afghanistan and british foreign commonwealth office. this is two hours. >> can i ask members of public place to move quickly and switch off your mobile phones or put them on silent.

[inaudible conversations] i think we will begin. first, secretary, thank you for coming today. this is a last chance i think as this parliament to have to be for us and we par please defund the time. we know you are busy about afghanistan and pakistan. karen pierce, you've been well known to the members of the committee from various rolls over a number of years. we should congratulate you on your new role. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> can i begin, foreign secretary, buy taking you to the conclusions and the outcome of the conference in london about afghanistan? what is your assessment of the outcome of the conference? >> thank you for your welcome and i look forward to many more sessions of the next parliament.

i am disappointed that mr. menzies finds that such an amusing fault. >> i am an admirer of optimism. >> i think there are two ways about thinking of the outcome of the london conference. one is the set of the deliverable that were enunciated in the conference communique in the three areas of security, governance and regional cooperation, and we can maybe go through the highlights and the weaknesses of those sets of deliverable. but i think they were substantive whether in the the new security commitments, the imf role, and we can talk of health but there is also i think something else, slightly less tangible but in a way more important and that is i think that the 70 foreign ministers went away from the london

conference confident that there was not just a clear military strategy but common on just a clear better civilian strategy but together they were both directed to words political settlement in afghanistan which after all is the only way in which this war can be brought to a close, and i think that sense of clarity and confidence about the overall strategy is very important because this is a war that has taken a great toll in our country but also the other countries of the collision as well as in afghanistan. the prime minister had to read out the krin ministers questions today and still begin seven further british soldiers who've lost their lives, and i think that the 74 ministers who came to the conference three months before its wondered whether the two disparate efforts of the military and civilian sites of

the coalition, never mind with the afghans, could produce a coherent game plan for 2010 and they went away believing that there was one. that is not the same as then be leaving that there are no obstacles or risks to be implementation of that plan. but i do believe it's important and honest to reflect that people felt this was the best shot and had integrity and coherence that's very important. >> could i ask you, we are coming to certain particular aspects if the situation in afghanistan. you have used the word to the durham -- deliverable. is the reality you expect these things to be delivered or are they aspirations of the kind of outcome that we might have had for the last eight years which have clearly not been delivered in many ways? >> well, some of them are within our own control, the decision of

the imf to take one example. others require decision making by the afghan government, and so they are less within control. all of them have an aspect desperation about them, but some of them are easier to fulfill than others or can be more directly fulfilled by the international coalition. and some of them will take longer to measure in their defects affects. >> how are we going to measure what has happened? how is the delivery of all of these commitments the way to be measured? >> it's not difficult in some areas. in respect to the afghan national army or the afghan national police there are quite detailed commitments about the buildup so we can measure that and look at retention ratios and the ethnic makeup of the afghan national army and we can look at the quality of the training. that is not terribly difficult to measure. when it comes to corruption to take another example, we know that 95% of the afghan people

believe that local governments and police has an aspect of corruption from the bbc poll, and so you can measure the output in terms of the consideration of the afghan people and you can also look at some of the more notorious cases and how they are dealt with and the new minister for country of car -- counternarcotics. there are different ways of measuring different of the quote on quote deliver rebels or commitments in the communique. >> may i add something to that, in kabul itself the ulin is joining the matrix of who committed what and what actually is needed to be taken. we will use the joint monitoring board of kabul to try to push those commitments for word and track progress on each of them both international and afghan commitments so that will give something that we can use day today to measure and in a couple conference itself when it takes place we hope we will be able to capture in that communique but

what has been achieved and what more needs to be done. >> who is in charge of that? is that mark's role or the u.s. representative? >> it will be primarily the u.n. special representative who is staffan di mistua. >> the london meeting also said there was going to be a followup conference and kabul collis when is that going to be? >> replete spring, early summer, so april or may. >> is that still under discussion or do you know when it will be? >> it is more than discussion. it is going to happen. the date has not been fixed. the afghan government are working hard to place the machinery on their own side to take it forward. [inaudible conversations] >> but it will definitely be happening in the first half of this year? >> yes. >> ok.

