construction workers will be sent home from these job sites because federal yours must be furloughed. they need a long list of construction sites that will be halted. george washington parkway in virginia, conrad rich, i don't know where that is, but in virginia. bridge construction and quarterly in, idaho, all over the country this is happening. the transportation inspectors, safety inspectors have no pay, so they have two leaves and nothing happening. this is going to lead to untold numbers of people. i set out to a million people won't be able to work. just really wrong with taking place in the present and it's not too late to stop that and i

hope republicans will reconsider him a think about their constituents standing in the unemployment line as we speak. >> just a brief explanation of why we are where we are at with this extension built, the brief extension of 30 days. there was an agreement between the majority leader of the finance committee and the minority leader in the finance committee, senators baucus and grassley, on a three-month extension of these very same provisions. there were more provisions in the bill also. it cost a little more than the $10 billion that is asked for because it was a three-month extension. senator reid pulled the bill from the floor of the u.s.

senate. he did it. the leader of the democrats pulled that will from the floor. i support extending unemployment benefit, cobra benefits, insurance, highway bill six, doc fix, small business loans, distant network television for satellite viewers. if we can't find $10 billion to pay for something that we all support, we will never pay for anything on the floor of this u.s. senate. i have offered several ways to do this, including trying to negotiate with the majority leader staff. none have been successful. we cannot keep adding to the

debt. it's over $14 trillion going up fast. if the budget that is before us passive, it will add another $1.5 trillion to the debt. last week, well now it's a little past last week, we passed paygo, for those of you who don't know what paygo with, it means you have to pay for everything that you bring before the senate and you can't charge it on the debt. you can't charge it. that's what paygo says. so understanding that, i hope the american people understand makes the use objections. now i would like to ask for

unanimous consent that the senate proceed to the immediate consideration of h.r. 4691, that the amendment at the desk, which offers a full set be agreed to the bill as amended be read a third time and passed in the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table. >> is there objection? >> reserving the right to object. mr. president. >> jordy leader. >> history is something i think you have to be involved in 27 what really transpired. first of all, there was no bill on the floor for me to take off the floor. there was discussion between

democrats and republicans. in the thursday before we left, with the last week long break we took how i was in a bad call with dr. baucus, grassley and mcconnell. by fred mcconnell said they were ready to agree to anything yet. they said if we are going to extend benefits for a lot of tax provisions that are very important to business, we should at least consider extending benefits for people who are down and out for the same period of time. so, understand the bill that came before the senate included a jobs package that extended the highway benefits for one year, saving a million jobs, creating jobs by allowing small businesses or any businesses to

hire somebody that's been out of the work for 60 days. that ought to pay their withholding tax, they get a thousand dollar tax benefit at the end of the year. that helps small business, made a provision in there to allow small businesses to write off and not depreciate after $250,000 of purchases in a year. very important to stimulate business. we had also in that bill a provision to stimulate the economy by extending the build america bonds are so accessible in our recovery act. so mr. president, they cannot all the excuses that one wants, but the fact our friends on the other side of the aisle are opposing extending unemployment benefits for people who are out of work. and i will also say this. hager was very interesting. i'm glad my friend brought that up. and i'm glad he brought up the big deficit because it is very big. but where was my friend from kentucky when we had two wars and paid for during the bush

administration? tax cuts that cost more than a trillion dollars unpaid for. where was my friend and the republicans object into that? now, mr. president, diego is important that we passed paygo here, we the democrats passed it. my friend didn't vote for it. it passed because democrats voted for it. not a single republican voted for it. we got these in effect during the clinton years and it worked. we paid down the debt and the last clinton years. we also understand how important the debt of this country is, started to build up so strong during the years of the bush administration. we brought to this floor that the presiding officer, no one worked harder than the presiding officer to come up with

something to address the debt. but the chairman of our budget committee and others. we wanted a debt commission and we brought to this for a debt commission, a good one mr. president. it was based upon what we did with base closings, military base closings. we tried for decades to close bases were unnecessary in the country after world war ii was gone, korea was gone, vietnam, we didn't know all those places. because of what happened straight to close a base because of local politics we couldn't do it. so we passed a bill that said we're going to have a debt closing condition. they will come back with recommendations in the house and the senate has a choice, either vote no or yes on the recommendations. and they voted yes and we close numerous bases all over the country. the debt commission that we established was based upon that same thing. and we voted, we democrats

voted. it would've passed. why didn't pass? because seven rep publicans who cosponsored voted against it. so mr. president, we don't need lectures here on debt. what we need is to recognize that there are poor people all over america who are desperate today and people who are working, makingll over america today, that are being told to go home because we don't have inspectors to take care of the work. therefore, mr. president, i object.

>> it's a guidebook, is a travelogue if you will, but it's also kind of a mini history work of biography of each of these presidents and what they see you can tell a lot about people at the end of their lives. >> a resource guide to every presidential gravesite. the story of their final moments and insights about their lives. who's buried in grant jim? now available at your favorite

bookseller or get a 25% discount at the publisher's website at public affairs books.com. type in grant's tomb at checkout. >> no discussion on this sunday's parliamentary elections in iraq. the american enterprises institute heard from election in military and when ellis on how the outcome of the elections could impact the war in iraq and u.s. policy. this is about an hour 40 minutes. >> thank you all for your patience. good afternoon, everybody. welcome to the american enterprise institute. i am danielle pletka. we're holding an event on iraq and on iraq's elections. it's a little bit amusing to me to be sitting here introducing event on iraq, something that when i started here at aei back in 2002 i used to do at a weekly basis. and the truth is that the good

news is no news in iraq and we haven't had as much to talk about in recent years, since the success of the surge. and while i think iraq has had some ups and downs, we are here on overall what is a pretty positive occasion to talk about iraq's elections, i'm going to get my number wrong. it's the fourth election in five years. elections are meant to be exciting and of themselves but only because of the democratic process and not any violence associated with them. always a committee to step up and violence in iraq and i've no doubt we will see more in the coming week. at the end of the day, most of the excitement is in fact coming from the to and fro of the electoral process rather than anything else, which is a wonderful story and something that perhaps as we look too closely, we tend to forget. but overall, a success story and one i know that we are very proud of here at aei and much of

that can be attributed to the wonderful, wonderful work of our troops. i'm not going to say anything more except to quickly introduce our speakers here today who will address the issues and you will find their full biographies online at aei.org. in order of speaking today, we have carina perelli who is the united nations elections better in and now the executive vice president of the international foundation for electoral systems. next to her scott carpenter was the custom family fellow in the director of project theocrat at the washington institute for near east policy, also a veteran of iraq and the cpa and even more battle scarred veteran of the department of state. next to him, we have brian katulis was a senior fellow at the center for american progress, does a great deal of

work on middle east issues and u.s. national security policy. michael rubén, ira aei resident scholar and michael, i was a traditional teitelbaum, also a senior lecturer at the naval postgraduate school on middle east affairs. and finally next to me, sorry everybody, i have a cold. i apologize if i sniff the route. it's not a motion. next to me is kathleen ridolfo who is arab affair analyst, but from 2002 until 2000 issue worked as an iraq analyst at radio liberty. karina, if we could ask you to start. thank you. >> thank you. i have been, in a sense, in the field of elections and transitions in conflict areas for high-risk environments for

the last 30 years of my life. starting with my own country in latin america. and in many ways, at every step of the process, you have to -- i mean, you find people that ask you the question, why elections? way basically not go through another type of arrangement? why are you betting on giving voice to the people so early in the processes? all of the transitions in which i have been involved in the latest one is afghanistan, from which i'm returning right now and i say two words about that in a moment. but basically, when you choose

the electoral path, basically you're making several beds. one of them is the fact that elections are going to go from hot to cold and bare therefore going to go from identity issues about the past, issues that are extremely violent and expressed in violence, with violence of political language to core issues that have to do with delivery of services, governors, the art of governors and providing and the things they require. and in many ways, this has been a path that has also been followed by the iraqi process. the other problem that people don't understand is that elections are not events. they are basically processes. long-term processes. and many times we have to fight

with what i would say is sort of impatience of the media, impatience of the stakeholders in a strong case of add in terms of the international community. that basically don't remember from where we started and where we are going. elections are also about building institutions, including political parties in many ways. and you have to build them through electoral engineering many times and you have to build them through rules of the game and basically through negotiation of the rules of the game. most people don't realize that the first documents that probably is negotiated after a conflict or during a conflict is not necessarily the constitution, but that part of the electorate of the

constitution that has to do with electoral provisions, elect oral how we divide power, et cetera, et cetera then, two things that i learned. one that i learned in my own country, which is basically that you don't negotiate democratization with democrats. so it is also an education of the elites, and education of the political establishment and an education of the people. and finally, something that is present in the spirit shall exercise is. when the founder of the jesse jesuits was asked a question, but i don't believe in god. yet a fantastic answer which is basically arrays if you believed in one day you will. so it's about creating habits

and basically also forcing habits but also the force of habit in terms of not discussing the issues through other mechanisms, including violence. but discussing it through institutional arrangements, discussion of world in the ballot box. and that is, in a sense, the path that we tuck when the process of the iraqi transition occurred. iowa's first called to start negotiation with jerry brimmer at the time, what sort of passed. unfortunately that discussion was interrupted by the demise of surge and basically the bombing of the hotel. and they later returned with --

and responsible for the arrangements in the organization of the first elections. and it was international for the southern and five. so that's more or less that sort of platform from which i'm talking. i also have to say that i meant these don't represent my current organization. they are my own. but in many ways i wanted to extract some lessons from that sort of bad that we took at the time. and from afar, i can see that basically in terms of the ballots, the habit has been

acquired. in iraq it discusses roles and in fact in many ways, fight within contained by the rules of the game of basically the democratic game, the rules about the electoral, the electoral politics. and in many ways, many of the things that we see our iraqi politicians being politicians and not being warlords or tribal leaders. in that sense, that is a big, big advantage. the other trend that basically emerged from the provision council elections, was basically the whole issue of the evolution of the vote of the citizenry. because in many ways, the citizens voted not so much about the message that we all extract

did was that the vote was nonsectarian, but it was also. it might've been nonsectarian, but it was a very strong anti-incumbent because of the inability of the politicians in power to basically provide basic services and provide therefore what we can call bread and butter issues. and that's, in a sense, is a very interest in evolution in terms of iraq. the process that we are seeing right now is basically obviously the fiddling with the rules of the game. a sort of judas was a sham with the anti-de-baathification commission that might reopen the wounds of the past and basically the emergence of fear mongers and fears. or with a certain degree.

