iran has nuclear weapons, we'll probably need to have them too. and again i think it's a variety of factors. security, as you mentioned. prestige. and influence within the region. and i think if iran has nuclear weapons, it's going to upset the strategic balance in a way these countries will have to react. how do you prevent that. you need to work on both the security, the prestige and the influence factors. so you have to convince these countries that, you know, we're going to help -- you're going to be secure. and we're going to help provide for your security. that's why it's important to sort of, you know, strengthen our security relationships with these countries. you have to convince these countries that having nuclear weapons doesn't give you prestige. you know, having nuclear weapons should make you look more like north korea. who wants to be north korea? you have to tell these countries it doesn't buy you prestige and influence.

we can't assume there would be a nuclear arms race. and it may take a long time and may be confused. and may be hard to recognized. there could be surprises, too. but i think we have to work to prevent a nuclear arms race from taking -- even if iran gets nuclear weapons. iran has been working on a for a long time. you ask yourself are they really going to be successful? but i think what we've seen, you know, over the last certainly the time i've been at the iaea is, you know, we've seen -- they have now mastered the technology. thanks to a. q. khan about how to enrich technology. a. q. khan has given them bad centrifuges and it's taken them a long time to figure it out. they can't enrich uranium at the level required if you wanted to have a large effective civil program. but they can enrich it well enough if they want to produce a small amount for nuclear weapons. and we're also very confident, the iaea is and we are as well that they worked on how do you take that material and how do

you fashion it into a weapon? now, you know, the u.s. intelligence community in the last assessment said they could have a nuclear weapon sometime between 2010, that's now, and, you know, the end of this decade. maybe we're still talking that time frame. but they have the wherewithal to build nuclear weapons. the question is, will they make that final decision? i think that's what george perkovich said. maybe we can still influence that final decision. i'm worried that they are going to make that final decision. they're going to decide it's useful to have those weapons so we need to figure out how do we live with that? [inaudible] >> just two quick supplements to what greg said. on why it's taking iran so long. and i would argue, you know -- i'm not sure they made up their mind. they're the only state that has sought nuclear weapons while being in the nonproliferation treaty. which actually slows things down and complicates things enormously and raises the stakes

if you get caught. israel, india, and pakistan acquired nuclear weapons but were never part of the nonproliferation treaty. north korea broke out -- it joined -- it joined the nonproliferation treaty in '92 but was already breaking out from it before it started. so it had much less constraints. so iran is the only one that had made that commitment. was treaty-bound. had international expectations that it wouldn't be making nuclear weapons. and then set about doing it. and i think that really slowed them down. and on the arms race piece, the only thing i would add is my concern would be the pressure is not as much security as civilizational. i would think that the arms race pressures will actually be between saudi arabia and egypt. if persia has a nuclear weapons

then they will need a nuclear arab and who will have the status and prestige of getting a bomb first. and that tension would be very strong actually. >> tom litman was the -- and i'll come to bill snyder afterwards. [inaudible] >> have you pressed the button. >> there was a regional security conference in the gulf. i think it was in december. it was general petraeus at the dccc us a spillses. -- auspices. and general petraeus made cryptic remarks about security infrastructure. and the impression he seemed to be giving was that the united states and the dccc countries are trying to develop some kind of jointly understood or coordinated response to the iranian program. in fact, is the united states or any other country trying to

organize or put together a coordinated set of responses or next steps for the day when the iranians finally test or go public? who was in charge of this? >> i certainly don't know, so you might. [laughter] >> i'm not in the government so i can't talk to you right now what's going on. but my sense is like yours, and as i think george said as well, too -- i mean, the u.s. government is starting to take some of the steps that i described. whether it's working with the gulf cooperation council countries in terms of enhancing air defenses, enhancing ballistic missile defenses. strengthening our security cooperation. i think that's the right thing to do. some of that actually started in the last administration. remember, secretary rice started to have meetings with -- she called it -- what did she call it. it was the gcc countries plus saudi arabia and jordan, i believe. >> and egypt. >> and egypt. i'm sorry, you're right. the saudis is part of the gcc

and she started talking about iran and also -- how do we deal with regional security. and secretary clinton, you may remember, early on when she went to the gulf, she said something about the importance of defenses. and a lot of commentators interpreted that as meaning, ah we're stopping iran in having nuclear weapons and she quickly clarified that, no that's not the case. the challenge for the administration or any administration is how do you shift from the diplomacy of prevention in the case of iran to the diplomacy of containment and deterrence in the case of iran without suggesting -- without losing your allies. you know, without suggesting you've given up on preventing iran from having nuclear weapons or without suggesting somehow it's acceptable. so i think as george said, a lot of the things i talked about -- you know, i can talk about it openly given my status. i hope the administration does

