see what the modern world looks like, horrible beyond description and you just look at the casualties and the world wars and of is now 65 years without an world war and i believe there is a formula and a process for preventing same in the future. ..

about 250 questions about structure and operations and how we actually get to the end goal in terms of how we implement these programs. there's about 250 serious questions to answer and we got them all wrong and i've always been divided in the context when people are willing to admit their shortsightedness or failing but let me just suggest in the end result they've been successful programs so they must have gotten some mixture of the questions answered right, and

with that, vice admiral. >> thank you ferc. i would also like to thank and to become ed for was in this conference. he's devoted his life to keep america informed about nuclear weapons. we've been in a nuclear weapon three is in this country for the 20 years since the cold war ended. while we've been asleep, five interacting challenges have arisen and mushroomed. today, in combination, these five put our nation at a grave

risk. increasing nuclear weapons threats, lack of a nuclear deterrent strategy, deteriorated nuclear weapons capabilities failure of nuclear non-proliferation and misguided nuclear weapons goals. i will spend a couple of minutes on each of these five challenges and then summarize what we should do about them. first, the increasing nuclear weapons threats. these have grown steadily over the past 20 years but because they are so different from the global thermonuclear threat of the cold war, they've gone

virtually unnoticed. if you examples, russia must increase its nuclear weapons capability because that's the only basis for their being considered a superpower. they are reemphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons and military conflicts. they've preserved thousands of technical nuclear weapons and matched by the u.s. or our allies. they have a robust active industrial base for producing nuclear weapons which we do not and for two decades the have been designing and producing

advanced low yield nuclear weapons which we've been prohibited from doing. china opposes an entirely different type of nuclear threat. it has embarked upon a huge strategic modernization program including greater numbers of advanced high-yield strategic missiles which can reach the u.s.. they also are developing nuclear anti-ship missiles against our navy in a taiwan confrontation. pakistan is increasing its nuclear weapons now about 100 improving. its political situation, as you

all know, is so unstable but some of these could fall into the hands of islamic fundamentalists. north korea and iran, robust dates, or on the verge of producing nuclear weapons and are well capable of using them or selling them or giving them to the proxy organizations for use. a terrorist organizations of many types are working ceaselessly to require nuclear weapons, and many of these are specifically targeting the u.s.. in some common nuclear weapons exist and they are not going away, ever. there are tens of thousands of them in the world today. the knowledge of how to build them is available everywhere. stocks of this material are

increasing worldwide. never has america faced such deferred and increasing debt the threats. the second challenge we face is our lack of a nuclear deterrent strategy. deterrence, as paul said, is based upon this year to become fear. we've heard the behavior of an adversary by threatening at. during the cold war we prevented the soviet launch of nuclear weapons against us by threatening to destroy the u.s.s.r.. it worked flawlessly for almost half a century our strategy was so successful that despite countless crises and many hot wars, not a single nuclear

weapon was detonated anywhere. our powerful nuclear deterrence in those years was also a major factor in ending the soviet union and defeating communism without violence. fast forward to today. nuclear deterrence, our strongest foreign policy tool, is nowhere to be found. what happened? it was a combination of many things. we didn't identify the threats correctly. we didn't make the tough intellectual effort to totally recast our nuclear deterrent strategy. we didn't educate the american people about deterrence. we were reluctant to threaten adversaries. we didn't design, test and

produce relevant new nuclear weapons and so forth. as a result, we've lost both of the will and the capability to deter our most threatening adversaries. it will take years to rebuild an effective nuclear deterrence strategy. and regrettably most of our leaders showed little interest in it. the third challenge is our deteriorated nuclear weapons capability and it's hard to know where to begin in describing our collapse. our nuclear weapons stockpile is seriously over aged and in questionable condition. it's also virtually irrelevant because it's composed of massive retaliation weapons designed for the cold war map to the co.

