political settlement is the integration on some of the taliban into the structures of local national government. how's that going to >> how will that happen? >> i think, it already is happening, it happened in the west, in harat and there are other examples in the south and the east, and essentially, the -- there is an interesting and -- reconciliation and reintegration is meant to be for those who are not ideologically committed to the insurgency and those who have perceived to have a cause, reintegration relates to footsoldiers, and reconciliation, relates to higher-ups, high level. >> how do you deal with reintegration. >> i'm coming to that. reintegration involves a decision by a local -- local people, local insurgents that they are better off in the political system than outside and it is led at the local level, by afghan forces, and international forces and local

afghan politics, because, essentially, if you are talk about district -- some district level you are talking about localized decisions made on a tribal or sub-tribal basis and that is not something that will be choreographed from kabul, whether from the afghan side or the nato side and will be the product of military pressure and political choice. >> does that mean, as we found out when we were in helmand, that one of the criticisms was the taliban was simply paying more, the economic taliban, put it like that, than we were, or the local people -- we pay them more than the taliban. >> that is not a durable basis on which to bring people over, if you want to bring people over you have to be sure their families will be safe, they will be safe and have a genuine political voice in the local system, and they have something to do and what we're talking about is a more sustain abable

settlement into which people decide they are better off inside than outside. >>... economical clerics and -- >> i don't think, with respect -- i don't think it is a straightforward economical calculation. >> straightforward in afghanistan -- nothing is straightforward in afghanistan. >> and in afghanistan, i think, it is more than a i say some people are... for $10 a day which is more than a policeman is paid and that is relevant and is a big decision to have them decide to fight the insurgency, with the political voice as well as economic well being. >> and the other thing you stress is the grand... president karzai is hoping to set up in the spring, early summertime line you are talking about, and if you were the taliban, invited this -- to this and there was no agreement, they can sit there, can't say and say we'll wait and the americans will wind down

there troops, and european political opinion will go to -- get fed up with the terrible deaths, just wait. >> that is case that is often put and is a static rather than a dynamic position. you've got a significant build-up of international forces, where they can hear a strategic plan as evidenced in the last few weeks and build-up of afghan forces and capacity of thes afb army and with the police, i think you would agree, the afghan national army is a significant fighting force and the prospect of 200,000 afghans in the national army and 100,000 marines, concentrates the mind and it is well to say you have time but you have an interim period and you have a fighting force of significant proportions, on the march. and, so, i think that it is not unreasonable, in fact it is right to say, that now is a...

there are clear incentives for them to participate in the political system, i'll say the taliban is not a homogenous group and i'm sure you understand that and this is a very very, much more desegregated society and that is why the jirgas are large affairs and the part about the society it has many, many distinction, twine and within the tribes. >> nonetheless there has to be a general agreement, which enough people on the taliban side sub describe, and split down to groups and people and so forth. and, the temptation, for them, will be, just wait all of this out, because, actually, although, there is pressure on those -- 18 months or so, after a time, it will divide because their patience will run out. >> that is a temptation but is also balanced by the threat. and, it is a calculation in that sense and i think we're tending to areas where it is quite

difficult to say much, without -- i don't want to say prejudicing but without getting in the way of the sort of --/me, it is and exercise that will not be done in the full glare of the... and will be and exercise that will involve a lot of afghan engagement and a lot of afghan talking over a period. and i think that it wouldn't be wise for me to say much more, i'm afraid. >> okay. >> with the issue of governments, would you agree that nothing is more important for public sentiment, or support for the war here at home, than the belief in the sacrifices of our armed forces, are in support of a viable, sustainable, political regime and lives are not being lost in vain.

what do you say to the members of the public, now i believe in the majority who don't believe the current afghan leadership is both willing and able to be the kind of strategic partner we desperately need in afghanistan. >> i think, first of all it is right to say that there must nts be a feeling the lives have been lost in vain, that is the most corrosive thing and is not the case we are spending british troops there to support an afghan government, sending british troops there, because of the threat, that exists to our national security, and if afghanistan became again a safe place for international terrorism to be coordinated, and planned. and, now, it is important that we have a strategic partner in the afghan government and that is the reason why there is emphasis on issues like corruption, and good governance, however, those are key issues, for afghans as well and when we discuss the corruption it sounds like a -- it is a western

