sending this into an, you know, an international, you know, engine of helping people to make an issue where an issue didn't exist. because the right to explore and the right to self-determination is clearly there. but the necessary deterrent we think has been maintained. >> but if it isn't successful, are we ready or capable of repelling any attack? >> well, as you indicated, this is something thaw might want to you know, explore. maybe elsewhere? >> mr. gates? >> the national security has institutions, international cooperation, multilateralism, can you tell us what percentage of public spending do we currently spend on institutions of multilateral cooperation? >> the figure is clearly not

going very well this afternoon. but i'm going to risk some figures. but i'm afraid it's not a percentage figure. but in terms of nato man power, which is the man power that where it's our own personnel including the cost of housing and the allowances and salaries and all of the rest of that, last year that in '09-'10 rather, that came to 145 million. but in relation to nato security investment program and the military budget came to 176 176,41600 of which 50 million and half came from the reserve. to our figure 11.5478%. and in relation to the eu missions that we're engaged in,

again, for '09-'01 -- '09-'10 we pay 13.876%. >> what about international constitutions. iaea, there's a hole issue here about what i'm trying to do is get the sense of the totality of the spend. >> right. well, i think -- >> the institutions that you made on progress in the united to the european -- >> i know the formula. i'm trying to get the figures. i don't know how you candy having this and get a clear handle on it. let's, for example, say to you we have nine and a half in afghanistan, all of the air and logistic capability with supporting a united nations sanction operation in the 44 nation coalition, now if you

want to mention the cost on that, then you need to add that on to the figures that chris is just given you. we provide, you know, security in the green zone in cyprus, you know, there are -- there's capability that we're providing in different parts of the world as well as, you know, paying our dues to these organizations. and it's a pretty complicated formula to try to add up what the cost are. >> but the due that is we pay are all -- we've already provided the foreign affairs committee. you already commented in your charming report again. >> i'll come on to our report in a minute. i want to ask, because i'm trying to get the sense of all of the government collectively, knowing from the fco paying or what perhaps some other department pays. but to have the sense of the scope of this would be really helpful. if we're going to have a clear view of the international security strategy, bringing everybody together, then it

would be really helpful to have the information brought together. >> maybe, would we maybe have a look at this and see if it's a feasible thing to do to get back in writing? i mean i think there is a valid point in here. when we embark down the international security strategy root, i had hoped as it evolved and develop, it could become something that was of great utility and in terms of providing priorities. and then the treasury would it be able to work out? we're a long way from the moment. you could understand it. but it would be a wonderful thing to look to achieve such a thing. >> i think the european union which cost 2.3 million. >> which would be spent somewhere else perhaps. can i take you to the statement that the prime minister made today? that refers to -- >> paragraph?

paragraph. >> well, they are not numbered. in the fourth page in the middle. it's the paragraph that's talking about nuclear issues. nuclear -- the roads in 2010. and it's specifically refers to the financial funding -- the funding for the international atomic emergency agency. iaea, you'll be aware certainly the foreign office minister are aware that the foreign committee talked about yesterday was pushing very strongly for traditional funding for the iaea. and that is clearly welcome. could you tell us -- give us some idea what scope of that additional funding is? >> i think i'm going to have to write you on that, i'm afraid. >> okay. and on the question of the mr.

bryant, you refer to earlier statements. one of the concerns that i've had in the committee of foreign affairs have had is a reduction caused by the budget pressure of the sco has had on civilian missions in balkins is the smuggling route for the people smuggling and political instinct if it happens again in particular could be very, very serious problem for the national security of this country. can you look at that again? because clearly, there is a very, very important issue here. the uk footprint being reduced and the implication it has internationally. >> well, security in the balkins, in the western balkins is best advanced not just we the uk but by all of our european

allies. i was struck in 2003, i was there. and by the fact that there was swiss military operating under a european union and bano, which making sure the europeans bury more burden in the balkins, i can't say we're going to be spending more money there in the immediate future, no. >> finally, for me, do you think that sco, dfid, and other departments have adequate funding for the increasing work that they have to do internationally? >> the -- a -- i think -- our resources -- it's a question of how you best deploy your oh -- your resources. everybody would like to be able

