recommendation. i hope some of the stuff in the middle is a little provocative and that it cannot further discussion after signing. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, george. at this point, when i speak, we are going to have a few slides, not many. so greg, if you could get your way out addition. [inaudible] >> good afternoon. they say a picture can tell a thousand words. so as pictures go, i particularly like this one. it is the 1999 visit by saudi defense minister, prince hall pond to the uranium to rhmond at kahuta outside the pakistani capital islamabad. 11 years on, salt and is now

print zoltan notionally if it were not for concerns about his age and help the future king of saudi arabia. too salty and last is nawak sharif, then the pakistani prime minister antedate provincial prime minister again. further left is dr. a.q. khan, the then head of the training facility but who has since admitted to having nuclear technology to china, iran, libya and north korea. the extent to which he did this as a so-called rogue agent is disputed. he claims he did it under the instruction of successive military and political regimes. there are also allegations that he offered nuclear technology to iraq, egypt and syria. the man to comically be left we can only see his legs was pakistan's chief of army staff, general pervez musharraf heard

later that year he overthrew nawak sharif in a military coup in sharif was later exiled in saudi arabia. also there that day with the head of the pakistan air force, the head of the pakistan navy and the top bureaucrats, retired general at the pakistani ministry of defense. reportedly, grants all time, his son print colored print zoltan and to delegation was around the enrichment plant saw that gary missiles were on the same site and also shown some nuclear weapons. you will recall that in the previous year, 1998, pakistan has successfully testified to gtri missile and the sub nodong. apparently the administration of kahuta with that day.

on jokingly to print zoltan. if you want you can take a few weapons with you. consult 10. if pakistan has them it is like we have done. can't as long as your oil is similarly hours, your excellency. [laughter] the delegation was shown, the cause and reflectors for an implosion type atomic don. if you don't know what they are, i'll explain afterwards. prince khaled, the commander of air or sister in 1890, 9104 and now this out the assistant minister of defense was told that they were very heavy. he reportedly tried to pick one and was quite surprised he could not even raise it. he then tried with both hands and still could not management. he reportedly said at least he had seen and held the real core

of a nuclear bomb. despite the time which has allowed us to visit, this photographs also has direct relevance for today as well as this next photographs of the accompanying saudi delegation. if and when iran becomes a nuclear weapons state, saudi arabia is thought likely to ask pakistan for some sort of nuclear umbrella. the most readably mentioned idea is that pakistani missiles tipped with nuclear warheads would be based in saudi arabia to deter iran from threatening the kingdom. such an arrangement apparently would not break international agreements if the weapons remained under pakistani control. there are no hard facts to prove the existence of this notion of the pakistani nuclear umbrella, at least none available publicly. indeed, there are a range of

denials, but there is certainly a close diplomatic relationship between saudi arabia and pakistan, perhaps unusually close. one only has to watch the high-level visits between the two countries to realize the respective leaderships value that the respective leaderships value the ties. i don't have a photograph of another visit to kahuta later in 1999, by the then minister of information of the united arab emirates, jacob philip ener on. he was given the same to her. i don't know whether in particular the you eat and go was pointed out to them. this is the prefabricated rushers on which the gtri missiles were being assembled and was sure that this activity to spy satellites have been imported from the ub member state of shock the period but he probably was told that much of the equipment imported for kahuta was ordered by trading

companies operating in another duty member state, dubai in order to evade export controls. the uae certainly knew this was happening. once after i walked into the offices of one such trading company, trading establishments in dubai while reporting for the financial times, the dubai authorities complained to the british government. this was in 1980, yes 30 years ago. the uae would probably now prefer to forget sheikh abdullah's 1999 nuclear tourism. i was hoping for a nod, but i didn't get one. and these days, sheikh abdullah as foreign minister and is a key and valued interlocutor with the united states, successfully helping to guide the so-called 123 agreement through congress so that the uae can access u.s.

technology and generate electricity from civil nuclear power plants. sadly, in terms of the u.s. trade deficit, the uae has selected south korean nuclear plants. i mention the saudi and uae visit to kahuta because they help define what we by nuclear security. and also help illustrate the way others may see it as well. to ordinary people, i.e. not the likes of us policy wonks, the term nuclear security seems like an oxymoron. it will be interesting to see how the white house six is the term to the public during next week's summit here in washington d.c. i would suggest that to some states, nuclear security is the possession of nuclear weapons. two other states, it is the protection offered by allies such as the united states, which have nuclear weapons. on the civil side, it might well be the energy security offered by civilian nuclear power plant.

