discussions with administration officials confirmed this that there really isn't any space between them on foreign policy and security issues. that they see that it is significant. what is significant is, you know -- and i've observed this myself simply from meeting with the two of them separately. they really do have different, you know, outlooks on the development of russia. they talk about it very, very differently. medvedev, you know, the fact that medvedev is a lot younger. that he does have experience in the private sector. he does have what we would call the more liberal outlook on things than does mr. putin. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hrbrbárbps)

i think in the case of russia where is the issue of sovereignty so sensitive and that has to be handled with the utmost care. >> i was just wondering if you could talk about the role of congress and particularly on the start treaty ratification but in general how much they can be an obstacle to what the white house is doing with iran sanctions and some lovely and other issues on the agenda plaques.

>> has a great question, thank you. congress can obviously be a big obstacle when it comes to nuclear arms control and that is because to the start treaty this seven has to consent to ratification on the comprehensive test ban treaty which is something this administration supports, they can also be an obstacle there. i think that's if we haven't yet to -- we've seen some things from the hill from particular senator harris the -- senators expressing an view on certain issues related to this on their vacation, missile defenses, several of those things. i think the obama administration has tried to have them off the path, one with a few speeches by vice president biden and a lot

of money to the nuclear weapons complex which many thought would be kind of a prerequisite for senate approval in some of these nuclear arms control areas but we will see what happens with the debate on the start. i don't think they are too many -- this new start treaty is on the face of an end to incremental, not -- there is nothing in there on missile defense. and doesn't seem from a rational perspective, a technical perspective have there are too many leaps here, but politics is politics and there can be any number of different bargains that can be asked for. i would say that i particularly was hoping that obama would be

able to do a series of unilateral moves that wouldn't depend so much on congressional approval and we will see in the country is particularly in the next two weeks. i think we will see some more of use emerging from congress not just on start but on the nuclear posture review. whether there is satisfaction there. >> a couple filing said. do you anticipate that when the president's meets with president medvedev that will be immune to get the russians to sign off on iran sanctions similarly when presidents who comes here should we look in both those meetings as potentially face to face sign off on iran? do think we're on the timetable? is hard to know for sure but for those covering around this should reconsider that one of the central agenda's? secondly, what ever happens to

the security council do you think it would be likely and advisable for the you or some other organization to do another component of sanctions? to think that's something we should anticipate after the security council does or doesn't come up with press last week almost every tree that's been of this nature there's been a tremendous conversation of the numbers. we haven't talked to members and is that because there aren't impressive or is about something else? i will stop there. >> on the iran question, i am operating and the assumption that to the meeting in prague it is very important to get sign off with mr. medvedev are get that much closer to its and that's the filing week with president hu and the chinese and that may be overly ambitious,

but that looks to be the game, sequencing from my standpoint. the russians are closer to us on this and the hope has always been that to get the russians to help to bring the chinese holon. i have always been intrigued by the idea of let's see if, the chinese have been quite happy to hide behind that russian who opposition to sanctions and a russian who local high position on issues including the expansion are others the chinese aren't enthusiastic about either. and on the iran sanctions was been interesting in this round with the obama administration and they've been pretty explicit in talking about this as on the reset getting the russians to come on board, that's a litmus test. now, if you ask him whether that's the litmus test with the

u.s.-china relationship and i know it's not. which reflects the much greater leverage and that the chinese have in the bilateral relationship with the u.s. than the russians in particular and that's a pretty interesting and telling i think change of affairs from even just a years ago where the russian support was viewed as you got that then it got the chinese -- that little paradigm if it ever existed i think it's broken. and the chinese have shown themselves of a number to bring issues over the past year to be willing to be more in front and in opposition to u.s. interests. i'm sorry -- the question, the nuclear treaty. >> the numbers? >> the numbers.

well, sharon do you want to talk about the numbers? >> i was going to refer to -- i think that there is less of an obsession with numbers because of the reason that in the day earlier which is the u.s. does not -- there are many in the u.s. that do not fear russia as a major strategic competitor here did maybe anger can talk about the discussion in russia over numbers, but there's another thing. first the numbers are not so low compared to what they were previously and also depends on what you are comparing to -- your accounting and is that the original start agreement and the moscow treaty, the white house has come out and said this is 30% lower than the sort of levels but in the and the really care? when of the war had started to get to -- now we are at 1550, --

when they start to get to the thousand level of were below then you're really going to start to care about numbers because then you're talking about to we continue to have strategic triad, are we going to continue to have missiles and bombers and submarines. and who else you need to bring into the negotiations and then becomes a multilateral funds control negotiation. previous administrations were always focused on the bilateral u.s. russian or u.s.-soviet to -- the obama administration said we will pursue multilateral arms control so the question will be at what point can you bring in those other players. >> two follow-up on that i think for the administration the most important thing is that we get the tree down, with the expiration of the start treaty in december would lose the entire verification of monitoring regime that went