imposition on an unwilling afghan people and actually the bbc poll, suggests quite the opposite and actually the people who feel most passionately about the abuse of power are afghanistan and is not something we're doing against the recalcitrant people, and that -- the confidence that afghans have in their own government, never mind that we have, depends on the extent to which they are governing in the interest of the afghan people and i think the dualism that is being suggested is not quite right. >> the fco described the august, dwoin presidential elections, and i quote, as credible, louing the political will of the afghan people, to be -- allowing the political will of the afghan people to be clearly expressed. given the evidence of intimidation and fraud do you still stand by those words. >> i think it was a credible representation, to say that president karzai got more votes than anybody else and this other candidates, and, it is also, credible to say he didn't get an absolute majority on the first ballot and so the final figures,

i think, 49, 31 or 49-32, i think it was a credible representation of the views. and i think the final result reflects that the strictures of the afghan constitution... but there are not significant lessons that need to be learned, and for these people, and you are right. but i would stick by the basic point, that the results revealed that president karzai was the most popular candidate. >> do you not agree, fraud 0 intimidation took place. >> and a significant fraud was attempted and intimidation was done. and that is true. but, i think a huge amount of the fraud was excised or removed from the electoral equation by the efforts of the electoral complaints commission we talked about earlier. >> sorry. i was going to add that the u.n.

also passed judgment on the election, and said that in their assessment, that they were free and fair, and i'm -- and pointed out they were the first afghan run elections in 30 years. and, so, at a certain level, if it was to be expected, nevertheless, the u.n. would pass... >> i would never describe them as free and fair, the results were a credible expression of the will of the afghan people and would never describe those elections, last august as free and fair. >>... candidate... if they weren't free or fair, last time, and given the recent moves by president karzai, to take control, of the electoral complaint commission, what confidence do we now have that we are going to have free and fair parliamentary elections later this year. >> i think to talk about -- we talk about free and fair elections in our country, notwithstanding the imbalance in funding of the different parties and we describe them as free and fair.

>> all the -- the electoral system. >> but we describe them as free and fair and to use the same phrase, about afghan liksz, as we use about western european elections, is to suggest that the public are more credulous than they are and it cannot be the case that we describe afghan election, in the same phrase as we describe western democratic elections, 300 years of democratic election, or, in our case, rather shorter than... anyway, you take my point. that is why we said in advance of the election we thought there needed to be a credible representation and that is why they said they were and i -- i doubt you'll ever find any thing thc that says, the next election will be free and fair because that is a bar that will not be met, but to work for are the next parliamentary elections are a credible representation and

that is the right word and that requires security and openness of the debate, and actually, something that the afghans scored quite highly on in advance of the presidential election and it is important, not just the process, the run-up to the election, abdullah had massive rallies and, there was an afghan-led debate of some depth and breadth and parliamentary elections pose a different set of challenges than presidential election and reflect much more the fragmented geography of afghanistan. but require reform, of the sort that you described as something we'll be arguing for and, hopefully, the electoral complaints commission and the nominees that come forward will do as well. >> my question, leads precisely on from that point and if i might say, sir, i thought you stated far too lightly in your answers to some questions on

this, as to the significance of the changes that are going to be brought about by president karzai's decrease. you said in answer to something, well, we'll wait and see who president karzai apoints. i think it is almost immaterial who me ashpoints, the significae is he'll be doing the appointing and they'll be his creatures and the commission will be his body and that is a profound difference from the electoral commission which you just referred to, and which plays as important role in safeguarding the elections and exposing corruption last year because that electoral commission... commission had a clear 3-2 majority, of nonafghan people, on it. shared by a canadian, two nonafghans amongst the five, that is the profound change and what i do not understand and i am very disappointed, so far, is

why the british government and indeed our other nato partners, are not taking altogether tougher line with president karzai, against this key change. because, if these changes go through, then, we have an almost guarantee of widespread corruption which is not going to be identified, i fail to see how the support of the u.k. -- everybody else is going to be sustained behind a government which is engaged in such degrees of corruption, and, surely, the british government and other governments should be saying to president karzai you do not do this, you preserve the nonafghan majority on the complaints commission and if you do not, then there again, there will be serious consequences to the degree of support we can continue to give you. >> first of all, there are quite a lot of words you used were exactly the words i used in response to... we're not that far -- i applauded exactly the work of the canadian-led ecc in

my earlier answer. secondly, we agree too on this partners of -- the parliamentary elections, representing an improvement on the processes of the presidential elections. and, the ecc, as well as the iec have an important role in doing them. thirdly, the u.k. is not an actor in the -- we work closely with the u.n., who are of course the coordinating body, for any international support, including financial, for the electoral process, and it is with the u.n. that we are working closely, in kabul. fourthly, the test, i think, is who is appointed to the body, whether they be international, or not, and, maybe a better way of putting it is the test, the action of the ecc, the test is their actions. and, we will have very high expectations for the sort of

