meyers director of public affairs program. and on behalf of the carnegie council i would like to welcome our members, guests and c-span book tv. it's great to see so many of you here this morning. and i thank you all for joining us. it is my pleasure to welcome george friedman to the carnegie council once again. as it is almost one year to the day that mr. friedman first addressed us on his bestselling books "the next 100 years: a forecast for the 21st century" his appearance this morning is living proof that history does repeat itself. this time taking us from where he left off, same time last year, he will go a bit further to discuss obama's foreign policy and tell us what matters for america's future. in the new preface to the next 100 years, mr. friedman writes that when this book was first published, everyone thought we were living in unprecedented times. not only because of the financial crisis but because of the election of barack obama, a

president that many predicted would change the political game. only one year ago obama was featured as "time" magazine's person of the year and his campaign of hope was still on the minds of many americans. now admits setbacks on healthcare, the still limping economy and what some view as foreign policy failures, writers, pundits alike are taking swings at obama's first year. some argue that the problems are inherited from the last president who left challenges across-the-board. others say he has spent nearly a year getting it wrong. ...

>> his reputation for producing thoughtful and genuinely analysis of international events daily are read by a foreign government agencies and fortune 500 companies. the articles run the gamut from national security facing obama's administration to information, warfare and cybersecurity. and possible outcomes of the latest pakistani india tensions that as a reader i can tell you there's always something to be

learned from reading his reports. the urge to predict the future goes very far back to the oracle of the temple. today surrounded by warnings such as renewed threats of terrorism to mounting deaths you may be one whether you need it anymore about what the future holds but even asking yourself why should you pay attention to george friedman? if history is any guide, and the glory is, the answer will soon be clear. please join in getting a very warm welcome to very special guest, george friedman. thanks for joining us. [applause] >> first, thank you for having me back and putting up with me again. a year ago i came here and i try to forecast the next 100 years. when i can't lose, i won't be here when i'm wrong.

but the reason that i did that, explain then, i was really not interested in policy. i was not interested in personalities. i was interested in constraint. i was interested not in power but in the limits of power. and it's extraordinary that i come to speak to you today, when we are being delivered a clinic on the limits of power. barack obama is now president, and he's an extraordinary man. but every president is an extraordinary man. out of 300 million people, the handful that crawl to the top have more in common with each other than they do with me. i could never be president. i could never be president because i don't want it, need it, wouldn't do it. these are men who would do it. and in order to understand the

presidency you really have to understand the continuity between them. the continent that may not be one of policy, but is deeply one of personality. and its deep understanding not just of power but of its limits. the american presidency is an extraordinarily weak institution in domestic affairs. president may say they create jobs or in charge of losing jobs, but the fact is the president is one institution sandwiched between the supreme court, which decide to reinvent the american convention -- elections. and between a congress divided by a house elected every two years. hints, constantly running for office. and a senate elected every six years.

with rules so complex and arcane that it takes at least three terms to begin to master. he does not control the economy in any sense of the term. he shares that which is quite independent and quite different. and a vast civil society of a private sector that overwhelms his decision-making. all of which was intended by the founders. the founders did not want a strong president. it wanted a president who could get things done only when there was, if not an overwhelming consensus, then certainly a general consensus. and we have to remember that barack obama won his presidency with over 47% of the people voting against him. there was this idea that there was a gigantic groundswell in the republic for barack obama,

that he had swept everybody away. but, in fact, his victory was about one point greater than bush's was. in 2004. he won. hee-won han delete. but he did not win overwhelmingly. and yet he was so skillful a politician and his supporters, that they made a close election a. like an overwhelming one. now pays the price for this. the expectations were not merely that he would change things but somehow that he had been endowed with powers that no other president had. he wasn't. and what he is expecting a is about what you would expect. he will recover. fails of his death are truly picture. the one place that the president does have institutional power is foreign policy. part of it comes in the constitution and the powers give

him as commander-in-chief. and part of it comes from tradition, where tradition and law have kind of combined to make him the foreign policy czar, if you will. as weak as the president is domestically, that's how strong he is internationally. and so we would expect that, unlike his domestic politics, mired in the complexities of institutions that our founders left us, he is foreign policy would be bold, decisive and so on. what is most striking wind you're in is his foreign policy is to a very great extent indistinguishable from his predecessors. this is not surprising because, in fact, the hand that a president plays is always the hand that is his predecessors. people say well, he's having

