and engage with iran then. too little maybe, too late, arguably not but not reciprocated. did didn't work. so then you could argue we have been too little threatening and too late. so it comes along in 2002. axis of evil mobilizing forces, we will do iran first and iraq and next. that is pretty threatening. strategy of regime change which is very threatening but not what you are supposed to do if you are trying to get people to stop building nuclear programs or believe in deterrence because the whole idea of deterrence is if you behave differently, you get to exist and we have a nice relationship but if your policy is no matter what you do i am getting rid of you that is an inducement to do stuff to keep you from getting rid of them but

in any case there was threatening so the argument is we have been too little threatening and done it too late on would argue that was done. earlier. now you could argue the way the iraq war turned in 2004/2005 took the threat away because the iranians said the u.s. is losing. .. activities to

actually make nuclear weapons is a distinct line. it has -- it has some meanings. and that one still hasn't been lost in part because i think the iranian government may have its own uncertainties about the cost and benefits of doing that. and that's in part because going from zero nuclear weapons to one or two or three or four is very, very dangerous. a couple of nuclear weapons don't do you much good if you're a country like iran. but they can get you in a lot of trouble. because you use one or two.

you destroy anybody but you guarantee counter-action that can destroy you. you have questions would you get caught in the act and lose that capability but invite kind of massive response? so it's a very precarious position. that they may choose at least -- or may not have made up their mind yet that they want to have. and as the ambassador said is it too late to detain. probably not. i remember being in a debate with patrick clauson up in new york -- this is a couple years ago. and the proposition was, can we live with a nuclear iran? my response was, well, what's the alternative? suicide? i mean, you know, things happen. if they happen, you do everything you can to prevent them. if you happen you figure out how to live with that.

and that's what deterrence and containment would be. not desirable. not, you know, what you would set out. i don't think it's something that i would articulate. if i were a policymaker. now that's what we're doing but it's something you do and greg laid out a bunch of the steps that you would do. many of which are being undertaken already. and that's smart policy. and it seems to me if we get -- and by the way, those things are smart to do even if iran doesn't make nuclear weapons. they're smart to be preparing to do today for other reasons. because iran is already projecting power and influence as we see in iraq. and as you can see in afghanistan. as you can see in syria. as you can see in lots of other places. one of the big arguments who won the iraq war was iran. and that they're pushing. and so you need to be doing these things in any case whether they get nuclear weapons or not.

and i think the list that greg offered is obviously a good place to start. so let me close there. with perhaps the boring and, you know, kind of endorsement of my colleagues' basic policy recommendation. i hope some of the stuff in the middle is a little provocative. and then we can have a further discussion afterwards. [applause] >> thank you, george. i at this point -- when i speak, we're going to have a few slides. not many. so, greg, if you could get your way out of vision. thank you. >> yeah, i don't want to be sitting in that. [laughter] >> good afternoon. they say a picture can tell a thousand words. so as pictures go, i particularly like this one. it is the 1999 visit by saudi

defense minister prince sultan to the pakistani uranium enrichment plant outside the pakistani capital islamabad. 11 years on, sultan is now crown prince sultan. if it were not for concerns about his age and health, the future king of saudi arabia. to sultan's left is sharif, then the pakistani prime minister and today potentially a future prime minister again. further left is dr. a.q. can, the then head of the facility but who has since admitted to having transferred nuclear technology to china, iran, libya and north korea. the extent to which he did this as a so-called rogue agent is disputed. he claims he did it under the instruction of successive military and political regimes.

there's allegations he offered nuea technology to iran, egypt and syria. the man to his left, we can only see his legs the chief of staff general musharraf. years later he through sharif who was later exiled in saudi arabia. also there that day with the pakistan air force, the head of the pakistan navy and the top bureaucrat, a retired general at the pakistani ministry of defense. reportedly, prince sultan, his son prince khalid ben sultan, saw the garry missiles on the same site and were also shown some nuclear weapons. you will recall that in the previous year, 1998, pakistan had successfully test-fired the