along with add so i think for the obama folks being able to replace the treaty and maintain a significant degree of that verification and monetary regime is probably the most important achievement from the standpoint of u.s. national security with the treaty. but for the russians the numbers are -- the russians -- talking over the last decade or so in nuclear circles with the russians, you often, they can talk about getting down to a thousand weapons and i think as soon see be a relatively reasonable proposition for them. kind of interesting how that is over this negotiation and this seems to been getting to where we are this treaty harder than some expected and i think again

getting the next step will be harder if we are not -- unless we're willing to really address of the strategic stability relationship and talk about their role of missile defenses that included and you can't be finessed in the next round i don't think. nearly certain from the russian standpoint. also the role of long-range precision guided conventional munitions. that's what's really a is began this sort of in the concern about the russian military strategic planners and where this is going. >> [inaudible] >> well, i think we're going to have to consider -- if there is

no discernible progress on u.n. security council resolution it will, of course, consider other options and the question is with a european allies will be most helpful there. the french are espousing their help but probably -- and they are talking big -- but the germans will probably in the end be a little more helpful but i think and we continue on the same path we been going down wishes to look at this and every single lateral which is not just the top level, highly political highly visible ones. >> did you want to add to that? >> [inaudible] >> great. question? >> politico. going back to the recent can you elaborate on what the recent suicide bombing means to that effort?

>> brief me -- for me the suicide bombings especially the bombings that took place in moscow last monday on the metro is a reminder that russia is probably if you look to the united states, europe and russia, russia is probably the most warner blow of those three countries, three regions to terrorist attack and to the possibility of a catastrophic terrorists attack. and whoever carried out of these bombings, it was a very powerful statement to undertake a mammoth underneath were very close to being underneath the former kgb building, the institution which

has pryor responsibility for the protection of the russian people. it's a little bit certain -- it is little analogous to the symbolic importance of of taking out the world trade center, the pentagon and the aspiration of taking out the capital is as well. how is going to play out is hard to predict. on the domestic political front in the past decade, there's no question that terrorist attacks have played to the favor mr. putin and as a justification for further centralization of political power etc. we have seen in response to this attack

i think the considerable difference between mr. putin and mr. medvedev. mr. putin has resorted to his usual playbook of a pull them out of the sewer line taking them out of the outhouse and that kind of a very tough talk and referred to some of that tough talk from medvedev as allow but we've also seen from medvedev is this is a reminder that really the core problem is the terrible of socio-economic conditions in the north caucasus which are the driver for these groups to attack which is not something we hear from mr. putin appear in. >> so how could the u.s. administration mistrust russia and aho. obama said the san ready to help last week. how could he do that and would they even -- foot rushing and be

open to that? >> can i jump in? that's a very good question because the way i see the conflict in russia is between not terrorism of which is some of the suicide bombers and save terrorism. another risk russian politics hasn't exactly been the same as our policy in afghanistan. in other words, for russia anti-terrorism means meeting with a wider swath of population with no cameras present and no media present and to which you wish and some of the brave russian human rights activists have reported on some of the atrocities by russian serviceman and security forces in the region, is not surprising the sister-in-law in more -- is like a thomas nast stirring even more cause for revenge and that looks as though the two people who blew themselves up in the moscow metro so-called black widows, women whose husbands or brothers

or some kinsman it were actually killed by russian forces, so how can read help russian anti-terrorism? navy to the example of guantanamo legal process and so on and so forth just to show the anti-terrorism does not mean the destruction of all human rights, the violation of human rights in the north caucasus so i don't think russia would want us to help. when i do fear there is a foreign policy aspect, whether strength is put in domestically are not on the foreign-policy side there are worries i think in some of the neighboring countries that russia could use this two-point fingers at countries such as georgia's worst they have been hinting at the georgia supporting terrorism against russia and supports some of the separatist movements and, in other words, it could potentially be whipped up as an anti corner anti neighbor device

in places where russia wants to exert greater influence and particularly in where it is handling terrorisms of that something and appear on the foreign-policy side. >> with add alizma thank everybody for coming to csis will be found later on our website at csis.org. thanks again for coming and if you follow up questions please feel free to contact us. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

i know what the challenges and we're in a unique position to go to war, what we need is policy-makers in washington to develop a roadmap so we can get it done. >> something about energy policy you like to talk about on your blog? at the new c-span video library you can search it, watch it, whippets and share it. over one has assisted thousand hours of video from yesterday or 10 years ago. every c-span program since 1987. the c-span video library, tables with this gift to america. >> the question debated yesterday at an event hosted by

