tv [untitled] CSPAN April 6, 2010 2:30pm-3:00pm EDT
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iran's leaders have ignored our choice and they taken a third path using negotiations and partial cooperation to divide the international community, to stave off international sanctions and to continue their nuclear suits. i can only assume that iran's leaders tokyu late at the prestige, influence and security that they see as provided by nuclear weapons or by reaching the threshold of having them outweigh whatever condemnation and sanctions emerge from the multilateral process. increasingly, i would argue, we must base our plans and
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diplomacy on the assumption that iran will have nuclear weapons. did i mention early-onset i was speaking for myself, not the u.s. government? okay, just want to make that clear. dears, wants nuclear arms and not be so suicidal as to launch nuclear attacks against israel, the united states or other partners are allies in the region. however iran's leaders may engage in nuclear brinksmanship, dangerous escalatory behavior to try to intimidate neighbors, to teach outside intervention or even to impress the republic. he may feel emboldened to use surrogates, asymmetric mansur conventional force to seize territory in the extend influence or assault neighbors. and whether tehran intends it or not, groups like hezbollah macie iran's atomic arsenal as a nuclear umbrella for more aggressive action against israel and others.
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mishandle brinksmanship or nuclear emboldened aggression may escalate deliberately or not to nuclear use. compounding this danger is a real risk that others in the middle east may decide to acquire their nuclear arsenals. kennedy proliferates including egypt, saudi arabia and from perhaps the nato ally most exposed. these countries could be motivated by their leaders desire for security, influence or nearly quit each. no cruncher he aspires to middle east leadership will want to be the last to have nuclear weapons. now nuclear arms race is not inevitable, nor would it necessarily be fast. with the exception of israel and iran, most countries in the region are far from having bomb making capabilities. but we must prepare for surprises. remember how in the mid-1980's,
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saudi arabia suddenly had css two medium-range missiles are carried from china. remember how more recently syria built a nuclear turn the desert with no one noticing for at least five years. fast and surprising or slowing fitful, a nuclear arms race would not defy the risk of accident, miscalculation or of a nuclear weapon following into the hands of terrorists. the united states must prepare to contain the dangers posed by a nuclear armed iran. we should do so in several ways. first, the u.s. and nato should reinforce our collective ability to protect alliance territory population and regional interests. this requires military capabilities to project force, to ensure the security of energy supplies and conduct operations despite the threat or use of nuclear weapons. this requires missile defenses that can protect the alliance
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territory and deployed forces. second, the u.s. and nato should drink and security relations with key arab partners, particularly egypt, iraq on the jordan, saudi arabia and the gulf states. consultations on the security risks of iran's nuclear activities would be a first note. subsequent acts could include bilateral will take national exercises, combined contingency planning, foreign military sales and missile and air defenses that could extend protection to regional partners and interoperate with the defenses. third, the united states and nato should act to discourage further proliferation. strong security relations with the countries most exposed as i have described can reduce the incentives to proliferate. also, iran must be denied any benefit from its nuclear arms.
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the world may have no choice but to live with a nuclear armed iran, but we should not accept it and we should not legitimize that. other would-be proliferators should look at iran, even with nuclear weapons and they should either treaty violation bring penalties instead of prestige, sanctions and that is security and isolation instead of influence. finally, it may donate to to consider the implication for its own nuclear policy. nato foreign ministers will be meeting in estonia later on this month. a lance nuclear weapons will be on their agenda. this item was added at the request of ministers from belgium, germany, luxembourg, netherlands and norway. these five foreign ministers have asked to discuss how nato can contribute to president obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. nato authority drastically reduced its nuclear posture. after the cold war, and i was
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there so i remember, the alliance/to stockpile of nuclear stock weapon and illuminated entire categories of weapons and radically reduced the readiness of delivery forces. while there maybe scope for some further reduction, further consolidation and perhaps changes and declaratory policy, a serious discussion is warranted before the alliance sets its force planning target as a nuclear zero. together with conventional capabilities and faced adaptive missile defense, nato's nuclear forces may still have a contribution to make in two ways. first, they drink iran's leaders from trying to exploit new nuclear arms and second by reassuring allies and partners who might otherwise seek their nuclear weapons. excuse me. beyond having strong security relations with would-be proliferators, what can the u.s. do to prevent another generation of proliferation?
