down our forces in a responsible manner. this task has been guided, of course by the policy announced by president obama about a year ago. since that announcement, we have reduced our forces in iraq by well over 30,000, to some 97,000, and we are on track to reduce that number, to 50,000, by the end of august. at which time we'll also complete a change in mission that marks the transition of our forces from a combat role to one of advising and assisting iraqi security forces, as we draw down our forces in iraq and increase our efforts in afghanistan we must not losing sight of other developments in the centcom aor,

i want to highlight the developments in two countries in particular, wryemen and iran, i yemen we have seen an increase unal qaeda as it exploits the country's security, economic and social challenges. the threat to yemen to the region and indeed to the u.s. homeland posed by what it is now called al qaeda in the arabian peninsula is demonstrate by suicide bombers trying to carry out operations in the capital and the attempt to assassinate the assistant minister of near yer in saudi arabia and the attempted bombing of the u.s. airliner on christmas day and the number of us have been increasingly concerned over the past 2-and-a-half years by the developments we have observed there and last april i approved a plan developed with our ambassador in yemen, u.s. in attention agencies and the state department to expand our assistance, to key security elements in yemen. with yemeni president's approval

we executed the plan last summer and strength end the operations carried out against al qaeda in the arabian peninsula in mid december and have been executed periodically since then as well. and with your support, we are working toward expanded sustained levels of assistance, in yemen. in fact, our efforts in yemen should not just be seen as part of our overall counter terrorist campaign, but part of what might be served preventive counter insurgency operations and our efforts develop key security forces in yemen and contribute to the overall effort to help men deal with challenges that could become much more significant if not dealt with early on. iran poses the major state level threat to regional stability, in the centcom aor, despite the numerous u.n. security council resolution and the p5 plus one

and the iaea the regime continues its nuclear program and is by analysts considered engaged in a nuclear capability and the regime continues to average fund, train, equip and direct proxy, streamist elements in iraq, lebanon, gaza and to a lesser degree in afghanistan. it continues significant intervention in the domestic politics in each of those location as well. iranian regime's internal activities are also troubling. as the violent suppression of opposition groups and demonstrations in the wake of last year's hijacked election, has made a mockery of the human rights of the iranian people, and, fomented further unrest. those internal developments have also resulted in greater reliance than ever on iran's security services, to sustain the regime's grip on power. having discussed the developments in these countries

i'd now like to explain the importance of two key enablers in our ongoing missions and raise one additional issue. the commanders emergency response program continues to be a vital tool for command,in afghanistan and iraq, and small cerp projects are the most responsive means to address local communities' needs, and where security is challenged, cerp often provides the only tool to address pressing requirement. in the past year we have taken a number of actions to ensure we observe the original intent for cerp and adequate oversight for use of this tool and i have for example withheld approval for projects over $1 million at my level and there is only one such project since late last september in the past year we have asked the army audit agency to conduct audits of the cerp programs and established guidelines north number of projects each team should

oversee and coordinated with the military services to ensure adequate training and preparation of those who will perform functions connected with cerp in theater and established procedures to take cash off the battlefield. beyond that the department of defense is currently performing an internal assessment and undertaking additional initiatives. with the force increases in afghanistan, cerp funding priority has understandably shifted from iraq to afghanistan. we pledge to continue aggressive oversight of the cerp program as the shift takes place. in addition, we will continue to seek innovative mechanisms and authorities to allow for greater cost-sharing and spur the development of similar counter insurgency tools by coalition and host nation partners. in the past year, centcom pursued several initiatives to improve our capabilities in the information domain. and we have coordinated these actions, closely, with the state department'snder secretary for

publ public diplomacy and made significant head way in improving our ability to counter adversary operations including establishing a full fledged joint information operations task force in afghanistan. nonetheless, we still have a long way to go. and we desperately need to build the capabilities of a regional io task force to complement the operations of the task force that has done such impressive work in iraq, and the one that is now beginning to do the same, in afghanistan. in the broader centcom aor, operation earnest voice is a critical program of record that resources our efforts to synchronize our io activities. to counter extremist ideology and propaganda and ensure credible voices in the region are heard, eob provides centcom with direct capabilities to reach regional awningses through traditional media as well as via web sites and regional public appearance blogging and in each effort we follow the admonition

