help american make these very hard decisions and i worry about this decision. >> they couldn't have gotten the constitution if it hadn't been debated on c-span. >> all i say here that corporations don't want to be paid to for the most part. they've had many ways over many years to pour more money into the political process if they wanted to and they've chosen not to and that is most corporations in america. to cross that line and all of a sudden decide as a corporation i want to defeat lindsey graham in south carolina and those corporations are in san francisco, boston, new york city could very well be the single biggest favor you can do for lindsey graham to guarantee the reelection because he will make a huge issue out of that >> good morning.

good morning, and welcome, it is great to see all of you bright eyed and energetic. we have a great session this morning. before we start, i thought i

would do two quick things of business. last night,çó the illinois campaign for better health care representative decided that he was born to be a little creative -- going to be a little creative. he broke out the words "budget reconciliation process." and then he wondered what words you could not make out of those letters and what words can you make out of those letters. i am going to read what you can can't not do. -- cannot do. you cannot spell the word filibuster. you can't spell out the word pass and pledge.

you cannot spell out the word lieberman. [laughter] you can use those letters for pelosi, reed. you can use those letters for the word urgent. >you cannot for the words lobbyist win. you cared for the word wimpy. you can for the word boalld. you can for the word "get a spine." for those of you, that are more hispanic lee inclined --

hispanic lely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @n

throughout capitol hill. it describes how frequently the reconciliation process has been used. there have been nine bills -- a 19 bills -- 19 bills enacted into law for the reconciliation act. there were three others that past but were vetoed by the president. -- that passed, but were vetoed by the president. in 1996, it was passed through budget reconciliation. the two major tax cuts by president bush in 2001 and 2003, are interestingly, the reconciliation process is designed to reduce the enicit,

but in 2001, it was the only reconciliation bill that passed that increased the deficit. with respect to health care, so many of you care about the children's health insurance program. that was an active reconciliation and you all know aboutñr cobra. those of you that were laid ndf and continue to get coverage by paying in. do you know what cobra stands for? the consolidated omnibus budget reconciliation act. cobra actually has the word reconciliation in it when itñi s passed in 1985.

when you are a lot to talk about this extraordinary process, please remember that this has been used with great frequency. turning to our wonderful program, we have a three of the most thoughtful journalists and people that really care about america's health-care system who have joined us on a saturday morning. in no particular order, i will start on my left. he is a blocker that writes a periodic column for the washington post. he was formerly associate editor for "american prospect."

his work has appeared in the " washington times" and other publications. he interviewed a couple of years ago, a man that said the following. he said that ezra was very top of very good, and very, very young because when ezra interviewed him in a restaurant, he was carded. >> i think he was just tell us about that. >> i think thatezra is even -- i think ezra is more proud that rush limbaugh called him a rising star.

i do not know how to take that. [laughter] [applause] >> what came after that was somewhat less complimentary, but you'll never see that on the back of my book. don't worry. >> seated to my immediate right is susan. she is the editor in chief of the nation's leading journal of health policy. she has been, for quite awhile, the auditor analyst on health issues -- the news analyst on health issues. she has been a columnist for " u.s. news and world report." çóher work on television includd appearances as a regular analyst and commentator on cnn.

she was a nieman fellow at harvard university, and if i read to you all the accolades and prizes that she has won four terrific work, we will not have the presentation this morning. . . the author of the book sick, the untold story of america's

health care crisis. and the people who pay the price. and he's a senior fellow at the think tank demos. so please give a warm welcome to these -- this wonderful group. [applause] it's a privilege to be with them this morning. when we first discussed this, we thought we would have health reform done already. and we were going to talk about the future of the health reform movement after -- and we'll talk some about that. but we've got some other things i guess we need to address first. so i'm going to ask each of you first, give your own take about where you think we are today with respect to the fight to get health reform legislation through the finish line. so i'm going to start first on my left and we'll do it in

other orders on other questions. >> i think you could -- well, thankbe=u2ujrp+ing me. good morning. i think you could say there's good news and there's bad news. and as has been happening recently in the news cycle, we'll begin with the bad. the democrats don't really know how to move forward. we can tell them. but for reasons that escape rational thought they don't seem to themselves know. the good news is what they do know is they can't move backward. that there be dragons. and this is not they well know 1994. they cannot pretend that the bill never came to the floor, wasn't their fault. they all voted for it. it passed their chambers. they've brought david ploufe to run the campaign and he wrote an op-ed for my paper saying you have to pass this bill because if you don't you're

still running on this bill. the difference between passing a bill and not passing a bill and you get to run on the bill or a caricature of the bill. but that's basically where we are. that the upside to the situation is that all logic, all moral decency, all disinterested observers say you have to pass a bill. you have votes to do it. here's how you do it. the downside is we're dealing with congressional democrats. and they can be a tricky lot to herd. >> susan, what's your take on it? >> well, ron, i saw that you were quoted yesterday as saying that the initial reaction of the democrats was one of grief. and if i remember my elizabeth coobler roswell enough, they have to move from grief through denial first before they get to acceptance. and i think that we're in the denial phase at this point. which is that they really are

still not only paralyzed with the sense of how to move forward, fut just a denial that they have to make a decision fast. which they do. i mean, the legislative time clock is tight. this is an election year. they really have to move very, very swiftly to get anything done. whichever course they take. i suspect that where they will evolve, once they move on to denial to acceptance, is a kind of a two-track approach. one of which will be to look to do the reconciliation business. the other, it's pretty clear, republicans yesterday, at least in terms of the popular perception, they have to look like they're negotiating with the republicans to find some kind of a compromise. they just do. because of the polarization of the political environment. and unless they do that, they can't keep quietly negotiating how to do the reconciliation,

which is in effect the one that's going to prevail. because nebraska who tells you that there's -- because anybody who tells you that there's going to be a meeting of the minds around a narrower proposal that the republicans and democrats can agree on is just garbage. it's just garbage. there just is not -- we had a breakfast a couple of weeks ago with dave camp who's the ranking member on the ways and means committee. who kept talking about common ground. and david brooks from the times was there and said, i hear you talking about common ground. i don't even see common pebbles here. there's really not a meeting of the minds. but i think perperception they've got to continue this notion that there's some kind of negotiation while working through the reconciliation. that's the only realistic strategy and hope they move through denial to the acceptance of that as quickly as possible. >> jonathan. >> let me preface this by saying e. -- by saying ezara, i've been a bit of a yo-yo.

temperamentally about this lately. and i remember last week, i don't know how many of you remember what happened,4what day, thursday was a very bad day last week. house democrats, it was bad. and actually i was getting on a plane with my kids and wife to go to florida. and hiding the blackberry so the stewardesses and flight attendants don't shut me down. i get an email from someone who i talked to. and the message is just dead. so i said -- i emailed back and said, only mostly dead? question mark? hopefully? [laughter] and i got back, no, dead, bleeping, didn't say bleeping, dead bleeping dead. and i got on the plane and my kids were -- my 10-year-old, are you ok? i just sat there staring at the seat in front of me. i hadn't felt like this since the red sox blew game seven in 2003. that sick pit to my stomach. but i got off the plane. and i didn't check my ismael

that night i was so depressed -- my email that night i was so depressed and the next person emailed back and said "alive." [laughter] so with the caveat that i'm all over the map on this, i actually just being here yesterday, and talking to people, relatively -- cautious will he but relatively enthusiastic certainly compared to where i was last week. and the reason i'm enthusiastic is there is more work has been done than i realized. we're not seeing it. i don't know much about it or i would be writing about it but there is more work going on behind the scenes among the people in congress who really want this to happen. the leadership, the committee chairs, they've made a lot of progress on figuring out this formula. the hard part is once they get this agreement, and we all know how this is going to happen. there's going to be -- they want to pass the senate bill and pass a fix in the reconciliation process. the stages, they have to come to agreement on what

thatization. and then they actually have to go through this long process of actually convincing all their members to do it. they have to get it scored. they have to then deal with the senate parliament aaron and this whole -- and we're learning that reconciliation, you don't -- 60 votes, you don't need 60 but it can go slowly. the other party can obstruct. so there's a long process. and what i think -- the great unnone is i don't know if it's a collective action problem but

message what to be doing in the next few weeks. but i feel like there's -- there's an opportunity there. a definite opportunity. more than i would have thought at this point. but they need to be pushed. >> the other thing that would really help here is if the public opinion numbers at least in the polls started coming up. for the president obviously. but also just over around health reform. and to fast forward to the part of what do you all do next, it's pretty darn clear the kaiser family foundation, harvard tracking poll, or not the tracking -- the tracking poll shows -- i'm thinking specifically of the poll they did at the massachusetts -- of

the massachusetts voters after the election, show that if you start taking the pieces of what's in the bills they have very high favorability ratings among the public. so a very important agenda at this point is to educate people as to the specifics of what's in the legislation. people like the specifics. they hate the whole thing. go figure. right? but there's an opportunity, i think, there. such that if you could at least start bumping those numbers forward a bit, and frankly, the rebound of the economy probably is going to produce some -- a little bit more satisfaction with the public, notwithstanding what's happening with the job numbers. but if they can just at least see sort of the light at the end of the tunnel on the public opinion side, i think that's going to buck them up. the other thing is, frankly, if christine ferguson were here, christine was john chafee's health person for a long, long time. christine would say there's nothing that helps more than

starting to give people lots of awards and recognition for things. you know, this is the time to go and throw, you know, think of, you know, best congressman ever on something. and just start giving people awards and recognition. and telling them you're -- you got their backes. for the election. because -- for the democrats in the house, this is all about the election. this is all about november. and they can't see beyond november. so anything that tells them that you're going to be there for them during the course of the campaign, and help them along the way, and help them, give them cover to vote for this, can only help. it can't hurt. >> i want to -- a good segue to a question i wanted to ask politically. if you were -- if you were thinking through the political

consequences for democrats in the congress and perhaps less so for the president, what do you think the political equation is in terms of passing or not passing reform? you've got certainly blue dogs who are in districts that are more conservative. are less amenable to health reform. but they're the ones in the tightest margin districts. i'm just wondering how do you each assess the politics for democratic members if they fail to pass health reform? so i'm going to go this way and start with you, jonathan. >> well, i mean, like ezra was saying, i think the political logic of this is unbelievably compelling. i mean, the way i would put it to all of them, is they have to decide what that one word is,

you voted for that horrible, awful liberal golvet takeover of -- government takeover of health care that passed or you voted for that horrible awful liberal government take joseph of -- takeover that almost passed. i want to go into that campaign being able to defend that vote. because we all know how it works when i was for something before i was against something. we've tried that. and i think you keep hyping the early stuff. and there's not as you have early as i would like. because we -- the ironies on the ironies on the ironies of this, in order to make the more conservative voters happy, cut the bill down to size because the bill was cut down to size and there's less to run on. but ok, whatever. i'll get over that. there are things to run on. and i think that's a straightforward, the obvious, the case to make, is that you're going to get attacked on

this. and this is -- you are going to be painted as supporting this. and your -- you're best off having something to show for it. and i think i'm -- i'm surprised more people, the mechanics of -- the mechanics of assigning -- of a signing ceremony are always good. passing a law is good. a lot of this is -- there's this -- a failure, we're going along and trudging along and this endless process. bring it to a closure of having the bill signed. that will help the poll numbers a little bit. and whatever, these are members of congress. not human beings. [laughter] >> susan. >> i tend to agree. i think that the -- a really interesting question, first of all, we all know that success breeds its own sense of success, right? success is just better. and even if people -- and since we can assume that a large