these problems because george bush. well, george bush had his problems because 9/11 happened. and 9/11 happened because bill clinton followed a policy to al qaeda, and bill clinton followed his policy because george bush senior followed his policies towards iraq, and so on and it begins to braid into what our founders wanted to see. but it is possible now after a year to begin to see something that has nothing to do with barack obama. it is to see the constraints on a president operating in a world. it is to see the limits of personality, to see the limits of choice, and above all to see the limits of policy. i can never make a speech in washington, whose main product is policy. endlessly. but, in fact, what we are expecting here are the limits of

policy and the extra forces that shape the president. according to cecil b. demille the federal used to say so let it be written, so let it be done. and every present is waiting for that moment that he can write all he wishes, whether it will be done the way he wishes. let's take a moment to consider how obama ran his campaign on foreign policy. and let's spend a little time thinking about what his basic arguments were. because he ran his campaign less against john mccain that against george w. bush. not a bad strategy. he had three criticisms of bush. the first was that the iraq war was unnecessary. that it was a mistake, and that it created problems that the

united states didn't need to have a. the second argument he made was that the war united states should be fighting was in afghanistan. this is where al qaeda originated, this is where the threat appeared, and this time spent in iraq was taken away from afghanistan. and then he made a third argument, which i think was at the heart of his presidency. which is that bush would not have made the mistake he made had he embedded himself in the traditional american alliance system. had he, instead of charting his own course, engaged our traditional allies, had he not been unilateral but multilateral, he would've had more international support. he would have been more effective even if you chosen to go into iraq, and above all, he

would have been guided away from the errors he made. and when he spoke about our traditional lives, obama meant the europeans. and when he meant the europeans, he really meant the germans and the french. and even backing his campaign, obama chose to campaign in berlin. and that was really an extraordinary thing that he did but he was trying to transmit something to the american public. which is that bush has led the united states into isolation, internationally, and he, barack obama, wanted to in that isolation, to restructure the relationship between the united states and the rest of the world, by which even frequently the french and the germans. but that's the heartland of europe so that's not necessarily a bad thing to want.

barack obama became enormously popular in europe. to the point where even the norwegians had heard of him and gave him the nobel prize. and his nobel prize, the way was decided was extraordinary, because it wasn't about peace. it's he changed the image of the united states, and by changing the image of the united states, it changed the way the world worked. which was a concession by the norwegian of the enormous power of the united states since the new italian prime minister was not going to have that affect on the world. but it also indicated a great hope in europe of the arrival of the new american presidency. the new american president went to europe, and he went to europe in the midst of the financial crisis. and the europeans came here in the midst of the crisis. and it was overwhelming.

what the germans wanted, what the americans wanted, were miles apart. what the french wanted, to the extent, was neither what the germans wanted nor what the americans wanted. and nobody can even discuss the pigs, which is the portuguese, irish, greeks and spaniards, who everybody is discussing a. that's a phrase they actually use, pigs. in his first discussion of europeans he discovered there is no europe there. there are germans. there are irish, there are polls, and if you put a bowl and a german together in a room, you get 300 years of different history. but certainly not take over and foreign policy. it was not that obama didn't know this, but he understood

europe and the way that was a binding itself together that it was europe today a very in workplace. and i was a very parochial one. it is engaged in a tremendous experiment. to bind to and poland into some sort of federation that goes beyond mere self-interest, that goes beyond mere problems of the moment, i'm as a mystic about this but i have the right to be. the american republic endured and they can endure. but certainly this is a time in history where europe's energies and efforts are inward. they would not admit that they were inward when they regard himself as the great international entity, but then they are people who regard for trade as being between belgium and holland. the inwardness of europe is in

impact it will fact. they have no appetite for adventures outside of their sphere, partly because the terrible history of world war ii. partly because this terrific institution, the european union, which is in part designed to constrain germany and part because the germans are burst beyond the bounds of the constraints. they have problems and they don't begin in kabul. when the president went to europe, looking for support, not for iraq, but for afghanistan, he found that the europeans gave him the same answer they gave george bush. no. we will give you some support. it will be limited support. we will not restructure our