thank you. >> is there a matrix for president karzai? >> the matrix for any elected politician is from the people who elected him or her. he has a five-year term, and the primary accountability for him as to his own people. in respect of the commitments that we have made to him and he has made to us, our own delivery of them obviously depends on his own decisions, so for example with respect of the development aid through certain developments of state depends on the confidence we have that the aid will reach its desired targets. >> and that depends upon the confidence you have in him. >> no, it depends more on the confidence we have in the people who we appoint to run the departments. >> welcome if he appoints the people to run the departments, then ultimately you have to have confidence that he will appoint people who do the work properly. >> president karzai is not on

trial for us -- >> not even today, after he appears to have taken over the electoral commission? >> she is not on trial for us. he is accountable as any elected representative to his own people, and he has also made commitments to us that we want to see followed through. where those commitments are not followed through, it will have consequences for the sort of cooperation we will have. and i give you the extent of development in that respect. in respect of the electoral complaints commission, because the body that you are referring to, he said he's going to make five appointments. we will obviously be extremely concerned to see the names of the people who are nominated because the ec's set ablaze a check on the independent electronic commission, the itc. and the ec's he played a very important role in exposing some of the fraud that took place in the presidential election with parliamentary elections planned for this september it's very important indeed that that check

continues to be to exercise and have influence. estimate isn't their independence of that commission will be compromised? >> well, i think that the ecc international nominees played a really important role in the expos' eighth investigation into the presidential elections last august led by the canadian who did a very significant job. i think they showed their worth. now, these five nominees are going to be nominated by president karzai. we have to see who he appoints because that will be an important indication and independence that might exist or not. >> the reason why concentrate on this is -- the reason i'm concentrating on this is this is the exchange's we had the prime minister's questions about the

response of willie those of us have supported the deployment to lay out the case to the british people for the continuing involvement. confidence in president karzai is central to that is it not? >> i think that it is very important that we are able to have afghan partners led by the president who are able to deliver on the commitments that they have made. i think one mistake or error may be too hard a way of putting it but one danger is that we forget although afghanistan as a presidential system it also has a critical role for its cabinet in also local level for a series of sometimes elected sometimes nominated politicians and although it's true all roads lead to the presidential palace in a presidential system is also the case that the decision

making by cabinet members and decision making locally is and always -- does have independence about it and i think that we should support very strongly presidents karzai not just his wish but his intentions@@@@ rbr)

deliveries would be assessed at the conference. can you tell me how far advanced the planning is and who is actually doing the planning for that conference? >> it's being led by the afghans as i said to the chair and the date hasn't been fixed and i think late spring or early summer would be a good time as it would allow dee dee to allow sufficient space to relax from the london conference to allow don progress for being so shortly after the london conference to make as one by the afghans. they are making arrangements not just in the foreign ministry but across the government. they are establishing teams and focus. that is what you would expect and that is a good thing. >> are we giving assistance from

the office? >> we are but it is an afghan conference. it's not a foreign office conference. >> how would you assess the success of operation iraq and would it be fair to say that it's on the even that american forces was reported last week met resistance in the south, british forces and quieter areas it has been patchy. >> i think it has been uneven in the assistance that has been met. i don't think it will be right to say it's been on even in success, it's been a relatively even in this success in its preliminary stage. it's important that we emphasize that this is an operation which is a couple of weeks old and it is far too early to start talking about quote on quote success. i think we've seen the first phases of operation in part of the homeland province that have been out with the control of the government for quite a long time

and represent what i would call the nerve center of not just the insurgency in helmand but also the drugs trade and very significant vested interest. >> one of the benchmarks of the operation being how good the afghan forces or when they are no longer side-by-side and the americans that when we withdraw one of the benchmarks will be will the stand for because i hope in some questions about how the afghan army and the afghan police. >> yes. that is a very important point. i don't think it is a by a very situation either we are there or not there where we want to transition to a greater and greater afghan responsibility and eventually of concern to the leadership district by district. that doesn't mean there will of the forces will be sort of switched off in the next couple of days or weeks.

