millions of them, who will conceive of themselves as enemies of the united states, and form conspiracies. as i said, this is a very serious problem, but we should not call it a war. if a stateactually organizes itself and makes war against the united states, if jihadists or others seize control of pakistan, that's a war, an there is a constitutional and very pressing legal question in there, which congress has yet to address in some ways and let me put it to general mcmaster, in the field, bruce just said, terror is a technique. we aren't making a war on terror according to bruce, so who is the enemy. and for the purposes of dephoenix, for the purposes of -- detention, for the purposes of what the president of the united states can do, who is an enemy that we can imprison? :

you have several groups. you have the afghan taliban. you have the pakistani taliban. that is -- made of a number of other suborganizations. but these organizations are operating against us. many of them are operating against the pakistani government. others are linked to

transnational terrorist organizations that have conducted attacks in india and elsewhere. and so these organizations are who we're fighting. so it is a war against -- if you want a proper noun, fill in the blank on any -- on any of those groups and we are at war against them. in iraq, we're at war against insurgent organizations that over time became affiliated with al-qaeda and allied with the al-qaeda affiliate in iraq. an organization with this attack fear ideology and those who don't go to their irreligious belief of islam is a nonbeliever and so forth. and we're also at war with shia islamist militias and those that are directly supported with the islamic republic of iran. i think it's important for us to understand the role of the military in fighting against these organizations and the role the military place in deterrence and conflict prevention. one of the differences between

wars against states or the cold war where you're able to deter a state actor -- these groups are much more difficult to deter. which is one of the reasons why we're fighting them overseas. to deny them the safe haven basis opportunities to pose a grave threat to us, our key allies and certainly our partners in the region especially afghanistan and in iraq. in terms of the status of detainees, these are enemy prisoners from our perspective. but what is important in these environments where the enemy blends into the population is to make sure that we are continuing to evolve our capabilities in the army to develop really police work. to be able to gather not just intelligence but evidence against these individuals because one of the key ways to defeat this enemy is to do so consistent with the rule of law within that particular country. and so what is important for us as we're fighting this enemy, as we detain this enemy is to develop a transparent

review-based security detainee system along with -- along with our -- along with our partners in the region. but there is no way that i can imagine giving the status -- the status to these individuals we're fighting overseas commensurate to the status of our own citizens have. i think that's a ridiculous notion. if we equate the fact that we're capturing the enemy as we should overseas to any kind of repressive policy in the u.s. -- bruce, i'm not sure what you're talking about but i think it's two separate issues. >> do you want -- i mean -- >> sure. well, let's take somalia. or yemen. which of course, you see because what we're talking about is the failure of states power and the creation of black markets and small groups, there's every reason to think that if we

resolve the problem -- if iraq and afghanistan are stabilized, well, then we have these other places now, i take it one question -- if it's a war which i don't think -- we need a new framework. i'll present it some time, or perhaps some time. [inaudible] [laughter] >> but from the constitutional point of view. from the constitutional point of view, you see, can we invade somalia? can we invade yemen? who declared the war? it's only this notion war on terrorism or war on them. we know what they are. and then, of course, we find out that there are all these little groups who have a very problematic relation to one another.

and we have not -- the congress of the united states has or hasn't authorized a global war. the bush administration and the obama administration doctrine is that this is -- there's no battlefield here. and that's why it's a problem for -- a domestic problem. when padilla, jose padilla arrives in the o'hare airport and is seized. has no weapons. just on intelligence and then he's put in the naval bringing for the next 3 1/2 years as an enemy combatant. so if we admit this notion that we're at war with all of these smallish groups. the thing they have in common, they're not states. they haven't controlled states, then how do we declare war on them?

now, the key issue, of course, we have to take proactive measures in a structure which is -- but we have to be problem-oriented in developing new constitutional concepts. not just call it war. not to encourage extravagant analogies to what franklin roosevelt was up to in a total war. for civilization. and say well, that's just like a problem which would be a terrible thing, destroying half of a city of the united states. but that's really -- we were up to much worse in the second world war, in the world war. and so we have to structure -- we have to structure a new framework without extravagant analogies to the moments in the past that's related to the problem.