national, international policy for this effort. europe and bush misunderstood each other. bush said, i am far more likable in europe. therefore, the europeans will do things for me they wouldn't do for bush. the europeans said we like you've much more than bush because you're not going to ask us to do things that we don't want to do. until he became president, it was a grand love affair. as he became president, the love affair is still there. he probably has higher ratings in europe than the united states, but the ability to craft a coalition that will actively involve itself in the war that obama's elected, afghanistan, isn't going to happen. no matter how popular obama is

in europe, no matter how committed he is to multilateralism, the german national interest, for example, does not extend itself to a massive national commitment for the future of afghanistan. the europeans don't read 9/11 as the americans do. they don't read al qaeda as the americans read it. they don't have the same interests. and, therefore, all of the policies that obama crafted, all of these ideas that he put forward were both genuinely enthusiastically greeted, and the american image change. but the answer was still nine, know, whatever. the germans are struggling now. they can give you 1500 troops,

but possibly we will give you five. hundred. then perhaps not. check with us in the month. we should not be shocked by this. the national interest of all countries supersedes subjective pleasures and likes and dislikes. and this is the case of there. we saw something very similar in russia. we all remember the reset button when hillary clinton went to moscow. she carried with her a little box that was supposed to say recent. it didn't quite say that, it said something else. and it was kind of cute. and the idea was that all of those nastiness that went on between the bush administration and, let's reset. the russians were utterly appalled. you want to reset to what?

to the orange revolution? to 1998? what are we resetting to? we haven't liked the past 20 years. yes, we had better relations with the americans in 1996, but we also couldn't pay our transit workers. we don't want to reset. we want to move forward. and, unlike the europeans who at least pretend to be polite, america notwithstanding, the russians didn't even try. the russian position as stated by putin was that the full of the soviet union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe ever experienced because it was the collapse of the russian empire. russia had once been poor, but it great power. now it was no longer a great

power and even poorer. the sum total of the benefits. from the russian point of view, reconstructing something like the former soviet union with different institutions and different ideology was easy until because putin's economic policy was not to be an international power any longer, but the focus on the export of primary commodities, not just natural gas and oil, but grain, wood, gold, diamonds, what have you. in order to do that, in order to have a control of the exports, the russians need to very close relations with places like toxic star and. in order to have a great policy, the russians did you have a close relationship with ukraine. and these economies that together to 200 years of misery

and toil and everything else. the united states declaration that these independent countries do not have a primary relationship with moscow, but are free to bilateral relations with anyone, and the west is free expand nato into the ukraine and georgia, struck the russians as a direct attack on their national security. it would be as if taxes were suddenly to be part of the warsaw pact. there would be agitation. but if you look at a map you understand that the idea of ukraine being part of nato would be terrifying to the russians to which the americans acted, hey, are you guys paranoid? what's the big deal? nato is not a military alliance. it's just a club. to which russia said great, let us in. to which the americans said no.

but that was because bush was at war. obama made a gesture. he took the ballistic missile defense system out of poland and put it on ships. the poles said oh, my god, your friends, you're betraying us once more. the russians said, cute. now what? obama expected some sort of enormous response to what was in effect a militarily minor move. from the russian point of view, obama was continuing bush's policies to the letter. which was having managed to destroy the former soviet union, the united states now intend to

extend by surrounding the russian federation, not only in the baltics but the ukraine, and to understand the russian position, during the cold war nato was 1000 miles from st. petersburg. today it is 90 miles from st. petersburg. and what the russians are told is it doesn't matter, we are just a club of nice people. and the russians say they might urge you change your charter and get rid of your military committee? and the american say, we don't need to change it, we already have the germans and the french and they don't have any military so it doesn't matter. those are the things i've been said. the russians don't get it. the russians don't trust us. it is not in the russian national interest to permit this policy to continue. and the united states has given the russians a window of opportunity, and that window of opportunity is the deployment of

american forces in iraq and now afghanistan meant that when the russians went to war in georgia, it was difficult for the nazis to scrape together a brigade to deploy the american forces were stretched thin. and the invasion of georgia was meant to deliver a single lesson to the former soviet union eric this is what an american alliance gives you. this and as we used to say at my age, 35 cents will get you to the subway. the russians saw the ukrainian situation as deadly to them. not accidentally. we're just help an election in ukraine, and both candidates are pro-russian. one of them wasn't pro-russian and discovered later, yes, i am. it is clear that the game is

