one was supposed to be because of something happening india. another at something to do with another part of the world. we couldn't risk damage. the reason why the intelligence upon which jtac base that assessment. so i would have liked to hold it here actually and in doing that, i do realize that for the public being told to be more alert, kind of means very little to them. but i think we got as far as we need to go. the public are aware that of what the security level is, i think if you go any further than that, you are seriously actually putting the public at more risk by damaging the intelligence of the assessment. >> thank you. the problem of course with that is you're going to get nothing back from the public. i just feel that there could be a little more openness with a

consequent reward for the public. and i think they often the public is better in dealing with confidential material that is given credit for. >> i don't think know, this is a kind of thing i can think up, people said you're asking the public to be more because when out on a higher level of authority. is there a number, is there something that they can do if they see something on a train that is less bureaucratic and less time-consuming than chasing after a train guard that probably is difficult to understand what he or she should do next. and alan and i have been thinking about that kind of aspect. and i think you're right there. i've made the point. if you go further than that, i am with you on making it mean something more realistic to the public.

i would really, really counsel anybody against thinking that we should give more information about why we reach that decision, which was the major debate that was going on at the time. and one of which i think would be very dangerous. >> as i said earlier, we made a huge advance in the sense that contest was not classified document. that was a real, we had to wrestle with that. the agencies worked really hard to try to enter, they could get stuff down to effectively unclassified. it was really nip and tuck to do it. we made a point of doing that. in the same way the national risk register. we really try. i take your point. we really tried to do this, to get this out. home secretary i think is right on the other point. the other thing with the change and the threat alert status, and though the apparent threat are a whole tapestry of other others, all of which slightly changed for certain public buildings, for certain areas, all of that

all changes which is all unseen, of course. so that's the of aspect. >> thank you. smack following on what lord fellowes has said, you can give out confidential information, i think both you and home secretary and lord west accept the current situation is not absolutely perfect. because the public will be worried when the threat is raise. and they don't know what more is expected of them. i welcome the fact that you are both looking at this to see how you can reassure the public. that's very helpful. can i just ask on, in terms of the national security strategy, and impact on individual departments, the strategy expects more of departments than in the past. is there now and appreciation amongst the various departments that they are all expected to do something more as a result of the nss? >> i mean, i think the answer is yes.

we have national security secretary now firmly embedded in the cabinet office which has the ability to to reach out. and i think the answer there is yet. one of the things i have to say that i found, i found very reassuring in the two and a half years or so that i've been in government after prime minister asked me to come in was the way the oic to come within the home office has coordinated counterterrorism across all government departments are because i have to say my expense of some 20 odd years and home where i've been at sea is trying to make big government department work together is not always been the most successful thing that i have ever seen. and i think it is work really well. i think now we are tearing this across into the national security strategy. and end of the secretary have worked very hard and trying to make these connections. had we really totally got there yet? the answer is no. we have to keep working on it all the time. i can see it in the cybersecurity area where still we are having to make sure that departments are pulling

together. we need to keep working at it. my goodness me it's a real step change and i believe the national security strategy has actually help the. >> to we have some figures as to how much is being spent by each department on national security? we know the home office figures because you're given into his you for. >> i have got some budget. i give a caveat on the. these are in my brief, but -- [laughter] >> i am always very wary when i use these sort of things. i think we have got to the security intelligence agencies, i have to .2 billion altogether home office, 1.3 billion. the ministry of defense of course there budget is 34 billion and, of course, part of that are involved in nationbuilding, failed state, all of this work as well as all of the other aspects as well. 2.1 billion roughly.

dfid about 122 million. so if you at all a together this quite a lot of money involved really. this represent a substantial increase, does it, over the last 10 years? >> is. the figure you will recognize is the 1 billion spent on counterterrorism since back in time of 9/11 which is now 3.5 billion. depends on how you break these figures out is why i'm always very wary of actually coding them. but the bottom right is with spent a lot more. we doubled the size of the security service. >> thank you. >> just to prove the figures are not entirely unreliable that's a total budget that which is referred to. rather than the specific sick but if i might just make a point that in relation to that, which is there are so many areas of the foreign offices engaged in a have a direct implication in relation to this, whether that is engaged in afghanistan which would be obvious to everybody, or for that matter as we are at