what are the risks in terms of the process of many of course? one of the risks, the most important risk is that basically voters grow disillusioned with the electoral politics in order to solve, address their problems and therefore that should be a set back. because we are talking about -- when we were in baghdad, even in 2004, 2005, they were talking about the democratic dividend. they were talking about the provision of basic services of electricity. that is still not the case and basically the current process might hamper the possibilities of the formation of a government soon and therefore basically

voters also a vote by not showing up at the polls, but also vote by basically reverting to previous ways of solving their problems and that is the tribal and so on. of course, there's always the risk of the nonacceptance of the results, whatever those results are going to be, at the politics becomes too polarized. and then, i want to basically mention one thing, which is basically a worse kind in terms of globally and then i'm going to talk to minutes about afghanistan. one is it's the fact that we have seen the emerging again, the ugly face of basically a sort of claim that

pseudo-sovereignty, to a fight against timely interventions of the international community in many ways and from other at risk, including national actors. every time that their diplomatic interventions, or the u.n. intervene and say you cannot do it because discoursed against sound electoral practice and found international practice. and that is particularly the case when we are discussing fraud and we are discussing basically observer statements. and it's something that is not only happening in iraq, it happened in afghanistan in the last process. and it's extremely worrisome because we might have a reversion to previous ways of

thinking. in terms of what lessons can be extracted from iraq to afghanistan, because afghanistan is an open process, obviously have to be very careful about what i say because i am still involved. but basically one of the biggest problems that we have seen emerge is a fiddling with the electoral rules as per the recent of president karzai. that degree has also the potential of the many de-baathification condition, article iii of the decree, basically in the states that candidates are going to be vetted by the security forces, with little or no input from the commission, with little and no input from the u.n. and from the

isaf. where is everybody is concentrating on the issue of the electoral complete commission. for me, that is a lot more -- that issue is a lot more serious than the one of the electorate commission. and we should be monitoring it. thank you. >> well done. very timely. >> well, thank you, danny and thank you for organizing this panel. i'm very privileged to be on it with such distinguished people and good friends. i served with carina in baghdad and was very thankful when she parachuted in to figure out how it was we would create this election system and working with iraqis to do so. i'm going to make three quick points today. first, is i think these elections in iraq are going to be about the future, not about the past.

second, that the electoral system that we now have will tend to cement emerging local and regional parties within the broader coalitions that exist. and three and related the coalition formation because of those first two issues will be extremely complicated after the elections take place. so .1, these elections are about the future, not the past. as karina mentioned, in january 09, provincial elections, voters had had it. they have had it with islamic slogans. they have had it with the pretenses that their issues are being addressed and looked forward to throwing the bums out. and they threw the bums out. i don't think there was an incumbent, very few incumbents were left in the. people did not want to hear religious slogans. they wanted to hear solutions to their problems. it was very retail politics. but at the same time, despite

the fact that these were local elections, people voted for more centralism. they rejected federalism. they have had it up to here with the kurds. they wanted to have a stronger central government that could take care of their issues. they repudiated the federal compact i collaborated by hakim islamic supreme council for iraq and the notion of a large kurdish regional government like area in the south. they wanted more centralism. in the car below, in fact, a former baathist governor was the largest vote-getter at the time. he won more votes than practic leak any single individual in all of iraq during these provincial elections. ..

of overestimated the impact of this process and its contribution to good the legitimization of the process as some would like to paint. at the same time i want to point

elving i think part of the reason this issue has become so big is the party is associated with the iraq national alliance were looking for a wedge issue to bring themselves back politically from the debacle of january, 2009. and i think this is a big problem for them. the reason i think it's a big problem for them is there isn't one shia party or even sunni party really that is pro baathist that wants to see a return of the baath party to iraq treated there for the south especially the parties, the voters are antibaathist, so first all you have to convince them that the return of the baath, the number one issue in this election you have to convince them that's the number-one issue u.s. second for hakim and others to have to convince iraqi voters that even if it is the number-one issue, and i don't think it is that

even if it is the number-one issue they are the best positioned to deliver on keeping the baathist side of government i don't think that's going to happen. one of the of the reasons i think this is about the future and of the past is even with sola band as a part of the justice accountability commission decision he initially said he was going to boycott the elections had to respond to his own constituents who said hugh candian them but we are going to run which ultimately forced him to back off and say actually we are going to run and are very enthusiastic about running and please get out and vote for us. and perversely i think for the ina, the iraq national alliance is the justice and accountability commission's rulings have cemented the base of that constituency that now is going to turn out every single voter it can in order to bring

about the change that it's looking for a. so although there's been much about this issue and i know michael and others will talk a little bit more about its i think as a wedge issue it may actually backfired on the speed and the issue of concern, and i understand why people would be concerned not it is not likely to be the definitive issue of this campaign. point number two, fathi elections will serve to cement cross i regional parties and local parties as constituent members of the national coalitions and in 2005 elections, iraq was one single district and also closed list the implications of that one single district in the close list is that political party

leaders are vastly strengthened. they get to determine who is on the list and where and it's a national list. no connection between the people voting and the people they ultimately he liked so you liked some of the list. the person may live in baghdad. what is it to you if you live in basra? in this election there are the multi member constituencies within the government's so the political parties and coalitions that are forming are trying to find powerful attractive local candidates to run. and then they are creating these collisions. so the impact especially in places like manila province with a party is particularly strong is they are going to win overwhelmingly i think in the province and they are a constituent member of the rocky a coalition.

but what happens after they are elected if they have a larger number of seats from the province and they go to baghdad, those seats don't necessarily have to stay within that particular coalition. you can move them around. and what about in this house? where from the polls i've seen 30% of the people are still undecided. who are they voting for? why at this point in pulverize iraq with 30% of people be undecided? i think these are the cause i supporters of muqtada al-sadr. it's possible anyway. and if these people vote and they vote for muqtada al-sadr here it is difficult for me to see the organization, operating over the long haul. they tried in the elections in december of 2005 ultimately of course the united shiite list split into multiple components and i think it's going to do so

again. thagard and final point. the collision formation process which requires a great deal of consensus building and a great deal of compromise is going to take a lot of time. they are constitutional time line which i won't go into the constitutional time line is every bit line is that it means the process will take at least four months if they are met. and i don't think they are going to be met so we are talking five to six months. why do i think it's going to be so complicated? for a number of reasons but since i have no time going to focus on one and kathleen is to talk more about it but the kurdish alliance is going to be the most coherent bloc of

delegates and in the past the kurds have always been the most sought after partner because they are the king makers. in these elections no question is when to get more than 25 per cent which means at least to have to come together. but wine concern that is the kurds which note that the united states is cui to be leaving soon are going to want to strike the best bargain after these elections and it's their last chance and here is the challenge. if they push too hard, if they hold out too long there's going to be a temptation to form an antikurd coalition and you could see it, the outlines of something possible if mulkey stayed of law gets the most votes and can't convince the kurds to come in on a certain level, then iraq list could try to form a government with the

number of others creating antikurdish list. this will be extremely dangerous. extremely dangerous. remember in the north getting a very solid list, national dialogue front incur caught doing extremely well, and you have a hard line united kurdish alliance in the parliament being ignored or pushed out. this can be extremely dangerous. so let me conclude. i think these elections are going to surprise us as they have every time they are held. i think more people will turn of the we think will turnout. i think there will be lost complaints if they are as well observed as they were last time i think they will be less. it's going to require patients on everyone's front to allow the political process to work in the coalition to form. the united states government and

the obama administration is going to have to be patient. it should avoid getting too heavily involved in the collision formation process, and it should avoid personalizing policy as it did unfortunately with the justice and accountability commission. there seems to be a rule of law issue for ambassador hill and general odierno. this came about a person and that was an irony in agent. this was a mistake and they should avoid it in the past. thank you. >> thank you to read it's an honor to be here. when michael contacted me to join the panel, he mentioned one of his colleagues was unable to ftp to attend and i don't know about you but the first person as the replete met i don't know if i would have picked brian from the center of american progress. [laughter] but we do have a lot in common on the panel and we have worked

on iraq for a long period of time and i've been on panels with scott before and have lively exchanges with michael. what i would like to do is fulfill my brief and try to talk moly about the elections but about u.s. policies so three key points on the elections and then three about u.s. policy. very important. first, and i want to highlight this, i think it's extremely powerful that on sunday the voters are going to the polls. it's a very powerful thing i think is not recognized by enough people in this town and i see that as a progressive who has supported democracy and worked on democracy in the middle east a long period of time. personally when i first went into iraq in may of 2003i saw the trauma that was exact on iraqi society and to see the society potentially moving beyond in this election i'm hopeful for that. second, we are not merely close to having a stable democracy in

sight of iraqi these days and for a number of reasons. scott talked about the debaathification curve awful mostly from the political angle. i think it represents and says a lot about the institutional maturity of a set of iraqi institutions and lack of transparency and i think that the befuddlement for those of you trying to watch this and talk to the iraqi context what is going on is the lack of transparency in the process is worrisome but it's also for those who have gone through and worked on space transitions it's probably not an outlier. it takes time to these institutions and if you look at the things i've written it's been about an over emphasis in our policy approach on security and security forces and not enough on how to help other iraqi institutions stand on their own. that said i think there were broad concerns about the respect

