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here to give evidence to the iraq inquiry. this is coverage from london. >> and the committee takes place in the months leading up to a general election. from the time that we began our work last july we have been at pains to preserve the absolute impartiality in the independence of the iraq inquiry. we have been clear from the outset that we had to remain outside party politics and we have asked the political parties to respect that position and we repeat that request today.

it was for that reason that before christmas my colleagues and i originally decided that we should ask to see the prime minister, the foreign secretary and development secretary after the general election. on the 19th of january, the prime minister wrote to me reiterating he was prepared to give evidence whenever the committee saw fit. we discussed this matter and concluded that in the interest of fairness we should offer their prime minister, before integrate hatari into the development 63 to give option to give evidence before the election if they wish it to do so and all three have taken up this offer. we will be seeing that if a limit secretary later today and foreign secretary monday morning. we have a very serious task before us to establish the u.k. and fall flat in iraq between 2001 and 2009 and to learn the lessons for future british governments facing similar circumstances. we can only accomplish that task successfully if we are seen to

be fair, impartial and a political and we are determined to do so. now, we recognize that witnesses are giving evidence based in part on their recollection of defense and we cross check what we hear against the papers to which we've been get access. i remind all witnesses the they will later be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence to the effect that the evidence given is truthful, fair and accurate which brings me to my first question. pamela starr, you have been a senior member of the cabinet since 1997 and the minister since 2007 in june and you are particularly well placed to offer insights into the whole period covered by the terms of reference read it has been borne in on this inquiry from the outset the coalition's decision to take military action led directly or most often in directly to the loss of lives of many people, servicemen and women and hours and the multinational forces, the iraqi security forces and many

civilians. men, women and children in iraq. still, more have been affected by those losses and by other consequences of the action. given all that experience, i should like to ask right at the outset whether you believe the decision to take military action in march, 2003 was indeed blight. >> it was the right decision and it was for the right reasons. but i do want at the outset to pay my respects to all the soldiers and members of our armed forces who served with great courage and distinction in iraq for the loss of life that sacrifices that they have made and my thoughts are with their families. next week, we will dedicate at the national our rate a memorial to the 179 servicemen and women who died in iraq and i think the thoughts and prayers of us are with all the families today. i shall also like to say that there were many civilian injuries and deaths in iraq as

well. british citizens and my thoughts and prayers are with them. and we know that there was a huge loss of life in iraq among civilians and i think any loss of life is something that makes us very sad indeed so i would like to acknowledge the contribution of the british forces but particularly acknowledge the sacrifice of those who lost their lives. i think that this is the gravest decisions of all, to make a decision to go to war. i believe we made the right decision for the right reasons, because the international community had for years asked saddam hussein to abide by the international law and the international obligations that he had accepted. 14 resolutions were passed by the united nations, and at the end of the day, it was impossible to persuade him that he should abide by international law. my feeling is and still is that we cannot have an international community that works if we have

either terrorists who are breaking these rules or in this case, aggressor states that refuse to obey the law of the international community. i do think, john, we have lessons to learn however. i think in three areas i would like to discuss with you and i hope that you will take on board the questions and the answers that come from these issues. the first is be a been fighting two wars and it's essential that we have the proper structure of decision making, and of course as time has gone on both tony blair and i have changed the structures of decision making in government. i think the second thing is we won the battle within seven days but it has taken seven years to win the peace in iraq, and i think we are developing the concept of a just peace and how we can actually manage conflict like this in a way that we get reconstruction and a stake in the future like in this case the

iraqi people and i think the third thing we've learned and i would like it to us to the to discuss it with you but there will be interventions in the future, and international cooperation has got to be far greater than it was. global problems require global institutions and i would particularly draw attention to the importance in all of this of the strongest possible relationship between europe and america, something i am determined to build up and continue to make stronger in the future. >> thank you, mr. brown. we would like to begin, if we may, by discussing your role as a senior member of the cabinet in the period up to march of 2003. we will propose then to come to the specific issues relating to your departmental responsibilities as chancellor and then your role as prime minister after june, 2007. and so first commodore was a senior member of the cabinet -- i will ask their dennis prashar to start questions. >> primm minister, as the chairman said, want to discuss

your role as the senior member of the cabinet in the period up to march of 2003. but before that i would like to get a better understanding of your views about iraq because by 2001, the government had been in power for four years and have taken military action in iraq, kosovo, sierra leone, of course after 9/11 in afghanistan. what conclusions did you draw about the role of the force in the policy objectives? >> i think we have had no alternative but to intervene in situations where there are two of risks to the post cold war world. the first has been, as i've mentioned, the action of mullen state terrorist commit the second is the action of rogue states or in the case of iraq aggressor states. and of the world community is going to mean anything in terms of our ability-here and our ability to live at peace, then we have to be prepared to take the international action. it is, of course, far better if

all countries are united in the action that has got to be taken. it but it has the necessary to take action in situations where either through terrorism we are put at risk and our own country were through the aggressor states the region in this case in iraq the region iran and iraq is put at risk attwell. >> can i just come back to the specific question on iraq because mr. villere argued in the comments on the 18th of march, 2003, that there was a link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, which constituted what he said was a fundamental assault on our way of life and that a threat of chaos from tyrannical regimes with wmd and extreme terrorist groups with the possibility of the two coming together, represented what he called a real and present danger. and he made similar points to was in his evidence to the inquiry in january. did you see a real and present

danger of this kind coming from iraq in 2003? >> i.t. we are dealing with this post cold war world. let me just say that after the end of the cold war and the expectation that we would have peace and the instabilities that excess did because the cold for mac were over, we found that there were a number of states and then we found that there were a number of long state terrorists who were prepared to cause a huge instability around the world. and this is essentially how this generation will be seen. we will be seen as a generation that had to deal with a post cold war era in which you both had terrorism and had states like iraq, which were aggressive states because of what the relation to iran and also in relation to kuwait. therefore in my view the world community is justified in taking action aware international obligations in this case accepted by iraq at the end of

the kuwait/iraqi war were not being honored. and if you're going to have international law and international community, then you need to be absolutely sure that the world community can constrain and in pos rules and regulations that allow us to live in a more peaceful world. so negative not making a distinction between the two problems. these are two problems however that lead to action. >> yeah understand that but can i just be more specific about this because what i really want to start with is whether you saw this as a real and present danger and march 2003. >> the evidence that we had -- i met the intelligence services on a number of occasions during the course of 2002 and early 2003, and in addition to my discussions in the cabinets and in addition to my discussions with tony blair himself, was

given information by the intelligence services, which let me to believe that iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with by the actions of the international community. of course, tall points we wished the diplomatic route to be successful. so throughout 2002 and early 2003 we were hopeful that the diplomatic route and the 1441 and the united nations would bring iraq to a sense that they had to cooperate and they had to disclose as well as dismantle whatever weapons they had. but the information that we had was information given to us by the intelligence authorities. >> so you would agree with mr. straw, white told the inquiry, that the case of military action stood or fell on whether iraq posed a threat to international peace and security by reasons of his weapons of mass destruction. would you agree with that? >> my thesis is this: that persistently iraq had been asked

by the international community to disclose and then dismantle weapons that every country whose on and that united nations resolution believed that they had, that we have a responsibility to ensure that international law in this case was upheld and the international community would mean very little if we could not in the case of the country that had systematically -- was in fact a cereal volume leader, serial violator of international law we would have no where -- no sense that the political will would be there for future interventions which may be necessary if we could not show that we could come together to deal with the problem of iraq. but of course what we wanted was a diplomatic route to succeed it right up to the last minute it right up to the last weekend i think many of us were hopeful that the diplomatic route could succeed. >> so your concern was mainly about the breach of the united nations resolutions. defiance by saddam hussain of those resolutions you felt was the reason to invade iraq.

>> yes my view has always been throughout this episode that the sanctions and then five no-fly zones and then the tightening of sanctions and then of course but demand that iraq disclose to the international community what it had and what it was doing. this was all about the implementation of a new international set of rules that were necessary in the post cold war world that we had already seen how much and instability could be caused by individual states that were either field states or rogue states as well as seeking the effective terms of a faction of non-state actors and terrorism that we had essentially failed in rwanda to take action where it was necessary. we have tried hard in the balkans to take action that was required. but 14 resolutions of the united nations had been systematically violated and ignored by iraq and was our responsibility to make sure the international order could work for the future.

>> can i move more specifically about your role as a senior member of the cabinet? >> yes. >> we understand from earlier evidence that mr. blair discussed iraq frequently with you in private conversations; is that correct? >> yes. we had a formal meetings at the cabinet and i think it's true to say that in 2002 iraq was -- >> i will come to that -- >> i'm sorry. >> i'm talking about private conversations with mr. blair. >> i was going to say in addition to these formal meetings of the cabinet i talked to mr. bel air regularly. we talked about all these sorts of issues of course because we were dealing with the economic issues, we were dealing with the reforms of the health service, we were dealing with a whole series of issues including dealing with the euro, an inquiry into how we would approach the hero, but i would talk to him about iraq and about the process of diplomatic negotiations. >> city would say you were absolutely in the loop from

early 2002 and on words? >> i think we've got to understand that the foreign affairs and the conduct of foreign affairs as i have discovered since i became prime minister is quite different in many ways from the conduct of domestic policy, and there has been a whole debate over many, many years about cabinet and prime ministerial government. but what you've got now is a unique situation where, in the past, 50 years ago, prime ministers and foreign secretaries would operate through embassadors and operate through memos. you've got instant contact between the time in history and the american president, instant contact before and we did before the triet secretary of state. of course if it were necessary between me and economic minister and this true of three's and germany and our relationships with them, so foreign policy is essentially the prime minister of foreign secretary, the defense secretary involved very directly with their opposite numbers in every country, and they are in a position to report to you and report to the cabinet

about what is actually happening on the day to day sometimes hour to hour basis, and instead of the intermediaries of the past, there is a huge issue about how individuals work far more closely together it the better personal relationships, the better conduct of foreign policy as well. >> but i understand that the relevant cabinet committee in, that is the defense and overseas policy committee didn't meet. but mr. blair told us that there was a lot of ad hoc meetings and he described as constant interaction with the government on the key issues involving key players. were you part of these interactions at these ad hoc discussions? >> yes. i was talking to the defense secretary from june, 2002 about what would be necessary in the -- in case we failed our diplomatic efforts. >> what type in 2002? >> from about june, 2002. about what we would have to do -- i will think you will find

there is correspondence between the defense secretary at the treasury about these issues that we were discussing what and the agility that all diplomatic efforts failed what would we do, and what would be the nature of our military engagement. i said immediately to the prime minister that the military options that we were under discussion -- there should be no sense that there was a financial restraints that prevented us doing what was best for the military. i think mr. hoon wrote to me in june -- i think the treasury paid a paper in june about these very issues. i was then that i started to talk to mr. blair. i told him that i would not -- and this was right at the beginning -- i would not try to rule out any military option on the cost. quite the opposite. he should feel free because this was the right course of action to discuss the military option that was best for our country at the one that would yield the

best results, and that we understood that some options for more expensive than others but we still accept the option right for our country. >> when did you become aware of the u.k.'s decision to support the u.s. invasion of iraq? >> the decision was finally made by the cabinet and then by the house of commons -- >> when was it -- when did you become aware -- >> at the last minute in march, and right up until the last minute i was hopeful, as i think the whole country were, that we would reach a diplomatic resolution of these issues. by the weekend -- >> but that was the decision to go to war. i talking about when did you become aware of the u.k.'s support of the u.s. invasion of one was to take place? >> that we would support the u.s. invasion only at the last minute when we were deciding that it was not possible for the diplomatic route to work any further. i remember going on television, i think it was the frost program the sunday before the parliamentary vote and the day before the cabinet decision on

this matter, and even at that stage, we were hopeful that the diplomatic rates could work, but even as that stage, we were also worried that the interventions of the united patients were prevented a resolution and it was not possible to imagine that this could be sort of felt simply day by -- simply by delayed. so it was for me a hope right up until the last minute the diplomatic action but work and i think the efforts that tony blair and jack straw made in putting our case to other countries and putting our case to the united nations, they should not be faulted because they tried everything in their power to avoid war, and itt will see that when i spoke to the cabinet on the meeting the day before the parliamentary vote, i was very clear that we had to exhaust all diplomatic avenues before we could conclude that it was inevitable or impossible to avoid a decision about war and these diplomatic avenues were

being tried bite of until the last minute. >> can i go back? in the wake of the 9/11 and the change of approach of the u.s. administration in 2002, mr. blair said that there was a whole series of government discussions about smart sanctions and a very structured debate about the review the policy of the government strategic options. now, you were not at the meeting that took place at chequers on the second of april -- guice laureate? >> before crawford. >> i'm sorry, before crawford on the second of april. >> but do you recall that you're part of this review that took place? >> when the sanctions were being examined the treasury and for an office would be involved because the implementation of the sanctions depends on the treasury's ability to do certain things as it does the foreign office, but we were coming to a

position where sanctions were being accepted by saddam hussein. he was finding ways. >> i know that but my point really is were you involved in discussions about smart sanctions and were you part of these structured discussions of policy options being considered in the early part -- >> i was not -- >> -- of 2002? >> i was not at any meetings per year to the pri minister's visit to crawford but i would know about the discussions about sanctions. but if the sanctions were to be changed the treasury would undoubtedly be involved and i would be involved in taking decisions. >> so you were being kept informed by the officials in the treasury? >> yes. we would continue to monitor what was happening within sanctions, so, too, with the foreign office because it was obviously our policy in relation to iraq depended on our knowledge as to whether sanctions were working or not the conclusion that we had reluctantly to draw was that sanctions were not being effective in the way that we had

