surge in iraq worked, which everybody seems to think happen, or at least many people do. and that this same type of surge can be duplicated in afghanistan. now of course, there was this 2000 surge that seemed to stabilize iraq, we had a similar surge with a similar number of troops during the 2005 didn't quell iraqi violence at all. the u.s. military doesn't like to admit that it simply paid the sunni tribes to change sides, and this was the real factor in main reason for the reduction in violence in iraq. which i believe will be temporary. of course, there was also the fact that there was so much ethnic cleansing that the warring factions were separated. now my prediction in iraq is not violence were returned. there have been periodic, large, multiple bombings like yesterday that indicate that all is not

well. now, the strategy and a short term was a good one, paying off the sunni awakening, which successfully divided the opposition and got the awakening to attack al qaeda instead of the united states. this same strategy of dividing the opposition has actually worked before to win counterinsurgency campaigns. now there have been very few counterinsurgency campaigns that have been successful in the 20 century. but the defeat of the philippine rebels after the spanish-american war at the turn of the last century, the u.s.-backed greek government's defeat of the guerrillas in 1947 tom and the british and defeated the chinese insurgency in the 1950s. all of those have the thing in common that they split the opposition. however, in iraq the ethnosectarian fishers are still great, and i don't think the show is over yet. in my book, "partitioning for

peace," which is what to do about iraq, i go through some of the other ethnosectarian conflict in world history and find that violence sometimes adds the user always returns a list the underlying issues have been resolved, which they haven't in iraq. i don't have an oil law which is their bread and butter commodity. so you can see the level of disagreement in the society. and of course, they have struggled even to get a date for the election. and that didn't happen until recently. now, even if the surge had been the deciding factor in the reduction of iraqi violence, the question is, can you translate that to afghanistan. afghanistan is a much different country and a much harder fight to win. here are some of the reasons that the taliban have a more zealous insurgency than the former baathists in iraq. afghanistan is a bigger country, has more people than iraq and there are fewer forces there. and according to u.s. military's own rules of counterinsurgency

warfare, u.s. would have to have nearly 600,000 troops in afghanistan to be effective. now of course, that's a rule of thumb, but the basic principle is that we are way under that. and there is no hope that we will ever get up to that hi. so i think we see the daunting task ahead. iraq is let. afghanistan is not as. of course, making it much easier for the girls, unlike iraq the afghan taliban have a sanctuary in pakistan. which is supposedly our ally, but which only goes after the pakistani taliban and not be afghan taliban. the afghan taliban is always useful to the pakistani government to counter the indian influence in afghanistan, especially when the u.s. is likely to leave as the president signaled his intention to at least are pulling out troops by 2011. so that was i think a message to the pakistanis that perhaps the elements of the pakistani

military, that they should keep supporting the afghan taliban. now in iraq, the insurgency was primarily urban, whereas in afghanistan it's a rural. because of the war, the civil war and the assassinations, in addition, the tribal leadership is weaker in iraq -- or is weaker in afghanistan than in iraq, and there is no awakening movement and afghanistan. the taliban are afghans, who for the most part don't target civilians. whereas al qaeda and iraq is led by foreigners, and does purposefully attack civilians to stir up in ethnosectarian hatred. that, of course, alienates many -- has alienated many sunnis in iraq. and of course, in afghanistan we have a corrupt karzai government who stole the election in ruled

only cobble. so much of it is effectively run by the taliban. we've had eight years with the u.s. has awfully between a kinetic counterterrorism strategy and a counterinsurgency strategy that tries to protect people, and we've seen the last oscillation of that. this happened during the bush administration, and now it is happening again in the obama administration that we're moving back to a counterinsurgency strategy. besides afghanistan being a much harder not to crack than iraq, we now have a lot of domestic factors affecting u.s. policy. the american public is worried after two wars stretched out after many years to get i think it is politically perilous for any politician in a democracy to escalate the war that is already unpopular, even lbj didn't do that when escalated the vietnam war. u.s. spending in afghanistan is more per year than any other military stance on the planet. so we are dumping a lot of resources into afghanistan.

the afghan war is expected to cost another trillion dollars over the next 10 years. of course, we are still racking up the bills in iraq. at the same time the u.s. is running a trillion dollar annual deficit, budget deficit per year during a recession. will probably undertake an expensive health care program that will cost between $1,000,000,002.5 trillion over 10 years, and not to mention the massive solvency problem looming over the social security and medicare system coming down the road. so it's really questionable whether the u.s. can afford to fight two wars simultaneously under these revised circumstances. now the u.s. military is backhandedly admitted that it can't win in afghanistan, but hopes the surge will allow it to disrupt and degrade, quote unquote, the taliban. which really means containing the taliban in urban areas and to the afghan security forces are up to speed. but of course all the surge

troops will not be in place until the fall of next year, giving them only nine short months until the withdrawal begins. the afghan forces are small, corrupt and incompetent, drug routes and will take much longer than even the five years that karzai has testified for them to be able to secure the country by themselves. the problem in afghanistan, contrary to what people believe is, that you can't conquer afghanistan. it has been copied many times that the problem is so doing it and controlling it, which he really has been. i think you have to go probably back to the persian-cyrus to find anyone who is actually controlled afghanistan. one reason for that is there a desperate groups living spread out and it's very difficult to control this type of -- this type of collection of different people.

now of course, we're only going to drink 240,000 afghans instead of the 400,000 that mcchrystal proposed. but the more, and the more u.s. troops we put in there, the less incentive the afghans have to train forces themselves. now it's not clear to me what stabilizing urban areas will do for the fight against al qaeda, since any training camp would probably be in the taliban controlled country side anyway. you don't usually put a big training camp in the middle of downtown somewhere. now i have painted an awful portrait of afghanistan and predicted that iraq will again disrupt in civil strife when the u.s. begins to pull out. what should the u.s. do in each conflict? in my view in iraq, the u.s. should sponsor a national conclave and try to decentralize iraq even further into a loose confederation of very odd thomas regions. with iraq's history of one groups controlling the central government, and using it to oppressed the other groups, the central government should be

made week so that the ethnosectarian groups don't fight over controlling it. most government functions include security the judicial system and social services could be in the nearly created ethnosectarian region. in those regions should not follow the provincial boundaries of iraq, that it has now. this would allow people to be policed and judged by people in their own group. the central government would only be allowed to create an open market among the various regions, and a representation overseas. some auto revenue or oil sharing would have to be hammered out to get the sunnis to accept the devolution of power to the regions. you might have to even move the boundaries around oil fields, etc. but in an imminent u.s. withdrawal which we don't have yet, might just catalyze the end of the stalemate on the oil. now contrary to conventional