actions that the ecc should take, i think that the u.n. have a big responsibility, in their engagement with the -- president karzai about this and i can absolutely assure you we are working closely with them to make sure that the importance we a attach to the ecc is widely understooded . >> may i ask another question in respect to the parliamentary elections, it is reported, and you would have seen this in recent days in addition to president karzai issuing the decree to make the commission effectively his own creature, he has also positively seeking to reduce the number of women, afghan mps, what is the british government's position on that. >> we would deplore that and i haven't actually seen that myself but obviously, any suggestion that one sex of the afghan population has less

rights as stand or sit in parliament, would... to the core. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> you mentioned corruption. several times. and you... you did, indeed, endemic and pervasive, as we saw. on our last visit. and a lot of money we put in, going missing and the london conference, has pledged a piece and reintegration trust fund and -- 100 million has already been pledge and we call a trust fund and who will be the trustees of this fund. >> let's back up a bit, you said that a lot of our money goes missing, i'd like to see evidence of that. because, our money, british money, goes from the department for international development to specific purposes is a did by pricewaterhousecoopers and i haven't seen a suggestion of our money going missing. >> in your papers, if you have any evidence to support that,

that is a serious allegation and would like to see more evidence of that. >> have you answered my question. >> it is important to have on the record i've never seen any suggestion that quote-unquote our money goes missing in afghanistan. and, there are very tight processes put in place, by the department of international development, to do that. and, maybe afterwards you can provide me with any evidence you've got for that. secondly, in respect of the reintegration fund, i think it is 140 million dollars was pledged, at the conference, and we spent over a five year period, over a one year period, and it is obviously, a trust fund, which the -- there will be two routes into it, one via the u.n., which reflects the importance of the japanese role in this, and the other is through a non u.n. dp route.

the the organization of the fund, will bring a smile to your face, i hope, which is that the press fegsal advice on the structure of the trust fund, trustees on the matters has been put out by the smith institute -- i'm glad you smiled, it is note the adam smith institute that recommended the sort of mass privatization of everything that moved in britain, in the 1980s, but a different adam smith institute, another one, which takes great inspiration from the teachings of adam smith. and they have provided quite extensive, sort of advice on the modalities of how the u.n. and the afghans are structured and i would be happy to provide you with those details. >> we ought to know now, more detail, and... i hope his

reputation will at least allow us to understand that other people's money tends to go missing in places like afghanistan. and, we already pledged to contribute, our money, to a peace and reintegration trust fund. if that is anything more than the reassuring name, there must be trustees who we know and are accountable to you, or to somebody here, for the disbursement of this very large sum of money. and i think, by now, we've all agreed, and, published, and welcomed, i think, by now, we ought to know who these trustees are, to be. >> and now, i think, 24, 25 days after the announcement of the trust fund, so 24 days into a five-year program, so, i think, that we shouldn't believe somehow we have missed the bus on this, the trust fund has been set up, the purposes have been

spelled out, and the professional advice on setting it in has been delivered, i'm happy to write about it, and the first set of meet, i think, i am right in saying, have happened, involving afghans and the u.n., and, a series of engagements, between the afghan authorities and the international authorities, and, no country is going to put his money in unless they are sure that it will be properly used and that is -- that is where we are. i'm happy to make sure, the committee has got full... >> i think, if i can, to ask the... details, because, i think, it is important that the trust funds are precisely that. can i move on, then to another announcement of the subject of corruption. which is, the establishment of an independent office of high oversight, again, all sounds very reassuring, but if we learn

-- it was reported today that the decree to set up, has been delayed, by president karzai. and, do you have any information about that? >> i don't... i'm not sure which report you are talking about and i understand the two decrease, there are two decrease involved in the implementation of the initiatives against corruption and i understood they both have been drawn up, and, you said, they haven't annulled, does it say in this report. >> it is reported in the guardian, that president karzai has defied u.s. pressure to pass a separate decree to help fight corruption. and, it is -- specifically refers to... strength and give independence to the -- the high office of oversight, and, it is unlikely that parliament will pass the legislation in time,

and as promised by the end of february and we apparently have a delay on our hands here. is it not more back sliding by president karzai, who is reluctant, as we've heard in earlier exchanges, to let everything go and has taken the -- electoral commission, is he not here trying to undermine the promised independence of the new body, to fight corruption. >> we have to make sure it doesn't happen, the new body is important, and i don't have evidence of the delay, but, i -- let us say i think there are two decrease involved in the, not one, and, it is very important, to follow through and is something that we are committed to, and, i think president karzai said he'll do it and needs to do it. >> and, there is a disturbing situation here, on the one hand we are seeing, there is no military solution, and they've got to hand over power to the afghans and develop civic society and strengthen the kind of democracy there and at the very moment that we are getting