it is a rather more phased approach than that. islamic the usual aspects of the operation was the advance notice given to the civilian population so they could withdraw away from the fighting. has there been a huge problem with displaced persons? there has been some reports thousands of people turning up in cities. have you gotten the scale of displaced persons, and have we -- have our allies gotten a plan in place how we can assist them to return and help them on a daily basis before they can return? >> i think it's very important that we do recognize the advanced signaling that was done but it was less to say the civilian population get out or mind your heads. it was more to say to the insurgents afghan coalition forces were coming and this was not intended to be a surprise raid. it was intended as a very clearly choreographed

politically led operation and which afghan forces supported by the international community was established governments in order. when i was in afghanistan in november and in january, in advance of the london conference, i talked to governor mangal, the governor of helmand, about this. nicoe politically lead, it was publicly led by him. because he was saying to the people of marah there are benefits for you and your families in terms of security services and employment that will come in the week of the military operation being planned. and that was an important part of the drive to make sure the local population rather than resisting the operation and siding with the insurgency or the former drug lords, actually supported the operation to read it was also intended to send a

very clear signal to the intent of the insurgency. the fact that the fighting has been relatively restricted speaks to that. the same is true in relation to civilian casualties. i have in my head the figure of 3,000 people who were on the move. i have just been handed a note that 1,900 families have left marah, so it would be in the single digit thousands. i think that would be the direct answer to your question. >> that is very helpful. the last point i wanted to raise about the practical difficulties of fighting insurgents. they are not a on uniform army, they will not engage in a frontal combat with ever forces or the coalition forces and they can slip away into the population. there have been some reports that insurgents have been using the local civilians as human shields. has that been a major problem for the coalition forces? >> i haven't gotten confirmation

of that; i have seen the reports, but i haven't gotten confirmation. >> as you know, the committee visited the united states in october of last year. in the course of our visit, it was represented to us -- i use that form of words deliberately -- that some middle-ranking and senior u.s. military officers were unhappy with of the contribution that were being made by the united kingdom forces and helmand. have any such sentiments been represented to you at the ministerial level, or two colleagues the official level in the foreign office? >> no, in fact quite the opposite. i think that the over the last nine months, as the american presence in the south in general and and helmand in particular has built up, that there has been a rising tide of fabrication of the work the british forces have been doing with the estonians and the danes

over the last three years curious why would emphatically say the opposite to the sort of whispering that you suggest. >> as part of these representations, it was suggested to us that united kingdom military input might either be excluded or perhaps marginalized. have you seen any evidence of that? >> not at all. one of the points the government has been making for a long time is that this is a coalition effort. it is a coalition effort in terms of men and women, it is a coalition effort in terms of equipment. that is an important part of the story. i think that is right that we recognize that, for some time, the degree of integration across drc south has been something that we have tried to explain to people. it is not that the britain owns part of the afghanistan. we are part of a coalition effort across the south, supporting the afghan government. we have also got troops in kabul, and relatively small number. i testified in front of the senate committee on foreign

relations, your sister organization in washington. senator kerry, the chairman of the committee, and a number of other senators went out of their way to see that on the basis of the visits that they had paid to afghanistan, including to the south, they wanted to send a very clear message about the admiration and respect the americans and american politicians felt not just for the british military effort, although particularly for that, but for the british diplomatic a and a work that was coming on. it is important to emphasize that from everything i hear, americans and of other countries know that this is a very difficult mission. it requires immense skill, as well as bravery and intelligence, and it is one of where all the other countries are as proud to be working alongside us as well as we are to be working with them. >> do i take it that these general observations that you have made apply in particular to the conduct operation moshtarak?