it quietly. and i hope perhaps the countries in the region in iran notice it. and our public rhetoric would still concentrate how do we convince iran in stopping its illicit nuclear pursuits? >> bill? >> thank you. >> bill snyder. i had the privilege to chair the defense science board which did some work on the proliferation issue. and there's a compelling body of evidence that suggested that perhaps the most important factor in containing the spread of nuclear weapons was the credibility of the u.s. deterrent. on wednesday, the president will sign the s.t.a.r.t. agreement which is going to extend the process of further reducing both

the numbers of u.s. nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. and there hasn't been too much discussion about the coupling between the -- these proliferation discussions we've been concerned about with respect to iran and the reduction in the -- in u.s. nuclear capability. but on the commission on the u.s. nuclear posture that was chaired by secretary perry, took some very persuasive testimony. about the concern that many allied and friendly governments had about the reduction in the u.s. nuclear capability. so i wonder if this factor is likely to have an effect on the regional consequences of iran becoming a nuclear power? >> george will answer it.

>> well, i think, bill -- i mean, things get conflated, in other words, a reduction of marginal capability that as you know the strategic command and the u.s. military command said they can do without, without changing the force posture, doctrine or anything else, which is what's being proposed under s.t.a.r.t. does nothing even to change u.s. ultimate capability. and i think that's being conveyed to all of the allies. the allies, i think, that you're referring to generally tend to be japan and then some of the nato states. in japan, since the perry/schlesinger commission says do take away the sea launch cruise missile that the u.s. had been retaining even though the navy didn't want it or we didn't feel we needed it. but we retained it at the

request of the japan as kind of a reassurance. the japanese government asked to have it removed in support of disarmament and other things. and then in nato as you know, the foreign ministers of germany, the netherlands, norway, belgium and luxembourg, as greg mentioned, asked that nato now take on this issue of how to reconcile deterrence not necessarily deterrence but with the agenda of seeking nonproliferation and disarmament. i think the environment is changing from the way it was in the cold war. wherein europe was everybody was worried about a massive soviet invasion where the allies wouldn't feel secure if we didn't have tactical nuclear weapons right there to deal with massive war subpact superiority to now the situation where it's reversed. the russians are going to be slowing the disarmament process 'cause they're worried about nato's superiority against russia. none of that dealt with the middle east, which is the region

here. except turkey where the administration's position, as i understand it, on turkey is basically those weapons can stay in turkey as long as the turks want them. that the u.s. is going to do nothing unilaterally to remove even these tactical nuclear bombs in europe which all the military -- and you know this better than i do. are obsolete. we would never use those weapons in a military operation. but we're saying basically if it pacifies and makes people feel reassured, we'll leave them there so there won't be a unilateral reduction. the more difficult issue is the question of the middle east where it's not so much -- where the u.s. isn't putting tactical nuclear weapons in the region. so any kind of extended nuclear deterrence would be from the systems, the submarines, the land based systems the bombers and the u.s. and whether that would even be necessary or would it be helpful at a time when you're still trying to persuade iran not to build nuclear weapons in the

first place. and you're trying to persuade iran's neighbors and the rest of the world to work with you to press iran. if you then announce oh, and by the way, we'll use our nuclear weapons against iran if iran doesn't stop trying to get nuclear weapons. i don't know how that would help the politics of it. but i don't know also whether u.s. military planners would say we would need nuclear weapons in any way to defeat iran in that kind of scenario. the ones i've talked to said we don't or we wouldn't. in which case why would you talk about introducing them now. 'cause i don't know that it would be reassuring actually in the middle eastern context for the u.s. to say, oh, yeah, we're going to bring nuclear weapons into the equation. i don't know how that would play politically and, therefore, be reassuring. >> raffi?