the moment negotiating with in your opinion on the free trade agreement with the indian countries where we've insisted on a wmd clause, not because we think that columbia and peru are developing weapons of mass instruction, but because of want to be the consistent every other and agreement that maybe and any other part of the world that there is a similar wmd clause. >> thank you. >> don't take that off my budget. [laughter] >> i think a stronger reinforces your point. >> disagreement once we're on money, isn't there? i want to follow his question about cooperation between department, and ask about the cooperation with the involved administration, particularly in scotland where there's a difference of emphasis, perhaps even stronger than that in relation to nuclear power, the

independent, membership of nato, how is cooperation been with the involved administration, particularly scotland? >> as far as i'm aware it is been good, in certain the gnashes agree secretariat, and the partners involved in various aspects to link out to the administration. there are certain things that are kept at whitehall, of course, but we still talk about with those administration. >> i get the impression the close cooperation with the police in scotland and operational agency, but not necessarily with the government as they call themselves, scottish executive. and you sound almost, lord west, as if you're not really fully aware, but you may be, that you've got a piece of paper. [laughter] >> from the lady behind you. as to whether or not there is the kind of cooperation that you and your colleagues would consider desirable or if there

is something more that needs to be done on that. >> id legislative progress i've been given says what i said. [laughter] >> so that's really nice when that happens. it reassures one. i think the only little bit note i didn't touch on was a simple emergency aspect and we work very closely on that in the area and that is, this is the civil contingencies secretary and those particulars were very close to there. but yes, we do link with the on these issues. >> i want to come back to money here, but because i'm not clear at the moment, for instance, in the ministry of defense, how you spent money differently, or use people differently from the armed forces and other people. how have you used in different as a result of the existence of the strategy than what was going to happen in any case be?

overwhelmingly the difference of ministry of defense, and this is something that is being not only seen, but required over the years. and that is the strengthening of the coordinating kick butt of the cabinet office. and whether or not your talk about afghanistan, where largely that is the three departments of government that need to work as completely in that together in order to get development capability, foreign office policy, and defense capabilities married as they can be in order to be as effective as they can be. or whether it is then include the home office in making, as i mentioned, our operations in afghanistan are not left behind. there will be people in defense that there is a need for that to be completely joined up. now i think the gnashes agree strategy, the apparatus, the committee, the committee that we call the international security

committee that brings all of the departments together as appropriate, is vital to how defense task does its business. the armed forces knew that they cannot be successful in operations unless there is, you know, politics and development, you know, operating within. and less that is linked back to the reasons why many of those operations exist in the first place, and that is to protect our national interest and national security, and that is understood at home. and we will be able to maintain the support for the kind of things that we do in the first place. so strengthening that, central, coordinating capability i think is something that is hugely welcomed in the department and in the armed forces themselves. >> i can see you are confused. messy as are course agreement has not been changed by the gnashes agree strategy but as a secretary of state says the

coordination is much better. in terms of money shares, movements of money actually there's only a little tiny bits of money being shifted. for example, this morning i announced defense, secretary of state now to be put into the maritime quarters at northwood, which meant of course we got this for something like 380,000 pounds at would have to build something that would cost millions and millions. so it's been that sort of thing because of the coordination has talked about. it is not because transeventy until there is a new scr than that will make that sort of change. >> yes. i'm sure we are all welcoming the addition of coordination all joined up approach. as you describe, but i think it's an issue that not any large sums of money have been expended differently from how they would have been otherwise. only very much a margin.

quite a few people in the cabinet, largest lapse of money, people doing different things that i'm not sure that would be true for the foreign office respected that and maybe we have decided suddenly to take people off doing job ads and put them onto job why. but we certainly breathe prioritize a lot of what we do. so for instance, in which he security and climate change are two of our key policies that we want to pursue with our neighbors that informs our policy in relation to turkey, to energy security but also in terms of relationship counter narcotics all in relation to burden sharing with other countries around the world, not just in terms of military operations but in terms of the father assistants and a whole range of other policing outcomes that we want to see. >> mr. brown? >> just following up on this point, given my experience in

the m.o.d. if i may just make an observation, and my time in the m.o.d., the existence of a strategic approach to national security, we went from the test of the government's contribution being how quickly you could deploy our armed services and to come into a situation where the need to deploy our armed services was a test of the governments failure. and to respond to a simple emergency, and that was a focus of the ability of civil capacity to respond in a strategic sense, rather than resorting around services. back to the point, sir malcolm rifkin made earlier, what was the significant changes that less strategic approach about the use of armed services and rather than stretching further it is concentrating on where the capabilities lie, but the question i want to ask is, how

