when i was in vienna at -- vienna is a wonderful place. when i came back after all those years, someone thanked me for having served the country in vienna as though i had been in vienna or kandahar. i was actually amazed the taxpayers paid for myself and my wife to be there. it was a wonderful experience professionally and personally. what also was wonderful was working closely with talented people in the department of energy. and the secretary who is continuing that work. and something called the global threat reduction initiative. this initiative has done much to remove dangerous material from dangerous places to account for and consolidate what remains and improve its physical security. in the middle east, we helped lock down nuclear material and radiological material in

countries like egypt, saudi arabia and yemen and removed nuclear materials from countries like libya and iraq and it removed 550 metric tons of nuclear material from iraq and helped to convert civil reactors from high enrich uranium that could be used to build nuclear bombs to medium and low enriched uranium in countries like turkey, libya and pakistan. the department of energy request in congress to increase funding by 67% to help meet the president's goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. , batting nuclear terrorism sits very high on our national priority list, many other countries including the middle east do not see the same threat. during my four years in vienna up one of my priorities were to inventor it -- invigorate the efforts of theç national atomi

energy agency another organizations to combat nuclear terrorism. one of the big obstacles was the disinterest of many member states. the united states and our european allies and other like-minded countries like australia, japan, ranked nuclear terrorism as a top threat. not everyone else does. diplomats from developing countries often sought nuclear terrorism as an american obsession and not a true tangible threat. they thought of nuclear terrorism as the stuff of hollywood thrillers and should it materialize as primarily a threat to the nuclear powers. they worried nuclear security would create new barriers, another barrier to the use of nuclear technology and divert funding from civil programs that were important to them. this i would argue, a very simple but important goal for

this nuclear security summit is for the president to encourage other heads of state and government to treat nuclear security with the same priority that we do. one of the basic international instruments to improve nuclear security is the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. in the middle east, egypt and syria signed the convention. israel, saudi arabia, pakistan and turkey signed the basic convention but not the 2005 amendment that strengthens it. in a few cases the reason for this reticence was purely political. the nuclear summit provides an opportunity for president obama to press these governments to set aside the politics or other inhibitions and join with other countries including in the middle east algeria, jordan, which have signed the convention and the amendment. nuclear security should be seen as a key task for governments

and for the iaea rather than a distraction or for some countries as part of political gain. the middle east is the potential source for nuclear terrorism and a potential victim. in the middle east, nuclear security will be all the more important as more and more companies seek to benefit from civil nuclear power. the immediate problem in the middle east is not nuclear security narrowly defined. the immediate problem is iran's nuclear program which threatens to destabilize and make a nuclear arms race. and the threshold of nuclear weapons. there is extensive and credible information for detailed studies and engineering work studying a

nuclear warhead. it can already reach u.s. allies and bases in the middle east. the last administration and this administration, 3 round of international sanctions. the choice of two path, negotiation or isolation, iran's leaders ignored our choice, using negotiations and partial collaboration to divide the international community, stave off international sanctions and continue their nuclear pursuits. i can only assume iran's leaders calculate the influence and security that they see as provided by nuclear weapons or by reaching the threshold of

having them outweigh whatever condemnation and sanctions emerge from the multilateral process. increasingly i would argue we must base our plans and diplomacy on the assumption that iran will have nuclear-weapons. did i mention i am speaking for myself? i want to make that clear. iran's leaders, once nuclear-armed, may not be so suicidal as to launch nuclear attacks against israel, the united states or their partners or allies around the region but iran's leaders may engage in nuclear brinksmanship. dangerous as, tory behavior to try to intimidate neighbors the brutal outside intervention or even their own public. they may feel emboldened to use asymmetric means or conventional force to seize territory extending influence or