over, and so on. could the united states have played it differently? could it have given the russians what they wanted? certainly. by totally destabilizing the american position in eastern europe, driving the bowls completely off the wall and probably the scandinavians next. de- stabilizing the balkans, making the church go slightly nuts and so on. this was possible to reset the button. reset it in 1995, you have the russians going crazy. reset it to 1985 and you suddenly discovered that bush's policy wasn't simply the fact that he was an unpleasant man. he may well have been, but it was constrained by reality. could the russians have said, well, we don't really mind if ukraine is a part of nato?

only if you don't have russian history. where, in 1932, germany is weak, prostate and help us. and in 1938 it is at their throats. the russians are aware how quickly the nine military forces turn, and they play the worst case. in both europe and in russia, we see the limits of policy. and the limits of intent. and above all, the limits of goodwill. for all the goodwill in the world, and i give it all to obama, it was a matter of great goodwill on his part. in the end when the things had to be done to genuinely forge a relationship with the european union, he could not help himself but to ask for things that the europeans could not give under

any circumstances. when it came time to reset relations with russia, he could not make the concessions that the russians had to have. and the russians could not make the concessions that the americans needed to move forward. when we look at the arab-israeli conflict, and a very telling point made last week which is this is more complicated than i thought it was going to be, he really should ask rahm emanuel about these things. you see again the intractability of american relations overseas. you see that it is not a problem of a stupid man without good manners in a world that is

waiting for a nice american president. you see that the disagreements are profound, they are real, they are a tractable. to the extent that they are manageable, they are manageable. you see an iraq that the basic policy that was in place, once bush invaded, remained in place. once obama took power, which is withdraw, slowly moving to the door carefully, hoping no one notices, before the civil war starts again. woods, almost made it. in afghanistan, the strategy is as was self-evident from the beginning, not to win the war but to set the stage for negotiation for the taliban. that would buy before karzai was shifted to palm springs.

but the problem is that the taliban knows the united states will leave. and even if the president hadn't said that, the red herring, he knew they knew they would leave. at next-door is a country of 180 million people, that shockingly does not want to have a civil war to pull the american chestnuts out of the fire in afghanistan. you know, our idea for pakistan is why don't you wage a full civil war between -- and we will like you for it, and the pakistanis said plenty of things about this. of course not. if you're the pakistanis, you're trying to hold your country together, not make the american exit from afghanistan outlook and. across the board what you see is the impersonal character of the foreign policy. in domestic policy the president

is limited by the institutions that were created by the founders. he doesn't control congress. no one controls congress. he certainly doesn't control the supreme court. he doesn't control the fed, and he absolutely doesn't control fortune 500. and there it is far too competent a place to be governed by a president. and the founders didn't want him to be powerful. they wanted it very difficult to pass bills. boy, they succeeded. in foreign policy where you expect the president to be extremely strong, you find in limited by something else. other nations with different interests who understand what those interests are, and are not going to be swayed by good fellowship. and that overstates what he was trying to do. he was trying to turn the clock back to the time before the

united states was a major power. a time during world war ii when it was regard as savior, not to parrot after 199 1991 1991 whene unites states was the only global power in the world for 1 dollar out of every four produced in the world was produced in the united states, with the united states was both the largest foreign investor and the largest target for foreign investment. because the borrower, the biggest lender, he was trying to push the clock back to a simpler time when britain and france and other countries are much stronger than the united states. you cannot be the united states and be loved. machiavellian as important question, is it better to be loved or feared? he should've asked a second one, do you have a choice? what we see in the obama presidency is a laboratory, not

only on the limits of power which has become a denial term, but under constraints operating on decision-makers and policymakers. and how profoundly limited control we all have on the process of the international system. and how little it matters how we want the world to be. there are many people who want to make a difference, and in small ways they can. but the idea that a new president will come in and reshaped the world he inherited, that is difficult. and as i said, this is not obama's problem. and i suspect it's very fortunate he lost the election in massachusetts. most presidents wait until the first by election to realize this. and then reinvent themselves.