is this reflected in the review just concluded of the use of reserve forces, how is it reflected in preparation for the strategic defense review and the building of the proposed in future? does it mean effectively that we are able to preserve our armed services for the source of violence that they are uniquely trained to deploy? >> the point of that's just been made is a trend that is happen over a long parade of time and was having before the national security strategy, and continues. and that is that defense has seen defense capability, armed forces capability is seen as being something that is not dramatically called upon in any given circumstance. i what we've seen over a long period of time is various

organizations, most particularly the police, developing their own capabilities so that defense is not as frequent as it was. this isn't a job of the defense as particularly wanting to do in some areas. and so as wanting to see people grow their own capability and has to be effectively held in reserve. but what arises from that is the need for a very clear understanding and what we and defense can and cannot do. it's no good people find the capability be leaving that in any given circumstance of the army, the navy or the air force will be there instantaneously in force on such and such a bit of time without knowing what exactly what will be provided and what timescales, what duration. and, therefore, what capability they need to develop themselves your now, when you ask how that plays into the strategic defense

review is a specific question that we have race in the green paper. because we are not sure whether that has gone too far, or far enough. and whether defense or to be still considered to be, you know, a larger part of the landscape back your for resilience in the united kingdom. so it is a question that has been flagged up. have we taken that question far enough or have we taken it too far? you know, is defense effectively not considered, you know, any circumstances to the extent that it should be? this is something that should be examined as part of the strategic defense review. >> and we have gone a lot further in terms of resolving some of the problems that were in our critical infrastructure resilience. and some documents produced today show how we are tackling,

how we are talking all of those areas. and i think the police and emergency services and all the various departments involved are far better place now than they were in that area. as the secretary says it is an issue that needs to be addressed. and the french white paper, which was produced in 2008, after our first strategy, and i, dollar, the man who wrote that, they went a lot further down track in terms of tying the army to the department in france. my own personal view is i don't think that is absolutely the right way of doing this but have their own reasons for doing it. this is an issue we need to think about. and on a specific tiny one, let's say something like the moon by typing, do we actually want to look at mystery that is an issue that has to be addressed. so these two have to be addressed. >> lady ramzi?

>> i wanted to ask follows on farewell with what was just been discussed. do you really think that the existing arrangements for the strategic overview of national security strategy are adequate? i mean, i know we are very waited in this country to the idea of late departments, and this is the philosophy of how it hopes to work. but there's also an argument i think can be made, and do you feel this has been strengthened by your experience over the last two, three years for one specific point of a cabinet department, if you like, on security? now, it always seems the way we think about things, for example, with the small contingency bill was going through parliament, it was quite clear everyone was passionate to avoid looking as if we were clogging of homeland security department. but in doing that if we don't

perhaps landed too far away from that, and isn't there a case and what do you think of it, of having everything centered? i know, we know there's a national security secretary at number 10 but it's not a secretary that one is was thinking of. what about a department with perhaps a senior cabinet minister responsible for national security? >> well, i mean, i think that is a model that could be used to get something we've looked at. what is quite clear is the prime minister sees himself as the person who's responsible and he takes this very seriously. i don't like the national city, international relations develop a committee. i am in instead which means. it meets pretty regulate actually. it takes a lot of time the various sectors of state, things to go to these me that andy top hamper meeting, the prime minister chairs it as each are

each are some of the subcontracted but not all the. and, of course, the secretary's estate there. as the cds there, the agency had one the police there, and has all the right people. and i believe that does give a proper oversight, proper direction to people to do things that i have mentioned the os cd in terms of counterterrorism which sits in the home office. and i think that works extremely well actually. i have to say i was surprised because before i came into being because a very good model. when i came in and it was been formed at the i joined, it really has worked exceptionally well. so i think probably that structure with all the subcommittees, look at specifics like afghanistan, pakistan for example, which the primary chairs which protect prepare areas of counterterrorism which the home secretary chairs, i think that structure is quite a good way of looking. the fact that there's not this committee i think is important. i know it has taken time to get to it and i think one of the