wisdom, my research shows that if countries are protection of the regional boundaries don't have to perfectly go on ethnosectarian lines. to avoid ethnosectarian violence you just have to avoid a large minority on the wrong side of the line, which threatens the majority. for example, in kosovo, the serbs still represent about, although less than 10 percent of the population, and there really hasn't been that much violence against them since kosovo became independent because the numbers don't threaten the albanian majority. that's one example. now though the u.s. should try to negotiate such a decentralization to end his confederation in iraq on its way out, the iraqis don't want to do this, that's fine, but i think the u.s. should pull out anyway because i think this will be iraq's last hope of more

ethnosectarian violence. and certainty, bush is arming and training of the sunni awakening your in the long-term it was a good short-term strategy to reduce the violence, but in the long term it may make the civil war more intense because there will be a third side arm. the u.s. already arm the kurds and trained those forces. contrary to conventional wisdom, and in spite of its oil, iraq has not really cgt u.s. interest that this is a subject which you really can't get too much in this seminar, but i don't really believe that we need to extend oil with armed forces because the market will deliver the oil. that's the subject of my next book. now, as for afghanistan, i know most people are interested in afghanistan because it's the war of the week, or you know, we forgot about afghanistan while we are doing all the stuff in

iraq, and now that iraq, the violence has and what about your short attention span and back to afghanistan. i think that the u.s. should also get out of afghanistan as quickly as possible. and i think it seems as if obama in his speech is giving it one last college tried before the withdrawal begins, but the question remains whether the security -- u.s. security can convince him to remain longer. they always make arguments he can't refuse to stay longer when u.s. forces get involved. i think that u.s. needs to realize that pakistan is more important than afghanistan. now there is some vague awareness of that in this administration, especially on part of the white house staff and present. yet for right now i think they have lost the battle. obama seems to have been persuaded that the u.s. escalation in afghanistan was needed to convince the pakistani government to fight the taliban. but that pakistan has its own and says to fight the pakistani taliban, and insurgency.

but not the afghanistan taliban which the pakistanis elements of the pakistani military used to counter the indian influence in afghanistan. of course, you can't restructure pakistan security priorities. india is a nuclear armed power, and that's pakistan's major enemy. so fighting terrorism am i would say, maybe even in their own country is secondary to the pakistan. it's certain a second or in the mind of the pakistan military. pakistan is a nuclear armed country that is being challenged with a new militancy that is being fueled, in my view, by the u.s. military presence in afghanistan and a tax into pakistan. is as the president has fueled the insurgency if you examine the timeline, the panel of insurgents didn't seem to begin until 2006. in 2005, u.s. forces moved out of kabul into the countryside.

so i think something similar is happening to what happened in the soviet period it would the more troops the soviets put in just created more fighters against them. now, obama has really said that strikes outside the tribal areas and special forces to hit afghan taliban targets in pakistan will be use, or at least threatened if the pakistanis don't do something about it. i think this will drive pakistan public opinion crazy, and of course, i think these sorts of strikes should be limited for getting al qaeda people and the lightest footprint that we can possibly have. of course, pakistan does provide, or at least people think they provide shelter for osama bin laden and al qaeda central leadership. somebody in the pakistani military probably knows where he

is, and the pakistani survey avoid fighting the afghan taliban, or trying to capture, kill its leaders. so the pakistanis have their own agenda. and i think one of the reasons that gates and clinton were walking back obama's pledge to begin withdrawing u.s. forces in mid-2011, which of course is designed to prod karzai to make reforms, was the realization the pakistani military that they know that the u.s. is going to leave would have no incentive not to accelerate the helping of the u.s. enemy, the afghan taliban. to forestall indian influence. now of course, mcchrystal said yesterday that the withdrawal date wasn't important to strategy, which basically blows the message to cars act that we will be leaving. so they're sending sort of a muddled message. now, i don't think obama -- he

doesn't pass the have to say the u.s. is going to withdraw because the pakistanis have already experienced a u.s. inherent limited attention span, which we don't have a really acknowledge too much in the united states which just happened time and time again. so our chief ally in the region will probably continue supporting our enemy -- our chief enemy in the region which is kind of a bizarre thing to have happen, if you know what i mean. but that's what's going on, right? the taliban will not be defeated, and it will outwait the united states. but what if the taliban weren't our enemy? what is my solution to this problem? what i would say is we need to distinguish between the taliban which is a local insurgency, and a kind of which is worldwide insurgency, terrorist group that is targeting the u.s. and that's a big difference because when you're a guerrilla group you hold territory. and we hold territory, you can

be deterred a lot more than you can be if you're a terrorist group and you can't be threatened. we don't want to repeat what we did in the cold war, but it seems like what we're doing, remember when we thought all communists were the same? but then, there were the chines communist and then there were the soviet communists. and then of course, communist like tito and those type of comments which we eventually, both the chinese and the yugoslav communist, sort of made friends with but we some extent broad our soviet enemy. in fact, richard nixon made friends with the more radical chinese, and sort of, not an alliance, but lose alignment to counter the soviets. so i think we have to distinguish all these people aren't the same, and a lot of the rhetoric, even that we're getting from the administration, seems to think that they are.

so what do we do? well, i would try to buy off what taliban you can as a way to minimize casualties and lower violence, so that we can get out. you have to accept the eventual reality that the taliban will help govern or govern afghanistan. i would rely on the afghan taliban's chief support of the pakistani military to make sure that they don't harbor al qaeda. the taliban should have learned its lesson of harboring al qaeda will bring the u.s. hammer down. and of course, we still have options. we could invade again, although this time we would remain. we could use the threat of periodic airstrikes, something that any taliban government would like to avoid if they are trying to govern the country because they do hold territory and we can hold them accountable. and you know, if the taliban plays ball with us and doesn't harbor al qaeda, then we leave it alone. the british press has reported

and private glaciations with the taliban, it recognized u.s. interest in not having al qaeda sheltering afghanistan. and of course, into the vast taliban controlled parts of afghanistan, that taliban hasn't been harboring al qaeda in training camps, and so that gives him cause for hope. people do learned their lesson. when the germans and japanese had their countries bombed into rubble, they changed sides. i'm not saying that the taliban would necessary do that, but certainly they may be much more pragmatic than we think. now, to give the pakistanis an incentive to pressure into any taliban government not to harbor the taliban, we could -- not to harbor al qaeda, excuse me, we could mediate what pakistan wants, and that is to resume the talks with any. the pakistanis do this and they