wanted and were inflicting damage on the iraqi people without it the same time causing the greatest of concern to the ruler of iraq. >> as the situation evolved in 2002 and 2003, weren't you and other senior members of the cabinet council took on the developing policy? >> of course, of course. and we had reports, as you will see come regularly to the cabinet about the diplomatic course that was being taken, and of course a lot of the discussions were leading up to the first resolution. one-fourth or one in november and the cabinet was regularly kept in touch by jack straw and the prime minister about what was happening so i cannot see an argument this is the cabinet were not informed. we were informed about the process of negotiations. they were easily focused on the diplomacy. we hope that the policy would work and we were regularly updated on the problems as well as the opportunities that came from the diplomatic process and

if >> were you informed of number to gain to the to -- number ten if of the that the white house? >> no i would not expect to see the private letters between mr. blair -- >> did he tell you the gist of the private conversations he was having? >> i would be discussing with him on a private basis the other issues we were dealing with that he would keep me up to date as he did with the diplomatic route but at the same time as i am making clear to you from june, 2002 in the treasury we had to start making preparations in case there was a possibility of war. in june we moved with the defense secretary at a number of options. we said finance was no barrier to discussing and concluding on the best options. in september we wrote a paper about the reconstruction of iraq and we were amongst the first to look at the problems that have to be dealt with if there was to

be reconstruction had we in the up and eight war that we had not sought the diplomatic avenues had failed. i think we did some of very important work estimating what the cost of the war would be and i think we got it -- i think our first estimate was 2.5 billion by 2006 and that was 4 billion but we were right -- >> we are going to come back to that later but can i just go back to your point about the cabinet meetings. mr. blair did tell as it was some 24 cabinet meetings but was the discussion substantially because you kept informed? word they discussed? was the proper discussion of the assessment of the risks and options or was it just information? >> of the cabinet meeting they are getting a report from each of the secretaries of state where there are issues that have got to be reported on or result. in the case of iraq everybody

was trying to get a diplomatic solution to the discussions of the cabinet were easily how we could push forward our diplomatic process these so that we could get a diplomatic solution which would prevent borat. so what was being reported to the cabinet on most occasions was what were the difficulties and what was done successes of our diplomatic efforts to persuade the rest of europe, persuade other countries to join us again in the u.n. resolutions or to join us in putting pressure on iraq, or pressure in some cases or discussions with some of the other arab states. so that was the me and it just i think you will see recorded in the cabinet minutes of the discussions at that time because we bring anxious to avoid war. we had to prepare for that and we are doing it in the ways i suggested that the cabinet was to essentially discussing how we could do more to move forward to the diplomatic route. >> but my understanding is that it was of course a diplomatic for brooch backed by military

threat and disinformation the preparations -- the meeting that crawford, you know, the options were discussed but were these properly explored in the cabinet? because yes of course you are pursuing the diplomatic route, but there were contingency plans being made both about the military operation and the aftermath planning. bless their proper discussion of the 24 cabinet meetings? >> i was aware as i told you because of the discussions i was having with the department of defense about the various military options that were being looked at. in fact, as you probably know from the evidence that you've received, one set of military options would have led us to -- if war had to happen, would have led us into one part of iraq could be officially the decision was to move into another part of iraq, and we became responsible for the basra area, but that was not the original plan and the changeover a period of time. now i was involved with discussions about making sure

that sufficient resources were available to do that, and i've always said the resources would be available. but at the cabinet of this a the most general discussions that we had a word generally the discussions were about the diplomatic effort in the different committees obviously. the prime minister was talking to the ford and secretary of defense secretary about options. i was not involved in these discussions but i was aware of what was happening because the rule the treasury had to play in advance initial planning for it even schiraldi that would happen. >> but, i mean, you received all briefings and submissions for treasury officials from the middle of 2000 it on words about a limit of the policy and about aftermath planning. but issues did your officials raise with you? specific issues were raised with you? >> first of all, the cost -- and we looked different estimates with intervention would cost depending on the options the were decided on, and my view was that it had to be the best military option and we had to support the military decision that was made and not allowed in

the option of financial grounds. the second thing we looked at was the reconstruction of iraq, and we do that there would be world economy implications, for civil the oil price spike to dollars higher and that was an effect of the initial part of the war. we had foreseen that but we also had to look at reconstruction, and i was determined -- isasi it is one of my regrets that i wasn't able to be more successful in pushing the americans further of this issue -- the planning for the reconstructionists essential, just at the same time as the web for the war of the diplomatic of a new field, and we were working on reconstruction and what might be done, what have called earlier to search for a just peace. we were looking at that early on and we had a paper in september. we discussed a number of options. but it came to march, we had a special cabinet -- sprick this

was discussed within the treasury with your officials? >> the discussion with treasury officials also discussions about how the international institutions could be brought in. >> did you discuss those concerns raised by your officials with the press minister, with the cabinet? >> of course we had a meeting with the cabinet at the beginning of march if i write -- >> the beginning of march? >> -- 2003 where we discussed three construction issue. i offered to prepare a paper that was to be sent to the americans about the issues of reconstruction that had to be dealt with if there was to be military action, and we were determined to understand how we could get the international institutions involved in reconstruction. we didn't see that it was possible for britain and america to 40 countries eventually in the original coalition but we didn't see how it was possible without the international lottery fund and world bank and the united nations being defaulted reconstruction to get the finance that we thought

could be something in order of 45 billion for the reconstruction so we were focused on this issue of reconstruction and as i say i wish it had been possible to follow that through much more quickly and in the aftermath of the first few days of the battle. >> what you're telling me it seems to me you had a very comprehensive briefing submissions from officials of these issues and you were fully appraised of these issues. but how did you ensure that your perspective was represented to the cabinet and your colleagues? were you able to influence your colleagues about these issues? >> we had a meeting of the cabinet in march which we discussed of the cabinet committee we discussed these issues of reconstruction. tony blair asked me to prepare a paper that he then sent --

>> free construction is one but what about the military options? because there was a question of, you know, what what the consequences if we got involved in the south of iraq you know, what with the cost of that -- >> i already made it clear the military option has to be the one that was best for the military at the treasury would not in any way interfere and suggest there were cost grounds for choosing one option against another. the devils not our job, the treasury was there to advise how we could deal with the financial issues that our rules from the military decisions and political decisions that were made so there was no time from june with the treasury said this is a better military option because it is cheaper ordered less costly. at every point i made it clear we would support whenever option the military decided upon with the prime minister and the cabinet and there would be no financial barrier to us doing what was necessary to be done. >> my final question is about the joint intelligence community because you would have received

the papers and we've been told by some cabinet members the had briefings on intelligence. did you receive such briefings or ask to be briefed? what was that? >> i've got the dates of the meetings with you the fourth of march 2002 so very early. the 13th of seven december, the sixth of february so i had five meetings with the intelligence where i was briefed on the evidence and information they had and these were full briefings. >> you're convinced the wmd was a threat? >> the information i was given was evidence that was known to many countries, not just our country about of the weaponry that the iraqi government held and of course at that time there was great certainty of months the intelligence community that is what every was there. they learned intelligence could

give us insight into what was happening but we have to be more sure that people have recognized the nature of the intelligence we were receiving from certain people. >> prime minister i wonder if i could pick up a point of detail from your conversation with baroness prashar. in march 2000 to the cabinet produced an options paper that was a strategic review of the courses available of iraq whether continuing containment or regime change in different forms. obviously very important paper we discussed with mr. blair agreed to do see the paper the time? >> i don't recall seeing that paper. my main involvement in looking at the options started in june. >> do you did this is one of the most senior members of the cabinet that you should have seen the paper?

you were going to have to obviously pick up the bills but you were also a key member of the cabinet. >> yes but i think everybody knew that we were pursuing the diplomatic route. everybody knew sanctions were being considered and how we dealt with them. the no-fly zone had been an issue of cause and everybody knew there were options available. it was only when it became clear we had to look at specific options and the treasury became involved. >> there's a treasury for all but your role is very senior member of the cabinet and here was the government looking at the fundamental question of whether you continue with containment or the mood in washington changed after 9/11 people were pushing for regime change and the government was looking at this choice. isn't it curious that you were not actually show the paper? >> i think i knew what was happening at the time that. i don't think i needed to see every paper that was put about

this but i would say that by june i was very much involved and looking at the financial aspect -- >> things that moved forward by then. i would like to form a clear understanding of the situation the cabinet faced and march of 2003 as it came to the point and then perhaps in a few of its move on to the question of the conflict itself and the immediate aftermath. you have talked about the need to exhaust the opportunities for diplomacy and try and to make peace. were you convinced that we had exhausted all the possibilities for the solution for the u.n. and diplomacy by the middle of march, 2003? >> i am afraid we had to draw that conclusion, and i think the members of the cabinet when presented with the information that the evidence drew the conclusion as well with one exception and i think that we

tried very hard on the diplomatic route. we reach a situation where everybody agreed in november that there was an issue with iraq that the weapons had to be disclosed, but the disclosure had to come and there was a final opportunity to do something about it. this had not happened in the intervening period therefore we reluctantly came to the conclusion that there was first of all little chance some who say and what take the action that was necessary. then of fortunately the countries that had signed 1441 that included a range of countries including if i may say so syrian countries like that that we couldn't reach final agreement about the nature of the action that was to be taken. >> but we are still in a situation in which the u.n. inspectors were reporting they were getting some cooperation from iraq and they wanted more time to pursue inspections and many members of the allied bases including security council agree

with them. so shouldn't we have given them more time? >> it was also obvious i've read some countries were not making it clear they would not support action under any circumstances and so whether we have given them more time or not at that stage and of course it would have been better if we could have given more time. we had to have assurance countries that signed 1441 were prepared to reach the decision at some point and that was not the evidence that was available as we made our cabinet decision. >> i would like to come back to that in a minute. but number ten itself asked the white house for more time and get in the 17th of march the cabinet decided that time had run out. is there a contradiction? >> no i think people did want to exhaust the diplomatic process to the floor but by that weekend, it was clear there was a number of countries that support to the original resolution that under no

circumstances it would agree to military action even though people thought that was the only route saddam hussein continued to defy the united nations, so it was the conclusion the rules from other countries now said even if there was more time for the inspectors they would all support action. >> you have referred to iraq as an aggressive state and clearly iraq had been an aggressor state, appalling record of aggression against all of its neighbors under saddam hussein. but at the time that we are talking about in march of 2003, was there actually a current threat of aggression by iraqi? >> i think all the evidence people headed nov let's say before we come to the march resolution that all the rest of the world agreed that there were problems that have to be addressed by iraq if they were to be a member of the

international community and they felt that he had a final opportunity to deal with the issues where he had not been honest with the international committee and had not disclosed dismantling the weapons and so from november to march the issue was not it seems to me the rest of the world did not agree that there were disclosure problems and did not agree that there were disposal problems. the question was whether people would be prepared to follow the rules of the international coffee and tea where someone consistently and persistently is a serial y a leader of the rules of the international community action is going to be taken three area >> directed and in breach of many here said many as you pointed out into the international community responded to that through a range of measures to refer to the sanctions, no-fly zones as well as active measures of deterrence but my question was there a threat of aggression

from iraq that required us to take this much reaction? >> i think the diplomatic -- i will put it the other with the diplomatic route appeared to the cabinet to have reached a conclusion where we could bossy the possibility of some of usian abiding by the rules of the international community. i come back to my original argument. to me the issue was we are in a post cold war world dealing with instabilities the success in different parts of the world. if the trash all community cannot come here that we are sending a message to other potential states and other potential aggressors they are free to do as they will so for me the issue was are we as an international community prepared to follow through the logic of position and with the diplomatic route has failed that we have either got to show ourselves on able to take action because we can't agree or we've got to be prepared to take the action as necessary so for me the issue goes back to how we as an international community will deal with problems where you

have rogue states and field states and obviously on state actors where terrorists and if we cannot find a way of dealing with these problems the world will be a very unsafe place for the future and i'm afraid this became a test whether the international community was prepared to deal with problems in the post cold war world where instabilities were becoming more and more apparent. >> it was that reason rather than threat of aggression that convinced you? >> i've always taken the view if we can't build a strong international community where people abide by the rules and if we cannot cope here to do so that we are sending a message to other states and other countries they are free to do as they will. >> did this is a message other states will have a heated as a result of the action of iraq? >> as i said at the beginning one of the lessons i learned from iraq and is a lesson the whole of the world has to come to terms with is our

international institutions for global cooperation on these matters are not yet strong enough. america and europe of course must work closely together in one of the problems in iraq is the close working was not see in the. americans are now working close together with french and german and italian government and spanish government working for closely with americans but if we are going to build an international community where people will feel safer from the threat of both terrorism and field states or rogue states that we have to have an international system of governance which people feel will take action when those people who break rules fight to have done so. >> from the answers that you gave to baroness prashar, but by the light and understanding that you were briefed on the terms and which mr. blair pledged to support to president bush in the

first half of 2002? >> i believe right up to the last moment we were trying to get a diplomatic solution so i'm not sure i accept the premise of your questions. >> by referring to evidence given by a number of people mr. blair himself, campbell and so on encapsulate. you say you didn't see the correspondence between mr. blair and president bush but what i'm trying to understand is whether u.s. a senior member of the cabinet understood that just of what he was saying to president bush in terms of pledging support. >> all of us knew what the stakes were that we have to take the diplomatic process work or there was a danger we would be at war with iraq but our efforts right until the last minute the efforts of the whole government in my view were to try to make a diplomatic solution to work and even that last weekend where i talked in detail to tony blair and was working closely with him

we were trying to see whether we could get some of the countries who indicated they would support no action under any circumstances to change the position so i would say the decision was made only after the diplomatic cause was exhausted. >> as we heard from a number of witnesses we had the white house privately in the first half 2002 we couldn't take the diplomatic which is obviously the preferred route for us and for them, couldn't get a peaceful resolution of this issue that we would stand with them and taking firm action. >> we had to prepare for the war as i said because from jude we were in the treasury and i was looking at options that were available but i still insist to you at every point in that year our first priority was to get a diplomatic solution. sprick that's completely cleared. we are asking is whether the prime minister of the day at

told to effectively what he told president bush. >> we do the options available to us included giving to the war we'll also, however, the best chance of peace and the international community working to the best effect was a diplomatic route and i still hold to the position i think that you are trying to move me from -- connect just asking c6 looking for yes or no answer whether he told you what he told president bush. >> the final decision was made in the head by the cabinet after the diplomatic option was exhausted. i kept in regular touch with tony blair and i do with the options were also due shia donley were tried and to make sure the diplomatic option was the one that was to be used and to be successful and until it was exhausted there was no decision made about coming to the war. >> do i take it from this he hadn't told you in terms what he said to president bush?