to increase their budget. at a time when the -- when the foreign offices task are very clearly delineated, some of them in relation to international -- into national security but some of them delineated along other areas as well, it's difficult to -- we don't feel that we are under resourced to be able to tackle those issues, no. >> no, i think i would say because one of the issues that was raised earlier was in relation to planning. i think it equally applies to other issues around the world is the question of prevention. so, for instance, in somalia, it's absolutely right that we want to tackle the piracy off shore. in order to do so we have to be able to return somalia to a properly functioning state. but the best win the things we've been able to do is through our own support of the mission

in somalia, we've been able to provide support. but in addition, the european union has provided it's development money and on top of that, the new mission which is going to be making sure that the armed forces in the security forces in somalia are better trained, i think will help to deliver a better functioning state. so one the things that is absolutely sell to us. and i think will be increasingly important is to make sure other countries in the europe and other allies bare more of the burden. >> mr. bruce? >> specifically in relation to the department of the national development, to begin with, when you were talking about money and trying to allocate what was being spent on the strategy, i was beginning to think it would undermine what the strategy was about. which is about joined up governments and pick out things. but specifically, you said 120 million pounds were at the contribution. would you articulate what this

is given that the there's a significant chunk of the fall back in the office that clearly identifies what it is doing in conflict and most conflict states is regard as a significant part of the strategy? we therefore assume if you are allocating money and i want to say that's important, it was a major contributor in that context. just backing up, when we as a admit tee have been pursuing this over the last three or four years, even two years ago, the permanent secretary said she was struggling. i think under her breath, she was. that's not my job as permanent secretary to deliver the policy on staffing. that was before we had the white paper which highlighted there was going to be much more engagement in postconflict and fragile states. it's hard to do with staffing. the question is who, when, and

where that maybe the straightjacket isn't appropriate if it's not going to deliver the policy? this is a small policy under two and a half thousand people. >> you're obviously right. the different contribution, as it were in the foreign office contribution, they have to work and very much together. but that's not to say that different subjectives which are obviously primarily about saving people's lives, given them the opportunity of economic future, and of avoiding poverty should be permanently subgaited. but in somalia, the figures on the uk spending on the amazon budget comes some 16 million pounds, i think. which has the difficult contribution to somalian comes from 20 million. it would dwarf the amount of

money that's being spent in other respects. in afghanistan, i think one the argues that we've won fairly successfully over the last few years is that a military -- this is not been iraq in the m.o.d., i should say, but the argument that we could -- that success could be brought about by military success alone, i think was always fundamentally flawed. and trying to bind together the work of the diplomacy of and reengaging communities of rebuilding the economy and alongside the military effort and ensuring people security is three parts of an important knot that needs to be banned together. >> the development secretary sitz on the international security committee and participates in these discussions and the three departments together control the conflict prevention, you know, funds. so development on money is tied

into our priorities. of course, we have other development priorities that are outside of just security. >> i accept that. i wasn't suggesting that that is a point of conflict. what i was getting at, nevertheless, the criticism that is directed increasingly against dfid on the ground is that there are two tied down to the capital and have not enough time to be out and about in the field. and that's in fragile states, which are very difficult to get about. and therefore, they -- it's not about money. it's about staff on the ground to enable them to do that. and what i think we're coming to the conclusion is under the government constraint that all departments are. but there is a danger that would compromise it's very ain't to deliver this part of the strategy. >> but ensuring security for those who work in the organizations or directly for dfid, and it's an essential part of trying to make sure they are

able to deliver on the ground. one the difficulties is in particular in fragile states, you end up spending a lot of the money that you would like to ensuring security rather than actually delivering a new well or building a new school or whatever? >> i think i want to pay for the facility in our common future. the 2009 doesn't identify this quite clearly as being an issue. i think also the issue of the civilian stabilization we shows on how we are focusing on trying to do this 1150 people we can draw to go rapidly somewhere if we feel there's a need to put in. i think we've identified. you are clearly identifying an error that is tricky. i think we are focusing on it. >> there are two further questions that we'd like to address. lord sterling, then lord harris. >> the last few days, there's been a huge publicity about the