portion of the american public will still not understand what's in the bill, they will nonetheless, there will be this aurea if things are passed, if things are accomplished and there will be this sense of victory which is the other key word that unfortunately those letters don't spell. but that's the critical word, "victory." so that will be -- that will be very helpful. and energizing obviously all the democrats and getting people to turn out. i think there's an interesting -- the interesting question for me is if you look at what the republicans are saying, even those -- the house republicans who put forward a bill, that bill basically says we don't care about universal coverage. right? because that bill at most, i think the c.b.o. scored it as picking up three million, right? so there's -- of course the concerns the middle class has about premiums, about the stability of insurance

coverage, but for those who still care about universal coverage or getting toward it, the republicans have nothing to say on that subject. and so to the degree that there is -- the capability of rallying a lot of people in america who frankly don't vote, because that's -- that's why the republicans can walk away from this population. a lot of them don't vote. but a lot of you represent those communities. you know, and if there can be some sort of marshaling of that force so you can get a turnout in november that will reward people for having delivered on this, that is going to be extremely important. and i know that the white house is still in this mode of we're calling this health insurance reform. i don't think they can do that anymore. i think they have to go back to sort of the ted kennedy universal coverage and speak to that!population. i do think they have to talk about health insurance reform

for the middle class. and the other thing they have to do is talk about the delivery system reform pieces that are in the legislation that are going to slow the rate of growth of health spending. because if you sort of put together the coalitions of people who care about health reform, it's about the people who care about universal coverage, it's the people who care about insurance reform and it's the people who care about not having a fiscal nightmare at the end of this whole progresses. and you got to speak to all of those constituencies and say it's not a perfect bill for any of those purposes. but it's a whole lot more than anybody ever expected across the board in those three areas. and the time is now. >> so how many of you all are terminator fans? on dark thursday last week, my friend, matt iglesias, was on the hill and said he wanted to run around like sarah connor shaking people saying you don't understand, you're already dead. everybody dies. [laughter]

and that's the political logic. of passing health care reform. if they don't do it, everybody dies. all of them. they all go down. the base doesn't move. the base sees them as losers, which they are. the other side hates the bill. and i just want to note one thing. when health care was failing last week i surfed over to my friends at "time" magazine. and my friend, mike sheer, who's a very nice guy and even if -- wrote a piece about the five things barack obama did wrong on health care reform. and then i went over to news week and michael hirsch had written the five things barack obama did wrong in his first year. and one thing to know about the media, because my colleagues are very, very, very bad at their jobs, is you work backward from outcomes, right? oh, so we failed. all right. well, what contributed to failure? well, overreach, it was too liberal, whatever. you succeed. well, my god, how did they make

that happen? you have the five things barack obama did right. we amplify outcomes. we cannot keep things in perspective by definition the way we do our work. we amplify outcomes. if this bill fails, it's a much worse bill nanne it ever was. if it passes, it will have been a better bill than it was. two other quick points. one, we should not miss here the fact that if health care fails, then the people who actually die are real people. that if all the congressmen did not get health care insurance, unless some version of this bill went through, i guarantee you, we would strike a deal. frankly, we could probably strike a deal. [laughter] sometimes when i -- you can strike a deal if you promise everybody an spad. -- an ipad. the difference between here and there is not that great. there's also a moral case which i think people miss. i remember evan bayh speaking about you're saying that these guys, they might need armageddon or such a clamity to

get this into their heads. and he wasn't talking about hundreds of thousands of people dying unnecessarily with an election going the wrong way for democrats in order for them to become more moderate. and these are individual human beings at some point have to be held account on a moral calculus. and whether or not they are, and whether or not at the end of the day, when they sit down in the dark of the room at night and think about what's happening tomorrow, they think my god i can't live with myself. if i let these people down. i generally believe going to play a part in this. but the last quick thing, you have to be very clear on what they're afraid of. it is not the bill. they know they're tied to the bill. it is the process. if you ask them why they are not ready to do reconciliation, it is because they are afraid of being seen to craft another back room deal. what has made americans hate the bill, the reason all the compone parts are popular -- component parts are the process. there is nothing people hate

more than congress. and the only way you can pass legislation is to go through this process. and it makes everybody hate your legislation. well, how do you pass legislation? i think the answer that i think the bush administration, when they were being able to pass things, figured out, was you just bear it. you just get through it. and you assume it will be more popular when you're done. that may or may not work but the only chance they have because there's no pared back bill or no magical pony that will save the democrats here. it's this bill or everybody dies. >> i want to ask each of you a question and it will sound like a rhetorical question. if there was a role reversal, and it were the republicans who were pushing the legislation, what would they be doing right now? >> well, we saw it in 2003. with the passage of the medicare modernization act. exactly what they did. and that's -- as we know, that barely squeaked through.

it was the famous three-hour vote. which is the other important point to make here. which is that no matter what anybody tells you what the rules are, they make up the rules as they go along. right? and so -- and particularly on the senate side. they can pretty much figure out a way, if they want to, to do what they want. so that said, what happened in 2003, there was not even support within the republican ranks to pass that legislation. there was a huge dispute over whether it was a massive new entitlement or whether it was privatization of medicare or whether that was good or bad, the whole bit. and there was some democratic support. but clearly the bulk of the caucus would not vote for it. what did they do? they kept at it. and they did -- a dark of night series of back room deals. >> and what about the budget? >> and no pay forings. and there's a lot you can do in this town if you aren't -- if

you're going to pass a $400 billion plus benefit and not pay for it. it's amazing. even among republicans who should have been crying foul as some of them obviously were, but they just did it. and basically the calculus that was just discussed was the one that prevailed. whi#h@@!i@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ b

end of the day it's better to get people coverage rather than the harebrained way it was done. so it's exactly as has been said you tough it out and you basically get it done fast. because the longer it drags out, the more -- as one of the cartoons in the post this morning has a picture of, the dead fish. and it's labeled health reform. and obama is saying ok, wrap it up, i'll take it. the dead fish is just going to smell worse and worse unless you turn public opinion around and get this done fast. >> yes. what the republicans, they would have moved on their agenda because they would have passed this six months ago. they move fast. and actually we're all kicking the democrats around a lot. and they deserve a lot of kicking right now.

i plan to keep kicking them. a lot of us will be kicking them. but i do think, in fairness to them, to give them some credit, they did this the hard way. and in some ways, how this turns out, it's weird to be second-guessing. it's weird fob second-guessing health care -- weird to be second-guessing health care because we are having like a victory lap, there's a fair amount of chant at the end at least that this -- the genie set this outcome or not. but you think about the medicare part d and the games they played with the actuary and the cost estimates. i mean, this administration, this congress, i mean, they produced a bill that they were determined was going to be scored by the congressional budget office. as paying for itself and bending the curvee over the long run. in some way, shape or form. at the end of the day they

didn't do a whole lot of curving bending and it barely pays for itself. but that's a pretty high standard to me. and there would be no excise tax if they weren't determined to do that. that excise tax is like the huge sticking point to the extent that there's a substantive one right now. i remember -- and goes to the broader way they approached it. obama gave an interview with david lien heart. it was early in the process when he was talking about how do we save money on health care? he had this long discussion and many more times about his grandmother, when she was dying, and how you decide what treatments work and don't work. and we spend so much money on things. at the end of life. i remember thinking that is a really adult conversation you're trying to have with the united states of america. [laughter] and i was thrilled. i thought that was a great thing. it was spoke well of him. and i think -- i don't think i was the first to say this. but i wrote at the time and said it's not too far leap from

that to your pulling the plug on grandma. and there we are pulling the plug on grandma. and they -- i think this whole thing is actually a test of whether you can do it this way. and i guess i'm not really answering the question but in thinking about the democrats and we're beating up on them, i think this is important to get through and part to show that you can do that. this is a test. can you really honestly create policy in the united states of america? because that's what they tried to do. whatever they did wrong and whatever people don't like about the bill, to their credit, they stuck to that. and i admire that. and i'm one -- one of the many things that worry me about what's happening now if this doesn't mass is we will have a conclusive verdict -- doesn't pass is we will have a conclusive verdict. you can't do it. and just throw out the rules and ignore responsibility. and i would prefer to think we don't live in that kind of world but i'm not sure that we do. >> so ezra, a life-long republican, what would your

colleagues do? >> i like to think that i'm -- joking about this earlier. but i'm a liberal with a personality of republican. i think we do live in that world. i think that the primary impediment to change and progress on important problems is the rules of the united states senate. i think the idea that the democrats have this absurd notion that there is some principled way to save hundreds of thousands of lives and whether or not you make it,0you do it that way is more important than whether you do it is shocking. absolutely shocking. and so i think that one thing you have seen from this, and i'm answering i think john's question here rather than ron's, but we'll go with that, is that they put a lot of time as john said into constructing a policy. that would work for what is fundamentally a broken dysfunctional, dilapidated political system. so they structured it such that most industries were bought off. they made it very, very moderate. the joke about the -- we were talking about this huge

transformation is how incremental and around the margins this is. we're talking about 4% of annual spending in a given year. and we're not touching the insurance of 90% of americans. we really are not. we're doing much less on cost than we need to do. but you had to do that. you have to build. you have to be incremental. and they put all this time as they did also in a very different way in the clinton years where they tried to create this beautiful, delicate compromise between the visions of the left and right. what they don't get, i think, what they did not do was figure out how to create a process that would turn the american people off. and as we look back, the truly problematic mistake. that they didn't -- i think take seriously enough what time does to legislation in the united states congress. that it is unstoppable trend toward unpopularity. it doesn't matter what legislation you're talking about. they didn't realize it with every day that goes by, the people that care about this bill are making another

compromise so they like it less. the people who hate this bill are learning why they hate it more. so that by the end of it the people who hate it are at maximum levels of enthusiasm and the people who like it are depressed and crying into their coffee in the morning. and it goes on and on. that more time is more time for deals. it's more time for my colleagues to report on process. and back rooms. and scandals. and in-fighting. it's all about speed here. and i think that what they need to understand going forward in not only this, the end of this process, but the next one and the one after that and the one after that and the one after that, is that the american people rightfully hate american politics. and that if they're going to get things done, they're going to have to prize getting things done. over the bodies in which they get them done. and i think republicans, to their great credit, get that. and i say that without a trace of sarcasm. they are right to think that

what is more drn that it is more important what they do than how they do that. i don't think they believe mccrery part d was a good bill but if they did, granting them that premise, they were dead right on how they did it. and it's a lesson democrats should learn. >> i want to ask each of you, i think that passing this bill probably the biggest political impediment on capitol hill are those in the more moderate or conservative districts, the so-called blue dogs. i don't mean to suggest they're the only impediment. there are folks on the left and right who have concerns about the process that we thought is the pathway to get in done. but i think at the end of the day, it's the blue dogs who are going to be probably the last and the most difficult to come over and vote for this bill. assess their interests and how you would speak to those interests. first on that one.