for human rights and iraqi society and of personal concern about the state of christians and this is a live issue today and the mosul province. it's a broad issue. i think it's a consequence and sad consequence the we we went about trying to promote freedom without enough attention to issues such as these and i think there are also concerns we should watch for in the post election period about the role of security forces and whether or not some elements could be used in a political way. we should watch because there have been some signs about that so we are not out of the woods. the second point it's very much still in a fragile state. it's a lot better than it was in 2006 and 2007. iraq acting national security adviser told me the conference a few weeks ago he was deeply concerned about the over militarization of policy and politics in side of iraq and i

think that's an important week. the last thing michael and two others will look at is we are moving into a very uncertain period. not only on election day but post-election period. i'm not going to place bets who might emerge as the next iraqi leader because we could all have a separate to our discussion just on that. there will be complex collections that may be formed and there's a added elements how the next iraqi president it's chosen. it's different than the past process not requiring supermajorities and not requiring the sorts of mechanisms aimed at fostering consensus but may have in fact actually helped contribute to some of the deadlock in iraqi politics we have seen for a long time so those are the three points, simple points but this is i think an important opportunity and we hope iraqi leader's i think the voters will see we hope the leader sees this

to advance iraq democracy. there are very worrisome signs i think about just what human rights, the rights of minorities, things that are not addressed in the elections that need to be addressed in long-term work inside the iraqi government and third the uncertainty i think mike will talk about that we addressed the open list system i think introduces potential for great uncertainty and surprises on sunday but the big supplies comes in the weeks and months in the negotiations over forming a government. three points on u.s. policy and my first will be a minority position in this room i think shared by many americans and around the world on the balance for u.s. policy i think the iraq war is stealing that negative. we are still in the midst of a selfish preparation trying to correct mistakes that were made particularly from 2003 to 2006.

we can debate this but i think we are still trying to take a sad song and make it better inside of iraq and i think we need to recognize that. on several fronts to u.s. national security which is the core focus we look at our americans more secure and are they see first offered on many accounts. first and foremost on terrorism i was in afghanistan recently and i know the tactics and technology. these things i think were enhanced and developed in a light training ground that simply did not exist before. i'm not for giving saddam hussein should have stayed around. just the way we handled the post saddam transition i think opened the door to bigger problems and a spread of the threat for the u.s. national security interest. iran which was discussed in the context of iraqi politics and maybe we will talk about it and build more but i think iran is

growing influence of the iraq war mike and we it was prosecuted and contributed and the iraq war also to a large extent was made to show and say something about american power after 9/11 and it's only succeeded showing its limits so we are in the process of rebuilding. this administration is pragmatic and trying to rebalance the portfolio and brought in national security without abandoning iraq and its key to stress in the political debates we often hear the accusation obama is abandoning iraq to iran and that's it and i think it's something much more transformative going on. the second point we are in the midst of a policy transition that i rockies and american support and it's not just about the troops. much of our debate i think is focused on troop training and last summer u.s. troops withdrew from the cities and there was a lot of hyperventilating what impact this would have and i

think yes it is a fragile security situation but i think i rockies are demonstrating a willingness to take on a lot of their own internal secure the challenges. what i would like to see is more debate about the other elements of american power including economic development assistance, the sort of things the state department an expanded mission is at least set to do. we had to agreement signed by the bush administration before he left office, the agreement that laid out a timetable for the troops drawdown and a separate strategic framework agreement which mapped out a very comprehensive set of dot i's on bilateral relations and political economic social and educational ties and from my perspective these agreements were linked as the u.s. began to disengage militarily. it is needed to increase its support rather than at and in

iraq due to the institution building activities i suggested earlier in the first part of my talk. i have concerns that will likely focus on that and do that properly and its tight how the state department operated for years and decades and the lack of balance not only just resources but whether it can deliver and i know scott, you worked there and have seen some of those constraints. the last point and i will close here is i have a bigger concern about u.s. policy overall and glycol strategic and coherence in the broad regional policy and i think it is a in coherence in iraq and brought middle east this existed essentially since we took the decision to go to war in iraq in 2003 and we haven't reconciled big issues. this administration has only begun to reconcile this in coherence. i think very simplistically and 1980's we had a policy supporting the saddam hussein regime as a buffer against iran

and the clinton administration had a dual containment policy and we have entered into something after this iraq war something quite different that at this stage i don't think the pieces add up when we look at the ticket items for u.s. policy in the region and as a policy analyst i think this is a -- is somebody watching? [laughter] this is incoherence that the bridges to administrations and i think this election and iraq if it produces the leadership and if it produces the opportunity for strong ties between the united states and iraq it can help us sort through our income appearance but issues like iran and whether we are going to actually get iraq to support in our broad efforts in iran remain a very open question and at this stage it depends who emerges as the leader of iraq so a lot of these things we cannot control ourselves. a lot of it is contingent on the type of partners that he urged

and as we move forward on other policy agenda items including the iranian nuclear program watching what happens inside of iraq and thinking through in a textured way in a nuanced way ma just we are handing over iraq to iran i think it's going to be a fundamental struggle for several years now. thank you. >> michael? >> thank you very much. no one knows the outcome of these elections and it's refreshing to see that when we are talking about elections in the arab world. it's a positive outcome. i want to stress repeating some of the points made by my colleagues on the panel i've got to agree with scott about the importance of the open list. it's amazing the important, the devil was often in the details and oftentimes in the broad american community we don't pay enough attention to the details but it's great because we are abandoning a system that really in power more demagogic forces

and we are talking about a system which politicians can finally become accountable to people rather than to ordinary citizens rather than powerbrokers and this is also interesting a lot of people work on this, i have to credit for a lot of the pressure to move towards a more open list and the u.s. embassy and others also contributed to this also interesting because many iraqi politicians found it in their interest to also increase the open list and criticized their opponents as being proponents of the closed list of protecting interest and so forth. we saw this especially with in iraq and kurdistan but i will let kathleen talk about that. the coalition building at the last municipal elections as also incredibly important when we look at the space evolution. i see democracy as a process and certainly the process is nowhere near complete.

but it is rather healthy rather than the maximo list attitudes taken so often in 2003, 2004i iraqis are willing to embrace the idea or accept the idea they can campaign hard and heavy against their opponents and the same opponents are going to be the partner as they try to strike deals. most importantly and not often discussed, oftentimes in washington we like to assume everything revolves around us and is response to our plans and too seldom do we take into account the variable time that sometimes no matter how well laid out the plans it takes time to increase new attitudes to allow the changes to the sword. once the new government forms and let's assume it lasts for years we are going to have a situation that people entering baghdad university less than seven or 8-years-old at the time

saddam hussein's government ended and in reality what we are going to see in this next government is a transitional government we're mentally the iraqis especially young iraqi scan start to purge themselves of some of the baggage we are still dealing with now as we try to transition iraq to a more space system. i agree with both scott and brian on different issues relating to the debaathification qualifications certainly i lament the lack of transparency and certainly the state of human rights in iraq and i hope with the open list system this can improve a little bit but it's printed a lot of outside pressure. however, we have to be worried about the blow back coming in a few different directions. how did we get to where we are with regard to the debaathification disqualifications? the u.s. embassy from early on basically from the period inside the collision provisional authority recognized or came to the conclusion that de-baathification was occurring in the wrong way and especially

under the ambassador afterwards lobbied hard in order to abandon the de-baathification and this is where we started having work with the iraqis and frankly with u.s. embassy drafting of the justice and accountability law which removed restrictions against baptists. what happened subsequent is it seems that the followers of muqtada al-sadr your who were reducing independence in parliament work to reduce this and in effect there is no mention of the saddam baath to apply it than perhaps they could have done with the initial de-baathification. it became effective on february 14th, 2008 under ambassador crocker signed by the presidential council including. i tend to trust scott in his criticisms of the process but

there's different versions of out whether the justice and accountability commission said that the de-baathification commission personnel can stay on the until a new was appointed. what is clear however that this is where i also want to extract the lesson from what certainly is an unfortunate occurrence is where petraeus and maliki, general petraeus and prime minister maliki worked on the security plan for baghdad general petraeus pressured maliki to throw out this renewed de-baathification commission. what we should extract however it is a sign of influence and political cynicism that it's back now at this point in time and we do have to recognize to borrow the phrase that we are no longer necessarily the strong course the people want to ally themselves with because whether they like america, whether they like what we say diplomatically

or not it seems increasingly people are going to make accommodation with the forces that might replace america after the eventual u.s. military withdrawal. i do want to see a couple of words about the shiite. i worry about iranian influence and have been writing about it since my first trip to southern iraq in 2003 when i was still inside the coalition provisional authority. my concerns were dismissed them and i've read about it as soon as i got out of government in 2004. i don't think anyone can accuse me of not being suspicious about why iranian intentions. that said it's wrong to secede iranian influence only with shia. and here i do want to point out that as we talk about withdrawing, we have to worry about the iranian influence from the other party as well. not only some of the arab sunni instances or so-called secular of list but also with regard to the kurds in a very large way.