reports, all of the time, of delays, of karzai apparently moving in the opposite direction to take control of previously independent bodies, so, the very idea of that robust afghan governmental structure taking over responsibilities is crumbling our hands and when will we lose patience with this man and dry a different approach, he's always... >> i'm not sure what different approach you are referring to. he's the elected president of afghanistan. so, there isn't a different approach, if by the approach you decide we'll give it to somebody and he's been elected by his own people to be the president of the country and we don't work with his ministries that abuse our funds, and we do work with the ministries that are able to function properly. we do seek to use our influence,

publicly and privately, in respect of the key -- that we are seek and the way in which the afghan government engages with the international community. we don't pretend that -- when there are setbacks they are not setbacks and we call them very, very clearly. but i don't accept the phrase that the agreement is quote-unquote crumbling in our hands and seems to me not justified by the evidence that is available. >> let me ask you, do you have a view on whether more could be done to try and govern afghan through the existing tribal structure, the way tribes govern themselves is not what i would approve of, not totally good at human rights, for instance, but the pashtun tribe clearly gives no allegiance to the government

and are disenchanted, and things with the corruption at the central government level and is that not an element in the complex strand of the country we ought to take more account of. >> it's a very important level. as i have head several times and remember, the pashtun are 35 to 40% of the population, and 60 to 65% are not and president karzai is a pashtun and differences within the pashtuns are as great as, those between them and other, because within the pashtuns there are many, many different communities. point one. point 2, i think that we have to remember that we are not living in 1979. 30 years, 31 years of civil war, effectively. 31 years of conflict. have really -- have really corroded the tribal structures and haven't eliminated them but severely corroded them and that is something that is... has a compensation that perhaps you referred to in your question in

trying to meld together traditional structures with new ones, thirdly, though, i think that community-based structures which will have a strong tribal element will be a significant part of any durable settlement in afghanistan, notwithstanding the corrosion of those tribal structures over the last 30 years, but that is not only true in the south and east but it is significant in the south and east and i think that the way i would operationalize your in sight on this is to emphasize the importance of local structures. i think, that there is a certain amount of criticism over the last 8 or 9 years the international community is focused on the central government in a country that is in fact ready to be decentralized, and, it has -- where it has talked about local structures it is talked often about new structures rather than preexisting ones. i think, that the way to think

about afghanistan, is obviously, a country but with 396 districts and 34 provinces and 396 districts and the districts of afghanistan give greater sense of the grant knew later of the tribal structures and the political settlements we are talking about will be built district by district but not the national level, and, i think that while i agree with you strongly that they are not the sort of structures one would anticipate in either of our constituencies they are nonetheless going to be an absolutely critical part of any sort of self-governance in afghanistan. sorry to give you have a long answer but it is a really important question that deserves a really serious answer and let's say, also, that the challenges, the sort of values or rights that we would expect to see reflected in our own decisions is also there and the

degree of letting go that is required, and recognizing there are some bottom lines above all the afghan constitution, and beyond that, there would have to be a lot of license in that country. >> taking you back to the london conference and the issue of the developments, during the conference, i met with the british overseas development agencies group. i understand that there are 25 ngos working in afghanistan, and some of them have a large number of staff, and, 200 for example work for save the children. at one point it was put to me, strongly, was why were the nongovernmental organizations not invited in any way to take part in the london conference and why did the canadian high commission have to organize an alternative, an alternative

afghan conference in london? >> i don't accept the characterization of the civil society, that is an alternative one, we were very heavily engaged in encouraging, sponsoring, and stimulating, the civil society conference that happened. far from it being something that was against our will, or in rebellion against the -- >> i didn't think -- the london conference wasn't just the u.k. conference, was it? >> we actually asked for the outreach conference to be set up. so, there is nothing alternative about it. >> and, in a related question, afghan members of parliament, there were quite a large number of afghan members of parliament here in london at that time. but, they also were at the canadian high commission event and they were not in the london conference, and, some of them said to me, very clearly, that president karzai and his ministers had not in any way consulted with the afghan members of parliament before they had come to london, to take part in conference. >> well, i think first of all,

