talking about, program access. also program carriage, which is a different thing where -- you know, these things get really technical. and he got into sort of an argument with brian roberts during the hearing about some of those issues. which it was -- it was fun to watch but i think the bottom line here is that one of the things that comcast is running up against here across-the-board is that -- anything that they've said they're going to do in this deal they say well, we're going to abide by the law. you should trust us that this is in the public's best interest. the problem is a lot of people don't trust them. >> host: joelle tessler, was it significant that the senate hearing was held by the judiciary antitrust subcommittee while the house hearing was held by the telecommunications subcommittee? >> guest: well, i have a feeling that before this whole thing house judiciary committees weighing in, too. basically the two committees in both chambers that really have jurisdiction are going to be

paying attention to this are going to be commerce and judiciary. so i think they just scheduled these two back to back since the executives are in town. i could be wrong. maybe knows better. i think the other two committees are going to be holding hearings. >> guest: they are planning scheduling them but they don't have the dates yet. >> host: what is next the both of you? what is the next step in this process? >> guest: the hearings would be the next step. it's going to be a long review. comcast has said this is going to take nine months to a year. i mean, they just filed their paperwork with the doj and the public interest statement with the fcc last week. i think what was going on here this week on capitol hill is lawmakers wanted to kind of get ahead of this and really try to influence, you know, what issues the regulators take a look at as they look -- as they examine the deal. they want to shape the debate. i mean, that's the influence that congress has here. they're not going to be the ones making the decision but they can influence the discussion. so those -- the hearings are going to be critical. you'll probably see some letters

coming out of these committees going to doj and fcc urging them to look at, you know, one issue or another. but, yeah -- i mean, i think this is going to be a long process. it will be probably up to a year. >> guest: on the doj they keep these things really tight to the vest but from the fcc side really the next big thing and as joelle said it will be months away is when the fcc chairman/staff decide, you know, to put forth an item to the rest of the commissioners where they say whether they think this thing should be approved or not approved. and that's probably going to be months away. and that really starts the final round of debates on what the conditions are going to look like on this thing. >> host: amy schatz of the "wall street journal" and joelle tessler of the associated press, thank you both for being on "the communicators." i would simply mention that both the house hearing and the senate hearing are available to watch in their entirety at c-span.org. >> guest: thank you.

>> later this week

>> now, for educators, c-span offers the new c-spanclassroom.org. we've redesigned the website to make it even more useful for teachers with the most current and timely c-span videos for use in your classroom. you can find the most-watched video clips organized by subjects and topics. the latest in education news, plus the chance to connect with other c-span classroom teachers and it's all free. sign up at the new c-spanclassroom.org. >> de ocratic national committee chair tim kaine spoke last weekend at his party's annual winter meeting here in washington. he talked about president obama's initiatives for healthcare and the economy. the election of scott brown to the u.s. senate. and what his party must do to

win in this fall's midterm elections. he speaks for about half an hour. >> well, listen, it is good to have everybody here. and i do want to offer a few upupdates what we've been doing as a party since we were together in austin but first wasn't it great to have the president here this morning. [applause] >> look, as the president alluded we've had our ups and downs in the year since the inauguration. he went through some of the accomplishments of the year and he could have gone longer but it's amazing what this president has been able to do in the midst of this difficult climate. and to personalize it on one of the items, just one, the recovery act. you hear the republicans who all voted against it save two senators. every house member and every senate save two voted against it going around saying the recovery act isn't doing anything. and i'm here to tell you, i was

a governor. and i had to write a budget before the recovery act was passed. and then i got to rewrite a budget after the recovery act was passed. and what i saw in the before and after scared me to death, frankly. and every mayor and every governor in this country, if they're honest with you, they will tell you they felt the same way. this recovery act was absolutely critical to getting this nation back on track. and as you heard the speaker yesterday say, you know, from 740,000 jobs a month we were losing down to 20,000. we're not where we want to be yet. that's a big jump from losing over 6% of g.d.p. last year to gaining nearly 6% this year, we're not where we want to be but that's a big deal. manufacturing coming back. not where we want to be yet but it's been a big turn-around. the jobs numbers came out yesterday better than expected. we're not where we want to be but the difference in the before and after just in virginia, the recovery act meant that there were 9,000 state employees that

i would have again a pink slip to in the jobs market in the last 25 years we didn't have to give pink slips to because of what we were doing. [applause] >> and i could do that about a lot of the accomplishments but lest anybody listen to some of the folks on the other side here who are saying the recovery act what did it do? i'll tell you what it did. it stopped an economy in free-fall. it put hope back. it's bringing the economy back and this president and this congress deserve enormous credit because the other guys -- they were going to let it go into free-fall and they weren't even going to pull the rip cord. this president has got turned around and we owe him a huge debt of thanks. we are seeing encouraging signs the economy grew at 6% in the fourth quarter. unemployment dipped below 10%. it's coming back down in january. the senate is moving forward on a jobs bill. and it is time for republicans to stop just saying no. and join democrats in trying to

get this economy moving again. that's what the president called for in the state of the union. that's what he called for again today. and we are waiting to see evidence that the other side cares about this mission as much as we do. [applause] >> now, while we're heartened by things are coming back as the preds said, improving statistics are still cold comfort to people whare huing. you know, i saw this in virginia our unemployment rate was pretty good but it wasn't good everywhere. the state wide average was pretty good but there are pockets and there are people and there are neighborhoods and there are families who however the statistics are, if they're hurting, they're hurting. and we need to be about them. and that's why jobs will be the number one focuses of this mission. as the president laid out in state of the union it's been aboutize day one in the recovery act and for women equal pay for women. and focus on small business successes. it's not main street that causes the -- wall street that causes

the economy to grows. the economy grows because of the moms and pops and the startups and the technology entrepreneurs, the folks who do something in their garage or come up with an idea and get a little bit financing to make it happen. it's the small business sector that's causing the economy grow and the president is championing that with smart strategies to start small businesses. and as you heard the president say we are not backing away. we are not backing away from the compelling, moral and economic cause to reform the healthcare system of this country. we're not. [applause] >> and, you know, what? we can't back away because if it's going to be done, it's only going to be because democrats will do it, right? i mean, it's not the other side that's out there saying we need to make reforms. the other side is fine with fewer and fewer businesses being able to buy insurance for their employees. the other side is fine with premiums and costs to businesses and families going up. the other side is fine with growing numbers of the uninsured.

that status quo makes them feel great. it makes them feel great. if we're going to change that status quo and go in a different direction, it's going to be up to us. i shared with you in austin a driver for me is this health clinic that i go to every year in the appalachian community where my wife's family is from, wise county, virginia, where people once a year on a weekend, a hot weekend in july drive from all over the country, 16 states this year to park in a parking lot and wait for days to be able to walk in and see a doctor for the only time they'll see a doctor. and they wait through evenings. and they wait through heat and they wait with storms with their kids in their cars four or five days at a time to epion up and then they wait in lines all weekend long to see a doctor for the only time. well, people are still waiting. they're still waiting. and businesses that are getting the premium noise -- notices and they are still waiting. and those with preexisting

conditions are getting their policies rescinded are still waiting and seniors who are waiting more and more for the prescription part d, they are still waiting. we've got millions and millions who are still waiting and they are waiting for us. and we want the other guys to epi. us but let's be realistic, they're not going to help much. we might get one or two. we hope we will. but if it's going to be done. it's going to be us that does it. we're not backing away from it. we're going to keep at it. it will be tough but we will succeed and the american people for years, for decades the story will be written that we stood up for them and we did something that seven presidents have tried to do. we got to stand with president obama in this congress to get this over the goal line, comprehensive health insurance reform and we will. and we will. [applause] >> now -- thank you all. now, let's talk -- now, let's talk elections and some challenges.

you know, the loss in massachusetts changed the math in the senate will health reform but let's remind ourselves of something. we never like to lose a race. we didn't want to lose that race in massachusetts. that was ted kennedy erase. -- ted kennedy's seat. there's eight more democratic senators that on the day when president obama was elected and we haven't had this big of a margin in the senate since 1979. so don't expect me or anybody else with this party to walk around with on a hang dog look on our face to have -- the ghost of harry truman would kill us about having only 59 democratic senators, right? [applause] >> we got to govern optimism with 59. we do have to learn some lessons. the lezzons is people are fed up with business as usual. they were fed up with business

as usual and that's one of the reasons why our great friend president obama is our president. and they still want to see more change and more open transparent process and we've got to recognize this as we do our work in congress but also as we do our work as a party. now, while that massachusetts race didn't end the way we wanted it to, let me say i am proud of the contributions that so many of you made to that campaign. and i think in terms of a harbinger of things to come, the intense activism that was generated to support that effort from state parties and volunteers all over the place beginning with massachusetts suggest that our people are ready and willing to get revved up and participate in these 2010 elections. i want to thank the massachusetts democratic party for their leadership. [applause] >> please, yes. we had more than 50 dnj staffers in massachusetts in the last three weeks and state parties all across this country in conjunction with the dnj and

volunteering effort, organized 45,000 volunteers to make 2.3 million go tv calls in the last few weeks of the campaign. we are hungry to get involved in 2010 and that's a good sign. now the loss in massachusetts -- you know, we were going okay elections in '09. we had won 5 out of 5 special elections in congress. we had added two more u.s. senators. but beginning in november, those midterm blues that affect every president started to set in and the governors races in virginia and new jersey and then on the outcome in massachusetts -- well, here's how i describe it. i'm describing it as our ghost of christmas future experience. so you all remember a christmas carroll. scrooge got the first ghost, the ghost of christmas future and he showed him what it was like and he didn't like what he saw. he didn't like what he saw. and he asked the ghost, is this the future or is it the future that might be if i don't make some changes and do some things differently? and you know the answer.

it was the future that was going to be unless there were some adjustments and changes. so we've had our ghost of christmas future experience. and we had it in january of 2010 rather than in november of 2010. we've got to learn the lessons. we've got to get better. we've got to be more energized and i know we can. i know we can. i'll tell you one reason why we can. in virginia, democrats didn't like losing the governor's mansion. you know, we have fought in virginia from a re-lylebly red state to an even state just in the last five years. and we'd gotten used to winning and it we didn't like losing the governor's mansion. so three days before my term ended in january there was a special election in a republican senate district in virginia. republican senator was elected attorney general. and so there was a special for that seat. now, the democrats in virginia had taken over the senate majority in 2008. which was a big battle for us to do. but here was a seat. and the republicans were sure they were going to win. look, we're on a roll.

we just won the governorship and we're feeling really good about it. democrats got enterized they went into that district and we won the seat and we added to our margin because we realized the other guys are energized we got to be energized. we learned that in massachusetts and we got to be more energized. and i know we can be. [applause] >> now, if you look at the last 17 midterm elections so here's the president talked about he doesn't mind running into a head wind and as i talked to the folks around the room in the last couple days i said i don't know all of you personally but i do know this about you, uphill battles don't make you nervous. head winds don't slow you down. if you can't run we will trudge. and we're not going to stop. and here's what we know about the presidential midterms. in the last 17 presidential midterms the president's party loses 28 seats. and 28 senate seats and loses governorships. that's the average.

we're not living in average times. right? we're not living in average times. so we have to assume that that norm is one that maybe it's a little bit tougher on us. this year. there is volatility and anxiety out there. but it is by no means a foregone conclusion and if we know if we work hard we can beat expectations -- i shared with you a number of you the last few days a couple of reasons why i feel optimistic that we're going to beat the norm. we're going to beat the norm first because we got a great president and a great success story. you know, that's the first element in beating the norm is a successful president who communicates in great ways with the american people. he has a success story already and we got to do a better and better job of telling that story. i certainly heard that from all of you. but the nice thing about this year is we already see it happening each week i think it will be a new block in that success story coming in. whether it's improved jobs numbers. whether it's meaningful financial reform that the american people grab on to. we're going to be building blocks in that success story

this year. that's the first thing we have going for us. second thing as i visited 29 states as dnc chair we got a lot of great candidates. you are fielding wonderful candidates out in this state. so in the midterms we're not just playing defense. we're not just going into the midterms trying to hold on to our own. no, we got people out in the field, you know, to win races that are currently held by republicans. to take over governors mansions which is critical in times of redistricting to win senate seats that are open by retirement or knock off incumbents to win house seats, to pay special attention to house legislative chambers that are close one way or the other that we want to get our way for redistricting. we are playing offense all over this country with great democratic candidates. and that's another reason why we can stand strong and why we can do well in 2010. and finally let's be honest republicans have a few vulnerabilities. you know, sometimes they are our very best friends, folks. they are our very best friends. and we're going to continue to shine a spotlight on the division and strife within the

republican party. the divisions between the establishment that shrinking republican establishment and the tea party crowd helped deliver a u.s. senator to us when arlen specter joined the democratic party and it helped deliver us is congressional seat in new york in november when the republican nominee that they sunk a million dollars into was abandoned by the party and ended up endorsing a democratic candidate bill owens who won a seat that we hadn't had since 1872. [applause] >> and i know you are seeing this in your own jurisdictions, that battle on the republican side, is erupting into a civil war in a number of very important races. the republican senate primary in florida. the republican gubernatorial primary battle in texas. we've got lions of the republican party.

the presidential nominee john mccain being challenged from the right in a primary in arizona. we have bob bennett, a republican senator from utah being challenged from the right in a primary battle in utah. that corrosive civil war on the other side is something that is, you know, going to produce some dividends for us this year. give us a chance to win some races that we might not win otherwise. and again i go back to little virginia experience i was sharing with my friend earlier. we took the state senate back in virginia from republicans in 2007. and, frankly, here's the way we did it. republicans from the right took on republican moderates in the state senate and we ended up winning races we thought we had no business winning and that's how we won the state senate and we are seeing that happen in races in the united states. we'll also continue to highlight not just that division but highlight the republican party's choice these days to become the

real captive of wall street and the special interest. it was great to learn it, no better way to learn it than a big front page story in the "wall street journal" that the republicans were soliciting money from wall street and that's nothing new. their pitch to wall street was invest in the republican party because we're the hope -- we're the hope for you to stop meaningful reform of the financial system. if you invest in us instead of, you know, supporting democrats as sometimes you've done in the past, we're going to stop all the reforms of the financial system that this president and this congress want to do. in other words, give us money, and we'll do your bidding in congress. stopping the reforms that america needs. stopping the reforms that we have to have to have a stable reform system. that's a scratch my back and i'll scratch yours that people outside the beltway are sick and tired of. republicans of '09 they are the

party of no. in 2010 they decided to be the party of no and they are the party of wall street and americans will not tolerate that. as they see that clear choice between a democratic party fighting for middle class, fighting for workers and fighting for a small business and a republican party fighting to get campaign cash and stop meaningful reforms on wall street. we're also going to point out republican obstruction. you know this week we learned a republican senator shelby is holding up 70 nominees of president obama around whom there's no controversy. and these are nominees for judges, defense officials, homeland security officials, you know, kind of some important things. they're holding them up in senator shelby's case because he wants money for a particular pet project in his home state of alabama. so he's holding up the very people, the very people that we need in this country to protect our country and protect our national security. and we're going to point those things out as well. now, the dnc is going to play a

critical role in 2010 in fighting against the head wind and in surprising people by beating all these norms. first, we think we have a very unique role to play, an expertise, a core competence at the dnc in communicating frequently and regularly with what i like to call our 08 surge voters. and it was at a cathartic surge relies and we're data freaks at the dnc and we know who they are. we know who they are. we know who those surge voters are in any community and part of the way we're going to succeed in 2010 by frequent and regular communication with those surge voters, especially the young, the minority voters, the first time voters that we registered in 2008. there were about 15 million of these surge voters who we know. and whether they turn out in november can make a huge difference in hard fought races. just to give one state as an

example where there will be some big races in 2010. of those 15 million, 456,000 of them are in the state of colorado. where we're going to have very big races in 2010. senate race, governors race and other important races. 456,000 of these surge voters are in colorado. they would normally vote in a midterm election at about the 40% level. i mean, the president is not on the battle. well, if we could get that 40% up to 48 to 50%, that would be nearly an additional 40,000 voters for our folks and in a state like colorado where we tend to have close state elections that could be absolutely critical so this communication with the '08 surge voters is the first thing we're going to do working from the dnc with the state parties, with the campaigns, with the candidates. and that communication we believe facilitating relationships between these voters and our candidates will bear our fruit. second, we made voter registration a key priority at the dnc.