>> i had regular conversations with tony blair and we talked about these issues by all to have copies of his letters and i don't know the exact conversation and you would expect me to. >> and his exchanges between the staff and president bush's staff, he emphasized there were a number of points the british government wanted to establish before any conflict, any possible conflict took place with iraq. he put great emphasis as we heard evidence of the u.n. ruda on building the white kawlija with international support on gating the support for public opinion and our countries of proper preparation including the preparation for the aftermath are not lease on achieving substantial progress in the middle east peace process and i assumed you would be aware and supportive of those points. >> we discussed the middle east peace process particularly because we felt progress could be made. the treasury at that stage and i

were working on an economic plan for the middle east where we could underpin the political road map with an economic bird mac if you like where we could offer the palestinians the chance of greater prosperity if violence was updated and we were learning the lessons for other parts of the world including northern ireland that if we could reduce the incentive to violence by making sure people were more prosperous than we might have a better chance of the peace process working so i was directly involved and initiatives on that issue and it was essentials of the cabinet's interest in this whole region that we could move forward the middle east peace process. >> why haven't we succeeded in achieving more substantial progress on the middle east process by march 2003? >> i've dealt with france and

israel and palestinian authorities and the progress of peacemaking in the middle east is one where is difficult to get both sides to do the same thing at once it is an experience of small steps forward and sometimes steps backwards and of course of the splits within the palestinian organizations have made it more difficult and the changes in the israeli politicians obviously be and you often have to start again. >> we've heard from other witnesses that while the americans heard what we said about the importance of putting pressure on the process effectively they did almost nothing to achieve this accept the last minute to publish the road map so our efforts to persuade them to push this forward haven't succeeded. >> president bush did become the first president to commit himself to the palestinian state and it was very important step

forward but we always recognized we had to get the balance right between the security that the israelis need it for them to reach agreement and persuading the palestinians there was potential prosperity and a voluble palestinian the economically viable palestinian state and in all the times i've been involved and in this, you very between wondering whether you can proceed inch by inch or whether you have got to bring the things to a head as happened in some instances the last ten, 20 years trying to work for a solution that is all encompassing now. at that point people were looking for something all encompassing and in the and it didn't move forward. we are still in the same position today where we are trying to get small advances that would allow people to have confidence to have negotiations of the biggest issues.

>> you said as prime minister in october of 2007 that in the house of commons to work on vince after you made a visit to the region the progress in iraq cannot be fully achieved, can that progress on the israeli-palestinian issues. does this imply that we should have continued to contant iraq while trying and to achieve more progress before had on the middle east peace process? >> i don't think so. there is a debate about this and obviously you as a kennedy will be wanting to enter into that debate. look, in the middle east when i talk to the palestinian and israeli leaders they all know the settlement that is necessary is likely to involve. they all know that the final negotiations would involve the future jerusalem and the land exchange and involved agreement about the palestinian refugees. it's how they get to the final settlement that is the issue and

how we can approve them along when there's so many difficulties, fruit and every time we try to move forward there's something that happens that makes it difficult to do so and most recently it's been the problem zig aucilla that prevented us doing it but i don't think that what happened in iraq has prevented us moving forward in the middle east at all. >> that was in the point i was making. let's come back to the cabinet meeting that you have emphasized took the actual decision at a meeting of 17th of march, 2003. that was the moment when and you and other members of the cabinet eckert accept for the late robin cook who resigned accepted the shared responsibility for the decision to go to war with iraq and if you look back from that point, do you feel that there should have been a cabinet committee set up before the conflict happened, what was set up immediately afterwards to

deal with it, the people that he should have the represented on. i think if i right in interpreting your answer baroness prashar if you hadn't been to his ad hoc meetings of the subject he told us about. you were not at his meeting at chequers in april of 2002 which is important. you work on his meeting in july, 2002 which was an important one. it wasn't a cabinet committee it hit the cabinet had to take this very big decision over whether or not to go to the war. shouldn't you have been cut and earlier? in the traditionally the chancellor has never been all the cavities. i don't think it had previously. stegano cabinets in the past? >> when it came to the cabinet being constituted the counselor was a member of that as i understand previously and other instances the chancellor of the previous government had been a member of that cabinet. >> it is seen as one of the most influential members of the cabinet as the most likely successor to accurately to.

>> it's great if you to say this but the fact of the letter is i didn't feel at any point i lacked the information that was necessary that i was denied information required but life role in this was not to second-guess military decisions or options. mauney role in this was not to interfere in what were very important diplomatic negotiations. that was the privacy and foreign secretary of defense secretary were involved in. my role was first wallace the chancellor to make sure the funding was there for what we had to do and we did make sure that happened. and secondly to play my full part as a cabinet member in the discussions that took place and that is indeed what i did and when the cabinet met on from one day before the tuesday vote in the house of commons i spoke at the cabinet and made my position clear. >> he said in your opening remarks that one of the points we needed to draw lessons from

fighting the two words is we need it the proper structures of the decision making. looking back to the situation in the year and a half before we went to war with iraq did we have the proper structure of decision making? shouldn't we have had a cabinet meeting such as it existed in any previous governments? it didn't interfere with conduct of business but reviewed the strategy and the diplomacy, free viewed preparations. shouldn't we have a committee to do that before the conflict rather than set one up afterwards? >> i think we did learn this and i think after the butler in query tony blair set up a formal system of decision making and that was the right thing to do. i may say that i've taken this further in the position that i hold now we have a national security committee that includes all the intelligence chiefs of defense as well as the senior ministers and it will meet regularly to discuss issues

related to afghanistan midland now but previously afghanistan and iraq. it is underpinned by the senior officials' meeting prior to that id jr officials meeting prior to that. the foreign secretary defense secretary of international development secretary are asked to meet before the the tubes to sort out issues relative to the relationship between the departments and i say it right at the beginning that we are learning and rightly so the wind you are facing in this case two wars the structure has to change and you've got to involved in the decision making the security defense chiefs in a very direct way and you also got to involve the senior politicians who are involved in this. this is the decision making a i think is necessary for the world where we have an interventionist stance related to difficult problems where we are part of the international community trying to resolve the problems. we have to have the process of

decision making so yes i agree we have learned lessons from the informality of the procedures but as mr. tony blair said to you he made changes himself as a result of what he learned a the than the butler inquiry i made further changes which i think are the right things to do and i think the national security council, the nsid as it's called as a committee worked well and allows on equal terms people who contribute to the discussion should contribute to make the contributions of this is a reform in the machinery of government i think is already been made and if we are to avert further lessons i will be guided by the committee's conclusions on that very issue. >> a very important point for us as an inquiry that is trying to learn the lessons from this. in the absence of the structures you've set up and mr. blair said that after the butler report was it the situation of the 17th of march, 2003 that the cabinet and

the most senior members of the cabinet was briefed, adequately informed, adequately aware of all the different aspects of the question in order to share in the collective responsibility for the decision? >> undoubtedly i was, and i had -- >> you were? >> there is no sense in which i felt i had inadequate information. obviously the intelligence information has had to be reassessed as the result of what we have now learned but there was no sense that we were denied permission necessary to make the decision and certainly on my part i was engaged in the discussions that had taken place that we did before the cabinet meeting. but equally i was involved and the financial decisions that involved also be aware of the the three options we had to consider so i have -- i would stress that as far as with my relationship with threat investor and with the information i was in line with

what was being done. stevan of the intelligence that he mentioned, robin cook of course had raised concerns up the way the intelligence was being interpreted. he had actually challenged this. were you aware of the time of his concerns that he discussed them with you? >> robin's of usis understand it was the policy of sanctions in the no-fly zone a better way of dealing with problem. >> did he cleared the intelligence, to back? >> i do not recall a conversation with robert about the intelligence. he may have mentioned that at the cabinet. i cannot recall that. but i do know that when all i had questions to ask about the intelligence and i reported the meetings i had with the intelligence services, they were telling me information that had not leave and confirmed by their security services by other countries security services as

well. we subsequently discovered the sources of these intelligence reports to a number of different intelligence authorities that were probably the same and the wrong sources but at that time, i had full briefings from the intelligence services and i was given information that seemed credible and plausible appetite. >> and robin cook's resignation statement which was before we discovered the intelligence have been faulty, he in public and in the house of commons actually challenged whether it was correct but had easily kept this to himself in the cabinet he hadn't made it more widely known? the question of the intelligence emerged more after the investigation took place into what happened that led the intelligence services to

complete certain things. intelligence is a guide, but it cannot be the only thing by which you make decisions. >> from the five briefings that you had from the papers that you read and received, like other members of cabinet, were you convinced that the threat from what was being reported, the iraqi programs of weapons of mass destruction, was growing? >> i was convinced of a more basic fact. i just ctu, for me i repeat a major issue was that a breach of the international communities laws and decisions was something that was unacceptable. as far as the intelligence, was concerned we took the information that was given by the intelligent services, but the more bwhet could continue ia

new world with circumstances where one country was determined to stand out against the international community no matter what happened. >> i think you made that very, very clear. i think the chairman wants to call a coffee break at this point. i would like to come back afterwards with other aspects of the question that faced the cabinet on the 17th of march. >> can i say to those pleas to leave the room unless you really need to because will take quite a long time to get back and so were going to resume in about ten minutes. >> thank you. let's resume and i'll ask their

rodrick to resume questioning. >> one of the important questions of the cabinet has to be clear about was the legality of the conflict. were you satisfied solely satisfied with the advice given to the cabinet on that point? >> yes, i believe the role of the attorney general was to advise us on the matters of legality. he gave us advice. he was certain about the advice he gave and we have then to go and make our decisions on the basis not simply the legal advice that the moral, political for taking action. >> from the legal advice for you and other cabinet members aware that the attorney general advice had been different until early 2003? i wasn't aware of any detail of this. i was involved in discussions with the attorney general.

i wasn't involved in meetings of the attorney general at all. we have a straightforward issue. we were sitting down as a cabinet to discuss the merits of taking action once the diplomatic avenues had been exhausted, unfortunately. and we had to have straightforward advice from the attorney general, was a lawful or was it not? in his bias in the cabinet meeting was unequivocal. >> see you at the time and not seen the formal the form of a device he presented to the prime minister on the seventh of march? >> no comment and i'm not a lawyer, i'm not an international lawyer. as i understand it, the constitutional position is very clear that before a decision of such magnitude is maybe the attorney general has to say whether he thinks it's lawful or not. i was a straightforward question he had to answer. if you answered equivocally in a statement to us, then of course they would have been questions,

but he was very straightforward in his recommendation. and to me, that was a necessary part of the discussion about the decision of war, but it wasn't sufficient because we are to make a political and other case that had to be examined in the light of the period of diplomacy at the united nations. >> see you and other cabinet ministers come except to worse for the foreign secretary and the prime minister, were not aware that the attorney general's position had been equivocal only two weeks before an in his document of the seventh of march and had been indeed directly opposed in the cabinet out to about the 11th of february? you are completely unaware of this and you are unaware also the foreign office offices legal advisers, specialists in international law, did not agree with the position that the attorney general presented to the cabinet? >> there was some press conference coverage about the foreign office. i maybe wrong but i think there may have been found.