i do want to also emphasize however not all shia are the same. during the i ran -- gura nye war it was like world war i with poise and grass to get gas and barbwire and so forth. it wasn't a famous sons on the front-line fighting against iranians. often times it was the shia conscript's treated like dirt by saddam hussein's regime. we have to recognize there's still a force of iraqi nationalism on the shia in fact if the united states underestimated the psychological impact of occupation, the iranians have underestimated the importance of iraqi nationalism all along. the idea that there can be a grand coalition between maliki's state of the wall list and the alliance to be is laughable it might exist on paper but i can't imagine shia and iraq as diverse political and fractious as they

are sticking to the eckert there is devoting as if the had the party loyalty of the british parliament. de-baathification i also wanted me now seems in many cases to be more on the popular among americans than it is in white swath of iraq. i mean al anbar accepted, but in a vast swaths we used to throw out these statistics that 55% of iraq was shia mostly because of the southern provinces. however given the flight of refugees especially sunnis refugees and given the lack of census i think it is safe to say the proportion of the arab persius is even larger now. now, when i was recently in iraq i had the opportunity to meet with one of the grand ayatollahs and what najif and i got the

importance of 1991. each one brought up this idea that in 1991 the united states purposely abandon the the shia to saddam hussein's gunships and it doesn't matter whether that is right or wrong because in the middle east generally speaking perception means more than reality but it would be a mistake to underestimate the impact of that historical what we see as a historical episode on iraqi attitudes today and this also goes to the nature of de-baathification as well as iraqi and specifically in talking abut general iraqi shiite attitudes towards general petraeus and general odierno. it's not politics in washington to criticize general petraeus but iraqi shia both clergy and politicians were talking about general petraeus as being naive

when it came to the baath and he could be antagonistic to the shia. we do have to recognize this especially with of the recognition that we in many ways are becoming actors in iraq and people are naturally reacting against us but also this idea the baath could be in power to pave the way for a smooth u.s. withdraw seems to be gaining residents in southern iraq whether that's the act quality of what is going on or not i don't know but the fact of the matter is we have to deal with the perception. a few problems as i conclude i am worried about election fraud we can talk about this during questions and answers. i'm worried about people gaming the system by purposely awaiting specific ballot boxes if they feel they are not going to win the district they could try to

cheat in the district. there is less faith in the independent commission of iraq now and perhaps there was a couple years ago and also even though it's laughed at in the united states after all we have spent so much blood and treasure on this episode there's a widespread belief i heard again and again from the shia, sunni and kurds and people on the iraqi military about the possibility that someone could try to stage a coup in 2011. that doesn't mean it would be successful. most people thought it would never be successful. and at the last point that i want to make as i conclude and turn the floor over to kathleen is oftentimes we focus our analysis even though we haven't been on this panel on personalities, on maliki and sterilizing will the president talabani. i'm nervous whenever we put more faith in an individual than the strength of a system especially when we have a situation with respect of violence that's

always able live away from the removal of the symbol official and with that let me turn the floor for to kathleen. >> you were the only one who went over in time despite yelling at me to be ruthless in my moderation before hand. so there. [laughter] thank you. >> michaels prerogative i guess. [laughter] thank you. it's a pleasure to be here. thank you for addressing the subject because it's very important. a few people have already noted the importance of this election but it is immensely important for the kurds both locally and nationally. within the kurdistan region of course the kurds particularly kurdistan alliance which is made up of the two main parties it would be the question whether or not they would hold on to power. we had a parliamentary election for the kurdish region in july

in which an opposition group winstrol 25% of the seats in parliament much to the loss. so the kurds will be looking to see how well they fare in the region nationally the issues go to all of these outstanding questions whether or not there will be resolved by the next government of course we know if you let iraq the past seven years the issues are pushed back but have to be dealt with and we know in the coming years and this year alone we will have a census. we are scheduled to have a sense this. i know that was long past due so that may be again. the issue of what role will the half with in the iraqi army and what levels will they be allowed to keep in the kurdish region. issues like oil. these will be coming to a head

so it's important to have a strong position in baghdad coming out of this election. again enormous turmoil in the kurdistan region on the ground leading up to this election particularly because it is challenging the puk so what you see is unfortunately some very on the democratic acts going on in the region, attacks on journalists and on canada so you have seen a number of candidates shot at in the last week. one was killed in the last month offices being attacked, verbal attacks in the press. one of the most stark commentaries was last week with an independent kurdish newspaper had a blank page you have guns but we have pens. so the kurds are following this

issue with or not people are moving from the kurdistan alliance the parties on both sides are claiming victory so you see in the kurdish press every day headlines where it says hundreds of supporters have come back to the puk and they claim of hundreds of gone back and thousands are coming our way. so time will tell how that will play out. we will know in a week or couple of weeks from now when the results come in but it's interesting because guram is campaigning on this idea we are forward thinking and we are about the change in the system, eliminating corruption and cronyism. ironically much the same argument the puk used when i was established it was established

from elite coming out of the kdp it's almost a cyclical thing of course if you are from a detractor for guram you will argue it is made up of the puk so how different can they be and frankly in terms of policy they are very much aligned. they will say it comes down to implementation. we want to implement on a different level. the puk supporters will say that guram wants nothing more than power and money and that's why they've broken away so they are in on unproven entity and remains to be seen whether the voters will continue to support such an entity but it's important in terms of democracy, democratic to the limit and pluralism in the region nonetheless. in terms of power in the region

the kdp holds more power than any other group having been weakened. for now they remain aligned with the puk. they are on a joint list and in terms of policy they are supporting the p u.k. however maintaining contact with members of guram so you see members coming in having meetings with the kdp. fairly routine. also you have issues going on where the kdp appears to be trying to assert its power over the puk so you see he left baghdad, deputy prime minister. he's from the puk to get you into the kurdish region and was replaced by a member of the kdp. the puk has renominated and member of its party to be the kurdish vice president and the

kdp has not ruled on that yet. they still haven't approved it. this has been going on a couple of months now. some might argue the kdp is trying to influence and take more than it normally would and taken advantage of that situation. the big course in the region of course this can the puk balance back. they've taken steps in the last few weeks to try to improve the image to try to make sure voters know the puk is open to change and accountability. he instituted an internal audit and said that maybe the first to be audited of course and is encouraging other eletes within the puk to submit their financial backgrounds and submit to this audit said the puk is taking steps. in terms of kirkuk we see the same battle brewing.

the puk has a strong hold. guram is on the ground fighting this every step of the way so it's very petty you see things like election posters torn down, candidates attacking each other, physically or verbally. you see a lot of anger on the streets. but again when you look at a place like kirk and it applies to all of the party whoever ethnicity or you will support your ethnicity for stand party second. can guram make inroads? it remains to be seen. he's campaigning on this idea of a joint administration. guram says the kurdistan regional government which wants to incorporate crewcut into the kurdish region has not done enough to make that proposal attractive to the other groups living in kirkuk so there are

doing there's no political space for the other groups in the kurdistan regional government. they have reacted to that by saying that's not right we are open to this and in fact we are open to the possibility of having a joint administration. this something you don't hear about. they've made references to this, vague references in the past. he commented on it again recently, his deputy also commented on it a little bit more at length in january saying we do need to take a hard look at the puk and how we have acted towards kirkuk and try to be more inclusive, and we are indeed open to the idea of a joint administration. of course in iraq in the campaign season all things can be said and retract leader so we

don't know whether or not this will hold. in terms of baghdad the big issues for the kurds will they be aligned if guram does well? guram is claiming about 20 seats in the parliament. if they do by chance when those seats will they stay allied with the kurdistan alliance, this is important. i don't believe guram will go against the kurdistan alliance on big issues especially if they're related to kurdistan because no one wants to be seen as giving an inch of land of kurdistan or giving up the kurdish fight also for the arab partners because of these big issues paul leal and pushmataha and kirk who is the valuable partner. someone made reference to this. the problem is there is growing animosity towards them and it doesn't matter what party look at, it can be sunni or shia.

i don't think there's one party that exists in iraq today that doesn't have members that feel the kurds have overstepped in their ambitions and it's something you hear talk about a lot below the surface and i think the kurds are starting to become acutely aware that this will be the big challenge who are their partners in the next government and i guess i will stop there. thanks. -- before the jury much. those were wonderful presentations. i'm going to open the floor to questions in just a moment but it struck me there were two things that interested at least me that we didn't talk about very much. the first is our timeline. the united states -- united states withdraw. some of my colleagues and i had the opportunity to sit down with folks from the military and our embassy in baghdad to talk a little bit about this and it

seems to me this time line of withdrawal and transition from combat to non-combat and then complete withdrawal is dictating absolutely everything and that is not a sort of conditions based imperative but is an imperative of that could lead us to hand off things a little bit perhaps quickly than we would otherwise want. understanding i think as broadly and said we all want to see this withdrawal had been so i'm curious what the speakers have to say. the other thing i quickly want to ask about and we talked about this a lot on fi de-baathification questions i do wonder -- the iraqi government explored during this one way and another way. at the end of today however there has not been any brilliant suggestion for any truth and

reconciliation in iraq and the lack of ability to separate the present and future from the past seems to me to be a handicap which presents opportunities always for those who want to exploit -- it's not right to call a day bogie, they were an awful party and had more adherents than just saddam hussein and his two sons. but that is a problem for the future of iraq and i wondered people think. i turn to the floor now. >> anybody? nobody? there you go. >> i am not a military logistics but i do look at iraqi politics the way this time line actually evolved and in the closing stages of the bush administration they are demanding this timeline. i don't know how strong the

demand remains once the government changes and once they have elections and there is a new set of leadership in my view there's been a strong and national in polls of declaration of sovereignty on the part of the iraqis. my personal perspective on the streets of iraq and 03 and in 04 shaped a lot of my own analysis the you never did a second chance to make a first good impression of the way we have made up for some of the past mistakes. so the points that i would say on the timeline is that any suggestion from coming from the u.s. first and foremost may complicate iraqi politics in ways that may not match up with the security situation if you understand my read and if i could make it clearer if we are suggesting we should stick around longer as opposed to iraqis, suggesting it could create certain this functionality is of the sort of