we practiced in iraq, that of being first with the truth. full and enduring funding of oeb and dod operations efforts will in coordination with state department initiatives enable us to do just that and to communicate critical messages and counter the propaganda of our adversaries. cyberspace is becoming an extension of the battlefield and we cannot allow it to be uncontested enemy territory. in the years ahead, extremist activities in cyberspace will undoubtedly pose increasing threats to our military and nation as a whole. dod and other elements of our government are of course working to come to grips with this emerging threat. clearly this is an area in which we need to develop additional policies, build capabilities, and ensure adequate resources. i suspect in fact that legislation will be required over time as well. with in dod the establishment of

the u.s. cyber command proposed by secretary gates represents an essential step in the right direction. this initiative is very important, because extremist elements are active in cyberspace. they recruit there, they processual ties there, coordinate attacks and share ac ticks and techs next there and we have to ask ourselves, if it is something we should allow to continue and if not we have to determine how to prevent or disrupt it, without impinging on free peach. inclusion, there are currently some 210,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen serving in the centcom aor, day after day, on the ground, air and sea, these troopers perform difficult mission, against tough enemies, under the most challenging of conditions. together, with our many civilian and coalition partners they've constituted the central element in our effort to promote

security, stability, and prosperity in the region. these wonderful americans and their fellow troopers stationed around the world constitute the most experienced, most capable military in our nation's history. they, and their families, have made tremendous sacrifices, and nothing means more to these great americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their service, to our country. in view of that, and on behalf of all of those serving in the centcom aor i want to take this opportunity to thank the american people for their extraordinary support of our men and women in uniform. and i also want to take this opportunity to thank the members of this committee, and of congress, overall, for their unwavering support and abiding concern for our troopers, and their families. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, general petraeus, we'll try a six-minute round of question here given the large turnout, general petraeus,

iran's actions, and lack of willingness to comply with u.n. resolution regarding their nuclear program continues to undermine security in the region. i believe that while stronger u.n. sanctions against iran are not only essential but it is critically important that they be enforced, now, the president has rightly in my judgment kept a military option to take against nuclear facilities in iran, on the table. should they be used for production of nuclear weapons, in violation of u.n. resolutions. i also believe that the possibility of a blockade or quarantine of iran's oil exports and refined petroleum products imports, should also be on a list of options, possible

options for action. can you comment on what actions you think might be successful in terms of sanctions that -- against iran should she continue to violate u.n. resolutions, relative to the nuclear program, but, also as to whether we ought to keep those other options on the table? >> well, first of all, senators, as you noted, in fact the president has explicitly stated that he is not taking the military option off the table. and, as you noted in your statement earlier, we have worked hard in the region, to build the so-called regional security architecture. to build a network of shared early warning, ballistic missile defense, and of other security relationships and partnerships that have been fostered in large measure brought about in large

measure because of concern by those states with whom we are carrying out these activities, about the developments in iran, that i spoke of in my opening statement. i think with regard to specific contingency plans or activities, that would obviously be something that we would want to do in a closed session, but, clearly, now, afghan had the -- having given iran every opportunity, not just the u.s. but all of the countries engaged in this effort, reaching out an open hand, providing the opportunity for diplomacy, to discuss and resolve these issues, the emphasis is now shifting and the focus is shifting to what is termed the pressure track, as you know and there's a variety of sanctions included in that that are now being discussed in the administration, and i don't want

to get ahead of them, if i could, in discussing those particular items. >> we are going to have a full hearing on iran and they'll have both an open hearing as i've mentioned to you in my office as well as a closed hearing on that subject. general, the -- general caldwell, who is the head of our nato training mission in afghanistan, has reported that very large increase in the number of afghan army recruits that are waiting -- awaiting training. there is a shortage of trainers. we have gone into that, and i think you would agree that one way or another we have to get those trainers present to increase the speed with which the size of that army has increased. my question is -- goes to that issue, in a way, but, general caldwell told us, when we visit him, is that there were a number of reasons for that significant increase in the number of

recruits, that one of them was the increase in pay, but, he also said that a very significant cause of that increase, that surge in the number of afghan recruits, was that the afghan leaders are reaching out to their local folks, to the people in the provinces, to increase significantly the number of recruits that are coming in, and that one of the things that focused the mind of the afghan leaders, to do that, was the decision of the president to set that july 2011 date to begin to reduce the presence of american forces, not to pull our forces out, tnot to have a total exit n any sense but to begin reduction as a way of focussing the minds of the afghan leaders on their responsibility to provide for their own security, and to