>> i don't think in particular -- fabian are they exemplified by the operation? >> yes, i think it's better to say that all the lessons of eight years in afghanistan have been put in a the planning and in the execution of operation moshtarak. having made six visits to afghanistan in the last three years, there is no question in my mind. general mcchrystal has introduced a modest new tempo in the military operations there, which she has, but a philosophy. the philosophy of protecting the population rather than securing ground-measuring your success by the number of taliban hukill but by the amount of the population protect is having far-reaching and quite radical effects of the way that operations are conducted. the accident but a great pope gave, of the advanced signaling of operation moshtarak, is every

counter intuitive but nonetheless interesting example of that. >> the committee might be interested to know that afghan national forces have done particularly well in moshtarak, which is one of the first times that they have been deployed in significant numbers. i know that general mcchrystal has been very pleased, as have afghan commanders with the way that that has gone. >> i should perhaps say that when these representations were made, the committees was lowest in this response -- robust in its response. >> i should point out that was the only time that that was set on the trip. everyone else was full of praise for the british contribution. >> although we do not disagree with the last comments, issues were put to us. one of them was that during the mcchrystal review, questions were asked about our campaign and helmand and the political wisdom of undertaking it. was that ever reflected to the british government? >> the challenge of the south

were a very important part of the mcchrystal review. it was leaked to the newspapers in full, so you can see that the review places a lot of emphasis on the south and east. in that sense, the challenges of helmand were very strong. i always talk about the south rather than just helmand province because the significance of, and relates to the strategic position of kandahar, and i think it's important to see the to develop. >> you just emphasized the importance of the south, foreign secretary, and the need for an early transition to the afghan army. one of the practical problems is that less than 5% of the afghan national army is pashtu and putative is that a real difficulty? >> to be absolutely accurate, it's correct to say that a small percentage, about 5%, is pashtuns from the south. of course, there are the costumes and other parts of the country.

>> true, but doesn't that make the point? you are fighting in the south, but you haven't galt anyone from that part of the world. >> precision is important to this because the tribal structure of the afghanistan is one of those things that distinguish it from iraq, which is often put into the same paragraph. there is a particular issue about negative tunes from the south and they are representative in the ana. that itself is an important issue given the singular national structure of the often forces. i think that recruitment across the communities of afghanistan is an important feature of the challenge faced by general wardak and general caldwell, the training start in isaf.

just one other thing, we didn't give the impression that the transition in the south will be one of the early ones. i don't think anyone has suggested that. partly because of the problems that exist. >> doesn't this mean it will be a long time? never mind the 5% or 10%; whenever it is, low figure of the pashtu people in the army. is it going to be a long time before we get them at acceptable levels? >> before the ana can get to an acceptable level. of the ana is not a locally based army in the way that is not built up in the way that the british army is of the welsh guards and the anglian regiment. it is a national army. but i think it is an important point that the lead responsibility for the afghan army will be enhanced in its effectiveness if there are local people able to be a part of it. that is why i say that general wardak and -- >> my point is that it will take

a long time building from where we are. >> it depends on what you mean by a long time. president karzai said in his inauguration speech that he wants to have afghanistan security leadership in the majority of the provinces within three years and across the whole country within five. it depends whether you think that five years as a short time or a long time to die with my meeting from general caldwell ia >> i remember sitting through his inauguration speech, and he talked about security of leadership within three years in the majority of the country and five years across the whole country. you are right to say that afghan

security leadership doesn't mean the end of a collision military rule. however, if you remember from the iraq experience, there was a distinction between the front line combat and overwatch. i don't want to use -- exactly those terms, but i think that the afghan security leadership implies eight very different role for the coalition troops, certainly a much reduced combat role. it would speak to a different role for the collision within the three to five-year period, although not to end with that period. >> it does show how difficult it is to have any sort of limit, as president obama has found, for cybill, when talking about drawing down in 2011, when we are facing all of these in ponder -- imponderables. >> welcome to be fair, that is not quite right. i mean, but president obama said is that from july, 2011, it will be the start of a reduction in

