. and it's basically just going to be reminded the blue dogs that this is possible. and then it's going to be coming up with some kind of a deal finally, and you see the president now doing this, to deal with the other undone big issue, which is going to be a big medicare reform. because everybody knows that once health reform is done, the next big conversation is overhaul of medicare and medicaid reform. college and haven't reform, call it whatever you want, but basically figure out a way to get that on a path of stability

or something closer to stability than what we have now. so i think it's all about talking about those pieces. go back to what i said earlier. you've got to talk about the things that matter to the populations that matter for them. that's the number one piece that matters. >> i think to what extent i would say off the same generic advice i would offer to a liberal member of congress. i actually think to some extent, there's ideological issues but there's issues of freshmen versus non-freshman. the ones who are safer as the ones that are not as a. and i guess i would say to the blue dogs, particularly though that you have a choice here. this election is going to potentially be about the obama presidency, and how it's going. and the referendum on the. so you have two choices. you can make the choice to basically be the guy who is not in favor of the obama presidency because you didn't support that health care bill, which is great except i guarantee you whoever

you are running against is going to be more opposed to the obama presidency than you are. you're not going to win that race. if this becomes a who is more opposed to the obama presidency, who is more opposed to the health care bill, you're going to lose. that is a given. or you can try to do things that make the obama presidency and make health care reform not a liability. and an asset. and that's true of the health care bill generally. you know, again, this would work for them to also. there's a lot of money in there for hiring nurses and direct care workers and training people. photo ops. go to the job training there. have an event where they are breaking ground on a new community clinic somewhere. these are good, generic photo ops. things you can run on that are tangible. senior citizens, they voted off year election. these are good things you can do to build it up. but also, keep in mind the effect of the obama presidency.

the obama presidency is not going to have a good year. it's just done. and his idea we can move onto jobs after it, well, you're not going to get more on jobs and health care guys and their political capital is gone. the truth is that hoping i can helping health care reform, both of these are in your interest. because the other decision is to run against these things that you're not going to be as against as a republican. you will lose that fight. this is your best shot. >> i think the blue dogs are probably the most interesting people in washington. the plot doesn't make any sense. and you don't think the writers can wrap all this up. like blue dogs, as susan says, their issue is that the deficit. hole and simple. except when they vote to repeal the estate tax, blow the deficit

up. the war supplement. you go right down the line. that's what makes it very hard to compromise here. because the issue isn't the deficit that it is perception of the deficit. and above that perception, different bills. now the problem for health care reform is that it is built in series with beckham and actually agreement with this premise, with the premise of that nobody believes it reduces the deficit. 60% think it increases it. 15% think it reduces. the rest don't know. so you do end up in sort of this political advice which i think is a very difficult place to be. because who knows? i mean, it is very hard to say what will help an individual blue dogs in their district. one thing i would say it's a mistake i think that a lot of people in this whole process made. the mental amount of lies, take ben nelson as an example. if i make moderate democrats in a state and i want to vote on a

little bill, how do i do? the answer they gave was i appear very ambivalent on it. this isn't where i want to be. it doesn't have a lot of things i want to do. we need to reduce the deficit more. if you wait a long time doing that, then at the end you do two things. you cut a deal to make it a more moderate bill, and you cut a deal to bring something back to your state or district. then it turned out those things didn't work. what you did during that whole period when you and all of your friends were saying this is a very good bill, you just convince everyone. your constituents didn't know you were playing for numbers. now they don't think it's a very good bill. now they just think, they don't like to go and they also don't like you. this is a problem. so i would strongly strongly, strongly suggest that what is dubbed it is going on tv. this goes for all the liberals and all of them and say, this bill, it's not my first choice or my second or my third, but somewhere over there.

or this bill doesn't do the things i wanted to do but it's probably a good start. there is a complete inability on the part of democrats to stand up and say, this bill, sure, maybe not where i am but this is a great deal. this is the biggest step forward we have had in society. this will save countless lives, prevent countless medical bankruptcy. on the night of brown's election, it just says we are sorry that our candidate decided to repeal the insult of the red sox and mock the voter, but health care is a very important thing and we're going to move forward. we would not be in a situation. but one thing is if the blue dogs are not going to be the people out there reminding their constituencies what is good in this bill, you have to ask yourself, who is. >> i want to make an observation. i don't know whether maybe you want to respond to it or not, we'll just move to the next question. it strikes me that blue dogs

actually have the most to lose and health reform if it doesn't pass for two reasons. one is there in the most marginal districts. by definition. they are democrats in more conservative districts. and typically, when parties switches over, as republicans saw in the last election, if we don't pass something it would strike me that the folks who are most movable of losing our those in those marginal districts. and the second irony is that in the more conservative districts, you've got less of a safety net for people who are uninsured or underinsured. you got higher rates of people without health coverage. those are the places that are going to be help the most by this legislation. so it strikes me there's somewhat of an irony. i don't know whether any of you want to comment on a.

