and in particular the fundamental change in american military structure brought by the goldwater-nichols act of 1986. before that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff was -- before that, the members of the chief of staff voted and the chairman was basically a coalition-builder. he couldn't speak out unless everybody agreed. we had as it were a check and balance system within the military. and the military members of the joint chiefs were mostly interested in more bombers. more -- more soldiers. more battleships. and that's really what jostling

around. and the chairman joint chiefs of staff for the first time in american history and for the first time certainly within the period where we had a big army began to speak for the military. ...

president of the you of the united states what the military strategies are. >> i entirely agree with your description of what -- >> -- mcchrystal's peach, word for word, because that really isn't what he did in my view. >> well, -- >> it was in the q & a period and it was a general question between a rating approach to a complex problem in afghanistan, versus more comprehensive counterinsurgency and he answered it honestly. it was not meant to lecture anybody or to influence policy, i don't believe. >> well -- >> we can disagree on that obviously bruce. >> the basic structural point is, because i entirely endorse your description of the appropriate role of the military. the question is whether the emerging structure, since 1986, actually did what is being proposed to do here and i do not believe that is so.

it is propelling the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff into a celebrity position. notice, as soon as bill clinton wins, the chairman's role -- appointment ends, eight, ten months after the term begins, bill clinton sees this, you know, he says, gee, i think for the -- i think we're going to appoint a new chairman of the joint chiefs who is not going to be a member of the joint chiefs. i'm going to go down to the lower command and take john schalle's -- i'm sorry, he seems like he's going to support my policies, he's a very confident fellow. he's a very first rate military guy. he was selected on political criteria. people notice these things. people notice these things. this is another step in the

politicization of military. another factoid and i'll stop. there's a colonization of military positions by military men. so the army, navy and air force, between 1947 and 1980, there were 41 people confirmed by the senate, none of them had served 15 years in the military. 15% had served five years. in the period since 1980 to the present, there have been -- don't take this number seriously, i think it is 23 though, and 25% -- i believe it was 25%, 23, 25%, 25% of them had served for 15 years in the military, and 40% have five years.

so i could give you have numbers in similar important things, for example, the head of the national security council today is a four star general. >> well -- >> i want to get general keane in on this. >> the politicization of the military, sounds scary. >> goldwater nichols, we don't want to go too far into it, but it was basically designed to grow officers so that they had more experience with their other services, and competencies with them and we call that joint. the ability to operate with other services as an army officer, and to operate in those commands with a degree of effectiveness and not be stove piped for your entire career, so that was basically it, but like anything, when you make some sweeping changes that impact culture and the rest of it, there are some mistakes made in that and there is something here that i do agree with bruce about. one of the things we did with the chairman of the joint chiefs is we, in a sense, politicized the position, because he is the

principal military adviser to the president of the united states, quote unquote. in the past, the joint chiefs were the adviser to the president of the united states. and there was problems with that system as well. you may be surprised to know that war is being prosecuted by operational commanders in the theater, one of them is mcchrystal in afghanistan, the other is odierno. they respond to a military command of bonnhoffer them in the name of general petraeus who responds to no four star in the military. he responds to the secretary of defense. so -- and that's appropriate. that's civilian control of the military. what you may know, may be surprised to know is the joint chiefs and the chairman have no operational oversight whatsoever of that theater. and i think we've gone too far to reno them. because for the reason that you

stated, they're concerned about their service primarily by statute, but there is no statute that gives them some operational accountability for what is being done in terms of the war. and the chiefs themselves, as a result of goldwater-nichols have even less influence outside their service, because the principal military adviser is the president. i think most of us will look at this to include congressional leaders, think that we at solutions. com point we've got to readjust this and bring this back into a more appropriate role for all of the joint chiefs and make the role of the chairman of the joint chiefs less of a political role, which by definition, it becomes today. >> so we're going to do one more question and then we're going to open it up for questions. we'll do two questions for the jennings temperature low, for every -- fellows, and two questions for the general

public. and let me turn in our final round to the media and the first amendment in this situation, both on the battlefield and back home. the new york times in 2005 and 2006 wrote a series of articles, which disclosed previously secret counterterrorism else pa, which included -- programs, which included surveillance programs that were coming into and out of the united states and some financial programs having to deal with banks in europe. these were top secret programs, that the bush administration believed were very, very effective in fighting this long war, and the "new york times," after listening to pleas from the highest levels of the bush administration published those stories, and we all learned about what is shorthandedly called the domestic surveillance program and the like. and the "new york times" went on

