administration, which i was not, i would not have advised it to try to reconciliation. that's too technical for us to talk about here, but i think it guaranteed that you would have partisan confrontation for the foreseeable future on this issue. and that's too bad. i am for health care reform. i am really for universal health coverage. i haven't figured out how you pay for it, but i am for it. and there is a way, but we have so far, we have made it so controversial that i think it's unlikely that it's going to happen in this final analysis soon. . .

and they orient each congressional district to suit the particular members of congress so they could get re-elected. so the number of congress members who are now subject to possible nonre-election dwindles with every passing census. so now there's is cynic for arch-republicans in some arch-conservatives in some districts. and arch-liberals in other districts. and the moderates in between

have been removed from the congress. so i think that's the downside of gerrymandering. but i don't know exactly -- i don't know that it would be unconstitutional to have the state legislatures who make this decision by the way. ordain that judges or nonpartisan blue ribbon panel could orient the districts. it's not going to happen. but i don't think it's unconstitutional. >> how do we rebuild collegiately. do the republicans and democrats need to go out to dinner often? it seems more like those bonds that sort of cross party lines don't seem from the outside to be as strong. is there some way to do that? >> i saw the other day or night on -- i think jim lehrer show, the former senator from minnesota, he's in the senate often now visiting. he said democratic and

republican senators never sit at the same table anymore in the senate dining room. i don't know. i've never been a member of the senate. >> well, they do. they do if they want to. >> well, i understand that. [laughter] >> but the point is well-taken. it really is. collegiately is virtually nonexistent in the senate. when i came to the senate. it was the rule. it really was. it's too bad that it has disappeared because it is the lubricant that makes things work. i don't know how you restore it. i do not know how that happens. but it needs to happen. i remember -- can i tell one story. it's a little off-color but not much. [laughter] >> my father-in-law was everett dirksen who in my view who was a great senator. lyndon johnson had been the

majority leader but he was minority leader and they got to be very close. but when the president -- when president johnson was elected president, dirksen was leader, republican leader. and they continued their friendship. in one day -- this is terrible. i shouldn't tell it. one day i was waiting in his office to catch a plane back to nashville. lee goldman and his secretary came in. >> we're going to leave the remainder of this recorded event and take you live now to state department coordinator of counterterrorism daniel benjamin. he's going to be speaking at the woodrow wilson center in washington. it's just getting underway. live coverage on c-span2. >> within the wilson center. today's meeting is cosponsored by the international security studies program and by our middle east program. the coseries of georgetown professor bruce hoffman sends regrets. he's unfortunately enable to be with us today.

i'd like to extend a particular welcome to those who is viewing's today meeting on c-span. i welcome those who are attending in person. as is usual, the usual format after this meeting is over, in one hour, we will adjourn to a reception in an adjacent room. today's topic could not be more topical. counterterrorism in the obama administration. tactics and strategy. and our speaker could not be more authoritative. it's ambassador daniel benjamin. he's the state department's coordinator for counterterrorism. it's a position he's held since may of last year. prior to his appointment as the state department's counterterrorism coordinator, dan benjamin served as a senior fellow and a research director both at the brookings institution and the center for strategic and international studies.

prior to that, during the clinton administration, he was a foreign policy speechwriter for several years. and then went on to become a director in the office of transnational threats. on the national security council staff. prior to entering government service in the 1990s, he had been a foreign correspondent for "time" magazine and the "wall street journal." after leaving government during his think tank years, he cowrote two important books on terrorism. the age of sacred terror. and the other was the next attack: the failure on the war on terror and the strategy for getting it right. so it's a great pleasure to welcome ambassador daniel benjamin to the woodrow wilson center. i look forward to his remarks. [applause] >> well, good afternoon. and it is a real pleasure to be back at the woodrow wilson center.

and to see so many familiar faces. i want to thank my old friend rob and bruce for inviting me to speak today about the obama administration's counterterrorism strategy and policies. i have had the good fortune to appear at wilson on several occasions while i was out of government. i had a book launch here. i didn't get nearly as many people. i believe the last time i was here was when philip strum did an excellent event on muslims in the united states together with the chicago council. so i'm really very happy to be here. and to share my thoughts on how the administration is reshaping the way we combat terrorism in both the short and the long-term. and on the persistent challenges that we face. let me start by talking about the broad issues. and then i'll try to provide some perspective and some context for understanding the threat and the u.s. response.