we haven't decided nuclear weapons since the 1980's. we haven't built one since the early 1990's. most significantly, we haven't tested one in 18 years. our brain drain is near total. you can count on the one hand our scientists and engineers who have designed and tested a nuclear weapon. in a very few years it will all be gone. without testing, their replacements have been inadequately trained. and for almost two decades, these replacements have been prohibited from doing research on advanced nuclear weapons. much of our vital nuclear weapons infrastructure, labs, a

test facility production plants is antique and deteriorated. our only facility for manufacturing hits, the trigger that is part of a nuclear weapon was shut down 21 years ago and we haven't started a replacement facility, which will take some 15 years to build. the department of defense has disassembled a large proportion of its nuclear weapons capability at accorded scant attention to much of the rest. nuclear weapons organizations have been closed or degraded. our cadre of the dod nuclear specialists is reduced in numbers and experience.

exercise, nuclear exercises are rare. replacement of our nuclear delivery systems is seriously lagging. the dod facilities and programs for testing the survivability of u.s. weapons systems against the effects of nuclear weapons are greatly degraded. most of these result directly or indirectly from absence of nuclear testing and most of them cannot be really restricted with a resumption testing. the fourth challenge and one of the worst is the failure of nuclear non-proliferation. the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat like no

other as paul comments in the results of a nuclear detonation. this threat of nonproliferation must be prevented using military force if necessary. yet for two decades neither the international community nor the u.s. has had the gumption to stop north korea and iran from developing nuclear weapons production capability. shades of 1938. as a result we are about to see cascades of proliferation and asia and the mideast leading to a proliferating world of nuclear horror and chaos for which there will not be any return.

the nonproliferation treaty cornerstone of the world's nonproliferation effort was supposed to prevent this. it established a two-tiered system for nuclear weapons. five nations the permanent members of the u.n. security council are approved nuclear weapon states or the other 184 signatories of the treaty have committed themselves to remain without nuclear weapons. these two tiers are essentials. they are the heart of the npt. nonproliferation requires enforcement, and grave those words in a stone. and this can only be done by one or more large responsible

states. ideally the five nuclear weapon states acting collegial the would bear this responsibility and the world may devolve to this. today however the u.s. must shoulder the burden of enforcement leadership. the moment north korea or iran news stopped by force a whole new world will reemerge. a proliferation will cease and non-proliferation will become a vibrant attainable reality worldwide. the fifth challenge is our misguided nuclear weapons goals. the prospect i just mentioned of nuclear proliferation which is upon us has so frightened

national and international leaders the they've conjured up an impossible to vision world without nuclear weapons. such a world as neither attainable nor desirable. as far as attain ability, no one can describe how to get their or how to remain there when nuclear weapons technology is widely known or how to verify the absence of nuclear weapons and other nations. as far as desirability, without strong nuclear capable states to maintain order we would exist in a world of frequent nuclear detonations by aggressors, rogue states, failed and failing states, fanatics, proxies',

terrorists, extortionists, criminals, even this affected individuals. despite these clear realities or president has established a world without nuclear weapons as a national goal and has directed immediate nuclear disarmament actions and the hope of stimulating others to follow. three of these options would be immensely damaging to our ability to regain its nuclear deterrent. ratification of the comprehensive test ban, denial of nuclear weapons modernization and major reductions in the stockpile. so the challenge we face now is how to create one recovery program which meets the five

interlocking challenges. first, don't make things worse. a job the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. it's highly unwise for any president to establish a national goal no one knows how to read and it's even worse to start taking drastic actions to needed to meet. second as i mentioned before history has shown non-proliferation requires enforcement and is simply must be done. the u.s. must take the lead and stop north korea and iran's nuclear programs by military force if necessary. third, reestablish nuclear deterrence as a powerful foreign policy and national-security tool.

the matter of interest this nuclear deterrent is new, the strategy would also deter biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. fourth, rebuild the weapons capability. terminate our unilateral test moratorium and cummins modernizing the stockpile. we knew relevant weapons to detour the vastly changing threats we face. and finally in a proliferation free world and only eight states possessing nuclear weapons leader of the world into responsible multilateral nuclear arms control, reduce arsenals progressively maintaining

stability all important and ensuring the five nuclear weapon states always have the nuclear weapons capability needed to maintain order. in conclusion we truly face a national crisis over nuclear weapons. and our current approach is perilously misguided and unrealistic. our new near-term objective of devaluing nuclear weapons is totally ill-conceived. nuclear weapons are the greatest force for peace ever known and we should emphasize their value. our new long term objective of attempting to make nuclear