in 2008, working together with state parties and other groups, we did a marvelous job on voter registration and you know what? we're not done. although we registered hundreds of thousands of voters all over this country, there's still so many more to register. i'm struck as i travel how often this comes up that for as good as we did in '08, there are still so many voters that we need to register. i had some particularly good discussions with folks in the texas democratic party about the number of voters that are still out there in a state that will be blue if we do our voter registration i don't believe. -- job. it's just a question of when. [applause] >> so what you're going to see, we'll shortly roll a voter registration website that will help all of our democratic candidates -- this surprised me up until now, there's not a central resource or website for voter registration. it's all through state parties or state boards of elections or local registrars. but we have been able to put

together and we're very close to a single source where you can send anybody in any corner of this country to go that will enable them to get the process through and register to vote. and we believe ongoing registration efforts are a key to our success in 2010. and coupled with those we're going to continue to focus on voter protection. our vice chair donna brazile is focused laser-like and we're working on voter protection efforts which is a central pillar of the dnc. how many were in here yesterday heard speaker pelosi? [applause] >> so the speaker read this the succinct definition of harry truman about the difference between the democrats and the republican parties, party of the people, party of the special interest. let me tell you another difference about -- that really is relevant to this voter protection thing that i have always found incredibly compelling, you know, if you need a reason to be a democrat -- but if you need a

reason or you want to convince somebody, this would be a reason enough to choose the democratic party. when it comes to elections, we want more people to vote. and the other guys want fewer people to vote. do you need to know anything more than that? do you need to know more than anything than that? right? and so -- [applause] >> that's why the registration and the voter protection is so key. we know that trying to keep people from voting and worrying about the numbers and trying to keep turnout down is part of their strategy. being more democratic with the small d and getting more people to participate as part of our strategy and that's why voter protection is so critical. well, one thing is clear going into 2010 your support on the ground and state parties and all the communities is so critical to our success. we did see in 2009 and in the massachusetts race to some extent that our base voters are reliable voters didn't turn out in a way we hope they would. there's always going to be

volatility especially after a historic election there will be a falloff. we did not see the energy and electric and some are campaigns and some of are us and energize folks and communicate well because we're going to need our supporters to be strong with us if we're going to win. you have the relationships in all the communities to make that happen. you were there in '08, you were there in '06 and in previous elections and we'll be able to make huge gains if we have our base voters with us and we're also going to be able to continue to do things and the president and the state of the union laid them out that i believe will start to get independents back in our camp and especially as they see how scary the other guys are on a whole series of issues that they care about. i want to say a word quickly about the change commission before i sum up. the commission was appointed -- the change commission -- you're going to hear about it a little bit from jim roosevelt later. but it was an effort that began at the convention in denver.

the convention which is the party speaking with the most speaks directed the party to do three things. to look at identifying best practices for caucus states important to encourage participation and recommend best practices for the states with caucuses. second, deal with the calendar and the primary and caucus season to avoid the ever earlier creep, creep, creep and maybe push it back a bit and the third issue of the change commission was directed to deal with and recommend to the party with strategies to significantly reduce the number of unpledged did get. -- delegates. we're taking that charge very seriously. the commission worked all during last year and met via teleconference for the last time on july 30th. they approved a report which you received by email which is a

report in the by law commission. and some of the recommendations were things for the rbc to do some additional works and come up with some thoughts on. and we will focus on those three areas and we will move forward. and it's the first step -- i think it's a very good report that tackles those three challenges in a strong way. but the rules and bylaws commissions and with input from all sources will carry that forward. so that we can make the right decisions. well, let me just a conclude and say this. we know that we've got to do. we have our work cut out for us. we know what the challenges are but we know what we have to do. we know what we have to do because we've done it before. ...

it is a choice between democrats who are fighting for the middle class, workers, families and small businesses and republicans who want to return to the day of cozying up to the special interests and wall street. that is how we will compete in

races around the country in 2020. we know the stakes are high. we want to produce good partners to get this work done. the stakes are high but the choice is clear. clear choices are energizing. we have to communicate that to the american people and when we do we will do quite well. thanks for your efforts and we will see you on the road near a community near you. alright. thank you very much. thank you very much. alright. >> the u.s. senate returns and 2:00 to debate the nomination of joseph greeneway to the court of appeals on the third circuit and craig becker for response on the national labor relations board. congress may consider jobs bill later in the week. the house returns tomorrow at 12:30 eastern for a general

speeches and legislative business. they're scheduled to vote on the intelligence programs bill in a measure to repeal the anti-trust exemption. live coverage of the senate on c-span2 with the house on our companion network, c-span. >> this week on the communicator's the proposed merger of comcast and nbc universal with an analysis from the associated press. tonight on c-span2. last week the british government continued official inquiry into the iraq war. force british international secretary told members of the panel she believed prime minister tony blair and attorney-general lord goldsmith that led the cabinet over the war's legality. we will hear the testimony of her private conversation that took place eight weeks before the start of the iraq war. this session runs a two and a

half hours. >> good morning. welcome to everyone and our witness. the objectives of this session will be hailing from the secretary of international development until may of 2003. i think everyone will be aware we have written extensively of our views on iraq and today is an opportunity to hear those views. and we will have clare respond to the timescale. we already heard twice from the party from 2002 and this afternoon we will be hearing from the secretary of state for international development in

2003. i say two things at the beginning of every session. we recognize that giving evidence based in part on their recollection of events and we cross check the cases. i reminded every witness they signed a transcript of their evidence to the effect that their evidence is truthful and accurate. with those preliminaries', i invite gilbert to answer the questions. >> in a letter we took, declassified one minute ago, the private secretary wrote to john stoltz on the fifteenth of march 2001. international development secretary was concerned that they were not invited to contribute to the discussion that led to the formulation of the proposed new policy framework on iraq. to what do you attribute this

exclusion? >> when they talked in 1997 it was old habits because they had been part of the final analysis so they really minded losing control of budgets and policy. there were some old habits not bothering -- some people were annoyed. in this instance given the subsequent exclusion of myself, i don't know whether that particular instance where the old habits or deliberate exclusion or mixture of the two. >> when it came to the discussion of the new iraq policy framework we asked mr blair on friday whether it had been discussed in cabinet and he replied it had not been discussed in cabinet but he went on to tell us the discussion we had in cabinet was substantive

discussion. do you recall such a discussion and what was your contribution to it? >> at that time? the first thing to say, i am not the only one saying it, the cabinet doesn't work in the time i was in government went according to the expected work. we had papers, had little chats about things but it was decisionmaking not in any serious way and i don't remember at all iraq coming to the cabinet in any way. >> the substantive discussion is not as you recall. >> not afraid of anything in the cabinet. if ever you raised an issue you wanted to bring to the cabinet they see you before hand and cut it off and say we don't want those things coming to the cabinet.

before we broke off for the summer, when there was stuff in the press about iraq and he said i don't want my statement leaking to the press. >> that was my next question which was at what point did you raise your concerns about iraq? and what were your concerns at that time? >> i asked in july because we were coming to the break up about how to have a discussion on the democratic and republican condo and personal reasons, iraq could be in the press. and he came to see me before the next cabinet meeting and said i promise to talk to you about iraq but i don't want you to come to the decision about how to hype things up and there was no cabinet through the summer break. >> we are in 2002.

>> and we went to mozambique together on the way to the meeting ten years after rio and a world conference on sustainable development. i can't remember. he saw me privately and said don't worry. we are going to the un and what are the military options? i really think we should make progress on palestine, get the palestinians to the middle east or the arab countries to help us with iraq, a better way of doing things. i haven't had any presentation. that is now factually not true. i have a diary, not a very fancy diary but we have notes on some

of these things. >> don't include all of it. >> papers to which we had access showed as late as late 2002 you and your senior officials were feeling frustrated by your continued exclusion in other parts of the planning machine. how did you know you and your department were being excluded? >> in september, having been to a meeting in geneva not where most of the u.n. humanitarian agencies were based and we had lunch and jacob kaelin burger was there. we all talked about whether we should be preparing and whether you prepare makes war more likely or not. he said i am preparing -- >> could you slow down a bit? >> we are preparing greatly with

preparing people and stocks. going back from that i thought we should prepare for all eventuality including war and avoidance of war and not talk it up thus making work more likely. having said that i have forgotten what your question was. that was a preamble answer. >> how do you learn -- >> following that, looking at all for risks cut, for risks of the use of chemical and biological weapons on this i was seeing intelligence. what sources close down we are not normally sure but i assumed foreign policy intelligence because it was a job i was in. i knew that the intelligence agency was saying, didn't have nuclear but was nowhere near it.

and people having biological and biological -- it wasn't saying there was a new and imminent threat. i was reading that. if we were contemplating war it would be a risk of possible use about the iraqi people. if it was used, could we do anything? we ask for a briefing and we normally got those from defense intelligence like on the sudan war and the other side could reason regularly. this just didn't come. >> these exclusions were specifically with regard to iraq? being briefed on other humanitarian issues are around the world. >> i had close working relationships with lots in the military in kosovo and bosnia and so on. no problems. but suddenly we couldn't get an

answer. i didn't know what was the problem. and also if you are preparing for all event to melodies and given the fragility of the situation in central iraq and all the sanitation and electricity systems were poor and the un reporting that would provide food for people of iraq. if there was going to be military action what kind of military action, what are the risks with electricity systems, which i think happens to a considerable extent in the first gulf war. i was asking for a meeting about strategy and said we couldn't get it. it started to become clear there was a block on communications. >> what did you do to break the block? >> it was extended to the

intelligence agencies do we also had continuous relationships. at the end of the cold war they were desperate -- we wanted to help africa and came to see me quite a loss. that kind of relationship -- and suddenly i wasn't allowed to talk to them about what was going on and what was a risk and all that. and the foreign policy adviser in number 10. indy end having spoken to tony blair having talked to the intelligence agency, it was clear there was a hole in normal communications which were being closed down. >> after he -- after david m n manning gave you this real satisfied? >> i had a couple meetings -- i

think -- i saw that. >> when did the prime minister himself become aware? how did he react? did you have any direct contact with him to get greater access for military planning? >> meeting with him in july, discussion in mozambique -- >> have you given you access to the discussions? >> we got in the end of a paper on the rescue of the use of chemical and biological weapons which said it was uncertain if it was a long standoff and it might happen -- there wasn't really an antidote we could get any wet. that paper did eventually come and he has probably seen it. everything which has happened

since makes me know that there was deliberate roughage in the meetings at all the normal systems, meetings that might be relevant to your department and responsibility that will be circulated. found calls internationally or president bush would keep it circulated. all those things closed down so the normal structure of communication started to close down. >> you're concerned that the cabinet was not an option? >> i received it repeatedly. what we have at cabinet are little chunks in the decisionmaking meetings. i went to see colin powell. why don't you folks have a meeting? so jack would make a few jokes as he does. there was the first meeting of the cabinet after the summer. people did, having obviously

read the press, saying this is dangerous, what about the palestinians and a number of people to give themselves worries off of their chest at that meeting and don't worry, cut remarks and thereafter the discussions were little chats about what had been in the media. there is a very serious machinery of government question for the conclusion of what went wrong. there was never a meeting. it was affecting the policy because there is the staff and all the permanent secretaries as well as the secretary of state for 4 in affairs. what are we trying to achieve, what are the diplomatic options, we never had that coherent discussion of what the problem was that the government was

trying to achieve. >> my next question relates to timing. by the time from the documents that you and your officials were being given access that was well advanced the digital debut feel you had enough time once you became privy to military planning, enough time to make the type of dispositions you needed to make? >> i don't think anyone had enough time. none of us knew when it was going to start. there was no imminent threat. no reason it had to be as critical as it was. we were good at -- we fund the

international system and put in extra money. we had a unit that got it back. we could do that quickly and we are very good at it. we started to put money for preparations including the red cross and international consortium of the red cross. we had a thousand iraqis employed inside iraq distributing the oil for food. that network was all over the country. we could point quickly, put in place the arrangements for human urgency humanitarian response is. tim cross said it wasn't taken monetary crisis because this was working. they were fixing of electricity and sewage, otherwise the hospitals were being looted and

we were saying please get francs to protect the hospitals, these humanitarian thing worked because a lot of work was done by a lot of people and we played our part in that. >> when you would be -- >> immediately after the invasion, in legalities and so on, the geneva convention, the duty is to deal with humanitarian needs. we expect the military in the first instance to make sure people were fed. they were ordering food. it was all done on a wing and a prayer. it was incredible and in terms of reconstruction and the

treasury was saying that the working party -- i couldn't get any extra money so the whole of my contingency reserve $100 million and emergencies in other parts of the world and afghanistan. at kept saying we need more money if we are to -- the treasury had a working party and will you lead because you can't get the world bank and other agencies to come in and get money from others, we were arguing over this. if you look at the paper you go on and on and it is not just my department. the treasury is saying it. we have to get full international support and cooperation to do the reconstruction. >> we have to move out of that area. >> mr. chilcot would like to a

question. >> he assured you you would be given military options. when was that? i didn't get the date. >> it was september. >> september of 2002? >> there was a meeting on the 20 third of july 2002 when these options were discussed? >> he told me in mozambique that i haven't had a presentation. what are the military options? hadn't had a presentation, i will come back to you. there have been many missing things. >> will you give them a presentation of military options? >> the military came to my office -- check couldn't remember them -- about the air targets and how it would be careful targeting and taking out a point about the fragility of

the sewage water and electricity. we had that but no presentation or military options but that is the reassurance on the possibility that has destroyed the infrastructure that happened in another way. >> if you just follow up on that trip to mozambique. this is what alastair campbell recalls, the idea of the production of the dossier. were you aware of any discussions of how to present policy? >> i am not sure i recall the dates. apart from the things we did in mozambique, mr. campbell wasn't present. >> you didn't discuss that issue?