young boy in pakistan that managed to get back. the way the police forces of the world got together and how it's going to be handled and how it's going to be dealt with by the law is extraordinary. by kidnapping is kidnapping. prior -- piracy is what i want to bring up. an interest on my own, two of the ships have been taken. it's 50 crew being held at quite a large ran some. -- ransom. i had a letter saying they are deploying one of their small cruise ships from the indian ocean. it's spreading and spreading fast, not just somalia anymore. they are not going to operate in the indian ocean. it's spreading other countries. even just going towards costing $50,000 a day in insurance and cancel the trips, ports being

canceled are coming up all the time. it's a subject that we brought up with lord west, we're going to be talking about it further. it comes to the law side. it's quite sad that 3 to 400 years the navy main roll is to protect the trade lanes of the trade. that's what is always been about. to my -- to a degree, the world navies do not have the teeth they should be allowed to have. i could assure you somebody probably realized but i don't, and i do, the russian and the chinese and koreans who protect their own ships with convoys. if i may gently put it, they are not certain to hear about them again. that's hoot matter entirely. but it is a fact to take into account. we were then told we must not arm our ships. we've started to arm our ships. twice now, as they've seen it, now the international unions have declared they want the ships to be armed because they

have many thousands of their things when doing it. the thing i wanted to declare is all three are enrolled. what is the possibility of the international law being tightened or even added into piracy to the anti-terrorist law which will enable you to deal with it much more effectively than you can at moment? >> if i start, i think that in general terms, the legal -- not specifically about prior prior piracy, the united nations has gone through, has a large number of different protocols and treaty obligations for all of its member states. it was encaging in -- encouraging in 2006 there was support for the antiterrorism strategy. i think different countries are

trying to reach the answer to the piracy situation in whether we need to reform the united nations and law of the sea. but the convention under law of the sea. but the -- but there are protocols, you started by mentioning in pakistan where it says that sometimes there are a lot of countries that haven't ratified conventions, for instance, charter abduction, or have ratified them in a way in the country that don't meet the needs that we would have in different countries. and i think there is still considerably further work to be done there. but on piracy, i think that's probably a matter of the defense. >> can i just say that those -- those people -- those ships, those companies, there are cooperating fully with the methodology and the advice that

they are given by those who are providing -- trying to provide their protection in the indian ocean can massively reduce the risk to themselves. i mean we have now advisory sea lanes, there are methodologies, there are advice to people. and naval capability kept in the adjacent area. when people actually do what they are asked to do, as i said, it's what it is reduced considerably. but one the consequences of that is that we're seeing pirate opportunities being taken in a far wider area of the ocean where we are displacing the activity and because it's a lot harder for pirates to operate effectively in the gulf of aden, they are going further south and

are operating many, many miles from the african coast, right across half of the ocean now. and it is -- it is not going to be possible to solve this in the maritime environment. overwhelmingly, it is, if not entirely, overwhelming, it is somalia that is the problem. and there should be a law of the situation that prevails in large parts of that country. it means that what naval capability, and there are many country who's are cooperating. or necessary extent. because you named some country that are only on the surface protecting their own ships. but they have agreed, and we tried to draw them in to a cooperative, you know, arrangement. so they have agreed to, even if they are there primarily to protect their own ships to, you know, communicate with us, too relay information, and effectively be part of the international protection that is being provided.

so there are many, many nation who's are providing naval capability. i don't think that we've got a problem in terms of, you know, rules of engagement or the legal framework within which to operate. the big problem is that the balance of risk for people who are living in an appallingly lawless country is such. with the kind of gain that can be made that's, you know, naval capability and naval deterrence is not pushing that balance of risk far enough so that people are not engaging in piracy. that's where the problem, we have displaced it to parts of the ocean, the problem is continuing. >> i accept that. but the point i was bringing up is that if you can use international law, once you actually get ahold of it, that would make a big difference. because then -- >> well, we have successfully -- >> if you can't deliver the

