acquisitions. we don't know. we know we need some. we don't know how many. we have a system that won't get started until it knows what the final answer is. i'll give you an example in a moment of getting over that. this is if you don't know the requirement, how can you begin to acquire? some cases, it's just unreasonable. we just know we need to get started. every day you spend trying to decide ultimately how many you need, is another day you're waiting to get started and another day the piece of equipment isn't in the hands. second is wouldn't it be worth waiting for something better? and of course in time you can have something better. but right now i'm focused on the next weeks and months in afghanistan. something that's best for next year or the year after, not existed in right now.

so the 80% solution as secretary gates says is something one has to learn to manage to in the case of support to rapid acquisitions. the third is, well, we could get this. but is this something we want in the long run? is it something that fits into the long range vision of the army table, the long-range of the marine corp table of equipment? maybe not. maybe it's just for this fight. which if we win the fight, it'll be worth having something that doesn't quite fit in to the long-range future. and the last of course is how do we get money quickly? congress provides the money. congress appropriately keeps a close eye. doesn't give us open- funds, ano forth. so there's a constant interaction with the congress to explain what we're doing, explain the urgency of what we're doing, and when we are

able to do that, we usually get their support. nobody wants to hold up the delivery to the war fighter. an example i give you of getting over the four catch 22s, which again every day this is blocking and tackling. i'd say my job is 90 -- i guess thomas edison said of his job 90 % perspiration, and 10% inspiration. i'll give you the example of mrap, which is the ultimate terrain vehicle that we are fielding right now in afghanistan. just to show you how fast the system can go when we really light a fire under it. we completed the source selection for the mrap atv in july last summer. the first atvs arrived in afghanistan in september.

and we've already accepted more than 5,000atvs, and almost 1,000 of them have actually been fielded, that is in the hands of soldiers by now. so that's very different from your 10 and 15-year program and record. that's less than a 10 month. vehicles actually fielded and in the hands of the soldiers. initially, when we set out to say how many are we going to buy and produce per month the -- our legislators and commanders in the theater were saying understandably they could only field 500 vehicles per month. the reasons for that are you will understand, for one to the nail phenomenal. you can't bring the vehicles in, because you don't have a place to park them, you don't have a place to park them, you don't

have concrete because they don't make it. you have to go to afghanistan -- pakistan and get your concrete. you have to have the parking lot for the truck and around and around you go. everything is like that in afghanistan. so it wasn't that we couldn't produce more vehicles. it's at that time, we didn't think we could absorb more. nevertheless, i decided we're going to produce them at a rate of 1,000 a month anyway. if we had extra vehicles in charleston or oshkosh, okay. better an mrap without an soldier than a soldier without a mrap, first of all. second, we could use the excess vehicles for training so that every soldier and this is now the case in afghanistan, the troops that are arriving have their driver's license on the mrap. they don't have to be brought out from the field, taught to

drive the vehicle, and then sent back out in the field with the vehicle. they arrive ready to go. they fall in on the vehicle. it's a familiar piece of equipment to them. so i thought we ought to buy them for the training ranges. out at mtc at fort irvin, there are mrap atvs. out in 29 palms for the marines, there are mrap. they are there so the soldiers can learn how to use them. so i bought -- i wanted to buy more than that we thought we could field. and we did. i also had in the back of my mind, i bet you we'll figure out a way to increase that number from 500 to a larger numbers. i think when the troops get them, they will lake them. when the commanders see them, they will like them. they will figure out a way to get more. we looked at the whole logistics pipe, that beginning in oshkosh

and ends up on a fab in afghanistan. every piece of that. and tried to see if we could widen that artery. and we have now. we are now up to being able to absorb 1,000 a month. it's a good thing i'm making 1,000 a month. there's an example of not waiting for the final answer. but beginning to acquire and ramp up to the 1,000 a month, figures we'll figure it out later. we don't have to figure out everything in order to get started with anything. so the m atv is an example. i could give you many, many more examples that we have succeeded in in supplying the war fighter, but it's always by hot wiring rather than driving down an open lane. it's true that we have an