american trip levels. they will have 100,000 troops there by the end of this year, and what he was pointing to was that from july, 2011, the balance of international troops in afghanistan troops will change. general jones, the president's national security adviser, talked about a ramp, not cliff edge, to the american presence there. but we do -- we do want to reduce and eventually remove the international troup component, and we have always said that. the will of the training mission is absolutely key, the role of security transition is absolutely key, and the urgency that has been injected by that date that president obama has given is an important factor. however, i don't think that it is right to give the impression that that is a cliff edge or a date when american troops suddenly disappear, because that will not -- to have a 100,000 of them there. >> just my point was is it great to take quite a long time side from where we are. but the other element, which we

went into in depth what we were in helmand, was the state of the police, which is of course, even worse than the army. they've got real problems with corruption, illiteracy, drug taking and so on. we felt that the general opinion was that the police were in far worse stake in the army command the army were not in such a pretty state, as we just indicated. so that means, again, the transition has to be anything sustainable is going to be very long process to get >> as the foreign affairs committee, met with the defense committee interviewed john and i we talked precisely about this issue and of the fact that the police are far less strong institutions with the army and the three problems that you identified on a completely recognize. mr. fmr, the interior minister has one of the toughest jobs in international politics and trying to reform to improve the afghan police.

but all i would like to just step back for a minute because the time lines that you're talking about critically depends on what kind of political settlement is made. the presumption, or assumption, underpinnings of the questions posed in the last five minutes has been that you've got this fixed level of insurgency and a lot of international troops and some afghan troops, and that we are going to build up afghan troops and they will take over from the international troops in fighting the same kind of insurgency that we've got. the essentials development that that london conference represented is that military and civil effort are designed to sponsor a different kind of political settlement. the signal importance of the reintegration and reconciliation agenda is precisely to weaken the insurgency so that it is containable by an afghan force, rather than by an international force of the current level. so, my answer to the "how long will it take" question in part relates to the training and recruitment and other issues, but the critical independent

variable is that the commitment and strength of the insurgency. the political attempt to divide and denude it, and to integrate it into the afghan political system, is absolutely key. the loya jirga that president karzai has said he wants to will, and the need to make sure that the north as part of the political settlement, not just the taliban insurgency in the south and east, are absolutely key. i am duty bound to say that that is the variable that has the greatest potential to shape and reshape the military operations in afghanistan. what is interesting is that the military and the first to see this. if you talk to general mcchrystal and think about the moshtarak operation, but psychological element of the impending presence of the force, then the presence of the force, and then the deployment of the

force, is absolutely key to what happens. we can't keep on saying that there is no military solution and pretend that we are looking for a military solution. if there is no military solution, which i believe there is and, but the military are part of the solution, we have to define and develop with a political solution is. i believe that there is a political settlement in which all those who are willing to live within the afghan constitution and separate from al qaeda are going to be part of the afghan political system. it will be a tribal political system, and there will be not political parties in the way we have them, although there will be political movements and political blocs. that is the ki, because it denudes and underlines the insurgency and integrates the significant parts of the insurgency that are not ideologically committed to the al qaeda. it will make it into an insurgency that is containable by afghans. >> to my bring us back to the london conference for a moment? foreign secretary, at that

conference nato allies pledged to do a lot more to support the coalition. my concern is whether the pledge is enough. are you confident that the burden is being shared equally or will be shared equally comic and the pledges that have been made? >> the pledges were good from bulgaria to germany to turkey. >> will be delivered? >> i think they will. they will deliver the numbers that they've promised: one hundred from bulgaria, two injured 40 from columbia, 40 from the czechs, 75 from finland and 500 from germany. they are numbers. but they do mean that britain will no longer be the second largest troop contributor? no. do they mean that britain and america together will account for a large percentage of the total trucks? that will remain the case. to the government's remain strong in their pursuit of the greater burden sharing?