>> the foreign secretary for too some press coverage. if that cloak, the question that came before us was that the advice of the attorney general whether this was lawful or not, the attorney general give unequivocal advice to the cabinet. i think it's been along to the committee to explain the basis on which he gave that advice. i forget now gave his evidence to the committee, but he had a straightforward question to us. it was in a simple question but a straightforward question. was it lawful or was it not in a given unequivocal answer. >> you don't think the cabinet needed to know whether this was a robust position or a slightly controversial position? >> i think in retrospect people as historians of this matter will look at it very carefully and see what happens and what was said between the people at different times and what were the first task on the second draft in the third drops. the issue for us is very clear. we are cabinet making a decision. did the eternal attorney general

give us advice on these matters have a position on this site was unequivocal in his position was unequivocal. he cited as i have already done the united nations resolutions that led us to believe that saddam hussein had failed to be with blah. the final opportunity for saddam hussein. all these things were said and avoid the basis on which we could make a decision, but it wasn't the reason that we made the decision. he gave us the necessary means to make a decision but it wasn't sufficient and it off. >> if you'd known his position had been equivocal only ten days previously when it was presented to the prime minister, would it have changed your view? >> i don't think it would've changed my view because unless he was prepared to say that his unequivocal advice was that this was not lawful, then the other arguments that i thought were important played into place and that was what i party talks you about, the obligations to the

community, the failure to honor them, failure to disclose, the failure to discharge come the spirit of the resolutions, particularly one for for one. i knew there was a debate to whether 1441 should lead to a further discussion or decision. i knew that was an issue but it seemed to me the attorney general's advice was quite unequivocal. >> solemnity to the decision itself. you say the attorney general has advised. the cabinet has been advised that the diplomatic route effectively is not meant. at this point of taking the decision, only the prime minister and the foreign secretary had been fully involved in the approach in the foreign sec reads so far as we have heard in evidence, for temple, had been aware of the terms of the prime minister's correspondence with the president which is very important. only the foreign secretary had seen the early advice from the attorney general. but the cabinet has to share the

responsibility of this decision. and we haven't achieved all the things we wanted to achieve on the middle east peace process in terms of u.n. support, in terms of international support in someone. do you think that this cabinet in which only two members were fully in the picture 100% of the picture and you are obviously more in the picture than those who are not as close as you to the prime minister was able to take a genuinely collective decision or was it being asked essentially to endorse an approach that had been taken by your predecessor at a time when the dye effectively was already cast? >> i have to be very clear. i believe we were making the right decision for the right cause. i believe i have sufficient information before me to make a judgment. of worth, i wasn't trying to do the job of the foreign secretary or trying to second-guess

something that has happened at other meetings. i was looking at the issue on its merits. as i said to you before, i was convinced of the merits of our case. equally at the same time, we have learned about how we do the things in the future and it was important to me that the matter went to parliament and the matter went to a debate in the house of commons and we've got to remember the vote in the house of commons is absolutely overwhelmingly in favor of taking the action necessary. i believe in the future it will be important that a government puts this matter to the house of commons as a matter of right, that the house of commons brought on these matters before any country goes to war. so i think we have learned from the process that we need also parliamentary engagement in this and i favor a change in the constitution, which we are bringing about where parliament will in all normal circumstances vote on the issue of peace and war. >> and two of your colleagues who were around that table, the

former development secretary and the than warren secretary in their evidence to this inquiry have told us that the concerns that they had. mr. straw described this decision as the most difficult decision he ever faced in his life and one of the most divisive question of his political lifetime. it was obviously very difficult decision for him. was this a decision that you had any personal reservations about? >> nobody wants to go to war. nobody wants to see innocent people die. nobody wants to see fewer forces put at risk of their lives. nobody would want to make this decision except in the most gravest of circumstances, where you were sure they were doing the right thing. i have said that i think it was the right decision made for the right reasons. i think the issues that arise in reconstruction and what happened afterwards are issues where i want to learn the very important

lessons, and we are learning important lessons for the future, but the decision to take the action we did was the right decision and it was made for the right reasons. >> you spoke just now the importance of the house of commons vote and obviously you're an influence in securing support for what was a controversial decision in the house of commons on the 18th of march, must've been important. were you happy with the way that the question was presented to the house of commons by your predecessor in his speech on that day? >> yes, we weren't a position where the cabinet had made its recommendation. i think in the future of the house of commons will have the right to make the final decision and that is what i'm trying to achieve. it was clearly a vote that was made out to her the recommendation of cabinet which

was sufficient in itself for us to make the decision to go to war. but it would've been better and it will be better in the future that parliament retains the right to make the final decision. tonight we stressed right throughout this morning the importance of view to maintaining international order and international institutions in the world that we now live in. but we were in a situation, u.s.a. cabinet were in a situation of having to go to the house of commons and ask them to support something for which we have not got the support of the u.n. security council. wouldn't have been much better if we had been able to prolong the diplomacy until such time as he had got supported the security council, thereby strengthening international institutions? >> if there had been any chance that the security council would have been prepared to come to a decision based on its merits within a few weeks time, i would've supported that.

but countries have made it clear that irrespective of the merits, they were determined not to enforce the will of the international community. a number of countries are making it clear that a respect about what actually the result of of the investigation were, that although the 1441 had said they were prepared to consider all necessary measures he would be prepared to do so. it was made clear by a number of countries in the region. i think france and germany was making that clear also. >> germany wasn't on the security council. are you really referring to free and fair? >> the restatements made by president sheer rock. he was not prepared to support military action could give no indication there was a time when he would support military action. >> after he made his statement, didn't the french government immediately contact number ten, the foreign office, the british

embassy in paris to say the british government was not interpreting his statement in an accurate way? >> well, that may have happened, but i wasn't the foreign secretary or the prime minister. the context that would be have with the french would be with them. what i knew is that there was very little chance on our assessment that the diplomatic route could lead to success, but the number of countries when they're not in themselves willing to consider the action that would flow from that. look, i think he got to understand them and the committee will want to look at this. we are at the beginning of a new phase of the world community. when you post world war where the russians in america are not the paradigm in which people see what they should do as individual states around the world. there is a danger in this. a seven country rogue states will be prepared to take action that heard the international community and certainly disobey the laws of the international

community. and this is a test of whether the international community could hold together. unfortunately we cannot bring all countries along. what if the international community have been decided that after 14 resolutions and after a huge attempt at diplomacy and after trying sanctions and not succeeding with sanctions it was going to give up on this weird and i think would be sending a message to every potential dictator around the world that they were free to do what they wanted aired i think it is a very important message to learn that nothing was going to be perfect and in a situation where we were in the midst of creating the -- if you like, the institutions of the practices of a new world. it was perhaps inevitable that some countries would not feel part of that process for the time being, but relationships between france, germany and britain and america are stronger now than they have ever been and i think that shows our determination is all countries working together, to create the

international community that requires that international law and international rules be observed. >> at this precise time were talking about the u.n. inspectors were saying, give us more time. the french government was saying to us, the trillion president on the security council were again saying we need more time before we come to this decision. they were thing will never do it. so why did we have to take a decision on the 17th of march? >> i think you've got to make a judgment here. >> it wasn't because the americans have said we are simply going to take military action this week? >> i think it is a matter of judgment here that for -- >> there was an american military deadlines? >> at the better judgment for the british cabinet and the decisions we made not other countries may appear to matter of judgment was whether after 14 resolutions, after 1441 had united the international community, after saddam hussein had refused to comply, was giving minimal disclosure, the

diplomatic channels have become exhausted as to whether you take the action that you would have said in november you are prepared to take. we were prepared to take that action can i justify that decision on the basis of our judgment at the diplomatic route had become exhausted. no other people can take different judgments but this was the judgment of the british cabinet at the time. >> mr. straw told us in his evidence that the foreign-policy objective of regime change was the improper and self-evidently unlawful. mr. blair perhaps in contrast to that ted said in a speech in texas in 2002, talking not just to iraq, but in more general terms, if necessary the action should be military and again if necessary and justified it should involve regime change. and he said to this inquiry that saddam had threatened not just

the region but the world. and in the circumstances it was that are to deal with this threat, to remove him from office. does that imply that the british government had ended up by aligning with the american interpretation of international law, the revival argument that the attorney general presented to the cabinet and the american object is of regime change, which had always been that policy under the previous administration, under pressure of an american military deadlines? >> our position was not that. our position was to support action so that the will of the international community that saddam hussein disclosed and dispose of weapons to be an workforce in the back of my mind was the sense that if the international community did not act here than the international community would find it difficult to gain credibility for acting in other areas and that this new world order that we were trying to create was being put at risk.

so i go back to what i say is the wider argument about to find the will of the international community. >> in order to achieve the objective you described, was in effect essential to remove saddam's regime from office irrespective of weapons of mass destruction? >> that became the result of the action and that became the result that the intention was to force iraq to abide by the interpretations of the international community about its obligations. in the end is failure to comply and to disclose and dismantle the same as the reason why action had to be taken inside iraq and the eventual effect of that was to remove him from office. >> chairman, i think he wanted to come in. >> mr. brown as i could just pick up a point getting back to the legal advice, looking ahead now back to what happened in the cabinet that made the decision but rather to a possible lesson to be learned for the future. it was implied in the full advice with the cabinet didn't see, didn't have to see that

there was a risk exposure both for ministers themselves and not least for crown servants both military and civil. in the event of some jurisdiction or in some process it could be found that the decision was not lawful. now, is a plain constitutional doctrine that says the attorney rules, yes it is, no it isn't, sufficient when there's that element within it and i'm thinking about future situations, with a risk exposure of crown servants and crown ministers may be involved? >> well, i knew at that stage that the permanent secretary to the civil service and the military chief had clear guidance to what the position was. so i knew that they were satisfied that they've got the legal assurances that were necessary. as far as the future is concerned, i think our desire to

be more transparent in the way we make decisions is of course got to be balanced by the needs of national security. but i think it is important that we do everything in our power, if we are putting these issues to parliament, and not simply taken executive decisions without recourse to parliament i think we have to provide greater information than what's on at that time. as it was one of the lessons i think will be learned with the infallible inevitable decisions. whereas for greater greater information so this is one of the lessons we can learn. but i do say that everything that mr. blair did during this period he did harper lee and i do not say that i was anything other than fully informed about the issues that i needed information and to make my decisions. >> thank you here at back to you, sir roderic. >> can i now turn to the

campaign particularly to the immediate aftermath of the military action. in january this year you said in a press conference that the mistake in the war was not to do the reconstruction and planet in the way that was necessary so that iraq could recover quickly after saddam hussein fell. what was wrong with the planning for the aftermath? >> i think this will be dated for many years to come and i hope that your inquiry can make some recommendations about how to do with that in the future. the ideal situation would be this, but an international organization like the united nations have a security and reconstruction agency that is available immediately at reconstruction of an individual country needs to happen. that would be true for example in zimbabwe if there was to be a change in government. it's certainly true in saddam, somalia, in the balkans area where it has to take place. one of the lessons we have to learn is that there are going to

be interventions that are necessary in the future for humanity or or for other reasons that you will have failed states, you will of conflict ridden states that will break down. you will have stayed then need to change and we should have in place as we have known person we have 1000 people who are ready to help in reconstruction immediately if there is a need for it. we should have the united nations or international agency which is responsible for security and reconstruction. just as we military support, we need civilian supports we can do all the things that are necessary with a broken state has to be rebuilt. so that's my first estimate i've learned. i wayside, from june onwards, june 2002 onwards would be a problem. in my first meanings, i said that we had to plan properly for that. but we couldn't. let us be honest that the americans had to take the authority it deserved.

and the course of action in iraq has been that we only came to what i would call the iraqi invasion, in other words, iraq's security forces, iraq police, iraq economic envelopment and iraq's political development. that was the basis of military construction that could take days. and we only came to that later and not at the first point after the invasion. i regret this. i cannot take personal responsibility for everything that went wrong. i did a paper to the americans just before the war was declared the sad that these things have to be planned for and waited the international organizations to be involved. >> we had of course anticipated that the united nations would do exactly as you said and added a lot of experience and also organizations like the world bank. but we weren't able to do that because we couldn't get the support of the united nations.