to win pulitzer prizes and all kinds of other things. is that a good thing? and on the battlefield, i've been embedded a few times in iraq and afghanistan. there's a big debate within journalism circles about the role of the reporter on the battlefield. do we have to rethink both the role of the media and even perhaps the first amendment when we're talking about this struggle or is that alarmist? general mcmaster, do you want to take a crack at that? >> if i could place the question in a broader context in terms of the transparency that exists, in any war that we're fighting. now i mentioned a negative sort of consequence of that, which was compromising techniques that we were using to fight our enemies in war rather than talk about that specifically, i'd rather talk about, which may not be appropriate for me to do in uniform anyway, but i'd rather talk more broadly about transparency in general being very good and i think that it's

really important for us to give access to the media for all our operations. in fact, you know, i never complained, i would never complain, and i don't think many soldiers anywhere would complain about baez in the media. what you may hear is that the wars in iraq and afghanistan are underreported. you know, there's so much that happens, that the american public doesn't see. so of course, you're going to see a lot of the negative things, obviously the breakdowns in discipline. what you don't see is every day soldiers are taking additional risks to protect civilians. what you don't see every day is the relationships we're building with populations who are so grateful to have this pall of fear and intimidation lifted off of them after life comes back to them, after the brutal murders, enemies are defeated. that's the story that we want to get out. of course, our enemy is very effective aft propaganda and dsm-ii information. the best way to counter that is through media transparency, i think. through our u.s. media and international media, so i'm all

for more reporters, more transparency. there's a downside to it obviously. there could be breaches of security, but it's always been my experience with every journalist who i've had the privilege to work with or to host temporarily in iraq , that's not really not much of a risk. >> that's been my experience doing it as well. although, as i say, there are questions in the media community about are you compromising your independence by being embedded? high always found -- i've always found while it is the ancient route of every soldier to -- right of every soldier to gripe, that no one holds back. there's no secretary of defense sitting around out there. but the general and the specific. the sense, the transparency is part of our armament and also the more specific sense, that there are thing we do and must do in this war that maybe should or should not change the dynamic

between government and the media. >> well, in my own view, certainly having the media on the battlefield with our troops is a huge plus for the american people. they have every right to seek even through that narrow prism what is truly happening, according to those youngsters, on the battlefield for america's values and they have the right to see that, touch it, as much as it's humanly possible and the only way you really can could that is through -- do that is through the media, so thank god we have journalists that want to accept that risk, first of all and you know as well as i that a number of them have given up their lives and taken that risk and others have been seriously maimed, just like our soldiers have been, so thank god for all of that. most of us who have become leaders in the military, welcome the media, want them actually embedded in the organizations, so they're not just parachuting in and getting out.

they get to understand their human dynamics of what is taking place, maybe get to understand the people a little better, and i think most of the journalists who have experienced this, as they are, capable of doing that, without baezing or prejudicing the situation. i don't think that is really the issue. because i think that is done better than any country on the planet. in terms of relationships of our journalists, and the soldiers who are fighting, and rarely, if ever, is a journalist out there going to put anything in print or say anything in a broadcast interview that would put those soldiers at risk. i mean, i cannot think of a single incident myself, but i'm sure that given human events, it's probably so. geraldo riverra drew in the sand.

>> he got kicked out of iraq but he's been invited back. >> based on his reporting, if i were the enemy, i'm not sure -- wait a minute. that's a joke. >> my own belief is, of course, these embedded people are fine. the information that they can provide to the american people is extremely modest. one of the great failures of american journalism is that they're not good at languages. so -- and the -- both in iraq and in afghanistan especially, afghanistan at the present time, that they can't get around. can't get around. so those are the more -- i mean, so if one wanted, you know, if one wanted to say, well, you know, do -- does the thoughtful or not so thoughtful reader of american press actually have a sense of what's going on in afghanistan politics? i don't think the answer is yes.