>> the note went around about the dossier and i remember my private sector asking if i wanted to engage and i said no. there are only so many battles you can fight. i decided to stay out of that one. >> i would like to go back into the machinery of government. you said there wasn't substantive discussion in cabinet but the argument we heard from mr. blair and jonathan powell and alastair campbell, essentially that it didn't matter if the official cabinet committee didn't meet or if committees where ad hoc with a small a or a small h but policy on iraq was being discussed intensively with the relevant people, the appropriate information, with challenge and risk assessment and diversity of views.

was that the impression you had? >> absolutely not. i believe in the civil service way of turning things. mr press, was the young assistant secretary. but i think the ministers should be in charge of their department but come to the table and everything should be challenged and looked at and no one gets everything right in you improve things by that discussion and my department came famous because we did things in that way. some didn't work like that. everything is for the media. powell was pulled into number 10. after the guillotine's came in, it was scrutinized, the bills

before they go to the lord's, i think the machinery in government in britain right now is unsafe and leads to endless litigation. that is the general critique. in the case of iraq there was secretiveness and deception on top of that. i heard tony blair talk about an ad hoc committee, i don't accept that. it is not the proper way to proceed. if you are discussing things other departments are supposed to know about, they completely excluded -- it is a chaotic way of doing things. >> you don't think they were looking at a range of options or possible risks? >> i presume you are looking at

the lead documents. tony blair had given his word of regime change. >> we will come back to that. you could see who the people were around the prime minister advising him. you weren't one of them. wasn't this a group that was pretty expert and diverse? did it have expertise in the middle east? >> i didn't know they were meeting and it is an in group. that is the way it works. if you do what ever they want -- challenge is the opposite. i had a friend doing research at the time and interviewing people and the message came back to me that i couldn't keep challenging, i was making myself on popular. >> you didn't see the options paper of march of 2003, you didn't see that at the time?

[talking over each other] >> march of 2002, before the prime minister changed his briefing before crawford, the cabinet's office circulated something called the options piper. they describe it as a background paper, not the paper decision. >> i didn't see that. >> you are clear about that? >> i have seen it since -- >> what do you think -- >> can i say another thing? the foreign office has some famous arabs who served in the arab world. they were kept completely marginalized and not allowed to give advice. they might not agree -- >> why do you think you were kept out of the policy planning process? was it because you didn't concern your department or was it because number 10 didn't trust you?

>> deep concerns -- it did concern -- >> the answer we had from alastair campbell. >> i didn't obey him. >> the argument didn't concern your department. was it planning on iraq or personal to you? >> i don't know. it concerned the department and humanitarian and reconstruction on the world bank and enormous relationships with the un and the rest of it. i believe in what the stated policy was. i believed there was so much suffering in iraq that we couldn't go on. i never heard robin's you. i amview. i am for the cabinet

discussions. his view was containment could go on but that wasn't my view because unicef's report on child suffering was truly awful. getting western inspectors back in and keeping the you and to get there if necessary using military action to get saddam hussein if need be, i thought we should look at the international court. why exclude me when i believe what they said the policy was? >> just pursuing the machinery of government one more step first, what we have heard from mr. blair and mr. campbell is that the iraq decisions were very much personal judgment that the prime minister of the day made but this was based on the strong convictions that he described to us in his evidence

on friday. it was his responsibility as a leader as prime minister to take the tough decisions and that these were then endorsed by the cabinet. you said it wasn't substantial discussion and mr. blair said it was. the cabinet of which you were a member, than the decisions were imports by the house of commons of which you are still a member even though the cabinet ministers weren't satisfied with the information or the level of debate or decisions. it was up to all of you to do something. .. sort of trip feed

of little chats to the cabinet. now, that's a machinery of government question. there's a democratic question. but there's also a competence of decision-making competition. if you do things and they are not challenged and they are not thought through, errors are made and i think we've seen the errors. >> well, the cabinet endorsed this? >> well, the last meeting was the meeting with the attorney general which i presume you're going to come on to. >> in just a minute, yes. >> it was hardly an endorsement. by then everything was very, very fraud. enormous pressures. and it kind of -- i think he misled the cabinet. he certainly misled me. >> i'm sorry. who led the cabinet? >> the attorney general.

i think we know everything about his doubts and his opinion and what the foreign office legal advisors were saying and that he got this private side deal that tony blair said -- there was a material breach when he said he needed more time and there's an unequivocal moral authority when it comes with leading. i never saw myself was a traditionist and i was stunned about the view of the international lawyers. i thought this is the attorney general coming just in the teeth of war to the cabinet. it must be right and i think he must be misleading us. >> have you had a chance to read the evidence given by the attorney general, the then-attorney general and mr. blair's influence on the legal opinion that was given -- >> i've read the attorney general's.

and i've read jeremy -- >> greenstock. >> yes. a man i have great regard for and i read it carefully and i read most of the prime minister on the radio. >> in mr. blair's evidence there was a summary, an encapsizati encapsization -- >> and you made a legal summary. >> i simply did a civil service summary that we've heard in the last 10 hours and you've heard that. >> yes. >> in your book you and you said it was difficult that he was not lent. now, lord goldsmith denied he has acted under pressure. he said he reached under a purely legal decision and

mr. blair could not believe any discussions he had with lord goldsmith at this critical stage and he said lord goldsmith gave legal advice and it was done, quote, done in a way in which we were satisfied was correct and bright. now, do you accept what lord goldsmith and what mr. blair said about this? >> i'm afraid that i don't. lord goldsmith said he was excluded from meetings and that's a form of pressure. and it was suggested to him that he go to the united states to get advice for a legal position. now, we've got the bush administration. it seems an extraordinary place to get advice about international law. to talk to jeremy greenstock -- i'm surprised by his advice. to interpret 1441 to say you've got to come back to the security council for an assessment of

whether 7% is complying but it's not a decision in the security council is extraordinary jesuital. i've never understood it and it's nonsense and it wasn't the understanding of the french because i saw the french ambassador. so i think all of them was leaning them, sending him to america. excluding him and then including and the chief foreign advisor in his evidence that he sent something and number ten said why is that in writing? i think that speaks volumes how they were breaking down normal communication. >> was it a critical week on the 20th of march -- it was on the 13th of march that lord goldsmith came into his office and told his officials that on balance he had come to the view that the better view was that

the revival argument could be revived without a further determination by the security council. and i suppose the question is, in the days before the 13th of march, specifically, was he subjected to pressure? was this a decision not reached purely on needle grounds? now, he has said not. mr. blair has effectively said not. do you have any evidence that in that period pressures were applied of the nonlegal kind to the attorney general? he had legal discussions with the americans in february. but i'm talking about the period between the 7th of march when he gave his formal advice and the 13th of march when he had come to this clear on-balance conclusion? >> no i don't have any evidence but i think him changing his mind three times in a couple of weeks and then even -- in order to say unequivocally there was legal authority to require tony

blair to secretly sign a document saying that iraq was in material breach and not to report any of that to the cabinet is so extraordinary. and by the way, i see that both tony blair and he said the cabinet would give him a chance to ask questions, that is untrue. >> well, that's really my next question because in march of 2005, after you left office, you wrote lord goldsmith stating that in the cabinet meeting of the 17th of march you had attempted to initiate a discussion but that this was not allowed. and what was it that you were trying to discuss in the cabinet on the 17th of march? and why were you not able to do so? >> i had asked for that special meeting with the attorney general. and it had been readily agreed that it would take place. that was the first time he came to the cabinet that i'm aware of. he sat in robin's seat. and robin didn't come to that meeting.

i don't know why he didn't come and argue but he didn't. there was a piece of paper around the table which we normally didn't have any papers per the agenda and it was the p.q. answer which we didn't know it was a p.q. answer then. and he started reading it out. so everyone said, we can read, you know. that's it. and i said, well, that's extraordinary. why is it so late? did you change your mind? and they all say, clare! everything was very fraught by me and they didn't want me arguing. and i was kind of jeered out to be quiet and that's what happened? >> and you went quiet? >> well, if he won't answer and the prime minister is saying be quiet and that's it. no discussions, there's only so much you can do. and on this, because i see the prime minister and -- the attorney -- the then-attorney to be fair to him said he was ready to answer questions.

but no report. i did ask him later because it was in the morning war cabinet or whatever you call it, that he did come to, and he gave all sorts of later legal advice. and i asked him privately, how come it was so late? and he said oh, it takes me a long time to make my mind up. >> i mean, the argument on this cabinet meeting that we've heard -- >> i'd like to ask you to ask for the books -- you know, the cabinet secretary keeps a manuscript note and there's another private secretary that keeps a manuscript note. i think you should check the record. >> we note that. the argument's been made that the attorney general is the senior legal officer of the government. when he actually reaches a decision on this, there's no point in the cabinet debating it because he has come to the firm legal view on this. and, therefore, there wasn't actually anything at that point to discuss. you just have to accept his authority as a law officer on this question. but you don't agree with that? >> well, i did.

i was stunned by his advice. but as i've said, i thought in the teeth of war, the attorney general of the united kingdom coming to the cabinet to give legal advice, this is a very serious monumental thing. and that's his advice. and i'm very surprised but we must accept it. that was my view. >> now, you've now had the benefit of seeing the earlier advice he'd given his formal advice to the prime minister of the 7th of march, which is a much fuller document looking at more than one option. do you think that it would have actually changed the cabinet's decision if they had been given a chance to see that advice of the 7th of march? >> i think people would have thought it was much more equivocal and risky and wanted to be more sure and less certain. and the other thing -- i didn't know till elizabeth resigned and it was in the full press and they said it was no legal

authority. i think we should have been told that. and i also think -- because the -- 'cause you can tell he was uncertain. he made blair write and sign a document saying saddam hussein was not incorporating due to 1441 and blix got ballistic missiles and these are not matchsticks and tooth picks or whatever and he was asking for more time. at the time when blix was asking for more time, the prime minister secretly signed to say there was no cooperation. and blix was saying i'm getting some cooperation. so -- i mean, this is graceful. -- disgraceful. >> 1441 had required a determination that iraq was in further material breach. and the argument which was made by the foreign legal -- foreign office legal advisors and made by sir michael wood and had been made by lord goldsmith until the 11th of february was that only

the security council could give that determination. but lord goldsmith subsequently came to the view the better view as he called it that this determination did not have to be given by the security council but it still had to be given by somebody. and wasn't he correct in going to the prime minister for that determination so that as it hadn't been given by the security council, it had been given by a member state of the united nations? >> well, one i don't accept that -- 1441 mean you have to come back to the security council for an assessment but not a decision. i just think that's a piece of nonsense even though jeremy greenstock agrees with it and that's unbelievable. >> well, there's different views. >> i'm just saying that. >> that's your view. >> but secondly, and the view with many other countries and other lawyers, of course, and i think the very fact the french asked for a different word and didn't get it doesn't mean the opposite holds.

but secondly, if the attorney general is coming to us and saying this is this complex way in which i mean, interpreting 1441 and, therefore, the security council can't decide whatever blix is saying and, therefore, i'm asking the prime minister to give a written assurance, i think we should have been told that. that was all kept from us. and we were just given the p.q. answer that said unequivocal authority, no doubt. i think that's misleading. >> could i finally move on to a question you did referred to earlier that i said we would come back to. in his evidence on friday, mr. blair gave the view that -- and i'm going to quote here. if we had left saddam there with the intent to develop these weapons and the know how and the concealment program and the sanctions had gone, today we

would be facing a situation where iraq was competing with iran. competing on both nuclear weapons capability and competing as well in support of terrorist groups. i've left a few words out in the middle of those quotations where they simply interrupt the flow. but you can see the full quotation in the transcript. now, that's what mr. blair called his 2010 question. was it a question that we actually either had to take military action to topple saddam in order to remove this threat or if we didn't do so, iraq was going to become both a nuclear and a terrorist threat as mr. blair suggested in his 2010 question? >> no. i think that's, you know, historically inaccurate. for example -- well, it was first the stated policy was supposed to be, which was we can't leave saddam hussein there

and not in compliance with the u.n. and sanctions forever. and they're eroding, therefore, we need to take action, therefore, the argument that i agree with. but there was no evidence of any kind of an escalation of threat so there was no hurry. i mean, that's one of the kind of untruths, the exaggeration of the risk of the wmd. so get the inspectors back in. get disarmament and compliance. if you get that, the logic is really sanctions open up the country and going alongside that and i'm sure that's in the public domain where initiatives from the saudis and the jordanians about possibly getting saddam hussein to go into exile, which would have been an attractive option it seems to me. the intelligence was that there was no nuclear and he didn't have the means. but if he could have done it, he would. so there was no immediate threat there. and the evidence on the chemical

and biological was people thought there were laboratories and people working. there were doubts whether it was weaponized. so surely if we'd gone more calmly and slowly and -- i would have like saddam hussein to be sent to the international court for crimes against humanity and crimes against peace as we got milosevic. i mean, ann bringing up that in the house of commons and tony blair saying he was looking at it but it was never seriously looked at. so i am saying that we could have gone more slowly and carefully and not had a totally destabilized and angry iraq into which came al-qaeda that wasn't there before. and that would have been safer for the world and that tony blair's account ofit the need act urgently somehow because of september 11, i think, doesn't stack up to any scrutiny whatsoever. we had more iraq more dangerous as well as causing enormous suffering and diminishing -- >> so you think the tentative way is other than toppling of

saddam hussein other than preventing him from becoming a more serious threat? >> well, as i've said, saudi arabia and jordan -- we're talking about getting him into exile. there was a possibility of the international criminal court. he wasn't popular in his country. i mean, there's an argument about very strong sanctions that you actually lock countries in and expect it to open them up because then as with serbia, that's the way we got -- in the end the people of serbia sent milosevic to the international criminal court. that was another option. >> but what about the argument that saddam would have become a supporter of international terrorism? >> well, firstly, i mean, the american people were misled to suggest that al-qaeda had links to saddam hussein. everybody knows that is untrue. that he had absolutely no links, no sympathy. al-qaeda was nowhere near iraq until after the invasion and the disorder that came from that. so there's no doubt that by invading in this ill-prepared

rushed way, not only did we cause enormous suffering and loss of life, we made iraq more dangerous and unstable and spread al-qaeda's presence in the middle east. >> was saddam a supporter of international terrorism? >> i believe -- i remember this back from my advice period. they used to send people to get students here who were not sympathetic to the regime. it was that kind of activity. that's not to say in no way, shape or form did he have any links or sympathy to al-qaeda-like ideas. >> you've made several references to kosovo and serbia and so on and we did not have the endorsement of the security council. and which is an action which mr. blair in his texas speech and subsequently to a degree indeed in his evidence on friday has held up as a positive example of regime change.

why was it right to use force against milosevic, one of the semi fascist dictators as mr. blair said but not against saddam hussein who was a nastier and dangerous semi fascist dictator. >> as kof aircraft anon said it is permissible and the strange precedent they used to give tanzania's invasion of uganda which seems such a strange one but that was all in the argument at the time and kofi annan when i became secretary-general of the u.n. i didn't do it just to protect the sovereignty of the states but also to protect the human rights of people. so there was a much, much bigger consensus. i mean, my own view on serbia's expansion and all the ethnic cleansing is that we should have

acted earlier to prevent it. and we could have done that. and we had a very weak u.n. peacekeeping to protect the supplies and stop the attacks. it was last minute. it was universally agreed. it was -- the refugees were pouring over the border. they were stuck at the border and that's where i first met tim cross. it was a different case. and one has to look at the i mean, of course, there's lots of nasty regimes in the world. some of which are our friends who come from the middle east but you have to come case by case and you have to look at what your objective is and what is best for the people of the country in the world and how you can best act. and you need to do this in a considered way. and what we did in iraq was very dangerous. ill conceited and made iraq more dangerous and destroyed lots of paper and destroyed lots of people's lives.