very bible things that i think we need sort of trying to work out how one gets to grips on some of these things. i am very keen to see how the committee gets it and i think it's important. this whole areas and so important. another thing that helps is the national security force, which i chair, which is made up of a king of the great and the good which is that a huge number of papers in terms of energy security, looking at which they then feed into the embassy and ministers to look at. so i think actually it's not half bad. i think it is quite good. i'm not sure going down the other route would be easy. i think it would be difficult. but it is another model. it is another model. and i think it's something we should shut our minds to as we develop what we're going. i think is absolutely right for this committee to have a think about that and have use on a. and i think we need to address

in that way. at the moment i believe the oversight is far better than people think. people talk about national security. this is very similar actually to the nsc. it is rather better in some ways because i think some of the advice it gives. that's another issue. and i don't think going down a dhs route would have been a good idea at all. perhaps some of the aspects there. so i don't think we have gone badly. >> the most important thing is you get department working together as well as you can. that's enormously difficult, and i think what we're saying to his we believe we're making progress. no one is saying it is perfect that if you decide to set up another, construction, effectively what you're doing is you're not necessarily given to people to work better together. you are moving the boundaries. and there are some dangers. when it is the other natural state for those boundaries to

be? i mean, i really do worry there is a trend and a tendency, and from my constituents and parliaments as well, to believe that you can defend the united kingdom within the united kingdom almost at the border. so i would want to see what happens being divorced because they're intrinsically attached. our national interest structure around the world, you know, we have to provide national security effectively. so simply providing another, you know, architecture, another common architecture. there has been some considerable improvement in getting us working together. i won't say it's perfect and we don't need to drive any further. but another construction, what we do? where would the boundaries fall and would they be in a better place than those that will be out in moments tonight it was not meant to be a criticism of

lack of coordination. i'm sure it is working, we can see that. and nothing is perfect. but the events of having one coordinating body, one permanently department, if you like, that's really where the boundaries are. it's not taking over from anyone department, but it isn't just full-time on the topic of national security. senior cabinet minister whose job is that, not over the 1001 things you will have to do. >> i will just have a stab at defining the home secretary. but i think since 1782, the foreign office and home office are to first ever did part of the state that worked very closely together. i think the reason why the home office is better placed now toledo national security is because of two things.

first of all we're responsible for crimes not punished enough. so the principal punishment went over to the m.o. j. and it was deliberate intent to focuses on catechism, leasing and immigration control. and so i think that is one developer. the second is the move from the os cd from counter office into the home office. that has been a very important development. it means that you would really just be moving things around virtually for the sake of it to try and create a janet napolitano and the new yes when you have got the machinery there, the corny machinery which boxes is absolutely vital. you have got, you have got some of the stuff at home office was dealing with. they use to deal with, as patty knows, they used to own half the

clubs and pubs in carlisle because a nationalized them in the first world war. captain until the 1970s. lots of things home office did they don't do anymore. there's a whole list of them. so i think it really is the biggest contribution to your question, which was a very thought question. how do you focus attention on national security. >> mr. kipping? >> i have an issue that is been talked about a time or two, which is -- most of our are owned and managed and well managed by the private sector. if the lights go out, it's going to be the secretary of state. how we ensure those chronic companies. they're hooked into the decision-making process of building resistance. >> well, i think in that area of energy, and in numerous other

areas, our links are will with industry are exceptionally good. maybe if i start some of the other ones as well, last week with the home office site and develop and branch exhibition which is held now for some 20 or 30 years, which we have expanded mathematically, and it has come at just under i think 400 exhibitors, a lot of acid be and things. we had over 3000, 3.5000 specially invited from around the people. we had a series of discussions with all of our grace industries in this security area. and i think probably our links that would industry had better in this area, well, forever probably. one within move across next up to critical infrastructure, we link again very closely with firms. they're our friends would have trusted people and then who are able to talk to at a very high

classification. about security issues. bareness will notice as well well for a time with the security service. and again, the americans when they come over are very impressed that we have links at this level with so many of these companies and we have had series of seminars about risk and have these things should be handled when it comes to crowded places and shopping centers. again, very close link we have with all the various shopping centers, with hotel groups and things like that. i think again better than it's ever been. on the energy side specifically, i think we do keep ourselves very lucky into that. there's been a lot of work that has gone on in response to the paper about energy which has all been pulled together at the moment. the nsf has looked at that as well. there is of course foreign, i mentioned that anything foreign office will be very happy to talk about that. but in terms of firms i think we are very, very closely linking. simile in cybersecurity. we are closely linked in and the e