acquisition system which still has the cold war vestage of it, namely, designed to prepare for a future war rather than or to conduct a current war. we are only still eight years into this, learning how to have a system which can conduct current wars, learn from experience, respond to stimuli from the battlefield, adapt and deliver what the current war fighter needs. we're taking some steps to put that on a more enduring foundation, maybe at another time, i'll come back john, and share our thoughts. some of jack has had the thoughts already. but i have told the entire acquisition community that responding to operational needs, i've said, is this highest priority. if you're a service acquisition executive, if your a peo, your

highest priority is responding to those. and also given them a menu of ways that they can work within the system, but work quickly. so i think we're getting the mrap lesson into the acquisition system at large. we'll say something about contingency contractors. i don't need to tell this ag brings withthe -- that our every soldier to the battlefield approximately one contractor. it's interesting to look back on the numbers in world war ii, there was one contractor for every service member. in vietnam, one for every five. in iraq, one for every 1.2 service members. in afghanistan, one for every

.7. in other words, more contractors than soldiers. because of the heavy reliance we have now on building new fabs, and construction required to do that, and most of the transportation is done by contractors. there are 107,000 contractors now in afghanistan. of whom about 3/4 are local nationals which is not a matter insignificant for the economy of afghanistan. and i think it's fair to say that first in iraq and now in afghanistan with these ratios, we have been on a learning curve about how to manage a contractor work force that large. and for sure, everything has not been done perfectly over the -- these years. and part of that is because it was such a new thing to have so

many. part of is it because in the time of war, you just have to act. and part of is it that i suppose we've all kept telling ourself it's not going to go on much longer. we don't have to get good at this. we don't have to get used to it. we do have to get good at it. we do have togged used to it. and we are getting better. i won't say perfect yet. we have a number of very constructive oversight bodies, commission on war time contracting and others has a distinguished membership. we are working down the same list they are to improve the quality of the controls and so forth that we apply to contingency contracting without sacrificing effectiveness. i'll give you an example. in afghanistan today, which is the use of cash. cash we used a lot of in afghanistan and initially in

iraq. obviously, that increased the vulnerability to fraud. in the last year, we've reduced our cash payments in afghanistan from 39% to 9%. very dramatic. how are we doing that? we're doing that by banking by phone. believe it or not, in afghanistan, many people bank by phone. and are willing to bank by phone. now we're paying them on their cell phone, rather than with cash, greatly reduces the possibility of fraud. and it made very dramatic progress in that regard just in the last year. give you another example. many of you know probably know what the contractor office representative of the corp, the corp isn't the person who writes the contract, the corp is the person that makes sure the contract is being carried out in the required way. any of us could be trained as a

corp within a short time. it would take us longer to be trained as a contractor officer, that is to be able to contract on behalf of the united states government and spend money. corp is sometimes easier and can be in theater a part-time job. we've been doing a great deal to improve contracting officer representative presence in afghanistan. this is not a mundane thing at all. i'll give you some examples, in the last year, as i've been watching these figures, in afghanistan, our contracting officer representative force which at the beginning was only 38% of the requirement is now 84%. so we've got 84%. still not 100%, but 84% of the contracting officer representative post filled that

we should have filled. we are now -- all of the arame and marine corp units before they deploy to afghanistan are training within the units, contractor corps. so they deploy with that still because now it's recognized that that is part of the skillset required for a modern expedition ary force. they deploy with people who know how to carry out the contractor part of their commission. we're giving them automated tools, little things you put on your laptop, which pull up the forms that they -- that tell them what to do for a certain contract with the requirements are within that contract for corp to help them easy their way. the department has added 10 general officer positions to

contingency contracting in the last year. very important move so that senior three and two star positions, that senior positions are filled with two and three star officers. so this is an example -- this cash and the contractor officer representatives are two examples of the kinds of things we're trying to do to get good at something we recognize as an enduring part of waging war. i'm troying to maintain a blast here in the department and i hope a balance here in washington and a balance here in theater between being able to. excellent stewards of the taxpayers money on the one hand, and the add jill and do what's required in afghanistan now on the other hand. we need to maintain that balance.