it is important to say that the two representatives of the civil society conference spoke to the london conference, to afghans. and they weren't politician, they were civil society. people, secondly, i think i am right in saying that the parliamentarians was purely coincidental and, a parliamentary union or interparliament exchange, which happened to be taking place at the time of the london conference and thirdly the london conference was a conference on government and, so, there is a limit to what you can do in 67 hours, and, we weren't trying to substitute for intraafghan discussion but i think, everyone i spoke to thought the conference was enhanced by the presence of the civil society delegation. >> and i can assure you the vent that took place at canada house was a very, very good one. but can i ask you to respond to specific criticisms that have

been made by the governmental organizations who are working on the ground in afghanistan? firstly, that although the conflict is very serious, the 25 times people -- people are 25 times more likely to die from poverty and mal nutrition than as a result of conflict and there is an overemphasis on the military and the role of the military, particularly, concerns about the way in which provincial reconstruction teams operate. and that the ngos feel that local people are reluctant to sometimes get engaged with projects which are military-led. when in fact they would be more likely to be engaged with projects that were either civil society-led or afghan government-led, and funded through the afghan government institutions. >> afghanistan is the 4th or 5th

poorest country in the world and i think there would be a strong development mission there even if there was not' military presence and the balance between international civil effort and afghan civil effort is obviously a difficult one, and there are all sorts of issues to do with the amount of money that is paid to international staff, compared to the local staff, and, that is tricky because these people are doing good, and important work. look, the best of all worlds is that this is led by the local afghan authorities. districts and provincial governments. and, that everything comes in in support of them, that is not always possible, and i think the overmilitarizization is a criticism but, helmand province is the most heavily aided province in the world and there is a massive amount of aid going in there and the key is this balance, and part of the job that's new nato's civilian representative will to be knit together the local military effort, and the local civilian

effort, that speaks a bit to the reintegration question, that sir john horam was asking earlier and i think is... >> may i give you some information, that you may find helpful? the london conference set a target that danish put 50% of their aid directly into the afghan system and that is to -- and divid believed their money is well protected from fraud, and, referring to that question and they paid the government of afghanistan typically on a reimbursement basis and once the funds are committed to a project, it -- they'll refund the afghan government and provides a fair degree of protection. and i think it is also fair to say that security -- the security situation, particularly in the south is so precarious while ngos will work there it is hard to get u.n. civilian staff to work there, so, at the

moment, most of the civilian development is very heavily reliant on prt, and on the civilians working within isap and ideally the next few years the balance will shift annual see more traditional development workers on the ground. >> thank you. can i just ask two more questions about this and get questions on human rights and then try and get something on pakistan. >> i was worried about the pakistan part. >> we're getting there. we're getting there. there is a danger that, because of the concentration on the conflict, in the south, that actually, we're not putting enough resources into the safer areas of afghanistan, which could actually build the credibility of afghan institutions? >> iraq, wink it is important the relatively safer areas don't become victims of flanking maneuvers by the insurgency but i think the test is going to be

in the areas where the insurgency is strong and that is why the south and east is so important. >> and you mentioned the new role as the nato senior civilian coordinator. is that the kind of role-light. >> no. no, it is not. >> is there someone who will do what is seen as that role. >> it is -- to characterize it, he was considered for the role as the u.n. representative. >> i understand. >> and the current term of office of the the current rsg ended in march and his replacement will sort of -- it is a u.n. role. with all due respects. >> are you confident the new u.n. representative will play -- have sufficient clout to play the coordinating role that was

thought necessary two years ago. >> well, i think that a lot of this is about -- yes. is the short answer, in that, the... it all comes down to personality and determination, and, the commitment of the partners and, he has gone out of his way to say he wants to work with the u.n. representative and he has a distinguished record in iraq and you may have come into contact with his work there, outstanding work in the north of iraq and he has his work cut out in afghanistan, and in a very big way and has his work cut out on the bureaucratic side because there are big holes in the u.n. operation, with the security issues they've suffered from, and, obviously, afghanistan is extremely challenging theater, but i have spoken to him already a couple of times and he's determined to do his job, and, in a way that brings benefit to the people of afghanistan as well as the union.