transition more that responsibility to them. did you and do you both -- do you support both the 30,000 troop surge and you also support the setting of that july 2011 date by the president? >> that is correct, chairman, in fact if i could note there is a shoor shortage and, they had an effort and got half of those pledged and we're looking at various options tor getting the rest of those and we're looking at how to do that on the u.s. side while urging nato to generate the remainder. and the surge in the recruits indeed was, i think a result of two factors, one, the increased pay without question, but, also, a sense by afghan leaders that

they have to get on with it. i think it is correct to say in the speech of west point the president sent two messages, one was additional commitment and the other was urgency and the urgency component of that was connected to the july, 2011 date. and it has indeed concentrated the mind of afghan leaders to a degree. we have also sought to reassure leaders in the region that that is not a date when we bolt for the exits but, rather, a date on which we begin a conditions-based process of transitioning some tasks, to afghan forces and begin a responsible reduction of our forces. >> and you personally support that. >> i did, yes, i have stated that on the record, many times. >> thank you very much, senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i thank the witness, general petraeus i want to talk about the issue with you for a minute, that is -- has dominated the news in the last few days and that is the increased tensions

between the u.s. and israel, over the settlements issue, timing of it and the implications of it, i note there has been increased palestinian demonstrations, and violence in the last day or two. in gaza and west bank. first of all, i understand that you have the greatest confidence in senator mitchell, and his work. to try to bring about progress in the palestinian-israeli peace process, is that true? >> that is absolutely true -- >> i wanted to get that on the record. to -- >> we have invited them to every single conference we have hosted, with centcom with ambassadors with commanders and so forth. >> now the presideent issue is r increased construction of settlements in jerusalem. which israelis view one they state of israel, when the peace

process is concluded palestinians view it as part of a new palestinian state. isn't the issue not the issue of settlements, as much as it is the existence of the state of israel? its neighbors, with the exception -- with exceptions, have dedicated themselves to the extermination of the state of israel. mahmoud ahmadinejad has said time after time they want to wipe israel off the map. isn't it true that we -- the israelis left gaza, on the presumption that there would be progress and, instead, they got rocket attacks and so, make you could put this in a larger context, for us, of what needs to be done, to reduce the tensions between the united states and israel, our closest

ally and friend in many respects. so, we'd like to hear a little bit about your views on that situation, and what needs to be done to defuse it. >> thanks, senator. first of all, again, a reminder for all, as you know, neither israel nor the palestinian territories are in the central command area of responsibility. >> but yours is all of -- >> having said that we keep a very close eye on what goes on there, because of the impact that it has obviously on that part of centcom that is the arab world, if you will, and, in fact, we have urged at various times, that this is a critical component, and is one reason, again we invite senator mitchell to brief all of the different conferences that we host and seek to support him in any way we can when he's in the central command part of the region just as we support lieutenant general dayton, who is supporting the training of the palestinian

security forces from a location that is in the centcom aor as well. and, although staff members have various times -- and i have discussed, you know, asking for the palestinian territories or something like that, to be -- i have never made that a formal recommendation, for the unified command plan and that was not in what i submitted this year, nor have i sent a memo to the white house on any of this, and some of this was in the press and i welcome the opportunity to point that out. again, clearly the tensions, issues and so forth have an enormous effect. they set the strategic context with in which we operate in the central command area of responsibility. my thrust has generally been literally to encourage that process, that can indeed get

that recognition you talked about and, indeed, get a sense of progress moving forward, in the overall peace process, because, of the effect that it has on, particularly, what i think you would term the moderate governments in our area and that, really, is about the extent of our involvement in that, senator. >> do you believe a policy of containment would be an effective option for dealing with a nuclear armed iran? >> sir, i think that is a big policy hypothetical that i would like to go around, rather than into. i think the policy right now is very clear. the president has said that iran cannot have nuclear weapons. >> are you concerned about the fact that we need -- the president's plan was 30,000 american troops, 10,000 additional allied contribution, we now have the dutch obviously going to remove 2,000 troops. we -- as senator levin pointed

out, we don't have sufficient number of trainers, and, we -- do we have any plans for the additional troops that are necessary, and what way we can accommodate for what is clearly a short fall of the number of troops that was in my view, minimum recommended by -- minimum necessary recommended by general mcchrystal? >> in fact, senator, part of that is of course why we sought the additional 100,000 authorization for the afghan national security forces which came as you recall i think in the wake of the official -- 0 official authorization in the wake of the policy announcement and is also, frankly why secretary gates asked for and received some flex factor as you know, that he has discussed. and, so that is in the background, there, if there came to be an emergent, emergency