>> well, obviously, the number one issue for the blue dogs other than surviving in november, the substantive issue for them on health reform is bending the curve by in large. -- by and larnddle. and some way out of the fiscal armageddon that awaits us. these are complicated issues. but let's just look at what's at stake here. we got 17% of the gross domestic product devoted now to health care. you cannot pass a law that moderates the growth of that. there is no law that could be passed that would do that. that the american people would accept. so bending the curve itself is going to be a long, long process. and the point of the bill, what is good in it is that it lays the groundwork, assuming the secretary seizes the reins, all of this is contained in those magical words the secretary's shell, the secretary shell set

up these pilot projects, accountable care organizations, etc., etc., etc. that has to be the piece that's played up for the blue dogs. you know, so if i were at the white house, what i would be doing is figuring out a way that once a week, for the next six weeks, secretary sebelius and others get up and launch a new pilot project already with whatever executive authority they have. to start doing this. and start playing up the systems that do exist in this country that have already bent the curve internal to the system. and they are out there. and it's basically just going to be reminding the blue dogs that this is possible. and then it's going to be coming up with some kind of a deal finally and you see the president now doing this. to deal with the other undone big issue. which is going to be a big medicare reform. because everybody knows that

once health reform is done, the next big conversation is overall on medicare and medicaid reform. call it entitlement reform, call it whatever you want. but basically figuring out a way to get that on to a path of stability or something closer to stability than what we have now. so i think it's all about talking about those pieces. and i go back to what i said earlier, talk about the things that matter to the populations that matter. and for them, that's the number one piece that matters. >> you know, i think to some extent i would -- offer the same generic advice i would offer to a liberal member of congress. and i actually think to some extent -- there's ideological issues but also a lot of this is freshman versus nonfreshman. the ones who are safe versus the ones who aren't as safe. because they're new. and i guess i would say to the blue dogs, particularly you have a choice here. this election is going to be about the obama presidency and

how it's going. and you have two choices. you can make the choice to basically be the guy who's not in favor of the obama presidency because you didn't support that health care bill. which is great except i guarantee you whoever you're running against is going to be more opposed to the obama presidency than you are. you are not going to win that race. this becomes a who's more opposed to the obama presidency and health care bill, you're going to lose. that's a given. or you can try to do things that make the obama presidency and make health care reform not a liability. and an asset. and that's true of the health care bill generally. again, this is -- this should work for a liberal also. but there's a lot of money in there for hiring nurses and direct care workers and training people. photo ops. campaign photo ops. go to the job training fair and have an event with -- when they're breaking ground on a new community clinic somewhere.

these are good, generic photo ops. things you can run on that are tangible. seniors, senior citizens, they vote in off year elections, talk about t(e closing of the doughnut hole. these are things you can do to build it up. keep in mind the effect on the obama presidency. this dies, the obama presidency is not going to have a good year. it's just done. and this idea that we can move on to jobs after it, well, you aren't going to get more on jobs if health care dies and their political capital is gone. and the truth is that helping the obama presidency in the long run, helping health care reform, both of these are in your interests. because the other decision like i said is to run against these things. that you aren't going to be as against it as the republicans. you're going to lose that fight. and this is your best shot. >> i think the blue dogs are probably the most interesting people in washington. and it's sort of the way that "lost" is the most interesting show on television.

the plot doesn't make any sense and you don't think the writers can like wrap all this up. because blue dogs, their issue is the deficit. except when they vote to repeal the estate tax. blowing the deficit up. tax cuts. the war supplement. you can go right down the line. and that's what makes it very hard to do substantive compromise here. because the issue isn't the deficit. it is perception of the deficit. and above that perception, is different bills. the problem for health care reform, which was built in serious respect, and actually agreement with this premise, with the premise the deficit reduction is important, is that nobody believes it reduces the deficit. the latest kaiser poll, 60% think it increases it. 15% think it reduces it. the rest don't know. those are not good numbers. so you do end up in this political advice place which i think is a very difficult place to be. because who knows? it is just very hard to say what will help an individual

blue dog in their district. the one thing that i would say, it's a mistake that a lot of people in this whole process made. the mental model of -- take ben nelson as your example. if i'm a moderate democrat from a conservative district or state, and i want to vote for what will be perceived as a l%b#@@@ ,h@ @ @ @ d@ @ @ @ @

or my second or my third but somewhere over there in choices or this bill doesn't do the things i wanted to do but probably a good start and a starter home. there's a complete inability on the part of democrats to stand up and say this bill, sure, maybe not where i am butness a great bill. this is the biggest step forward we've had since the great society. this will save countless lives, prevent countless medical bankruptcies. prevent chronic pain and infirmity and anxiety. and to say this is a good bill, on the night of brown's election they just said we are sorry that our candidates decided to repeatedly insult the red sox and mock the concept that you would touch the flesh of a voter. but health care is a very important thing to the people

of this country and we're going to move forward. we would not be in this situation. but one thing is if the blue dogs aren't going to be the people out there reminding their constituencies of what's good this this bill, you have to ask yourself, who is? >> i want to make an observation. i don't know whether any of you want to respond to it, and we'll move to the next question. it strikes me that blue dogs actually have the most to lose if health reform doesn't pass for two reasons. one is they are in the most marginal districts. by definition. they are democrats in more conservative districts. and typically when a party switches over, as republicans saw in the last election, if we don't pass something, it would strike me that the folks who are most vulnerable to losing are those in those marginal districts. and the second irony is that in those more conservative districts, you got a less of a safety net where people who are

uninsured or underinsured. you got higher rates of people without health coverage. those are the places that are going to be helped the most by this legislation. so it strikes me that there's somewhat of an easterny. -- of an irony. >> further irony, if this goes down, what is the vehicle to moderate the rate of growth of health spending? and where is the next bill going to come for that does nothing but that and doesn't deal with all of these other factors? so if you take them at their word they really do care about the deficit and the debt, then this has to pass. because there is not going to be another vehicle that comes along. and to talk further about the contrast between what people say and la they do, if you -- and what they do, if you ask the house republicans, for example, do you like what's in this bill? do you like the independent medicare advisory board that's

in the senate bill? which essentially would take away -- save congress from itself basically in terms of making decisions about medicare? they don't like that. because they don't want the power taken away from them. but they want somehow medicare to be fixed. right? so if we assume that -- there are rare fleeting moments of rationality among some of these folks, then this has to go forward. and i think -- if there's hope, it's going to be appealing to those in the party and there are, among the blue dogs, and there are, people who will understand that. and understand that this is not going to happen independent of this broader vehicle. >> i'm going to ask one last question with respect to this process. and then i want to talk about have you -- have you talk about the post enactment phase. yesterday we saw in "the new

york times" rahm emanuel was quoted perhaps not surprisingly saying that the next things that are going to get the attention of congress before we complete health reform are the jobs legislation, bank regulation, and we also know that to tee up the final bill, there are some steps that need to be taken. they have not yet reached full agreement in terms of how to work out the differences between the house and the senate. they've got to talk to the senate parliament aaron -- parliamentarian of what can be included in a reconciliation bill and get a score from the congressional budget office. they've got to work out the sequencing process for passing the senate bill in the house. and the reconciliation. because there are things that need to be done. you raised the question, susan,

before, about timing and it seems to me there may be a balance here. on the one hand, timing is not on our side. we don't want to move this -- have this take much longer. on the other hand, the grieving process has not completed. and having time for a breather might actually make folks more determined to move forward. do you want to talk a little bit about the challenge of timing? >> sure. i don't believe that a breather is a good idea. i want to say one thing, i think that people in this room particularly need to be very clear on because it needs to be communicated very clearly. there are two ways that health care reform dies. and they don't look like these. here's what they don't look like. they do not look like rahm emanuel comes out and says we're not doing health care reform anymore. we don't like it. and it does not look like health care reform fails in a vote. it will die in either of those

ways, i promise you. here's what it will do. if it dies. number one, rahm emanuel and other congressional democrats will come out and say we are as committed to health care reform as we always have been. this is a key priority. that's why we are in washington. we're just not going to do it right now. that's number one. and number two, is pareback. we get some magical -- your insurance company, there are no more rescissions and this is a great victory for the american people. but that article scared me much more than anything else has so far. because the way this goes down is that it grows old and it dies. like other organic matter. and i think this needs to be called out. if emanuel is saying that it needs to be called out by people in the base and people who care about this as the death of health care reform. because you can't run that timetable. you can't deal with jobs. and i don't know -- he seems to think jobs will pass by tuesday

at noon. i'm pretty sure it will take longer. they don't even have their bill it should be noted. then banking. you don't have the votes for banking, number one. bank tax is going to be your election issue, number two. so we're going to turn to this in mid october? nobody's going to be there. and even before the summer, and everybody's already back home campaigning. this goes soon or it doesn't move. and then there's the reconciliation structure which expires. when the new budget and there's disagreement on when the new budget is taken up or enacted but either way, that reconciliation instruction, you can pass a new one but that's difficult to do. but the white house last week, and it may be john heard the same, they were telling me, the president didn't set a timetable in his speech. he didn't need to. we all know we have to move quickly due to the reconciliation instruction expiration. so this goes quick or it doesn't go. and one thing that nobody

should let anybody get away with is suggesting that it is viable or honest to say that oh, we'll do this after we do everything else. but we're still going to do it. this moves or it doesn't. >> didn't you read -- i mean, we all know rahm. he's a very smart guy. i read that as that -- what they're going to do is just for a few weeks take this off the front page. while the deal is negotiated behind the scenes. there's no lack of will in the white house to do this. and to push this forward. i thought that was all about rahm saying -- rahm is a deeply politically calculating animal. and very effective because of it. and he's saying we're going to yank this off the front page. we're going to put jobs upon the front page for the next three weeks. to shift the conversation. while pelosi and i everybody else behind the scenes figures out how to do that. that's what i took away from

it. >> my understanding, and i'd like john's take on this as well, from my reporting on the white house, is that rahm wants to cut bait. that there's an argument internally in the white house going on right now, and this is -- and i've reported it so i'm not laying on anything secret here and rahm wants to pare back. that the reason there was not a clear declaration of intent from the white house for a while after massachusetts when all those hill offices were screaming for direction, was because the white house was internally divided about how to move forward. so i think you're completely right. that is one outcome. of what we're talking about here. but i also think that it's -- that way of moving forward scares me because that is another way of saying they're keeping their options open. when you take health care reform off the front pages which maybe you need to do and it also makes it easier not to put it back on. and one thing that's hard to do is to get members' attention to go back into something hard and difficult and scary.

they don't necessarily want to make a choice to kill health care in the congress. but they also don't want to do the work to pass it at the moment. a lot of them. they just don't want to do this anymore. they're tired. they are tired of health care reform. and so i do think that there is a serious danger here that this thing dies just due to inaction, due to inertia. where it is right now it can be right there and not pass. so i'm less sanguine on this than you are. both because sthri rahm himself is less committed -- because i think rahm himself is less committed to the cause and not that they're saying we're not going to do this. it could be the timetable that you say. but constructing this new timetable where they're not just doing health care reform until they get it done, it makes it easier for them to not get it done. >> jonathan, you want to respond. >> i think it's known, i think this has been reported, rahm has always been among the more skeptical. i don't think this is a

substantive thing and don't think he has anything to do against doing a big health care plan in principle and give everybody health care and it was a political thing that he has always been skeptical that this was reaching too far. and not the only person in the white house who feels that. this has been an ongoing debate. and to some extent you want that debate happening internally at the white house. from the beginning. you do want different political views. i don't think it was -- i do worry that sending mixed messages doesn't help at a time when congress itself is at this -- do we go, do we stay, do we go, do we stay, the message from the white house should have been from tuesday night. i think that the tuesday night to me, if this all goes down, it will be the tuesday night massacre. i'm still waiting for the administration to officially get on msnbc tuesday night and say we lost the race and we're going forward anyway. i think it was criminal malpractice that they didn't have their talking points in order. but my understanding was that

was -- there was a good deal of indecision there. that they weren't sure how they wanted to proceed. i tend to think the timing issue, i'll put myself between you two a litt÷e bit in the sense that i do think number one there is this process that's going to take time. i don't think i fully appreciated that myself until recently. but the scoring, the parl parliamentarian, we can't have a vote tomorrow. we could have a vote in the house of representatives. 218 members of the house of representatives willing to vote for this bill, nancy pelosi could schedule a vote and in 24 hours we could vote and the bill could go to the president. everybody should remember that by the way. if this goes down that we are 24 hours away give or take from passing this giant health care bill, whatever you think the flaws are in it. but there is -- if we're going to go through reconciliation, you have to go through the scoring and the senate parliamentarian and round up the votes. and i do think to some extent, obviously insofaras the