in three critical areas. if i had spoken to this audience a year ago, just before taking office, my view based primarily on what i read in the newspaper and learned at events like this one would have been that the united states had developed very good skills, really great skills at what i call tactical counterterrorism. taking individual terrorists off the street, disrupting operations and dismantling cells. on the strategic side, however, i was concerned that we were losing ground in the campaign against international terrorism. and in particular, that we were failing effectively to counter al-qaeda's narrative. in my roughly 10 months in office, i have to say my view of our tactical capabilities in the areas of intelligence, military and law enforcement have been more than amply confirmed. and i have to say my colleagues working in these areas have developed abilities far beyond anything i could have imagined when i left government at the end of 1999 after serving on the

nsc staff. but my view that we had not yet raised our efforts to a truly strategic level was also confirmed. and that we had not yet really begun the hard work of devising policies that would stem the tide of recruits and undermine the appeal of al-qaeda's world view. now, i'm pleased to say that under president obama's leadership, i think we are addressing that vitally important shortcoming. we are now formulating policies that seek to shape and constrain the environment. in other words, when terrorists discover that their immediate surroundings are more hostile to them and that they have fewer havens, their ability to evade detection will diminish and their numbers will shrink. central to this approach is taking steps to undermine the appeal of al-qaeda's rationale for violence. obviously, part of this strategy involves building a genuinely global approach to a global threat.

the administration has been working hard to reinvigorate alliances and partnerships. and this is especially true in the arena of counterterrorism. through consistent diplomatic engagement we are seeking to boost the political will and strengthen the resolve of senior leaders around the world. that will is essential for our long-term capacity-building efforts with a long-range of partners. our success will hinge on strengthening the ability of others to deal with the threats in their countries and in their regions. we cannot be everywhere all the time. and we will be vastly better off and safe if others are concerned about the threat as we are. and for these reasons we've also reengaged in a host of different global and regional multilateral floor that are capacity-building whether the u.n. and elsewhere because these are all critical force multipliers. at the core of our actions is a recognition of the phenomenon of

radicalization. and the need to stop vulnerable or alienated people from becoming terrorists. in every country where violent extremism has taken root, we are asking ourselves two questions to guide our approach. first of all, are our actions going to result in the creation of more terrorists? and what can we do to shrink the pool of future recruits? for many years while i was outside of government, i argued that the united states had to make countering violent extremism a priority. and now in my position as coordinator for counterterrorism i have to say i'm challenged and a little more humbled by the responsibility of developing and coordinating the u.s. government's efforts to undercut the al-qaeda narrative to isolate extremists and prevent the next generation of terrorists from being recruited. as part of this effort we are looking to address what deputy national security advisor john brennan has called the upstream factors of radicalization. we are working to confront the political, social and economic

conditions that our enemies exploit to win over recruits, funders and those whose tacit support enables the militants to carry their forward their plans and where communities where violent extremism has made in-roads and providing positive alternatives we are working to marginalize the extremists. in addition the president, the frustrate and the rest of the foreign policy team understand well how headline political grievances are exploited by violent extremists. that's why the administration is giving so much attention to resolving conflicts like the arab-israeli one which create deep antipathies against the u.s. and can be exploited by violent extremists. it's also vital that we hue to our core ideals in this construing. president obama has said from the outset there should be no tradeoff between our security and our values. and indeed in light of what we

know about radicalization, it is clear that navigating by our values is an absolutely essential part of counterterrorism work. thus, we have moved to rectify the excesses of the past by working to close the prison at guantanamo. forbidding torture and developing a more systemic method of dealing with detainees. now, let's turn to the geographical areas i mentioned earlier. i believe we are moving in the right direction in the central theater of afghanistan and pakistan. i've been in both countries in the last six weeks including spending the week before last in pakistan meeting with law enforcement diplomatic and intelligence officials. we're seeing growing resolve and we should never forget that by far the largest number of al-qaeda captures in the world have occurred in pakistan with the direct assistance of the pakistani authorities. the u.s. government has seen a number of very encouraging signs over the past year that pakistan not only recognizes the severity of the threat from violent extremists but is actively

working to counter and constrain it. pakistani military in the tribal areas and the northwest frontier province have eliminated militant strongholds and crippled the operational abilities of extremist groups. moreover we are seeing cross-border cooperation between afghanistan -- with afghanistan and the isaf forces in the reduction of key militant safe havens. in the wake of the military operation and swat we have seen public opinion turn more decisively against the militants. and now as a result al-qaeda and its allies have found it tougher to raise money, train recruits and plan attacks outside of the region. more broadly we are working with pakistan to establish the kind of relationship based on trust and mutual interests that will lead to the defeat of violent extremism in that country. which has claimed such an enormously large number of lives over just the past year. we understand well the trust

deficit that built up over decades between the united states and pakistan. and which helped create the current situation. we know that these challenges will not be overcome overnight. but we think we're on the right track. just last week pakistan and the united states took another step in building a strong and durable partnership by holding a strategic dialog in washington. the first at the ministerial level. the discussions generated new momentum and mutual trust to jointly tackle the extremist groups who threaten pakistan's security and our own. in recent weeks we've seen tangible evidence of pakistan's efforts to clamp down on extremist networks operating within its borders. and as you all know several top afghan taliban leaders including mullah berader have been apprehended and we are grateful to the pakistani authorities for their actions. now, we understand that to keep the progress coming, the united