nuclear science has much to offer on the positive side, but it also carries considerable risk that nuclear weapons being in the wrong hands of rogue states or terrorist groups. and again on the civil side, even civil nuclear power plants carry risks of radiation accidents or theft to dangerous materials. it might appear that awkward people would think the same way on this issues, but i suspect it is not the case. i've been told that significant agreement at next week's summit will be in safeguarding nuclear materials, particularly what are known as fissile materials like plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the explosives inside atomic bombs. the particular danger is that terrorists will acquire such materials. the future that i think president obama wants to be able to offer is of a reduced -- as i've reduce nuclear arsenals,

declining ambitions for nuclear weapons, the best control of nuclear weapons and the widespread availability of electricity generated by civil nuclear power plant. the recent history of nuclear weapons in the middle east offers several challenges to this. i would list them as follows: firstly, nuclear weapons are still perceived as the ultimate guarantor of a country's sovereignty. this is the case in pakistan, israel and the way i see it, it ran. but to put this list into some context, don't forget the united states was, along with others, also firmly in this category during the cold war. a second challenge, according to news reports, terrorist of the nuclear materials, atomic bombs themselves as being the must-have terror weapon. whatever is agreed at next week's summit, anxieties will remain.

last october, terrorist attacks pakistan's military headquarters in rural india near islamabad, where are pakistan's nuclear weapons kept? i don't know. but i was told deep inside very secure military bases. if the military headquarters meant to be very secure i asked? the terrorists didn't get quite as far as i yanni's office the response. kalyani is the chief of army staff and pakistan. the third challenge is to the remained an unfortunate overlap in the scientific knowledge and technical stick goes needed to develop either on civilian nuclear power plant and research program for a military program. and a fourth challenge is jimmy nuclear technology has a common ingredient in international great power of rivalry. think of the behavior of moscow and beijing towards international us-led diplomacy on iran and the tolerance of

moscow and beijing towards russian and chinese business links within this case it ran. despite these challenges, there has been -- there has been progress. pakistan is i think no longer exporting enrichment technologies or any other nuclear technology. a previous customers, libya has disarmed, though iran remains a problem, a big goblin. but i ran aside, gone are these days, this photograph from the 1980's, 1985 to be precise. , of the pakistani design enrichment plant in china. another item of progress, nor is china giving away nuclear weapon technology, the most egregious example of which is the gift to pakistan in 1982 of a bomb

designed and 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. that's enough for two atomic bombs with some left over. such a policy came from the very top. this 1988 photographs -- is that the grand old man of the chinese nuclear weapons programs along with the visiting dr. a.q. khan and his wife. i'll tell you the names later rather than attempt to pronounce chinese myself. if anybody is interested. another item of progress is the notion that nuclear weapons are the ultimate stater semple has been downgraded your colonel gaddafi of libya saw the light on this. saddam hussein of iraq learned the hard way as did syria although the final chapter on that is yet to be written. i think it is the challenge of

stopping the spread of information, which will be the permanent headache. munir ahmad khan, the other comic into united states and was trained in the atoms of peace program. he later worked for the iaea in vienna for 14 years. in pakistan he then developed the program working to produce plutonium, a nuclear explosive. his better-known rival, a.q. khan, would perhaps never have learned as much as he did about the other way to produce nuclear explosive uranium enrichment if the dutch have enforced their own rules against nonnationals being permitted sites as sensitive material. are we any better at this type of thing today? i'm not sure. didn't i read last week that a former north korean representative of the iata was considered a key player in this country's nuclear weapons program? is the wrong people getting

access to information will continue to be a problem and a particular challenge for the middle east. will there be enough uv citizens with the relevant skills to stop a plan to nuclear power stations? certainly not. where will the technical stuff come from? pakistan has a nuclear establishment estimated greater than 10,000 people strong. could they be tempted to work in the uae? would pakistan stop them going? even in this example, if the uae continues to forsake nuclear weapons and the technologies to require plutonium and highly enriched uranium, there could well be an unfortunate cross-fertilization of knowledge and skills. and if you think i'm unfairly concentrating on the uae and pakistan, think instead of turkey or jordan or morocco or reject. the challenge for the world today and in terms of today's discussion in the middle east is