any type of intervention and whatever we think about vice president fighting's intervention i looked at the iraqi press and arabic press and saw how it was characterized and some vicious vociferous terms as a zionist coming to the country trying to reinstitute the sunnis into the system so yes these are largely out of your views but even within the mainstream iraqi politics suggestion coming from the u.s. and may create certain complications from a u.s. policy perspective i'm not certain staying there gets any more leverage. a u.s. policy question at this point michael eluted to inductors is how much leverage to be actually have at this stage presumably we have more with more troops in the country among certain factions but i'm not certain how clean but winds up. ytd to people who made proposals titled conditional engagement

and have elaborate schemes to tailor the security assistance in ways that could help effective rate political outcomes on the big questions like constitutional reform and arid kurdish question. i've been skeptical of that because i don't -- i think it is too complicated by half. please listen briefly on the de-baathification question and truth and reconciliation commission i agree it's not been resolved, it's been an issue and eight foreign in the site of many iraqi. i would add to that iraqi side talk to when they look at the period from 2005 to 2007, and the activities of the militia and people who still have not been brought to justice for things that have happened recently i would add it is even more complicated than trying to get people to account for crimes in the world war i crimes under saddam and after. it is even more complicated but i think by that period of time

and the fact you have anywhere from i don't know the latest estimates from three to four iraqis still living in places they did not live in 2003. idp said refugees and i've probably over analyzed the idp is politically but i'm curious to see how they play out in these elections and to actually if anyone is there a police in this election because i had the presumption while the surge helped lead to decline in violence, iraq is much more fractured and still remains fragmented and always i am curious to see in the results of the concerns of the idp and refugees bubble up and then the answer importantly by the political system later this year and early next. >> on the policy issue i think i agree with brian however i would say that one of the things we should not do is speak out publicly like i did general

odierno did saying that he has a plan be should things go badly are not the inside of iraq i don't know how helpful that is. i do think that we have a great degree of influence still if we use it wisely and i think part of the challenge is to play the cards we have in an intelligent way and sometimes i don't think we are doing that so terribly well. on the justice and reconciliation issue i would call attention to the first minister of poland who used to talk about thick line of history to say there is the future and there's the past and we are going to just kind of forget about it, and poland today is still going through this process of looking at its past in terms of who is a communist, who wasn't, who benefited from the system and who didn't and it's

happening in other parts of central and eastern europe as well, east germany is another example so i think this process is going to move in fits and starts. one thing on strongly believe the zero ase reconciliation as a notion has been much more our conception than an iraqi consumption. accommodation? great. we want to look for ways to accommodate with one another but reconciliation, we are not quite there yet. and in order for there to be true if there has to be justice so it is no accident this was the justice and accountability lal not just and reconciliation that there is one thing has to come before the other and so i think that it's going to be two steps forward, one step backwards but i also think strongly that these local committees are getting out of control. they are out of control and the government has to train them and

because it's leading to a great deal of intimidation and as one of my colleagues has referred to as incipient mccarthyism it has to be avoided, has to be reined in because the de-baathification is a very serious and required process, don't politicize, don't cheapen it. >> i don't think i'm going to attempt to summarize my thoughts in terms of time lines and impact of the troops but i wanted to give my the true sense of wisdom in terms of a truth and reconciliation because i am probably the only one in this panel that has -- that was raised in the military dictatorship in a country that had the honor of having a high

political ratio of political prisoners per capita in the world in 1978. and today is a very special day for us because secretary of state clinton is attending the inauguration of one of the insurgents that word hostages for 15 years of the military regime and who went through the polls was tortured other times by the way and in the same election they rejected a referendum to basically abolish the amnesty against the military. it took 20 years. my first point is basically anybody who has lived through

this sort of process and rejects the work for conciliation. you don't reconciled. you live with it. but your children don't reconcile either. for than come for my kids is the equivalent of talking about world war ii therefore it is removed from their experience basically they don't care any longer. the problem is how do you get from there to hear and that has to do with basically closing the past in many ways and the local committees do not help in closing the past. the fact of criminalizing one of the things we learned in latin america is basically that to the

barbarians who oppose the law and therefore you don't create flawed process these of basically taking people to task for act committed in the past without recourse to the law. that is exactly the opposite of what is happening right now in iraq so in many ways, it has to do with a comprehensive strategy. it has to do with education, it has to do with time but it also has to do with making sure institutional arrangements are in place so that even your worst enemies and people who tortured you basically have what you didn't have which was the law. >> will set psp for free much. but we opened of floor for questions. if you didn't hear to the rules come before a microphone, state your salt and put it in the short form of a question. the microphone is here.

sir. >> thank you. cno resources. the discussion so far seems to have focused on persons and party maneuvering and mention of local issues but our international issues beyond the de-baathification. what about discussion of all the major issues we hope by the election will help results like hydrocarbon law, the disputed territories, the thrust of economic development, the delivery of services, constitutional forms and so on. so are their national elections or is it really about local politics, politicians and de-baathification? >> i would have to see those issues and that sort of campaign which i think maliki and others really want to discuss was a victim of this kerf waffle as we've been putting it related to the de-baathification issue.

i think when it emerged as an issue to come at a certain stage of the election campaign where the pri minister and his party had to take part to the right and it became this huge debate within society and consumed the national newspapers everyone was talking about that to the bis service of many of these core what i would call you are right, national issues. but i would also sue because the electoral law and feel you to have a national list to go alongside some of the constituencies is the issues really are more localized because the parties of that are running are running in the governance and have specific interests that they want to protect so the national agenda will only be set after those groups are in the parliament and are able to set the national agenda. it's not going to be the same

national agenda that went into these elections because of the new political actors that will emerge on the speech national league. >> if i can add to that in this case it seems the externals countries are often times baliles. they've made much out of saudi arabia's animosity -- receive animosity to permit mr. mulkey and vice versa the shiites are being perceived as just being pawns of iran even though this far more complex than that to be that same time, the open at list accountability ase in fighting development in a different way. look, turkey announced its opening a consulate in irbil. and when you go to iraq, kristin gore frankly baghdad or i'm sorry, basra najif, most of the more investment turkish come in the south much of the investment is iranian. when you go to baghdad would always strikes me when i go to baghdad is you don't see any cranes on top of the buildings,

you don't see any signs that debt is getting buildup or indeed it is changed much in the last several years but in this way accountability of politicians matter. people are talking about who was able to bring development to najif at the converse to that is who took too much money off the top the disenfranchised or stole money from ordinary civilians. in baghdad will be interesting to see whether any discussion is sparked by the open list about why so little is happened here in terms of development. one of the metrics i'm going to be carried is about is how many people actually return to parliament. when i talk to folks of bad debt and for cities on set within four years the expect 50% of the faces in parliament now to remain in parliament. the would be to reduce what happens with that before we move forward with the issue of a wide scale national issues as you have said.

>> three quickly all of these outstanding issues i said they are important for the kurds but more than that, if you are a political party or person campaigning in a government do you really want to highlight these issues? because what you're highlighting particularly if you are running for reelection as you fail to achieve them in the last four years so it's something no one wants to talk about. for the sable you definitely don't want to talk about federalism because they paid for that. the iraqi voters said we don't want federalism, so the same can be said about other issues going on particularly when you get to places like basra where people were outspoken about the what they want. so if it is just the idea of what's not rock the boat. let's try to focus on other

things and the de-baathification issue was perfect for that because it refocused peoples energy's on something that candidates can get behind. >> a couple of reasons up. this one please. ..

it really did awaken iraqi nationalism in a way that they, among the shia that perhaps surprise the iranians. one of the big takeaways would be bad if there is any military strike on iran for example this summer, that is likely going to be in that timeframe when iraq doesn't really have a government, when it is going to be a lame duck government if it takes 45 months to put together this coalition that is something we need to have in the back of our minds. the other thing precisely i'm worried about, i had the opportunity to meet with officials from the south oil company in basra. there is a lot of discussion about closing the straits of

hormuz and what worries me much more swept militias might do to take off-line the southern iraqi oilfields which after all provide about 70% of iraq's oil. that way if it closes the strait of hormuz, you more or less, if you close the straits of hormuz you more or less stop iran's own oil exports and if you take out iraq's port or if you take out the oilfields iran can benefit from the price spike in oil. >> if i could add, my concerns about strategic incoherence. this hits the nail on the head and whatever the policy lever is used by the united states in the international community the question i have this is where does iraq fit into that and when i talk to people in this administration i don't see a clear picture. they talk generally about trying to help iraq reintegrate itself with its neighbors and michael is correct in terms of what i think is a sea change in turkey. two years ago turkey was invading northern iraq and now it is opening consulates.

the thing from u.s. policy perspective that concerns me is i don't think we as a country this administration and the previous one too has sorted out how it reconciles its policy objectives on iran versus iraq. it is a question that came up when secretary rice was at one of these international contact on iraq meetings and she was after somebody was asked about iran's extensive investment and the cross-border trade and a lot of the extensive ties that exist naturally between two nations. if the overall imperative is to come as many people in this room have supported, try to pressure iran through sanctions and through a tightening of the news through diplomatic and economic -- do we have not only the iraqi central government is doing have the kurds onboard? i'm not certain that that is the case and i don't know that we will have an answer to that question because of the uncertainty that exists, that will exist in the iraqi

government and who is leading it. it creates a strategic conundrum for us which i don't think there is any easy answer to and just one last bit on the bid on the regional reintegration effort and we hear this from the pentagon and others, i don't know how well or what their precise proposal is to try to get iraq better court made it with a security strategy in the gulf air of states that the administration has been trying to develop. it is a big policy question and i don't know if anybody on the panel has an answer but it seems like an enormous inconsistency in the point of incoherence that did not exist before. 's pie will pie will certainly endorse brian's incoherence and wholeheartedly that there seems to be, as you say, the problem of incoherence between specific country policies and broader regional policy something that affects not just the last two administrations but is a consistency in washington in terms of iran, people oftentimes

talk about how we play checkers and the iranians play chess. i think that is a reflection of that incoherence. >> thank you for the panelists, for the presentation. i am from the washington institute. since last summer vice president biden has been the point man for the administration on iraq and has made it number of troops to iraq, and it looks like, very likely that he will still be the point man for the future. i'm wondering if any of the panelists would like to assist the vice president's performance with regard to iraq and does iraq need a special envoy just to focus on? >> if i may just speak more broadly and then perhaps turn the floor over to brian i am not going to address vice president biden per se but what i do want to highlight is a note of caution that when we go into

this coalition building efforts over the four or five months after the election, we have to recognize that nothing, that we cannot compartmentalize statements as much as oftentimes in washington we like to do, that everything that is set in washington is going to become a political football in iraq if it relates to iraq by some parties, by other parties, by some people claiming favor by other people asserting iraqi nationalism and so i would just extended note of caution not only to vice president biden staff but frankly too many in congress, to republican critics of this administration and so forth. we have got to be cognizant that nothing that is better said that is said in d.c. stays in d.c.. >> i think a fair assessment of his and waldman and i'm not certain exactly how much authority he has with the particular bureaucracies, those who work at the state department and others.