states has to do more than just help pakistan defeat extreme jays militarily. we need to help in the economic development in hose historically neglected areas that have really been safe havens for extremists and we need to strengthen pakistan's ability to govern effectively. the u.s. government has allocated many millions of dollars into the projects that address the social economic and political factors that push individuals into the arms of violent extreme jay groups. and as you know pakistan is now one of top recipients of u.s. assistance. we know that despite setbacks in pakistan, al-qaeda has proven time and again to be an adaptable and resilient adversary. the organizations desire to attack the united states and our interests abroad is even stronger. and even though it is the greatest pressure it has experienced since being evicted from afghanistan in 2001/2002,

the group continues to try to inspire attacks. no one should presume that we are out of the woods. far from it. let me also bring up one important addendum here. al-qaeda is not the only group with global ambitions that we have to worry about operating in south and central asia nor is it our only focus. it's made clear that it is willing to undertake bold mass casualties operations with a target set that would please al-qaeda planners. the group's more recent thwarted conspiracy to attack the u.s. embassy in dacca should only deepen concern. it could evolve into a genuinely global threat and one that seeks to replace al-qaeda or compete with it. very view things worry me as much as the strength and the ambition of l.e.t. which is a truly maligned presence in southeast asia. we are working closely with allies in the region and elsewhere to reduce the threat from this very dangerous group

and i'm pleased to say there's growing cooperation in the region to thwart l.e.t. especially between such critical and not always easy partners as india and bangladesh. let's now move to the southwest. in terms of public perception of the swifting geographical orientation no place has received more attention than yemen. the failed christmas day bombing was a stark reminder that governed or under-governed spaces can serve as an incubator for extremism. furthermore, that conspiracy demonstrated that at least one al-qaeda affiliate and not just the group's core leadership in pakistan has developed the capacity and the desire to carry out strikes against the united states' homeland. we should expect others to follow. we can no longer count on them to be focused exclusively on the near-enemy, the governments of their own countries. having said that, we should also have some perspective. contrary to some recent and very

overblown media accounts of media accounts in yemen, the country did not turn into a al-qaeda haven in yemen overnight. it was the first front since the december 1992 al-qaeda attempt to bomb u.s. troops in a hotel in aiden was probably the first genuine attack by the organization. those troops as you may recall were en route to somalia to support the u.n. mission there almost 8 years before the uss cole attack. al-qaeda has always had a foothold in yemen and it has always been a major concern for the united states. what i can say definitely is that the obama administration has been focused on yemen since day one. we've worked very closely and much more effectively with the yemeni authorities over the last several months and we're making genuine progress. we've engaged consistently and intensively with our yemeni counterparts to help build political will for our counterterrorism objectives. many of the administration's senior civilian and military officials including deputy national security advisor

brennan, assistant secretary of state jeff feltman, general david petraeus and myself have visited yemen in recent months to discuss how we can jointly confront the threat of al-qaeda. and the result of this kind of engagement has been the most forceful actions and aggressive response that we have seen to aquap in many years. those actions it's important to emphasize began the december 25th plot and have continued ever since. we recognize that al-qaeda has taken advantage of insecurity in various regions of yemen, which has been worsened by internal conflicts. we also know that yemen is grappling with serious poverty. it's the poorest country in the arab world. the lack of resources inhibits good governance, deliverance of services and effectiveness of security services to deal with terrorism. so to have any chance of success the united states' policy must be conceived in a strategic term -- in strategic terms and timelines.

that's why the administration has adopted a two-pronged strategy for yemen. helping the government confront the immediate security concern of al-qaeda and mid investigating the very serious political economic and governance issues that the country faces over the long term. not only are we working to constrict the space in which al-qaeda can operate in yemen by building up the country's capacity to deal with the security threats within its borders, we're also working to develop government capacity to deliver basic services and economic growth. the departments of state and defense are providing training and assistance to yemen's counterterrorism forces. and our aid programs are working to address the underlying conditions that make yemenis vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment. in this manner we're helping the yemeni government build more reliable and credible institutions and to create a more predictable future for its people. obviously, for those of you who know yemen, this will not be an easy task. it's a long-term undertaking but a critical one.