also produce the al qaeda leadership, u.s. and even offered pressured indians to make a prominent peace with pakistan that if pakistan doesn't play ball, and doesn't pressure the afghan taliban not to harbor al qaeda, u.s. simply could realize with india and in all bilateral aid to world bank and imf support for the pakistani economy. now, also i think the pakistani insurgency will be attenuated when the u.s. leaves afghanistan because what drives the islamic -- islam's, crazy, not in islamic soil. this is what the u.s. has been doing, and the exact opposite of what we should be doing after 9/11. finally, the al qaeda central leadership of course could move to yemen or somalia. so i guess it is not in any more important than any other country than a potential shelter. the administration just made the

argument that winning in afghanistan where the 9/11 attacks emanated from will embolden the islamic militants and harm u.s. prestige. i think these are similar to somebody argues that made film made during the vietnam war. vietnam went to the communist, you know. all these bad things would happen, which never really happened. now i think we can continue to use law enforcement intelligence airstrike in special forces to contain al qaeda and any of those potential sanctuaries. and including afghanistan and pakistan, if we have to. and i think containing, by containing the taliban, instead of just containing al qaeda, makes the problem worse because you have a foreign occupation. i think we need to pressure pakistan and get them to do what they can. now, if they don't do what we

can do we need to keep al qaeda contained with the least footprint available. so doing no harm should be the first u.s. objective. we encourage islamic militants in the cold war years too, as a bulwark against atheist communism but we're still doing that and certainly by occupying muslim soil. and bin laden must be pleased by both obama's surge and bush's excursion into iraq. so i think we need a lighter touch, and concentrate on counterinsurgency and drop the counter -- counterterrorism and drop the counterinsurgency. and i think we will be much better off. there's no perfect solution, but that's what i have mine.

so we will go now to our second speaker, peter galbraith. [applause] >> ivan, thank you for the presentation. i apologize for in a few minutes late. let me just begin picking up on the broader thing that you raise, which is the question of, question that has intrigued me. i suppose having worked in so many divided states, and a third the policies that we follow. almost invariably, the united states has an extraordinary commitment to the continued existence of every state that

exists. this was most prevalent in 1991 when george h. w. bush did everything he could do hold of the soviet union together. including going to kiev on the first of august of that year to war and the ukrainians against nationalism, a speech that became as the chicken kiev speech. it was an extraordinary commitment of u.s. prestige and diplomacy at a time when it was just unrivaled in the world, to a cause that was totally hopeless. and in which we actually had no interest. because within the month, ukraine was independent. the same error was made with very tragic consequences in

yugoslavia, where james baker went on the 21st of june, 1991, toward the leaders of the six republics of these in yugoslavia, that if they broke up the country, that those who broke away could expect no sympathy from the u.s. but at that point in time, the people of slovenia and croatia had already voted, overwhelmingly, or for independent. the leaders were, their whole being was about independence. the date was set for the 25th, four days later, and of course they went ahead. and it was not possible at that time, or indeed, many months in advance, to have saved in yugoslavia. and there was no point in trying to save yugoslavia. the world is not worse off. in fact, i think it's better off

that there is no soviet union. it's not worse off that there is no yugoslavia. but the tragedy of the yugoslav situation is was not the breakup of the country, but the violence. and the violence was definitely preventable in the spring and early summer of 1991. the holding yugoslavia together was not a possibility. and we continued with this commitment to the unity of every state that exists, so that, for example, in iraq one of our major objectives as stated by the second president bush was the unity of iraq. and yet, there is a part of the country, kurdistan, in which every single person there, at least everyone that i have met, and this was also expressed in a

referendum that was held at the time of the first iraqi elections, which -- i mean, every kurd i met favors independence. that includes those who hold prominent positions in the central government in baghdad. and in a referendum that the kurds held, this time of the january 30, 2005, elections, they voted -- 98% were for independence. it was obviously not binding referendum. and so again, i would say that the interest that we have in iraq is not in the unity of the country, but in avoiding violence. now, there are obviously circumstances where the continuation of the state, of a state, may also be related to avoiding violence, and to some

degree that may be true in iraq. certainly it had the -- kurdistan declared itself independent in 2003. that would have produced a very violent reaction from turkey. but as the situation has evolved and turkey's thinking, you had extra in her statement by general kanaan, who was the last military dictator of turkey who staged the coup in 1980 as military men do, they made himself president. he was the guy who launched a crackdown on the kurds in southeast turkey. this was a time when described the people of southeast turkey as kurds, was illegal. they were mountain turks. but recently he said, you know, what's this business about an independent kurdistan in northern iraq? of course it existed we have to get used to it. and incidentally, it is not a threat to turkey. now again, i'm not saying that

turkey would, if kurdistan declared itself independent tomorrow, that turkey would be very enthusiastic about it, but there is a clear evolution in that situation. the other frame with which we discuss these problems is that we tend to describe the people of these areas by the state. the number of times that i heard the phrase yugoslavs from people, i can assure you i never met a croat who accepted he was a yugoslav. there were a few people of mixed products of mixed marriages who describe themselves as yugoslavs. you're not going to contradict me on that one. [laughter] >> i bet there are some serbs who describe themselves that way, but not so many. a certain number of bosnians,

muslims, but fundamentally, this is and how they look at it. this was really a construct that we had. we also referred to soviets, czechoslovakia, and we referred to iraqi's. and again, and virtually every kurd if you call him an iraqi, he or she is offended. and frankly, describes even this sort of break describes how we view the country. i listen to you describing iraq as flat. well, that is true for the part of iraq that thinks of itself as iraq. but if you look at the map, and that isn't strictly speaking true. . .

a stable peaceful and democratic unified iraq. yes obtained, but we weren't going to lose it in the picture that was painted by former defense secretary rumsfeld who said imagine what would happen if al qaeda come if we pulled out and found china would be taking over in baghdad. the image you of was from

vietnam, this north vietnamese tanks knocked down the open gates of the presidential palace in saigon was an going to happen in iraq. simple demographics. this is 2% of the population are shiite. and they were in control of the army, of course, the shiite army. they controlled the south. there was no way that the al qaeda and baathist insurgency was going to be allowed to defeat them. and the kurds who were -- server blade -- certainly in the earlier years ago and maybe even still today the strongest military in iraq -- they weren't born to be defeated by the al qaeda element and there was no support among the shiites were al qaeda or those who viewed the shiites as apostates and who should be killed. the kurds, there was virtually

no support in kurdistan. in so really we are talking about a problem that existed in about 20 percent of the population and, of course, the problem solved itself of when the fundamentalist element to the local power structure, the baathist, were very happy to have them, as long as they were killing americans, joining two americans was great. as long as they were killing shiites that was fine, even the big massacres of shiite civilians, but then they began to shake down the shakes for writing. they began to demand their daughters into forced marriages and began to kill the local tribal and shakes at that point these guys said we had enough and asked americans for money in it and need to ask for weapons and in a short time they are able to defeat them.