>> but mr. blair in a policy speech -- he said this in his speech in texas, i quote, if necessary, the action should be military. he's not just talking about iraq here. the action could be military and again if necessary and justified. it should involve regime change. and he went on to say, i've been involved as british prime minister in three conflicts involving regime change. milosevic, the taliban and sierra leon. now, that's the statement of the minister for policy. >> sierra leon is not a civil war -- >> as a cabinet member feel -- i mean, was this the government's policy? >> he made the speech. i thought it was quite a good speech. the doctrine of proposal in the international system of the idea of the responsibility to protect that where you got a government that can't or won't protect its people the responsibility should transfer to the international community.

this is to redefine the idea of sovereignty -- to the absolute sovereignty to people in individual states and you have a commission that spells it out beautifully and the international community should intervene -- so it's not immediate military action to do whatever they can to bring relief to the people. but military action would be the last option. it should be considered according to the just war theory, you know, proportionate. is there any other way? and only be done if you can put things right afterwards. now, i agree with that. we won't get it now because of iraq. people don't have the trust in the international system. but that would have been a good way of dealing with things like zimbabwe if we could have moved the world there but the mess in iraq means there's no trust especially in developing countries for the security council members to behave in a fair way in such matters.

>> thank you. i want to go back on the way legal advice was handled in the cabinet because after that, you wrote to the attorney general complaining about the breach of the ministerial code. and i want to read the relevant paragraph the minister of code if that's what you're referring to. it says the advice from the low officers is included in correspondence between ministers or in papers for the cabinet, or ministerial committees, the conclusions may if necessary be summarized but if this is done, the complex text of advice should be -- should be attached. so you're suggesting all he had was the summary, not the actual -- >> all we had was the parliamentary answer. >> so you didn't have any attachment to it? >> nothing, whatsoever. the ministerial code says that any formed legal advice should be circulated and it wasn't.

of course, it's complex because he was changing his opinions so quickly. >> i know. but then he wrote to the attorney general. but both he and lord tomball said it wasn't a breach of the ministerial call and firm right you submitted the same letter to the committee of standard and public life. was it resolved or did you let it drop? >> the trouble with ministerial code because also you're -- the ministerial code you're not supposed to mislead parliament and if you do, you're supposed to correct the misleading and there was a lot of misleading parliament by the prime minister of the day. but, of course, the way to enforce the ministerial code is the prime minister. so what can you do? >> this is why you didn't send it to the committee and standard of public life. did you get a response for them? >> i don't remember the -- they were making a complaint to the bar council acting as a barrister he had breached the principles of giving proper

advice and they took legal advice and said when he gave us his advice he was acting as a minister and not a barrister so, therefore, they got themselves out of it understandably. and so that was the -- and i think the complaint -- >> you did write to alastair -- >> i'm sorry. i don't recall it. >> but you pursued it? >> i pursued it as far as i could go and got rebuffed. and as i say, the minister -- i think it's a machinery of government question. i think the ministerial code is unsafe because the enforcement mechanism is the prime minister and if he's in on the tricks, then you've got no way of holding anyone to the ministerial code. >> at any stage you were not given the full picture. all you saw was the summary -- >> it wasn't a summary. >>reporter: -- >> no doubt, no question there's authority for military action. which i thought at the time it must be it. it was stunning.

and when i find out what went into it i think we were misled and we should have been told of the views of the foreign minister. >> i think we'll take a break and come back in 10 minutes also. thank you. >> let's resume. >> we're slightly going to shift gears and i want to look at defense own planning in late 2002/2003. now, from september 2002, there was planning, am i right? and you were determined to avoid the perception that they were planning for war; is that right? >> that's right. that's exactly right. >> so how did you get them to

plan that you didn't want to happen? how did you manage to deal with that? >> i appreciate the question. and, of course, because we didn't talk it up, there's a lot of people here who like to claim that we didn't prepare. but it was jacob who really clarified it for me. they were ready preparing. but i thought, no, the right thing is to prepare for all eventualities. we could have a success. we could have blix succeeding and sanctions being lifted and it includes the possibility of military action and includes the possibility -- so that's very clear and not difficult. and then the only other question is, not -- 'cause everyone keeps saying, are you planning, are you planning are you trying to make war inevitable and i kept saying we're planning for all eventualities. and the public perception and the official opposition tried to

make the argument that i had difference about the war we're not planning. i know you have so many documents and so much publication because this myth is about i ask you to consider publishing the record of the humanitarian work. i've been in dfid reading it. and for academics they'll be able to see what exactly happened. >> that's fine. if you're preparing for all your eventualities, what did you instruct your department to do? what were the other scenarios that you were planning for or you instructed your department to plan for? >> well, we went -- the possibility of success and the opening up of iraq which was not the nicest things to plan for and you've got the world bank and everybody would come in and dahd-di-dah. and military action and the total international cooperation. you'd get troops and all sorts of countries.

you'd get all the international players supporting. the worst case scenario is military action without u.n. authorization 'cause we're on our own then. and for the aftermath you've got difficulty of getting other players in. there was another paper -- i don't think it was ours that had the scenario of catastrophic success. what happened actually. very rapid military success. and then breaking into ethnic conflict. so that was foreseen as a risk. and on that, i have to say it's for the military under their geneva convention obligations, this is the american and our own military -- they should be keeping order. you can't do any reconstruction. it's very difficult to do humanitarian relief when you've got chaos, looting and violence. and it seems to me they didn't prepare for their geneva convention obligations to keep order and provide basic humanitarianism. and that was a military failure. i think it's a lesson-learned

thing. i see the military say they didn't have enough. and they should have said to blair. we're not ready. >> what you're saying to me in late 2002, you had instructed your department to plan for all different scenarios? >> absolutely. >> and that -- they were clear about that instruction? >> absolutely. and if you publish the files, which i would ask you to do, that will be clear to everybody. >> i think you frequently have been challenged that you instructed your department not to engage for the challenge on iraq. i think it would be helpful to hear what your instructions were to your staff. that you did instruct -- or did you or did you not instruct them enthusiastically? >> the question you just asked me that we got down to planning against all eventualities within

the difficult communications we had in whitehall that we already discussed. there was, though, a moment when of shock when my permanent secretary and nicholas brewer who was with dfid is our ambassador to south africa said there was a very strong rumor that the attorney general saying there wasn't legal authority for war. and he was thinking of resigning. and the military were worried that they might be making soldiers subject to the risk of the international criminal court which, of course, was a new instrument. and i thought good heavens am i putting my civil servants at risk by asking them to prepare for the consequences of a military action? so that became a worry. and i think in the end andrew

turnbull asked the attorney for review on this. i think some of the doubt might be around the worries over which was only a room. we never saw anything in writing. i clarified even if there was any legal military action it was aggression. it's always right to prepare humanitarian relief. so that was clear and we had to get on with that. and the truth is on reconstruction, you go through -- there'll be a military invasion. the geneva convention will apply and so on. the military will be in the lead. and we need another u.n. resolution presumably we're going to come on to this. >> we'll come on to it. >> i know. but in terms of my protection for my civil servants, that's clear now. i got -- you know, i was thrown into a tiz by the thought i might be asking them to do illegal things. then it's clear we should prepare for humanitarian even if

it is an illegal war. and even reconstruction requires some u.n. authorization anyway, therefore, we're okay legalities for the civil servants. and it was up to the attorney general what civil servants could and couldn't do. that was a big issue for quite some time. >> i want to put something to you which sir robert frie said to us. we had different representatives who came to the queue who would hardly hide their moral disdain for what we're about to embark upon. what's your response on that sort of view? >> that we had a liaison military person and i know the department has gone back to her given that. and she has said there's no way she showed moral disdain. i mean, i can't -- there was lots of emotion in the country at that time.

but dfid is a very professional high quality organization and the liaison person was a former military person. so i think people read back into the script. you know, the thing was such a mess. and people knew about my doubts so they start conflating it and say it's all dfid's fault really. but that is not the record of what people did. >> so you're saying your department was clear about your personal views and that did not have a negative impact on planning. is that what you're saying? >> i am saying that. they were clear. i mean, people in the country shared our view including the possibility of war authorized by the u.n. no question. we needed to get rid of sanctions. we needed, you know -- iraq was suffering and we had to be willing to contemplate military action. so all my worries about whether we did it right not the possibility of doing it. >> can i come on to the planning with external partners?

because when it came to discussions with external partners, we understand that a constrained of planning of 2002 was that number 10 issued statements in departments no the to discuss plans with iraq with external partners? i think you also shared that sometimes you did not want your department engaged in discussions with external partners? and is that that the case? >> number 10 bloc and on ngos they were queuing up to be involved but british ngos hadn't been working in central iraq. ...

>> when was that? >> i think that was sort of october, i think number 10 lifted it said still be careful budgets and talks, something like that. so that was kind of official mission. i have personally --

>> just to be clear, so number 10, it was constraints on what you would discuss with the partners but you personally had not? >> that's right. that's right. and then, i and others also talked with, i talk to qaddafi a number of times. sort of breaching the number 10 ruling, and it was for shetty was the secretary-general and worked on the preparation. for the u.n. and was very fraud as well because there was such division around the security council. the u.n. prepared to be quiet. >> what sort of issues were you discussing with the united nations and to geneva and to new york? >> as i said earlier, we don't have thousands of people come marching in to do humanitarian work like an army. we have money and people and expertise that we can inject

into the international systems to get them working well. if this blockade is, we can put more money towards expert people, get things moving. so you have to, food, oil for food, 60 percent of the people are dependent on -- it comes in on ships if there's going to be military action can we keep the food rolling? if not we will have a starving country. what can we do in sewage and electricity and water get bombed? to have capacity to do quick repairs? etc., etc. the world health organization, what about the hospitals, if there are going to be injuries in war? can we make sure there is enough jobs. all these kind of things. >> what with united nations doing about their role if there was a possibility of military action after that stage the? at that stage it was, louise was leading it. does a lot of work in geneva.

i think they said in november that they had been working for a year quietly. but she had taken it to a higher level. she was a senior person. that they were preparing for all eventualities but keeping it quiet. >> and that was i think the right thing for her to do. she was a very good official. >> did they express a view of out what was the role for themselves in the united nations? >> everyone in the higher levels of the u.n. was fraud and hoping and hoping that there would be action by the secret council. but because of media, everyone was worried that might not be the case. things might get messy and difficult. that flows into the flaw that services the secretary-general and assistant secretary-general. so whole thing was tense and people were very worried. >> so you were trying to work with this sort of broad context

where there was concern, the drumbeat outside with the media were different and you were trying to plan with united nations, within the broader context? >> i do those people where. i knew them well. woodworker emergencies in different parts of the world. we understand each other perfectly. we were planning. i wasn't even trying. i mean, humanitarian wanted to work. just all the other things fell apart. and keeping people fed, stop collar outbreaks, getting the water fixed when it was broken, et cetera. the hospitals were decimated but icrc came with new supplies and -- that was very bad. but you know what i mean. we did plan. we worked with the u.n. and so on and the icrc very important agency. the pre-position all sorts of drugs and materials. so that people could have clean

water. so you can take water from the river, you know, all that. we did all that. >> my final question is, why did you accept the instructions that was not discussed plans for number 10? what was your understanding of their reasoning and why did you accept that? >> well, i think the only real issue was the ngo's, and they worked that significant. i mean, oil for food at something like 1000 iraqi's employ. there was a network of people who could deliver humanitarian things. and the british ngo's wanted to be in on it more. but they weren't going to be significant players, especially in central iraq. >> so you thought that didn't matter. >> yes, sir. >> do you need have conquered nations in geneva and lateral nation's also those quiet behind the scenes conversations? >> with the icrc.

>> let's move on. >> i want to talk to you about the relations with the united states. we've heard a lot about some of the asymmetries and size between the united states and united kingdom, but also the very different structures of government. was your natural interlock toward in the united states? >> well, the head of usaid was andrew. so that was the obvious link. and we always had state department. i mean, over afghanistan, i met colin powell and rich armitage? yes, state department and usaid. and you probably know, they did masses of planning. and that is just a couple of months before that was all thrown away and everything was moved into and it was the most -- so we worked with them quietly and i remember andrew,

who fought in the first gulf war and was a republican and head of usaid and he said, the most dangerous possibility and is that they get -- that we get chaos and sectarian divisions, and what he must do is to chop the top off the system but not everyone, but every teacher has to be a member. i remember him saying that in terms and how right he was. >> when was that conversations? >> i'd have to look it up to check, but i would think a late 2000 to. >> late 2000 to. >> but i could doublecheck if you wanted to. >> and as if you anticipate my next question, which was about the shift from the state department to the pentagon. when did you become aware of a shift in the focus of planning? >> i think fairly soon. telegrams low and i was a reader

of telegrams. i would have stopped them coming if they realize. so i knew it had happened but it was done. the state department had prepared an enormous detail. suddenly -- but we all knew about the divisions in the u.s. administration and the people and the pentagon and so on. but to throw away all the postwar planning, it takes a bit of time to absorb the information you're getting. it's hard to believe they would do that. but they did. and then tim cross was the other -- i knew him from kosovo. >> i wanted to talk about tim cross also, but just on the state department planning. had you seen any of this planning? had using any other result at all? >> i had been briefed on it, and we have telephone communicatio communications. with some of the other agencies. there were some that wouldn't talk to us. i knew the german minister very

well but he was extremely upset and wouldn't talk to us, but we are trying to keep everyone in as far as we could because we would did them all for afterwards. and we kept in touch with the state department and usaid. >> slow down. >> sorry, sorry. just wave. and usaid -- we became more and more concerned that after an invasion, geneva convention obligations, if we didn't some kind of u.n. authorization, we needed to roll over oil for food because you had to keep doing that. that was crucial to keep people said. we wouldn't get the world bank, we would get other countries. so we were talking that a lot to usaid and they totally agreed and said yes, yes, yes. so we were working away on them.