and that's my real problem with this war -- you know, this amless war talk. >> well, first of all i don't think that's aimless. and arresting someone at our airports that we believe to be a suspected terrorist or a danger to the threats of the united states is more in the purview of criminal activity and something that they're doing in the sense, a much lesser action than what has taken place overseas. where our armies, navies, air force and marines are operating in the theater of war. i want to go back to something bruce said about the soviet union. you know, this communist ideology, clearly intent on dominating the world with that ideology, not trying to force it on others in the sense that fosterism and nazism had to be doing. it had to be violently upheld and the world would come to them because the model state they created had collapsed before our very eyes but in going so they

became a super military power and clearly had ideological opposition in what the united states stood for. therefore, we were geopolitically opposed with them during that time frame. what kept that from becoming the potential holocaust it could have been is because they were a nation state that wanted to preserve that nation state. and the policy of mutual-assured destruction worked for both nations. that's the reality of it. i believe this period we're in dealing with these transnational actors is a more dangerous period for us. because of their what intent is and the means to achieve that intent. and even though they're not sitting there with a government and a head of state and a police force that's self-evident and an army that's even more evident for us to deal with, their danger and threat to us is significant. and it's not something that we should ever attempt to minimize in any way, shape or form or

even suggest that it was less -- it's considerably less right now than any period since world war ii. >> well, let me shift gears right now from that big question to an intimate question in a way. interrogation, which is a question of our values. and in this world that we've been discussing where -- whatever label you give it, the danger can at any moment be very extreme. the government has taken steps in interrogations that many people believe cross the line into torture. so i just want to ask an open-ended question. are there times when interrogators in uniform or civilian interrogators must in this long war that we're talking about cross those lines of our values and traditions? and is there -- is there a constitutional way you can do it?

who would like to take a crack at that. >> i'll just answer from inside the army perspective. in terms of army operations. the answer to your question is no. there's never a time to cross a line. i don't think you can justify it from, you know, any kind of philosophical point of view from either point of view as treating manza ends or a jon stewart mill kind of point of view taking a utilitarian point of view on this. first of all, it's not right to do it. it undermines our values as a force if we behave in that way. it can have a corrosive effect. but also it just wouldn't work. i mean, there's no reason to do it from a military operations perspective. now, the large -- the largest percentage of the people who we capture in iraq or afghanistan -- you know, many of them have been essentially brainwashed, okay?

they have been brought into these organizations through effective propaganda disinformation. some joined for money and so forth. you have a very tiny corps of committed idealogs. and they are recruiting and coercing them to join these organizations. i'm talking people with third and fourth education. they kill the and the mosque can and they use the mosque as a recruiting tool. they draw 15 and 16 years old and say give us your son or we will kill your family. so once they see that we are not some part of a zionist crusader conspiracy. that we're not there to subrogate them. once they see they are being treated respectfully you get all kinds of -- you know, cooperation from them. there is no reason to use any kind of -- you know, any kind of physical or mental abuse on them in our experience. >> it happened, though. >> of course it happened.

>> do you think in the early years after 9/11 that ethos that you just described was weakened in uniform and certainly with civilian interrogators. that abu ghraib wasn't just, you know, an aberration. that there was a shift in the way men and women in uniform looked at that? what do you think? >> i don't think so myself. i spent a lot of time on abu ghraib. we had a fundamental breakdown in discipline and leadership that led to absolute outrageous hooliganism. and not a function of policy. and you get into the details of that ineffective company commander and brigade commander headquarters in kuwait as opposed to the theater. how we tolerated that is beyond

belief. not having the proper oversight,alities. -- et cetera. there's no excuses for that horrific behavior and even worse for the moral high ground that we lost as a result of that. and the damage it did and continues to, you know, resonate around the world in terms of america saying this and doing something else. we grew up as officers in the united states military. and torture is about as foreign to us as any subject could be. i mean, it just isn't in our values. it's not anywhere in our policies. there's no training about it. it's not something we would do. at the emotional tension level of war and particularly when you're dealing an enemy that's living in and among the people and doesn't wear a uniform and tension levels and frustration levels, there is times of abuses, yes. when we find those abuses, you know, we deal with them.