need, that that is available as well. >> finally, general, and admiral olson, do you believe the don't ask, don't tell needs a thorough review before action is taken? >> senator, my position is, that -- can i give my statement on that, sir? >> we're short of time, but, please, go aheaded . >> how long is that statement? >> 8 minutes, sir. >> no. no. >> well, look, sir, that is not -- this is not a sound bite issue. >> i understand, a straightforward question. >> we respect, believe me, the thoughtfulness that you are applying to it. we have reader public statements, but, an 8 minute answer, unless someone else wants to use all their time for it, i'm afraid would violate our -- the spirit of our rules and i would suggest, however, if nobody asks you that question, and you use the -- their time is used for that purpose, that you make that part of the record. but someone may very well ask, i don't think it would be right, because of our time limit, to

take 8 minutes out of someone else's time, is what it would amount to, if no one asks you the question, all their time would be used for your answer i would ask you consider making it part of the record but respect very much the thoughtfulness, you put into a statement, i haven't seen it but you have made public statements -- >> i think you made it unlikely that you will be asked if it is 8 minutes. admiral, do you want to make a comment? my question is pretty straightforward, to be honest, do you believe a thorough review of the policy and the legislation needs to be conducted, before repeal? >> yes, thank you. >> and senator, let me answer that, i believe the time has come to consider a change, don't ask, don't tell. but, i think it should be done in a thoughtful, and deliberate tiff manner that should in exclude the conduct of the

review secretary gates directed, that would consider the views and the force on a change in the policy, it would include a -- an assessment of the likely effects on recruiting, retention, morale, and cohesion, and would include an identification of what policies might be needed in the event of a change, and recommend those policies as well. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> as you said, i believe, the effects could go in either direction. likely effects on -- could go in either direction, i believe you told me, either negative or positive, the study could show. >> it could. it could. yes, sir. >> thank you very much, senator lieberman. >> thanks, mr. chairman. thanks to both of you for your leadership. general petraeus i want to ask a couple of quick question about iran first. i thought your statement, prepared testimony was very strong and clear here and you describe iran as, quote the primary state-level at the to

stability in the region. add that its nuclear program is to use your word serious, end quote and part of the regime's broader effort to expand its influence, i agree, of course and you mentioned just in response to questions that president obama said the military option remains on the table, not our first choice, obviously and that is why we are pursuing economic sanctions. i want to reinforce the fact that i believe previously it was said that in the exercise of your responsibility, at centcom, you are working on actual military plans with regard to iran, which we all hope you never have to use, but, as the military works, on contingency plans for a host of scenarios around the world, is that correct?

>> sir, again, probably best for a closed servings but, i mean, as you know, we get paid to prepare for contingencies and it would be irresponsible if we didn't do that, we try not to be irresponsible. >> yes. well, because i know how responsible you are... i assume you are working on plans. so i'll leave it at that for now. let me go to iraq. we watched the election that is going on there now with great satisfaction. it's not the perfect situation. but, when you think about the fact that a little more than three years ago, it looked like iraq was going to descend into chaos, and now, we have a government operating an economy coming together, increasing self-defense, by iraqi security forces, i was struck by the

success of the united parties, as it were, the nonsectarian parties, and so i look forward to continued progress, there, though -- i want to note in your statement, those words are very important, that we now go on from, there was a time when we'd say iraq was -- gains in iraq were fragile and reversible, and today, i note in your statement, you say gains in iraq, quote, remain fragile and reversible but increasingly less so. end of quote. i appreciate those four additional words. i wanted to ask you, whether, in light of all of that, but understanding they remain fragile and reversible. our gains in iraq. whether it will still be possible or we should desire to reach the -- draw down to 50,000

american troops in iraq by september 1st, of this year. it is obviously not a draw-down required by the status of forces agreement with iraq, it is a good goal, but i'm sure you would say, it would be -- would be the first to say we don't want to arbitrarily go to it if we think there is significant risk of reversal, as a result. so, give me your sense at this moment of whether we're going to be able to get down to the 50,000 by september 1st. >> i think we will be able to do that, senator. i think that in fact we may reconfigure the force a bit, over original what we thought it looked like four months ago or so, we're constantly tinkering with it and we may want to keep an additional brigade headquarters as an example and slim out some of its organic forces and some of the other organic forces elsewhere, headquarters matter, in these times, because they are the