>> usaid didn't have the same sort of clout within the american system that you had in the british system? >> no, no, they are an agency rather than a department. but we are also -- i'm using the proper machinery of government and ambassadors and things with the state department to the same end. speculated to have these contacts with the state department, were you a learned by them in any way about concerns, probably formally, about concerns about the impact of the shift from the state department to the pentagon in terms of postwar planning? >> i can't personally remember. i just know everyone was utterly stunned and shocked. so i can't remember people's words, but you can imagine. >> okay. >> just another setback. crazy story we are on. >> the argument that was used at the time at which colin powell appears to have exacted was that as the military would have to be

doing most of the work, they would have people on the ground. they have the resources. it made some sort of sense for them to be responsible. so in part, this is also an argument about the relationship between civil concerns with reconstruction and the military role. you spent a lot of time on i know in dfid. what was your input in those discussion? >> well, it all happened very quickly. but the truth is, you need the military to prepare. i don't think either our military or their military prepared enough for their geneva conventions and hague obligations to keep order, to keep humanitarian relief. because everything was done on a wing and a prayer and too fast. but if you wanted in the world to come together, and support the reconstruction of iraq, you needed to not only have the military, you needed the

military to do their bit and then you need to bring everybody in. that's what we're trying to achieve. so to hand all over to the military is a bit foolish because your chances then of getting cooperation from the rest of the international system made diminish. i think that was just pure sectarian divisions in the u.s. system and part of the problem. and colin powell was becoming marginalized expect you mention tim cross. you indicated that you dealt him from your balkans days when dealing with kosovo and such the like. how closely in touch were you with tim cross? >> i remember tony blair saying and we're going to send tim cross, he is your friend, isn't he, claire? so i knew when he went out going, and when he came back i told you a number of times on the phone come and initiated by me and i think sometimes by him, and he came to see me i think on one of his first trips back here

and said, it's terrible, they are still moving the furniture in. i can remember him saying that. now i have read his evidence, and i'm very surprised by it. i know about all there in iraq because it was such a mess. we decide not to put a lot of people in and just liaison. there was an individual he wanted that we didn't particularly think was good. but he says he asked for someone from the dfid to go in. we had one humanitarian adviser in -- ambassador to the u.n. office because most of them would be in geneva. but just because such questions might come up. and i, after tim cross ass, i asked him to liaise with tim cross but i also asked andrew natsios to talk to tim cross. that didn't prove useful, but it could have done. so i was surprised by what tim cross headset that i can talk

about the later phase when -- i must say tim cross story is such a sad story. and if he was an official from my department, i think it's outrageous that they left him out there on his own. we would have supported someone. >> can i just go from what he says in his memo and just refer to this. just reinforces what you just said. to start, having confirmed that with u.k., i was reinforced from that that he needed, i was reinforced with little support from the sco and with dfid official based in new york speck that is the guys. clare short would not allow me to work on a full-time, i think it means basis are, because of her well-known concerns. >> that's not sure that i have asked the department to check that because i read it. and they said it's not true, and that he asked me for some support and i asked our

officials to delay is all within. so i believe he believes it that he is a very fine man but it's not true, according to the records of the department. >> that's very helpful. >> there are questions were later. >> we will deal with those letters. so just in terms of your understanding of where things were, you knew from tim cross and also from your concerns about the shift away from state department, that things were not going very well in washington in terms of postwar plan. >> could i just let everyone know, we did know what the date was going to be of the war because now we know it. we can look at this pic because it is incredible in a messy way and things worked ready. so although we were worried about all these things, we did know how quickly we were going to work. >> so you did know in february that -- >> i knew from s.i.s., the intelligence people. i think one of the american age

was favor the 15th which was the day of a big demonstration and also my birthday, so i remember that. but that got put back. and given the lack of preparedness, one was expected today to be put back. so we knew there were people pressing for war, but given that things were not ready, we didn't -- i mean, i wouldn't have believed that we would go that quickly given how i'm ready everything was. >> let me just ask again, and in in terms of the scenarios that you are expecting in terms of what would happen. you've mentioned already your concerns about what would happen if chemical and biological weapons were used. and the effect on the population. what about other issues including looting? how much study had been done about that possibility? >> that was the catastrophic stress center. which was the paper i think and foreign office, i am speaking from memory here. but the military would go very

quickly, and then there was a risk of chaos and sectarian divisions. and so that was thought about, and i think that's a military failure. that is a geneva convention obligation to keep order. i mean, obviously, humanitarians can do that. we can only operate if there is some kind of order. >> you mentioned your birthday on the 15th of denver, the day, saint valentine's day when he wrote a letter to mr. blair. >> didn't do any good. [laughter] >> which we have got the classified so you see in this letter. i think it is quite an important letter. in this story. and you warn in this letter of the risk of humanitarian catastrophe. now, we've had a lot of evidence

that suggests that part of the problem, possibly, was that the risk of humanitarian catastrophe were well understood, and you've already indicated to your department was prepared for these advice on these. and in the end, the immediate consequences of the war for that reason were not as bad as many -- >> but we sent 100 million or something a cheating that. >> i'm not saying it was because an easy thing to do. i suppose i'm saying is it was an eventuality that was prepared for. but there was a concern that reconstruction itself and the consequences of the loss of law and order, as you describe it, was not fully appreciated. is that a fair criticism of what happened?

>> i think there were -- i told you about andrew natsios saying that was the greatest danger. i think he feared most. it was the catastrophic scenario in planning papers. but then the pentagon, i think believe its own propaganda. and thought the people of iraq who hated the regime, and it was a hateful regime of course, would be giving flowers to the soldiers. and they really believed their own propaganda and thought they could come out very quickly, and that everything would be easy. and that's why they threw away the state department's stuff, and i mean, i later wrote for the new american century documents, and clearly, it was a long-standing view of theirs, they were wrong. but that's why we got a problem. because the people who are now in charge both military and reconstruction, absolutely believe that we would be welcome and it wouldn't be any trouble.

>> at the time when you're writing this and your writing at a time when there was still considerable expectation of a second u.n. resolution, your hope was that the u.n. would be able to handle this range of problems, that they would be able to take a leading role in reconstruction? >> well, this is the second u.n. -- know, the third, how are many, because we had to have oil for food resolution as well. this is the question of legality of reconstruction. the same question that the international court of justice gave judgment on any palestinian occupied territory. so an occupying power is required to keep order, provide for humanitarian needs, and is not allowed to change for institutions of a country they occupied, or its laws. so we knew that if we didn't get another u.n. resolution, we were in big trouble.

we could do humanitarian, but you can't reconstruct the country. and that became an absolute obsession of why so. it wasn't just my department that if you look at the file, in list of foreign office efforts and david manning, condoleezza rice, et cetera. the group in the u.s. administration that hated the u.n., didn't care about international law, and i think jack straw was getting frantic because here's another u.n. resolution that we might all fall out about that than to worship in use by the attorney general, saying if any grids went to, there are certain things they could do not do because of the law. because of the geneva convention. >> this is getting to the postwar situation. i'm just trying to clarify the lines you are taking before the war, where there's a considerable stress in the letters and those coming from your department. at the end of this letter, of

the 14th of february, when you're talking about the humanitarian risks, you make an important point about your budget. you set my department is tight budget constraints, we have made humanitarian disasters across the world and my resources are strained. i'm happy to prioritize iraq from a contingency reserve, but i can't take resources from other pool and need people to assist post-conflict iraq. without some understanding of finance, i cannot responsibly commit dfid to the exemplary partnership with m.o.d., which we discussed. interested to know, first, what sort of resources you were after at this stage, and you say you copied this letter to gordon brown. what's with response you got on that particular request?

>> well, there was this talk of an exemplary role. it was rather late that britain was taking on because it was first planned to go to turkey. and then there was some, i think, it's clearly late. i think tony blair convened a meeting and gordon brown was there and jack straw and i. about the post invasion plans, and this exemplary role phrase came up. and we were up for a. i mean, if you, the staff go beautifully, that's good for the country everything else, as well as britain's reputation. but then i'd written a number of letters, saying all we've got is our contingency reserve. and i'm supposed to keep that for other emergencies in the world. unit, coming to end of one financial year and then another. . .

treasury set up some kind of working group -- this will be in the papers. and came with a letter saying there's no money. money is very tight. and, therefore, we've got to have a u.n. resolution so we can get the world bank and the imf and all the others in. that was a treasury response. and we only got any extra money from the treasury, i think, after the invasion had started. so how you can plan an exemplary role when it's that late is impossible. >> so -- and there's one other thing on this, they suggested we

send a couple of officials in orha or maybe our military for the south. and i said we should go on a scoping mission but we shouldn't put people in because it was promised what we couldn't deliver because we didn't have the money. and if i put people there as though we were going to bring lots of money, that was misleading. so we sent a scoping mission but we didn't put people -- i can't now remember -- i think it was probably in the military planning than orha because we had nothing -- no answer. tony blair is getting all these letters and copies to gordon brown. it's a dysfunctional nature the way the government was operating. >> as far as you're aware you sent off this letter on the 14th of february. you're not aware of a response. >> i sent a number of letters about muffin. -- money. the response we got was after the invasion had started. and prior to that we got this --

the results of this working group or whatever it was called saying there's no money. and that's why we got to have a u.n. resolution for reconstruction so we can get the imf and the world bank -- >> so from that point of view we were taking on the potentially exemplary role. but when you asked for more resource prior to the war to support this exemplary role you haven't been given any promise of extra funds? >> no. there was no reply to a lot of letters and then there was that treasury working group sailing no, really. >> can i just ask you a final question on the period leading up to the war. we've mentioned the importance of the u.n. to you. and this was clearly a major concern when it became apparent that a second resolution was not going to be found. what was your reaction when you realized that that was likely to be the case?

>> well, the first thing was they claimed and this was untrue that the french had vetoed -- and, of course, as known a permanent member is a veto. it isn't a separate thing and said they wouldn't support any military action. and that was untrue. but that was said repeatedly. and i remember saying that can't be the french who had done that because there was a french statement and the authority of the u.n. had to be upheld. but again, when they said that the french had said that, therefore, there could be no second resolution, i believed them at the time. you don't want to disbelieve your prime minister in the run-up to a war and you don't want to disbelieve the leader of your party and you want to be loyal. i did believe them too often, i think. but then i decided -- my idea

was that we'd prepare for everything. as i used to call it, we'll hold on to tony blair's ankles. he will hold on to bush and we might get the thing done right. that was kind of my idea in my head. and then i -- whatever the date was 12 march i decided i would do this interview with andrew and say there's not a second resolution i'm leaving the government, which i did. and let me say i completely on my own because my poor old servants in their press office were hauled over the coals. they had nothing to do with it. this image that we prepare for everything. we try and keep it on the u.n. route. get the thing properly -- i mean, i also argued with blair. there's no hurry so why don't we move on and transform the atmosphere in the middle east and the chances in iraq would be massively better. so that was my concept of what i was doing. >> and did you discuss this with other cabinet colleagues at the

time? we've heard jack straw who had his idea of plan b at this time. which would have given us is much lower -- did you discuss the situation with them this >> things were enormously fraught and this breakdown the normal communications -- i had various cups of coffee with gordon. and discussed with him. he was very unhappy and marginalized -- he was worried about other things beyond iraq. he would say on iraq, we must uphold the u.n. and i would say i agree and are we going to do it that way and he would talk about other issues that were worrying him. and i go on about iraq so i'm not sure we were communicating terribly fully but we were having cups of coffee. i talked to jack straw when we were on the platform together at the party conference and said is there any risk that tony will go to war with the americans without the u.n.? and he said i'm not sure but i'm working on it. so we had that conversation.

gordon told me that robin cooke had told someone in the media that gordon, robin and i were against -- i wasn't reading all the media at that time. but i didn't know robin was going to resign. you can see how for the communication -- well, the discussion in the cabinet was. it was tone blair who told me that robin is gone -- or going today. >> so you were unaware -- >> it was fractured and broken down. >> you had no idea that robin cooke had misgivings? >> i knew he had misgivings. and robin had said if we do it properly through the u.n., we're all for it. so the misgivings were always about breaking out of what was meant to be the policy. which 'cause of the media one was fearing all the time. >> and so you had a meeting with the prime minister which encouraged you to stay. what were the assurances you

were given then? >> well, he rang me up and was very cross and i said well, i'll go now. and he goes no, no, he didn't want two of us going at the same time. and he said come and see me. he asked me to see him two or three times and said what is it? what is your bottom line? and indeed involved my permanent secretary in writing a letter to andrew turnbull. and it was a second resolution u.n. lead on reconstruction. and the road method was negotiated. and the palestinian state in 2005 publication of the roadmap. and he said oh, well i can -- he said oh, if you care about the roadmap that might help me with bush. and he had me back in another day and said, oh, bush is going to make a statement saying he accepts the roadmap. i have to say at that time i didn't think the president of the united states and the prime minister of britain said

something as profound of that i thought it met something versus a bit of manipulation. and then he had me in a separate time and said i've got bush to agree to a u.n. lead on reconstruction. and i want to you stay and we need international cooperation. i booked my place to make my resignation statement with the speaker. and the prime minister persuaded to stop. there's lots of arms twisting going on about the size of the labour revolt but it was going to pass. and i thought well, if we got the palestinian state and a u.n. lead on reconstruction, that will be so much better than what will otherwise happen. and i'll stay for that. and i took a heck of a lot of flak for it but i still think if we'd done those things we'd be much better. >> thank you very much. >> i think we might take another break at this point and come back in 10 minutes. thank you.

>> i'll turn to re-open the questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to turn to the planning on the eve of the invasion. we've heard earlier your well intentioned letter of the february. and again on the 5th of march and i think there's a statement that you made in the house when you talked about your concern about optimistic assumptions about the aftermath. and you also, i think, said that it's not as full and complete as it could be in the aftermath planning. sort of there's obviously some concerns pretty much, you know, from february onwards. and why do you think the prime minister was ignoring the

warnings you were giving and going ahead? >> i think this gets to the root of why we went. and i think now you can see the documents, the americans were determined to go. blair had decided to go with them. he couldn't get britain to go there without going through the u.n. but in the end if the americans were going, he was determined to go with them. and i repeat -- i said it before. but it's very important there was no need to go at that time. there was no emergency. there was nothing happening that meant we couldn't have more time. >> i mean, you said that on the 5th in march. >> i'm saying that in general. i mean, it's a very important point. now, this is about the special relationship. was blair willing to say to the americans, i'm not going with you now? it's too early. blix should have more time. the international system needs more time to prepare. i promised you i'd be with you. but this is the wrong time. we can take another six months. and i think he was so frantic to be with america that all that was thrown away.

and if he'd done that, his place in history and the u.k. role in the world would have been more honorable. britain needed to say this. the special relationship, what we mean by it. do we mean we have an independent relationship when we say what we think or do we mean we just abjectly we go where america goes because that puts us in the big league and that is the tragedy. >> what is your understanding of what he was saying to president bush at that time? do you think he was raising these issues with him in terms of after-planning and was he being given assurances that it would be all right on the day or the night? >> i don't know. but i think he probably thought the americans could do it. you know, that they knew what they were doing. but you have to ask him, i mean, i can only think that's what he thought. otherwise good heavens how irresponsible is this as we've seen.