he is lucky. he knows he is screwed now. this gives him more time to fix it up. but now we come to the really important question that i will leave you with. president bush's policy on iran was, make terrible sounding threats, and do nothing. about the best policy you have under the circumstances. because of russia's relationship to the united states, the time in which sanctions can be meaningfully imposed has probably passed. the chinese didn't even and send a new delegate to the last round of talks. the president must now make a decision. is he going to accept a nuclear iran, or is he going to take some sort of military action? it is truly coming down to that.

but again, it's not that simple. because the question is what would the israelis accept? because confronted by the possibility that israeli attack that might fail, for which we will be blamed equally by everyone, privately placed, is better that we do it ourselves. but even there, where he finally faces a fresh and new toys, we are dealing with a question of, does she really have a choice. and the united states live with a nuclear iran? will the israelis permit us to? and even here, where the issue is new in a way, it's not an issue that he controls. let me stop there and ask questions. [applause] >> you spoke about the limits of

power, but there is no limits to my ability to praise you for the very wonderful analysis of obama's first year in office. i'd like to open the floor to questions, and i would just ask that you wait into the microphone comes to you. and please, identify yourself. >> james, thank you for a wonderful talk. what constraints on power through history and at the present time are opposed by the underlying economic and financial crisis and conditions? >> obviously, they are substantial. one of the questions is whether or not the recent financial crisis created a new reality, or was it simply a repetition, a very old game. from my point of view, this is the fourth time in opposed war

world where the financial system failed, and either federal or international bailout took place. the first was the municipal bond crisis of the 1970s, a about new york and think that in the second was the third world debt crisis, the creation of the brady bond. the third of course was the class of the entire savings and loan system. and the fourth was the collapse of the investment houses, which was the noise for a very simple reason. with the savings and loan in minnesota went downhill, the people on cnbc, or the equivalent, came from these investment banks figured at least spoke their pies and said we must put this in context. the same with a third world debt crisis. now the people, the same people were interviewed but they just lost their jobs and had their 401(k) smash. part of the extravagant excitement over this was the

fact that we weren't a benchmarking this. the s&l bailout was a 650 billion-dollar bailout. at a time when that was still real money. the brady bonds, the international bailout of the third world debt as a percentage of gdp was enormous. so the answer to your question is, the financial situation has a great deal to do with it. but you must first figure out whether you have broken out of cycle, cyclical process, or whether you are truly in new territory. it is the tendency of the financial markets to constantly announced at what they're dealing with is unprecedented. i look at this for the terrific crisis we had, and i compared to the consequence of 1982 when interest rates were 22% on mortgages, inflation was over

10%, and unemployment was 11 and 12%. i say this is a pretty bad recession. second worst since world war ii, maybe third opinion on how you look at the 1970s. so i would say that we have a fairly stable platform in the international system since world war ii. and that system hasn't broken down. i realize this is not the conventional view, but when i take a look at the system i don't have to put a great deal of attention to it because we haven't had a breakout cycle. we have seen this before. >> hi. ron. what can you say about the constraints and opportunities, if there are any, with respect

to china? and how does that fit into the overall picture of financial recovery or failure of recovery? >> well, china is one of those that in our view is broken down. the united states and china are in a strange dance. the chinese are utterly dependent on the united states, as well as on europe for the export of their goods that they cannot sell them domestically. some chinese -- 1.3 billion people in china. 600 million of those people live in households where the total household income is $80 a month, or less. 440 million live in households where the income is between $80 a month and $160 a month.

china is an extraordinarily poor nation. the part of china where the household income is above 20,000 a year, which is the global benchmark for middle-class life, is 60 million. now, that's france. that's a large country. but in the country of 1.3 billion, you have 60 million whose primary economic relationship is outside of china. the greatest threat to china is the american savings rate. if the american savings rate moved to the levels somehow thought it would move two, 5%, a substantial portion of that, because of the weight is distributed, the lower middle-classes, comes out of wal-mart. and anything that comes out of wal-mart comes out of china's hide. in china, that would in those countries that would mean we