so you can of international agency but if you don't have a legitimacy that allows it to operate, then you are stuck, and so that was surely the situation we found ourselves in. >> at the united nations does come in at a later stage. >> after resolution may. >> i was chairman of the ims and the imf committee were prepared to come in. the world bank were prepared to come in. i talked to james wilkinson, the president of the world bank and asked them to come in. and we have the two development funds for iraq in international reconstruction to sell before iraq, but it is true to say that the postwar planning because we now know that you cannot win the peace simply by military action. you need to engage the people of iraq or any other country, you need to give them the chance of political empowerment at some stage. you need to have strong security forces and you need what i discovered in bozrah need economic development. these things were not the

central part of the initial reconstruction plans, but they became that way and the lessons we learned in iraq have now been deployed in afghanistan. i hope the committee may be able to draw some of the lessons that we have learned in iraq and say that they are more relevant to other situations as well as to iraq itself. >> i think there's going to be a lot there for us to explore. you say from june of 2002 onwards you were pressing for thought to be given to this question, but the british government on planning for the aftermath really didn't get into gear until february 2003. why did we take lundy? why were we so late doing it? i think the committee will have a paper we did in september -- >> recommendations were made. we only set up to planning unit on the 11th of february 2003. >> this was originally of course

we wanted this to be an international effort so our original proposals were that we had to involve the human imf world bank as quickly as possible here that was obviously frustrated by what was happening in the diplomatic negotiations over trying to find a way forward. we had a meeting, i believe, on march the ninth of investors to discuss reconstruction. i was asked as a result of that -- >> that's very late. >> as a result of the papers that had been done. we had a meeting on march the ninth and i was asked to do a paper we sent to the americans after that meeting about some of the things we thought had to be done for reconstruction. >> or whitey think the cabinet hadn't paid more attention to the aftermath planning at an earlier stage? >> i think because we were more confident than you may look now at now that the diplomatic process would have more success, but clearly we were preparing for military options and clearly we had also to prepare for

reconstruction. now, the work that was done in america and clearly the work that was done in britain was not done as much an parallel as it should have been done. >> could i just intervened? we know from what we've read from open sources that there was a great deal of planning done for the aftermath by the state department. but that was not drawn on when the department of defense became that department. >> this is the problem alluding to, that there was a different decision being made about what the path of reconstruction and would be. and obviously, our planning was based first on more international involvement by other partners and secondly on the issues that i raised that we have learned more about in recent years, but you've got to get the iraqi people on your side. this is what general petraeus of course learned when he was in his the work that he did in 2006, 2007, but she got to have economic projects that let

people feel they have a stake in the future and you have to get the security of armed forces of iraq sorted out in such a way that they can be responsible for security and that requires non-corrupt police as well hear it now these are all the lessons that we've applied in basra and i believe that if we look at the in the next session, we have learned lessons from basra that are applicable to afghanistan, but also to other countries around the world. i come back to this original point. really this new world has got to have some international organization that is responsible not just with peacekeeping and matches of humanitarian aid work with international organizations, or for stabilization and reconstruction. >> but presumably it will be up to offer in areas where there is an international consensus in favor of the action. >> i'm not sure about that if i may say so. in the end they came into iraq and was repaired to comment -- >> the resolution had been passed in may. >> i was two months later, but

it did pass a resolution. of course, the united nations mission in iraq led to the tragedy of that in baghdad and the withdrawal of the personnel of that mission and the world bank mission personnel, the ims personnel had to be withdrawn. treasury people in iraq. the soul. working a very difficult circumstances, very bravely organizing the new currency of iraq, organized in the new financial budgeting system for iraq and organizing public reconstruction. we were directly involved in these things. >> used that in the planning. we were driving out effectively and obviously a lot of warning signals came back from washington to london in the early months of 2000 turks pursing great concern about the american lack of planning for the aftermath and the shift of locusts to the defense department. we heard this from a lot of earlier witnesses. shouldn't we, given the very

large commitment we were making to this operation and the military commitment have been able to exercise more influence over the americans to make sure that the aftermath planning was done properly and that we were cut into it? the >> later in the year i did go across state -- >> contacted about the period before the invasion. >> the united states out they had to take more serious the issues of reconstruction for the first. of course the issue was with the military campaign succeed in a succeeded in a very, very short time as you know. but the issue of reconstruction became more urgent and more immediate than perhaps people had expected it to be. i can only say that we have started landing and the treasury for this some months before but we had to persuade our other colleagues that this was the right thing to do. i mean colleagues and other governments. >> and planning done by your officials and the treasury had that looked at the likely scenarios that might arise after conflict in iraq including

upsurge in terrorism, instability, having to deal with very damaged infrastructures, need for peacekeeping force to keep a lid on the ethnic and religious tensions and so one? were these things at the treasure was looking at quite >> a lot of these would be matters of foreign office would be looking up more carefully than we would be. we were looking at the economic issues that would arise about jobs, about the provision of utilities, about the currency. as you know, we completely remodeled the iraqi -- >> so you were looking at these things. now, do you think the problems which did arise in the aftermath could have been mitigated if the coalition have been much better prepared really to get into action on the issues you mentioned at the beginning and if it had this wide international support we didn't get until after the second resolution was passed in the united nations in the middle of may? >> we have to remember there were 40 countries as part of the

coalition. it wasn't two, three, four, or five. >> there were only two occupying powers. >> you've also got to remember by may the united nations had come into play despite all the difficulties they faced in the future the united nations were part of the reconstruction program. we need the imf and the world bank. but which included the treasury was that we would need all these world organizations to be enrolled for the reconstruction to be successful. >> at what point did it become obvious to you before the conflict that this plenty was defective? did you get worried about it? 's >> i don't think that we were fully aware of all the attentions within the u.s. administration. i feel that we should have, of course, has been able to more quickly and do what we eventually did on politics, economics and security and that is building up the iraqi forces.

but the decisions made in the first days were not in mind with that. and we have learned that lesson and that lesson as we learned for future conflicts as well, that it's only a necessary condition of change in iraq that military action happened, that it was only sufficient if we have the reconstruction and that's what i mean about a just peace must enroll and i think we've got to look at this further countries and that there is a right as citizens to participate in the political system established as quickly as possible. >> want to get security and law and order. >> security and reconstruction go hand-in-hand. >> the u.k. was not believe the joint occupying power but it was also decided to take the responsibility for the four provinces in the southeast of iraq. were you involved in the decision that we should take on this responsibility? >> yeah, this is a big decision because it's a play taking far greater responsibility for one

area. basra was about 2 million people. the other provinces were a group of people and basra became the center both our problems and what we were eventually able to achieve successfully i think in putting basra into position where it could govern it out. >> you remember when you -- when the decision was taken we would take on this role? 's >> there were. the first was when the military decision was that instead of our troops go in and in the north, troops were going in the south. and that was a decision taken on military advice and that was a change that was made to our plans, that the second decision without we would organize iraq after the military success. i can't recall exactly when we were given the responsibility for basra, but i know that for us it'd been involved economic and social and political

measures. >> there were meetings discussed in earlier evidence held in march, prime minister, development secretary, i can't recall offhand whether you were there or not about taking charge of basra and what would be required here it >> the march 19 reconstruction meeting. >> yes. now, subsequently, once the occupying invasion of south bend has happened, we were in position as occupying power. we begin to have to deal with some very, very serious problems of insurgency within iraq, each security problem which got worse. do you consider the problems of the british and american thinker towards occupying powers are principally caused by external interference and al qaeda external interference by a friend and al qaeda?

's >> the world was interference. >> was the principal cause of difficulties? >> you really have got two things happening at once. you have got the intent for both iran and by al qaeda to make a mark in iraq. but should also got the sunni insurgency and you've also got the tension between the sunnis and shia. so it's not an external problem, but that did contribute to the instability of iraq. >> were these problems, all of him that we could've anticipated and should've anticipated? >> i don't think we could've anticipated everything that happened subsequent to the invasion. but i think one of the lessons that we have learned that we will apply in future is that you've got to move quickly to giving the iraqi people a sense that they have greater control of the situation. now it is true that we were dealing with the iraqi army that

existed under saddam hussein and politicians and bureaucrats to work under saddam hussein. but it's also true right think that we learned this lesson from other past conflicts. but unless you can quickly involve the people of the country in a sense that they are about to get more control over the country, then you become very quickly an army of occupation rather than an army of liberation. >> finally, before i head over, just the cabinet mechanisms you've referred to the adult ministerial meeting that began to happen from the 19th of march and indeed met almost daily i think until the 10th of april. that was an ad hoc ministerial meeting in i believe you attended it. do you feel that that served useful purpose and sanctions while? >> yes, the work on it which meant almost daily i attended a

large number of these meetings but it also harmed at the time of the budget and other things that were happening in international meeting so i attended as many as i could. yes, it's other useful functions and it allowed the different departments and agencies to report on what they were doing and so we had greater coordinations as a result of that. >> but then the second committee was set up, which was the ad hoc ministerial meeting on iraq rehabilitation. and i began to me from the 10th of april and went on meeting right throughout these until august. was that also an effective ministerial committee of the kind we hadn't had before? >> i think we're learning lessons all the time here. i can't give you specific information about the success of that particular venture, but it was a necessary means by which we dealt with some of the problems that opposed weird what i can tell you is that we have learned a fuller lesson about the need for government to be organized for a situation where you are at war and in this case

at war with two countries, with afghanistan and iraq and so you need structures of decision-making that can't -- >> the u.s. chancellor didn't go to the needs of the ministerial committee and rehabilitation? >> i would be the chief secretary. if there were masses of fact day and public expenditure it would eat probably the best thing at that stage for the chief secretary to be at that meeting. i think he was president. >> he went on the eighth of may. the previous three meetings you had the foreign secretary, the defense secretary, patricia hewitt, attorney general, i wonder whether treasury was only represented at the official level on this ministerial committee. >> i don't know. >> right. >> thank you. i would like to ask some preliminary questions on financial aspects, essentially before march 2003 and after the

lunch break i know sir laurence freedman wanted to pick up the larger scenes. but just to begin with, you told us already this morning just about the cost of potential u.k. involvement in action in the central estimate of the time i think you told us was 2.5 billion, was not to be seen as a constraint on a decision whether to act or not. how for though was the potential impact on the public finances efficiently a concern that was something you needed to share or was it something the treasury could contain within it felt like >> no, we had to be clear with parliament that we were setting aside money for this endeavor. so we made an original estimate of the cost would be 2.5 billion by 2006 because our planning. it took us to them. but then having revised our estimate it was 4 billion to 2006 and i think i'm right in saying that the eventual additional cost above the

minister of defense normal budget was an accurate assessment that was made. in november, reported to the house of commons that we set up a special reserve. i was a billion pounds. that was for a year. so is reporting a year ahead, the special reserve. and in april, when i did the budget i've reported that that was no 3 billion to take us through the next time. we spent about a billion year additional money on iraq for most of these years and in total iraq has cost the treasury something in order of eight alien pounds. 2 billion pounds of these are for urgent operational requirements, but the total cost is a land that we have found over these years to pay for the offer we made in iraq on top of an also rising defense budget. >> i like to return in a moment if i made to the aspect of the federal reserve.

first picking up again i point you made early this morning, that you are not going to advise your colleagues that the financial considerations should determine either the scale of our military contribution, or indeed, whether we should make it if diplomacy failed to answer nicholas mcpherson, your permanent secretary told us pretty much the same, that the treasury wasn't in the business of advising his ministers to support one intervention of another on cost grounds. on the other hand, the scale of the uk's commitment, whether the mental engagement were military intervention or the turnout image of an contribution, the difference was very great. was the concern about the broader economic consequences for the u.k., the potential ones something that you knew you to get a grip on it and understand

and estimate in contributing to the eventual distribution? >> yes, we do paper in july. and they have been june actually, that are from the time over that but the cost of the various options that would have been looked at by the minister of defense. they said i should talk to the prime minister about that. i made it clear to the prime minister that no option should be ruled out on the grounds that it was too costly. that we have to choose what the right military option was, the right option for security and if we were to be in a position where the diplomatic avenue failed, he should know that the treasury would make allowance for whichever option was chosen. and in september, we did a paper -- it could have been september, october, we did a paper that was on the overall effects of potential war in iraq. we said the oil price was likely to go up by 10%.

we said the oil company would suffer a greater degree of volatility as a result of the tiered issues would arise in a situation where iraq was not supplying order to the world, but equally at the same time there is instability in the region. we concluded that the cost then every construction would be something in order of 45 billion peers who did work on reconstruction as well and take the view that this had to be shared as much as possible with the international community and that was why one of the imf and world bank involved. these were the preparations that we made, but the first click announcements of setting aside money was in the first to set aside a billion. but by that time either be made available to the defense secretary 500 million pounds for preparations which included the purchase of necessary equipment in case we were to be a war. i think it came in 200, 20100.

we also set aside money for training which was available for extra training by the ministry of defense and every application might be the administration of the fence. i made an absolute clear was made for equipment and every application that was made for resources necessary for the campaign in iraq had to be met by the treasury and we create a system that was quick and fast moving so we can make sure the mill is very defense needed as quickly as possible. >> i would like to return when moment to the system of what are known as few ors. just before that, did the assessment of the financial impact locally as well as nationally offer potential ability actions. did i clarify itself sufficiently before, in effect, the march.

, or did a little before march when they became more likely that military action would take place. was there sufficient handle on the financial and economic consequences by then? >> yes, you think so. in fact the oil price could go up to 10% and spiked debate equally and it's reassuring to know that our estimate of the cost of the engagement in iraq was proven to be accurate. the cost of reconstruction again we made a pretty big estimate of what it was likely to cost my think again we were probably to be right. as far as defects in the world economy we thought these could be managed. >> just before we turn to the special reserve and did you all are, we have seen the papers to which he referred about the assessment of the financial economic impact if i say so is very impressive in their quality. but we can't find it and may be similar this with the habit of

the time of the treasury there is not much but it did on the discussion of that or how they were handled at meetings or discussions. is that just otherwise? >> anything in the case of the first paper was about the military options and i think is that in the first paper that i would want to talk to the prime minister about it and i did. so that was a conversation that i had with the prime minister. on the second set of issues on reconstruction, we were making estimates of what was likely to happen and that led us to the meeting on march the ninth, when we picked up a different decision that had to be made on reconstruction, and they agreed that i would prepare a paper that would be sent to the americans to remind them that we had a few of reconstruction that appear to be different from their view. >> thank you. you have mentioned already the provisions of the pre-budget report of 1 million pounds for the special reserve. i think i have got two questions, if i may. the first is, you set the amount

of the special reserve for defense purposes or prospective military engagement at a billion pounds in november and then in your budget you raise that to 3 billion. was very concerned that the pressure is on the reserve from all the quarters of insurance and financial 2002, 2003 that it would add that were threatened the best of the limit need to create a special reserve over their different rationale? >> the special rationale was created and it was to do with issues of security and counterterrorism. and that wasn't created with an announcement that this was money was deathly spent on iraq here but it was created to his public recognition that we set aside a billion pounds. by the time it came to the budget it was clear that this action would take place over a period of time and in actual fact the 3 billion represented a cost of 1 billion a year. in addition, of course to the

existing defense budget which was also present at the time and i have two i have to emphasize that, and i said that every single request that was made for equipment had to be met and every request was met, and at any point to military commanders were able to ask for equipment that they needed, and i know i know of no occasion when they were turned down for it. >> thank you. again, we might return to that a little later on, but just what the record, it would help me, i think, if we could have on the record what the terms of the treasury's golden rule where and how far it came near into thousand two, 2003 and 2003, 2004 coming under threat. >> i think this may be misunderstood that the golden rule was to be met under the cycle. so it wasn't a role that had to be met here on year. so what if we had to rule in one particular year that would be understood in position to the

whole cycle. the golden rule was that current expenditure would be covered by taxation and the capital expenditure would allow for borrowing and we were reading the golden rule at that time and it is only of course the financial -- global financial crisis that has made it difficult for us to meet that rule. >> one other point if i may on the special reserve and how it was presented. as he just told us, it was described as being needed to meet the united kingdom's defense and overseas needs in the fight against global terrorism, and in the budget report in april 2003 and was defined more specifically ask for possible action in iraq. we asked sir nick mcpherson why this had been described as the fight against terrorism. we were interested to know whether it implied the sense that the fusion of the global terrorism threats and the aircraft goblin had come together and he told us not.