assaulting neighbors. and whether tehran intends it or not, groups like hezbollah may see iran's atomic arsenal as a nuclear umbrella for more aggressive action against israel and others. mishandled brinksmanship or nuclear emboldened aggression may escalate deliberately or not to nuclear use. compounding this danger is a real risk that others in the middle east may decide to acquire their own nuclear arsenal. candidate proliferous include egypt, saudi arabia and perhaps even turkey, the nato ally most exposed. these countries could be motivated by the desire for security, influence or merely prestige. no country that aspires to middle east leadership will be the last have nuclear weapons. a nuclear arms race is not inevitable, nor would it

necessarily be fast. with the exception of israel and iran most countries in the region are far from having bombmaking capabilities. we must prepare for surprises. remember how 1980s saudi arabia suddenly had medium-range missiles from china. remember how more recently, syria build a nuclear reactor in the desert with no one noticing for five years. fast and surprising or slow and fitful, a nuclear arms race would magnify the risk of accident, miscalculation or of a nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. the united states must prepare to contain the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed iran. we should do so in several ways. first, the u.s. and nato should reinforce our collective ability to read -- population and

regional interests. this requires military capabilities to protect force, ensure the security of energy supplies and conduct operations despite the threat or use of nuclear weapons. this requires missile defenses that can protect alliance territory and deploy forces. second, the u.s. and nato should strengthen security relations with key partners particularly egypt, iraq, jordan, saudi arabia and the gulf states. consultations on the security risks of iran's nuclear activities would be the first step. subsequent steps could include bilateral multinational exercises, combined contingency planning, 4 in military a sales and defenses for regional partners and operated their own defenses. third, the united states and nato should act to discourage further proliferation.

strong security relations with the country's most exposed as i described can reduce their incentives to proliferate. also, airtran must be denied any benefit from its nuclear arms. the world may have no choice but to live with a nuclear-armed iran but we should not accept it and should not legitimate it. other would-be proliferators should look at iran even with nuclear weapons and they should see that treaty violations bring penalties instead of prestige, sanctions instead of security and isolation instead of influence. finally, nato needs to consider the implications of its own nuclear policy. nato foreign ministers will be meeting in estonia later this month. alliance nuclear weapons will be on their agenda. this item was added at the request of ministers from belgium, germany, of the netherlands and norway.

these five for ministers have asked to discuss how nato can contribute to president obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. nato has already drastically reduced its nuclear posture. after the cold war, i was there some remembered. they slashed the stockpile of nuclear weapons, eliminated entire categories of nuclear weapons and reduce the readiness of delivery forces. and the scope of further reductions or consolidation and changes in declaratory policy a serious discussion is warranted before the alliance sets its planning target as nuclear zero. together with conventional capabilities and adapted missile defense, nato's nuclear forces have a contribution to make in two ways first by deterring the leaders from trying to exploit new nuclear arms and second by reassuring allies and partners

who might otherwise seek their own nuclear weapons. beyond having strong security relations with would-be proliferators what can the u.s. do to prevent another generation of proliferation? first we should continue to discourage the spread of sensitive technologies that can be misused for nuclear weapons. it is good and important to countries like the you a e and saudi arabia have committed to forgo enrichment technologies as they develop their civil nuclear capabilities. they recognize that foregoing these technologies every line in the market for the nuclear fuel makes sense economically and helps reassure the world of peaceful intent. it would be good and important if countries like turkey and egypt would make that same commitment. it is troubling that they have not. we should continue to back efforts to establish international fuel banks and

discourage companies pursuing these technologies and nuclear suppliers should finally agreed to restrict their transfer. second, we must reinforce our ability to detect and investigate clandestine nuclear activities. it is deeply troubling that syria and north korea were able to hide for so long their collaborative construction of a nuclear reactor. much more encouraging was the success of our intelligence community in finding iran's second enrichment facility. we need to build on this success but beyond iran and north korea. this means looking for a clandestine nuclear programs and also trying to understand leadership motives and decisions, and it wants nuclear weapons. they do not have the tools or resources of our intelligence community for major member