the -- but the other feature i want -- and of course, i mean, i'm all for the embedded journalism, but there's only so much that you can learn from a particular perspective in a particular place on the field, and it's good drama, good television, but i don't really think it's key. what is key, for example, is the remarkable fact, i still am really amazed by this, we are presently fighting in iraq under a -- something called a status of forces agreement negotiated by the bush administration, with the maliki administration. while it was being negotiated, it was kept secret from congress. entirely secret from congress. the reason -- i was in basra, and indeed there were two senators, clinton and obama at the time, one of the reasons we

found out what the -- what the negotiations, you know, as they were evolving, this agreement, which commits american troops for three years was never approved by the congress of the united states. i should emphasize. it was -- we found out about what the evolving negotiations were because the maliki government leaked arabic versions of the text to the arabic-speaking media and the french service committee, and the christian science monitor translated the arabic text in a horrendous way. more power to them. it was hard for me to understand the text. into english and i give this to hillary clinton and president obama.

and it was only after the agreement was signed by both the ambassador for the united states if iraq and maliki that it was officially published to the congress of the united states. now, this is incredible. >> the role of congress is -- >> just to publish the thing. >> we tan to go to questions very quickly, general mcmaster and general keane. >> i just have one quick comment. i think you underestimate the degree to which you get access when you embed u.s. troops. we're in amongst -- we're working with iraqi leaders, iraqi police, iraqi -- you need it get there with security obviously, because our enemies are operating in and among the population an are targeting journalist. the most dangerous course of action would be not to embed journalists and to rely on stringers, because the stringers who are in those communities oftentimes are in influenced by

our enemies, and i think can almost read some stories in some print media and i know exactly that the stringer is planting that propaganda from the enemy in american papers. now depends i guess on thette tore's familiarity with the situation, to be able to weed that out, but we have to remember that the enemy is really operating very strongly on this battleground of disinformation and it is in our interest to give the maximum sort of access to the media. we don't lie, the enemy lies, the best way to expose those lies is to give access. >> well, i just want to comment, i happened to be in iraq during the time when our negotiating team was doing some of this with the iraqis on the status of forces agreement. those negotiations were kept secret for obvious reasons, because they were negotiations. and there was no intent to keep that from the american people, we had positions ourselves, iraqis had positions, if we exposed those positions, and

what the disagreements were with the iraqis, that would break down what we believed was a relationship that was a political relationship, that was being forged, to come to a common agreement. and get two leaders to agree to it. if you're going to open that up, that would, i think, risk the ability to have common agreement. >> maliki leaked it, he's a politician, he's running for office and he was taking a very strong stand about how finite american troops should be in iraq and he wanted to get -- the disempowerment of congress. here we go. >> senator clinton couldn't get it. the wasn't the american people. >> we'll start right here with a question. please, if you would just state your name and fire away. >> ok. professor ackerman, i was taken by your proposal of creating new structures. and also, the fact that you are basically saying that words create reality. that language creates reality,

and therefore, instead of calling it are war, we should call it more -- start naming it a state of emergency when there are attacks here. i'm wondering, did you fully talk, explicate what you were talking about in terms of new structures, is that one example, do you have several ideas,? and i'm also wondering what the generals think about that, and part two, part of this, in parentheses, what do you call what's going on in afghanistan and in iraq ? are they wars, have we declared war, what should we call those? >> well -- >> conflict? >> all of law is words. i have a booked called "before the next attack," which tries to talk about how we should think in terms of these temporary emergencies, that during these terrible incidents in our future, we should engage in

extraordinary measures, and that the challenge is to bring these measures to hand end. -- to an end and go back to normal. now we might also want to redefine the norm ham, but the -- normal, so the fundamental structure is that. another -- i have quite a few such things and i don't want to -- but i definitely do believe that the john you memo kind of thing is a structural failure and that we should redesign the way the executive interprets the constitution. >> but there's a strategic question in that answer and let me ask our military. could you fight this war? could we win this war? could we succeed? if we approached it as a state of emergency, when there's been an attack, and we have the president is granted extraordinary powers an we try

to return to some kind of new normal, or is it a campaign, sustained campaign? >> bruce, would you answer the second part of our question for her, because she asked you about afghanistan and iraq and how would you describe those? >> yes. well, i think we won the wars, in afghanistan and iraq and that is to say, mullah omar is no longer the head -- and we won them very dramatically and effectively, and now what we are are in alliance with a very rickettey states, more rictety in afghanistan than at present in iraq and we are fighting in afghanistan for sure, on the -- in a civil war. in a civil war. and that it's very important from my perspective, although these labels aren't too useful

to distinguish between al qaeda, which is a risk, which does have a risk to our national security, and the taliban, which is an active participant in a civil war that is of problematic concern to the homeland in my view. >> there's your answer. did you want to comment, go ahead. >> highly comment on the discussion -- i'll comment on the discussion. we deposed two regimes, iraq and afghanistan, for our national objectives. we don't want to refight why that was. i think we all know the reasons, but those regimes were deposed. saddam hussein, you know, in iraq , and the taliban regime in afghanistan for different reasons. in both cases, elements in those societies chose to rogaine power. -- to regain power.