element of engagement and if indeed we think there is a particularly fragile situation, say, in a certain area, in the north, then we might do that, and that is something that we are looking at, but we still believe that we will be able, to stay on track to get down to that 50,000 figure. >> there a is encouraging and would mean, i assume, there would potentially be a 7th brigade headquarters. >> that is correct. that is one option that we are looking at, but still within the broad 50,000. >> and i take it. from what you said, that the there probably would be in the areas of kurdish-arab conflict around kirkuk, where i know -- >> that's correct, sir. >> that our forces are working with other forces, have really helped to maintain stability. >> that's correct. >> appreciate that. let me go to afghanistan with this question. there is a lot of public discussion recently about

reconciliation with senior taliban leaders, some senior officials in our coalition are pushing aggressively on the idea we should try to cut a deal with the taliban. perhaps with the help of historic allies of theirs in pakistan. personally i worry these ideas are ill-advised though i'm sure we look forward to the time when there can be reconciliation, particularly beginning with lower level taliban and probably not as zealots in that regard. i agree with secretary gates, that we need to first make the taliban understand that they are destined to lose this fight, before any serious consideration of reconciliation at the higher levels, can take place. and, therefore, i worry that the current public talk about reconciliation is counterproductive, and i want to ask you what your view is on that. >> well, i agree with secretary

gates on that. senator, i think certainly thinking ahead to that moment when, perhaps, the taliban -- and we're talking about, senior level taliban, because -- indeed there has been what is called reintegration, at low and mid levels, in fact, yesterday, again, i've got to confirm it, but there were open reports about a couple of taliban leaders, coming in with their hands up, that is not an uncommon event over there. but, there are many low and mid-level leaders. that is part of the strategy, is reintegration with our afghan partners clearly to indeed try and break off from the greater taliban movement, those who might become part of solution, instead of the continuing part of the problem. on the other hand, reconciliation, at the senior levels, as secretary gates observed, is probably a bit unlikely, at the conditions that the afghan government has established, for it, if indeed they are not feeling a considerably greater amount of

pressure than they probably are right now. and, so that is what is kind secretary gates' view and that happens to be my view as well. >> i appreciate that. that is reassuring. thank you very, very much. >> thank you, senator lieberman. senator inhofe. >> thank you, mr. chairman i wasn't going to ask this question, but, general petraeus spent a lot of time talking about the programs, and the ccif and all of that. >> right. >> the whole reason for this initially was to give more authority to the commanders in the field, and to be able to do things to respond. and we have had really, i think, testimony, that talks about how much more effectivity is if you are able to do this without going through a lot of the bureaucratic time delays that would come otherwise.

i was -- would like to know, they are talking about 1207, the civilian to civilian portion of this, now, reverting more back to the way it was, before, or at least, having a greater state department influence, in it, do you see this as creating any kind of a problem, number one, and, number 2, do you think, starting with this, that it may spread to some of the other elements of train and equip. >> well -- >> policy thing that you may not have any -- >> hugely important. want to kind, want to make sure we have the oversight that can guarantee to you and the other committees, obviously, that we are responsibly overseeing the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. we are indeed trying to work closely with our partners in aid, other civilian elements to make sure we coordinate what we're doing in the field and one of the achievements in regional east in particular of isap has

been to build, literally, a civilian chain, if you will, that parallels the military chain back to kabul and allows them to coordinate much more closely, in their thresholds for various levels and so forth, as you go up. i think that is working well. i think we have to continue it. we also, though, want to make sure that, again, it can be the responsive tool that it is. and, so, we're sensitive to a sense if there is too much bureaucracy building up, then that would defeat the pups of it in the first place and we are trying to find the balance, between the sufficient amount of coordination, and oversight, and still allowing the free use of it, if you will, in the way that it was intended. >> if you see the effectiveness is impaired at all, let us know, and that would be helpful, and would you agree with the comments, admiral olson, first of all, in all of these programs, and, secondly, his comments about what changes might be coming and what to look for. >> absolutely, sir.

