rogue states. that is about nato. in principle, there are political and psychological biases with respect to nato and nato expansion.

economic and other interests in each particular neighboring country, the west might look at it in a much less hostile way rather than one russia says this is our area of national interest which is often seen as neo-imperial attempts to dominate. russia does not want nato to take over post-soviet space under whatever pretext and deprive russia of its legitimate interests toward russia as nec

minorities and economic investment and everything russia has with respect to that space. there is concern that some conflict in the caucuses, which still remains quite likely, may bring russia and the wet sand and to direct confrontation -- and the west into direct confrontation. if nato comes right to the russian border from the west and from the south, that is why russia says that. in the new military doctrine, it is formulated in a very cautious way, just like the formulation on nuclear-weapons. it is worth mentioning here because in some short time,

russia will come with its nuclear posture review. russians waited and waited for this to come with their own military doctrine. then they decided not to wait any longer but then as military doctrine was effective by the thrust of president obama for nuclear disarmament, by the information we have that the posture review was delayed because of obama wanted to have some less traditional formulation, and by negotiations and resetting relations -- since 1993 when first russian military doctrine was formulated, we have never had a doctrine that would be so cautious and conservative on nuclear-weapons as the present one. it formulates only two situations under which russia may use of nuclear weapons. one is in retaliation afford nuclear or chemical or

biological attacks on russia and its allies. second, to repel overwhelming conventional aggression which would put under doubt the very existence of the russian state. that such a tall order that i cannot think of anything more liberal than just and equitable pledge. this comes very close to equivocal no first use pledge. it is already weapons of mass destruction, no first use pledge. the very existence of russian state, it's difficult to think what should happen to doubt the very existence of the russian state. maybe america defaults on all of

its investments -- [laughter] >> that is an important point about the doctrine because it has not been discussed. either that language or demeaning and that is different than it seemed like it is going to be months ago. >> a lot of people and high officials were improvising on the subject come out with sufficient knowledge of the subject and there was a lot speculation, preventive strike, pre-emptive strikes and so on. nothing of that is in the new military doctrine. the previous ones that russia might use nuclear weapons in case of conventional aggression in critical situations. but that is a very amorphous term. the present term is i would say very conservative. >> thank you for this good

conversation. the u.s. is behind on its commitments for dismantling nuclear weapons. in fiscal year 2011, the obama administration has significantly increased funding for the laboratories, some argue some of the funding is not necessarily needed for reliability means. how do russian negotiators view these increases and the backlog of dismantlement and does it affect any future negotiations after the start treaty. >> we will go with you and some of time have left. >> i base slightly different version of the question from a five-year old. given that nato was created as

primarily a buffer against presumed soviet aggression, now that the soviet union no longer exists and presumably the threat of russian aggression is at least substantially reduced, why do we even have nato? >> it's great to ask a russian those questions. >> i will leave the second question to you. why do we have made no? >> why do you think we think we have nato? [laughter] >> with respect to laboratories in the budget for stewardship of those things, it has taken russia and a very complex and way. nobody is very concerned about it. weapon storage business

something that will have to wait for many years before nuclear disarmament comes. what it does, that would be a real hard core nuclear disarmament. we're dealing with launchers and delivery systems. it is peripheral. even as slowly as we go with reducing missiles, bombers and submarines. those russians who are responsible for watching americans would probably interpret at as a way to pacify republican opposition in this set, the beginning of horsetrading, and even more on future [unintelligible] >> russians are good reading things, so that's a good interpretation. >> was nato, -- with nato,

russians were not against nato in the early '90s. when the soviet union agreed for german reunification within the nato alliance, russians looked very well at the at and considered data to be -- looked very well at nato and considered a dead to be good and there was a top of russia eventually joining nato. yeltsin wins even made a very conspicuous statement saying russia will put the question of joining nato [unintelligible] and it produced such a reaction that corrected it in a few days, saying the typist made a mistake, that russia will not participate. but then, the attitude toward nato started to change.

the crucial turning point was the bombing of serbia and. after that, at russia's started to see nato as an aggressive alliance that used its force arbitrarily out of united nations security council framework, out of for a mark of international law, at will. what is more importantly that it did not change the official attitude toward nato, but the grass roots, russian attitude toward nato. i lived at least half of my professional life in the soviet union. i do not remember ever seeing such an outcry of anti-nato, and that-western movements at the grassroot lovell of the russian public as in 1999.

the more official propaganda was coming against nato. the more russian people like nato. but that changed dramatically after 1999. then, russia started to judge nato not by the nature of the state's which are native members, whether democratic or not quite democratic, but by the nato actual functions. by the actual operations. the operation in iraq, which was not a new operation, but the united states and a number of nato allies, intervened without obvious, clear reasons, that was taken in a very hostile manner. the predominant opinion in russia is that nato is an

alliance which first of all tries to take the ground which was liberated and left by the soviet union and russia, to come to the russian borders and prevent russia from using, exercising its legitimate issue in post-soviet space. also, nato wants to become global and elbow away or substitute the united nations as an operational body for peacekeeping or intervention whenever nato decides to do that. >> before we go to the last question, i was reminded, and it's a point you have made a number of times, first of all, the only nuclear arms control experience in the world is between the u.s. and the soviet union and the u.s. and russia. the treaties and experiences we

have had thus far have never actually verify the part that goes boom. it has always been the delivery systems. i remember briefing members of congress a few months ago and i realized they did not realize that arms control had never dealt with the part that goes boom. that's how i explain it. there is the part that flies the thing and a part that goes boom. we have destroyed this parts that fly but never dealt with the parts that go boom and he said, you are kidding. i said there are weapons that have been dismantled, it just was not verified and counted. many of the lights when you turn on your lights in your state, the power is supplied from the fuel by that. and he said you are kidding me. >> you are talking to children this way?