>> thank you. >> when we were in afghanistan, last year, we had the privilege, it was a real privilege to reach a very small group, of afghan women, who are fighting for women and girls and human rights in afghanistan and very brave and tenacious they are. the great and overwhelming concern, as they've put it to us was that as a price of the political settlement, it could be women's and girls' rights that got eroded or scaled back, and, the question i want to put to you, is, can you give this committee an unequivocal assurance that as far as this british government is concerned, there will be absolutely no endorsement or more likely possibly turning a blind eye, pontias pilate, washing of hands, to any settlement that

will water-down and reduce women and girls' rights in afghanistan, compared to those as set out in the constitution. >> certainly not. certainly not. i wouldn't be party to any watering down, certainly not, i could not give you the commitment. a vital part of the durable goods of the settlement is precisely living up to the commitments of the afghan constitution, so, the bravery of the people that you -- is something that is very, very striking. and their willingness to speak up is something that needs to be supported. and their organization and ability to talk to each other is something that needs to be supported as well, because they are doing brave work in a difficult climate, but, it is very important that we have -- emphasize our commitment to help the afghans live up to the commitments of their own constitution. >> thank you. secretary, can we move on to now questions of pakistan?

the current situation in pakistan is clearly quite different to time our committee visited in april last year. we have seen, for example, the recent arrest of... in karachi and the federally ministered tribal areas and other parts of the country. and is there a fundamental change in the relationship of pakistan'ses security apparatus, and the united states and the western world? >> well, that is a good question, there is a fundamental change in the relationship between pakistan and afghanistan, in the governmental, relationship and president karzai and... you see a big difference.

in respect to the pakistan-america relationship which you asked about, i think it is a relationship in transition. and i hope it is a relationship, in transition, to a relationship that is far more mutually supportive, and afghanistan is a test case. afghanistan is the test case for the ability of america and pakistan to work together in different ways, with respect to each other's interests. i think there is a commitment on the part of both countries to do that. and i -- something i talked about, a lot, with all a -- up to the vice presidential level, and when i was in washington in january as well as when i was in pakistan in the first week of january, and, there are few more important relationships, to the security of the world than the u.s.-pakistan relationship. it has a long way to go from -- to become its own productive relationship, that it needs to be. >> what about the u.k.-pakistan relationship, and, particularly, with regard to cross-border security corporation, with our

forces and u.s. forces. >> our forces are a long way away from the pakistan border. if you look at -- think about the helmand, it is a very, very long distance from the further south we are in afghanistan, and it is... 150, 200 kilometers, 150 kilometres down to the pakistani border and in terms of border cooperation it is about afghan-pakistani cooperation and to go to the kind of... in the control room, i have not seen them next to each other, that is is a remarkable change, and, wouldn't happen before, and i think, the -- there is a very important crossing point next to canned har, and that is very important and there aren't british troops involved there but that is a very important part of the cooperation. >> and, what about the issue that leaders of the insurgency

in afghanistan including those who are behind the attacks on our forces, the ieds, and the other activities, are known to be based in pakistan? >> that is a very important issue. and that is a very important motive for the cooperation that we seek between afghanistan and pakistan, and is also a very important part of the dialogue we have with the pakistani authorities, not about cross-border security cooperation but the tactics of the pakistanis, in respect to the threats to their own country and threats across the border. >> i recognize the -- at the outset that more violent and afghanistan-pakistan comparisons have to be treated very carefully, but, i would say from my time with the responsibility in the area i am -- have absolutely no doubt whatsoever that the beginning of the end of

terrorism, in northern ireland was marked when and only when we established cross-border cooperation between north and south, and, in the same circumstances, that we have got here, can you tell us as far as the british government is concerned, we have the announcement, pretty well at the same time the committee was in afghanistan, and the prime minister made the statement in the house when he came back, and he was at the same time as us in afghanistan and pakistan, made an announcement about bilateral financial support to the pakistan authorities and for counterterrorism purposes and, read the statement in hansard and i wouldn't expect to you give any details, but, can you tell us, in broad terms, how that is going, and whether it is going to be expanded, and, i just simply would make the point, the sum of money that the prime minister announced, which is, as i recall, was 15 million pounds, the sum of money which

we are using there, needs to be set against the vast sums of money that we are actually having to deploy in afghanistan to deal with the tear mitchell which is coming out of pakistan and, there, we can't begin to shoulder the financial burden ourselves. we have a huge, huge financial, quite a -- apart from the blood issue, which we had such a another grim reminder of the prime minister's question today, we have a huge, huge financial benefit, quite apart om saving lives, benefit, giving every possible help to the pakistanis, in establishing a no safe haven policy for the terrorists inside their own country. >> i agree with sir john, distinguished minute material record gives him a very interesting perspective on the border issues and i think that you are right, one has to be