states, but inspectors often have access and information member states don't and may be able to connect the dots in ways that member states can't. we should continue to help the and i e a in building its schools and make as routine as possible the sharing of information. the inspectors need not only more information but more authority. the administration is right in encouraging more countries to sign the additional protocol. but rather than just trying to run up the number of countries that have signed the administration needs to focus on those key countries that have refused and i would argue president obama has an important discussion to have with egypt and brazil in the margins of the nuclear summit. third, the united states should step up international efforts to interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear material. pakistan's con remains under

house arrest. simon can clarify that. whether he is under house arrest or not the case of syria's covert reactor suggests north korea has moved into the market for nuclear weapons technology. the proliferation security initiative endorsed by president obama and needs to be reenergize and targeted in the north korea activities. we should renew high-level diplomatic efforts to bring in china, indonesia and malaysia to rely on the maritime routes used by north korea. let me conclude by recalling the question inherent in today's topic. are our efforts to promote nuclear security in the middle east too little too late? i regret to report my view that it may be too late to avoid a nuclear-armed iran but it is not too late for a concerted effort

to contain the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed iran and prevent another round of nuclear proliferation that could make the danger of nuclear terrorism that much more frightening. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. he is not under house arrest at the moment. he as to ask 30 minutes in advance before he goes out. i am told i saw him in a bookshop with his wife. i would like to ask george perpich to come forward. >> i am guessing that was mr.

book's book shop. i don't want to be more boring than usual which i would be because i agree with just about everything ambassador gregory schulte said. i am tempted to liven it up by talking about the nuclear deal where we do disagree. but that isn't our topic today. the implications, they carry over the personal dealings with pakistan, by the nuclear program and certainly with our effort meaning the u.s. government to try to get agreement around the world and a treaty to stop producing additional nuclear weapon material which does come to our subject today that if we are talking about nuclear security and the security of fissionable materials, that can

be made into nuclear weapons, one of the ways overtime to limit that problem and get a handle on it is to at least get states to stop producing more of it. there is an ongoing effort to negotiate such a treaty which pakistan adamantly blocks with an argument that this sound is not persuasive that because of the nuclear deal india is in a position to produce dozens more nuclear weapons per year than it would have been before. pakistan has to keep up with th that. stay tuned to that because there will be a announcement that pakistan's capability to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons is going to increase significantly. as will its determination to block a treaty to stop that and they will be blaming the united states for this because of the

nuclear deal with india. that will be a live topic going forward. in terms of today's agenda like greg i want to unpack the title because the title was artful. nuclear security in the middle east, too little too late. each of those terms in fights all little bit of discussion and so if what is meant by nuclear security is the security of nuclear materials, the parts that can be made into explosive nuclear weapons, ambassador gregory schulte did a great job but the message, relatively positive, there's a lot of effort, the nuclear security summit next week in washington will try to mobilize high level leadership to deal with the problem of securing fissile materials and of all the problems in the world this is one of the more manageable.

the number of sites where the material exists is known or close to being known. it is a small number. it is not too complicated to know what to do with those sites for those materials. it is not an emotionally or historically latent issue. it is not like dealing with the serbs or the croats in the middle east war corey and japan where you have all these legacy issues that complicate things. this is a relatively manageable issue and i think the summit and the attendance that is going to be at the summit is testament to that that you get more than -- the leaders of more than 40 countries willing to come to an invitation to work on this issue and not really holding it

hostage to a lot of other issues suggests that it is a relatively benign problem to try to deal with although an important one. if what we mean by nuclear security is the broader understanding of security, the environment in which one lives, the sense of states or other actors that they are in an environment that is either secure from threats of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation or insecure to the point that it makes you want to get nuclear weapons or you are worried your neighbor will get them. if it is that sense of security or insecurity the situation is not so good. as it is in terms of just securing the materials. the question again in the title would be nuclear security in the middle east. the question is what is the status -- it depends on where you sit and where you are?