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first, we should continue to discourage the spread of sensitive technologies that can be misused to build nuclear weapons. it's good and important for countries like the uae, saudi arabia has committed to forgo uranium enrichment technologies as they develop their civil nuclear capabilities. they recognize that forgoing these technologies, every line in the market for their nuclear fuel makes sense economically and helps reassure the world of their peaceful intent. it would be good and important is countries like turkey and egypt would make the same commitment. it's troubling that they have not. we should continue to back efforts to establish international field banks, discourage countries from pursuing these technologies in the nuclear suppliers group should finally agreed to restrict their transfer. second, we must reinforce our ability to detect and investigate plan to see nuclear
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activities. it is deeply troubling that syria and north korea were able to hide for so long their collaborative construction of a nuclear dirt. much more encouraging was the success of our intelligence community and finding iran's second enrichment facility near calm. we need to build on the success, but look beyond iran and north korea. this not only means looking for kind is the nuclear programs, it also means trying to understand leadership motives and decisions that could cause a country to decide that it wants nuclear weapons. i.e. investigators to not have the tools or resources of our intelligence community or those of other major state. but 80 inspectors often have access to information that member states talent and maybe able to connect the dots in ways that member states can't. we should continue to help the iaea and building its investigative skills and tools
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and make as routine as possible the sharing of information. the inspectors need not only more information, but more authority. the administration at us right us write encouraging more countries to sign the iaea's additional protocol. rather than just trying to run up the number of countries that have signed, the administration needs to focus on those key countries that have refused to date and i would argue president obama has an important discussion to have with the leaders of egypt and brazil in particular on the margins of the nuclear summit. third, the united states should set up international efforts to interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear material. pakistan's a.q. khan remains under house arrest. [inaudible] simon can clarify that. however, whether he's under house arrest or not, the case of serious covert or is suggested north korea has moved into the
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market for nuclear weapons technology. the proliferation security initiative endorsed a product by president obama needs to be reenergized and targeted in particular on north korea's proliferation activities. we should win a high-level diplomatic efforts to bring in countries like china, indonesia and malaysia to lie on the maritime routes used by north korea. only conclude by recalling the question inherent in today's topic. our our our first you promote nuclear security in the middle east too little too late? i regret to report my view that it maybe too late to avoid nuclear armed iran. but it is certainly not too late for a concerted effort to detain the changers posed by nuclear armed iran and preventing another round of nuclear proliferation that could make the danger of nuclear terrorism that much more frightening. thank you very much.
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[applause] >> greg, thank you very much. no, he's not under house arrest at the moment. he has to ask in advance 30 minutes in advance before he goes out. has he gone out? i am told that people saw him in a bookshop last week along with his wife. i'd now like to ask george berkowitz to -- berkowitz to speak. i'm guessing that was mr. books shelf for a.q. khan would've been shopping. i don't want to be more boring than usual, which i would eat because i agree with just about everything that ambassador -- excuse me ambassador sheltie said. intended to lighten it up by
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talking about the nuclear where we do disagree, but i know that that is my topic today although i think the implications are some of the effects of that deal actually do carry over into our dealings with iran certainly our dealings with pakistan and its nuclear program and certainly with our average winning the u.s. government effort to try and get agreement around the world antitreaty to stop producing additional nuclear weapon material, which actually does come to our subject today in a way that if we're talking about nuclear security and the security of fissile materials are highly enriched uranium to plutonium mainly that could be made into nuclear weapons one of the ways over time to limit the problem and to get a handle on it is to at least get states to stop producing more of it.
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and there's been an effort. there's an ongoing effort to negotiate such a treaty which pakistan adamantly blogs with an argument that is sound if not ultimately persuasive that because of the u.s.-india nuclear deal and yet is now in a position to produce dozens of more nuclear weapons per year than it would've before. pakistan has to keep up with that therefore pakistan will be producing more nuclear weapons. and you should say chance.because there'll be an announcement that pakistan's capability to produce plutonium now for nuclear weapons is going to increase significantly. as will its determination to block a treaty to stop that and they will be blaming the united states for this because of the nuclear deal with india. so that will be a live topic going forward. but in terms of today's agenda, i do like greg, want to unpack a little bit the title because the title was artful.