yes. >> is very realistic prospect that countries such as russia, china, india and some of the central elysian republics will offer significant support to the nato and its allies in afghanistan? >> to take russia as an example, it will offer significant support, but for obvious reasons, russian troops will not deploy into afghanistan. >> what about indian troops? >> i think that is unlikely, and for various reasons it is not something that we are arguing for. the third plank of the london conference conclusions related to the regional equation, including the regional support or otherwise for independence, sovereignty and stability in afghanistan. i do not think that regional powers or partners deploying troops into the afghanistan would be conductive to the sort of regional stability or confidence that is necessary. >> see you think the burden from the same time to come will fall

disproportionately on the united states and great britain? too the burden will fall disproportionately on the west, although it is important to recognize the contribution of the countries such as australia, which is not a nato member, but nevertheless has 1,500 troops in danger in afghanistan, certainly america will buy manyfold be the largest contributor. remember that we are the second largest contributor with 10,000 troops and the americans are talking about having 100,000 troops there, so you can see the order of magnitude. >> could buy at two specific examples without changing the assessment the foreign secretary gave? india is a very large private sector investor in afghanistan, as is the aga khan. that is an important part of

development. the russians have been very helpful in providing transit facilities. rather recently, they have expanded the they have said in the nato-russian permanent joint council that they would like to work with isaf to do more on the counternarcotics. those are important areas. they do not replace troup contributions, the facility and enabling background that we need. >> it's also worth saying i have been helpful leave reminded the the 36% of the isaf troops are from the e.u. countries, that is 31,000 troops, which is not negligible. >> it was interesting that when mr. horam, gisela stuart and i went down to helmand we met an

estonian officers -- the estonians are doing a fantastic job and helmand -- who had been there with the soviet forces all that time ago. that was an interesting link. john will remember meeting him. he was a remarkable man. on the contributions of other countries, they're have been criticisms by this and other committees of putting troops on the ground; it's making sure those troops actually contributed don't have caveat and restrictions. the expression was given to us by some senior people down there that there are "plant pot nation's." you just move them around, just a forces around because they don't actually do the job. if countries are going to contribute, if they are going to say that they will put troops on the ground, they have to actually be there available to do the role they are supposed to do. and the caveat that have existed by some nations have actually been the end pediment to

activities by us and the americans and others and if we are going to have the troops there, they are going to be there and we'd be willing to do the job. >> that is a good point. no country likes to put its young men and women into danger. so there are temptations, no doubt, in some countries for them to deploy troops in areas where there is less dangerous. even where they are developed. if every country did that, we would not be an effective nato alliance. i think it is a very important to recognize that some of the smaller countries of europe are deploying disproportionately large numbers of their total armed forces, even though the absolute numbers are not that large. it's also important to recognize the country like this does not put a caveat on the will of its forces and had decided to send its forces to one of the most dangerous areas, alongside the danes and estonians, who i think you are right to recognize. but the nato alliance is survived or fall on the collective capacity, collective commitment and collective

responsibility of all its members. in a spirit that is not hectoring but nonetheless firm, it's important to emphasize that nato needs to deliver on its aspirations, and that means governments of each major country singing very firmly and clearly that they will live up to the commitments the it signed up to in the nato charter. >> i agree very strongly, foreign secretary. are you disappointed that the dutch government have fallen because of the failure to agree to the request to extend the period of the dutch troops in afghanistan? >> it's not for me to comment on internal dutch politics. what is obviously disappointing is the prospect that the immense dutch contribution of afghanistan will no longer be available. it's important to recognize that there is a particular history to the dutch commitment. they agreed to extend from 2007 to 2010 precisely because they were asked by nato to make a time limit to cut it. that was itself an extension of

