wal-mart's. once we can challenge other accounting rules which makes the job of the military industry and implementing reductions much and mort it from a jabbing by the formal ceilings. if you compare reduction in addition revenue treaty is not conditioned by the first one in 70 years introduced actual reduction of warheads by many thousands. between 45,000 warheads were reduced from a strategic forces of the soviet union then russia and the united states. and in many countries missiles and bombers and submarines but from this point* is less impressive

because it 10 years duration time it is a reduction of four has will be a few hundred at best and even that was a new quite formal accounting rules. the main significance of the new treaty is not in its physical reduction. the main significance is restoration of the hormones dialogue of a strategic relationship between the two leading nuclear superpowers? after a long break, it is kept in mind we have not had a new strategic arms control treaty for 20 years since 1991. we never had a treaty that was signed supplemented or magnified and into force. we had that chain of

unsuccessful sort which i mentioned but never had a formal binding treaty. here is the significance. basically we have a slightly different ceilings for the delivery of vehicles and agreed accounting rules and procedures. this is not surprising because the expiration puts it very tight schedule. and less than one year of actually having negotiations , basically in the preceding years but they dissolved but they have to organize them so for doing one year they did a great

job been coming to a legally binding treaty which hopefully will be ratified and i think it is worthwhile to pay a tribute to to the works very well together especially carnegie% and i think the hard to recognize their commission. another thing is it is a fulfillment of their commitment of the nuclear weapons states from the non-proliferation treaty. has they come in me for the disastrous conference of 2005, the conference will be fined whether we go through disintegration of nine

proliferation but it could be between the treaty and essential countries. last but not least, this is in line with their ambitious goal of the article of the four great statesmen and commitments of on the road to nuclear disarmament. however recruit about the with the analysis with both with the united states and russia of the process of ratification of the treaty will face a lot of difficulties and problems. i would be happy to say the russian people enthusiastically wait for signor treaty to implement the that would be a great exaggeration.

those russian people who are interested in this subject subject, largely have grave and downs of your treaty because nuclear-weapons are for russian people now. much more important than a decade ago i would say more important. they are more important than during the cold war time has a dealer of national security. ready but then russia a campaign started against the new treaty. and the erroneous way it started by massive attacks on the late trade me that expired. all of a sudden after 20 years of start article after article in respect to

military magnificence and newspapers attacked start one as being detrimental to russian security and they were scolded. and i cannot have an eight other explanation but that it it will sell off which will be conducted. when there is a science but the reason is 20 years after the end of the cold war russia feels much less secure. in contrast to the united states, european states, and of course, china and many other countries for material large extent it is their fault with the domestic politics and foreign policy but the united states and

nato contributed a lot to the feeling of insecurity in russia and nuclear weapons, the only reliable assurance was a national security and it clearly spells that out without any reservations. >> nuclear weapons are one of the few legacies of the superpower. >> which russia? and now after the economic crisis greatly diminishes. yes they are oil exports but nuclear-weapons relatively have become this much more important. certainly nuclear weapons are looked upon with experts by the professional community as the great

equalizer and instrument wake of russia and purity with the forces and the dick killer with nato getting very close to the russian borders and acquiring multiple superiority. as an instrument to make up for russian superiority of ballistic missile defense and space technologist but for most they're relying and systems and and those who feel the most vulnerable. and now going back, you can see russia as a growing and rising country on the threat two of view and a guided system on the united states has the greatest threat of the russian national security.

if you look at the military doctrine, the list of priorities he may find that native expansion is not one. ballistic missile and the decision guide call our number four and nuclear proliferation so those threats are never seven and then national terrorism is pretty 11 it may prove that is a issue. but the prevailing opinion of the strategic community both in a government and part of the government. >> taken as a political reality. >> the main argument will be

used against the new treaty is easily predictable and does not limit the ballistic missiles and the united states or provide for any certainty about ballistic missile defense where there are stringent limitations at least for the next 10 years. secondly, the precision guided systems which will be expanded that is what the strategic forces. ashley reductions that are supplied by the treaty they will convert their nuclear weapons in exchange for certain guidance a long-range weapons and that would be seen as a major deficiency.

and it was the number one ejection but it now moves down the list it is for the new accounting rules in particular which now the number with which they were tested. providing the united states with great potential are built up from warheads to deliver systems within relatively short time. russia will not how such a potential because russia is withdrawing in massive numbers the obsolete strategic forces and introducing a new one at a very slow rate within numbers than those new ones will be loaded so roche said

does not have capabilities. >> the new treaty is basically eight about america and rejection. nothing is 80 prevents russia from using these systems and they will be under anyway because of massive withdrawal of all systems with very small numbers with anyone but in 10 years according to the russians' current plan it will almost fully modernize the strategic forces within the -- by 70 percent the official number and including to draw your attention to that, the land development and deployment of the new heavy missile.