>> in terms of this special relationship, i mean, we heard on friday when he was talking about that the conditions about the middle east process. and the aftermath. it was a way of influencing. do you think we were able to exert enough influence? >> i don't think we influenced anything. that's pathetic. i think it humiliates britain. i think we could have -- i think if we'd said we're not going now, i'm not certain -- i know rumsfeld had said we'll go without you. but, you know, american public opinion was saying in coalition, yes, alone no. and if you look at the so-called coalition of 30, they've got rwanda -- they ran around the poorest countries in the world getting them to come on the list so it would look like a coalition. they weren't asking them to send any troops because there had been a big coalition in the first gulf war. so i think if britain had had the courage to mean what we said the policy was to say, no,

there's no urgency. we're going to take a bit longer and prepare properly. give blix a bit more time, keep the -- 'cause don't forget the russians the french the germans were all saying we agree there should be war if need than to enforce the authority of the u.n. that's where britain would have been. and it would have been honorable and he wasn't willing to do it. >> as i said earlier, you were raising these concerns. you were not being listened to. why did you continue to support the policy? >> i supported the policy that i supported which was doing it properly through the u.n. and then we've just heard the discussion -- >> no, i'm talking about the aftermath in planning on the eve of the invasion because you were raising all these issues because you were not being listened to. why did you continue to support the policy because the aftermath in more ways is more important. >> why didn't i resign high wind i would? -- resign when i said i would? >> yes.

>> i tried to answer then if i knew then what i know now, i would have. i had the prime minister getting the president of the united states to agree to the publication of the roadmap which should have meant a palestinian state by the the end of 2005. think about how it would transform the middle east and i had the prime minister promise to me that bush agreed there would be a u.n. lead on reconstruction. so although i thought it was wrong to rush and wrong to go, i stayed because i thought if we did those things we could avoid the disaster that would otherwise take place. i still agree with myself. if we'd done those things it wouldn't have been such a disaster but i was conned. >> are you still of the view that if we had more time and more resources it would have been better? >> i still think we should have done what the policy was. i think we should have said saddam hussein you can't go on forever. you can't keep fooling the00 we got blix back in. we got to mean it. we've got to -- you know, we're willing to use military action

if you obstruct. i think given what the saudis and the jordanians were saying we could have gotten saddam hussein out. there would have been all sorts of ways that would have been better. i agreed with the policy as it was formally stated. i don't think it was the policy. the policy was we're going to war and we don't care about the u.n. and blair's policy was, i've got to go through the u.n. because i got to do it that way or you can't get britain there but i'm going with the americans. come what may. it's a very sad story. >> what about resources? do you think more resources would have made a difference in the aftermath? >> oh, i mean, i went to the spring meeting of the world bank and i knew all those people very well and the world bank and the imf were desperate because they thought some of the divisions in the security council might come in to their institutions and might get all that bitter division and they were looking at precedence like japan and, you know, could you engage with an occupied power? and i convened a meeting with

the french, the germans and all the nordics and i said i know you hate the war, if we get a u.n. lead-in, and they said they would and said to blair if we can do this right we can get the world to reunite and rebuild iraq. that's why i resigned in the end because the feebled u.n. resolution we did debt was not enough. it did cover the world bank and the imf explicitly but it didn't bring the rest of the international community in and the treasury about the resources, there's no resources here. we got to get a u.n. led to get the cooperation for reconstruction. >> were others in the cabinet concerned planning on the invasion -- >> no, i think by then everything was so utterly fraught and it was a massive arm twisting exercise taking place

to get people to vote in the parliamentary labour party and no one was talking to everyone and everything was absolutely in a terrible condition of tension and people had decided to go with blair, come what may. >> and the machine was cranking on towards military action and not much attention was being paid or being listened to about the aftermath planning? >> well, the preparation for the aftermath planning. and this -- if you look at the files, i do hope you will consider publishing them. it goes on and on and on we got to have a u.n. lead with all the resources. >> you were doing this -- >> but so was the front office. it was not only us and it was swept aside and the decision was made, bang, suddenly we're going to war and you can blame the french and concoct the legal authority and off we go. >> were you not given the impression that the united states had this in hand because you've seen papers. and, therefore, they were optimistic and they thought -- >> well, yes, as we've said all

these enormous state department planning which included the danger the chaos and sectarian fighting and so on was thrown away. or the pentagon took over and at the didn't believe there wouldn't be any trouble and people would be waving flowers at them and off they went. they believed their own propaganda. and the british government's capacity to think better than that was just subverted and thrown away. so we have deep eternal shame. >> thank you. >> turning to sir martin gilbert. as the military action began, as has been said no u.n. lead of any sort had been agreed. how did this affect that moment the division of responsibility between dfid and the military? how did it impact or what you saw as your respective contribution, what you could deliver at that time? >> as i said, we can do

humanitarian anytime without legal authority because, you know, you should always help people in need. so if there's a crime of aggression you can still go in and help people. no problem with that. and all the preparations were made for that. and we spent money early to get the u.n. system and the icrc ready and we spent more money, you know, as it went. that was all absolutely fine. then for the aftermath and reconstruction, there are these very serious legal questions about geneva convention obligations and what -- and the attorney general was involved in this giving legal advice 'cause there was pressure to put british people in orha and the attorney general said they need legal advice but what they can and can't do they can do humanitarian and they can't do reconstruction if it means reorganizing the institutions of iraq. so it was a fair old mess. and arguing we've got to get the u.n. resolution. and, of course, blair had said

to me he got bush's promise of a u.n. led for reconstruction. then bush came to hillsboro, if you remember, northern ireland. he said u.n. six times and he's summing up. so they got him to say vital role for the u.n. but it wasn't -- i mean, people say you shouldn't expect america to let the u.n. but america let the u.n. lead the political process in the administration. but the lead on constructing a new political system in afghanistan was led of the u.n. by brahimi and it wasn't ridiculous that we were able to persuade bush to do the same. in fact, i took a copy of the afghan u.n. resolution to the cabinet to say, look can, we could do it again, you know, this is all we're asking. but in the end instead we got 1483 which really fudged and

said -- i mean, i spoke to kofi around this time. he said we're not going to do a blue wash for this attack. and occupation. so the u.n. wanted to be engaged but was not going to bless it. and then in the end we got 1483 which said there will be an interim authority -- and it had to be brought into being by the occupying powers. it just recognized us as occupying powers. it didn't say it was a legitimate occupation. it just said that's what we were. and other countries wouldn't come in 'cause it was too weak but how you were going to get to a legitimate iraqi government. and then i left the government. it was no good. what blair was promised me. it wasn't true. he just conned me. it wasn't strong enough to bring in all the other players although it did explicitly allowed the world bank and so on. and there was later another u.n. resolution to recognize the

beginning of some iraqi government authority and, of course, i had sistani insisting on elections and there was going to be even more trouble because the u.s. planned to draw up a constitution and take longer before they had any democratic process for iraq. >> can i just go back briefly to that short period where you were at dfid and orha was established. first of all, did the establishment of orha lower your expectations at that time that there would be a u.n. route? was this something that impeded dfid's -- >> no we were just in a bit of a lunatic asylum. i worked fantastically hard at the world bank spring meeting to really -- using all my friendships and so on to get everyone agree that we would all come together. and orha was just another bit of the problem. but it went from washington to kuwait.

and then it moved into baghdad quite quickly. and then there was -- they set up this ad hoc ministerial committee that jack straw chaired to plan the aftermath. and we were getting pressure -- actually i had pressure from tim cross to agree to a particular individual to do humanitarian in orha. and we thought he performed very bradley in kosovo and we were saying, look, we need to have someone we trust do that. but we sent out a mission, a very good additional to look at orha and see what we could do. and he came back and said it's disastrous. it's chaotic. it doesn't know what it's doing. we decided to put a small liaison humanitarian unit in and to operate outside. in the meantime we're getting reports the water is broken off here and this hospital has been looted. you can't wait when you got those kinds of problems.

and then there was -- i think jack straw went on a visit -- i'm still in the government at this stage. there's a decision to send 100 officials into orha. well, we know about post-crises. everyone in the world flies in and you get chaos. like in haiti. so imagine you got this totally dysfunctional orha and you're going to put 100 brits in from all different departments. they could be the best people in the world but it's going to be more mess. >> but the perception that dfid was reluctant and on downing street was that you were holding back was a misunderstanding -- >> no, no. orha was a mess. and putting lots and lots more people in would be dreadful. we put our liaison unit in so that we knew what it was doing or if it was doing anything. we also had the attorney general's legal advice about what people who went in could do. and that's all over the files and he wrote a number of letters as well. i mean, it wasn't just a one-off thing.

and then the prime minister said -- tony blair then still the prime minister said we've got to put in, i think, 100 people was the aim. and dfid should pay for them. by now the treasury said we could have 60 million, up to 60 million. you have to justify each tranche but we could claim the extra money. and we didn't want to take -- neither did the permanent secretary -- it wasn't just me reporting responsibility for what we thought would be chaos and hopeless. so we agreed the foreign office could draw down on that money and pay for those people. and we'd carry on keeping the humanitarian stuff going. >> one last question on this. given the -- >> and we were reporting that it was chaos. i mean, others -- >> it was shambles. given the dominance of orha and of the american role at this stage in the reconstruction, did you -- was there any alternative for dfid? was there any other route that

you contemplated using to get your staff in and to work particularly in the south? >> well, day in and day out -- again if you look at the file, every day to the war cabinet i'm saying there's a breakdown in electricity in basra. i see them doing that and there's an outbreak of cholera there and we were doing -- we were busy and feeding in people money and reports and so on. we asked admiral boyce to get france to put some protection that are in danger of looting. and the looting which people talked there wasn't looting in basra. it was. it went crazy there. and we're trying to keep people fed and food on the sea and then beyond that, there was the world bank and -- we were close with the world bank and knew them well. and knew their effectiveness.

they were sending us scoping mission -- this is reconstruction now. and we worked with them and knew how all of that worked. and we weren't ignoring orha. we weren't writing it off. some machinery had to be brought in to being. but you can't work in it when it's dysfunctional. and there are immediate emergencies you've got to attend to. but we kept our eyes open for -- and, of course, it did changed. >> and you're satisfied given the resources you had and given the shambles of orha, you were able to do the maximum in terms of the things you've been describing? >> we did the humanitarian. and we got the rollover of the offer of food so people could still be fed. basra and baghdad did a magnificent job getting people fed. and so we were doing all of that. and looting -- it was getting worse. the chaos was growing. and then i left.

>> just as you're -- well, before you leave, you had gone in having worked very closely in the planning in the last short period of the military, what was the relationship once dfid personnel were in south iraq with the military -- how did that relationship affect the -- your effectiveness? >> well, on the ground in sierra leone, bosnia, so on, we always had good relationships with the military and we are can-doers and so are they and we want to get on the ground and make things work. in this case it was totally different 'cause we'd been frozen out. i think that affected my relationship with boyce. i got on very well with those before him and we worked on pakistan and so on. but he'd been told to have nothing to do with me obviously as people used to do, he spent his life in submarines and it showed. he wasn't a chatty sort of chap.

and when in the war cabinet in the -- when i would go in each day and say this is happening in basra, this disorder, this electricity, it really ignored him. he wasn't getting those kind of reports and he thought i was moaning. but it was true these things were happening but you could -- you can tell in a small meeting when someone was irritated and he was irritated that i was bringing these reports. but that was my job. so that wasn't a very good relationship. but some of these military that have said to your committee dfid is a very good organization and whatever doubts people might have had about the war we've got to do what we've got to do and people got to be help and they'll do everything. ...

>> they suddenly, last week, they order food. it was mad. but they did it. and they wanted to get closer to us. suddenly at the last minute. and we didn't sulk neither i or the situation was too serious. but the chaos had it's consequences. and that is a failure of the military of both militaries to take seriously their geneva convention obligations to keep order. and i think the british military should have said to blair we're not ready.

that's their duty. they fell to their duty. >> we'd like in a few moments to ask for your reflections. but before we do, to come to your own resignation. and there were two or three judgment questions i'd like to ask. i suppose the first one is your concern about the going prominence of the united states in the aftermath and the diminishing role for the united states is what brings you to the point of resigning. but you said in your resignation better, the negotiation for 1483 which defined like the relative roles of the u.n. under coalition afterwords were secret. you would have been aware that negotiations were going on the 2nd, although postinvasion u.n. resolution, wouldn't you? >> yes. but you have to remember i was leaveing the government, tony blair has me alone and persuades

me to stay, ask me to stay and macs me promise to work on bringing the international community together. normally when the u.n. resolution is being negotiated, there are lots of telegrams through each draft. suddenly, none of that. can't see what's happening. so we knew they were talking about it. >> but you are still relying on the undertaking that tony blair had given you about the role of the u.n.. >> absolutely. so we were kept out. no telegrams, no seeing what words people were working for. none of that. and suddenly we told it's been agreed. i think we still hadn't seen it when we got in the meeting. neither had anyone else. when i do -- there's a lot of -- there's a break of faith in what blair had said to me personally. and then the resolution is feeble. and it isn't enough to get that international community coming in, which was the whole point of

me staying. >> i'd like to ask about 1483 and it's content and effect in a minute. was it a breech of faith by tony blair to you. andrew turnbull in everything to us in effect said it's bush who said to the prime minister that the united u.n. would have vital role. he was -- we took false comfort from it. >> yes, i think -- but blair had said to me please stay. i had the promise. i need to help me get everybody back in. that was the thing i said. i thought we were going to get palestinian state. then -- it was the hills for a meeting. and this vital role. i think by then british didn't have much leverage because we'd given it all away basically.

what could blair do then? but he didn't talking to me. so he didn't have the leverage, didn't get what he promised, and didn't even say clare, look, i'm sorry. i've tried. this is what we can do. so hopeless. >> it's speculative, but had he done that, might you have reconsidered your decision to go? >> i don't know. i don't know. but the other thing it behavior became obviously by his behavior and the people around him it had been about not managing what was said in the i know taking and what was given. >> you've been credit the call of the content of 1483. is there an argument that it was, however, limited the role for the united nations that it conferred that it did nonetheless work to bring the international community back together. i mean those who had opposed the

invasion of france, germany, russia, and others, all came in behind 1483. >> well, i think the spirit was pretty broken and uneasy. people let that through. there was we don't want blue wash. we are not going to justify what you've done. you shouldn't have done it. it allowed the world bank and so on in. i think it was done separately. >> yeah. >> so it didn't -- people were with their bruces. but we've got to go on living like this. but, i mean in letters that did start to flow around again, the japanese prime minister, the indians, they phoned the egyptian president phoned blair. they were all saying get to u.n. afterwards and we'll all come in. that was what was being lost.

and that was on the record. that wasn't enough to bring everyone in. we needed extra troops. if we had a stronger u.n. lead, we might have got that to keep order. >> i want to ask you something you may decline to accept. but to ask you to put yourself in the position of tony blair in early may of 2003. the invasion has happened, the military side is pretty much done. there has to be a united nations security council resolution to try to build the thing back again. were the terms of 1483 since you're in tony blair's seat, where they the best he could get from the americans or you've spoken about the loss of leverage -- was it actually --