a previous commitment it is that commitment, made not just by the dutch government to the nato but the dutch government to their own people, that lies behind the difficulties and eventually conflict and demise of the government. it is important to understand that, without in any way quote of playing the point that it is much better to have a dutch in afghanistan giving an important role than not in afghanistan. >> obviously it is for the dutch queen to decide on the interim government and then for the dutch people to decide on a future government. but i think it's very important to put on record that the dutch contribution to afghanistan has been very significant indeed. it has been hugely solitude. the of the debate come in and remain a big part of the operation. >> foreign secretary, every time i turn on a television and the radio and hear that more innocent men, women and children among the afghan duty to afghanistan civilian community have lost their lives or have been named as a result of nato

operational air strike, i react in what i am sure isrbrba,yhrbr time avoid virtually to the full one would hope civilian

casualties? >> it's essential that we do. what is striking about the last year is that it has shown that it is possible to minimize civilian casualties. the reduction in the civilian casualties has been very large. that is a tribute to the way in which general mcchrystal is implementing his doctrine. >> not in the last few days, you would agree? >> in the wake of operation moshtarak, they're have been two major incidents and there are obviously to be deeply regretted for precisely the reasons you elude it too. however, it is important to say that the vast majority of the civilian casualties are caused by the insurgency. i think three-quarters is the number caused by the insurgency. the fact that general mcchrystal

changed the rules of engagement and changed the way in which commanding officers are expected to be a is significant. but my grown is as loud as yours, i absolutely assure you. >> i.t. we all recognize that if there is we to be a political settlement that is going to in donner, we will have to go down the route that we followed and the northern ireland and indeed others have to follow elsewhere, which is to find out whether among those who are engaged in murderous activities that are any of significance and weight that are worth talking to. can you give us your present judgment, with all of the information available to do, on whether there are significant elements among the taliban

leadership who are prepared to lay down their weapons and in this murderous strife, and at the same time fulfill the to the essential requirements that the british government have rightly said must be fulfilled, namely accepting the afghan constitution and severing all links with al qaeda? ..

i think anything we say on this does not suggest nies that doesn't exist. i think it's important to preface all of our discussion in the base points. i also think it's very, very important to say that a discussion of this have been somehow reconciliation as an alternative to a military staff witchery. when i said that the military effectiveness is to challenge that notion that a military strategy is alternative to a military strategy. now with all of those caveat -- sorry to use that word in this

context, but nonetheless i think it's relevant. with all those caveat, i do think that this conflict will be brought to an end, in the end, three political settlement. in the question is whether we can minimize the bloodshed in the interim. and i think that there are good grounds for pursuing a reconciliation strategy, but we can only pursue it in a way that allows those on the ground to make the links and commentary. >> thank you. i'd like to ask you about that to jackie dan. for the record, you remember this was in the automotive 2008. i do know the precise numbers, but about 2000, to point out thousand predominately true or focused on delivering this turbine to the kajaki and.

it was a first-class operation although there were lots of lives related to an and around that operation trotter cheaply. but the question i want to ask is this, what was the genesis of the decision to deliver this, which has never been restored. and i understand can't be stored because the logistical operation of the roadway. i ascertain that the initiative was an american initiative. my primary question to you, as you can you explain to us the decision-making process? what is the way a desirable thing is assessed against the cost of loss of service personnel, of taking service personnel from two containing and focusing on this operation because all the evidence suggests that there was a taking

of the accelerator in one or two areas where there have been containment and driving down the taliban. i think we do need to understand is to find out what happened precisely they are and what is the political, civil, military decision-making mechanism for these large operations. >> the best thing would be for me to write you about that specific incident. for two reasons, i want to make sharia the full picture and secondly to make sure i don't have any mistakes. i think it is very detailed operation. it was obviously a military decision in terms of deployment of forces that was made on the ground. it would be a balance against a series of other objectives in operation that could be used. i think when were talking about a specific military deployment, it would be remiss not to make sure that all the facts are correctly set out. >> yes, but may i come back? clearly there was a military deployment in what is not in