>> and member of congress. [laughter] >> at some point, when the experience of arms reduction, what it goes further beyond the u.s. and russia, we will be into this new domain of trying to count warheads and verify warheads which has never been done and raises these issues are very complicated and intrusive you are referring to, including the people's healthcare alignment and i'm sure that all work great. last question. >> there is a lot of attention focused on the upcoming review conference. apart from the statement, which is to is there anything the

russian federation is planning or you would recommend as an initiative to achieve consensus of this review conference, for example, at the last one of the mother was a russian proposal with regard to converting the middle east into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. >> you are a great authority on that. i feel a little bit awkward discussing this subject. however, as far as i know, russia will not come with any surprise to the review. nuclear-free zones, safeguards, multinational fuel cycles, the usual menu of things which are to be discussed. if you are asking what i would recommend to the russian government, my response is i

would recommend to the russian government and the p-5 government to concentrate on one issue and push it through instead of discussing 10 issues and having another document of buried general character. that would be possible on the basis of this achievement of the new start treaty. the political position would be fortified. my choice of all the issues would be to universalize asian -- universal was asian -- universalization. let's leave the discussion to

others, but let's target this particular subject. let's try to pull for a resolution that would recommend to nuclear supplies group to link all future deals on nuclear transfers, technology transfers, and material contracts to citing [unintelligible] . that would mean going forward in the regime and rap -- than just having another general discussion of all the great problems associated with the regime. >> thank you. i would like to thank all of you for coming. i think russia is lucky in the world is lucky to have someone as talented and thoughtful. i think you understand why i say that.

we're very grateful you appeared with us today and it might invest. thank you and i would like to thank you all for coming. [applause]

the irony was that they thought that the new technologies might not be technologies of freedom of speech. as electronic media had become dominant and displaced the print media, they brought with them a culture of regulation. they are creatures of regulation and beginning with the telephone regulation. as the electronic media came into prominence and replaced or displaced the print media, they

brought with them a different culture of regulation. they might prove to and not be of freedom but a trojan horse smuggling an army of regulators past the gates of the first amendment's. -- gates of the first amendment. i wrote an article in which i took issue with most of the assessments. i pointed out that it did not seem that the first amendment had gone away all of this time. you could make an argument that in some ways it had expanded. also, some of the regulations that he decried had actually

been eliminated. a lot of content regulation had been diminished or disappeared. if i was to write that article again today, i might have to reconsider some of my arguments and conceded that the arguments might have been better than i give credit for. we have seen efforts to revive otheother forms of regulation. localism, if there was ever a trojan horse for regulation, that is it. we have seen a revival of decency regulation.

the fact of the matter is that regulation has not disappeared and it might actually been increasing. one thing i could not have been considered in 1993 was the internet. today, any test of the thesis would have to come to grips with the internet. in contrast to other electronic media, the internet has been famously on regulated. -- unregulated. here at last was a test that would disprove poole's thesis.

here we have an anarchic medium. what we are hearing and nowadays is that maybe the internet will not remain an unregulated media. i am not talking about net neutrality but regulations to some parts of the internet. these are what people consider to impose a common carrier type regulations on broadband providers. whatever the merits of these, you cannot dismiss the possibility that the internet will become part of the regulated media.

in short, yogi was right, it is not over until it is over. i will not try to introduce our panel. suffice it to say that all of them have substantial expertise the game plan here is to began in the order of proceeding. we look for some interactive discussion and some comments from the floor. why are we regulating this?

>> well, i am working on it. but i have a brief power point. this is a terrific introduction of what we will try to cover during this panel. this has been a problem regarding the fcc. this will begin to provide a partial answer to our problems. i will go to some of the background on the issues and then hopefully set it up for the rest of the discussion on the panel. technologies come and go. the telegraph being the great new advanced technology of the 19th century. when we get technologies and various ways of thinking, that technologies may go but the regulatory models tend to remain. at the time that the telegraph was a new technology and the

government was looking for ways to regulate new technologies that camel long, they looked to whatever regulatory models they had. -- the government was looking for ways to regulate a new technologies that came along. you look at the statutory mandates and some sound some like the first amendment. you find that the decisions that interpret the statutory mandate are something different than the standard first amendment rights that apply to print media. you can trace them farther back than the nbc case in 1943. there was a different level of protection for the broadcast media. this is a cycle that has

continued. you can look at the impact that the media has had to in order to control speech as well as with government. we never had censorship euros before we had a printing press because you did not need them. the printing press was a very important part of our political system and this was protected in the first amendment. that has not in true with other new technologies. every other new technology that has come along were considered to be not protected by the first amendment, starting with film, of course. there was a decision in the supreme court in 1915 in which it was held that motion pictures are just a