i agree 100%. i think the 1206, 1207, 120 8 and as you mentioned which is often neglected in the ofrgs, the imelt funding are key to success and a applaud this nish vif for cerp and the commanders responsible for ultimate military success in the renal oug-- region ought to have the -- >> and you agree you have a broader responsibility cerp transition to cdif is a good program. >> yes, i do. >> admiral, i've always been sensitive to the training process in afghanistan, one reason is that way back, probably five or six years ago, we had our oklahoma guard over there, was active in the training of the trainers. and, right now, you have special forces and conventional forces, that are involved in the

training. how is that broken up? >> through the special forces trainers, the cleanest way to divide it is the special forces trainers are training their afghan counterparts, in a program that originated as a commando training program, selecting battalions, from the afghan national army, and, putting them through a 12 week training course that then created a commando program within the afghan national army, and that is how expanded slightly or recently, to include a special forces counterpart, with in the afghan national army. most of the training of the afghan national army, the raising of the army, if you will, is being done by force trainers. >> good. good and in terms of your responsibility in this special operations, the fact that you are not only dealing with the asymmetric threat but also a more conventional threat posed by north korea and iran, do you

have the resources to be able to confront those threats in your opinion? >> sir, from a -- yes, sir. again, with the -- depending on army, navy, air force and marine corps, for service com and support we are in the tracking and planning of business to go beyond that, i think we should go into closed session. >> do you think as -- first of all, what is the ratio now to special operation and conventional that are over there? in numbers of personnel? >> special operations forces number about plus or minus 10%, roughly 6,000 -- >> roughly 10 to one. >> in iraq and afghanistan relative to just about 100,000 in iraq, now, as that draws down, and has -- as afghanistan moves up. >> when the draw down occurs, would you see somewhat of a

proportional draw down or do you have any thoughts on that. >> no, sir. we don't expect to see that. and in all my conversations with the general odierno and general petraeus, it's my expectation that the level of special operations forces will remain constant in iraq. >> let me -- a final question, general petraeus, for both of you, ral, as we continue to fund pakistan's efforts, i read several things, of concern is -- arisen with my we might be inadvertently getting the fundings to the wrong places like the pakistan base jihadists. either through this madrassas, i'm not sure i pronounce it right, the educational institutions, or the federal funds going to pakistan. what kind of cautions, precautions are we taking to make sure they don't get to the wrong people. >> well, the security force

funding elements are going directly through the security forces. again, any of the different categories of funding that we have for them, whether it's military financing, imet, pakistani capability fund, 1206, whatever, these all buy either equipment, training or education, for members of the pakistani military. >> okay. >> so i'm confident that that money is going where it should. >> that is good. there were a few articles that have been written, and draw question to that and i felt that was the case. thank you very much. >> thank you, senator inhofe, senator reid. >> thank you very much, gentleman, thank you for your service, general petraeus can you give us your initial evaluation of the election in iraq, it appears that -- let me ask in terms of the sectarian lines, there has been a lot of discussion, senator lieberman

mentioned of the nonsectarian alliances but the results of the votes appear to strengthen the sectarian positions. >> well, the prime minister maliki's state of law coalition is the leader, overall, if you will, and will certainly not get a majority, we'll get a plurality. second interestingly, it appears to be, though it is very close, former prime minister allawi's coalition, she's a shia leader of a coalition that has substantial sunni backing, and his was the leading coalition in many of the sunni majority provinces. very close to him is the coalition of the supreme council and tprime minister joffrey's party and chalabi's party and that is in there as well and the kurdish, if you will, overall number of kurdish votes, is in there, also.

at the end of the day, clearly, there will have to be at the very least, cross-ethnic coalitions. there will certainly have to be arab and kurd without question and what remains to be seen is how much cross-sectarian coalition-building will take place, and, that will be the dynamic, i think. >> you expect this process of selecting new government to stretch for several months. >> yes, we do. >> and one of the interesting results is that he apparent success of sadr and his party or at least his grouping? >> again, i don't know if it would be a surprise candidly. i think, actually the pollsters, those who watch it would have predicted that. actually i think the fact that maliki's coalition is higher actually is quite significant. and, again, the question will be, you know, the parties don't have to stay with their

coalition. they can join other coalitions, and that is going to be the interesting dynamic that plays out. >> one final question about the elections. the iranians were involved, at least in the sense of supporting financially some of the parties. what is your -- what influence do you think they'll have, given what we know, preliminarily? >> well, i think iran in the past has had influence when it comes to deal brokering and they are not alone in that influence in those, certainly. other actors in the region, will have some degree of influence, as well. and i'm sure that they will continue to try to exercise that. the fact, however, that they were not able to succeed in getting all of the shia major parties to run as one coalition, was quite significant. that was a goal of theirs. the fact that in the january

2009 elections, the parties most associated with them did not do all that well, was significant, frank, the fact that there was a strategic agreement is quite significant, in that regard, as well. so, you still have this dynamic that ryan crocker, ambassador ryan crocker used to talk about, that there is a certain degree of self-limiting aspect to some of iran's influence, given that iraq does not want to be this 51st state, if you will of iran, and that it is very conscious of its identity versus the persian identity. >> admiral, can you comment upon yemen? it is an area you are concerned with and i'll ask general petraeus afterwards, it is a country with huge problems, depleting their oil and water resources and demographic challenges and they have a civil war despite al qaeda. youthful challenges. with that good news, besides saving money on your car insurance, what can you tell us?