moneys to it, then there's no future of being in that form of business. it's become a business strength. >> we have an agreement with kenya. we have prosecuted pirates in kenya. they are offering the same facilities for terrorist. so there is the ability where there's the evidence in this case to bring these people to justice. but, you know, as i said, a balance of risk is there is still balance of equilibrium. people need to stick with the advice that they are given. they can hugely reduce the risk if they do. it's about the way they load their ships, about the watch that they keep, about the sea lanes they use, about the communications that they use. if they do everything and stay in touch with the people who are there to protect them, the risk is massively reduced. >> you might mention the task force as being pretty successful there. and making sure that as many

countries in the world as possible as adequate measures for assets? >> mr. mr. gates, brown, your question broadly. >> well, we do have witnesses here. i wonder if i could ask the question and the type of question that lord asked a little earlier. that is scenario planning for external events which may impinge on the range of the departments. to give a specific example, let's assume that down trek, there is a series israeli raid on iran, now this could clearly have very serious implications for us, possibly in afghanistan, it could effect our oil supplies here, and a range of other implications as well. what i'm not quite clear about is where in our existing

national security structure scenarios, potential scenarios like that are actually looked at and then handle the really across a range of departments. >> well, if i could maybe start, as i said, we do have a horizon unit that looks at what ifs. i think the specific like that will rely on asking the specific question and saying to departments what the implications of that. and the example that you give -- i have asked that question. what does this mean in terms of our security and in terms of terrorism? what other effects is it likely to have? what impact will it have on the departments? i've actually asked that question. people are looking at some aspects of that. i don't think one could feed into your overall national security strategy. though specific what ifs. other than if i say, the scanning that's going on as a backdrop in the work that leads into the national revicing it.

how often it's revised is important. we had one before. it was necessary to do revision the following year. it meant we change some aspects of it. the mention, i think, was to have another issue. the election is sort of slightly in what makes the -- adds a different factor all of this. but i think again, it's -- i think it's something that we will need to look at to an extent on an annual basis. i'm sure this year, it will be looked at again. >> planning for those scenarios is -- does take place. and vulnerabilities are identified. we try to mitigate the threat. i don't think it something that we can, you know, properly discuss in the forum. but they are, you know, they are taking place with regard to some specific scenarios. >> we have searched to the specific target that divorce deliberately from the normal

business of the office. so they can do more of that what if thinking, there's no one specific element which relates to the services. because british people abroad, prince, after the bali bombing need protection and help and advice and support and all of the rest of it. i think we felt we had a lot of lessons to learn from that occasion. since then, we provided greatly more training around the world so that nobody can deployed without having gone through specific disaster, management training. >> looking at another aspect of international law, one the issues that certainly came to my attention and foreign affairs committee actually went to guantanamo in 2006, is the international law and the geneva conventions with regard to the americans, of course, unauthorized enemy competentes. and that this is an issue where

we've been told there's no need to think about changing it to complicate it. this problem is not going to go away. it's a problem that effects many countries on both domestic and foreign policies. i'd like to know, is there any thinking going on in that area to try to get more adequate laws for the 21st century? >> there's con -- constant thinking in the area. wherefore that is possible expect in certain circumstances where it might be through special international courts or whatever. -- but there are situations where we -- and this is probably a matter for the home office, but of course where we have the control orders. and then the third thing we try to do is on the basis of understanding move forward to deportations with assurances. >> but you are very much dealing with the margin. the fundamental problem is the

geneva conventions do not address the problem. >> that's why there's a lot of thinking going on. [laughter] >> mr. brown? >> i expect the generic point on lord lee's question and gibbs has something hat committee exist after the election will have to come back to. that's the adequacy of the league structures to address the much-changed environment and in terms of security that we face in the 21st century. i mean, i'm not choosing anybody of come mr. -- complacency is the comfort with that, sometimes given the light to by the facts on the green, the fact that we have to report back to the significant number of pirates in somalia, not necessarily by us, but by other people. and not taken to kenya. i'm not asking for that generic point.

i'm fascinated by the document that was published today on the issue of maritime security and the progress that has been made. the eu operation and the nato contribution, and what the americans do, you know, in aggregate will provide the ships to do -- first of all on sea battle. but there are still serious problems. and during there. and it looks as though the international community is beginning to get to grips with this with 100 pirates we have in kenya. and that's the promise of a possibility of a pirate prosecution centered in the shale. :