the -- that i think -- that is the situation in iraq. i don't know whether after u.s. withdrawal if we will dissolve into violence. actually i think there is a certain inmates stability to what has happened. precisely because iraq as already having an extremely decentralize constitution in which it is a confederation, at least a confederation between arabs and kurds in which kurdistan has all the trappings of an independent state including its own army and its of legislature, its own private, only recently when the iraqi flag was redesigned it was allowed to fly there. in its own immigration. you need a visa to go. >> but you don't need a visa to go to kurdistan. and the fact that it has all the trappings of an independent state brinkley reduces the

incentive to go for a formal independence. and as between the sunnis and the shiites in to think of themselves as iraqis and i don't thank you can think of asymmetry devolution of power in that country. the other thing about iraq, so basically the iraqi system allows those who want to do every there on the garrison be independent to be independent. and those who doubt they don't have to. and at the center with a super majority system of any allegation of -- allocation of positions each is represented in the central government bought a shiite will be the prime minister he doesn't choose the other ministers. if there are 20 ministers, 10 of them will be shiites, five will be kurds, but it will be the kurdistan nationalist parties that use the kurdish ministers and the sunni's choose the sunnis of the bargaining takes

place within the cabinet. quite often issues are not resolved but on the whole i think it's not a bad system and i think i'm more optimistic that their real danger of violence in iraq which is violence iman these organized statements if you will, the kurdistan shia stand as it stands, there's a very good chance that will not happen. let me turn afghanistan which is obviously a been at the center of my thinking for the last year. in one of the problems of afghanistan is that it has a government structure that is completely unsuited to the country a. of lot of similarities between iraq and afghanistan. in an iraqi have the three groups and it afghanistan there

are four. the pashtuns, 45 percent, the tajiks and 25%, the shiites at 10, was pakistan ever represent, both have some turk. and you have the more violent south, the relatively small stable of north. but where as in iraq you have both a high degree of local self-government and a system that insurance is power sharing at the center, in afghanistan you have a napoleonic constitutional structure. highly centralized in the sense that the central government appoints the governors, of the ministers, the education approved at the local level is controlled from kabul. there's not a local authority.

the provincial councils are collectively just advisory bodies. and there is also a winner-take-all system at the center and so you have an election for president, somebody wins, and that person then exercises basically of power. there's really quite a week parlance. the president controls the supreme court, the president controls and this turned out to be critically important that independent collection commission. and the other structures of government. now, at least that's how it works in theory. in reality a person's it's a very diverse country both ethnically and geographically, what this really means is that the president doesn't control

parts of the large parts of the country. in the tajik areas on the ground significantly self kentuck -- area as to in our regions and when you get to the pashtuns regions one of the points to make as we talk about the taliban, it's almost exclusively a pashtuns movement. so and operates only on the order of percent of the country that are pashtuns. and thus the north and the central highlands certainly the central highlands and a lesser extent the north are relatively stable. one of the things and this was proposed by dr. abdullah abdullah was the karzai principal challenger, interestingly and man who was one of the few to afghans in the sense that his father was pashtuns and his mother was

tajik, but in spite of that he was actually thought of by everybody as a tajik and he didn't -- he did not have a shared identification among the pashtuns with him. but what he proposed and once i think makes sense is that there be entrenched power sharing idea of a new, taking some minimum powers away from the president, having a cabin in promised her in parliament chosen with the same kind of bargaining that takes place in the iraq. in truth when afghanistan needs is an iraqi style constitution also with elected local government. now, i want to emphasize in case both iraq and the united states, iraq and afghanistan, it's really not for the united states to impose a solution.

so yes there is given a significant investment particularly that we have is be on a for my transitioning out of iraq, ours was not well, in a nation of iraq except by the kurds. it's really -- and the dynamic is very different, the way we're viewed as different. so our ability to shake hands and, political events in iraq is much less and our very much urge a lower profile there. in but in the case of afghanistan we're ramping have. it's very much welcomed, it's essential for the karzai government for its survival. and it's not unreasonable to say we have 100,000 troops there, additional 3,000 from nato, we are spending all this money, that we expect something. and we certainly -- what is it that we ought to expect? well, we ought to expect incredible partner. and the problem is credible

partner does not exist. the karzai and administration and has for the last eight years been characterized by a attractiveness and toleration for corruption. toleration of corruption. now it's an office by virtue of massive fraud and is seen as a legitimate and rightly seen as illegitimate by and large segment of the afghan population. as it actually didn't -- karzai didn't win those elections. it isn't incidentally that the elector of complaints commission took karzai slightly below the 2% in abdullah gave up, because he recognized it was hopeless. the electoral complaints commission and did a statistical sample of because all they needed to do was to bring him blow to%, there could be run off and didn't need to determine how many he got but based on what i

know from the staff is that karzai quote was probably about 41%, not 49%. and abdullah was not that much far behind, maybe 35 percent. so this was a much closer contest. i think abdullah was right not to go to the second round because the independent election commission was moving to increase the number of posters when the root of the problem was postponing centers, that is close centers that never opened or existed producing a million funny ballots. and because it rehired -- in every case of ron was either perpetrated by the election commission staff or they collaborated with those who did the from and a new piranha and didn't report it. every one of those people were responsible for the staff work being rehired. in practice a little aside, exactly one person has lost his job over from the afghan

alexian's and that wasn't one of the people who committed fraud. [laughter] and in the end, the results of this process is that we don't have a credible partner and that is the missing link in president obama's strategy. is what makes it so difficult to implement. the idea of protecting and the population, okay, you can do that, you can clear the taliban out of an area which is hard, you can -- but then you need something to happen otherwise you'll be there forever. specifically what you mean is for there to be an afghan army to come in and help to secure it and eventually to take over. you need to african police to provide order and then you need an afghan government or some kind of a government that can provide public services, honest