>> sir, yemen is a -- clearly a place that is being challenged. and, i second what general petraeus said about the rising presence of al qaeda in the arabian peninsula and their focus on yemen as a place where they are seeking sanctuary and our involvement from special operations community is relatively low level, we have a relatively small training engagement. with certain yemeni forces. but, beyond that, sir i think we have to go into closed significance to talk about specific activities. >> general petraeus you want to comment, further? >> i second the motion. >> very good. let me switch to pakistan. it is dispersing to krach and elsewhere. is that a result of what you -- karachi and elsewhere and is that a result of the different orientation of the pakistani armed forces and security

services are they putting pressure on the quad sure. >> there are a number of factors at play that may be one of them, certainly, pressure actually in afghanistan, in afghanistan and s just perception or fears that have resulted from that campaign and the campaign from the pakistani army and frontier corps, targeting the pakistani taliban, from the afghan taliban and of course, and others detained in pack tiny as there were some also in afghanistan. feeling a bit more pressure worried about what might be in the future, has resulted in some of this dispersal. thank you. >> thank you, senator reed,

senator chamblis. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, as we continue down this read, trying to make sure we recruit and retain the finest men and women america has to offer, as two of you guys that are -- our junior officers and mid-level career folks look to you to provide the right kind of leadership to allow to us retain those folk and thank you for the great work you do. general petraeus i want to go back to what senator lieberman talked about, relative to meeting the goal of 50,000 troops, in iraq, by the end of august, general odierno odierno has expressed concern about the fact we'll need some, roughly, buffer-zone type troops, make a bct in the northern end because of the iraqi national forces and the kurdish regional forces, issue up there. is that going to be a part of

the plan, that you are talking about from a disbursement standpoint, is this going to be additional... >> no, this would be for -- our goal, right now, senator, and we think we're on track to do that, to achieve it. is to reach the 50,000, with possibly, with some rescoping, again, as was mentioned, possibly a 7th brigade headquarters, not necessarily all the brigades elements, don't need all of those. what we need are headquarters. headquarters matter enormously when you are coming down, because, they are the engagement element that is there, and, particularly, in an area where our contributions as honest brokers and so forth, are important. that is seen as, again, an option that we are looking at. no decision has been made on that, yet, and, again, the intent would be to do that within the 50,000 and it would

be a rescoping of the force rat than an increase. >> okay. general, the -- two of the issues we've had, ongoing in afghanistan, are the rule of law, or lack thereof, as well as the corruption issue in the government, can you bring us up-to-date on both of those issues, please. >> well, the rule of law, again, three elements of that, as always, police, much more emphasis on not only training police, but, also, on partnering with them, and, insisting that, before they actually put the uniform on, they receive training. and so, this is all part of, as i mentioned, getting the inputs right, and the concepts right, and those are among those. the detention side of that, the correction side, we're working hard to help them, state inl does it with the afghans directly and we're doing it with an element that will eventually take over the detention facility we have at bagram.

a goal we have for early next year, and, that is on track, so far and then, the judicial leg of the three legged stool, of rule of law, is an area that i think everyone agrees there needs to be greater effort and there have been additional resources, and, partnering activities, carried out, with a special element, in kabul, that has indeed been productive, supported by the fbi, and doj, as well. and, we think that that is an effort, overall, that is going to need to expand over time, as, frankly, we had to do in iraq, as well. with respect to corruption, president karzai announced his anti-corruption campaign, there have been some actions taken, to remove corrupt individuals, and, there is no question that there need to be more.