>> let's add a further irony, if this goes down, what is the vehicle to moderate the rate of growth spending? and where is the next bill going to come for that does nothing that bad and doesn't do with all these other factors. if you take them at the work that they really do care as ezra says about the deficit and debt, then this has to pass. because there is not going to be another vehicle that comes along. you know, to talk further about the contrast between what people say and then what they do, if you ask the house republicans, for example, do you like was in this bill, do you like the independent medicare advisory board that's in the senate bill, which is in chile would take away from congress from itself, basically in terms of making decisions about medicare. they don't like it. because they don't want the power taken away from the. but yet they want somehow

medicare to be fixed. right? so if we assume that there are rare moments of rationality among some of these folks, then this has to go forward, and i think if there is hope, it's going to be appealing to those in the party. and there are, among the blue dogs, and there are people will understand that and understand that this is not going to happen independent of this broader vehicle. >> i'm going to ask one last question with respect to the process, and then i want to talk about, have you talk about the post enactment base. yesterday we saw in the "new york times" rahm emanuel was quoted, perhaps not surprisingly, saying that the next things that are going to get the attention of congress before we complete health reform

our jobs legislation, bank regulation, and we also know that the final bill, there are some steps that need to be taken that they have not yet reached full agreement in terms of how to work out the differences between the house and senate. they got to talk to the senate parliamentarian to determine what could be included in a reconciliation bill. they've got to get a score from the congressional budget office. they've got to work out the sequencing process for passing the senate bill and the house, and the reconciliation. there are things that need to be done. you raise a question, susan, before about timing. and it seems to me there may be a balance here. on the one hand, timing is not on our side. we don't want to move this, how does take much longer.

on the other hand, the grieving process has not completed, and having time for grief might actually make folks more determined to move forward you want to talk a little bit about the challenge of timing? >> sure. i don't believe that it is a good idea. i want to say one thing i think that people need to be clear on because it needs to be communicated very clearly. there are two ways that health care reform dies. and they don't look like these. here's what they don't look like. they do not look like rahm emanuel comes out of says, we're not doing health care reform in the. we don't like it. and it's not look like health care reform. it will not die in either of those ways, i promise you. here's what it will do, if it does. number one, rahm emanuel and other democrats will come out and say we are committed to health care reform, always have been. this is a key priority. it's why we are in washington. we're just not going to do it

right now. that's number one. and number two, is karabakh. is we get some magical, you know, your insurance comic and are no more recessions. this is a great victory for the american people. but that article scared me much more than anything else has so far. because the way this goes down, is that it grows old and it dies. like other organic matter. and i think this needs to be called out. if you manually sync that he needs to be called that by people who care about those as the death of health care reform. because you can't run that timetable. you can't do jobs, and i don't know, he things jobs will be passed by tuesday at noon. i'm pretty sure it would take longer. then he doesn't even have a bill, it should be noted. you don't have the vote for banking, number one. that will be your election issue.

number two, so we will turn to this in mid-october? nobody will be there. even in the summer, before the summer and everybody is already back on campaigning. this goes to only doesn't move. then there's the reconciliation which expires when the new budget, and there's disagreement on actually what it is when the new budget is taken up for an active. but either way that legislation instruction you can pass. but the white house last week and maybe john hesser dissent, they were telling me, the president didn't set a timetable in his speech that he did need to. we all know. so this goes quicker. or it doesn't go. one thing that nobody should let anybody get away with, is suggesting it is viable. or honest. to say that we will just do this after we do everything else but we are still going to do it. this moves or it doesn't move. >> we all know rahm emanuel.

is a very smart guy. i read that as what they're going to do is just for a few weeks, take this off the front page. while the deal is negotiated behind the scenes. there's no lack of will in the white house to do this and to push this forward. i thought that was all about transfixing, you, transit is a politically deeply calculating animal. and very effective because of a. and he is saying we are going to yank this off the front page. we're going to put jobs on the front page for the next three weeks. shift the conversation, while pelosi and everybody else behind the scenes figures out how to do that. that's what i took away from that. >> my understanding, from my reporting on the white house is that rahm wants to cut paste. there is argument in the white house good on right now. rahm wants to tear back.

the reason there was not a clear a duration of intent and the white house for a while after massachusetts, when all those were screaming for direction, was because the white house was divided about how to move. so i think you're completely right, that is one outcome of what we're talking about here. but i also think that it's that way of moving forward scares me because that is another way of saying they are keeping their options to get that when you take it off the front pages for a while which maybe you need to do, it also makes it easier to back off. it also somehow makes it harder to put it back on. they don't necessarily want to made a choice to kill health care in the congress, but they don't also really want to do the work to pass it at the moment, they just don't want to do this anymore. they are tired. they are tired of health care reform. and so, i do think that there