administration, and can win a the trust of the people. the karzai government can do that. they want to it. in the way in which the most experienced government, there's a lot of talk in washington about corruption and that's there of course, but that isn't the main point. the move with the experience this as abuse of power and the people operating with impunity and it isn't just parents officials. it's really the local power brokers and again month of the apply of our cultural standards we imagine if you're out of officer out of power so we think there's a corrupt governor or abuse of government and want to get him out of office but it doesn't change things because the guy is still actually running things. the dilemma, the difficulty we face here is that once you have

an -- excuse me, the dilemma is that once you have katyusha to remove these guys they're still in power and wants the population has lost confidence in the government even if you could miraculously get honest administration it doesn't mean you're going to regain the confidence of the people. that's the problem because in order for somebody to sign up on the government side they basically put their lives at risk. the taliban basically leaves the elders alone unless they are aligned with the government so you would need a larger critical mass to simultaneously over to the government side and that's very hard. so i don't see that this piece is going to be readily next. i do think moonball elected

local self-government will help, but it's by no means a panacea. let me just say a word about the police and then just a word to respond to what ivan said about pakistan. on the issue of the police, there's a real dilemma here which is that we have an eight week training course for police which is relatively short, but if you want to get large numbers you can train them for long periods of time. the trouble is you have people who come in with the first few weeks are spent on basic things like basic hygiene, what is required when a whole bunch of men live together, and then it most of them are illiterate. so if you really wanted to get a higher quality of police you have to have a multi your training course that included such things as teaching how to read and write but if you did

that at the end of the process you have a relatively educated person who wouldn't want to be a policeman and. [laughter] and these are some of the dilemmas we face and some of these dilemmas i won't go into it come from imposing our idea of the afghan army should be, when our idea of the afghan police should be. ambassador, which has raised this and i won't go further but he does observe that afghans, they are not unknown for the writing process and how we need to spend so much time and train them to fight. the return to the question of pakistan. mr. neary save about the u.s. relationship with pakistan is that the pakistan is remember everything in the americans remember nothing. and as a result we simply adopt the pakistan narrative of what

happens in that narrative is of the u.s. as an ungrateful ally, that we lost interest. well, that isn't how it happened. first, the u.s. having -- having embraced pakistan 1981 after the soviet invasion, pakistan then made a commitment to the united states that general kelud and said pakistan has neither the means or intention of developing a nuclear explosive device. congress put this into law and i have a lot to do that actually. and that was simply putting on his promise, his commitment which now been made him off her into law. they knew that if they crossed the line on the nuclear program that their weapons and their aid would be cut off and they did and it was cut off. we'll out are in deep apology and noted for their breaking their commitment.

and that reflects i think the larger problem of the relationship. which is that we have always viewed as we as pakistan is doing something for us and we have to -- they're for -- therefore we are not sufficiently grateful and have more losses the pakistan narrative. but the soviet invasion of afghanistan was a lot bigger threat to pakistan to united states. and we might have approached it by saying to pakistan, to the general, if you want our help here's our conditions and an expansion to keep them. instead we approached them position of weakness and we said, if you will sign up with us and fight the soviets in afghanistan, we will provide all these goodies in the general said, yes i want to control and, of course, the most significant thing he wants to control was to decide who among the afghans got

the u.s. assistance. he gave them to the very people that he does the most, that are our enemies. incidentally no soviet ever attacked us from afghanistan, but, of course, the very people that we funded and refunded because pakistan the general insist refund or the people who ultimately were responsible or contributed significantly to the attacks on the united states. in the same franklin plan check approach was apply it toward musharaff. in the bush administration. there is, however, no easy solution to the problem in pakistan because pakistan is a divided country, certainly divided ethnically pure and with significant independence movement in baluchistan, linking separatism, and the fact that the pashtuns are on both sides of the border.

but it's also divided horizontally in the sense that there is a civilian government, but there's also the army which has run things formally for half of pakistan's history and informally for the other half of most of the other half. there is the isi which operates in the army and suppose the lead rope elements of the isi. so we were to lay down some of these conditions, the right to cut off aid to pakistan, who would we be heard in? and would we be serving our interest? i would argue that in frank our interest lies in strengthening pakistan's civilian government. i know there are many criticisms of the president and he is in less than a person to and being that the practice would be awfully good of pakistan had one civilian government that actually served its term and then left office. rather than being overthrown.

in the civilian government has a different approach to india in the military, the pakistan military -- you spoke of it as india as the enemy. well, is an interesting and -- if you talk to pakistan and actually on almost any subject, flower arrangements, and within a few minutes the subject of renewable,. you can spend all day in india talk to rep. security issues of the subject of pakistan does not,. india has moved on. pakistan's military has not and, of course, their well-being depends on the in the interactive. that is the raison d'etre. and is why a two incredibly reckless things like support terrorists who are responsible for a number of attacks in the

ad included in the mumbai attacks which are the one thing that completed to it pakistan and india war. and why they believe it's useful to be finding in the half in afghanistan both against the pashtuns against the tajik and the taliban and against the karzai government. so as tempting as it would be to think of pakistan as a unitary actor, subject to pressure, it just doesn't work that way. so i think we have to operate the reality of pakistan and that reality is we will be much better off if democracy really takes root in the country, if it becomes institutionalized and it can have a civilian government with a measure of control over the military, and that's not impossible some of the ship that is taking place in terms of it the military fighting the pakistan taliban which they were

reluctant to do it is under pressure and direction from the civilians. pakistan was much less engaged in afghanistan during this election than it had been in 2004. on and that was the civilian government's policy decision that they did it on to be involved. again, it's hard from perfect but it's not impossible. and i think over time what we want to see is strengthen civilian government of pakistan and britain to pursue some of the ideas that president zadari has been shared by other pakistan politicians of cooperation with india, and afghanistan, regional markets and even pakistan provide the infrastructure or india. let me stop there. [applause] >> thank you, peter, for the interesting presentation and i will go to our third speaker, charles pena is a senior loan at

the institute. >> good afternoon. ivan hasn't given me a time limit but since i now stand between you and two important things, the first questions and second ones, i will do my best to keep my remarks relatively brief. peter who addressed the first part of your remarks, and californian by birthright, northern california specifically, you talked about how people identified. i also want to congratulate ivan for been pretty accretions about scheduling this particular event. we talked about this six weeks or so ago and who would know that it would happen the week after president obama decided to make his speech about ramping up troops in afghanistan. the title of today's event is, can we withdraw from iraq and afghanistan? i'm going to focus my remarks mostly about afghanistan but i would say 80 to 90 percent of what i have to say you can probably transfer over to