extremely careful importing into south asia examples from ireland but i'm struck that you, with your experience, feel confident enough to do so and that is very, very striking. from the my perspective without referring to the irish experience, i would just say that there will not be stability in thing afghan side of the border and the pakistani side of the bored and vice-versa and i share strongly the passion that you have for work with the pakistanis and that is why high have been to pakistani six times as well as afghanistan, six times and will give you have a strong commitment that our counterterrorism spending is quite small, under 10 million pounds and has gone from 3 to 6 to 8 and going up again next year to 9 million pounds, and, the -- we are expanding it but it is small compared to the many billion pounds spent on troops in afghanistan. and our total aid spend in

pakistan, is much larger than low single digit millions. 250 million pounds, 220 million pounds a year, spent in pakistan and of course the dividing line between narrowly defined counterterrorism projects and broader civil improvement, whether education, health, is a blurred dividing line, but, i think that both the testimony to our commitment to work closely with the pakistani authorities, to a country of 170 million people and one has got to have a sense of perspective, but, i think that one area of the civilian military balance is rarely talked about and is the civilian military balance between the military investment in afghanistan, and civilian investment in pakistan. you talked about it, absolutely rightly and the lugar debate showed the americans are beginning to talk about it, and i think that is a good thing and the fact that pakistan got

strong support for the imf loan, is implementing it, as well as on the fourth round of the imf loan, and whether any pakistani government has done that and no civilian government has done that and while it is easy to knock governments around the world i think the pakistanis, are -- the way they've implemented economic program has been pretty tough, on them and is an additional reason while we'll continue to support them. >> on that very pointed, not so long ahead, the house of lords said because of the budget constraints there would be a cut back on funding for counterterrorism, and counter... how would you interpret from that that this cut back was on your projected spend, and as opposed to actual spend. >> there is no cut back, in fact even at the time that he was speaking, the pakistan counterterrorism spend was due to rise and will rise. the -- since then i have written

a statement in the house about the special arrangements that are being made for 2010-11. for the -- that year to bolster, the finances and i'm confident we'llable able to maintain the comprehensive network and the addressing priorities. >> what you are saying this is statement made in the house of lords i believe january of this year was wrong. >> not exactly. i want to see the statement, as -- a confusion arose in the debate, between a cut in spending, and an increase that wasn't the side that it might have been -- >> that is what i said, cut back -- >> let me finish the sentence. from an increase, that is lower that might have been if we had more money and that which is a different category, than the projection. and, so, the fact is that the budgets are rising, they are not rising as much as they would have done if we hadn't had the reduction of the value of sterling, because we purchased

120 foreign currencies however to make up the reduction in the value of the sterling we have extra money from the treasury and extra freedom to sell off buildings we don't need and extra money from the yfco, and the british council and the fco trade services and this is a thing for the committee, come the next spending review, which ever government is in power, there is a real issue about how to accounts for changing the exchange rate for the department of... >> it is all a game, we are very much onto the issue, and -- >> thank you. i'm sorry. >> it is important -- >> can i assure you, the committee, the committee -- the committee will be commenting publicly on those issues in next few weeks. >> i hope that -- the full picture over 2010-2011 -- >> i'm sure we will have it --

everything. can i ask you, you mentioned the bbc world service. do you think it would be helpful as it is -- clearly has been, with regard to the arab world, and iran, if we had an urdu television channel coming out in the bbc world service to try to increase the media coverage, because i understand that bbc world service radio is heard by about up to 10% of the pakistani population. which is quite a high figure, but, clearly, the urban population that doesn't rely on radio and watches numerous satellite and cable television channels and i wonder if a television channel would be something to think about. >> one of the things that i was -- have to say to our iranian colleagues is that the government doesn't control the bbc world service and it is important that i don't look like i'm deciding what channels are

broadcast. but, i think that -- all avenue us who have been to pakistan know the vibrancy of the urdu written media, remarkable vibrancy, and i think it is an interesting idea and let me take away in an extremely diplomatic way and find out what the bbc independently might decide on this. >> okay. >> sorry, john -- sorry. i have the wrong john. >> what is the problem in getting pakistan to deal with existential threat to itself and also to deal with the... more help with afghanistan. has been the story, the threat, perceived threat from india and. how see any change in that situation? >> i think that there has been a significant change. in the last couple of years, and, in the appreciation in pakistan, of its domestic terrorist threat.