political push to get this through is dependent on the obama administration generally, the democrats in congress having some favorability ratings, i think doing events like the ones in tampa. i like trains. building trains. good stuff. bring up -- that's fine. i don't think at the end of the world to have a little bit of this spotlight -- hanging on evan payh's every word and a couple of days? on the one hand, the longer we go, as -- the urgency phase. and it becomes easier to become adjusted that maybe we don't do this. and i think that's a real danger. and actually, in some ways, i was thinking about this yesterday we were all writing about what rahm said. what to say and what to think. and i was asking people who are in the middle of this, what do you think he was saying? and i sort of realize that in some ways, i don't live in washington. so i don't have the secret washington decoder ring that everybody gets here. [laughter] but my sense was that maybe one of the things that's going on here is we're seeing trial

balloons. so what happens if we don't do this for a while? see how people react. and damn it, react badly. you know? no, that's not good. we want it now. we want it as soon as possible. that. but actually, i won't actually respond to this dialogue that

just went forward. because i think there's several things here. for many weeks, this is well before massachusetts, the president and the white house when they were gearing up for the state of the union message, they had a very different assumption about what they would face at the state of the union message. they were looking to come into the -- the president to come in triumphantly, health reform would be passed, and the conversation would be moved to jobs. and the white house for months, not the last week, for months, has been thinking about this major jobs initiative. they want to focus on jobs. they wanted to focus on the budget. and so it's not surprising that that's what the state of the union message was mostly about. that was not a change as a result of massachusetts. so number one, those -- those

folks who commented that health reform was not in the speech until half an hour, that was not because of massachusetts. that was long determined way ahead of time. and indeed, that the white house had not scheduled a state of the union message for quite some time. i remember asking jim musina, deputy chief of staff, when are you going to schedule the state of the union message? and the answer was always, you know, tell me the schedule on health care reform. and as it became clear that that was not going to move quite as quickly, they had to move forward with the state of the union message and that state of the union message, the key element of that had been crafted long ago. maybe the exact wording was changed. but was crafted long ago. so i wouldn't make anything of that. jonathan, you wrote months ago about the internal match

nakeses -- machinations within the white house when a determination was ultimately made that health reform would be the top domestic priority. whether it be included in the budget. and the white house was divided. and i think the white house on tuesday night after the massachusetts election was divided. but i will tell you my view is éhere is no division in the white house at this moment about passing health reform. you know, things in the white house, when staff gets together, they may have their own internal vote. but there's only one vote that counts. and that's the president. and he really is determined to get this done. i don't think -- whatever ambiguity there was tuesday night, and wednesday, and maybe even running into thursday, and rahm was looking at small ball options to be sure, i don't think there's any ambiguity in the white house today. so i'm going to ask one last question and keep on lining up and then we'll open it up. so the health reform process in

congress comes to an end. we pass the legislation. what is our main job looking forward and i'm going to ask you that, both from a political perspective and from a substantive perspective, what is it that all of us should be thinking about are the krill cal things that need to happen -- are the critical things that need to happen after the legislation gets enacted into law? if anyone wants to take a first crack at that. >> shoring up public support. explaining to people what's in this. especially highlighting the things that happen fast. the fair number of things that -- that are supposed to happen in the first year. and the more those things happen, and get highlighted, for example, preexisting condition restrictions not being held against kids. those kinds of things. that is going to be very important. so shoring up the public support.

secondly, making sure they don't repeal the damn thing. and any of you in t$e audience who lived through catastrophic coverage in the 1980's know that this is potentially a real threat. and again, you have a very similar dynamic at play. you had a big bill that got passed. people didn't fully understand it. and then a bunch of people suddenly woke up to the fact that they were going to be taxed at a higher rate for the provision and the whole thing came apart. basically within the space of about six weeks. intensive -- there was a longer lag between the passage of the bill and the repeal. but the real opposition to it jelled within a period of about six weeks. and then it was gone. and that is a real possibility. particularly -- we don't know what the outcome is of november. we presume the democrats will hold the house. but we don't know that. right? so making sure that it is not

repealed will be step number two. number three is the implementation of all the rest of it. and this is going to be a long, hard slog. particularly if the senate version ultimately prevails and most of this is done around the states. and just sort of working at the state level to make sure that the pieces of this that will be in the hands of the states are implemented. and i think there's going to be an extremely important role for advocates there, both in helping them to decide how this plays out but also to retain a sense of momentum at the state level to get this structure put in place. . no carrr

ringconnect 1200 >> for people who want to see action on america's problems, the first thing is it is a process. i think -- if you look at an alcoholic, he may be facing cirrhosis of the liver, losing

his job his family is in debt, but that is not his biggest problem. it is his first problem. you have to solve that problem before you can save any others -- salt in the others. people will have to start thinking more about that long term problem. >> i agree with everything that has been said here. the implementation has been made here. there is a lot of work that needs to be done. the difference between a well- implemented bill and a poorly- implemented bill is huge. in terms of politics and policy, i am a big believer in

intangibles. everybody gets the training. -- everybody gets a train to ride on. i think the things in this bill that are tangible -- some kind of universal labeling on insurance. things like that. having and a website that people can look up things. this should not be something abstract years from now. this is a political thing, but it is important. it speaks to the process problem. if this bill passes, people who supported it should start supporting the people that voted for it.

you want congress to understand that when they vote for something and it may be a hard vote, they better feel rewarded for that. there is going to be a fury coming down on them in november. get out there and say this congressman voted for this bill. i think that is so important. in january, this will pass and people may not be happy that there is no public plan. at the end of the day, these people are going to get a fury from the right. if the answer on the left is it could have been better, no one is going to vote for these things any more. and you will not be able to fix it. [laughter] [applause] >> i want to add one thing to it and then open it up for questions. in addition to the political work that is done, there is one

area that i think all of us will need to rise to the challenge. under the house and senate bills the 37 million people that will be eligible for new coverage -- eligibility standards are going to change enormously with respect to medicaid in ways that are truly unprecedented. you will have millions of people who are going to be eligible for subsidies. we have to make sure that all of the people eligible for medicaid safety net and for these subsidies actually get enrolled, stay enrolled. we have to make sure the systems are put in place said these are enrollment-brimley systems. that is all our challenge. -- enrollment-friendly systems. that is all our challenge.

i do not want to break presidents. we do these teleconferences roughly every two weeks. we get the questions on our computer screen. people lined up. tony always gets the first question. you go first. >> is this on? we have four blue dog democrats in tennessee. only one of them voted for the house bill the first time. two of the others are retiring. one of those basically said when we ask him directly to support and pass the senate bill, the response is i always like the senate bill better than the house bill. this is a blue dog democrat that would not vote for it but it's

likely to vote for the senate bill. maybe we picked up a vote. his response was which you please some people in my area that have insurance to call up and support this? they want to hear from people that have interest and support the plan. these are from some blue dog democrats. >> does anyone want to respond? >> i think that underlines the point we have been making. political support in november. >> i will keep on switching the microphones. >> good morning. i am from new hampshire. i want to get some feedback from a session i attended yesterday when we were talking about what to do when we go home and what message to give. somebody said we should be focusing on the cost of not

passing this legislation when we go home. that resonated with me because i think a lot of people, because of the lack of transparency and the way insurance companies handle the money changing, we do not have a really good idea of what some of these issues are. and not are saying, what is in these bills? what is the real cost of not passing the legislation? i hope those in the media will consider that and comment on that or do some writing on that. >> you can see it in the scoring of the cbo. millions did not have health insurance in a matter of years. we anticipate certain things happening with respect to the fiscal sustainability of the program. if you want to live in a country where it that if people do not

have health insurance. it gets more expensive and it is difficult for people who have it to afford it. employers will continue to drop it particularly in the small business community. on top of á@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @

this. can anybody remember what the political dynamic was in the months leading up to the passage of medicare? nil. can anybody remember with medicare coverage in 1966 and how it is different from today? no. get something on the books. fix it overturned. love the one you are with. -- fix its overtime. love the one you are with. >> i am a primary-care doctor in los angeles. my question is -- i wanted to respond to some important points that resonated with me particularly in my practice at the community health center. you mentioned how congressmen

and gentlemen have to go through the stages of grief and a mile. i want to say how we have to model that and then forced this change. we need to move past that time of indignation, because that is not what my patients need. what i have been doing is to sit there are some concrete things to celebrate in this bill. this bill will change the lives of my patients. what role do you see providers planning -- playing? we want to celebrate these things and move past the brief and talk about what really matters. >> you are from south central? >> st. john's.

>> there are a lot of great community clinics associations in l.a. i think providers are incredibly important and somewhat under appreciated by some that are promoting these bills. the single biggest way -- you are a provider, you talk to people you see. your patients have a better understanding than those in a middle-class suburban office. even so, telling people that you see every day -- it makes a difference. i also think people trust doctors, nurses, health care professionals. they will be looking to providers. whether that is as an individual or a group, you are involved locally.

calling members of congress, talking to them as an organization -- the want to hear from people with insurance. most of the uninsured -- maybe you think that does not make you very good. providers will resonate in a congressional office. they may have some clout in the community and may have some money to give me. that makes a difference. talking about what is good in this makes sense. >> it is one thing we are trying to do which i would like to talk about it on about which isñi the role providers complain not just for policymakers but bringing voter registration services directly to health care centers in a non-partisan way. we have an effort for we are doing just that.

there are creative ways in which health-care can play a role. [applause] i think we have to think creatively and have providers come to the table and say what do we need to do to get the votes in party and their support. we may have to bring ourselves to the political sphere in a way that is smart and savvy. >> next question. >> i am a primary-care physician and the executive director of doctors for america. many have been looking to the president for leadership. i want to get your take on his address to the gop retreat yesterday and his interaction with tom price, also a physician and some of their

discussion? is it going to change? talk about his commitment to health reform. >> i think that was the most compelling political television i have watched ever. it is fascinating because there is serious disagreement. obama would have gone down to the retreat and people would say we would like to work together. everybody would have gone home and clapped and went back to what the retooling. it did not happen. obama went down there and we have will talk. he said no, that is incorrect. your bill does not do what you say it does. your claims of tort reform is.

to hold down spending. it was delivered pretty much in those words. it was fascinating. if they do not work with us, we are going to highlight that we are reaching out and really attempt to shine a light on their obstruction. they have been doing that then you're pull -- your poll numbers like this. if they keep this up, they will not win an election. it was the first time where you say, maybe they actually have a plan. putting a camera with him in house gop and letting him sell these bills. what we saw there is that people watched it. when price cut of -- got up for

others -- or others, went a couple of proposals are put in a room together and somebody is at a microphone talking about it, you can explain the differences in one and the other. it was the first time the american people said we are watching. it was nice to see somebody saying there are real differences here. i thought that was very powerful. it was a very powerful event. >> there should be more of it. what was incredible was that after the election of scott brown, the people of massachusetts like the health reform. we just feel that we have already paid for them and we do not have to pay any more towards national reform.

where were the people saying, hello, the u.s. taxpayer that throws more than 3 billion in that reform for medicaid. we enabled massachusetts to do that. we are happy that massachusetts is on its way to universal coverage. now we wanted for the rest of us. calling out people who say these things -- maybe some of them really believe they just do not know the facts. let us not let them get away with it. correct the record every step of the way. >> we have time for a couple of questions. then we will talk to one of our board members. >> you have done such a good job

of bringing these people here. i want to return to the diversity of opinions on the stage about what did rahm emanuel say in what it means and are we going to have a couple of weeks we talk about jobs or several months. if there has been a fight in the white house about whether to move forward on health care, at this point, rahm emanuel is losing. second, while we may need to push back, inside baseball, this is one of those process stories that has alienated a lot of the public from broader health reform efforts. it did not get past process to look at what was in the bills. i challenge all of the

advocates of the organizers, including the journalists to talk about lessons about what one person said and another person said in more about what is in the bills and what it means in this particular community. >> thanks. >> i am from st. louis, missouri. thank you for sharing with us. my concern with health care reform and other legislation is what someone calls a speedy process. there is an open, transparent government and how do you balance that to insure a sense of trust. they are not all idiots on capitol hill. we can get something done.