wholesale to by iraq. i thought was interesting that ivan chose the term, can we withdraw. the simple answer is, yes, absolutely, no problem. all the president has to do is make a decision. whenever we talk about military winstrol, everybody throws up all the reasons you can't do it, how complicated is and all the politics involved. the bottom line is the commander in chief can make the decision. all he or she has to do is make it to and then he tells the secretary of defense and then works with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, make it happen. it's that simple. so the institute can withdraw is, yes,. it always has been, yes,. you just have to have the political will to make the decision to withdraw. so then the next question that comes out and is how you do

that? it's a logistical nightmare and it is particularly in iraq at the month, it is a bit of a logistical nightmare. but in afghanistan yes you can withdraw. let me suggest, the president has said he would like to begin with withdrawal of troops in afghanistan in roughly 18 months. and to reduce a month in which is not unreasonable, that's an average rotation that is not unreasonable at all, and two brigades amount we can be out in less than 18 months out of afghanistan. in fact, we can probably be having close to a year if you made that decision now to bring a drawdown at roughly two brigades. that is about 7,000 troops depend on whether it is combat or combat support. so the house is also fairly doable and you tell folks on the joint staff figure out the logistics, work with the

commanders to the figure out, then you find a way to bring in the troops out. of course, pardon of problem particularly in the iraq is equipment -- how you get the equipment out because we have a lot of heavy equipment there now. we have less so in afghanistan so it's probably a bit easier. but again not logistically easy but logistically doable and i would suggest that if you made the decision today that you withdraw rather than ramp up in afghanistan, you could be out in less than 18 months which is on the president says he would actually like to begin with strong forces from afghanistan. so if you can do it because it's simply a decision, and how you do it is doable, what it really comes down to is should you. and so maybe the more appropriate question is should we withdraw from iraq and

afghanistan? rather than the labor the point on a rack, let me focus on afghanistan. as i said, if we strategically the logic applies equally to both. the answer to should we withdraw is, yes,. and let me walk through of an argument as to why that answer is, yes,. verso all the proposed ramp up of troops, 30,000, which is less than a general bristol wanted, he won a 40,000 and the president decided 30,000 instead of 40,000. ..

>> could combine the active duty army and marines and get to 600,000, but there's no way that we can get to that number if we have to. and so the roughly 100,000 u.s. troops after the surge, give or take, plus the nato troops, enough to do what? in terms of counterinsurgency. in up to occupy kabul and keep

karzai in scots as the mayor. enough to me occupied two or three more provinces in afghanistan. but not enough to occupy the country, not enough to run a counterinsurgency. so what happens when you have a small force trying to run counterinsurgency? you play whack a mole. you subdue the enemy in one area and then when you say hey, we have, you move onto the next area. and as you move onto the next area, what generally happens is the place you pacified before, violence erupts there because there is no one minding the store. the solution of the president has proposed which is by the way the same solution that president bush proposed in iraq is, we will train afghans to take control of their own security. during the bush administration, as they stand up, we will stand down. that is exactly what president obama is proposing in afghanistan. so you don't have enough troops to run an effective counter certainty, you may or may not

have enough to run an effective counterterrorism strategy in afghanistan. so that is problem number one. and a reason why we should withdrawal was announced a. number two, no political leader in the united states has ever admitted to the american public what's required to run an effective counterinsurgency. we make it sound as though if we just put in enough troops and obama also talked about bringing in more civilians. there's also going to be a civilian search. state department and other services, that we will just do this in a kinder, gentler way. we will provide all the services and schools and running water and all the amenities that people like. they will love us, and won't turn against us as a result. and so between the military and the civilians, you know, we will win. well, that's not really how it's done, or at least that's not

what history tells us. history tells us that when you run effective counterinsurgency, you kill lots of people. and if you don't kill them, you in cars rate them. and that you engage in broadbrush relatively harsh tactics to do that. because the point of counterinsurgency is to impose security and order. and he do that anyway you can. it doesn't matter how much collateral damage is involved. it doesn't matter whether you are telling or locking up the right people. what matter is that you are imposing order and security. that is the whole point of running a counterinsurgency operation. you don't do that by killing people with kindness. you do that by using military force. and that's exactly what history has demonstrated that if you look at the british who are often acknowledged as the experts and counterinsurgency, mostly because they used to have lots of colonies and had to run counterinsurgency operations to have security in their colonial empire.

that's what the brits did. it's not very pretty. it's ugly, and it runs counter to how we believe -- what we believe we are as a country. which is why presidents, not just this president, any president, doesn't admit to the american public what's required to run an effective counterinsurgency. and so they dress it up in a lot of giveaways that are a politically more palatable. so are we -- to have enough troops? and are we willing to engage in the kind of tactics that are necessary to win? and i think the answer is no, we're not. number three, how long do we have to stay? we've already been in there eight years. not sort of as has been suggested oscillating going back and forth between counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, relatively small footprint, let's wrap up even more. again, the history of counterinsurgency is five to seven years. five to seven years with enough

troops and engaged in the kind of operations that you really need to engage in. that is not exactly not what president obama has proposed. in fact, he even said much to his credit, he does not want this to be an open-ended nationbuilding mission. and i applaud him for that. but if you going to run effective counterinsurgency, you better plan to be there for a minimum of five years. by the way, the brits were in malaysia for 20 years. running their counterinsurgency. better be willing to be there for a long time. this is already an unpopular war with the american public and what are the odds the american public will be willing to put up with five, seven, 10, 20 more years of this? so from a tactical perspective, i don't think we can win. so those are i think three strong tactical reasons to withdraw. but most importantly, the one that trumps those very

strategically, it's not in our interest to stay. both peter and i have talked a little bit about this, but occupation is what fuels resentment, which is what creates terrorists. it creates terrorists in the territorial that your occupy, and as we saw with 9/11, it creates terrorists who may decide that they want to strike you at home, away from the territory. that you are occupying. and so, since the whole point of having gone into afghanistan in the first place, which i would argue we had to do at the time, but since the whole point is to try to reduce the terrorist threat to the united states, not increase the terrorist threat to the united states, at this point in time, eight years later, having not really achieving the objectives that we wanted to achieve when we first went into afghanistan, is now high time