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nuclear security in the middle east, too little too late. in each of those terms i think and write a little bit of discussion. and so if what is meant by a nuclear security is the security of nuclear materials, parts that could be made into explosive nuclear weapons, i think ambassador schulte did a great job here but i think that message was relatively positive, that there is a lot of effort, nuclear security summit next week in washington will try to mobilize high-level leadership to deal with this problem of securing fissile materials and of all the kind of big problems in the world, this is one of the more manageable. it's the number of sites with material like this is known or close to being known. it's a very finite number, it's
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a small number. and it's not too complicated to know what to do at those sites for those materials. it's not an emotionally or historically they didn't issue. it's not like dealing with the surge of the croats in the middle east or korea and japan where you have all of these legacy issues that very much complicate tanks. this is a relatively manageable issue and i think the summit in the attendance that's going to be at the summit is testament to that, do you get more than 40 leaders of more than 40 countries willing to come to an invitation to work on base issue and not really holding it hostage to a lot of other issues, suggest that it's a relatively benign problem to try to deal with. albeit an important one. if what we mean go by nuclear
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security is the broader understanding of security, the environment in which one lives, the sign says states are other areas that are in an environment that's either secure from threats of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation or insecure in that sense and insecure to the point that it makes you want to get nuclear weapons or you're worried that your neighbor is going to get them. if it's that sense of security and insecurity were talking about, the situation is not a good as it is in terms of just securing the materials. and there the question in the title would be nuclear security in the middle east. well, the question is, what is the status of nuclear security depends on where you sit in who you were. the view maybe different in israel than it is in iraq than it is inferior, then it is in jordan, that it is in saudi arabia. i would argue in none of these places is actually good, but the
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degree of anxiety and a sense of insecurity depends on the place. and i think in a lot of ways that we end up talking about iran and i will talk a little bit more about iran. but i think it's indicative of the overall problem and the way we might think about it. to remember back to the 1980's and the first of the iran iraq war and the motivations for iran starting its clandestine effort to enrich uranium and acquire other capable stupidest nuclear weapons cannot have a very, very insecure times for iraq war was being attacked by chemical weapons on missiles by saddam hussein's iraq and basically the international community did nothing to respond. in fact, denied the charges that iran was making that iraq was making these attacks were a number of years. we can go through the history
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they are and the different ways of complicity menace. but the general argument is if you don't attend to states with capabilities when their security interests are very, very challenged, and you don't respect the security interests, don't expect them to stand still. they will react you can in many ways, what we're dealing with now is a reaction to that. is it too little too late? another element in the title. well, i think it depends on the gun whom were referring to them what the problem is. is it too little too late to do with iran? i'll say somewhere. i would say that many of the states in the region answering that question at the title is nuclear security in the middle east too little too late. they were very talking about israel in its acquisition of nuclear weapons that it too little too late and you've done too little and eugenic too late, or not at all? and i'm saying that because the
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npt, the non-proliferation treaty review conference next may, in six weeks or what have you, less than six weeks, four weeks. there're going to be perhaps 190 countries meeting for a month in new york, talking about nuclear security, non-proliferation nuclear weapons. that event operates under consensus rules, which i would say are very unfortunate, though we don't understand why they exist. and there will be everyday reference to with great dna and israel's nuclear status and what the u.s. is doing to deal with it because there was a resolution at the meeting in 1995 when the decision was made, which the u.s. strongly, strongly pushed for the right reasons to indefinitely extend the nuclear non-proliferation. that was under question in 1995
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and the u.s. in other states one basically an agreement to indefinitely extend the treaty. but it was contingent upon acceptance of the resolution on the middle east put forward by the middle east and others. and there'll be an argument for which there is evidence that any ensuing 15 years, very little has been done to fulfill that resolution, which was part of this deal made in 1995. and i hear to litigate or argue one side or the other. i'm saying this is a very big life issues that will be affect the nuclear security in the middle east, u.s. national interest and other states natural interest in the weeks ahead and in the time after that. and just as it's very common at carnegie for the washington and to tutor other places right now to have meetings on iran were refocused on the security inflammations overran another world. what i'm trying to suggest in much of the other road, there is
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a very different focus, although they're worried about iran, too. there were other elements in other parts of this policy that we're going to get exposed to at the npt in may that we don't normally get exposed to in the u.s. and not to do do with the broader middle east, israel's position there. to the extent that were talking about iran when we talk about too little too late, i would argue well, again, not argue but want to unpack too little of what? one could argue that the u.s. has tried isolation of your ram going back to at least when i started working on this which was 1993, so it's a personal failure of mine for 17 years having tried to work on the iranian nuclear problem. but people forget, this was when iran was just starting to say that it wanted to resume the