i am afraid that speedy process for set out of balance. can you address have that trust in government combined with our message of reform? >> this is a very hard thing for people to balance. you saw it with obama who made this pledge that everything is going to be open to c-span. but of course not, everything is not one to be open to c-span. there is a reason why my fights with my girlfriend is not open to c-span. [laughter] if you open it to c-span, you have a meeting and then a back room meeting where people make decisions. if we put the age ban two-one, young people will get screwed year. but if -- these are hard trade- offs. the way the media works -- obama

challenges republicans to provide answers. the whole point is to get out of that one line sound bite. it is very hard to say what i am about to say from the view of a politician. transparency is a way people on the other side of the debate deal with issues. there is something called transparency that you can help people's understanding of it. when the senate releases a bill, it is called the chairman's mark. it is in english. people who can read a novel can read that bill. and to get an idea of what is going on.

i ensure all of your legislative people are ecstatic when there is a chairman's mark up. real transparency would be saying everybody has to release a chairman's mark. that would really change the way people can assess what is going on. there is also this type of transparency -- you need cameras everywhere you are at or spend eight months negotiating a bill. the gang of six process -- people equate transparency with bipartisanship. it is complicated.

there are places where you can make real gains to help people understand all of the process. there are places where people are scoring points or what could tv. it is very hard@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @- we say we want more u transparency. >> i am going to reward your

persistence. you get the last question. >> i am with the center for medicare advocacy. i was chatting with a woman on the train platform and told her of is going to this health advocate conference. we were talking about health reform. we got on the train in parted ways. then she walked up and found me, gave me her car and tell me what the talking points are that you learn from this conference to tell my members of congress. i am asking you what are the three bullet points that detail everyone to say when we call our congressional delegation? >> will want to take the first crack? >> the richest country in the world and the leading country that does not guarantee basic health coverage for every citizen.

how can we leave this legacy to future generations? this country not to the standing the fact that it does not guarantee coverage still covers a lot of people and spend a hell of a lot of money on health care. it is unsustainable. if you look at the long-term picture over the next 75 years, 119% in gdp could go into health care. we still would not cover everybody unless we have certain laws. let us go back to some of the basic values of american life. ñri mean pre-colonialism. eight americans had the notion of doing something in thinking about the ramifications to the seventh generation. let us think about the first generation all the way up to the

seventh generation. do we want to leave them as a society -- we spend as much as we do on health care. we break the backs of future generations and not everybody reaps the benefits. there is an increasingly shrinking pool of people. these to me are the talking points. get it done. >> it was really out last weekend so you cannot hear what everyone was saying at a bar mitzvah last weekend. people were asking me whatñiñi s health care bill is going to do. here are my three sentences. everybody can get insurance. the insurance israel. over time -- the insurance is real. over time it will get less expensive. i feel like anybody can grasp

those. >> if i were calling a congressional office i would say to them, talk to them and if you do not, i will not vote for you. [applause] i am not mad at you. i cannot reward this. i cannot donate to you or vote for you. future congresses, we need to punish this behavior. there are scared people. they are more scared about if they do not vote for it than if they did.

>> we have to make sure people understand what the cost of doing nothing. what is going to happen to the additional people who are going to join the ranks of the uninsured? what is going to happen to small businesses that cannot afford coverage? what is going to happen to seniors as the doughnut hole gets larger and larger? as you look at those things and you consider your audience, you can contrast that with what is in the bill. i think you can make a powerful statement. i want to take three remarkable people. [applause]

>> and we want to thank our remarkable moderator. [applause] >> thank you all. we go to our workshops next. we have a wonderful clothes and lunch. thank you all.

here at csis, and people frequently say do you miss being at dod and i say i don't miss being out the dod except one thing, i miss the ceremonies because they are such a big part of reminding you of what your life was about. and today is a chance for us to have a ceremony.

now it's actually a bigger day in many ways. admiral roughead was just at fort meade where we attend the tenth fleet, so this is a historical day in many dimensions, and we are going to celebrate today a very great man who was a part of the history of the navy, made the navy so great and also i hate to brag about made csis great, and that was arleigh burke. now this and you will abshire lecturer serious, david abshire and arleigh burke founded csis and david decided he would like to use this as an opportunity to talk about arleigh burke to read before we get started let me just, there are some notable people can't do justice but jim watkins is great to have you back. we are delighted to have you here. thank you for coming. yes. [applause]

and i know that -- i haven't seen him yet but i know that sean o'keefe, secretary of the navy, will be a riveting and dena is here someplace. the undersecretary, and we are grateful to have him. thank you three we are delighted to have you here. and this is just an entirely on selfish personal thing that my friend, alan camera build 17 of the arleigh burke destroyers and wanted to come for the event because it is a big part of his life so i'm glad he could join all of us. we are going to have a wonderful afternoon. david has asked and i just so happy this is the case that pam, a very dear friend who came to csis ago but it was agreed school work release program. [laughter] she's going to get a little history of arleigh burke and the abshire series. pam, why don't you come up and join me, please. [applause]

>> thank you and good afternoon, distinguished guests. it is a pleasure to be back on my own stomping ground. i began my career here at csis. i would like to give a date but you don't need to do the math today. david abshire asked me to come today from chicago and i'm sorry about the cold weather but he asked me to connect some of the pieces and briefly explain how admiral or arleigh burke and the abshire letcher came to be, and when your first boss, mentor and your friend asks, you do it. like the great naval adage loyalty of, loyalty down. in 81 the center for international studies began to raise its first endowment fund like reading in doud shares to be the was logical to raise endowment in honor of the cofounder, one of our military is greatest naval commanders in the pacific theater of world war ii. and then president eisenhower's

chief of naval operations, admiral arleigh burke. in september, 1983 we celebrated a beautiful evening honoring admiral arleigh burke and his wife, bobbie. i know many of you were here. hubbard case, john lehman, admiral thomas more were among those who spoke about the admiral's her lewicke service. our team had spent countless hours at the navy are working with officers on the history and film to pay tribute. this afternoon we will hear more about admiral arleigh burke's accomplishments, since we can learn about leadership. the story doesn't end here. many under the tutelage of the dr. abshire decided it was time to recognize his contributions to the country, a west point grad, korean war veteran, assistant secretary of state for congressional affairs and cofounder ocs -- csis along with admiral arleigh burke and its leaders most of the years until

1999 when dr. john took the hound. the board at that time chairman was armstrong, another great patriot first woman ambassador the court of st. james and chairman of the president for intelligence advisory board helped us raise the funds for the abshire letcher. we did something on her defense price today by announcing creation of this lecture during one of the csis roundtable meetings. the late beloved ambassadors are strong, berman, tayler and many of you here today along with other csis staff and friends did this behind david's back. not surprising long after senator sam nunn and yes, dave, his sideburns were quite long then gave the inaugural letcher in march 83. since then manfred woerner, lee hamilton, the duke of westminster among those who've given this esteemed lecture. perhaps you, admiral mullen can

be persuaded to give a future one. as with this background i hope to have a better understanding how these traditions began. having left washington journal the family foundation on remain actively involved in two of washington's greatest institutions. csis led by the exceptionally talented john hamre and the center for the study of the presidency in the congress where i serve on the board of trustees. david continues to have an idea sometimes our board members the trustees will say to dave dave, don't you think we are doing a little too much, and i smiled to myself and chuckle inside, and i think got some things will never change. we have so much to address in the world today but we have some of the best and brightest at csis and ocs pc to do that. both organizations across the lessons of history to deal with today's challenges come all the time of moving forward with a fortitude and loyalty inspired

by those who came before us. there is no better example of this spirit than having dave

began to recognize his greatness and extraordinary personality, the missis, the mine life if he had, it is simply extraordinary. what made him a unique leader, what made him a successful descent, how de arleigh burke once placed under house arrest under the add morals and later stricken from the promotion list then get promoted to the highest position in the navy? and three appointed to times? how did arleigh burke get away proud to the collection presidential on the strategy of the corrine and war? how did arleigh burke get away with telling president

eisenhower that he should scrap conlon strap the draft? what makes this personnel will be -- personality tick. why was he sent back to his father's farm in coloradan and promoted over 92 senior officers to become the chief of naval operations? figure that out. i tried to. the arleigh burke story is much more than just about dissent, survival, promotion. his story provides lessons, since about leadership, about strategy, about tactics, innovative research that are as important to us today as they were in arleigh burke's time.

.. to changing circumstances. i am preparing this lecture and a bully assisted by alex. he did graduate work in a civic award in the same military story

professor wassail likely. while there are many books about burke i almost you normally benefited by my friend potters remarkable at the naval academy for many years biography. potter do his own analysis of burke for many interviews where burke himself allies to himself to potter. both men of action don't have that capacity, sort of conflicts with decision-making. he possessed both. and of course my dear friend, evan thomas, in his magnificent ratings beginning with john paul jones and the wise men and all about the pacific as an inspiration and we're so glad you share the meeting. our story will open with a

steadfast between the united states and the japanese navy over aquatica now in the solomon islands. we find ourselves in the southwest pacific in 1942 through 1944. in many of these battles, the japanese gave as good as they got. the new tactics had to be developed to defeat the powerful japanese navy. mander arleigh burke suddenly became to national fame during his service of battles with his destroyer squadron named them the little beavers. he loved the little beavers. he always loved those favors untracked sailors and that's why the lone star sailor down on involving avenue symbolizes that let that he has for sailors. burke was an aggressive combat leader. his standing orders were to attack an enemy contact without

orders from the task force commander. in the battle empress augusta bay and cape st. george, he emulated among all people the strategy to defeat hannibal in the second punic war. here's how he described it to himself. the plan was based on hitting the enemy with one set of surprises after another. this is accomplished by turning to destroyer divisions in parallel columns. one division would slip enclosed under the cover of darkness, launched torpedoes and dark back. when the torpedoes hit the animals started shooting to the entire first division, the second half of the team was suddenly opened up from another direction. when the rattled enemy turned around a new unexpected attack the first division would slam back into it.

i produced a start mean the tree. power in the battles the solomon islands to the japanese no longer held any initiative. the u.s. navy launched an island hopping campaign to the sensual pacific to the heart of the japanese empire. in preparation for this offensive admiral ernest king had determined that all surface commanders needed to have aviators, chief of staff, or vice versa. this order helped to defuse the growing rift between the surface and naval aviators. the command structured also resulted in admiral burke been sent as chief of staff to the prestigious mark, a pioneer in naval aviation.

initially, burke refused. i will not go, i will stay with the little beavers he stubbornly said. [laughter] he did not want to leave. he didn't warn burke. in the first disagreeable meeting, he says their category, welcome aboard, take a shower and get some sleep and then come back up here after you sleep it off. it infuriated burke finally went back and got clean clothes, came back up, reporting for duty, sir, they grouted each other. that's the way it was for two weeks. and then it began to break in this relationship of great affection when he was finally approaching his death. but the two are different as you will see.