garry missile, a copy of the north korean and had tested two atomic bombs. apparently the conversation at kahuta that day went something like this, khan joking, to prince sultan, if you want you can take a few weapons with you. prince sultan, if pakistan has them it's like we have them. khan as long as your oil is similarly as ours your excellency. [laughter] >> the delegation was shown the cause and reflectors for an impillows-type atomic bomb. if you don't know what they are i'll explain afterwards. prince khalid part 1991 gulf war and now the saudi assistant minister of defense was told that they were very heavy. he reportedly tried to pick one -- pick up one with one hand

and was quite surprised he could not even raise it. he then tried with both hands and still could not manage it. he reportedly said at least he had seen and held the real core of a nuclear bomb. despite the time which has elapsed since the visit, this photograph also has direct relevance for today. as well as for this next photograph of the accompanying saudi delegation. if and when iran becomes a nuclear weapon state, saudi arabia is thought likely to ask pakistan for some sort of nuclear umbrella. the most frequently mentioned idea is that pakistani missiles tipped with nuclear warheads would be based in saudi arabia to deter iran from threatening the kingdom. such an arrangement apparently would not break international agreements if the weapons remained under pakistani control.

there are no hard facts to prove the existence of this notion of a pakistani nuclear umbrella. at least none available publicly. indeed, there are a range of denials. but there is certainly a close diplomatic relationship between saudi arabia and pakistan. perhaps unusually close. one only has to watch the two high level visits of the countries to -- the respective leaderships value the ties. i don't have a photograph of another visit of kahuta in 1999 by the administration of the united arab emirates. he was apparently given the same tour. i don't know whether in particular uae angle was pointed out to him. this was the pre fabricated structures under which the garry missiles were being assembled. and which shielded this activity

from the attention of spy satellites. had been imported for the uae member state. but he was probably told much of the equipment imported for kahuta was ordered via trading companies operating in another uae member state, dubai. in order to evade export controls. the uae certainly knew this was happening. once after i walked into the offices of one such trading company in dubai while reporting for the financial times, the dubai authorities complained to the british government. this was in 1980. yes, 30 years ago. the uae would probably now prefer to forget sheik abdullah 1999 tourism. i was hoping for a nod but i didn't get one. these days, sheik abdullah is a

foreign minister and a key and valued interlocutor with the united states. successfully helping to guide the so-called one, two, three agreement through congress so that the uae can access u.s. technology and generate electricity from civil nuclear power plants. sadly, in terms of the u.s. trade deficit, the uae has selected south korean nuclear plants. i mention the saudi and uae visits to kahuta because they help define what we mean by nuclear security. and also help illustrate the way others see it as well. to ordinary people, i.e., not the likes of us policy wonks the term nuclear security seems like an oxymoron. it will be interesting to see how the white house explains the term to the public during next week's summit here in washington, d.c. i would suggest that to some states, nuclear security is the possession of nuclear weapons. to other states, it is the

protection offered by allies such as the united states, which have nuclear weapons. on the civil side, it might well be the energy security offered by civilian nuclear power plants. nuclear science has much to offer on the positive side. but it also carries considerable risks of nuclear weapons being in the wrong hands. of rogue states or terrorist groups. and again on the civil side, even civil nuclear power plants carry risks of radiation accidents or theft of dangerous materials. it might appear that all good people would think the same way on these issues. but i suspect it is not the case. i've been told that the significant agreement of next week's summit will be on safeguarding nuclear materials. particularly, what are known as fissile materials that plutonium and highly enriched uranium. the particular danger is that

terrorists will acquire such materials. the future that i think president obama wants to be able to offer is of reduced nuclear arsenals, declining ambitions for nuclear weapons, the best control of nuclear weapons and the widespread availability of electricity generated by civil nuclear power plants. the recent history of nuclear weapons in the middle east offers several challenges to this. i would list them as follows. firstly, nuclear weapons are still perceived as the ultimate guarantor of a country's sovereignty. this is the case in pakistan, israel, and the way i see it, iran. but to put this list into some context, don't forget the united states was, along with others, also firmly in this category during the cold war. a second challenge, according to news reports, terrorists now see

nuclear materials if not atomic bombs themselves. as being the must-have terror weapon. whatever is agreed at next week's summit, anxieties will remain. last october terrorists attacked pakistan's military headquarters near islamabad. where are pakistan's nuclear weapons kept? i don't know. but i was told deep inside very secure military bases. is it military headquarters meant to be very secure, i asked? the terrorists didn't get quite as far as as kiyani's office was the response. kiyani is the chief of army staff in pakistan. the third challenge is that there remains and will continue to remain an unfortunate overlap in the scientific knowledge and technical skills needed to develop either a civilian nuclear power plant and research program or a military program.