>> no, no, no. we were doing counterterrorism operations in other areas as well. there was general and instability around the world. without that we we had to make provision for it. we didn't specifically announced in november that this was simply iraq or it was for iraq and other purposes. i april of course we have the budget, we were meeting at a time if it was the first budget for 50 years that it happened when the country was at war. >> there is one other point i think it's important to establish for the record because of this terminological, not arguments, but debate about what it was about global terrorism, was it about iraq, or the to the same thing? has really only in 2004 onwards that the incursion of al qaeda into iraq becomes a fact. before that, you are not facing a terrorist threat of the mounting insurgency guess, but that's the saddam aftermath

amazing to get to the chronology right, have i understood it right, in november 2002, you have an view a counterterrorist used for the special reserve. by april 2003 comments clear that the main body of it is for iraq operations, but none of the deals directly with counterterrorism in iraq because that comes later in 2004. >> i'm hoping not misunderstood on this. i said at the beginning i thought there were two instabilities of the world had to do what's in the post-world cold war era. but also its war with iran. while we were recognized in the special reserve, that there were two separate functions that had to be dealt with because of instabilities. by the time we came to april, we were clearly in conflict with iraq and the vast majority of

that money was used for iraq. >> thank you you would like to turn now to from the arrangements of funding military operation in iraq, in particular in the period leading up to the invasion perhaps just immediately afterwards. now, you've described already the necessary approval system for expenditure that had us and indeed the operation. i'd like to thank the committee as a whole day would come after lunch to the broader question of it relation to the overall defense budget. but just looking at the need for urgent operational requirements, which arise out of the actual military enterprise, the treasury that limit on how much the mod could spend on preparation and uor's and from time to time of the request was made you raise this when it's incrementally -- >> can i put it the other way

around. we didn't set limits on the expenditure on uor's or on equipment. we made estimates about what they would need and said if you need more, you come back to us. so there was no limit set. their allocations to ensure that money could be spent immediately but i think coming out, that the different urgent operational requirements that were agreed to and they were all paid. it wasn't the question of it being a limit beyond which you couldn't go read at all times we said here's money that is available now for the equipment means you need to address. once you have spent back, then we are prepared and always were ready to actually deliver more. >> from the evidence we've seen is that not a disputed area. there is one thing that's just with establishing a thing. uor current urgent operational requirements. qualified if they need a set of

eligibility criteria, which the treasury misjudge. no argument with that. who we've seen no evidence to suggest that attempts are made to go outside those criteria or to have an argument about whether there are not any particular case. but it is some of us is in it for the record, the case that there was a proper discipline system for the operation of the uor? it didn't lead to contentious arguments or disagreements are refusals but there was a system. >> there was a system but it was a system that was one that i think of the ministry of defense make decisions quickly and get equipment ordered quickly. and the initial allocation 500 million was the start of planning for example of the challenger tanks as i understand it have to be designed in a particular way or the terrain in iraq and night vision equipment. all of these things were being ordered and money was being made available for that.

i think it was equipment that was needed in iraq -- any piece of equipment that was needed for iraq that was in part of the normal ordering process of the ministry of defense would be made available and that's why 2 billion was spent in iraq alone on urgent operational requirements out of the 8 billion in total that we've spent on iraq. in the same goes in afghanistan where we provided very substantial additional money for equipment and for materials that are necessary for the conduct of the campaign. he wasn't restricted in the sense that we'd roll something out on the basis that we didn't think it right. it was a flexible way of the ministry of defense could meet the requirements that they set and they wanted. and i know of no case when urgent operation was turned down at any time. in fact is that to my officials at the beginning all urgent operational requirements must be met and we must do this with weekly as possible and in the

end we brought in someone from the ministry of defense to be with us as we make these decisions so we could speed them up even faster and at the same time anything under 10 million was accepted without their having to be processed. >> just to round up on these two, in a sense, secondary points. the first is that the officials -- official treasuries in the ministry of defense as ministry would've had to work quite closely together and had to be mutual satisfaction of the uor system was working. >> yes. >> there is the usual amount of bureaucratic interchange when the situation arises. you might have kept a bit of a nine on it from a pie, but you didn't see any friction or possible problem there? ..

getting answers to claims for additional funding they would need to meet their respective responsibilities. in the event the claims were settled by mutual agreement in her late march, was this because it was slow to make a timely reasonable case or because the on the certainty of the

situation made it difficult? >> it was neither. what it had unlike the ministry of defense and all other departments have had this was a contingency so in the spending review we set aside contingency funding available that in their case was 80 million pounds and our position was use the 80 million pounds where that is necessary for the reconstruction and preparation for the reconstruction and then come to us and we will fund whatever is additional to that so we wanted the contingency to be used first of all and i think the was the right decision. then when we were satisfied the contingency was used we provided an extra 120 million that was additional money for the work they were doing and reconstruction. i think i've also right saying we provided 20 million pounds to the foreign office for additional work they had to do in setting up different things in relation to iraq so we were

ready to provide additional money but we wanted to be sure that the of their own contingency fund were using that first. >> thank you. your side reference to the office brings me conveniently to the last question before we break. we had evidence from a number of people that in particular facing the perspective task of taking on the southeast and basra province in particular there is going to be the need to find money for both fco as well as diffard that was the department for aftermath planning. they were not getting the results they felt they needed to fulfill the additional responsibilities they were being asked to take on. you remind us there is an additional 20 million provided as is not unusual there's caps sometimes between the satisfaction and claim. but i wonder whether you would

like to comment in the market and that much later we will come to it in the afternoon the problems basra confronted us with in terms of the construction of stabilization. >> we will come to that this afternoon on undoubtedly. everybody would like more money than they receive and that is a normal process of discussion with the government but the office did receive this additional money. i've got to say we will perhaps look at this when we come to basra. one of the issues in iraq is there was money available through the united nations. there was no financial planning system in baghdad that could release the money to basra and week, the treasury had to go in and create a new financial law that allowed expenditures from iraq to go to basra which was the old fund being invested so the issues in basra were first of all obviously what we could do but secondly with the international organizations to do it certainly iraq through their own money could actually be when money had ever got to

basra before but we had to create a law elbridge financial planning and budgeting made it possible for the money to be distributed from iraq to the provinces. >> this is a good moment to break for lunch and we would like to resume at 1:30. i think with no more ado, prime minister we will break now and come back after lunch. thank you.

the next journalism must be one open to blogs and email that are hammering like this on the door to be let into the conversation. to add new information, to raise new questions, to suggest new context.

now a discussion on counter insurgency operations in iraq. journalists who covered the war talk about the effectiveness of u.s. military operations. this is part of an all-day conference hosted by johns hopkins university school of the advanced international studies. it's an hour and a half. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning. my name is bill weiss, the director of southeast studies here at sais. it's my pleasure to welcome you back or if you were not with us

yesterday to your first experience with our conference on the lessons learned, since lost, counterinsurgency from the yen, to iraq and afghanistan. once again i would like to express our great appreciation to dr. steve maxner at texas tech university and his colleagues for cosponsoring this conference with us and also again to give special thanks to lockheed martin corporation for its generous support of our conference activity. yesterday after an important keynote address by mike, assistant secretary defense for special operations and a low intensity conflict we discussed and debated somewhat spiritedly how we should learn a from the past from the past conflicts and what we should or could have learned from counter insurgency and the imam. more than half a century ago marshall of the royal air force

john schweitzer learned that if there's one attitude more dangerous than to assume a future war would be just like the last one its to imagine that there will be utterly different that we can afford to ignore the lessons of the last one to read today we have three expert panels whose members will explore specifically how the lessons of the vietnam have been transferred, ignored or adapted to contemporary conflict in iraq and afghanistan. lessons learned, lessons lost. let's see. our first panel of counter insurgency is chaired by dr. patrick of the center for new american security. patrick? >> thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. it is a great privilege to be here and i want to thank john hopkins and texas tech to be the center for the excellent work in putting together this two-day

conference on important issues. but i was at oxford university years ago whether the vietnam was a counter insurgency was a subject of debate. forget about the lessons. but now the are reducing it to counter insurgency and putting it together with iraq and afghanistan and discussing these lessons. i also mindful of winston churchill who said the further backward you can look for other for what you can see. our panel looks back only seven years so maybe we can only see forward a few years but i think with our distinguished speakers we may be able to even glimpse some lessons beyond that. the word lessons is also a broad and nebulous term it may be the importance of looking for lessons lost, the outcome of misplaced or whatever is a this searching for them in the dialogue in sue's thinking about it but obviously it is based on an acquisition of knowledge it hopes to have facts and a

rendering a judgment the importance making sure you take the fact some of the narrative, the chronology and try to the and render judgment that may be helpful in this case may be for operations but also i hope that the strategic level and it is at the strategic level i often do most of my thinking of trying to figure out whether we are on the right track or not for instance one big question was asked this past weekend on the future of our afghan policy was if the iraq and afghanistan war combined are the second most expensive war in american history in terms of cost, not casualties, the first is the second world war you can imagine how the united states came out of world war ii, cried for position of power and wealth and prosperity how are we going to come out of iraq and afghanistan?

unfortunately i think nobody here would say we are going to come out in the same position that maybe that is a false choice. maybe there was no choice but i really throw that out as a provocation as we now turn to the three panelists. we are going to go and the opposite order of your program and let me introduce each of the speakers and then i will turn to linda to kick it off. linda robinson is a distinguished writer and was a distinguished senior reporter for u.s. news world report for many years and has been a fellow and author residents at three wonderful universities, harvard, stanford and right here at the center at johns hopkins university. she's the author of some outstanding books from masters of chaos to the secret history of the special forces to more recently tell me how this in this general david petraeus and the search for a way out of iraq and it may be partly on that work that she draws her comments this morning. she's also most importantly

until lightly a swath for graduate. the work so hard it's conscious of a graduate institutions right now as my daughter applies and i think it probably started us off more. thomas in contrast was from yale so this tells you about his skull and bones background. he was an outstanding reporter for the washington journal and "washington post" and he earned two pulitzers, not one but two. he has an award winning blog which these days is like a pulitzer and he is of course a senior fellow at the center for new american security. he's the author of toole outstanding books on iraq as you know i sure if you ask which covered 2003 to 2005 and more recently the gamble which looked at the next couple of years after that 2006 to 2008. he's also the author of a very recent cnas report on iraq

arguing that 2010 this year is going to be a pivotal year in iraq war and last but no means least andrew brings to a different dimensions to the discussion this morning. he's a middle east scholar having really studied, worked, lift, fought in the middle east including the american university of beirut, that was the fighting perhaps and also king's college london. he is a soldier but army rangers in iraq and afghanistan on the other things. he's also a great writer and thinker and he's written a great book, this man's army. he writes one of the most provocative blogs and as well as on the internet and most importantly he's a great colleague that the center for american security so we are almost having a staff meeting here we are letting linda joined and with that, linda what does it mean? what lessons do you draw from iraq? >> thank you for being here. i'm delighted to be part of this conversation today.

i am certainly going to draw on my book tell me how this ends and my comments today i also just finished writing a chapter for a book that is looking that lessons learned from both iraq and afghanistan and pakistan. i am by no means an expert on vietnam so i will rely in part of our dialogue to try to extract and tashi in some of these links. i did start this chapter however say the united states is going through its most sustained in the intensive experience of war since it departed the end of 35 years ago so i have been living through these years very conscious of the fact this is a new vietnam generation in a way. the people out there fighting are going through and some ways many of the same things that surface people did in vietnam. i think also as a country we are going to spend years are getting

over this war and grappling with it and tom and i have certainly been involved with the dates trying to get the negative right and people who haven't spent a lot of time on the ground over there i.t. to get involved in some polemics of that departure from what we believe i think are some of the empirical factual things that must be kept in mind. i'm going to spend a good bit of time talking about the critical period if 20072008 but i would like to set the stage with a kind of backdrop of the first years of the war and then conclude by offering you some of my broad conclusions and what i'm calling the practice of strategic counter insurgency, the things i think we have learned in my back that are applicable to the current ne war effort what i believe will be future engagements.