we hold people accountable. they go to jail if necessary. they are dismissed from the military if necessary. they lose their rank and status that they have if necessary. the abuse of enemy combatants in war by the united states military has occurred in every war we've ever been in. that's the reality of it. the reality is it's not policy. and war is an event that's full of tension and emotion. and use psychological pressure. when h.r. says it's a breakdown of discipline, that's exactly what little. -- it is. we take these beautiful young people in america and we train them to do something that's very difficult. it's not just to protect lives but to take human life. that is a sobering responsibility that we draw from our commissions as officers through the constitution of the united states.

to get somebody to do that, you have to have discipline organization because we never want to take more life than is necessary. that's american values operating in the wartime environment. we will do what we need to do to compel an enemy in terms of taking life to be sure. and then when we have that prisoner in front of us or a detainee in front of us, we want to treat that prisoner with the dignity that another human deserves. that's policy. so torture is about as foreign to us as officers or as noncommissioned officers as there is in the united states military. it has happened. and when it does happen, we're going to hold people accountable. and if necessary, put in corrective mechanisms in terms of education and training, which we had to do after abu ghraib to make sure that everybody understood what we thought everybody should have understood. now, i do have an exception here. i believe that the president of the united states acting as the president duly elected by the

people should be able to act and use special interrogation techniques if in a special set of circumstances -- if the sovereignty of this state is being -- is being threatened by a typical catastrophic wmd event. and he has somebody in his hands that knows where and when. if that intelligence is there, then i think that president should be able to do something about that to preserve what could possibly happen as a result of that. that's the only exception i would make for that. >> well, torture was the official policy of the president of the united states. not what this is what john used memo was all about. john's memo of what was in one

of his more extravagant's dimensions said that despite the fact that there is an antitorture statute passed by congress, despite the fact that we are signatories to international agreements. but it's not a mere question of international law, mind you. it's a question of domestic law. and we're not talking about john yoo's -- it isn't john yoo. it was the administration's policy. which was reported. and obviously president bush knew it. it was -- it isn't merely that the office of legal counsel defined torture in a narrow way. it also asserted that the president of the united states as commander in chief had the constitutional authority to override the statutes.

and that was the feature that m imjack -- john yoo with jay biby who was ahead of it to withdraw the memo. but there can be no doubt that torture was the official policy of the bush administration. and we shouldn't engage in collective denial here. my concern is not so much the reason of ex cull presumptive probation of john yoo and the like. my concern is what's going to happen after the next terrorist incident in the united states? is there any reason to think the extreme reason as exemplified by the bush administration will not

be repeated? i do not think there's any reason to think that the next time around will be better. unless we take constitutional -- unless we think constitutionally about the problem and create new structures. you see i believe in the period after an attack there is -- after a terrorist attack in the united states, the -- there is -- there is a good reason to have a new statute which regulates states of emergency. neither a crime. nor a war. but to create a state of emergency in the united states so that we can have not torture. but for 60-day periods arrest under much less than probable cause. and detention and questioning of

people suspected of engaging in terrorist acts because, of course, we won't know next time around. just as we didn't know last time around, whether there are 8 cells throughout the united states. each of whom has prepared. or whether this small terrorist group of 300 people with some serious weapons were just lucky. it's not a problem like war. but it is a problem. and it is justified for a short period of time to try to find out whether and disrupt the other 7 or 8 sources in the country. the problem that i see before us normalization of states of emergency. that things that are justified in the short run -- although i don't -- we have people who can disagree about what special interrogation techniques are and are not and things of this kind.

but whatever is justifiable after an attack, what you suddenly recognize that it isn't merely a free floating exist which is going to exist not for the long war. it's going to exist for a very long time. hundreds of years. this loss by the state of its monopoly of coercive authority. but when something actually happens, that's a very good reason to try to find out whether there are 8 or 9 other things that are about to happen, too, and take preemptive strikes and in every 60 days in my proposed emergency statute where the details aren't too important. congress would have to vote again on whether we should have another 60 days of emergency. >> state of emergency? >> absolutely. >> instead of thinking in terms of war and crime, we should have these three conceptual boxes. war in which we're really dealing with -- it's a very

different problem if extremists take over pakistan. that really is a very different problem from these little groups moving around. and they're never going to be eliminated. >> an american state of emergency is very provocative. and i'm going to -- we're going to open it up for questions in a little bit. but i want to pick up on something you said and get the view of our military friends and colleagues here. and that is that after the next attack, god forbid, the president is going to be radically empowered once again. i remember coming to the white house -- i was covering the white house after 9/11. and i'm sure i was imagining or projecting but you walk through those gates and i almost felt you could sense all the values, the traditions, the strength, the hopes, the fears of the country surging into that office, into that person.