and a fourth challenge is that to me nuclear technology has become an ingredient in international great power rivalry. think of the behavior of moscow and beijing towards international u.s.-led diplomacy on iran. and the tolerance of moscow and beijing towards russian and chinese business links with in this case iran. despite these challenges, there have been -- there has been progress. pakistan is, i think, no longer exporting enrichment technology or any other nuclear technology. of previous customers libya is disarmed though iran remains a problem, a big problem. but iran aside, gone are these days, this photograph, from the 1980s, 1985 to be precise. of the construction of a pakistani-designed enrichment plant in china.

another item of progress. nor is china giving away nuclear weapon technology. the most egregious example of which is the gift of pakistan in 1982 of a bomb design and 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. that's enough for two atomic bombs with some left over. such a policy came from the very top. this 1988 photograph is of the grand old men of the chinese nuclear weapons program. along with a visiting dr. a. q. khan and his wife. i'll tell you the names later rather than attempt to pronounce chinese myself. if anybody is interested. another item of progress is the notion that nuclear weapons are the ultimate status symbol has been downgraded.

colonel qaddafi of libya saw the light of it. saddam hussein of iraq learned the hard way and did syria although the final chapter of that has yet to be written. i think it is the challenge of stopping the spread of information which will be the permanent headache. amid khan the other khan came to the united states on a fulbright. he worked in vaccina for 14 years. in pakistan he then directed the program working to produce plutonium a nuclear explosive. his better-known rival a.q.khan would not have learned the other way about produce nuclear explosive uranium enrichment if the dutch had enforced their own rules nonnationals being permitted to sensitive material. are we any better at this type of thing today? i'm not sure.

didn't i read last week that a former north korean representative at the iaea was a key player in the nuclear weapons program. the wrong people getting access to information will continue to be a problem. and a particular challenge for the middle east. will there be enough uae citizens with the relevant skills to staff the power stations? certainly not. where will the take a break staff come from? pakistan has a nuclear establishment estimated greater at 10,000 people strong. could they be tempted to work in the uae? would pakistan stop them going? if the uae continues to forsake nuclear weapons and the technologies to require plutonium and highly enriched uranium there could well be an unfortunate cross-fertilization of knowledge and skills. and if you think i'm unfairly concentrating on the uae and

pakistan, think instead of turkey or jordan or morocco or egypt. the challenge for the world today and in terms of today's discussion in the middle east is what bright young engineer or scientist is studying and traveling picking up knowledge and ideas? and what political event is forming the context of that person's thinking? is there a conference on hydrodynamics in the washington, d.c. area this week? what the hell is magnet hydrodynamics do i hear you ask? well, it's complicated but it could relate to centrifuges which enrich uranium. back in 1974, there was such a conference here. and it was attended by one dr. a. q. khan representing not pakistan but the netherlands. who noticed? probably nobody who should have noticed. it's not clear anybody should have noticed at that time at least anyway.

but it illustrates the extent of the challenge between allowing the normal academic discourse that we pride ourselves on and what can be done with the knowledge acquired. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. i now switch hats and chair the event. and we open up for a q & a session. but i will do that normal cheeky thing which is to use my temporary position of power to ask the first question. -- questions. ambassador, was there ever a time -- was it ever possible to have stopped iran? i know it would just be agreeing.