my view is many of us covering iraqi focused overly on military operations and did not spend enough time understanding the country called on iraq and i think that may be true in general, that may also be a critique of those who prosecuted the war but i think that we will cover the war in an in-depth need to scrutinize what we did and didn't do well. as i began then writing the book by delft very heavily into the iraqi politics and spend a lot of time and. i still went out and spend time with troops at every echelon from the squad up to the four-star and three-star command but i think it's important to try to understand the main dynamics of the war from a political perspective that than in the forbes what did it didn't happen in the military cents.

the five errors that i believe really shaped and set the groundwork for what was a deepening and almost lost war by the time we got to 2007 began with of course the famous decision to disband the baathist party and saddam hussein's military and security forces. we don't know whether there would have been an insurgency without that step up tall but guaranteed that one would occur particularly in combination with these other four errors. the decision to go ahead with the january 2005 elections evin once it was clear the sunnis were going to boycott the election and again set up a political dynamic that no military operation could overcome and then of course that assembly that was elected went ahead to write a constitution where in the shia is lummis ideas were at the forefront and

that created a further sense despite ambassador's attended the last minute to negotiate a deal whereby the constitution would be revised within four months of the new parliament taking its seat that never occurred. that has never occurred and that is still a central part of the political in the game that i will give some time to as well. the fourth error was in my view there was a persistent tendency through 03, 07 for the military commanders and analysts to ignore the growing threat from the shia islamist extremists side. we were very focused on sesame extremist threat. there were some elements including and i was with the special forces of the beginning of the war and over the border and we saw people pouring in from iran and they were tracking closely on the solder and first assassination that occurred.

so the elements were there from the beginning and i totally reject this notion it only exploded with the samarra bombing. it was absolutely in a plea from the first days and all you have to do is read the book was a an advisory key figure in the early transition government and he speaks for the shiite islamist contingent when he says of course we were going to try to seize all the power we could. it was a win or to call situation they were trying to be the winner and they were aiming to take over and his book makes this clear so there was no awareness of this i believe on the part of the military commanders and i think in sufficient there was a divided policy crowd that didn't adequately grapple with this. he did i seek appreciate it but he didn't have enough allies. the fifth error was the treaty

of the city's population as the enemy and is involved in discriminant targeting and practical blunders and repeated clearing operations kicking in the same door of the same family that had nothing to the insurgency and of course as we know and what general mcchrystal calls quite enough of you to get one person and the whole family now joined the insurgency so we really blundered repeatedly over those years and i went back. i was there every year of the war and extended snapshots for my time on the ground. so now i will move ahead to 20071 petraeus was named as the multinational force commander. the very first and the most important thing he did was set up the joint strategic assessment team called jsat in the acromegaly ago. was headed by mcmaster and in did -- it was very

multidisciplinary and three multinational so the key point is they reached out from the get go to find smart people across the disciplines. it was not a military exercise. this was model of what petraeus had gone to reclaim and you will come f m -- 324. i was involved in a workshop to critique the first draft of the 324 and he conducted like a graduate seminar to be he a of a bunch of people, every expert, a bunch of academics of course military officers and six or seven of us journalists and had at it and the jsat performed in a similar way. no holds barred extremely profound critique and examination of the war and why had been done to include the critiquing of with the u.s. approach had been and so the conclusion reached and there were many conclusions but the essential thing was the diagnosis of the war and use it

had components of terrorism and insurgency and so forth with what they concluded this point it had become primarily a communal struggle i.t. civil war. the shia and sunni dynamic had come to the floor and had to be dealt with and the primary prescription was there for an accommodation have to be reached. political accommodation and the use that word rather than reconciliation but the point was you had to fight a political way out ultimately and that military tools and forces had to be used to try to produce this outcome. this report was not adopted lock stock and barrel but rather it was used to fashion the joint campaign plant which was again a joy and combined exercise between the multinational force come and and the u.s. mission, the country team. ambassador crocker was very critical throughout this effort and was treated as an equal

partner and he brought the country expertise and their regional expertise to the table and and valuable you know, having individuals in the right places does matter as i sure the scrutiny of the end of war has made clear as well. the joint campaign plan had a number of features but what i would like to do is to live right down into what i think this is my only part it's great to be operational tactical but i think what mattered in terms of getting to the dynamic changes in the momentum and trying to get a dynamic that favored accommodation rather than the civil war and the disintegration of iraq they adopted what i would call a blend of population center get in any centric counter insurgency and i know that f m 3-24 heavily relies on the population centric type of approaches, but there was definitely with and enemy

centric and the key was getting much better intelligence that provided much more precise targeting and i will see a bit more about that but i just going to run through life the were the essentials tactics, techniques and procedures that were applied it's critical to note they were applied more less simultaneously and as you all know your experts here the massing defects over time and space is critical and one of the debates that's broken out had been with some battalion commanders who feel the wording of the right things prior to s happening for one tour inf it one area over the may and a zone of conflict because it would unravel the minute they left and it had nothing to look up to and this is why again my topline conclusions are about strategic counterinsurgency. yes, we've got the tactics read that matters not at all if you

don't get the big picture right and that means first diagnosis and in the application of the correct tactics over a wide enough area and in this case this was the main effort and that is why i focus my reporting in the book and my time because i had a certain amount of time i could spend and write this book while i was reporting, so the critical things of course we know the famous search committee is increasing troops, 30,000, but you also had 100,000 iraqi is being added to it but i submit it wasn't the numbers so much as the change in how they were deployed and the dispersion of the troops was critical and on just as a bumper sticker to do it. it had a purpose. the dispersion into the joint securitizations and combat outposts all over this made area and again there were a few before there were sufficient numbers, 60 and naim, baghdad, 77 in all of the greater baghdad

area at the peak so that gave you and ability to start transforming the neighborhoods. there were also a number of population control measures and a lot of people on the swishy side of queen don't like to talk about this but they were important putting up the walls of the neighborhoods that had become the bomb factories but also in the targeted areas, the ne market areas that were creating the huge casualties. more and checkpoints, x-rays of the bridges, curfews, vehicle banks. fallujah was shut down so you had a lot of aggressive measures taken to contain the insurgents, separate them from the population targets and then as i mentioned counterterrorism became more effective because it was unable to fundamentally by the eckert intelligence and faster intel loop and to name some of the things of course we had massive increase in of mant from a real vehicles and the use of that and the development of

the fusion centers to enable the rapid targeting. you had technical things like these by a metric systems that look like polaroid cameras and they would go in and take pictures yet get fingerprinted to retina stance of the suspected insurgent population basically all of the military meals in a given suspect area would be registered so for the first time in the entire war you had a shared computer database and that would enable you to stop hitting the wrong places repeatedly. and to get the right ones. you also add here and terrain and some maps developed to try to understand the shifting at no secretary and make up of different neighborhoods and it was never totally cleansed. there's a lot of false reports what happened at baghdad and the uncritically you have the old rates to the insurgency and their base so the famous sons of iraq effort to and being west as oliver anbar and that was

troubled engagement. it's important to understand a greater baghdad this is a cosmopolitan city and it wasn't just try this data was all kind of social groups and neighborhood based. i witnessed in many of these areas and one of the key people door of one of the worst neighborhoods in the south was a cardiologist and yes he's from the tribe but it was much more important. his socioeconomic standing and his whole stature in that area and his decision to become one of the people who would stick their neck out and say we've got to accept this with stretched hands by the individual italian company commanders and i really reject this notion there was somehow a spontaneous decision by this to the insurgency, the nationalist insurgency as opposed to the fringe al qaeda and iraq elements. they did not spontaneously flip. they would have had no one to come in from the cold were it not for those dispersed soldiers and that was the primary reason for them to be out there and in addition of course as these people came in you started

getting of parallel to the intelligence. you couldn't get it any other way so you started to have a very rapid change and that a man might even before the famous september 07 testimony of petraeus and crocker. i was reporting the that that's where i broke with my magazine because they put it accept things had changed and i was saying look like here telling you guys and the serious because there was such a polemic atmosphere in town that no one wanted to believe this war we all thought was lost could actually be turned around. so, this is what happened. we are not -- that was not the end game. the endgame is now and i wrote about it in chapter 15 and i stand by everything that was in their and the mission of this administration is or was to complete the end game and we're living it right now and the elections are happening in the this is a critical moment. there is a wider alliance.

it's very unfortunate the purging of the many candidates, the endgame has a number of critical elements. all of these people who stopped fighting and at the height the sons of iraq included 100,000 people said that's larger than any other estimate that ever was donner of the sunni nationalist insurgency savitt represents the bulk of the insurgency and their base. a lot of population, the odds of the recent underground of the insurgency was included in fact, so it's critical the be incorporated into both of the security services and political and economic life of the country. it is also structural changes. they have to come to an agreement about the federal nature of power in iraq and attacked more iraqis to me we just need to understand iraq has had a centralized state system for a long time and it needs a more centralized model than it currently has in the constitution. it also is more secular than

many people realize. yes there's an islamic portion to the population that they've got to fundamentally come around to its political structure. can they do it? they did do it very importantly in the provincial powers law which balanced the tension between the central and the regional powers and i thought it struck a very fighting and workable balance with the help of crocker and people in the embassy and the second tier level of iraqi politicians were much more pragmatic than a lot of these political leaders who are divisive in the secretary influences. my view is by disappointed the administration did not accept my recommendation to end of play and instead of the appointed ambassador who'd never been in the region before, and i know chris hill is a very accomplished diplomat and i don't mean to make any personal attack on his professional reputation but simply the critical in the game period is

now and i've covered insurgencies oliver latin america. the endgame is political and you've got to get a political system that all iraqis live under and you have to incorporate former insurgents and to the regional diplomacy peace and iraq has always been a counterweight to iran and that is the formula for stability in the region. you cannot get there unless you have internal stability in iraq and to make people, and i've heard a number of people flippantly say the war is over the shia have one and the access of the region is inevitable not true, the iraqis do not want to be the 51st state of iran and we have to be partners. it's what we do it for them that we have to be partners and brokering some of the internal deals and some of the regional deals and the iraqi would like us to help them come to professionalizing their forces and continue to serve politically as a counterweight to iran which is next door and

will always be played the influence game in iraq. it's inevitable. so i am very concerned we are in danger and having won the battle it we are going to lose the war and i will just say a couple of things and maybe we can come back to this in the discussion. as i said to you the political analysis is key. i think that is the key lesson for strategic counterinsurgency and every country is different. there is the template and i am very concerned when i hear people and put a very distinguished people around town saying something like strategic counterinsurgency orthodox counterinsurgency doctrine as if there's some template that we put on every war. everywhere makovsky different in every country is different and what we must do is that analysis first and i pushed back on a number of things. population centered approach does not require heavy u.s. footprint. in fact the preferred model is

to use host nation forces and of afghanistan in my view that doesn't mean building a big centralized army and police. you've got to go local and use and formal structures. i know there's a big debate about that but if you get a big heavy footprint and there is a lot of these countries you are going to go wrong. there is also the clear hold bill to be the formula widely adopted is -- that connotes a process that is mechanistic, its physical and is sequential in a way that coined practice rarely is so i think we need to stop and think about the words and formulas that we are using, and i think right now i've got a couple of other lessons i will throw out but i did the right over my time and by sorry for going on at great length. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. >> tom. >> is it on?

>> there should be a green light. >> first lesson, check the microphone. >> can you all hear me in the cheap seats? okay. on the above to negative about this conference at all. i'm not sure that the imam speaks that much into iraq or afghanistan. and i was thinking about this on the metro last night because i've been reading this book by andrew rowe called waging war mike in afghanistan. it's terrific and the lessons learned areas and i think has a lot more to speak to iraq and afghanistan than the vietnam experience does. but since we are here -- [laughter] >> i will go on. it's also intriguing to me that david petraeus was very conscious of the imam and iraq. remember he wrote his ph.d. at princeton on the imam. what is striking to me one day

we were talking and i had been reading some french history of the algerian war and i mentioned the general not by name. i said there's one general if he list of the top of his head about eight of the french generals of the 1950's who had fought in both the and on and algeria so he really was quite conscious of the back of especially the french background in vietnam and counter insurgency. i want to talk about to highlight two areas. the first is what petraeus did and i want to say this in the context of my believe the search field in the sense that it did not achieve a strategic goal. the surge achieved its tactical, improved security. there's a lot of iraqis alive today because of the surge. it was a real achievement. i think they failed though because the purpose of a stated purpose of the surge was it to improve security, create a breathing space which a political breakthrough what occurred. that has still not occurred.