it matters how much he can actually say to chris hill, do this and he has got a large team in the embassy. this largest u.s. embassy in the world and getting larger. jack lou announced i think an increase in that sort of effort. one of the points that i maybe went through very quickly and i would take it far away from the notion of envoys and he was even the point person, it is important to have someone in the white house who is focused on this. hopefully someone with the stature of joe biden can make sure iraq stays iraq's days as a high priority agenda item in any crowded national security agenda. i worry that that is not the case, and you can read between the lines of my comments. i'm concerned that we don't have a fully integrated strategy. i'm not certain that simply having the vice president or a special envoy is the answer. making what you have got on the groundwork and work effectively, making sure to stitch together in an interagency process inside the u.s. government with the

pentagon which has far more resources and personnel at this moment and managing what i call recalibration, the theory of it, of a declining military presence with what the state department is doing. for instance the state department or has taken over the police training brief, and for those who have worked in the state department, the challenge just organizationally and institutionally is a major challenge. that is not solved by having a special envoy or not. it is a major issue and that doesn't even get into coordination with other international organizations like the united nations. i hate to sound market bureaucrat but this is how policy is actually done and we have civilian agencies that frankly don't operate as efficiently as they could and others on the panel can speak i think better from experience on that. so my answer would be you no vice president biden i think is

deeply interested in this issue. he has intervened in some ways that i think have created negative reactions but it is not the issue. i think the issue is how do you get the u.s. government any more integrated policy as it is managing one of the most complicated policy transitions we will try to undertake in the long period of time. president obama says we want to be careful getting out of iraq, as careless as we were getting in. i worry if we don't have senior management level attention on how we are doing what we are doing whether we will be getting out pretty carelessly. >> frank gunner, lehigh university. we spent 25 months in iraq as an economics adviser. before i went there i thought the biggest economic problems were security, oil and agriculture. when i left last year i was

convinced it was corruption and i know mr. rubin has spoken and written about this topic. i would like to know do you think the election or the election results will have an impact on the level of corruption in iraq? thank you. >> i will just say briefly with the obama system, the issue of corruption has become front and center in iraqi politics. it was a major factor in the election if you will of the islamic supreme council down in southern iraq. it wasn't just an issue of the federalism although that was also a factor. it is an issue with regard to prime minister maliki's staff. whatever recommendation he may have and he is a better recommendation than some of the people underneath him, to certainly been felt by some of the people underneath them with regard to how they are being pitted up in different provinces and so forth and as kathleen said, the whole existence of the

khaddam list is as a reaction to corruption in the kurdistan regional government specifically kurdistan, although as kathleen also said, it is an open question about whether if the good dumb is able to get in power whether it will be less corrupt than their predecessors were. we tend to focus a great deal on terrorism and terrorism inside iraq, terrorism is of course a huge issue but it affects a limited number of people. the difference with corruption is corruption affects people across the board in iraqi society whether it is in the health care system in iraq, whether it it is an everyday goods and services, whether it is ordinary people dealing with the police in the street. i do wish that one of the lessons that we extract from our time in iraq, once we put all the partisanship aside, is how do you best interim to a reconstruction nation-building

exercise without flooding, without using the amount of money allocated as a metric when all too often flooding that country with money can create almost as much harm as good. >> we will take one last question. maybe one or two last questions. missing people. thank you. >> my name is matt and i work with brian at the center. looking at the politics of iraq over the past few years we have seen the dawa party empowered by u.s. policy, other parties, religious parties such as the solders-- sadrists and it speaks him diversity some diversity among islamist political parties what lessons do you think can be drawn for u.s. policy toward islamic parties throughout the middle east from the last few years of politics in iraq?

>> thanks for the question. my view on this is perhaps heretical here in washington but the fact is what we have seen in iraq is when you open the political system and you begin to allow islamist to compete, that they collapse in on themselves because they can't deliver anything. i don't know why it is that we rush out to embrace the islamist politically, thinking that somehow they are the answer to the opposition everywhere in the world. it seems to me that the lesson from iraq is that islamists can't govern and when they, when they try, they quickly run up against the limits of the islamic is the solution slogan, so i would say that what we see even in the names-- you try to find the word islamic in the

political coalitions that exist in iraq today, you won't find it because it is not attractive. so i think that that is one of the lessons i would take is, let's worry about the system in pushing for opens political systems, where political parties can register, where there can be freedom of expression, where all the aspects and elements of an accountable system are in place and then let society function. >> let me add one thing to that. one of my greatest criticisms of democratization during the bush years was the willingness of the greater u.s. policy community to ignore or to legitimize political parties as the lyrical parties if they relied on militias in order to enforce their will. if you are going to go to the ballot box you should base your legitimacy on the ballot box. if you still want to hedge your bets by basing legitimacy on the point of a gun, then i would be loath to bestow any legitimacy

upon that group or may washington angle. whether it is the problem in palestine, whether it is the issue in iraq with the bother corps or if i can be heretical some of the peshmerga units as well versed dj shah mahdi. it is a major problem which i'm not sure that washington fully has gotten its arms around. >> my name is mohammed and i am in the enter news agency. i was wondering what you think about whether the kurds can 18 very key make her position after the elections that they have had in the position following the two last national elections and how do you see the power and influence of kurds changing in baghdad after these elections? >> everybody is writing and talking about the kurds being the key makers and i think it

will really come it really depends on how this election plays out for the shia. however, i don't think it is necessarily the case that they are. coming out of the election. if maliki does very well, if allawi does very well, and they a line with smaller groups that do fairly well, they can build their own coalition in the parliament and won't necessarily need the kurds. again this rising anti-kurd died in iraq will have some kind of impact. it might not initially. initially maybe we will see the same kind of alignments as we did in the current parliament, but i think down the road, before these four years are up, we will see a shift and i don't think the kurds are very well positioned coming into that period. and the influence of the kurds

in baghdad of course is also-- depends upon how well they can play their cards, who they can align with. it was very interesting that prime minister maliki came out yesterday and said he wants an alliance with the kurds and allawi's and after the election. arch enemy would be a strong word to use but i would say that in terms of either i found it very interesting. again this is posturing for an election, so if you know anything goes after an election. this is iraq and as someone just said to me this morning we are things happen in an election season in iraq, but the kurds are definitely in a difficult position. >> james from national journal magazine. two quick questions.

apparently after after the debaathification controversy that thought is the sunnis will take part in beaumont be disenfranchised by the elections. if there is a four or five minute gestation period for government we are pulling 50,000 troops by august what does the panel rate the chances that we will see violence and perhaps another spend toward civil war? it is not a majority but i'm curious what you think the chances are because that is my biggest fear. also brian laid down the challenge he thinks this has been a strategic net minus this war in iraq and i'm curious where there they are our other panelists. >> do you want us to vote here on balance? maybe we can just get a couple of comments and answer to the questions. scott. >> just on the first question, i am less worried about a renewed sectarian violence between the sunni and the shia and i am about the prospects for real flashpoints on the border with the kurds. i think that is much more

likely. the issues that are outstanding that have been yet to resolve politically are those issues related to kirkuk, the disputed territories, the oil law, all of these issues somehow related to what the final status between the kurdish regional government and central baghdad are going to be. on the whole, yes i would say that it was worth it. >> any one else? [laughter] >> what i would say is that especially in the coalition building time, we are going to see certain parties resort to violence to see whether violence pays off. we should be very very careful about incentivizing that violence. this by the way is one of my concerns with regard to the u.s. approach to the debaathification and three death breathe at the vacation issue, this argument that if debaathification occurs

that there will be violence. it seems we are reacting to preempt violence in a way which that should do which of them i think some of those who might resort to violence in the future. as to whether it is worth it, i would say, i disagree with brian respectfully on this. i would say yes especially since we forget that what we do know from the harmony database documents from the documents seized from saddam hussein was that sanctions were collapsing. we know that and saddam hussein was determined to reconstitute the programs which we found out he didn't have at the point in time when we went in. >> just a few words on the violence issue and i will take the coward's both on the other one. [laughter] but, basically, in this type of situation, we tend to forget that violence is also a form of

political language in a campaign that there is a lot of violence that occurs not as a reaction to anything but as testing of the grounds, as provocations, as basically intimidation and in that sense i think that we have might see some violence coming our way, and the important thing is how the international community and the iraqi's themselves operate on the basis of that violence. there is going to be some violence in the next few days obviously. i mean many of the attacks on the incoming, on baghdad, is part of campaigning in terms of assuring that maliki does not control the security situation.