>> thank you. >> i'm raffi. and my question is addressed to simon. do you agree with your two colleagues here that it is too late to prevent iran from getting nuclear weapons? i'm not quite clear that i got the answer in your presentation. and as a follow-up to any of the panelists, what would happen to the status of america in the middle east if after both the bush administration and the obama administration have repeatedly said they will not allow iran to get nuclear weapons capability if they actually do get it. what will happen then? >> i personally don't think that economic and financial sanctions are going to be effective in deterring iran from pursuing a

nuclear weapon route. i also don't think that diplomatic pressure will succeed. these measures might delay things. but they won't necessarily change things. my assessment of iran is that iran wants a nuclear weapon. and in particular, this regime in iran wants a nuclear weapon because they see that will guarantee the islamic republic. and give them the kudos of having provided iran with a nuclear weapon. i also think that iran sees of a nuclear weapon in the way that north korea sees it. which is sort of a way of deterring of bullies of the

world community and in particular the united states. so in other words, the more pressure iran finds itself under from the united states, to my way of thinking there's great danger that it will only re-enforce its determination nuclear weapons. left open in this assessment, is the impact of a military assault of one form or another on iran. i'm no expert. you might delay iran getting a nuclear weapon. but there are consequences or there are likely to be consequences. and most people that i speak to think the consequences would be enormous rather than the apparent zero consequence of the impact of the attack on the syrian reactor.

>> and what would has been to the united states -- [inaudible] >> well, i'll leave it to my colleagues to pass judgment. i don't -- as only an aspiring american, i don't feel qualified to really make that judgment. >> george and i quickly conferred. and we conquered it won't look good if granted nuclear weapons. [laughter] >> that was pretty easy actually. after multiple administrations have said this would be unacceptable. you know, one thing i've learned in my career dealing first with the balkans and then with nuclear proliferation never say something is unacceptable because sometimes that means you're going to find yourself accepting it but rather focus on what you're going to do to prevent it from happening. or if it's happening, to contain the consequences. and so i think, you know, rather than sort of wringing our hands if iran gets nuclear weapons,

gee our diplomacy wasn't working and say we have a determined opponent here and how do we make sure that the iranian leadership is not left better off. but is left worse off? that it doesn't gain those thanks perhaps it wants. whether it's prestige or security and how over time and it may take a long time -- how do you roll back their program? i mean, how do you make it clear that they are not benefiting from their nuclear arms. that there is another path that they haven't chosen yet. and perhaps some day will find a different iranian leadership that decides they're better off without those nuclear weapons. and so i think, you know, rather than just sort of saying oh, we weren't successful, i think we need to figure out how we succeed in the longer term in terms of minimizing the influence, minimizing the benefit they get from nuclear arms and maybe eventually

convincing them under different leadership to give them up. >> we have time for two more questions. can we take them both as one? and -- if you would like to first -- >> hi, thank you. neither israeli or pakistani nuclear capability raised the possibility of having a direct impact than the shift of poverty in the region. but the regional countries seem to be reluctant to take up a position against iran. so my question is, are they willingly accepting to have a shift in the balance of power in the region? or do they see themselves irrelevant to the outcome of this dilemma?

>> please. >> don, another national defense university representative. no one has talked about the bombing option very much. and how much delay and some of the -- we know some of the likely repercussions on the thoughts. >> on the military option, i kind of let the -- in general let -- let the generals speak for me. i mean, i think since for the last several years including in the bush administration, it was very clear -- it was very clear in secretary gates' testimony to be confirmed and in the bush administration where he thought an iran with nuclear weapons was deterable.

and you see it in statements from admiral mullen and others. clearly the generals have a sense a bombing would not put the u.s. in a better position over the ensuing years and i haven't read anything that makes me think that i'm not right. and raffi question the status of the u.s. if iran gets nuclear weapons. that's a great question and greg and i both agree it's not good. you have to evaluate that against the status -- if the u.s. took other actions. so in other words, a bombing campaign, how does that leave the u.s. status internationally. and i don't know the answer to that question. it could be better. but i think that's the way to address that question. on your question, ma'am, which i thought was a great question. and this is something that conpounds -- i mean, i know it confounds u.s. diplomats when you talk to countries and their leaders privately they talk about how very, very concerned they are and how much they don't

want iran to have nuclear weapon capability and publicly why doesn't your government go out and make expressions of that or work more closely with the u.s. and others? and you get different answers. but that i know. -- but they don't. and they say we don't want to make the iranians come after us. or there are things they could do to us quietly and interfere in internal affairs that we don't want to do. we don't want to alienate others. so there's lots of different answers. but i know in several of the countries in the region, going back several years, i would have officials come up and say privately you should bomb them. and then i say what will your country do after we bomb them? they say we will hang your president in effigy. and our people will fill the streets. and so i think that's part of the tension. turkey has been very interesting