>> with respect to prisoners that we have arrested and are being detained, at bagram, the president looks like he's committed to moving down a path of closing guantanamo. what will we do with all of those battlefield combatants that we have picked up and are now being housed at bagram? >> well, again, what we're doing with respect to those that are at bagram, is indeed preparing a plan to transition control of that to an afghan corrections force that we are training, equipping, and will mentor and partner with, we won't just hand it to them and leave. we will provide continued partnering with them for some period of time. that is the plan. for what we want to do in bagram. >> at this point in time are you confident that we're going to be able to take those prisoners who

are comparable to the remaining prisoners that we have at guantanamo and that the afghans will be able to deal with them in a way that doesn't put them back on the battlefield, either in afghanistan, or potentially in some other country and around the world including maybe the united states. >> well, that is certainly what we're endeavoring to document that also includes rehabilitation efforts, it includes engaging tribal leaders and mullahs. and families. again, as we did, frankly in iraq and i might note, that in iraq yesterday we transitioned the taji detainee facility and we're in the 2,000 to 2500 number of detainees from some 27,000 that we had there during the height of the surge. and that is quite an accomplishment, really for those of our elements that have been engaged in that -- including at verse times, currently lindsey graham, u.s. air force, but, also, the very much, the iraqi security force elements that are

in charge of that now. and, again, we don't just hand off to them, we train, we equip, mentor, we monitor and so forth. >> i'm always concerned about the security of our country, when colonel graham is in theater over there. the -- >> we'll give senator graham an extra minute on his time to... >> he needs more than that to defend himself. [laughter]. >> the glad path for troop strength in afghanistan, and, the collateral issue of training the security force in iraq, are we on the right glad path, will we be able to meet the goal of next year. >> you are talking about afghanistan? >> yes, afghanistan. >> in terms of the deployment of the additional forces, we made the commitment to the president

to have them all there by the end of august, with the exception of a division headquarters that is not needed by that time, 99% of the 30,000, we are on track to do that. i can tell you that transportation command, the lodge stations of the world have done magnificent work to enable that and get their equipment into theatres so they have what they need, obviously, shortly after they get there, or before hand. and that is on track and we're somewhere close to the 10,000 mark of the 30,000, increased a good bit recently, and, again, touch wood, that is on track. with respect to the afghan national security forces, we are behind a bit on the afghan national army side. somewhere around 1300 or so below the glide path we need to be on, to take to us that additional figure that, we have talked about in the future for them.

as i mentioned, the combination of additional army and police will be somewhere around 100,000 over the next 18 months or so, so, clearly, there is going to have to be greater recruiting, and, better retention, on the part of the afghanistan national normall army, that is the goal and is an important reason that afghan leaders have to grip this and that is exactly what they've done, as, i think senator levin mentioned, and, we also have to expand the training capacity there and that is linked to the need for the additional trainers. there is no question about that. and that is again, part of general caldwell's plan with nato mission in afghanistan. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, senator chamblis, senator akaka. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, welcome to admiral olson and general petraeus. and thank you, very much, for

your leadership and distinguished service to our country and also thanks to the men and women that you lead and also their families for the support that they give our troops. we are really grateful. general petraeus, afghan forces are taking an important part in operations. many times lead and even in making up the bulk of forces involved. again soldiers and police force, must not only expand greatly in a short amount of time, but, they must be trained to a higher standard in order to -- for them to gain the trust and confidence of the people. i believe well trained and properly sized afghanistan

national army and police forces are a prerequisite to america leaving afghanistan. my question to you, general, what are the most difficult obstacles to successfully building the afghan national army and police forces and how are we coping with these obstacles? >> senator, you are exactly right. this is a critical element, component of the overall strategy. among the challenges is insufficient training capacity. right now with the authorization of the additional forces, we need to ramp up the capacity to train them and that is not just basic recruit training but it is also, if you will, branch training, for the different elements of the military and the

police. it is leader training, it is development of institutions as well as just basic trainees. a challenge there, beyond needing more trainers, and in some cases, more facilities, is also the challenge of illiteracy. as you know, illiteracy, runs somewhere in the 70 or so percent range, in afghanistan, a bit less in the cities and a bit more in the rural areas, and, obviously, that is a challenge, if you want the police to be able to read the laws that they should be enforcing. and, so, there is actually going to be a modest component of literacy training, made part of the training plans, and will be brought in, a bit at a time. and, we'll work with this, but, to see if that can help with the effort as we go forward as well. i think that the facilities, the

equipping and the other components, again, there are challenges there, but those are generally surmountable and really it comes back to the issues of having the numbers of trainers and then partner elements over time, and, then, frankly, dealing with a culture in which there is a -- an acceptance of a degree of corruption in which tribal norms and so forth intrude, understandably as well. >> admiral olson and general petraeus, i believe we must grow our -- since you mentioned the culture, we must grow our foreign language capability. there seems to be an emphasis within dod to improve these capabilities so that our service