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bushehr nuclear power plant at its start during the iran-iraq war and so iran had gone to germany to see men's to ask for work in the clinton administration, not the george w. bush administration. the clinton administration took a position no nuclear program in iran, not just no enrichment, no nuclear power plant, no nothing in iran. that was the u.s. position. and the u.s. used his influence with germany to get germany to stop cooperation with iran. and that was seen as a victory of the strategy of isolating iran. and then russia came in to fill the german position. so russia said will provide this cooperation. and then it was found actually that russia, around 96, 97 that russia had agreed to supply
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uranium enrichment technology to secretly to iran and then the clinton administration exposed to this to yelp and got agreement that the rush and slid back out of that element of that, but they would go ahead with bushehr. but in the uranium enrichment cooperation. and that's where we thought to play until it was discovered that pakistan was supplying uranium enrichment assistance to reran, that i was in russia when this was announcing. where were the russians surprised and not happy. they thought they were the only ones in this kind of relationship with iran and it was like, you know, somebody finds out their mistresses having an affair and they are outraged. [laughter] and how could they be with the pakistanis? and the russians are still mad about that. the point is that the ways of trying to do that isolation,
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which i support, we've been trying for a long, long time. and so i don't know if it was too little or too is just a question of there are always ways around these problems. i don't think isolation was too late. iranians and others will argue that inducement is offered to late and too little. but there again, i would remember in 97, 98, the clinton administration tried inducements with the khatami administration. as a positive change. there were efforts whether they were clumsy or culturally insensitive and we don't understand each other's signals and so all of which is true. but there was an effort to reach out and engage with iran too little too late, arguably not, but unreciprocated it didn't work. so then you get you could argue well, we've been too little
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threatening and too late. and if the bush administration. so it comes along in 2002, axis of evil, pretty threatening, mobilizing forces. working to do iraq first, iran is next year that's pretty threat in. strategy of regime change, which by the way is very threatening, but not which are supposed to do if you're trained to get people to stop building nuclear programs or b. you believe in deterrence because your idea of deterrence is if you behave differently and change behavior, you go to excess and we have a nice relationship. but if your policy is no matter what to do in getting rid of view, that's kind of an inducement to do step to keep you from getting rid of them. but in any case, it there was threatening stuff. so the argument is that we've been too little threatening and done it today, i would argue no, actually that was done earlier. now you could argue well, the
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way the iraq war turned into thousand four, 2005 took the threat away because iranians said the u.s. is losing. you know, we can talk about that, but we've tried these things. now iran has adapted so i think the iranian situation is very different than it was in 97. there's a much greater attachment of these to uranium enrichment then there was then if they got turned into a national identity issue. so that brings me to kind of the end and the only place actually think i differed with greg was, is it too late to stop iran from acquiring the capability to make nuclear weapons. i would argue probably in terms of enrichment, that they're having difficulty, but they basically know how to do it. but i would argue perhaps differently from greg but it's not too late to induce iran not
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to make nuclear weapons. but the decision actually in the set of activities to actually make nuclear weapons is a distinct line. it has to meanings. and that one still hasn't been lost in part because i think the iranian government may have it own uncertainties about the costs and benefits of doing that. and that's important because going from zero nuclear weapons to one or two or three or four is very, very dangerous. a couple nuclear weapons don't do you good if your country like iran, but they can get you in a lot of trouble. because you use one or two, you have to don't destroy anybody, but to guarantee counteraction that can destroy you. you have questions about, would you get caught in the activities that capability but invite kind
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of massive response? so it's a very precarious position that they may choose or may not have made up their mind yet that they want to have. and then as ambassador schulte said, is that too late to detain or deter iran, i think the answer has to be absolutely not because what's the alternative? i remember being in a debate i think it was patrick clawson up in new york. this is a couple years ago and that proposition was, can we live with a nuclear iran? and my response was, what is the alternative? suicide? i mean, things happen if they happen come you do everything you can to prevent them. you figure out how to live with that and that's what deters containment would be, not desirable, not which you set out. nothing i would articulate if i were a policymaker now that
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that's what we're doing. but it's something you do. and greg laid out a bunch of the states that she would do, many of which are being undertaken already. and a smart policy and it seems to me if we get -- and by the way, those things are smart to do even if iran doesn't make nuclear weapons. they're smart to be preparing to do today for other reasons because i ran authority project team power and influence as we see in iraq and give us 10 comments you can see and hear you and as you can see lots of other places. one of the big arguments if you want the iraq war was iran and they're pushing, so you need to be doing these things in any case whether they get nuclear weapons or not. and i think the list that craig offered is obviously a good place to start. so let me close they are with perhaps the boring, you know, kind of endorsement of my
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