in a sense in offering especially with the proposed deal to fuel the tehran research reactor of last october. turkey stepped in in a way that was very welcomed to try to build confidence. and perhaps broker that. my guess is without being -- knowing the details, that turkey was probably very frustrated by dealing with the iranians on this issue as well. but that one response that neighbors have with trying to deal with iran -- everybody who deals with iran is frustrated. i mean, maybe not hezbollah. [laughter] >> but everybody else. and the question is do they keep the frustration to themselves or do they express it in different ways? and i think that's -- i don't have the answer to that question. but i think everyone is frustrated by it including turkey or the other states. >> when we talk about bombing, there's a big wildcard here and that's obviously israel. and i'm not in a position to evaluate how the recent developments between the u.s. and israel might affect decision-making there.

but i can say individual as a person, i was surprised that israel didn't undertake military action a couple of years ago. i mean, israel set some pretty clear red lines and if israel said red lines, if something is not acceptable they will do something to me. remember when the israeli was talking about the point of no return, i understood that -- i interpret that as meaning having an enrichment capability. but they didn't act at that point. and i don't pretend to understand or be able to evaluate their decision-making problem. but i suspect the government just saw how complicated that was in the middle east. now, what about other countries in the region? if i may pick on your own country, turkey, and tulin who's a great reporter by the way. knows i'm a friend of turkey. i worked very closely with turkey in the balkans and the iaea.

but i have to say i've been disappointed recently. after i left, the board of governors passed a resolution on iran. it was after the second enrichment facility had been exposed to the world. and there was a resolution that basically condemned iran for violating security council resolutions, for not having told the iaea about this nuclear facility in advance. this was the first resolution that was passed by the board of governors. since we reported iran to the security council. it was significant. and we got a pretty good majority of the iaea board to go along with us. i mean, it wasn't the u.s. and our european colleagues. it was japan. it was australia. it was russia. it was china. it was countries from africa. it was countries from south america. what did turkey do? it abstained?

how could turkey abstain on the fact that a country next to them is violating security council resolutions. and failed to tell the iaea about this facility they're building that really didn't look like a civil facility, excuse me. well, the turkish ambassador explained at the time well, you know, we were trying to mediate and we thought the timing was bad and so forth and so on. but what i've told my turkish friends is, you know, beware of offers to mediate. when i was in vienna i did a lot of traveling to talk to governments and to speak. and it was -- it was funny. like every government i'd go to particularly if they're on the board of governors as turkey is now, they would tell me, ambassador schulte the iranians came to us that we could mediate. i heard that from the swiss the spanish and from the italians. and i think that was the talking point that, you know, my iranian counterparts were using. they'd go to countries and say, you can be a hero. you can mediate. and that's sort of tempting.

isn't it nice to be the mediator. you don't have to take hard positions. you don't have to put any pressure on. you know, if you're not successful, it's probably because the u.s. messed it up. you know, if you are successful, you're going to be a great hero. it's a very clever strategy by the iranian government to let everyone mediate. it typically wasn't successful. now, the swiss tried for a while. and then the swiss got frustrated and said forget it. you know, we're going to join with the rest of europe and the rest and sort of condemning what's going on. the spanish, the italians were tempted for a while and they backed away. but in the end turkey fell for this siren song of mediation. and to me it's worrisome because turkey is an important country. it has a lot of influence in the region. it's a nato ally. and with turkey abstaining, it's basically sending a signal to iran that you're being successful.

in dividing the international community. you know, turkey abstaining, brazil abstained, too. that's a problem. and turkey and brazil also happen to be on the security council right now. big victory for iran as we look in the security council to put sanctions in place. so i think -- you know, it's very tempting for the countries in the region to try to be neutral. but how can you be neutral on something like this that has such major implications for regional security. and where most of the rest of the world is not on the side of iran. is not sitting at the middle. but is joining everyone else in condemning what they're doing and urging them to comply with the international commitments and to take advantage of negotiations and so forth. >> thank you, greg. well, of it leaves me to bring this session to the end. thanks for being such a good audience. and coming up with some interesting questions.

and i'd like to thank my two colleagues for some great presentations. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> under the new healthcare law, americans who don't purchase insurance will be subject to a $325 fine beginning in 2015. but the head of the international revenue service says his agency is limited in ways to enforce compliance. douglas shulman spoke at the national press club for an hour. >> good afternoon. and welcome to the national press club. my i'm the president of the national press club. we're the w