it may occur this year and it may not all of the basic questions that lead to violence in iraq between the surge are still hanging fire out there. how do you share will revenue, what is the difference between major groups, what is the disposition of the city of kirkuk, will iraq a strong central government or be a loose confederation? what is the role of iran? all of those lead to violence in the past. all of them could lead to violence again. the leading changing the security equation that i see is that the force that intervened to stop the civil war of 06, the americans will not be available if these questions lead to widespread violence again. what did petraeus do? i agree that the increase in troops was almost a side show in terms of the importance of defense. i think the single most important thing was a change in american attitude in the search. you saw new modesty in american goals quietly downsized. remember the united states

wanted to iraq with a fantasy that we could go into one of the world's oldest, change appointed a gun and leave in six months. the original plan was to be done 30,000 troops by september 03. petraeus formerly but quietly abandoned that fantasy and said look what we are trying to do here is get out of here with our short on our backs and leave behind a country that hopefully is stable with democratic but don't expect much more than that. i remember joking at the time that they should drop the name of the camp victory for their headquarters and change it to the camp of accommodation. like many of my proposals it wasn't accepted. the shibley was also significant, i was conference of american officers, some american officials and some iraqis who specifically tried to parse out

what's happened in anbar province in 2006, and the americans were talking i think quite logically about well first we went out and established outposts along the population that we ensured the police would be recorded locally it have local knowledge. that we bit and talk to the tribes and brought them and so on and several hours into this, a former iraqi general said tie out fellows, i will tell you what changed from my perspective and 06 and 07, you guys finally started listening. at the first couple of years of the war, an american would walk in and say okay muhammed or whatever your name is this is the way it is going to be. a couple of years later they said we have a respect the iraqis said they would listen have an hour and say this is the way it is going to be. finally and 06 and 07 americans would walk in and say what do you think we should be doing here? what are you trying to do? what do you think our sustainable approach is and how can we help you and in fact he

specifically said it was striking to him then colonel shawn mcfarland at the end of each conversation with c ok here are the three things i take away from this conversation that i need to do. suddenly the knowledge, the decisions were flown in a different direction. something that is ignored as a command issue and i feed academics are especially blind to this is petraeus just didn't get the pherae right he shoved it down the throat of the military establishment and i think this was probably his great achievement as a commander. the theory was commercial off-the-shelf colonial counter insurgency theory. and there were a lot of people in iraq to one dustin this well before petraeus and odierno got there. but petraeus and odierno did this make sure that every echelon of command plus finally fighting the same war and this had been a major problem of iraq for several years. i remember it 03 come 0405 he

would move from the division and was like a different war, different rules of engagement. they dealt with by rockies differently. specifically how close could you get to the convoy before they shot at you and they had science that occasionally would inform you that the slides were always in english not helpful to the literate iraqi farmer trying to get his tomatoes to market on time. what i saw petraeus do and odierno do was go out and get several echelons down. i remember talking to the commanders would say petraeus could have a day with the driving around in my humvee and talking to me. he also had david this kind of political commissar to go out there and make sure not only were they commanders talking a good game for the executing a good game because there were some commanders who talked a good game but see and to operate in an old-fashioned. i think also what petraeus had was a matter of timing and this

might actually be an analogy to the vietnam war back to the abram's era which was by the time petraeus and odierno took over they had a very seasoned force underneath them. a lot of people had tried the hard way, the conventional way and so on and were willing to listen and actually had enough knowledge of the streets to understand when something made more sense and i think it was also significant petraeus and odierno were the first command team that both commanded divisions on the ground in iraq and had a field for the streets much more than their predecessors to veazey and sanchez. this made a huge difference in their understanding of the war mike and credibility with support of the commanders and their ability to understand what battalion and brigade and regimental commanders were saying in a way that never made sense to sanchez or tce. i remember the time of petraeus advisers seem to be i said to do you listen to when you are out and he said i look for the company commander of the second

or third tour. and i said what do you feel out here? how does this please feel to you from the previous tour and he said those guys started saying to me in may and june of 07 things are changing he said that is what i really started thinking this thing may be improving the security of here. the second thing that happened and is still happening is the andrew and i talked about quite a lot in our call over at the cms where we write our instructions for the obama administration. this is the question of the host government and it is a hold on our whole theory on which we cannot borrow from the french and british. the french and british were essentially fighting colonial counterinsurgency campaigns to retain presence of some form in these areas. we are trying to establish a government that can stand on their own and let us go home and i think there is a fundamental

difference there. and it leaves the question again how does this end? it may be that victory in both iraq and afghanistan is when the host government feels strong enough to kick us out. try explaining that to the american people. finally, on this report i did last week's that was also ran on "the new york times" as an op-ed i called for keeping 30 to 50,000 troops in iraq for several years to come not because of any great benefits but because the possibility that a force that size might be able to detour a slide back into the civil war that easily could become a regional war and also the force would buy time and tide is essential in the growing a new political iraq and allowing new political leaders to emerge. in retrospect what we should have done is not thinking of the national elections but began with a local neighborhood elections and media year later towns and cities, your leader

provinces and grow a new generation of political leaders. instead what we tried to do was quickly told elections it basically throw a class of embittered distrustful exiles and a secretary and leaders into the leadership positions. so i think that's something we need to think about a lot is how we deal with the host governments in the future. i don't like the idea of keeping a lot of troops in iraq. i think it is the least bad option though and i also think just because you invade a country stupidly doesn't mean that you should leave it stupid. as i wrote it though i was thinking about something henry kissinger ivory and it to him at the jail about a year ago and we were talking about the end of the vietnam war and i said which do you think is more difficult as a strategic problem, vietnam or iraq and he said no question in my mind, iraq.

now i will turn it over. >> first of its donner to be here on the podium with two journalists who've written perceptively of the iraq war. i feel kind of out of place. i spent a grand total of four months of my life in iraq. ably trying to lose the war which i will talk about a little bit later but patrick is giving me this white for it to both, and what i just heard and also try to reorient the conversation may be pointing towards the next panel think about afghanistan so the meat of my presentation will be thinking about the changes that took place within the u.s. government and specifically the u.s. military caused by iraq and where that leads us going forward. as i looked this morning at my wardrobe i thought 20 to put on a tie and i said who are you kidding tom hasn't worn a tie since 1973. [laughter] i think there's a lesson here

just because it hasn't happened before doesn't mean it's not going to happen. [laughter] i said i served in iraq for just a few months which is there are folks in the audience who spent years on the ground there, and again i was trying to lose the war. all the indiscriminate targeting that we were doing and the fall and winter of 2003, 2004, you can blame me. ironically though, one of the things i haven't really seen come out in any of the narratives about the iraq war this far, it really in a coherent manner and this is partly due to the classification issues was the beginning of the iraq war those of us in the special operations units and task force, i think we misdiagnosed the iraq war. we thought we confused which was the nascent insurgency for counterterrorism problems we essentially approached the problem is likely would i don't

know the red army faction in germany and kicked down a lot of stores and broken lot of windows trying to get these guys on a certain list. now when a counterterrorism type of task force or direct action special operations task force are linked in with a wide counter insurgency campaign it can have a devastating affect on the enemy's ability to operate. and i think that is one of the things we saw in 2007 and 2008. one thing i would like to see john out in the narrative some day is the degree a lot of the brigade commanders who were battles base of letters and greater baghdad during 2007, talking to guys like jeff bannister, what units had they been in the prior to that in addition the guys that were in the special operations taskforce this committee had been in conventional units in iraq before that as well so there was a more symbiotic relationship and the relationships i think that had been forged in special operations units before battered

in 2007 and 2008 no relationship was more important than that between mcchrystal and petraeus and fast became. iraq did have a great impact on my life because i gave up dreams of going to law school and decided it invaded my second country without knowing anything about the people, the region, the history, language, and supply and that spending most of the past six years in arabic speaking middle east. i want to talk first let me comment on a couple of the things that were said. in addition to the bit about immigration of special operations forces and conventional operations i think it's important and something that again hasn't been in the narrative so much probably for classification issues. the other thing is linda and tom have written to really good narrative some of the surge but they were initial narrative said it now i think we are going to start seeing the other -- like they both say this there are

other stories to be told from the platoon of leaders perspective and stories to be told from the iraqi people's perspective and we are starting to see that come out and we will be about to affect the surge and what took place in baghdad when we see those narratives come to the floor. anamosa has a book on the effect the search and u.s. military operations had on iraqi refugees and the crisis and it's a fantastic book so i would recommend it. and there was another -- there's a new memoir by matt gal looker about fighting this platoon leader in the early 2008 and 2001 and it is again a fantastic triet i'm going to agree with tom on something they a little bit later but i want to disagree. i think that i told tom decided that he is to spread to the narrative that the search failed. i don't think the goal of the counter insurgency campaign waves by a third party on behalf

of the host nation government is to lead to some political breakthrough or create time and space for political breakthrough but time and space for a political process and i think that we have actually done that in iraq. it's taking place right now. the other thing you said yourself general petraeus walked back the skilling conditions in iraq and said hey we are trying to get out of here with our sure on our back. we negotiated the sofa agreement and that is a testament to both some of the good work done by the nsc as well as our folks on the ground in iraq and they deserve credit for that so i am not so sure i would be brutal of the search failed. it may be too early to make the judgment and then i think that important political process is taking place and has been taking place that we can take credit for the u.s. military and diplomats can't take credit for. but the goal of my remarks is to

kind of talk about what we have learned in iraq, what we haven't learned, how we've learned and where this leads going forward. over the past 25 years there has been a lot of social science looking at what drives innovation within the military organizations and this literature is certainly picked up the pace in the 1990's and i think can apply to what's taken place and with in the u.s. military in iraq and afghanistan. there's two different models for explains innovation. you've got rationalist explanations and cultural explanations just to give too rational bottles real quick. on the one model an external threat can lead to civilian intervention plus mavericks' working within the with the reorganization to create promotion pipelines and innovation. this is the very pos in fees this. you've also got the bottom of innovation where creation by a field unit can lead to a new theory of victory but in service

and creates a pipeline and leads to innovation. it's kind of top down and bottom-up forms of innovation and the rationalist explanations. i think we've seen a lot of that in iraq but to other things and cultural models. military leaders can change culture on purpose and external shocks can make innovation more probable. i think that certainly in iraq we've seen strong military leaders like general petraeus create cultural changes within the u.s. military as whether or not iraq has been a big enough external shock to see an end to these changes and please within the bureaucracy as large as the u.s. military i think is very much a question very much certainly vietnam which is the conflict was not enough of an shock to create significant and enduring change within the u.s. military and how does its business. as far as iraq, you know if the

worst explicit for different levels, political, strategic, operational and tactical negative tactically iraq is certainly creating change in the way that we fight counterinsurgency and the way that we fight the u.s. military dustin business tactically. operationally as well we can point towards f m three through cody for as in a civil strategically and politically and also culturally i'm not so sure. as tom mentioned one of the real holds on fm three through code 24 is it doesn't wash the fact that we are not great britain, we are not france, we are not fighting our counter insurgency campaigns on our home turf for the french perspective at least that is exactly what algeria was, maybe not be a jury in perspective and the same thing with northern ireland committee of the irish catholic perspective but london perspective was the home turf. on the other hand i think that the french and the british had problems with the french

settlers and irish protestant leadership that in a lot of cases are very similar to the problems that we have as we deal with the post asian governments so there may be lessons to be learned but overall, there is kind of a if the fee is in the 33 code 24 represents operational genius and political naivete. there's this assumption and steve pointed this out, that our interests line up with interests of the host government nation and because there is that assumption we haven't seriously thought about what happens when those interests don't align. this is something that steve rowe a recent essay about and has been thinking quite a bit about but i think that is the real problem as we look at not just iraq and afghanistan that any third party intervention whether you're talking about peace operations as another thing. how exactly you used leverage over the host nation government is a problem i don't think we've thought hard about and we are really suffering for in

afghanistan certainly and iraq to a lesser degree. culturally, you know i was and as i spent time in afghanistan over the past summer i think because lessons i learned in iraq that were beaten into my head as i got to know the arabic speaking middle east i think culture really matters and i very hesitant to make some sort of proclamation about afghans or or pashtuns are or what afghan culture is, without being able to speak the two languages or having spent a lot of time on the ground so one of the things i focused on was our operational culture. as you study other cultures to become attuned to your own norms and social rules and policies. and farrell, an irish scholar wrote a good essay on american strategic culture a few years ago and two of the things he

noticed a the american strategic culture or what he called technological fetishes and aversion to casualties and i still not sure that we are over either of those. if you look at steve bedle sent me a draft that he's writing on a recent experience, and in afghanistan for example i think that you can still see that a version to the casualties applied. it's still there and it's still present which is a problem in the population counterinsurgency campaign when you have to assume a lot of risk to get to know the population. you've got to be walking your beat and some convoys moving to afghanistan do this well and some troops to this well, some commanders do this well and understand some days you need to be nm u.n. rapport dee dee de -- mrap and other days on the street. other commanders don't understand this very well.

in iraq what you had and tommy lewd to this and i felt this was very perceptive he talked about the need to push petraeus's vision down the throats of the military. this is something i was talking to the brigade commander during the surge and i said tell me about odierno what do you think and he said the genius of odierno is he shoves the throat of general petraeus down or a division of general petraeus on thus notes of the one start. whether or not general mcchrystal can do that in a collision fight and be able to use general rodriguez to the same purpose with u.s. troops i think is very much of error. so if i can to keep this up again for afghanistan and with respect to the lessons learned i think there's been some significant lessons learned in iraq and with linda and tom have written quite well on the tactical and operational lessons. the strategic and political lessons i don't think we have learned nearly as much as we

needed to. i don't think that we have done a lot of hard searching and fought about how to apply the leverage when operating when conducting counterinsurgency campaign as a third party and then as far as our strategic culture, the culture of the u.s. military i think it remains to be seen whether or not the cultural changes that have taken place and that you see in the junior officers in iraq and afghanistan are in during or fleeting and afghanistan in a lot of ways is going to be a test case for whether or not that is the case. thanks. >> thanks for the excellent remarks. we have about 35 minutes for questions to be i will look for hanse but let me ask the first question. all of you highlighted the importance of iraq as building the capacity making the transition specifically thinking about the iraqi