>> i wouldn't have been in his seat. i have have said first the palestinian state. let's move, let's get some progress on the ground. no hurry. transforming in the middle east, get everybody to help us. i would have done it all through the u.n.. we would have been in such position. the middle east would have been happy, the world would have been cooperating. and it would have been better. >> no, no, that was possible. that's what we should have tried for. >> i got one question on 1483, and it's implications which we pursued with other witnesses. you weren't any longer part of government at time of it's significant. but it defined the united states and the united kingdom as joint occupying powers. thereby giving the united kingdom with equal responsibility and

accountability. everybody that happened under and after 1483 across the hole of iraq not just in the southeast. was that a sensible decision? no other country followed as having occupying powers? >> it probably made blair feel important. i've read on how he couldn't do anything. it's just a very sad story. but with the important thing is -- i mean, we with usually have a u.n. special representative. and in the case of afghanistan, that led the consultations and then the lawyer and all of that. that was the big thing for me that was wrong with 1483. >> we did have -- >> by the way on that, they first refused him. the americans kept asking for sergio. in the end sergio became the u.n. human rights. but also within a weak position, normally the u.n. special representative was in a much

stronger position and the u.s. wanted coordinator and it was all pretty insulting and hopeless. but no one had any leverage left. and the americans were gunghoe at that time. >> all of that. they thought they'd done well. >> just before you leave the government. it was becoming apparent that the likely outcome, through and just after the invasion would be 1483-type u.n. resolution welcome without a u.n. lead but with a role for the u.n.. but with the u.s. lead, was this something to be planned for? as a realistic estimate of what could happen as the outcome? >> in those scenarios that i talked about much earlier, we

had military action without u.n. authority, the worst-case scenario. >> this was not the worse case. this was the next case. >> no, i'm saying that's similar. so we thought about that. but then i think we me batting right and left, we needed more resources then. and that's the treasury work. he said, that way we don't have to put money on the table is to get everybody in. if you are not going to get everybody in, you have to come up with money. but they didn't do that either. >> so insufficient or no resources able. >> therefore, all we could do is humanitarian stuff. we in the u.n. system did that well. >> i'm going to ask my colleagues whether they have any final questions. then i'll turn back to you. sir roderic? >> you say we should have allowed more time. we should have done it through the u.n.. we said earlier that the

russians and germans were prepared for the military action, but not at this time. but we've heard the argument from jack straw and tony blair, the president had said they weren't going to degree in any circumstances. the prime minister of the day, mr. blair says it wasn't that they would veto any resolution, they would veto a resolution that authorized force in the event of breach. wasn't it the case -- >> that was a lie. a deliberate lie. at that point, if you remember blair he was gray and thin and under enormous strain. at that point, john prescott went around on him together. he came in and distracted you and claimed that they said

they'd veto anything. they said, i thought they can't say that. it doesn't make any sense. there'd be no written statement or memorandum or something like france, russia, i don't think germany. or was he just a player because he was germany. he was saying we agree there might need to be military action. but not -- yes, of course later somebody send sent me the whole iraq statement which was being sent out by the french embassy. he comes clear within everything that he's not saying ever. he's saying not now. we have him asking for more time and getting some success. so that was just -- it was one of the big deceits. it was the only way to get through. you remember the americans stopped buying french fries and all of that. >> you say the full text of the

chirac's statement was being sent out. did you talk to the french about it? >> at the time, i asked my private secretary to find out what the french had really said. he got me some very brief things. shortly after i saw the french ambassador and he said if only britain and france would cooperate in the security council, we can achieve a lot. and that france was very hurt and upset by the blaming and the -- it wasn't too that they were saying never. but he'd like us to get back together. and could i get blair to bring chirac. that -- france wanted to get back to the relationship. but he was going to america. and the france ambassador said would you get him before he goes. blair wouldn't do that. he said i'll ring when i get back. >> the argument that we with

heard from jonathan powell was that at this point asking for more time what really wasn't going to make any difference at all. it was effectively clear that saddam wasn't complying. the french and russians, the french n particular had made clear they weren't going to agree to resolution authorizing military action. actually, what was the point the of seeking more time? >> that was the line at time. so they have to keep saying it. but it's not true. and blix was saying -- do you remember he said these are not ticks when he got rid of the ballistic missiles. he said, he started off believing the wmd. then he was getting to the point where they breaking up ballistic missiles, can you bring anything to test the desert. and he started to see, he was

getting some progress. they were terrified. they started briefing against blix. they were testify if id of -- terrified of blix's success. >> how much more time was need? >> there was talking about asking for 45 more days. people were saying -- do you remember jack straw said we have to deploy the troops to prevent war, we have to go now because with we can't leave them sweating in the desert. in fact, you could have rotated them and brought some home. if they done more preparation, it would have been a good thing. the point is there was no emergency. no one had attacked anyone, there wasn't any new wmd. we could have been taken more time and done it right. >> there's a real point. you have the troops out in real numbers, you can't just rotate them. you have to right kind of forces in the right military

configurations. you can't just leave them there indefinitionly. >> well, i'm sorry, but they weren't ready. they said that themselves. they weren't lady and they hadn't faced up to their geneva convention obligations. it's not just go in and bomb a few things and take over. they weren't ready for that. i don't agree. given that you deployed them, you could have had much better preparation. that would have been a good thing and got more equipment. and you can bring people home and send them out and do training. troops do that all the time. >> we've heard from other witnesses this process was just allows saddam hussein to jerk our stranges is one the expressions that'd been used. he could manipulate, conceal, spin it out, and do until the pressure had gone off? >> that isn't true. they were saying things like that. in fact, the arab world was talking more and more about taking him out the.

getting him into exile. getting more pressure on him and get him out without a war. it's just not true he was jerking any strings. the pressures were mounting. and what they agree to ballistic missiles being broken up. they were worried. >> so you seriously believe with more time we'd have gotten support or acceptance in the middle east region. we'd have had support in the region and french and others on board. >> i can't say. i don't know what would have happened. there would have been a much, much higher chance of getting all of those things. we would have been been more ready. if we tried, there would have been much more honor in what was done. there was no reason to rush whatsoever expect that the americans wanted to go. they, i believe, were scared of blix being successful. and they started to smear him. there's no doubt about it if you go back to those days and look at the media.

dreadful. >> look, just a couple of questions. first on the money again, you've mentioned resources. and you used minutes ago a figure of 60 million pounds. can you just explain where this amount came from and what it was negotiated? >> i'm speaking of memory on the amount. i think it was -- this was -- we'd been asking the treasury and blair for money if they wanted us to do more for a considerable time. and then there was a letter from paul who was their financial secretary to the treasury at the time, giving 30 million to the military for their geneva convention humanitarian obligations after they ordered the food. i think this was after -- certainly the special forces had

gotten in. so this has all started. i think 60 million for us to draw down. so we have our own contingency reserve, which we'd spent a lot of, but proving me needed, we could draw out of the 60 million. >> where did that number come from? your proposal or theirs? >> the number. i don't know. officials talk to each other a lot. 60, 30, 90, a bit under 100. i guess it was something like that. but i don't know. >> were you content with that number. did you think you would be enough for the short term? >> it's all we had. we were in a crisis. i was still hoping to reunite the international community. >> so did the treasury strategy at the time is to get world bank and others in to pick up the cost? >> yes. and the paper. there's a paper to that effect.

we must get the u.n. lead. because then we'll get the world bank and all of the other parties and contribute. it won't be a big cost. >> did you discuss this with gordon brown in the period after invasion. >> no, i think by then gordon was back, and we were blaming the french. it was all different. no more cups of coffee. it was all different. he said to me, make sure you prepare. it was media that we were preparing. and then if you leave the government, i'll have you back, things like that. >> so just in terms of where we were on the financial side, you had got a provision but it'll come rather late. and it would do so long as you were able to get the world bank here. but there would be a far greater drain on resource if you weren't able. >> you probably have the -- the

amount that america spends, i can't remember though. >> they authorized 18 million, yes. >> yes, so 60 million pounds? i mean. you know. it was nothing. there wasn't serious british strategy for no international cooperation. and that had to have money in it. he couldn't do it without resources. we asked and asked and asked and neither the prime minister nor the treasury came up with anything expect the 60 million when they did. >> another question relating to the period just before your resignation. when it was clear that orha had failed and bremer was going to be appointed did you go out -- >> no, because i knew him. he'd been in number 10 as -- and we'd worked on sierra leone

together, we'd been the liaison for the prime minister because we were in very strong position in sierra leone. no, i didn't talk to him before he went out. >> so you weren't engaged with the question of the replacement of orha. >> no, that was all being done by america. i don't think anybody bothered to talk to britain about any of it. >> lastly, in terms of general approach you are taking and issues you mentioned to palestine and the role of u.n.. now the prime minister at time had clearly spoken a lot about this issue going back to crawford and had made it a major feature of the broad foreign policy of which iraq was a part. and he reaffirmed his commitment to the issue when he spoke to us last friday. and i suppose it can be, we already put it to him and others

that there was a degree of reality about the expectations of what could be expected or -- at time. i think he said in retrospect, he probably wasn't a time when you would go to see a lot of progress because of the effects of the second to the father and obviously there was remarked. >> no, we had the road map. >> there wasn't a road map. but what was there -- was it ever that realistic at this time to expect that it would have been that straightforward to move to a palestinian state. the questions i'm asking are really about how much you could have hoped at this time even if your working relationships had been excellent with blair on the sorts of issues? >> i think tony blair sincerely wants to contribute to peace in the middle east.

he's the root -- it's the root of all of the unhappy and terrible suffering and all of the rest of it. but he doesn't seem to be capable of using the leverage that he's got in his hands. he was in the moment of massive leverage. he should have done it differently. then we would have seen. either the americans would go on their own or we might have jolten -- gotten some serious progress. very important to it. in a treaty with human rights obligations. no one revokes them. there's another peace of leverage that isn't used. it was one the countries that doesn't call for this. by the way, i think he's absolutely insire in thinking what he did in iraq was the right thing, by the way. i'm not saying he's insincere.

that's a serious question. this is back to the point about the special relationship. what is it? does britain has leverage? when we do, did he use it or not? we didn't. we didn't try. >> just lastly on the u.n. question, a verse of the same question, you've talked about the u.n. concern about blue wash that the they didn't want to get retrospective endorsement to what the coalition had done. and again we've found evidence of some reluctance in the u.n. to get themselves so involved. so was it only a case of us not pushing enough with the americans. do you think the u.n. really was ready to take on a much larger role given how difficult they knew it was going to be? >> tony blair had a conversation with kofi and he said we don't

want to run the situation in iraq. you can give the u.n. the proper run -- role, but if it's not going to run -- the whole question of sovereignty and the occupying power doesn't have a way of creating the new government, you need the u.n. to do that. that's not running it. and kofi didn't want to bless what had taken place. he used that phrase to me. but they would have taken on that proper role, but it wasn't on offer. the u.n. was very bruised. it could hear more of the rhetoric -- kofi even gave in. i know it broke his heart. he was a person friend. kofi didn't want it, sergio

didn't want it, so tony blair builds on kofi saying we don't want to run around to excuse the feeble role that was given to the u.n.. >> the office thought they did quite well -- >> i read jeremy greenstock's evidence. i do agree with the point that is were in chairman's question. but it had virtually no leverage by then. >> this inquiry has two basic task. the first is to establish from many people's different perspectives. the other of course is to identify serious lessons to be learned from the whole experience. i would invite you to give any comments you have with that in mind by way of final remarks today. >> thank you. the first lesson is for the

system in it's relationship with the department of international development. if you are in a postconflict or post major emergency you have to involve dfid in the bigger picture. we're the leader in the world bank. why freeze away from that? i know number 10 was telling them not to. i think they need to learn it deeply and everyone needs to get together earlier. the lessons for government, i think as i said the machinery of government has broken down. it's now so powerful they don't understand too much legislation to get anything true. it's not properly scrutinized and policy isn't properly thought through. i think when you add secrecy and deceit, the system becomes dangerous. i'm still shocked that britain could do what happened in iraq.

it makes me fear. we need to learn the lesson so it can't malfunction again. and that's one the jobs that your inquiry. i do hope the lessons will be learned. thirdly, i think that the role of the attorney general is completely unsafe now. i mean poor old peter goldsmith. but he was put into the house of lords. he wasn't the politician in his own right. he was a commercial lawyer. he was kind of excluded, and then let in if he said the right thing. didn't tell us the truth. i think britain should re-examine the role of attorney general. i think we would be better off with the legal advice or employ someone to say there's a different view. i think the whole role is proved to be completely unsafe. i think the attorney general didn't tell us the truth in these letters as well. but i think the role is unsafe.

i think he was in a very difficult position. and fourth thing, i think, is about the special relationship. we really need a serious debate in our country about what we mean by it. whether it's unconditional poodlelike admiration and do whatever america says or whether we have bottom lines and we sometimes agree and sometimes don't. i think we have ended up humiliating ourself and being a less good friend to america if we had stood up for an independent policy. that's a bigger question. when america asks something they all get terribly excited and love america asking us to do that. we really need to rethink that. those are my lessons. >> thank you very much. i'd like to thank our witness this morning and to thank all of you who sat here through this morning and to hear the testimony.

with that i'll close this session. and this afternoon we resume at 2 p.m. when we should be hearing from hillary benn and later on from sir peter. thank you all very much. [applause] : journal@c-span.org and

twitter. we will talk to lease up from the politico who wrote friday about a possible jobs bill that the senate. they said there would be votes in the senate on the jobs bill. what is the status? guest: that is exactly right. he said it originally last thursday on monday, clearly it will not happen. senate aides are planing -- blaming the snow. but it is not clear whether they would have had a bipartisan bill to proceed even without the snow. reaching a bipartisan consensus on anything in the senate have been pretty hard, even on a limited jobs bill like they are talking about. host: the white house said they are pivoting toward jobs.

the president said he called on jobs legislation. what are you hearing in the mix of this legislation? guest: i far more limited bill than the type they were considering before scott brown's win in massachusetts. more corporate tax breaks, tax incentives, these types of things that it extended every year like the corporate r&d tax. it might include money for the highway trust fund. it is going to include payroll tax holidays sponsored by senator schumer and senator hatch. it will be a mix of things but largely focused on taxes. host: you wrote on friday >> host: you wrote an article on political on friday there is intense pressure on leadership improving living jobs focus bill before the senate lease for the february recess. what -- where is that pressure coming from, and when do we expect to see them in their february recess?

>> guest: that's exactly right. the senate leadership, they want to move a bill before the secretary as well, but moderate democrats particularly want to see that happen. when democrats lost in massachusetts, and has really shut people up in the capital, and particularly shook of moderate democrats who are up for reelection. for people like evan bayh, blanche lincoln, they really want to move before recess. and they're supposed to go out i believe on friday but with us know we will see what happens. >> host: will spend 40 also talk about trade agreements that the president has called for, to stimulate job growth. what can you tell us about any answers in the senate side of the things for that kind of legislation? >> guest: i know that democrats, support for trade policy so that's happening in the senate as well as the focus is and the house. they are moving on these thing things,.