by june 1944, the united dates invaded the mariana islands. these islands were critical of the japanese strategy because from their american b-29 bombers could begin a bombing campaign against japan itself. the japanese navy tour everything into destroying the u.s. invasion fleet in the famous battle of the philippine sea. even though the u.s. scored a victory, shooting down over 300 -- 300 escaped. it had been badly hurt by one aggressive carrier air strike. at the one time, when it was within range, the fleet was not

sunk. japanese planes in the so-called turkish sheep shoot turkish satisfied the fleet escaped. burke believed because the overall commander admiral spritz was not aggressive enough in pursuing the japanese fleet. he adopted to play it safe to protect the invasion fleet. one of perks not to write in after reports of the battle. burke was blunt, criticizing admiral spruance. he asked the burke tone it down. don't you think you should go back and rewrite those last two pages he suggested? nosair, but i will. [laughter] he already knew that the commissioner left to sleep and when out and snoozed and didn't

read his reports. so burke concluded, the enemy has escaped. he was badly hurt but one aggressive airstrike at one time when he was in range the fleet was not sunk when it could've been. the pacific war story now moves to the largest naval battle over in naval history, which is so brilliantly described by evan thomas. in his sea of thunder, i wish i could write that way. where he gets into the mind of the opposing commanders with this enormous research that he did, mr. ambassador, some in japan of them here. i don't know how he does all this and then does what he does at "newsweek." he's a genius. by october 1944, the united is

prepared a strike. the strike would fulfill general macarthur's promise to return to the philippines. again the u.s. fleet was tasked with ensuring success of this invasion. once again, the japanese threw everything they had to be americans. the japanese divided their fleet to do three task forces. one was composed of what remained to the japanese one vaulted aircraft carriers. as the japanese no longer had enough training pilot to compete with the americans, this decoy fleet would try to wear the powerful u.s. fast attack are your fleet away. this ploy, this strategy would allow the two remaining japanese service tax forces -- it was a brilliant strategy.

again burke and disagreed with the commander, bill hall's then. they were like both tied up with your ego and they could make terrible mistakes. that never happened to burke. by now, halsey was a folk hero in all of the papers like macarthur nobody dared challenge him. burke and mr. policy would make a serious blunder if he left unprotected the invasion fleet in order to chase what turned out to be a japanese decoy fleet burke argued that halsey had a chance to defeat the japanese decoy fleet and still tired south in time to deal with the japanese second task force,

courageously to be played it smart. he didn't. the third smaller japanese fleet already had been destroyed. halsey neglected the tactical importance of the japanese carrier force and focused on the northern japanese fleet as the biggest threat. he was suckered. burke begged him to relay these doubts to halsey, but mr. grant, i think you are right but i don't know you're right. i don't think we ought to bother halsey. he is busy enough. he's got a lot of things on his mind. burke was despond end. during the night, report reached the u.s. fleet that the japanese senate force was heading for late today, senator task force was any delay takeoff to the unprotected streets vacated by halsey. their brilliant move was taking

place. again, burke went to matcher to force the issue by contacting halsey personally to change course. matchers said@@@ say entr'acte fell back south and plenty of time to deal with korea. but halsey slowed his fleet.

in the next while halsey shipped to worded decoy fleet, admiral carita is powerful fleet was causing havoc around late today. finally halsey realized he had been lured her to the decoy fleet bourque had been right. but then was too far away from the battle to influence the rest of the battle. but luckily the tenacious but almost suicidal defense of the invasion fleet escort carriers forced carita to withdraw before he could attack the transports. , save the invasion. burke felt that halsey made a critical error and that the u.s. had averted disaster only because of the miraculous defense of the outnumbered escort carriers and destroyers.

his policy or mr. had listened to burke, but if they had. they would've had the opportunity to completely annihilate the japanese fleet and bring the war to a conclusion. this is one of the many might have been of burke. after late today, burke continued to work together in iwo jima and to the kamikaze onslaught against okinawa. they were together with great affection under the end of the war, however different they were because burke would work with people who were different from him. our story now takes as common now that we got to do is they need a sip of coca-cola to get us through the next scene. [laughter] our story now takes us to the period immediately after the war

in 1949, captain burke, by the way when he was promoted to rear admiral, he attested that at the end of the war he said it won't be able to keep it. it's just not good and he had this habit of fighting promotions. that's strange. i never had that when i was in the military. i wanted to get them. captain burke was made head of the organizational resource and policy division in 1823. their burke developed the first long-range navy plan since alfred damon hamm. the flooding to be involved in what became the revolt and did he get into trouble. as you recall, during this time of bitter competition, we did

not invite any air force generals to this meeting. [laughter] better competition between the different branches, the armed services, regarding which service would take her in her role in national defense. the so-called revolt was a controversy over the powers of secretary of defense. many senior officers were unhappy with the new austerity measures of secretary of defense lewis, johnson and a grace period of discernment. they publicly attack new service unification under the department of defense, sounds familiar. it was also an attack on reliance on atomic power as the country's first line of defense in the other two services. in about 23 burke was cast with courtney deason maybe suffered for its role in the national defense challenge for the air

force nuclear strategy. he was no shrinking violet. burke boldly testified before congress, get a plan. he was traumatized and played up in the press and then characterized his anti-unification as secretary of defense. in retaliation, and defense secretary lewis johnson and navy secretary francis matthews removed burke from promotion to rear admiral. this was it for arleigh burke. his career was over. he and critique bobby got out the old planet and figured out where they would go next and were packing up. the vic uris solomon islands was packed out.

meanwhile, back at the white house, a captain denison, bader and admiral, handed harry truman the list of promotions to rear admiral. and god bless him, he spoke up and saved admiral burke. he said sir, there is one missing. i think an injustice has been done. truman said, what's that? he says it's captain burke, arleigh burke. truman said, didn't i meeting down there in norfolk? yes, sir, that's the one. he is good. yes, sir. well, just write his name back and period on the promotion list. the old secretary of defense and

everybody were shocked. rear admiral, arleigh burke was saved for this country. now, the irony in the revolt of the admirals however this remarkable career with so many turnabout that they did feel they have to give them a place to start it cool down. and a noncontroversial position would be defense research and development board, ironically. this position was another step in opening a new vista to admiral burke and introducing him and controlling him with technological and strategic solutions to naval and defense issues. creative breakthroughs, thinking smarter not richer. we need that today. the seeds were sown in this

training for burke's monumental polaris breakthrough. well, when i moved back after the outbreak of the korean war in june 1950, the traveling doesn't stop your burke or the deputy chief of staff to naval commander naval forces far east and then as commander division five. after macarthur is truly brilliant and chant operation, which burke applauded and the north korean armies running back to the north, burke flatly disagreed with macarthur's strategy to pursue the north koreans to the oulu river, ignoring reports of chinese intervention. and as with a custom time he spoke up and challenged. burke argued that macarthur's

should establish between one son in pyongyang and from that lined the u.s. army could continue to mop up north korean armies and if the chinese did intervene, be it in an ideal position to deal with it. but avoid, provoke. burke knew when to be aggressive and when to be careful. macarthur revived the idea he knew best. burke didn't. it's burke's advice had been followed, the chinese would have not intervened to want something new line today would be the border between north and south korea and two thirds of korea would be free. another burke what if. 1951, to burke's surprise, he would made a member of the united nations truce delegation,

the purpose was to negotiate with a communist or military discernment in korea. as those tedious negotiations proceeded, burke became angered and frustrated by the fact that the american soldiers continue to die while we rankled over a few hills, later i had to go fight through those sales. and people died and we weren't accomplishing anything -- any development of status strategy was unsatisfactory. he learned a lot about the communist and those negotiations , particularly if he had to take a rare stop in the next room, come back and then take a new position had new on the line and do good negotiating position. but something else happened during this period. very remarkable, mr. ambassador.

arleigh burke lived in japan. he came to that the japanese. that japanese guy came in and put flowers in his room and when he left every night, he thanked the management and they said she's done this on her own. he got to know your admirals and he became a powerful influence on the development of the early japanese maritime defense force. and when we sent up csis and when it came back from the state department he was leaving inside, you know, i've attended this conference is in japan. this was an 1970, you've got to open major efforts with japan. and it's for that reason we got together in these major congressional exchanges and later got to know dr. toyota who gave his japan chair and dr. anna mori was endowed the ad

share leadership academy. in a real tired of this senator with your great country. after six months, burke returned to the united states and he became her -- let me say i wear my decoration from your emperor briley. admit it pertains of what csis has done with japan and your honor. after six months, burke returned to the united states and became director of strategic lands division. now after assuming this position, he boldly asked to see the president. you know, he's a rear admiral. [laughter] that didn't mean a dime to him. well, all right, they granted him 15 minutes. went on two hours.

michael mullen forcefully laid at his observations about the communist and why this war, the whole strategy was wrong and later eisenhower moved to what dirk wanted. he was banging his hands on the table and the president saved him. it was just an amazing personality, german lessons. with his record of defense, the figured he had them tied. he was shocked when president dwight tauzin hauer were announced he would be chief of naval operations in 1955. he did. [laughter] this is not a good idea at all.

there were 92 active flight duty officers senior to him. it was going to cause bad feelings and make his job impossible. furthermore, he had -- did they think he was a path he? he had a bad habit of speaking his mind and he was not going to change. objection to overrule he kept saying over and over in 1965. my gosh, how did you do with? [inaudible] the hard way. they added press attention and with this war expert -- exploits written up again you know on the many times, "time" magazine covered burke more than never. he was a true national celebrity and hero. as the 15th cnn, burke

immediately set about doing cockade individual initiative and responsibility to ranks, take the initiative, thinking new, come up with new ideas. burke often said he could not command anything in@@@@ @ @ @ @b u.s. facility to

fulfill its defense obligations at that time. especially those of the navy. he disagreed with the secretary of the navy on this. he disagreed with the secretary of defense on this. and then he demanded to see the president. we are back at it, once again. in those days it was a privilege to be a cno. that's one reason we're still on this implication, mike. and from that president eisenhower, was the secretary of navy and defense sitting there angry. burke goes on and on laying out the reasons for his position. and mike is getting redder and redder in the face. and finally, after some time,

take slams his fist on the table and he says, will keep the draft, meeting over, burke coming you stay back. burke had one, but he got a falling out. he says, don't you ever create a situation where with you or to superiors in of them i overrule them and disgrace them. never again, sets burke. yes, sir. the draft remains. well, burke figured he had one match but he figured he was through. and he began to get these invitations does that come over to the white house for drinks, come over and have a little discussion. they developed this fast friendship. ike with dina gettysburg while burke was here the senate. one of the last people you send

for to talk to. now, we mentioned earlier how burke treasured the value of science, the cutting-edge, the narrow edge in victory like we know it that comes from those breakthroughs which are so key. and his greatest achievement as chief of naval operations was the development of the players. burke felt that such a nuclear harmed polaris designed to be prepared for some earnings would give the u.s. strategic flexibility in the cold war. burke contrasted this flexibility with that of the air force dependent on bombers operating firm fixed positions. furthermore, he argued the

missiles and development were dependent on fixed lines and strides. he pointed out that polaris missile submarines could move anywhere around the globe with agility and from not just one designated decision. the polaris maneuverability could also replace -- and this really burned up the air force, the air force bombers launched outside the nation. needless to say, burke's strategies sometime got them to control retaliation, certainly greater agility was a devastatingly direct attack on the air force bomber and massive indiscriminate missile.err. now this is one fight burke didn't win, just as he did on the polaris, but not on the larger strategy. this is just as he had not won the argument on the alternate on

the line in korea. the soviets constantly began to match the build of the decreasing numbers, strategic bombers, once escalation superiority was lost, we managed to assure destruction, which could have led i learned to nato and we play these games every year to a terrible miscalculation where we were using nuclear strikes for political standing, not think they might do a nuclear strike on boston as a political signal. henry kissinger challenged that at a conference we ran and csis in 1979, he challenged its undersecretary of defense. ronald reagan, jim watkins, admiral watkins was in the room when ronald reagan moved towards seeking strategic defense initiative as a flanking maneuver as a way out.