the washington institute. speakers include the former u.s. ambassador to the international atomic energy agency. this is about 30 minutes. >> [inaudible conversations] >> in afternoon and welcome to the washington institute for near east policy. my name is simon, i'm the picture of fellow and director of the gulf of program here. it also forced me today to chair this session, one of the caris occasions year when a also a speaker so i hope i will get the bounce right. if i have to disagree with one on either side of myself. [laughter] with me today to address this very important topic of too little too late nuclear security in the middle east, gregory schulte and george perk of it, gregory schulte is currently the senior visiting fellow at the

national defense university center for the study of weapons of mass destruction. there's no way to get that on one on. [laughter] from 2005 to 2009 he served as the u.s. permanent representative at the international atomic energy agency in vienna. george who i have the honor of listening to this morning as he was doing in a gig at his home carnegie endowment is the vice president for sundays and director of the nuclear policy program at the carnegie endowment for international peace. he's done a lot of work over the years on nuclear issues and the road a very good book on india. many years ago which i referred to proclaim. welcome to both and i am going to start by asking gregory

schulte speak. as a government employee he has a variety of conditions to describe the restrictions use anger. he knows a better off than i do and i will leave it to him. [applause] >> simon, thank you very match. is a privilege to be here with you and with george. when i was the u.s. ambassador to the iaea georgian night agreed on many issues, he got in the all wrong but on many other issues we agree so is a pleasure to be here with him. and i am a senior fellow which gives me academic freedom cycas behind so i do need to be clear about that, and not speaking for the u.s. government. a year ago in prague president obama warned that nuclear terrorism poses put the most immediate and extremist threat

to global security. the president vowed to lead international effort to secure all learn both nuclear materials around the roles in four years. this month's nuclear summit is intended to advance that goal. like president bush and president clinton before him, president of, recognizes that nuclear terrorism must be at the top of our national security agenda. to prevent nuclear terrorism we must detect, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, we must develop a defense in depth of our homeland but we also must walk down the material that terrorists can use to build an improvised nuclear device or a dirty bomb. when i was indiana -- by the way vienna is a wonderful place. when i. >> after four years there somebody actually think to me for having served my country in the vienna as though i had been in baghdad or can the heart or

something like that and i said it was actually and it is the taxpayers paid for myself and my wife to be there but it was a wonderful experience professionally and personally. and but also is wonderful working closely with the talented people and the department of energy and i know you heard from deputy secretary who is continuing that in a particular the work led from of energy to something called the global threat reduction initiative. this initiative gtri has been doing much to remove dangerous material into account for and consolidate what remains and to improve its physical security. in the middle east the gtri help walk down a clear material and radiological material in countries like egypt, saudi arabia and yemen. is how to remove nuclear materials from countries like libya and iraq. and -- and we've moved five and a 50 metric tons of nuclear material from iraq.

it's how to convert some of reactors from high enriched uranium that can be used to build nuclear bombs to medium or low enriched uranium in countries like turkey, libya and pakistan. the department of energy has requested congress to increase the gtri funding by 67% to howl me to the president's goal of securing of older mbomu clear materials within four years. all, nuclear terrorism is high on national security priority list many other countries including the middle east two not see the same threat. during my four years in vienna when of my reduce was too big for it in to praise the efforts of the international atomic energy agency and the other base organizations to combat nuclear terrorism but one of the big obstacles i faced was the disinterest of many member states. well, the u.s. and our european friends and allies and many other like-minded countries and

australia, japan, ranked nuclear terrorism as a top threats, not everyone else does. in fact, diplomats from developing countries often saw nuclear terrorism as an american obsession. and not a true tangible threat to. they thought of nuclear terrorism as the stuff of hollywood thrillers and should it materialize as primarily a threat to the nuclear powers. they worry that nuclear security would create new barriers to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and divert funding from several programs that were important to them. thus i would argue a very simple but important goal for this nuclear security summit is for the president to encourage other heads of state government to treat nuclear security with the same priority that we do. one of the basic international

assistance to improve on nuclear security is convention on the physical protection. in the middle east israel and saudi arabia and pakistan and turkey signed the basic invention but not the 2005 amendment. in a few cases the reasons for this reticence is purely political so the nuclear summarize opportunity to press these governments and set aside the politics and join with other countries swings in the amendment.

nuclear security to be seen as a key task for the iaea had revenue than as a distraction or some countries as part of the political game. the middle east is a source for nuclear terrorism one.