dispute is the skill with which the deployment and delivery of the turbine was concluded. now i'm quiet at the very trusting if you would elaborate on that. but the issue with who and how it was evaluated that it was to the objectives which he bound mind to get that turbine to look at kajaki dam and have some prospect of being installed. that's not a military thing. that presumably was a civil decision by somebody either in north america or over here. and not how and who could make such a strategic decision. that's not military. >> no, my answer was about the military, which lost about. in the respect of the kajaki dam project, from memory it is the usaid financed project which is -- choose linkages are back to the u.s. embassy in kabul.

the studies -- i think the studies in which kajaki leiby role has been focused were related to the economic development of helmand province, notably in respect of agriculture. the precise timings operational opportunity, other deployment issues, who took them, but i was questioned largely. i think i can either enter a general way by saying the people on the ground wailed the different fact yours and then come to sensible decision, which i'm happy to say. oregon's label right with a more precise, which may be more useful. >> thank you. can i take you to the question of counternarcotics? as you are aware, our committee expressed some skepticism

flashier about what the united kingdom had. and we have been in correspondence with you since then when he wrote to us in january. can i ask you, arising from the current situation in the more recent information, according to the united nations office on drugs and crime, there's been a 22% fall in opium poppies cultivation in 2009. including and 33% reduction in helmand. but at the same time, we understand from sco information centers, that the price of legal crops, including wheat having visited foray. and now fallen back. it appears that farmers were likely turning to poppies cultivation. can you explain that, which would seem to be a counter to the economic interest come and

given that they're in the past we thought the price of legal production is up. and it was in the economic sense to move to wheat, where they now move back to poppy. >> i think there are two reasons behind the fall in poppy production and relevant to the position in 2010. the 2008 figures were similar. their two factors factors driving the decline in poppy production. one is the price of licit products, notably wheat. the drug production is a function of insecurity. those two factors going to explaining the reduction in poppy production. you then have the fact that the global wheat price has fallen. this is obviously relevant to the calculation of any firmer. but the other thing relevant to the farmer was wet chance there is that the security risk if he tries to produce poppy. that's where the security become very, very relevant.

and i think the other thing i'd say to the cost that is the prices of wheat, cost of feed are boring. and governor mangal distributed wheat seed to the how mandy's. he hasn't given them out three, believes that every farmer should pay something for the weekly that they get, which is his social market zabul. but it's quite subsidize anything. and that's an important part of the explanation. >> what about the well-known fact that the taliban has financing their duty to some extent from the poppy taxing people who were producing the poppies. what has been done to stop the proceeds of the poppy production going to the taliban?

>> well, i think one of the most important things they are is to recognize that there are, you use the word tax, some of that tax is extorts a en route between the major centers. i think that the helmand kandahar link as an important part of that. the route that goes between it for example. i won't go into that. but there is an important issue there about the way in which the insurgency extorts from farmers on different routes. when i went to afghanistan in 2008 with an secretary rice, we talked a lot about the importance of protection of roads and i know that significant challenge for the international afghan forces in the south relates to that. one of the benefits of better production of roadways would make it much were difficult for the insurgency to finance through that mode of taxation.

of course, there are some who are running poppy production who are much closer to the taliban and the engagement of the security forces there becomes a rather more relevant point. >> isn't it true that there are still people linked with poppy production who have close connections with senior figures in the afghan political establishment? >> bare allegations in that respect, yeah. >> if more than allegations, isn't it? >> know, there are allegations. >> perhaps will see some figures in a trial. >> if i found they are guilty, the allegations made to something more. >> you've mentioned at length, foreign secretary come the critical nature of the political settlement, this dual thi