the view may be different than it is in iraq or syria or jordan or saudi arabia. i would argue in none of these places is it good but the degree of anxiety and sense of insecurity depends on the place. in a lot of ways we end up talking with iran and i will talk more about iran but it is indicative of the overall problem and the way we might think about it. to remember the 1980s, but iran/iraq war and the motivation for iran starting its clandestine effort to enrich uranium and acquire other capabilities to produce nuclear weapons came out of a very insecure time for iran where it was being attacked by chemical

weapons by saddam hussein's in iraq and basically the international community did nothing to respond and denied the charges that iraq was making these attacks for a number of years. when you go through the history and the different ways of complicity. if you don't attend to states with capabilities when their security interests are very challenged and you don't respect those security interests don't expect them to stand still. they will react and in many ways what we are dealing with now is a reaction to that. is it too little too late? another element in the title. depends again on who we are referring to and what the problem is. is it too little too late to deal with iran? many states in the region answering that question if the

title is nuclear security in the middle east too little too late are you talking about israel and its acquisition of nuclear weapons? you have done too little too late or not at all. i am saying that because the non-proliferation treaty review conference next may, in six weeks or what have you, there will be 190 countries meeting in new york talking about nuclear security, non-proliferation, nuclear-weapons. that event operates under consensus rules which i say are very unfortunate that we all understand why they exist. and there will be everyday reference to with great vehemence israel's nuclear status and what the u.s. is doing to deal with it because there was a resolution at the meeting in 1995 when the

decision was made which the u.s. strongly strongly pushed for the right reasons to indefinitely extend the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. that was under question in 1995 and the u.s. and other states won agreements to indefinitely extend that treaty but it was contingent upon acceptance of a resolution on the middle east put forward by egypt and others and there will be an argument for which there is evidence that in the ensuing 15 years very little has been done to fulfill that resolution which was part of this deal made in 1995. i am not here to argue one side or the other. i am saying this is a very big live issue that will be affecting nuclear security in the middle east, and u.s. national interests and other national interest in the weeks ahead and in the time after

that. just as it is very common at carnegie or the washington institute or other places to have meetings on iran where we focus on the security implications of iran or anything else in much of the rest of the world there is a very different focus though they are worried about iran too. there are other elements of this policy that we are going to get exposed to that we don't normally get exposed to and i have to deal with the broader middle east and israel's position. to the extent we're talking about iran when talking about too little too late, too little of what? one could argue that the u.s. has tried isolation of iran going back to when i started

working in 1993. having tried to work on the iranian nuclear problem, this is when iran was resuming the nuclear power plant which had been stopped during the iran/iraq war and so iran had gone to germany to ask them to resume work to complete the project and the clinton administration, not the george w. bush administration, took a position to know civil nuclear program in iran. not just no enrichment, no nuclear power plant, no nothing. and the u.s. used this to get germany to stop cooperation with iran. this was seen as a victory of the strategy of isolating iran.

russia said we will provide this cooperation. then it was found that russia had agreed to supply uranium enrichment technology secretly to iran. the clinton administration exposed this to yeltsin and got agreement that the russians would back out and they would go ahead with the bushehr power reactor in the uranium enrichment cooperation. that is where we thought things were until was discovered that pakistan was supplying uranium enrichment assistance to iran. i was in russia when this was announced and the russians were surprised and not happy. they thought they were the only ones in this kind of relationship with iran and it was like somebody finds out there mistress is having an

affair and they are outraged. how could they be with the pakistani. the russians are still mad about that. the ways of trying to do that isolation which i support, we have been trying for a long time and so i don't know if it was too little or if it is just a question of there are always ways around these problems. i don't think isolation was too late. iranians and others will argue that inducement was often too late and too lou. i remember in 1997/98 the clinton administration tried inducements. that was a positive time. there was change in iran and there were efforts and one could always argue they were clumsy or culturally insensitive and we don't understand each other's signals all of which is true but e