and if we do our job over time we will help reduce the appeal of extremism and weaken the attraction of the al-qaeda narrative. now, let me turn to another priority region for our counterterrorism efforts. to a certain extent which is a good news story. al-qaeda and the islamic magram has failed to meet the objectiv objectives. the group has been unable to conduct major sophisticated attacks since the summer of 2008. this is due in large measure to pressure from algerian forces. furthermore, aqim is in chronic financial trouble particularly in algeria and unable to reach

hits recruiting goals. and whether it would establish itself in europe and carry out attacks there. this is a possibility that we always need to be on guard about. but that said we viewed the near term likelihood of expansion of operations is less likely than just a few years ago. this is in large measure to the -- due to the pressure that the group has been under in algeria and the strong counterterrorism efforts by france. in the saw hill, however, the picture is different. aqim maintains two separate groups of fighters in northern mali and it has recently increased attacks and kidnappings including against western targets. in the last two years, aqim and the saw hill stepped up the pace kidnapping austrian tourists, canadian diplomats in niger. a british hostage was murdered by aqium and as it turns to kidnapping for ransom to raise

funds we are urging our partners around the world to adopt a no concessions policy towards hostage takers so we can diminish this alternative and absolutely critical funding stream. the countries in the saw hill remain determined in their opposition to aqim despite the capacity. and we have the trans-sahara counterterrorism partnership. this is a multiagency effort to help our partners in the region build the capacity they need to defeat terrorist organizations and facilitation networks. we're also working closely with other key international partners to ensure that their efforts in the region are well targeted, well coordinated, and effective. our quiet but solid support for their counterterrorism efforts has emboldened our partners in the region to stand up to extremism. we know an effective counterterrorism strategy has to go beyond efforts to stop the harm it the u.s. and its citizens and its allies and its

interest. as president obama put it, a campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. we've looked now at key regions. i'd like to turn back to some key principles. to combat terrorism successfully we have to isolate extremists from the people they pretend to serve. often they do this themselves. the indiscrimanting target has alienated populations and for support of the group's political program. it's outraged clerics and former allies who in many cases who have spoken publicly against terrorism. of course, we can't count on al-qaeda to put itself out of business. so we're focusing our efforts on undermining the group's narrative and preventing the radicalization of vulnerable or alienated individuals. in the government we call these efforts countering violent extremism. and one of the first things i did in taking office was create a unit in our bureau to identify

drivers of extremism and develop programs to counteract them. we're hard at working developing a better understanding of the dynamics of communities in which extremism has taken root. every one of these at-risk communities possesses unique political, economic and social factors that help contribute to the radicalization process. and for this reason we know that a one size fits all program has limited appeal. instead, programs need to be tailored to fit the characteristics of the audience. and for that reason we're employing microstrategies customized for specific communities and even neighborhoods so that they have a better chance of succeeding. we're realistic about what the u.s. government can achieve on its own in this realm. and in marginalizing of proponents of violent extremism at the local level. while the united states is sometimes going to take the lead, often it's a better place to play a supporting role or none at automatic. -- at all. it ensures that no country can successfully combat al-qaeda on its own.

so partnering with others especially at the local level is critical. these officials are likely with partnering with foreign government officials is likely to have an understanding of radicals in their area and who is best placed to counter it. letting partner nations lead is often your to our long-term success. we also know that credible local voices have to take the lead in their own communities. they're the ones best placed to convey counter narratives capable of discrediting violent extremism. the u.s. government is working to identify reliable partners and amplify legitimate voices. the u.s. can help empower these local actors through programmic efforts or by simply providing them with space, physical or electronic to challenge extremist views. nontraditional actors such as ngos, foundations, public/private partnerships, private businesses are some of the most cable and credible

partners in local communities. the u.s. government and partner nations are also seeking to develop greater understanding of the linkages between diaspora communities and ancestral homelands. through family and business networks, events that affect one community often have an impact on the other. so with the aid of these credible messengers the united states is trying to make the use of terrorist violence taboo and to trump the radical narrative and we hope to offer something more hopeful. president obama's effort to create partnerships with muslim communities on the basis of mutual interest and mutual respect as he discussed in his speeches in ancara and cairo presents an opportunity to promote a more positive story than the negative one of al-qaeda. while clearly we have not figured it all out and as the december 25th airline plot made clear, significant gaps remain and we are likely to have setbacks in the future. the contemporary terrorist threat was not made overnight.

nor will it disappear overnight. we still have a lot to learn and there are a myriad areas we can improve. but i think we've come a long way over the last 15 months. we're making significant progress on the big picture strategic issues especially when it comes to cve countering violent extremism. and i'm pleased to say that within the senior political leadership, there's a broad shared understanding of the vital need to get this right. in closing, let me also say that we have more and more to work with. and this is a source of great hope, it seems to me. we see an ever greater desire on the part of ordinary people around the world to be rid of radicals who undermine everything that these individuals seek to achieve. i saw that clearly in pakistan two weeks ago where i met not only with officials but with an alliance of clerics whose followers number in the tens of thousands who are looking for support as they try to make their ag