so, basically we have seen it already happening. it is going to happen a lot more as testing of the grounds in terms of the time of the coalition forming and it is also going to be targeted violence in terms of some key players emerging from the polls as a result of the acceptance of the results and the current configuration. violence will not be absent for many years. it is not absent in many transitioning actions by the way and it is a lot more frequent than people expect. it is just that basically they lens of the press is a lot more focused on situations like afghanistan or iraq than of jamaica where basically every year every election year for instance there is violence as part of the political discourse of the different candidates. >> and just to add to that, said

terry and hisism i think will continue and i think this idea of closed communities, a sunni arab community, there will be a sunni shiite community and there will be not-- makes communities. i think this trend is continuing and it will continue or go in terms of real violence, i would say of course that northern border area is mixed areas, kirkuk and diyala, the contentious areas. this is where we will see more real violence in the coming years or continued real violence. i think baghdad will probably settle down. it has been pretty quiet. there are reports of anecdotal sectarianism continuing but i think that is going to finish because i think people will just move out and you won't see those ms. communities and therefore it won't be an issue. 's be with that i'm going to actually close down our panel and thank our audience and our panelists for very interesting,

at least for me, very interesting presentations of thank you all very much for being here today. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> now campaign strategist mark penn talks about this year's elections. mr. penn has-- secretary of state hillary clinton during a run for the presidency as well as former british prime minister tony blair. mr. penn spoke at the clinton school of public service in little rock arkansas last month. this is about 50 minutes. >> thank you for that very kind, very kind introduction, and underscoring that the voters are not numbers but they are people with habits, thoughts, beliefs and i find so often that the real intelligence of the american voter is really underappreciated. in fact i got into the business

of polling pretty much after reading a book one day by a fellow called theo key and the book said, the simple fact of this book is that the voters are not fools. the voters in fact have real perspectives, real issues, real changes in their lifestyle. so i hope early as this class really as this class that these the election of 2010, two may to maybe provide a little insight into what is happening right now and what has happened in 2009 in before, what and before, what are the conditions that have been set up to make this perhaps one of the most hotly contested midterm elections probably in our lifetime. i think by the time we get down-- usually the midterms don't start until june. i think that they have art he started are discarded and the political season is on. and i think that is why i think by the end both parties are going to pull out the stops. i put up a little data because

well, it wouldn't be a presentation without a little data. and so let's take a look at what the country has been through in the last year. remember, the country left the bush administration in a state of extreme despair. they really felt president bush did not deliver on whether the economic promises or the promises related to the war in iraq. they really wanted a change in if you look at the numbers, 63%, if you go into just the beginning of january as we cross over, 63% of americans thought that the country was on the wrong track. well, today, and some of the latest polls, 65% think america is on the wrong track. so, in fact, despite some serious dose of hope, optimism

and improvement, that happened around march, april and may, the general mood of the public actually remains exactly the same, at one of the lowest levels that the record in terms of people believing that things are on the wrong track. now, what has happened to the president's job approval during that period? as you can see, the blue line is his approval and it started around 62%, a great start, an excellent approval rating. however, the trend has been straight down, and there've really has been, as you can see, virtually no change in that trend during the entire year. you know, if we were in the white house delivering these charts, these would be tough charts for any president at any time, and if you look at the disapproved numbers, that they

disapproved started pretty much at the republican base of 34%, and they have moved up in this polling was 51 and the "new york times" polling it was pretty much split 46-45 but right now you would say that presidential approval is hovering below 50%. now let me give you what i call the rule of 50%. the moment you get at 50% or below, it is to everyone's political it bandage to start kicking you. while you are above 50%, everybody says you know maybe i shouldn't get too hard because maybe there will be a boomerang and people will react negatively. so when you fall below 50, then it often and genders almost a collective, a collective kicking up as you will, right and so things get even harder to manage during this period. it is critical for a president

to keep his approval above 50 for that very reason, to prevent that kind of impact from setting in. i think you saw that with president bush. one day he was 50. the next day he was in the 30s. i don't think we are likely to see that with president obama but i think the president knows he has got to reverse this trend and that the state of the union did not reverse the trend. the biggest event the president has every year is pretty much to get up there with the state of the union, outline your agenda for the future of the country, and use that as a springboard for restoring confidence in the country. and what happened on the state of the union this year was a think the president gave an excellent speech, but the facts of the problems, particularly the economic problems in the 10% unemployment i think have equal in the mood now where they are saying they have got to see some results. remember, it is results that ultimately create a bond between

the people and the president. all presidents get elected with hope. all presidents are successful political candidates. but out of a successful political candidates may be one in three actually become successful leaders and presidents. it is far harder to govern than it is to actually get to the presidency. now, having said that, let me just say and i came out when president clinton was not at 47% by the 32%. and so, in fact, the ability for a president to turn this around it's really quite high and quite strong. a because it is early and b because programs take time to work and c when they do work it cements that bond. people always wonder how did president clinton successfully navigate the waters of 98, and impeachment. it is because by that time in his term he had told people he would improve the economy and he

had improved the economy. he told people he would prepare the country for the 21st century and people felt prepared. they had an essential bond of trust warmed over six years that president clinton would deliver for them. that bonds doesn't form early. i think what happened with president bush is after six years they said you know what, president bush did not deliver and i think they soundly rejected him and couldn't wait for the change. with president obama, this is only a year. up the charts aren't headed in the right direction but the problems are big. he knows you have to reverse these by the midterms or things are things will continue to snowball. if you take a look at this party, you see that well, democrats, the blue line up there, they started out pretty happy and they are still pretty happy. they were at 90% approval and they are at 80% approval. republicans were at 42% approval

and they have dropped to 19% approval, so more than half. and perhaps most important and independent line was that 62%, which you remember 62% was about where the president started on average and that is dropped to 38%. so that means that where democrats are relative to the president, it has dramatically separated from where republicans and independents back our. and that of course means that there is tremendous possibility for on the one hand a united democratic party but on the other hand considerable change in results of the elections in 2010. now, if you take a look at congressional approval, congressional approval has actually improved. it used to be 80% disapproval and now it is 71. but, you can't really go into,

and again you can see the similar pattern. he was that close to 80%, 76% disapproved in january and coming off the bush administration. then, things look promising. dramatically changed, so saw a dramatic swing up almost a 40% approval, and then since then and you you see the similar pattern, down to 24% approval of congress, 71% disapproval. that means if you are running as an incumbent in 2010, most of the voters, close to -3/4 of the voters are saying they want more change in congress. again, these are tough numbers. when you see somebody like senator evan bayh saying look back i am going to resign from the senate because there is too much partisanship, he has also taken a look at numbers here that are saying look, the public

mood out there is about as tough for someone facing re-election in congress as i think i have ever seen it. i don't think it actually could get much worse. than to have disapproval in the 70s. again, if you take a look at this i party and look at the blue line, for a wild, democrats in the april, may, june period pretty satisfied. they served as up to 63% and then they trended down to 32% approval. if you look at republicans, republicans have not been happy about congress since they don't have either house and so they are not going to be happy, not a surprise. but independents mac also follow the line when they went up to 34 and they are down at 19. but even a majority of democrats are right now and not satisfied with congress.

when your own party has both houses and you don't have a majority of your own party, that is also more-- likely to come out in this midterm election. then come if you take a look at congressional balance, the congressional ballot here you know, shows 44 republicans and 35 democratic. a lot of different polls have congressional ballot that showed now republicans either at parity or up. traditionally democrats have run about eight points ahead, six or eight points ahead in the generic congressional ballot. this is about as extreme as i have seen the congressional ballot. and let me go back to kind of a theory that i have about midterm voters. about two thirds of midterm voters are going to vote on the basis of the candidate.

that is they are going to say look matt, i really think this candidate knows the issues. he is closer to me. about a third are going to vote on the basis of mood. and so, the result results of these midterms is a combination of the interaction of who the candidates are covering about two thirds of the voters and the mood. a third of the voters either come out and say look we have to keep going in that direction we are going in this country or we have got to change direction. i am to satisfy. that third of the voters doesn't know or even care that much who the congressional or senatorial candidate is. but they care is they are expressing themselves through the voter and right now it's the third that does that then produces bigger swings, then one braley imagines, which is why this links typically are a little stronger, a little bigger than pollsters predict because

again if its wings all in one direction, than that can really produce a strong reversal. i always joke that 94 congressional elections got me my job with president clinton because after those 94 congressional elections, the president really changed his team, his staff, the direction and really moved back to the center and a very significant way, but then ultimately led to the re-election in 96 and the kind of approval of his presidency throughout. but these again are tough numbers. now, there is one other factor that i think is worth pointing out, which is the rise of independent voters. you know we have had several independent presidential candidacies, 1980 we had john anderson, ross perot went in and out of the presidential race,

but typically if you go back, this has not been a country with a significant number of independents mac historically. if you go back to the 1940s, in terms of party identification, you can see that between 15 and 20% of the country identify themselves as independents. and at that around 40% identified themselves as democrats and around 35% identified themselves as republicans. and you can see where they peak at around the time of president kennedy's election in the early 1960s, that democrats went straight up to actually 50% of the country identifying themselves. democrats-- the republicans went straight down. as you can see with the surge back coming around 1980 with president reagan bringing back

the republican party but if you look at that yellow line and they are, that is the independent line. the independent line has shown a steady rise in the country so at this moment, with 36%, i had seen it in some polls is highest 40 or 43%. the biggest party in america at this moment is no party. and this is, if you go back to the 70 year history here, this is a first in united states electoral politics. and so when we talk about independent voters we are no longer talking about a small swing group or a microtrend. we are talking about the bid, the biggest imaginable bloc of voters, and that number of voters than that can swing back and forth in the two parties is greater than ever. and the number of voters who are saying you know i have faith in the republican party. they let me down.