but if you could look back and decide that you were going to be an extraordinary capable person, what would you have done to stop it? or were you only delaying it? and to dr. perkovich, my question is, you mentioned that the focus is not going to be on iran. or not likely to be on iran in this meeting in new york in a month's time. what are we missing? is there a way of switching the focus onto iran? or do we just have to hear a lot of bleeding against the united states for several weeks in new york city? not an unfamiliar sound. i'm afraid in order to catch everybody on camera and in the microphone, i'm going to ask you to respond at these mics. thank you. >> thank you, simon. it's always nice to reminisce about opportunities foregone. and we can only speculate about

this. yeah, i think the last administration and this administration pursued a dual-track strategy. and the one track was to offer opportunities for iran to have dialog and other issues. if they suspended their uranium enrichment. the other track is what this administration called the suppression track, international isolation. u.n. sanctions. i think part of the problem is that each track was too little too late. the inducements were weak. the pressure was weak. and so it is conceivable that if the dual-track strategy had operated at a higher level, if we actually were able to threaten crippling sanctions, a number of years ago, and if we actually had serious -- more serious inducements a couple of years ago, maybe we could have changed the approach taken by

the iranian leadership. but maybe not. it's entirely speculative. >> on the question of the nonproliferation treaty conference in may, i think there are a number of things that can be done. and i actually don't think -- as you said simon, the bleeding at the u.s. will be as bad as it's been. and i think that will be the case for a variety of reasons. i think much of the world had a greater dislike, even hatred for the bush administration than was warranted. so it took special satisfaction out of bounding them. and similarly many of them have greater fondness for the obama administration than would be warranted by the degree of difference between their two policies.

but i think that works in the u.s. advantage in this case. there's a certain amount of support. and by the way, there's a number of things that have happened -- or will have happened beginning tomorrow. and then wednesday, when the president is in prague signing the s.t.a.r.t. treaty, these are all preludes that it's clear the president of the united states is trying to reduce the nuclear weapons, reduce the role of nuclear weapons. mobilize others to try to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament. so i think that will get noticed. as to the question about iran and how to keep iran from succeeding and avoiding the spotlight, there are a couple of things. one is, iran has isolated itself more lately. i get asked by reporters a lot, you know, has obama's change in policy towards the russians

brought the russians along in pressuring iran? and i said, no, the iranians brought the russians along. more than anybody that deals with the government of iran the more they can't stand with the government of iran. you can talk to the indians and anybody. at the end, people want to strangle them. and so i think that iran will find less support this time than it had before. although there still will be some. so the pivotal issue will be the middle east question, which can be allowed to devolve into nuclear weapons. to the degree it can be handled and dealt with, then iran loses tremendous support. egypt in 2005 worked very closely with iran at the review conference to block any progress. and, in fact, they met with the iranian ambassador at the time. and he said, i was prepared to spend 3 weeks wrecking your conference.

he says i ended up having a vacation here in new york. the egyptians did it for me. i didn't have to do a thing. and so i think to the degree that the u.s. can have a more forward-leaning approach to the broader middle east issue, that takes away that issue for the iranians. and you can actually get more focus there. and the french by the way really want to focus on iran. and so it's not just the u.s. there are others who want -- who want that focus. and so we'll see if they can mobilize in a way that's effective, too. >> right. i'll now carry it open to questions. and if you could identify yourself. and make sure your comments end with a question mark. do we have a mic? no, we're speaking into the ones on the table. this gentleman here. if you could identify yourself, please. i'm afraid you'll have to turn

around and speak into the mic. that's the only way that the thing operates. and press the button if necessary, please. >> i'm from national defense university. my question is about two assumptions of this panel. one of them that if iran makes the bomb, other middle eastern countries, especially saudi arabia and egypt, turkey will follow. all those examples in the world show that countries make the bomb because they are concerned about their security. is nuclear iran -- does nuclear iran pose security threat to saudi arabia, egypt and turkey? the other assumption of this panel is that iran is making the bomb. can we be mistaken -- the fact

that iran has taken longer time than any other country in the world trying to make the bomb, if this is the case, there is some question. is there any doubt in your mind about why if iran is making the bomb, why it is taking them very long? >> thank you. ambassador shulte, could you give a diplomatic response, please. >> remember i'm speaking for myself so it may not be diplomatic. you're right to question the assumption there will be a nuclear arms race. boy, i used to talk about that all the time. that's what would worry countries often about iran's nuclear program. that it could spark a nuclear arms race. and we can all agree the middle east is the last place you want a nuclear arms race. i think there would be a lot of pressure on the three countries you mentioned. to have nuclear weapons. i've been in each of those countries. without being specific, i've had senior-level d