for the u.s. to leave and let afghanistan be run by the afghans, however imperfect that might be, okay? our only criteria have to be that the government, whichever government is, whether it is the karzai government, whether it is taliban government, that any government in afghanistan not openly provide aid and shelter to al qaeda. and if they decide to do that, we come back and we do this all over again. which by the way is cheaper for those of us who may be worried about the costs. it's cheaper for us to leave than if things get out of hand again, just come back and do it all over again, then it is for us to stay and try to make something work that maybe we can't make work. and so here are the issues. number one, both peter and i have been talking. the taliban is not monolithic. we here in the states tend to equate the taliban with al qaeda. they are not won an essay. there are outlets of the taliban

that would support al qaeda and wanted to attack united states. or other elements of the taliban. but they are just interested in us having stay in a government in afghanistan. we got to stop treating them monolithically as a single threat as to somehow they are a threat to the united states of america proper. they are not so we have to be willing to live with less than perfect in terms of what happens in afghanistan. and i also think that we also have to be willing to concede at this point of what's left of al qaeda, whether they're operating out of pakistan are coming across the border periodically into afghanistan, and by the way, i saw a news report that supposedly even bin laden, assuming he is to live, find his way across the border into pakistan periodically. al qaeda isn't the same kind that existed that attacked us on 9/11. bin laden in particular does not have operational control over a group that has global reach back

and attack the united states that are larger problem is not osama bin laden and what's left of al qaeda hiding out in pakistan. are logic bomb is the ideology of radical islam, which is seeking to the muslim world, in part because we helped promulgate that by our actions in places like iraq and afghanistan. so i would argue whatever benefit there might be to getting bin laden at this point, and believe me i would be able to say that we got osama bin laden, but strategically the cost required to try and get bin laden and contain al qaeda, the costs far outweigh a residual benefit at this stage and point given that bin laden and the people surrounding him no longer represent operational the real threat to the united states. the real threat is spread everywhere within the muslim world being fueled by ideology and anti-american sentiment.

and so this notion of denying al qaeda safe havens in afghanistan i think is a pie in the sky notion. al qaeda, there will be some safe havens. why? because there'll always be people who have sympathies and decide they want to support groups like al qaeda. the question is are they local threats or global threats? as long as their local threats, then those are threats that the afghan government needs to do with, and once that we may have to live with. again, less than perfect that it is the global threat that al qaeda may represent that we have to worry about. i think we have to worry about that last now than we did eight years ago. i think we need to worry more about, we are radicalizing muslims around the world as witnessed by the bombings in madrid and london in particular. and our very presence and to muslim countries at the moment, iraq and afghanistan, goes a

long, long way to fueling that radicalism, that its u.s. occupation that makes us a target that there may be a certain amount of anti-western, anti-u.s. elements in radical islamic ideology. but most of that is because we are there in their territories, not necessary that they want to come after the united states in the u.s. it doesn't solve all of our problems. i don't want to suggest it is a panacea. and certainly, withdraw from iraq or afghanistan doesn't necessarily mean that either country will be a better place from the perspective of the iraqi's or afghans. peter has alluded that maybe he thinks iraq would be, and i think that would be great. but our concern is not whether iraq and afghanistan are better places. our concern is whether either one of them represents a threat to the diocese. the best way, in my opinion, to

move in the right direction to ensure that neither country is a threat to united states is for the u.s. to withdraw to give muslims in those countries less reason to want to target the united states, less reason to have sympathy with the ideology of radical islam. we would be much safer country as a result of doing that. so again, let me reiterate. can we withdraw from iraq and afghanistan? yes. how do we do it? we can do it. it's a little bit logistically competent but it is certainly doable. but more important, should we withdraw? absolutely. because that's what is in our strategic interest and those are the kinds of decisions that any president should be making the decisions that are in our strategic interest. thank you. [applause]

>> now we'll go to questions. you have heard both more optimistic and pessimistic view on will happen in iraq. and you've also heard some differences of opinion on what we should do in iraq, either -- excuse me, afghanistan. and also the differences on pakistan. so that should prove some -- provide some good questions here. so who would like -- right here. >> very interesting presentations that highlighted the complexity of this whole situation. and i think they underlined the fact that the wars from the beginning were serious mistakes, and have gotten us into a deep quagmire, which i think needs to be emphasized.

because one of my questions, and i've got another comment after this, is in order to get support to get out of the war, it's not just a criticism of obama. but to build and support across the political spectrum in this country, to recognize the facts that you are stating and the necessity of getting out. because he is being criticized on the right for not wanting to stay in forever. so i think it's very important to build that kind of broad support in order to make this progress and get out. on the case in afghanistan, i think it's important in the exit as we work out, because i have a number of afghan friends and my daughter worked there for a couple of years, to within the taliban be willing to make the separation between the national segment who really wants to govern the country and the dictatorial segment which led for which imposed an incredible set the rules on behavior and things throughout the country,

blew up the buddhist statues in things like that. which is not the one we would not to have as an ally. my third question to peter and iraq, is given the conflict between the kurds and the other iraq is over the oil, on the border of kurdistan, how does that get settled in order to separate a kurdistan from the rest of iraq? >> peter, do you want to handle that question? >> let me begin by just making clear that i'm not in favor of withdrawal from afghanistan. i have reservations about additional troops, because i don't think they can accomplish their counterinsurgency mission. because there is no credible partner. but i think the consequences of withdrawal at this point in time would be disastrous for many people in afghanistan. and that we have accomplished a lot and we are not viewed as an

alien body in the way that we are in arab iraq. [inaudible] >> i am just making clear. in some ways i think there were three bad choices. more troops, but i think that was ineffective. because there's no credible local partner withdrawal which would lead to rapid deterioration and the current situation, which is gradual deterioration. and the real world, they are not happy solutions. the second point i would me, it doesn't follow that if we would withdraw the taliban would come in and be the government. remember, 55 percent of the country are tajik. these are groups that the taliban has no support. many russians don't support the taliban. so if we were -- it's conceivable ever were to completely disengaged, yes, then the taliban would be, have some possibly maybe of taking advantage of chaos and kabul for

the afghan other groups started to fight each other as they get in the early '90s. but if we remain engaged with even small number of troops or even without troops, taliban is not going to come back and take power. and also there may be formula for it to include in parts of the country, you know, that there would be room for a very conservative islamic party that would embody the taliban. but when you speak to your daughter, don't be under any illusions as to what that would mean for women in the country. you know, let's not pretend that it's going to be something different and it's going to be. on the issue of oil and iraq. there is something in the iraqi constitution that basically addresses this. which says that -- which provides a revenue sharing.