i had faith in the democratic party and they let me down. i am now kind of sitting back here waiting to see whether or not i am going to go back to the democrats if i see progress on the economy or maybe swing in another direction. but these are also tough political currents that would suggest, that would suggest that there is considerable movement and considerable possibility where growth of independents out there and a political environment like this. now, this could change back. if you go through these historical patterns you can see how the democrats and republicans have both had times when they have come back, but as you get a new, younger group of voters, more plugged into mass communications, two networks, to connecting on issues and if you take the number one assembly in the country out there, which is i want to see progress not partisanship, you are seeing that both parties are facing now

a crisis in confidence over themselves. frankly, and i should say that a lot of polls and a lot of people always like to say there is a crisis of confidence in government and their institutions and i am usually the guy that says that is not really the case. there is not really a crisis of confidence in our institutions. people are voting, people are listening, people are participating more than ever before but they really are saying in a very clear way enough partisanship. i want to really see common sense ideas adopted across party lines. and as you can see from this number, there is a tremendous change. now the media is focused very much on tea party republicans and sarah palin. when you look at this chart, you also understand that the electoral change if there is

electoral change, one way or the other is not going to be driven by sarah palin or the tea party movement. it is going to be driven by the voters i told you about at the beginning of this talk, rational, thinking, better educated voters who care about the issues. and they are saying i want a solution to the fiscal problem. i want a solution to the economy , and that these kinds of voters now, more informed, more tuned in. i think people are following politics as never before. they are not rejecting the system. they are saying i'm going to participate in it on my terms and i think it is very important for the political leaders to be attuned to that. and look, the other thing about the voters, this growing group of independent voters is that it is frustrating for them to find the voice particularly when they feel the media is being dominated by the left or the right, continually with

attention given to whether it is palin in the tea party movement or others instead of how they really feel about issues like health care, education and the economy. so, you know, at the end of the day, what is the president got to do about this? well, the president has to do a number of things right and he has clearly gotten the message in massachusetts, but the first thing is that an governing from the center, in recognizing the growth of the independent voters, the actions have to be more than words. people have to feel that the administration itself is governing squarely in the center, is looking for the kind of commonsense solutions to the common sense solutions to the big problems out there and that means that if you look at the charts, that means that they have got to see a change in direction from the white house and an explicit, clear change in direction, or they have got to see some results.

because their patience for results is wearing thin. i think if you recall president clinton had a very clear economic strategy. elements of that economic strategy were popular. somewhere not so popular. he believed in expanding trade. he believed in expanded investment, in imprint searcher and education, in math and science. he believed in closing the federal deficit. and, those three elements were a strategy that everybody understood whether people were for or against trade, whether they liked it paying of higher taxes necessary to close the deficit, whether they agreed or not with the additional infrastructure, expenditures and those on education, moving the country forward. they hung together with a clear strategy. years later it was attributed for success and i think president obama has to outline a clear strategy.

what are the elements beyond stimulus that are a strategy for the long-term success of this country in a competitive, global environment. the president is going to need a deficit strategy. without a clear deficit strategy people are going to say it is out of control. the commission is a first step towards that strategy but at the end of the day, it is not a substitute for that strategy. and then, and you know working on the everyday problems. sometimes it is popular to ridicule a lot of things president clinton did in 96. he did some small things like balancing the budget, reforming welfare, creating 24 million jobs you know. and, take a look at the things that were done in the 9622000 period were in many sense the kind of empowering achievements that started with these

individual strategies but layered up not just to these big accomplishments of welfare reform, of a balanced budget and putting 24 million people to work but also making people feel good about the role that government plays in people's lives. as he said then, the era of big government is over but that didn't mean the government didn't help eliminate some of the problems of smoking. it didn't help protect the kids. it was-- didn't help protect women from abuse. it took on day after day a series of growing modern problems, whether it was the soccer moms who felt them or whether or not it was the aging workforce they needed them, relentlessly taking on those problems to show that the presidency was about both big things and really connected with people's everyday life. and, if i were going to say, say

that what is really needed to turn things around is very much a dose of the kind of clintonism that we saw in the years following 96, and that's clintonism i think in many ways can be easily underrated. it wasn't as flashy but it was, it sure was productive. having to clear economic strategy with its three legs, really going for the balanced budget deficit reduction, really then creating welfare reform, moving the country to the center and a way that people in the center felt that the president was listening to them. that was so critical in president clinton's time. all of these elements i think are very similar to what president obama has to do in order to both reversed the kind of numbers that you see here and to be an incredibly successful president. we are all hoping he is going to do that. we are all hoping a good dose of

clintonism will in fact really i think help with this country in that direction that i think the country is clearly looking for. and will again be successful in resolving in another two-term democratic presidency. thank you. [applause] >> thanks mark. alright, your turn. folks can ask questions. please raise your hands and wait for the iker phone to get to you. lots of questions about the 2010 elections i am sure. >> thank you for being here. my name is evelyn and i'm a student at the clinton school and in dean rutherford's class and we have been talking about our predictions for the house and the senate and the governor's races in midterm and i was wondering it is still early in the year but if you think republicans will take back over the house house and the

senate and get majority of government as well? >> well, in fairness to you and the class, you know i would say that it is early to make those predictions. i think the point of this talk was yeah if these numbers continue as they argue can see the are you can see the kind of swing, where the house would shift, where the senate would become considerably closer. these are pretty frightening trends from that respect, but the most important part of this talk is that these trends are not set in stone or co-what happens with unemployment, what the president does, whether he shifts the direction, again there is a lot of time here so people always say polls are a snapshot in time. your predictions on the 2010 elections are actually a snapshot in time. they are based on what conditions are today. conditions are today aren't good

either for the 2010 elections. they could very well produce the kind of swing that would move the house. i think that it is hard or-- remember in 1994 there were 22 resignations. i think here there are only four open seats. actually structurally it is probably a lot harder for the conditions that happened in 94 to really reoccur. the republicans don't seem to have their act together either. they don't have a leadership that has a coherent alternative strategy, so if we say look we saw what happened at 94, so what is the probability of that free happening? there is certainly a probability. structurally it is a little less likely but numbers wise it even said out because this content could be so high. i think if unemployment got down to 8% of people so i continue to retch and think you would see a lot of reduction in pressure on this.

>> questions. >> hi, my name is aaron and i'm a student here as well and my question is about the growing number of independence. he spoke a lot about centrist voting and the efficacy towards the center when you were working with other politicians. do you think this focus on the center has increased the number of independence back? >> i don't think that there has been in off, i don't think there has there there has been enough focus on the center, at least in the way i interpret how the media tends to cover the political stories. it seems to me that whoever has held the center since 1992 has really held the governing mantle of the country, that we saw that pretty-- if you take one model which is the country is all about red versus blue, that really was the model of the 1940s when virtually everyone was either red or blue or they

pick sides. since 1992 i think the model has been people saw clinton as being more in the center i think in 92 and then 96 it was very much the same thing, where he held the center against bob dole who was seen as more conservative. i think in 2000, bush managed to win the presidency through compassionate conservatism. again, his move to the center and he painted al gore is a big government liberal. he pushed al gore a little bit to the left. frankly al gore had an equally good claim to the center so the election came down to the wire. i think bush re-held that in 2004 against kerry and pushed over to the left. he lost it in 2006. i think, after the 2004 election bush seemed to be dominated completely by cheney and the right wing and the center said, this is not what we bargained

for it doll it all and they dramatically shifted. i think obama held the center going into the election and i think as you can see with the growth of independence, it is the center that is really at stake and the media continually makes it look like it is the extremes or the other thing that i notice that is out there is that they try to depict all voters as angry, so it is all about who can tap into the anger better. my point is a lot of the voters are distressed and rational. and they may have anger, but their actions are really rational. they are upset with the conditions of the country. they are upset with the deficit. they are upset with unemployment so they are going to vote on the basis of that. who they think offers them not a more extreme picture but who offers them a more rational way out. i think that is how president obama got elected in the debates when he appeared to have a

rational, thoughtful way out of the economic crisis. john mccain didn't seem to have a clue or a plan and that was not about anger. that was a think really quite thoughtful. >> in looking at the independent numbers there may be a temptation to think that that is all tea party members. could you give us a little background on what is inside the independent constituency? >> i think that is a good question. independents aren't really monolithic either. i think if you look at what is in the independent bin is mostly former democrat and former republicans. and, so i actually have analyzed them. they are ross perot independent -- independents, more antigovernment, you know more alienated from the political system and then although it is an old analogy, there is more of

a john anderson independents, well-educated, thoughtful, but few kind of their vote is being not about the parties but about what they think is right. you also have a lot of independents in there to now are socially more tolerant, but economically more conservative. and so the system has a structural issue, if you are socially more comfortable with the democrats but you believe in smaller government and some of the republican-- but you don't want to put your lot in with sarah palin and the extreme right, you are continually confused about where to go. and so, i think that is a very big part of the growing independent group. >> a question right here in the back. >> hello. you have not mentioned health care. how big a role do you think

health care will play in the 2010 elections and is there anything that obama, congress could do between now and then to really do bet that the battle long? >> well, the issue about health care, and i think if you go back after hillary's original attempt at health care, the administration really said hey we are going to move step-by-step on health care as we know that everybody agrees with the goals. let's have better health care with wider coverage and lower costs of the issue is how do you get there and how do you pay for it? and, how do you get there and how do you pay for it opens up a pandora's box, eerie difficult issues because 85% of the voters have coverage and the most importantly they feel they don't want to see changes that might impinge their ability to get the health care that they want at any time. now, i think the obama

administration looked at some of the things that hillary did and said well hillary waited later to do health care. hillary to the plan and gave it to congress, and they took i think an opposite approach saying well, maybe this will be more successful. we will do it earlier and the waltz we want to write the plan here at the white house. we will let the plan bubble up in congress, and what they learned was that it didn't matter how do you approach the problem. even if you did what previous people didn't do, it still got you to the very same place, which is that people are reluctant to see big change to their health care system of occurring all at once. they in fact continually prefer, hey lets to electronic medical records, let's get rid of discrimination, let's get rid of health care discrimination, let's not just add all kids but then let's m