burke has something going for him in adding agility, which we lost. in the strategy. he ended a second term as cno. burke stated it was obviously time for him to retire. ike would have none of it. it was his third time however and you was disappointed with himself and his own leadership. he opened up to me here at csis was a failure to the bay of pigs. he felt he had let himself down. he felt he had not performed the way he had performed previously. he went over this privately with me again and again. he would never write it up because he said he didn't want to hurt anybody now that it was over. he served as acting chairman of

the joint chiefs during this period. he would be invited into these meetings, allowed to take no note and b. and criminal change made, no capability or allies whether this was a work of our operation were not. burke regretted that he did not go to president kennedy and blow the whistle. this is not going to work with all of these compromises. when he did speak up it was during that famous night in the oval office. when the bay of pigs operation fell apart. he told president kennedy that he had a destroy post cuba ready to file, which kennedy replied, burke, we don't want to get involved. to which burke responded, mr. president, we are involved. well, anyway, he was not allowed

to fire and he never wanted to talk about it after that except privately. a revered admiral burke retired in august 1961. in his biography, professor potter describes 1962 hou first attempted to persuade him to join me in found in a strategic group is a part of georgetown university. i told the burke it might be called the center for strategic studies, bader added international commerce in my doctorate in history from georgetown, got the blessing of father edward bunn who thought i was an episcopalian. i came to know -- i came across myself very well. [laughter] i can't know admiral burke when my -- burke turned me down the

first two times. i bet didn't bother me. i didn't have any experience. i was dating a navy junior who loved those white navies and not those west pointers would grade gold vitamins. she was a navy many times over, admiral sample was lost at the end of the pacific war puget for members of her family and she knows all this. so my wife turned me down the first two times. i got around the third time. [laughter] i figured i'd get burke on the third time and potter says ivo hook burke on the third go around. i burke on the focus on the need to foster a coherent national strategy. a challenge we face today. dubiously i'd were as staff

director on capitol hill. i explained to burke my frustration with the committee compartmentalization or. i need the admiral's frustration with our part to mineralization in the executive branch. we both agreed that such mutual compartmentalization, both in the pennsylvania avenue was the enemy of strategic coherence. the enemy of the best use of our resources. burke said when i finally hooked him, if we can tackle that issue in this new center, it will be truly strategic. count me in. by working arrangement with burke was to be there at 8:00 sharp every morning. he had a notebook, schoolboy with all of his boards he was on four important corporate boards in his boy scouts that he was bleeding. give me his view another

organizations of what worked and didn't work, carry over to ours. and given a runtime runtime of senate research, stay out unless he thought it was off course. our first meeting he said to me, something's very telling ten. -- he said dave, you commie arleigh, but i wanted wuornos to commie mr. burke eared a set admiral, nobody is going to college you mr. burke. why do you want to be called mr. burke? he said i'll tell you that there are a lot of big shots getting out of government who actually think there are big shots. they think the world is going to come to an end. that's wrong. they've got to remake themselves and i've got to remake myself and i mr. burke. he was mr. burke.

nobody but that told you something about his personality. our first conference in the hall of nations at georgetown on his imprint. council on foreign relations meant to bring that great big vote, 1000 pages a lot yesterday called that, but it was a strategic awakening. the title of the conference among national security political military and economic strategist in the decade ahead. burke said you got to look ahead. nobody's doing that. we've got to have that in our strategy. and i think admiral mullen will agree when we locked and we've made progress of three departments and they're looking for years ahead in each one compartmentalized. furthermore, burke insisted on this conference that we bring together nation of security and national economics. sound familiar?

burke quoted eisenhower who often said that those dealings with the daily near-term operational requirements could not look over and across the strategic horizon. now the 30 odd scholars at the conference she included some well-known older names like herman conquerors, escalation business, edward teller and younger figures like henry kissinger, james abstract shelley murray. he consisted we pull together the points of differences to find the issues. he said so often the problem is people jump to the problem and they're not looking at the issues from all angles and that's what it is to be truly strategic. later i worked with arleigh burke on the walter edge lectures at princeton. here he wrote it and spoke about

the difference between power and force. he said that so many presidents, generals, admirals, ambassadors don't understand. he said that a if you mobilize perfect power, if you have the perfect battle you didn't have to fight. you gain the willing were direction without it through power, not with force. force always been the potential. csis grew throughout the 1960's as the vietnam conflict grew incrementally. we committed half a million men with body counts, incrementalism, light at the end of tunnel, burke was beside himself with his strategy, national security visor walt came over and we had the young

president here and he said, the areas just over the horizon. we're about to break off here in the takeout. that was two weeks before attack. we had an after action on todd. there is a three-star general back from vietnam that came@ @ b

and the ultimatum he wrote then i'm retiring in another year. we've got to make things really interesting again. that word interesting is the key to burke's personality. whenever he disagreed, with his superiors or his predecessors, his arguments were interesting and captured his opponent into what he was saying. he attracted them to what he was singing he made them think anew. this became his unusual quality of persuasion, which ultimately became the key to great

leadership. burke was a magnet. i arleigh burke's funeral to face and a packed and apple is chapel in a very chilly day in 1996. he nearly lived to 95. prior to a step that would visit him for a decade or more. his retirement home, he lost his chronology, never his wit. as we sat in that packed chapel, several of you would have been there. there was one place on the aisle, next to the national security adviser. i don't think that would be president clinton because when

csis was founded in the vietnam war there were people at georgetown as a student and i know that he would march against rotc marching against even csis even though we had moved downtown. about that time, the president of the united states comes down the aisle, get set to deliver the eulogy. she was right, magnificently with admiral burke. john, you were there with admiral burke fighting the battle of the solomon islands right along with them. what a great tribute from the commander-in-chief. our story ends here, except that he's the godfather of this institution, that john now so

splendidly leads. arleigh would be so proud of john. csis, our counselor here, one of them said when we honored him on his 80th birthday, csis was the first institution in washington that sought to be truly strategic. why not? arleigh burke was truly strategic. thank you very much. [applause] [applause] >> i would not as i say our panel, it doesn't seem right to call this distinguished group a panel. every one of them is such a

singular leader in america and were so proud to have them here. you got copies of their resumes. i'm not going to go through introducing anybody by personal background. because i think that would be done again this afternoon. but let me just take the opportunity to save a sincere thank you. please everybody sit down in a sincere thank you to admiral mullen, to admiral ann rondeau into the secretaries john warner here at csis for being here. evan thomas is a fabulous author and has captured the spirit of these times and probably the most gripping of ways. we've asked them to take the leader. adam, can i turn it over to you? >> event. david, wonderful speech. shouts the question, when do leaders, simply military leaders and the civilian control system disagree, dissent, challenge

higher authority? i want to ask that of each of the group and let me first-ever to admiral mullen. would arleigh burke survive today? [laughter] >> i guess in the way david captures them so well he would figure out a way to do it. given those that he routinely challenged in the description i think of the word interesting and how you would draw individuals and even as they got not and even at that level and clearly want to hear from him again. i suspect he could. and that he would have figured out a way to adjust to the circumstances that exist today and very much so. >> can you address the larger

question of when particularly of military officer in this control system, when and how and under what circumstances, what are the rules of the road unchallenging higher authority? >> well, actually i think not unlike what admiral burke did in the sense that in discussions that would be routine with your boss, your civilian boss and man does when you disagree and feel strongly about it, even as we can now right up to the president and it's not just me, although i have routinely more access to the president and the other chiefs. certainly they have the option. and that it's done privately and it's done in a way that i think in a timely fashion, if you

will. and that you have a president. you know, on the other example is i think that or they are tied to white dave was talking about is the bad i've senior individuals who want to listen. even if it maddens them, they were also willing to listen and i think that important for anybody at any senior position of military that you want to listen and having that opportunity opportunity, give advice and present a couple examples he didn't win them all and i'm sure that he marched off and did whatever the senior civilian leadership said enough so we do now. and so, both opportunity certainly i have it and i had with president bush and president obama and i think it's very important part of our system in the opportunity to do that. and when the president makes a decision, we're on. >> clematis pickup at the last

person. what's the line when you don't go any further? how do you know when you're supposed to salute and keep going? was that moment? [laughter] >> i really think that as you have thought the problem through, as you have tried as david mentioned about arleigh burke has made the arguments interesting. they you would've explored those areas and have had a thorough setting of your position. and in the society and in the system in which we work, when the civilian authority makes a decision, that's it. i think you can't go in superficially. you have to about the problem for yourself, but when a decision is made, at some point it is contrary to your sense of honor or your ethics, then at

that time you other options. >> at one point, at least one point, admiral burke basically went over the heads of others in the military, they never took him aside and don't do that again. can you imagine a circumstance in which you are a senior military officer, military offers more senior to have gone on to the president and say no,. under what circumstances might you do that? you talk about honor and ethics. can you be a little bit more specific about a moment in which you think your senior military officer has just got a dissent?

are these conversations that happen at the highest level? [booing] i think it's very, very clear that the expectations of civilian control in military is unquestioned. i think everyone that is subordinate to me understands the strength of my convictions in that regard. i do believe it is important as a senior that you foster the opportunities for your subordinates to feel comfortable and free and have a meal for

discussions. as opposed to having been held in check and then trying to reach everything at a final moment. and i think that in the ability to have that organization comfortable coming forward, that there is an expectation that opinions can be offered, positions can be taken and i think that that is for the best of the institution. >> admiral roughead, you are a teacher at the national defense university. what do you teach about this whole obligation and duty or limitation on speaking to the power so to speak? >> let's bring burke as our example to the institute of question. burke absolutely able to constantly reframe the problem. were reframe his mind around a new problem. and so the notion of strategic

reframing is an intellectual predisposition that you have or that you learn. and so what we do at mdu or what any of the defense education entities seek to do is to help us to reframe where we have been do something more that we should be thinking about. so what burke was able to do and what we seek to do in the spirit of burke is constantly seek to reframe mindsets and mine friends about the issues in front of us. what burke was able to do was to be able to be comfortable speaking eight, ten, 20 years out. we do that as well. it's about setting the mindset and the mindfulness about what you are given in the environment. if i might say though, also the chairman, eisenhower was a

leader who also knew what he had. and so the respect -- the respecting of the mind of the leaders who were subordinate to you is also part of this. so burke was allowed to be burke. and one of the key things that we seek to teach is to be respectful of the intellect of those who are junior to you because they may indeed have an insight or a reframing that you don't have. and so every good leader would seek death. but we seek to reframe and to teach the ability to be comfortable in the environment. >> senator, you have been watching this balance for a long time. talked with a little bit as you have watched over the years of whether you think the modern military of the balance right on its willingness to challenge the civilian authority or to challenge even within the military their own superiors.

do you have a sense of how that balance is? >> let's go back 41 years when i was privileged to be in the pentagon in the navy secretary. we used to get in the rooms with the cheese and larry would

burke. burke have a protocol. when you join the navy secretary, he would send a little note, now is that i like to meet you and you'd go over and see them in his home with his lovely wife and i swear i first got to know him. so we were out on the sixth fleet and i did a little research with the aid at that time his name is tom haberer. he later became the chief of naval operations. but this one incident might've cost of not. i found that the ship that burke had in his squadron was still part of our active fleet. so i went aboard it. he transferred me permit cruiser over to the ship. and as a custom i/o is went down to the engine to the operating

ship. and i was just with the senior chief down there. there was no chief petty officer down there operating at. i said, do you think you could drive this thing at 31 like burke? he looked at me and he looked at the other chief and he said, you bet yeah, you know what. i said, crank it up. and he looks at me and he says i usually take my orders from the captain, but you're the secretary? civilians authority controls. [laughter] this was a true story. it was an exhilaration of when that's the implant went full thrust on this cruise and the rotating powertrain. so i've got i better get back up to the bridge as it's going to be a little destination. i got up to the bridge and i have this program that i knew

where burke was. and i called them from the bridge and got the ships there and we were standing there. i got among the phone thinking he'd need just exhilarated to know that his chip. he's right to dirty one knots right now. ..