from what are the existing oil fields, and then allows the regions of which there've really only one, kurdistan, to develop their own resource. and this has been incredibly important to the kurds, because if you talk to any kurd, what they will say about the oil of iraq is that they wish iraq never had any oil. because it was used to finance the operation of the kurds, purchase the chemical weapons that killed of them, and for the physical distraction. so for them, having -- even if the revenues and they are saying there will to do that although they're not constitutionally required to two, if for them if they have their own independent source of revenue, that's really the critical element. in terms of how it works on territory, the largest oilfield, which had agreed should be managed by the central government. but which they believe should be part of kurdistan and the

constitution says there should be a referendum, which hasn't been help it if kurdistan became fully independent, but what -- i guess inevitably cure cock would go with the. i suppose i'm not sure it would give kurdistan an outsized share of the total oil resource because there is so much in texas in this topic and frankly the certain oil in the sunni areas. this is a matter that was never explored. >> okay. right here. >> i think we should get to another that has kind of a long question. i will talk to after is not a. >> i with the northern community college. with regard to afghanistan, the assistance of the heroin trade i think should be a threat to not only are will being but to the whole world. so why do we make that a major focus of effort. there's also major funding for the taliban itself. >> well, i will take a crack at

that. i think we have done everything since 9/11 except really focus -- we have made effort against al qaeda, but we really focused on iraq, and we got into nation building and drug interjection and afghanistan, and actually drug eradication. i think everybody in afghanistan makes money off the drugs, not just the taliban. of course, the best thing would probably be to cut the demand off by a really radical solution would be to legalize drugs in the u.s. no one is really going to do that. so that would take the fire out of some of the insurgency right there. or if they did in europe as well. no one of course is going to be doing that. but i think if you're going out and you're in medicating poppy fields, the population is not going to support you. they will go over to the taliban. i think that's what the u.s. military was very reluctant to do these types of things. earlier in afghanistan. now of course they have -- obama

has changed the policy a bit as i understand. he has gone away from that and more trying to get the traffickers and that sort of thing rather than the actual growers which is an improvement in the policy, but it's still sort of a sideline. i think we need to get back on what we should be focused on, and that is it's tragic that, you know, afghanistan's major export is opium. which has turned into heroin. but, you know, u.s. hasn't paid attention -- what we haven't paid attention to sufficiently, i don't think, and that is with your eyes on the threat. and anything that helps us get al qaeda and bin laden, and i think, you know, chuck is right. just because you get bin laden doesn't mean that the show was over. but you've got to concentrate on that. and anything that takes your eyes off of that, including fighting the taliban, in my estimation, should be put aside.

we can talk about what's good for the people of afghanistan, what's good for the people of iraq. but i think first of all we have to keep our eyes on our own security as well. and that's really what we failed to do since 9/11. >> karl? >> carl. i sorely applaud the central thrust is which with we need to achieve a public recognition that the enemy is not taliban, it's al qaeda. and reframe our attitudes accordingly. it is an uphill job changing american opinion. i applaud your efforts are. i have one specific problem i would like to ask about. i have seen reports that arming the police and developing the army of afghanistan, we're having a lot of success recruiting tajik's now. and not much success recruiting

pashtuns who are joining and affecting in considerable numbers and to are considerably outnumbered in the army. and it seems to be if and when we do get out, we are just make it possible for opposing factions to kill each other at longer range. what do we do about that? >> do you want to take that? >> well, this of course goes back to the history of how the current government came into power. which is, that we align ourselves, are we back to the northern alliance, which was primarily a tajik movement. i'm not sure that most of the recruits are tajik, that certainly the leadership of the army is tajik. the dilemma is very simple. and particularly true i think in the police.

if you recruit -- i will talk about the please and a word about the army. but if you recruit pashtun policeman to serve in kandahar, if they are outside of kandahar city they get eight weeks training. and they man a checkpoint. their chance of living through the year is probably 50%. and overall, the mortality rate of the place is 10% a year. that's not a very inviting occupation. so of course, if you're a tajik and you go and serve in the save tajik areas, that's a spot. that's a jet. but if you're a polished and it's not very inviting. and i further don't know how much of that same factor plays in the army. but again, my impression is that are pushpins and the army. it's just that the higher ranks are tajik. >> i think more generally any

time you have an ethnosectarian division in the country and you are training a force that is more inclined to be one second group than the other, is a place to trade at than the same can be said for iraq him if we train everybody in the civil war there, i more pessimistic about peter than that because i look over iraqi history and i see so many kurdish and shia rebellions against the sunni government. and so, and also the history of these types of things and other ethnosectarian problems with countries with problems with ethnosectarian violence that needs to come back all the time. so i think anytime you trained forces of one side or the other, even if they are nominally, you

know, the iraqi army, the afghan army, or whatever, you risk that, that happening after you leave. and of course, the u.s. always leaves these situations sooner or later, and as we're talking about korea or germany or something. okay, we have time for one more question. right here. >> david isenberg, international peace research institute, oslo. open question, maybe chuck wants to address it. why should anybody put any credibility in the obama administration to withdraw from afghanistan by may 2011 given the recent estimate by secretary gates? and clinton that at that time, the withdrawals not fiscal, be dependent on the assessment that the military commanders on the ground, which is certain add-ons for we are staying. >> i mean, i think anytime a president says that we are going to withdraw, this will certainly true in iraq under the bush administration.

i think it's going to be true both in iraq and afghanistan under obama. is a condition that there were always the conditions that the president didn't say unconditionally we're going to start withdrawing troops in 18 months. they will look at an assessment. they will look at what's on the ground, and if they don't think things have gotten better, my guess is that they will find a reason to stay. so i don't think anybody should be surprised by the testimony of secretary gates, secretary clinton's remarks about we will have to have an assessment, we will have to wait and see. so i think all he did was he threw a marker out there, you, weather was too broad karzai to, who knows. i mean most of it was domestic political consumption. he knows this is an unpopular war at the moment that he knows if he does at least give some lip service to the possibly of withdrawal, that politically it will become a quagmire, you know, for him.

so i do not necessarily put much stock in his statement that we will begin withdrawal in 18 months. and the question will be, whether the american public decides to hold his feet to the fire 18 months from now. and to sort of answer the part of the first question, you know, the president doesn't need, you know, to build a political coalition to decide to withdraw. he can just decide that as long as he is willing to weather the political storm that ensues. and that's the problem. the problem is that the president does not want to weather the political storm. and so he is trying to find some sort of consensus on withdrawal. but since we don't need congressional approval anymore to go to war, you know, and you don't need funding so much to withdraw as much as you need funding to keep troops deployed. you know, he can make the decision. it's all about politics. >> yeah, and i t