what bright young engineer or scientist is studying and traveling, take enough knowledge and ideas? and what political event is formed in the context of that person's thinking rights is there a conference on mac out of hydrodynamics in the washington d.c. area this week? what the hell is magnet hide your dynamics do i hear you ask? well, it's complicated, but it can lead to centrifuges with enriched uranium. i can 1974 there was such a conference here and it was attended by one dr. a.q. khan, representing not pakistan, but the netherlands who noticed probably nobody who should've noticed. it's not clear anyone should've noticed at that time at least anyways. but it illustrates the extent of the challenge between allowing the normal like atomic discourse we pride ourselves on and what can be done with the knowledge acquired. thank you.

[applause] thank you. i now switch out and share the event. and we open up for a q&a session. but i will do that normal cheeky thing, which is to use a temporary position of power to ask the first question. and ambassador schulte, was there ever a time -- was it ever possible to have stopped it ran? i know it would be just a dream. but if you could the back and decided that you were going to be an extraordinary capable person, would you have done to stop it or were you only delaying it? and two.your perkovich, my

question is you mention that the focus is not going to be on iran and is not likely to be on iran in this meeting in new york in a months time. what are we missing? is there a way of switching the focus onto iran or do we just have two here a lot of pleading against the united states for several weeks in new york city, not be unfamiliar sound. i'm afraid in order to catch everybody on camera and microphone, i'm going to ask you to respond that these mics. thank you. >> thank you, simon. it's always nice to reminisce about opportunities for gone. but we can only speculate about this. i think the last administration and this administration pursued a tool traffic strategy and the one track was to offer opportunities to iran to

participate in civil nuclear cooperation and to dialogue and other issues if they suspended the uranium enrichment. the other wet track was what this administration calls the pressure track, international isolation, u.n. sanctions. i think part of the problem is each track was too little too late. the inducements were weak, the pressure was weak. and so it is conceivable that if the dual track strategy had operated at a higher level, if we actually were able to threaten crippling sanctions, and number of years ago and if we actually had more serious inducements a couple years ago, maybe we could have changed the approach taken by the iranian leadership, but maybe not. it's entirely speculative. >> on the question of the

non-proliferation treaty review conference in may, i think they're a number of things that can be done. and i actually don't think, as you said simon, the bleeding at the u.s. will be as bad as it's been and i think that will be the case for a variety of reasons. i think much of the world had a greater dislike, even he cheered for the bush administration than was warranted, but took special satisfaction out of pounding them. and similarly, i think many of them have greater fondness for the obama administration then would be warranted by the degree of difference between their two policies. but i think that works in the u.s. advantage in this case. there's a certain amount of support. and by the way, there's a number of things that have happened or will have happened beginning tomorrow and then wednesday when the president is in product

signing the start treaty with vignette at. these are all prelude to the review conference where will be very clear that the president of the united states is trying to reduce nuclear weapons, reduce the role of nuclear weapons, mobilize others to try to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament. and so i think that will get noticed. but as a question about iran and how to keep iran from succeeding in avoiding the spotlight, there are a couple things. one is iran has isolated it sells more lately. i get asked by reporters a lot, you know, has obama's change of policy towards the russian -- brought the russians along and pressure reading iran? i said no, the iranians brought the russians along. they said them or anyone deals with the government grant, the more they can't stand the government of iran.

he contacted the indians, you can type to anybody, which is at the end after a while people want to strangle them. and so, i think that iran will find less support this candidate had before, although there still will be sun. so the pivotal issue will be the middle east question, which can be allowed to dissolve into the question of israel's nuclear weapons, to the degree that i can be handled and outwit, then iran oozes tremendous support. egypt, you know, in 2005 worked very closely with iran at the review conference to block any progress. in fact they met with the iranian ambassador at the time and he said, i was prepared to spend three weeks wreck your conference. he said i ended up having vacation here in new york. the egyptians did it for me. i did not do a thing. and so, i think the degree that the u.s. can have a more forward

than an approach to the broader middle east issue, that takes away that issue for the iranians than you can actually get more focused there. but in the french by the way really want to focus on iran. and so, it's not just the u.s. there are others who want that focus. and so we'll see if they can mobilize in a way that's affected, too. >> now carry it over to questions. and if you could identify yourself and make sure your comments and with a question mark. have we got a mike? no, we're speaking into the ones on the table. the sentiment here. identify yourself, please. i'm afraid you have to turn around and speak into the mic. that's the only way the thing operates. and press the button. >> and from national defense university. my question is about two