weapons go away is also unattainable. they will be with us forever. our best course by far is to build upon the two-tier system so wisely established by the nonproliferation treaty. restrict possession of nuclear weapons to a small number of large responsible states. charged these states with the responsibility of enforcing nonproliferation by force if necessary. an implicit role they've had from the beginning which they failed to carry out these five nuclear weapons states. finally require these nuclear weapon states to improve and test their weapons regularly to increase deterrent capabilities

as threats eve of. thank you. [applause] >> any questions from the audience? [inaudible] >> stephen young with new conservative scientists. just one question for you in terms of say you were given all of your wishes to we have an active and growing program, we had a new type of weapon. you're whole wish list was granted starting it never went away, we headed through the entire last 20 years as well. what would have changed in the world? would 9/11 not have happened, what china might be a growing

power? how would a nuclear deterrent help? how would it have changed if we had this whole period? >> i must apologize to didn't quite get -- >> i will try slowly. the question is if we granted you your entire wish list for a strong nuclear deterrent, what foreign policy outcome of the last 20 years or have gone forward with change, but 9/11 not have happened? what iran modeled nuclear weapons? with north korea not test nuclear weapons? >> got it. thank you. my hearing is the best. we would be in a different world today as regards proliferation. it would have been simple and easy to stop both north korea and iran years and years may be a decade ago once the

determination became clear instead of the endless negotiation and the feet as we have our diplomatic sanctions and efforts. if that happened, if these states had been stopped dead cold using military force of necessary, certainly using the threat of military force to we have preparations to make it clear in making positive statements like if you don't dismantle your nuclear weapons capability we will dismantle it for you. if that had been done neither of those states would have nuclear weapons today. if that had occurred, if the clear example that the united

states for several states or maybe an even larger history doesn't disclose its alternatives but possibly the five u.n. pt nuclear weapon approved states. what that action a clear example? nuclear proliferation by nations like syria and others just wouldn't have occurred and we would be in the process of reducing the number of states with nuclear weapons and there are several ways that could be done and scaling back a nuclear arsenals on an even much greater rate than is happening today.

only hours is going down to read all the other nuclear weapon states in the world are going up in their weapons so yes, the world would be totally different. and no, it isn't going to solve our economic crises but it's going to keep us safe from threats of nuclear weapons, which today are increasing pace. >> we will now proceed with the next two speakers and probably we should go without questions between them so we can keep on time. if you have questions specific to georgia or darryl keep them for the end of the q&a. now we will turn to george, the director of studies of the carnegie endowment for international peace and for those of you don't know i'm sure there are not very few of the audience, he's written the paper

that he and james wrote on abolishing nuclear weapons as well and in their response there are two from about 13 international scholars on the issue which he and james edited so with that let me turn it over >> thanks. i'm not going to talk about what i was preparing to talk about and i think there'll talked about the agenda going forward, and i was going to talk about the basis and what is meant i think when president obama and others talk about a long-term ambition or desire to work towards a world without nuclear weapons. i think the discussion that we have had the last hour or so was so fascinating that abstract and theological i would like to at least try to talk about the world i experienced when i

travel around it and the relevance and nuclear weapons in that world and the problems that we face which i think are very significant and in no case does it occur to me or any policy maker that the problem we face in the world is we are too close to zero nuclear weapons and therefore all of the issues genuinely difficult issues about zero are interfering with our capacity to achieve our objectives, to make the world secure, to maintain deterrence. in other words zero x so far away whether you think it is desirable or not that to spend a lot of time now talking about it as a real impediment to anything seems to me in san and not to correspond with what real people are having to deal with so i want to talk about kind of the current horizon negative use --

issues to be with. one of them taking seriously the goal of zero as all u.s. presidents have but most emphatically president reagan and president obama. one of the reasons actually was eliminated in a way maybe unintentionally by paul robinson when he talked about the basis of the word detour which is tehran's to the qtr rise in much of the world sees these weapons, whoever possesses them as weapons of terror, mass terror and they are not comfortable with it and that's one of the insights behind the policy of other states as well as ours is look it's a little hard to sustain public support for this including countries we need to work with us if these weapons continue to terrify people. one of the virtues as the detour in the process. but the good guys we think are the good guys may not be