>> host: lisa lerer read her work at politico.com. thanks for joining us. >> guest: thanks for having me. >> twice a year the british prime minister go before the house of commons liaison committee to answer questions about issues. prime minister does not see the questions in advance and the panel is comprised of 30 select committee chairman. at just two and a half hour hearing prime minister gordon brown answered questions on the british economy. parliamentary reform, foreign affairs and his role as prime minister. >> are you ready? okay. order, order. welcome, prime minister. on this occasion we have, and as in the past you have been given advance notice of the themes. but you have been given no advance of the questions. the themes are dealing with the deficit, which will be led by

peter. the second is integrating democracy led by total right. the third is counterterrorism policy. fourth is foreign affairs, as always led by mike. and the fifth and final is on being prime minister, led by sir alan. i suggest we go -- [laughter] >> i suggest we go straight into the first theme, peter? >> i want to ask you about the annual deficit. and if there's time about the accumulating debt. i'm asking my colleagues to join on the specific aspects, consequences of that. to factual questions. as proportion of gdp the economists have identified the u.k. as only one of three significant industrial is significant industrializing economies it sizzle in the fiscal year with deficit in double digits. japan, the united kingdom, ireland and spain are requiring

the largest. do you accept that? >> i think you have to add what was said by president obama in his budget last night. i think it's right to run a large deficit. i think it's been essential for us to have the recovery that is necessary for the economy. we have managed as a result of that in face of the biggest financial crisis of what we've seen for 70, 80 years in maintaining far higher levels of and deployment that we would have been otherwise to achieve. say businesses that might have been -- >> visit to -- >> and at the same time, keep people from having homes repossessed. and it will be published in the budget and yes, it is a high level of deficit but we got defensive have extra from a low level of debt. we have influx will enough to have been able to afford the deficit. >> let's look at the deficit because it's not about the recession deficit. it is the underlying deficit.

and has nothing to do with the recession that are only advisers as it is 70%. the imf said in november that ireland, spain and the u.k. are the three countries with the worst underlying structural problem. do you agree with that points to? i don't agree with the structural problem that you detailed. the reason that we are confident that our deficit reduction plan can do with the problems that have been caused by the recession is because we entered the recession with a very low level of debt compared with other countries. you have got to go back to what the level of debt is and the underlying level of debt in our economy is lower than america, germany, france, northern japan. and entering the recession. and i just want to say, you are basing your questions on the assumption is wrong. it has been right to run a deficit, otherwise more people will be unemployed and we would make the mistakes of the 1990

1990s. >> i didn't set. i'm talking with the level of debt that is necessary, the level of that we had as were entering the recession. the level of debt was lower than other countries. it meant we are able to run a flexible enough policy with a high deficit to take us through the recession. i think history will show that in comparison with the '80s and '90s recessions, we did the right things to keep unemployment as low as possible. we did the right thing to avoid repossessions and we do the right thing to -- we ended the year with more businesses that we started the your. >> that's not about structural deficit. i will move on. time is against us. do you agree to target you set as chancellor for sustainable debt levels of 40 percent of gdp over the economic cycle has been breached spectacularly and it will reach 78 percent by 2014, not returning to your own definition of sustainability until the 2030s? >> the average g7 that will be around 100%. every country has faced as

public every country has a high level of debt as a result of the recession. every country, germany, france, america, japan, whoever you compares with them have had to deal with dealing with recession through raising the levels of debt that it is not unique to britain and any suggestion that it is is ridiculous. we entered the recession with the second lowest debt of the g-7. >> will i think that the application. just one last question before i pass onto my code. do except your announces in a system irrespective of when we began deficit reduction, there is a debate about that. irrespective of when, your universal that your plan to do so are not sufficiently clear that's causing greater concern of the disputed deep at the heart of government of what the right stretch is into you with the government? >> i think we're talking about clarity, that our position is the for your deficit reduction.

deficit reduction plan that involves major changes including a rise in the top rated tax, including also a rising national insurance to maintain our health and education services. including removing very substantial pension to actually including public expenditure, cuts that include public sector pay and rising far less than people have expected including changes in public sector pensions. also including counseling program such as the program in the health service where we have found it is not a priority for the future as well as changing so for programs. slid made substantial because we have before you plan to cut the deficit. and i believe when you look at the details of the plant they will be satisfied that we are taking the actions necessary. now i will finish by saying if we were to cut the deficit more quickly, and if we're to cut the deficit now this year, just as we're trying to get out of the recession, then the economy would suffer more jobs would be lost, more businesses would go under, more homeless would be

repossessed pixels not just the point of political controversy about the time that we should start to reduce the deficit. it's a matter jobs, homes, businesses. and those people who want to cut the deficit immediately and cut it very fast are making a mistake with the economy, which needs the level of support we have been getting it. >> almost no one in the city agrees with you. they have studied them and they don't agree with you. can i ask you, those plans are based of growth forecast are quite optimistic. but should the prudent under estimate and so you get more proceeds than you expect, what should be done with that money? reduced borrowing, lower taxes or increase spending? >> the first thing is i don't accept our growth protections are more optimistic and you're basing your whole question on that. i believe that when you see the american and owsley yesterday that they're expecting to get to 4% growth in the next two years, you are sure the world is hoping that they can create a growth at

a faster rate to get out of recession. and so i don't think it's unusual in expecting a high rate of growth next year. and this year and a year after than the year before. as far as the bounce. our bounds has always been between taxation that is fair, public services that are essential, and securing the reduction in the borrowing, that is desirable. and getting that balance right is what the judgment of every budget is about and the chancellor will in my view continued to make the right judgments about that. the premise of your question as a pessimism about the british economy that i do not share and i do not believe that the british people share either. >> is true but that is a good point. phyllis? >> prime minister, one of the ways in which public spending can be reduced or may be made more effective is through efficiency savings. local government has already been much more effective than

central government in delivering efficiencies and savings, a billion pounds a year, and they've met their target ahead of time. what are the lessons that central government can learn from local government? >> first of all, local government is a very substantial additional sum of money from central government in recent years to local government is not having to make efficiency savings in an atmosphere would have been starved for money over the last few years. very substantial sums of money as a result of the public expenditure plans, particularly for education. but secondly, we learn the lessons that the total space experiment which has been done any number of authorities for the moment is an attempt to use all local resources in one area more efficiently. so instead of looking at just a bunch of local authority, we look at what is spent by health and other government agencies in the air. and we look at whether we can look at overall greater efficiency in the resources. buildings that duplicate and could actually rationalize that. in other cases, there is an

overlap in terms of human relations or in terms of i.t. where you can consolidate. these are the things we can do at a local level and local government is leading the way of this. we are very interested in the result of the total space is provided for. >> i was interested to catch the television just less than an hour to see you talking about, prime minister, and i but now my question so every knows that i decide what to ask before you decide to do. there is no collusion. i did want to ask about total place, whether you agree with the figure in the pricewaterhousecoopers analysis that was commissioned by london councils. which suggested that if total place where carried out across the whole country, that there could be a 15% improvement, saving, on the spend on public services which they thought would help very significant in tackling the crisis. do you agree with those figures because i have been in a number

of these where we discuss how this total space project can work. and i think it's something we've got to do for something. we got to persuade all the agencies to come together. you have to persuade agencies that sometimes have worked at arms length or at quite a distance from others to work together. but then you've got to know the view of the land is being used by the public sector. you've got to know the resources and all areas. so it has a great deal of scope and i think that 50% is probably not unrealistic. but we have to look at the way the different projects that are a part of total space work, and then judge whether we can apply more widely. >> are you going to use the savings to reduce future central finding? >> we always want to fund local government very. in the last few years, it is risen more slowly than in previous periods. and we tried at the same time, to live a good to keep the

council tax down. will try all times to make sure the balance is right with the local taxpayers and the provision of national funds. >> can i turn to a different aspect of local spending, which is about capital investment in infrastructure, in particular housing. absolutely essential, particularly with relation to housing in order to avoid the stock deteriorating further. and future making cost much. are you going to be similarly hopeful to proposals that local government brings forward a new lease of funding, which would require the treasury to be a bit more forthcoming than it's been in the past? >> you know, for the good of time local authority was never in a position to build houses. it's been important -- >> i'm not talking about building houses. i'm talking about particular councils would still have very large public housing stock, which is still not in very good

where it needs to be investing in maintaining the quality of the stock. >> but i was just talking about the flexibility now available to local authorities. one of those areas is in the ability to build houses. as far as the repair and maintenance of houses, i don't think any government has done more that i think we have prepared and renovated over 2 million houses. it was our priority for the first few years. years. we are putting more money into the building a formal houses that we did before. but certain i agree with you. you cannot allow the stock of houses to fall into disrepair and it is not our intention to do so. and we've had a huge problem of investment over these last years in preparing house that spent but what i was asking whether government will be at a treasure in particular be more sympathetic, sort of new ways of councils bring and monies, and they can design their own schemes and raise their own finance, not be relied on to the scheme? >> this is an issue about the

discretion that local authorities have come at this is an issue that is important to housing associations as well. and what they do. clearly the treasury will continue to look at rules and relation to get the balance right between allowing agencies or councils to have the discretion to make their own decisions. but not allowing or allowed to be higher simply because something happens right across the local tory sector to increase at higher level. >> i am asking whether will be a change in emphasis and he will be more sympathetic? >> i'm sorry? >> given that the. >> we are prepared to look at this and look at whether we can help the authority's more effectively to deliver the best housing possible. >> thanks. >> prime minister, was on the issue of health, clearly the debate that's going around, i'm not sure whether what endorses, but they're looking at 20 billion pounds saving over the next three years in the health budget.

notwithstanding that has done quite a lot from the last five or six years, no question about that, how could we reduce that skill and protect services as you committed the governmegovernment? >> frontline services in our health care are to be protected. as part of our deficit reduction plan, we have ensured that that part of our health care is going to have real terms funding increases so that we are in a position to deliver the best health care possible. and as part of that, removing as i said in my speech earlier today, to acquaint new definition of what the public can expect to what public services. before we use to talk about aspirations and we talked about targets. now we're talking about guarantees that are individual guarantees to those who use the health service, that they have a right to expect that they will have the cooperation of the 18 was, that he was a account specialist within two weeks, then come down to one week. that they have a right to a

checkup over 40 at the same time that they have a right to see a doctor within a week or in the evenings. and a social care, a rifle urgent need social care in their homes if that is assessed as being necessary. these are the ways that we can move the health service for. where can we make efficiencies that will allow this to be even more effective? i think we announced changes in the way we are dealing the i.t. computer. and we've announced changes at the department of health is making in its central budget. but we are determined, and of course, we built hospital, we built 110 new hospital development. i think we spent 40 billion pounds of new hospitals in the last 10 years. we have built more in the health services that has been done at a time in the history. and therefore you have that cash at the investment and you cannot expect that you have the same level of capital investment in the next year or two, although it does remain i.

and that's the way we're going to be able to deliver the best health services we can directly to the individual. >> so is the target that is being, you talk to the 18 weeks, the target effectively around patient choice, will be protected during this next three years? >> i don't see a situation in which we will be anything other than able to guarantee that the maximum level of weight for hospital operation is 18 weeks. in fact, the average is below 10 weeks at the moment, but the maximum is 18 weeks. i see a situation where although you have to wait two weeks to say it council specials, and that's something that has been a big change in making people's fears less as a result of the time gap being shortened, we want to get that down to one week where you can actually get your results of a scam, and have it in your hands within a week. we think that is an essential way of removing the fear that's

why people have of cancer. and if i may say so, the two big advances in recent years in cancer treatment our first the development of screening, and then the proper diagnosis. and if someone who is suffering from breast cancer or other cancer, these are two examples, gets a screening early and gets the diagnosis early and never gets the treatment early. and the rate of survival is more than 90% as result of the work that's been done. that is a big change that's taking place in britain as a result of the new investment has been made in cancer care. >> finally, prime minister, is the front-line services talk about protecting frontline service jobs as well. can you say there's going to be some changes in employment and health to? >> there'll always be changes in the health services. there is a commission on nursing at the moment that is about to report in the next few days. i have been fascinated meeting with that commission over the

last few days. they have just been telling how the role of nursing is going to change over the next few years. and nurses are now doing operations that they are now doing surgical operations in certain cases. you've got nursing sultan's, and you've got nurses leaving the profession in so many different ways. and the skills that nurses can bring to the profession will change the nature of medicine as a whole as we move forward into this new era where prevention is going to be as important as a cure. and where a lot of energy will be put to make sure people do not contract diseases or conditions that they have in the first place, rather than seven having health services repair service for people. >> i have just attempted when you talk about prevention, that's been the easiest. for decades now, and we think that will be protected, willie? >> we have announced that one of the guarantees who want to get the people, whereas previous the you can only get a health check,

a full health check up and people had to pay for that. and therefore large number of people went without that health check and never had that. but we want to offer people that preventative health, which is a free health check. as soon as possible. so that is one of the things we want to introduce and equally, of course, the screening and the diagnostic equipment that is being advanced for prevention in relation to disease like cancer. >> thanks that. >> prime minister, i suspect this is the last time we will meet in this warm,. >> may be for you. [laughter] >> well, we never know. your support both as chancellochancellor and indeed as prime minister for our science base, we put that on the record. but when we look out and protecting over the next decade, the u.s. arguably had a larger

deficit than the u.k. had. and yet, president obama made as a cornerstone of the u.s. economic stimulus package and investment in fundamental science, put in some 21 billion u.s. dollars in two fundamental science. was he right? and if so, why didn't you fall to? >> will, what america has not been is what we've done over the past in his which is to double the size of what you. america's try to catch up in a way that we have been investing consistently insights over these last few years. i just look at the -- we are now one of the world leaders in space satellites and we are winning all the contracts, or our country is winning a very large proportion of the contracts. as you know in biotechnology, we are leading the world and so may different areas of that size. and you go right to these areas of pure science and applied to it and it is the result and scientist will tell you not just of individual genius, but of the investment that has been made

over the last 10 years at a historically high levels in the science base of our country. >> i think, prime minister, you're making the case that if i take you back to just a year ago when you gave the lecture at oxford. you said the downturn is no time to slow down our investment insights. but to go more vigorously for the future. so we will not allow science to become a victim of the recession. those were your exact words. is that still your view, in the pre-budget report you slashed 600 million pounds from science funding and from higher education? >> first of all, we have cut size than going through the recession. there are no cuts to a place at the moment in science spending because we have put the money in. as for the future, this is a debate about the efficiency of the universities, and of course our sites and other research institutes. we believe like it other areas there are things that can be made without affecting the quality of the work that has been done. but i do think speed is you can

reduce size of funding? >> hold on. i said that during the recession which is now over, during the recession we had been taking level of science in the. in the recovery we have already set aside considerable sums of money for science and technology projects. i think technology strategy board announced 220 projects only a few weeks ago. equally on science we are making huge progress in some of these key areas that we're doing what. >> your secretary of state announced it will be a standstill in terms of research funding for science. that is not, sort of investment you're talking about a year ago. are we stopped investing from this point onward to? >> i do admire the persistence and would you put the case for for universities and sides, but research activity has doubled since 1997. and the issue -- >> i say congratulations. >> the issue is, what we will do