is the united states by going with a new treaty they are much thicker than now because it will affect. >> you are now withdrawing the old system now and easily they could start a new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. and order to collect nuclear disarmament have further arms reductions, it would be very important to persuade russian political leaders and strategic communities and three principals ideas. the first is that nuclear

disarmament will not affect russia or citizens of the world. to put it in a different way that the russian interest it will be paid much less attention. second, the united states is serious about nuclear disarmament. as i mentioned in the beginning it sends conflicting signals. on the one hand it is the first practical treaty for the last 20 years which will probably be rectified but on the other hand, official accounting rules make a very strange plaintive view from the actual nuclear weapons there were some doubts in

russia about the united states with respect to nuclear disarmament very few people doubt that. but many doubt the seriousness. the military establishment. actual the one is a merit to exist off of russia. and last but probably the most important idea is that the estates are pursuing nuclear disarmament if they are serious about it. in order to improve things to national security and order to enhance the huge security with the weapons systems with the ballistic missile defense comment with the conventional and

long-range systems. the doctrine presents this new threat as eight with a traditional military threat to russia. and russian military doctrine establishment to assure defense again to the aerospace attack. that is the conventional system is relying on space information. so all of these ideas are to be taken very seriously here in the united states and in the west in general it harder to go forward with nuclear disarmament. i think it is high time for the united states military establishment and the parliament -- department of defense to stop ignoring the

growing concern of russia with long-range systems since opening this new avenue of the military technological development and think it is up to them to initiate serious consultation with russian scientists and to provide persuasive arguments that this new system is not against russia and to suggest confidence-building measures that removes the number one concern of russia. as of now as far as i know americans are just ignoring saying russians were annoyed and it is not against them point*. much more is needed than that. the same with ballistic missile defense. this treaty provides for a

lot of transparency and certainty for the next 10 years. with respect to a strategic offensive and it would be very good if the united states provided the same low of transparency and just like that. go before and now the main concern of him but what is planned over the nearest future but the prospects? americans have a far and now have the open-ended program and for russia, some kind of certainty is needed to go forward that certainly it would be much more difficult to achieve. that is to a great extent if the new treaty is the first practical step on milan

route of nuclear disarmament are of many decades to come. thank you. [applause] >> rather than end use my position as moderator to ask questions i want to go directly to you all to ask questions and may jump in if there is something i cannot resist adding are challenging. i ask you to raise your hands and when i call you, to identify yourself and your affiliation and we can begin their in the back. >> please go ahead and stand up. >> i am from the center from non proliferation states and

the monterey state. thank you for the very interesting presentation. a couple of questions. foreign minister said the other day a little more open to the idea of missile defense after this treaty and what of the prospects for that? >> also under secretary talked about moving on to the issue of texaco nuclear weapons and and there and the other prospects? >> can you hear me? i think the cooperation of ballistic missile defense is the most important thing in the long term relationship but we have to recognize that joint ballistic missile defense implies virtually a

military alliance. common threats and at present we are quite distant from that relationship. it is not technically complicated but politically and as long as we're talking about and from wherever they may encourage for russia certainly that would create some problems as china because it does want to purchase the eight and russia china is not only a great partner but a great concern. russia would not like to join the ballistic missile defense to make some

conscious enemies like iran. and a large part would be very strongly against that. but still to be successful with the treaty to be successful in spite of all the difficulties it would be possible to start to approach this on a step-by-step basis. first to be very important and not difficult to implement is to revise the which was agreed to more than 10 years ago and still has not became operational. some early warning systems would be important in order to contribute to each other

knowledge about what is happening with alice -- ballistic missile test and also important to avoid mis calculation to avoid some concerns about the test of the other side and it would be good data collection center from food tins proposal several years ago to make it operates in realtime. immediately to send a warning of the ballistic missile launch to both sides and probably to the alliance on both sides back out another stepped would be to make our theater missile defense in this purely theoretic exercise by think from the strategic logic

point* of view it is possible because it does not create a conflict of interest without the strategic offensive balance because neither have weapons that may be intercepted by the ballistic missile defense due to that shorter-range treaty signed in 87 and we should results but the arguments against it we do not have weapons that would be targeted. we did not have medium or short range missiles it would be easier for us to agree on some joint programs are deployment to protect our forces abroad and then protect part of the russian territory in europe and

european territory against possible threats from the south without bringing it into the picture the most complicated and controversial sector of china. if we're successful with that development when we gain experience to start something more err grand juror, with respect to global missile defense that has to wait far enough and a live team this strategic forces and then 1/8 to the frantic situation while still relying on the strategic balance of offensive weapons against each other. with respect to do tactical

moves come i think there is great enthusiasm in the west about technical nukes and future technical weapons reduction of limitation. i am not so enthusiastic about at and not because of strategic reasons. there are for russia to have quite the substantial number it is the same reason which made may tell maintained a lot of technical weapons 20 or 30 years ago that conventional inferiority it is the ratio of conventional imbalance is now all about the same reversed as they thought what it was 20 or 30 years ago. of course, in this situation tactical nuclear weapons look for russia to be an equalizer. to address the issue from

the technical and legal part united states will teach great success in the new strategic arms reduction treaty it is a serious problem for potential future negotiations. by insisting and persuading russia two except the principal for a deployed lap band and the united states has greatly undercut the ground floor of limiting or reduce sane nuclear weapons because none of those operationally deployed. and if you look at the legal precedents we certainly would be you will be able to say one year from now that all technical nukes

proliferation and do not exist. there is storage is. none of them is on delivery assistance and if they deliver a system so with the geo start principal doing away with weapons by dismantling or limiting delivery systems. you cannot eliminate heavy caliber activity which shows mostly conventional weapons attack came aircraft, ships, which may use tactical nuclear weapons and you cannot apply the same principle of the rise you have to do with the conventional forces all together. if you try to limit those in the storage is you have to

be in warheads than from the point* of view no difference between tactical are st. -- strategic they are kept together with texaco weapons and that is not a problem of nukes and there is still in different than it strategic or tactical. it is perfect from the front of you of the diplomats budget is not something we can address now especially with the prospect of thousands of strategic nuclear weapons remove to sturgis so from the legal point* of view and technical point* of view technical weapons would be a serious problem just to give you one example sayinha