and there is a sense where the president is almost supreme. he could have ordered an invasion of the moon. in those days afterward and probably gotten majority support for it. so the question i have, what is the responsibility of the military leadership when the civilian leadership under the pressures of the emergencies which we are going to face overreaches or something really stupid? [laughter] >> that happens in terms of military and national leadership -- i mean, there's always been disagreements here. and i think what you're going to find, you know, from the military is sort of trying to sharpen the reason at the policy-making level of the rationale to go to war because most people have been exposed to this quite a bit.

you know, but the use of the instrument. but i think at the heart what the military is doing, we're providing advice. we're placing options in front of a national leader in terms of what risks are and what benefits are. and when we disagree in a matter of policy and we don't believe we can execute that, then there's plenty of opportunity there to do something about that. >> what do you mean? >> well, resignation, which is done in full public view, which would crystallize then that issue a little bit more. you know, for the media and also for the congress of the united states. you can imagine a four-star leader resigning over a matter of policy with a president or a theater of war within 24 hours

after that resignation, where is he? before the television cameras -- >> he's on night line. that's where he is. [laughter] >> most of my military friends would probably shy away from that. but they would -- they would answer the call to testimony before the congress. and given a full explanation of what that is. the american people would have the benefit of that. the congress, you know, would have the benefit of that. i mean, it's an important issue. i think sometimes it's overstated in terms of what military impact can have on policy formulation. because at the end of the day, military executes that policy. that's primarily what it's function is. but it does not minimize the importance if those leaders believe that policy is wrong. they have a moral problem with that policy. or they have some other execution issue with that policy, then they should speak.

and most of the ones that i know would, including some that would not. and even though they've been in leadership positions. and i would like to think that those that are coming behind us are as well. and h.r. has wrote a marvelous book on this. >> during the johnson administration, what's the responsibility of a military leadership when the president is getting into or getting out of war in ways that the military judges won't? >> well, there's only one responsibility. and it's to provide your best military advice. and to not cross the line between advice and advocacy. nobody elects generals to make policy. to do that would be dangerous to our democratic values and processes. but it's important for the military to provide their best military advice. and the quality of that advice depends, i think, who the military leaders are. the degree of which they're able to provide thoughtful advice.

and in a way that connects to the policy goals and objectives. there has to be what professor elliott cohen has called this unequal dialog between civilian leaders and military leaders. it's very important for military leaders to help maybe crystallize the policy by helping -- helping civilian leadership understand the potential costs and consequences. help sharpen whatever the objectives are. george marshall said at one point that if you get the objectives right, a lieutenant can write the strategy. i think a lot of the -- you know, a lot of the debate has to be about that. i mean, george bundy by contrast, who helped, i think, set conditions for the disaster of vietnam and the way we got into vietnam, said that the lack of an objective was really an advantage. because that would give the president more flexibility in the domestic political realm. so if things went bad in vietnam, the administration could just say well, it wasn't really our objective to win this war anyway. and it was that ambiguity that prehaven't the development of an

effective strategy. the problem with the joint chiefs in this period of time is the joint chiefs of staff failed to provide their best military advice and told their civilian bosses what they wanted to hear and they compromised their principles for expend si. -- expediency. so i think sometimes you can cast a false dilemma like we are here like total war. we're not total war. i mean, that's a false dilemma also. a false dilemma between resignation and then -- and passivity, complete passivity. there's a lot of examples of very effective civil military relations in the course of our history. i would say it depends less on law. it depends less on bureaucratic structure. and it depends on the character of the individuals and the relationships that they develop. and i think that's what's most important. >> i think it depends a lot on drugstore.