contracting officers and representative haves the feeling that it's an environment which is not conducive to them taking any risk at all on behalf of efficiency and responsiveness to the war fighter. they'll seize up. we owe them an environment in which they can strike that balance appropriately. and i'm trying to do that. counter ied. i'm going to say something about that. the secretary gates asked me and the director of operations on the joint staff several months ago to what did we focus for these months intensively on making sure that the we are doing everything we possibly can as a department in the coming months for this fighting season in afghanistan to combat ieds. i don't need to tell you that ieds are a triple problem. they are obviously a threat to life and limb. but also to mission suck sed if people can get outside of the

wire, military and nonmilitary, then they can do the mission assigned which is the c.o.i.n. mission. if they can't get outside of the wire, they can't. it's huge success to defeat the ied. finally, it's essential to the morale of people in afghanistan and our partners and soldiers themselves. on all of the ways, the counteried fight is essential. the secretary said would you just -- i know no other way of doing this than to do it myself. would you every day make sure we're doing everything that we? and that's what i do. every day. i'll give you some examples. this is just a matter of getting everybody here in washington in the defense department, intelligence community, in the services, in the various task force, mrap, and in theater,

various commands and in afghanistan centcom all focused on these next few weeks and doing everything we possibly can for the fighters. my discount rate is huge for that particular part of what i do. and we've had -- and justdy focusing in that way we've been able to do some things that i think are going to be very important as the summer goes on. let me -- first to accelerate the delivery of critical counteried enablers to the troops for the this season. give you an example. this is a total of several billion dollars over the next weeks and months. these are robots, they are hand held metal detectors and ground penetrating radars. they are vehicles. and there's something you'll begin to see over afghanistan which are elevated line of sight

in particular air ship born censors. we are pushing all of the isr, all of the preed doors, reapers, hunters, warriors, everything we possibly can into afghanistan. but there's no matter what we do, it's never going to be enough so that every time a patrol goes out, it has that eye in the sky over it looking around, checking out its local situation. there is an alternative though that for the area of a fab or for a city or for a particular length of road is just as good. it's kind of what you see every morning when you turn on the television to look at the traffic report. that is an elevated line of sight camera. and we are going to be this summer increasing many fold the number of air stat born

cameras. there's one in kandahar, over top of the city. every patrol can have a camera looking around a few blocks around it. is anybody sneaking up on them? every person of ill will in kandahar thinks that camera is looking at them. every person of goodwill thinks that camera is protecting them. so we're going to be introducing a lot more of them. because it provides for those people under their own control the same functionality that a fancy uav would have. but it's something we can afford to get in there this summer. i knew i couldn't double the number of uavs, but i'm going to 20 fold, whatever goal that means the number of these elevated line of sight, air stats. we're focused on training. so that our troops who go into

afghanistan this summer as part of the surge are trained for the distinctive character of ied fight in afghanistan. one that depends on home made explosives, one that has much more decentralized networks behind it than was the case in iraq. we can apply some of the cases, but not all of the lessons to the case of afghanistan. so, john, if you go down to the national training center at fort irvin today, you'll find soldier that is are going to rotate -- rotating into afghanistan being trained specifically in afghanistan lanes. that are mock afghan villages with afghan villagers and the particular kinds of nitrate and fertilizer-based explosives. they are distinctive. they are going in for what they are going to find in the area

where they are going to operate. and third because we are not alone, fortunately, in afghanistan, we're part of a coalition, secretary gates thought it was important, he announced this istanbul some weeks ago, to do whatever we could if not at the expense of our own effort to assist our coalition partners in their counteried capabilities. we're providing them with mraps and some equipment. we're taking some of that training expertise we have to their training ranges. so when they deploy from europe, let us say to afghanistan they are getting some of the same kind of training distinctive to the afghanistan fight that our people are getting. these are all things we're doing in these weeks and these months to get us better prepared to deal with the ied threat in afghanistan.