so, now, it is possible to have a conversation with senior people in pakistan, but, also, members of the public. about the fact that whatever they think of the, as you say, perceived indian threat, there is a domestic threat. i think a lot of pakistanis still believe in the ancient threat, perceive, but, i think there has been a change in that they would recognize, the domestic terrorist threat and would say, as well... >> how will that manifest itself, and, in that -- the disposition, the military forces -- >> 120,000 pakistani army, on the western border. that is a pretty big change. >> right, as -- i mean, how quickly does that happen. >> happened the last couple of years and you've got the swat operation, you've now got the waziristan south operations and waziristan operations and the

pakistani frontier corps which have been having a pretty rough time on the border. and now you've got significant reinforcements, however, you still have -- still remains the case, that improved relations between india and pakistan would be a massive boost to the pakistani ability to concentrate on what i believe is their real threat. now, in that context, i think it is important to say that at the moment, nothing would do more to help build confidence on the pakistan side and the successful conclusion of the prosecutions that started in pakistan with respect to the mumbai bombings. because many, many indian politicians and people, who have perfectly -- perfectly willing to support india-pakistan dialogue say we cannot have a dialogue until there is real

show case that pakistan's domestic problems and ability to project them will be properly addressed and the mumbai prosecution, the pakistanis are pursuing, with dedication, the conclusion of that, a successful conclusion of that, will be a significant moment. >> thank you. >> i think it is worth saying, both governments deserve credit for the resumes of the india-pakistan dialogue, admittedly at the level it is at the moment and the indian prime minister and the pakistani prime minister came to the london conference on afghanistan. >> final question, and, final question, conscious of time, can i ask you, you referred to who came to the london conference. we invited iran to the london conference and can you tell us at what level iran attended . >> it didn't attend. >> didn't attend at all. >> no. >> obviously, that is a great disappointment. do you think iran has a role in

assisting the stabilization development in afghanistan. >> i need to be careful to describe it, because it suggests somehow that we have been -- there is almost fault on our side. >> no. >> and it was a great mistake on the part of the iranians, not to come, because it showed they were not interested in bringing stability to a country that has big implications for them and the iranian prime minister protested to me, last year, about how important he felt afghanistan was and how he wants to work with us on i and, of course, the failure to turn up was, i think a mistake on the iranian part, and undermined their own claims, to be a responsible partner, but i am happy to repeat to this committee, as far as i'm concerned, iran should be part of the regional dialogue about the future of afghanistan, how the sovereignty can be respected and how it can be supported. >> okay, andrew, we have two

minutes. >> i want to ask, rightly, my last stab at this. >> i never felt you stabbing me. >> in the nicest possible way... at cabinet level, what discussions are there about how we would cope as the united kingdom if we had another crisis elsewhere in the world, not just talking about the deployment of armed forces, significant armed forces, deployment, but, that, and also, the capacity of the machinery, your department and others, to cope. it does seem to me were in a very precarious situation, if something unexpected blows up in the world we would not be able to rapidly respond either in terms of military deployment or the resources of the foreign commonwealth on this, and, is there discussions at government level, cabinet level, as to, you know, what we are -- the capacity to respond to the unexpected. >> i think it is a good question.

i think that the emphasis on flexible skills, which is a -- emphasis not just in the military but the deep employeematics service means if there was something that suddenly became and over arching priority, there could be redeployment and new resources, and new efforts and i think that the flexibility, the adaptability of the system is actually quite high, but, obviously, that would have an opportunity... what else you could do but i think the premium is on a comprehensive network which is able to respond in a serious way. i mean, the -- the committee -- i don't know if the committee has taken any evidence or opined at all about the defense review. but, the 19 -- 1966 white paper said... defense of foreign policy and that is true and it is important to recognize that we need to think about the

policy context that we face and then, make deployments and decision, on the defense side, with long lead times or long diplomatic side to service that. >> and last ten seconds, you saw my action when you raised -- reaction when you raised the question of the foreign office resources and i would make it clear that i mean, i have sympathy for you and your department but it seems to me, it is oldshion -- fashioned collective responsibility and it is grossly unfair to the department but also bonkers that the department should be frustrated in carrying out our primary interests around the world because of problems with regards to exchange rates. in other words, the departments will take sacrifice. >> i hope that the... the record will record the smile on my face when i say, that, we don't really want your sympathy. because it's not sympathy -- >> i'm right behind you. >> it's not sympathy. we want your respect and criticism and we want your

engagement and we want your ideas, but, sympathy, we don't want. we want to deliver on the shared objectives that we have, and i think the committee has been studious and... and that this is shared interest we have and the basis on which i have always enjoyed working with the committee and thank you very much for working with us. >> before we concluded i want to place on the record, thanks of this committee, and our staff, for the cooperation we have had from your department, and people abroad, and in this country, over the period of this committee, and we have not concluded our work yet. we have three significant reports that we'll be publishing, before we finish, one of which will address directly the issues that you and ms. mckinley have been talking about and i'm confidents our successor committee, whoever is