six years will list serving and what he was able to accomplish and it's one of those things i looked at that and i was wondering how i was going to even come close to matching up to anything like that to be able to accomplish so much in that period of time, and i used it from that standpoint.

from the civilian control peace, i guess i'm much more driven and informed by a current times and by current times i would say the last 20 years or so and my goal as a leader is to be strictly a political, strictly neutral and in fact the state of the union earlier this week i had many comments about the chiefs when we stand up, when we don't stand up and the aftermath of the president's speech, but the goal there who literally is to certainly respond in a way that is supportive of those national security and military issues but other than that stay completely neutral so amongst my colleagues and actually with my juniors i

do talk a lot about the need to stay, be completely a political and where that is different from arleigh burke's time is i think in the situation where there is this seeking of news, the fast exposure to the media certainly the media is always looking for the kind of differentials to in many cases sharpen issues were about where i think it has gotten out of bounds is quite frankly when we take off and there is tension between those who have worn the uniform their whole life and they take off and there's tension between free speech which is nothing i certainly would ever take off but i think in ways it can be very difficult to understand

certainly i frame a lot of this in terms of the farmer in peoria whose riding because generally speaking they are still called admiral or general on the one hand and on the other hand they were training in that regard many of our young officers in particular, but not exclusively that it's okay to speak up and it's okay to disagree publicly and constantly and i worry a great deal about that in terms of the a political position that the military is in and so actually one of the things i have asked admiral, ron had to do is address this issue. actually in all of the war colleges because i do think we need to make sure we have a right and -- pledge your both encouraging them to speak about the same time saying watch it. >> but they have to do it correctly and the treasurer here is the apolitical military and it is in my view what we have to

i think in short regard and retain at all costs in this democracy and it goes back to who we are, who we work for, very clear civilian control and win as i think the admiral said when we disagree and against a point of ethics or morals and when we are actually working for someone and they don't have confidence than it is for only choice is and to speak up but quite frankly it is to move on. >> let me ask you more specifically and you've been asked about this before the recent example like this when it got in the news was general mcchrystal and how do you think he handled that? >> i don't want to -- [laughter] how do you think he handled it? [laughter] >> actually pretty well.

>> it was a very difficult position obviously very early in his tour in what was certainly if not then but rapidly becoming the most visible four-star position in the united states military and it was one that was made much more challenging because it was public, and actually one of the things, and this is part of us growing as an institution, growing as an individual and general mcchrystal and i talked a long time about moving into the four-star realm. it's different and he was going to do it on the world stage and that is a challenge, so all in all i thought he did handle it well. it was a very difficult -- it made the challenge of the review that much more difficult and certainly i would have preferred to not do it as publicly as we did and we all learned a lot in that regard and certainly i

would hope in a further strategic reviews we can avoid that particular model. [laughter] >> admiral called me ask a question of the navy. by tradition, the captain of the ship has tremendous of 40. in the old days complete authority. but even today there is a tradition of a cabinet of the ship having all this authority and when he gets on land yet he's got to learn how -- he's not admiral, like nelson putting his spyglass and say i can't see the signal. how do you balance of this tradition of authority and command authority on a ship with deference to civilian authority? what do you tell them? >> as you pointed out one of my favorite burke quotes, and i identify with a great deal is you have the autonomy on the ship and as he pointed out going to see used to be fun and then they gave us radios. [laughter]

and i think that even translates up in the current connectivity that we enjoy. but i think for me and one of the great things about the navy and something of a place tremendous value upon with all who serve and wear this uniform and burke articulated this himself and that the navy is a culture of command, it isn't a culture of staff, and that simple concept makes us who we are. the willingness to step forward when something needs to be done, the willingness to accept accountability, which is often times judged to be a bit extreme and the navy but that is what our culture is, and i find that culture of command translates to the shore as well because it is

about the willingness to take on the hard things, the willingness to lead and most importantly when things are good or bad you accept the accountability, and so i do not see a distinction. i see it as a great strength of this service and i am extraordinarily proud of the men and women who live that culture. >> let me go back and ask you this question again because you are in a position of having served a long time from a wonderful perspective you're dealing with the military. do you think that there is any evolution here for better or for worse on military willingness to stand up to civilian authority either good or bad? is it fairly even direction? >> i found particularly the individuals in the military that

to get the flag and in the general rank in the army, they know at that time to accept and be very candid. throughout my career in 30 years in the senate of was on the armed services committee regular contact with senior officers and i always had a policy very often to lead the aids in the room and sit with that officer but none of my own staff and just exchange views. i found a very productive and i'm sure i've had with you and you in my office on that basis. by the way i remember when you came to the cno i ask you when i was a secretary did we ever meet and do defiantly said no and you said you added this, i was a lieutenant on the online, this was during the vietnam war. you said i did everything i could, i never wanted to go there. but what goes around comes

around. ul that now. [laughter] but i've got to tell you, the american citizens should be grateful for the young men and women who all volunteer to come into these ranks and work their way up to give their lives together with their families and when they get there it has always been my experience whether it is in the senate the five years i was the navy secretary. >> rondeau, let me ask the same question. d.c. military getting more or less willing to stand up to or to challenge or for better or worse civilian authorities there in a trend? >> i think the question is framed interestingly because it is at the edge. i think that young people or older people i think that what determines the leader who can do this responsibly is intellectually curious and one who is able to ask questions of

him or herself and their environment so this is not some image of the first act. you go about your professional life and ask questions. you try to understand and to try to analyze, and that some@ @ rb airman, soldier, marine to get

their so they can come to an analytical understanding of what is going on. once you do that, your boss, your leader is going to be grateful and for the most part they will help you carry the argument and they may even help you she did better so that it will be successfully argued. so in my mind this is not about the edge point when you must take on somebody at some point of adversary. it is about being compelling and good and competent and coherent so that everybody else is then compelled. this was burke's gift and a gift of good leaders to be able to do that and know where you are intellectually so the intellectual curiosity of a young person today is to understand. the access to information is without precedent. our job as leaders is to help

them get there so they feel as though they are being heard, so that we are listening. this is about a conversation and not just about being at the edge or the adversary. if that is happening and it happens every day then you have a healthy military and a healthy mind. >> these fine officers are managers. but bottomline they are all commanders and foremost in their minds at all time is the fact they are responsible for the life of those in the ranks. their decisions put them in harm's way. their decisions direct them to perform those duties. that is a special burden none of us in private life or politics or business or whatever. we don't have that. that is why we still they give it their best.

let's take time for a couple questions from the audience. >> there are mics. now's the time. yes, ma'am. >> i have a question for admiral roughead. this experience with the military to bring in an offering relief, how we might be to get out faster? >> i think there are. as you may recall there will be a couple of responses similar to this, the tsunami of 2004 in the pacific the earthquake in pakistan and so we're always looking at how we can do this

better and the experience in haiti whenever that may be we will have learned much from how we respond, how we stage the types of skills and equipment we may need and i think that is one of the great things about not just a humanitarian relief for anything else, that the military has a wonderful culture of learning from our past and mistakes and we are willing to expos things that perhaps were not done as well as we would have liked and analyzing why that happened and how we can be better. we are constantly renewing and re-examining ourselves. >> any thoughts so far as to what he might change? >> i think that the, one of the things very important to me and

what we've been working on for several years post-tsunami is the continued integration of non-governmental organizations and our military forces and other agencies. we have come a long way. i think that we have to continue to work on that and pitch into one of these relief operations of this magnitude it is not one entity that will hold the whole thing off. it's the integration of that. mix all and we've been working closely with his organization and there are going to be a lot of opportunities to continue to develop those types of relationships and protocols that allow us to come together more quickly. >> can i just comment, i have been both intimately involved and i think the response has been remarkable given the

suddenness to the scope of it and the ability for us to mr. resources and get them there in the mass that is required as opposed to individual piece and i did, i thought some of the most remarkable stories were some of the rescue units. there was a rescue unit from china which got there in 33 hours out of beijing. the israeli hospitals i got there and all of those are an important part of this and we had units, we had our coast guard was magnificent, literally as right after the earthquake. however it is taken much more than that to get some structure in place to be able to handle the scope and volume of the tragedy. and it has come in many ways as

a result of assistance in indonesia and pakistan and even katrina here where you couldn't get their fast enough. you never can in these and yet, and i will do as an example, the comfort which got there in record time. you can't been a 1,000-foot ship and with all of its people. i would like to be able to do that based on previous experience comfort of their in record time and look what she's doing now and that is one example getting the forces on the ground. so we clearly will learn and are much better than we were but from my perspective the response has been magnificent from ngos, usaid, from our government and other countries as well in addition to the men and women of the military. >> i'm from the voice of america and have a question for admiral mullen.

under this deal of leadership and what you consider a charter of course in a complex situation towards a destination that has been determined by the commander in chief what sort of factors you have to consider and i will give you to to talk about, one is don't ask don't tell and the other is relations with china because the taiwan arms sale announced the last couple of hours so how do you try to balance this commitment to taiwan and the decision that is made with the imperative of remaining engaged with china? but now that i talked about china don't forget about the first point i made. [laughter] >> i would actually be happy to answer the second question and i will answer the first question tuesday at the hearing. [laughter] >> fair enough. >> the issue from leadership perspective with china is one that i and others have responsibility from the military

to military perspective and opportunities as has been the case with many countries. i actually find it a little bit ironic we are talking about ed morrill burke who put the program in place, and i literally last week was in moscow in negotiations with my counterpart with respect to the start follow-on treaty which has an awful lot to do with of the vision he had even though he didn't win all of that which speaks to the decisions we make and how long they last. sometimes we think of them in the short term. so i try to think about how i handle myself and approach this from the long-term perspective. after you are here in washington for a while there is an of virginity to look back in just tomorrow and what does it mean? the reason i bring that up in her china particularly is my thoughts are very much not even close to just the senior

leadership perspective because i really want our younger officers to meet each other. because that's the future. that's going to be the relationship. that's what we lost more than anything else in pakistan when wishing to become sanctioned them for 12 years is the man agreed officers who are not generals who don't know anything about the united states so i always have that in mind even in the discussion earlier in terms of in both accountability and being a political. half of my mind goes to our young ones so that in the long run that change can be made and i feel good way with china. and i will save tuesday's answers for tuesday on don't ask don't tell. i certainly recognize the question and i understand this issue is moving very rapidly. >> i would like to make a

comment [inaudible] i think what is so overarched is the civilian military and burke understood this as the power of ideas and i want to take two examples, one who john with my navel had because i served on the board of the naval war college and then my army at on a visit i had privately with david petraeus. but here are two cases of the whole change of strategic tactical doctrine won by the penn saver they tried to constantly sync as he went to history petraeus went to the lessons of iraq both learned, both got their acolytes.

davis petraeus described how they got the bosnian, the puzzle they put together out at leavenworth. i remember mentioned at the white house petraeus was at leavenworth and they want to bring him back and he said are you in the penitentiaries and i said no. [laughter] i would say he said that in the white house now, last administration. but the man got his acolytes and then became assistant secretary but before that were going to the naval war college, the chairman of the foreign relations committee john became secretary of state and when they came into washington there was a coal strategic vision and the move into the pacific and the only reason, the only thing we had prepared in a world war i with the navy to support the army over there was due to this

one guy and his thought process and the acolytes. petraeus did the same and they change the mindset in the way you fight in a symmetrical war. i told him this is very similar, very different, and then when you get into this it blurs civilian military. people are moving forward on ideas and doctrine and of course the other things i've said in the book, civilian george marshall, a great secretary of state as well as defense and national security advisor, this mix is good, this military experience mixed with civilian, state department has learned to appreciate that.

we need engineers, former for stars and usaid today and so forth. but i think this has been a wonderful session and really we are indebted to all of you. i think we better rabbit up -- raptors this up but all i think you all for being with us and echoing the one and only admiral