saddam hussein and his thugs, former regime element, organized a major movement to do that and they were aided and abetted by the al qaeda, which was a foreign intervention force. the taliban in iraq , not a homogeneous group -- i mean in afghanistan, not a homogeneous group to be sure and h.r. mentioned some of the variances of it, initially aided by al qaeda but not now. we as military practitioners look at that as an insurgency trying to regain power, address the grievances of that government in power, and use armed violence to achieve that. what we are doing as a counterinsurgency and by definition, it's a war. what i have trouble with bruce is, i think he's saying to us, the al qaeda who is a transnational organization, not whetted to a -- wedded to a particular country, when we're fighting them in iraq as an intervention force, it's a war.

when we're fighting them in afghanistan, it's a war. but when they kill 3,000 americans here and go back someplace, and they -- and they're difficult to get a hold of and they're moving from one country to another, the congress of the united states has authorized the president to kill or capture them wherever they may be. because of what they have done to us and what they could do to us. that gives him special powers to do that. we believe that is -- we're fighting a war against that enemy, even though at times, it was in iraq, at times it was in afghanistan. some of it is if pakistan. some of it is in other places. we do believe that meets the definition. >> ok. we're going to go to another question here. >> first off i want to thank the panel for speaking to us tonight and this question is for all three panelists. general mcmaster, you

mentioned a necessity to set your objectives ahead of time and presumably that imperative applies to war or states of emergencies, or whatever conflict and however you described us. >> we in the military, we're going to go -- no matter what you call it, we're going. so go ahead. >> so i'm interested to know, what are the objectives of this conflict, and how the three of you would define those, and how we achieve them to end the war? >> that's a great question. >> it's a really important, important question, right, because war is waged to achieve policy goals and objectives. i think there is a tendency to sometimes to equate war to just military operations. and this was one of the probable else going into afghanistan and iraq , i think, is that in the 1990's, it became very popular to think in terms of this revolution in military affairs, if you heard that term, and this

has sort of led over into the orthodoxy of defense trance for passion and the idea was because of america's technological capabilities, and significant advantages, and especially in areas of surveillance, technical intelligence and precision-guided munitions technologies, that we could wage future wars cheaply, quickly, low cost, mainly at stand ofoff range and tears a republic dued war to kind of a targeting exercise. but what it did is it depoliticized war. it considered war outside of the political goals and objectives you have to achieve in war and it also dehumanized war. and neglected the enduring psychological, cultural dimensions of conflict. and so that misunderstanding, i think, really helps explain the lack of planning in certain areas, integrated civil military planning for those wars, so if you say, war is ways to achieve policy goals and objectives, what are policy goals and objectives in afghanistan and iraq ? they're very clear. i mean, they've been articulated

very clearly by our civilian leadership. the key is if you want to have an iraq that is secure, where you have sustainable security and stability in a country that doesn't prey on it's of self, is not a threat to its neighbors, it doesn't develop weapons of mass destruction and so forth, and you know, we are interested in what happens of after the fall of the saddam hussein regime, right? we went to war with that country in 1991. we spent 13 years containing that country. we went to war to unseat the government if 2003. we ought to care what happens next, ok? so the continuation of the war is to achieve a political outcome, and the kind of stability there consistent with our trillions, ok? there and in the region. and we ought to be straight up about that. same thing in afghanistan, now in afghanistan, the problem began because, as general keane said, a safe haven and support base for those who committed mass murder against our citizens on september 11 and citizens of other nations. now, what -- the reason the gin effort there is still connected to that is because it enemy

seeks this safe haven and support basement we know from the federal administered tribal areas and northwest frontier provinces in pakistan and areas like yemen as well, the enemies has used those safe haven support bases to plan attacks against our country, so the effort to help afghanistan stabilize, to provide security for its own population, to develop a monopoly on the use of force within that country, to establish local governance and address the needs of the population to meet their basic expectations, which are by the way very basic in afghanistan and have mainly to do with security, that is still all connected with denying this enemy this safe haven and support base and it would be the same -- i mean, this dynamic that i think existed in afghanistan prior, if this neoholistic enemy, organization were to gain control and we have to remember, this is