and it's remarkable what can happen when you get everybody together and focused and say i don't want to hear about anything six months from now. tell me what you can do now. how many weeks and every day pushes away to get these things done. that brings me to logistics, and the huge logistics challenges that the department faces right now in the way that those logistics or challenges are being met. i'll start very briefly with the retrograde from iraq. the retrograde from iraq is a huge task by itself. of course we have afghanistan on top of that which is even bigger. just to put on the retrograde from iraq, it is not as large in terms of tonnage as the retrograde from iraq after desert storm. however, it takes place in a -- on a particular timetable. we need to get down to a certain level by august.

it takes place in an environment where there is still threat. it goes on while we are continuing to operate. and i don't think this is inconsequential, the retrograde from iraq, takes place after being there for many years. this wasn't like checking out of a hotel that you'd be in for a short time as in iraq after desert storm, we were more settled in. more equipment. and so we had a lot to do. we start out with 350 fabs in iraq. about a year ago, and we're closing them. getting those numbers down. 147,000 contractors, by the way, now down at about 100,000 and

going down about 75%. you know the troop levels will be going down to 50,000. 3.4 million items of equipment. about eight months ago, we're now down to 2.2 million and we have to move another 1.2 million before august. this is a variety of equipment. there's traditional military equipment which will go back home with the units. there is equipment that was never associated with units but that was bought for iraq but never put in iraq. that's all of the green equipment. there's white equipment which is nonmilitary standard equipment bought to support the fight over the years. some of it in the hands of contractors and some in the hands of troops, refrigerators, desk, all kinds of stuff.

so-called white equipment. 41,000 vehicles. which is now at 29,000. so we've moved 12,000 vehicles in the last few months. we're going to have to move many more. this is a enormous migration of equipment. one the things that has paced us is decided where something goes. we know it doesn't belong or isn't needed in iraq anymore. does it go home to become part of the army or marine corp of the future? do they want it? does it fit in? if not, guard reserve, active duty, if not, where does it go? kuwait for a future contingency? does it swing to afghanistan? do we leave it behind for the iraqi forces? do we give it to somebody else? all of those decisions need to

be made before the piece of equipment is moving. it's not just the physical moving, it's decisions about where it goes. we know close with the most important logistics challenge of all. which is afghanistan. afghanistan if you take a lobe, where is the last place you'd like to be tighting -- fighting war if you had the choice? you might pick afghanistan. land-locked, very great logistics environment. we can't get effective until we get in, we can't get in and get set until we have moved the people and equipment and the means to sustain them through the very center arteries, a couple of ground lines of communications. the air bridge, and so we are working every day to widen those

arteries. and i'll give you again an example of the mrap atv, the atv because it's a military piece of equipment, we refer to move by air. and that means flying from charleston, where the government-furnished equipment are installed in the vehicle as they are delivered from oshkosh, flown to kandahar or bagram, there to be married up with a unit and put out in the field. we are in the interest of fielding them more quickly, and being able to use the air bridge for other free up capacity on the air bridge for other urgent needs this spring and summer, we're beginning to put mraps on ships now. now that we've shipped a lot into afghanistan, while those

are being absorbed and digested we are putting them on sea lift, taking them into theater on sea lift, transferring them there to sea lift. the legs are shorter. you can pop them in more quickly. eventually, to -- may be able to use ground communication, the ground transportation the entire way for mraps. so you have to in the case of logistics for afghanistan look at every piece of the pipe all of the way through -- up in the case of ground transportation up to two lines of ground communication to torkham and shahman, over the northern distribution network and a

couple of branches of that up through russia and the baltics first and russia. over the caucuses and then in through the stands. and then in the intratheater transport, while by air lift or the challenging job of getting on the roads in afghanistan and moving things around from one place to another. so every day is an effort to widen those arteries. every day is an effort to get equipment into afghanistan. the people who do this work are truly remarkable. and my office is filled with messages about bottled water or fuel or toiletries or whatever. build an intense container for troops to live in. containers for the contractors