assumptions of this dynamic good one of them is that if iran makes the bond, other middle eastern countries, especially saudi arabia and egypt, turkey will follow. all the examples in the world show that countries make the bomb because they are concerned about their security. is nuclear iran, does nuclear iran pose security threat to saudi arabia, egypt and turkey? the assumption of this is that iran is making the bomb. can we be mistaken that in fact iran has taken longer time than any other country to make the bond if this is the case? is there any doubt in your mind why and if iran is making the

bomb, why it is taking them -- [inaudible] thank you. >> ambassador schulte, could you give a diplomatic response please? >> remember i'm speaking for myself so it may not be diplomatic here it i think you're right to question the assumption that a new clear arms race. and boy, used to talk about that all the time. that's what would worry countries often about iran's nuclear probe ram, that it could spark a nuclear arms race. i think we can all agree to middle east is the last race in the world when a nuclear arms race. i think there would be a lot of pressure on the three countries you mentioned to have nuclear weapons. i've been in each of those countries without being specific, i said senior level discussions in which senior officials said will probably need them, too. and again i think it's a variety of factors are at security as a mentioned, prestige and, you

know, influence with the region. and i think if iran has nuclear weapons is going to upset the strategic islands in a way that these countries will have to react. how do you prevent the? i think that's where we have to start thinking about. you have to work on both a security, the prestige and influence factors. so you have to convince these countries that, you know, we're going to -- you're going to be secure and were going to provide for security. that's why it's important to sort of strength in our security relationships countries. you have to convince these countries having nuclear weapons doesn't give you prestige. you know, having nuclear weapons should make you look more like north korea and who wants to be north korea? you have to convince these countries it doesn't buy you influence. we can't discern there can't discern there would be a nuclear arms race. and any nuclear arms race may take a long time and be confusing and hard to recognize. there could be surprises, too. i think we have to work to prevent a nuclear arms race from

taking even if nuclear arms in iran. they been working on it for a long time and they're really going to be successful. but i think what we've seen over the last, certainly since the time i've been at the iaea as we seem to have now mastered the technology, thanks to a.q. khan about an rich technology. a.q. khan defense about centrifuges so if you cannot want them to figure figure out how to do it. but they cannot -- they can't enrich uranium at the level required if you wanted to have a large effective civil program, but they can enrich it well enough that they want to produce, you know, the salamat nuclear weapons. and were also very confident coming iaea is, we are as well that they work on how to take the material and how do fashion into a weapon? now, the u.s. intelligence community in the last assessment said they could have a nuclear weapon sometimes between 2010 and the end of this decade. and no, maybe worth stocking

that timeframe. they have the wherewithal to build nuclear weapons or the question is, will they make a final decision? i think that's what george perkovich said gerd am worried that they are going to make that final decision and decide it's useful to have those weapons, so we need to figure out how do we live with that. [inaudible] >> just two quick supplements to what greg said on white's take it your rants along and i would argue i'm not sure that they made up their mind. they are the only state that has sought nuclear weapons while being in the non-proliferation treaty. , which actually slows things down and complicate things enormously and raises the stakes if you get caught. israel, india and pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons that were never part of the non-proliferation treaty. north korea broke out -- it

joined the non-proliferation treaty and 92, but was already breaking out from it before it started. so it had much less constrained. so iran is the only one that i've made that commitment, was treaty bound, had international expectations i wouldn't be making nuclear weapons and then set about doing it. and i think i really slowed them down. and on the arms race, the only thing i would add is my concern would be the pressure is not as much security as civilizational. i would think that the arms race pressures will actually be between saudi arabia and you just. if persia has a nuclear weapon, that an arab state will need to have nuclear weapons and the question will be between saudi arabia and egypt, which is the one that gets the status and the prestige of having an arab bomb first. and in that intention would be very strong actually.

>> tom said to the net outcome to bill schneider after. [inaudible] >> there is a regional security conference in december. [inaudible] general petraeus made cryptic remarks afterwards about security architecture. and the impression you seem to be getting was that the united states and the gcc countries are trying to develop some kind of jointly understood or coordinated response to the iranian program. in fact, is the united states or any other country trying to organize or put together a coordinated set of responses or next steps for the day when the iranians finally passed or go public? who is in charge of this?