will be closing factories. in the country where it legal immigration internally is people making $80 a month, unemployment doesn't hit your 401(k). it raises the real question of starvation. and, therefore, the chinese are doing what the chinese have to do now. a massive security track down in their country. taking control of all telecommunications, being very aggressive in arresting dissidents and breaking of any organizations because of the chinese know something that others may not, which is they've got problems. and they are acting rationally. and his google business is a very interesting one because the chinese have a choice of saying, oh, what the heck, have some sites. the chinese aren't worried about the sites. they are worried about the kind of information getting into the state that so china come in my

mind is an outlier. how it manages this crisis with the kind of demographic it has is a mystery. and then the interplay between it and the rest of the world is another very serious question. so one of the things about any financial crisis is the disproportionate effect it has on some cool country. the countries that were really get and the last one, countries like iceland, is a national worth is a couple of parents. and the major industrial exporting countries. particularly china. which is very badly hurt. >> i'd like to ask you about the supposedly special relationship between the united states and the u.k. before obama announced his

decision to send extra troops to afghanistan, gordon brown even gave special cover by announcing he's going to increase the number of troops. it's been rumored that obama has personalized this relationship in some way because the treatment of his grandfather and kenya. is there anything to this? >> if it had been a different relationship than bush had with blair, i would say that's an interesting story. but there's a continuity continuity in british foreign policy. historically, they are worried about the continent. and historically they want to keep their options open. british, economic and military strategy is to keep one foot in europe and one foot firmly in north america. and this is but a policy that's been followed since since churchill. and there's always a personal relationship between the american president and the british prime minister. and that's particularly fostered by the british prime minister.

he does not want to be in the position that france's relation is determined. and so there are good geopolitical reasons for the. i don't know that he helped obama's, he may have, i suspect obama couldn't help himself if he wanted to. but i do know that there's great continuity going back for several generations in special american relationship with the british. and vice versa. >> the former advisor to bill clinton has written a case for goliath and says the united states has assumed a major role in foreign policy and the world to the largest in the world governance. and former singapore ambassador has written that the major mistake made by the first president bush was in the

aftermath of the collapse of the soviet union to position america is just another of the world's nations and he said this was a horrible mistake. what do you see as the pro and cons of america function as, in fact, even the goliath in the world superpower, the policeman of the world, and there but he limitations there such a resentment to it, that there are some advantages to its? >> advantage or not, that's what we are. we control 24% of the world economy. all the world sees. we are a d. and socialize power so american and dutch lives and is only larger than china's, japan's combined. we are an extraordinarily large country, and 1200-pound gorilla. and we are clumsy. and we don't have to be careful because they are smaller than we are. and the problem that we have is not whether we want to be goliath or not, we are goliath.

how do we plan to behave? you can't decide not to be as powerful as the united states is. that's not a president option. you can't pretend the united states is just another country. you can pretend that come if you want but nobody takes you seriously. power consists of military economic power -- realities, and the realities are excellent at it i will give you one example, just to make the united states is that the american economy is 3.3 times the size of china's economy. can turn dollars bigger. the united states economy grows at 2.5% a year on average. back and forth. for the chinese to keep even with 2.5% growth of the american economy they have to grow a point to 5%.

just not to fall behind. anything below that they fall behind. it is structurally difficult in under generations to undermine american economic power. so the answer to that is, not the question of should we be the world's leading power. it as the world's leading power, what do we plan to do about it. and because we are so powerful, it may kill us. >> what do you think of obama's plan of mostly taxing financial institutions? >> he has to tax somebody. under them than me. you know, the answer is i don't

really know the econometrics. i don't believe anybody knows the econometrics because i don't think anybody really knows he is taxing our how he's going to do. i think the reset button in the white house went the other day and nobody is sitting down and thinking it over again. so my view on that is, if it ever happens, i will think about it. but count on one thing in an economic crisis. you're going to get bad policy to account for the other thing, we will survive it. >> thank you. what do you think of the crystals position on the taliban? >> it's hopeful. is hopeful in the sense that the crystal understand a military victory in afghanistan forces we have available is not going to happen. he is trying to re-create the process that happened in iraq

when, after the american surge kind of trickled, this convince the sunnis to come out and negotiate publicly with the united states. the problem is that the sunnis were afraid of what would happen if the united states left. that is if the united states left, the shiites might turn on them and a bloodbath. they had a motive. the taliban doesn't have the same motive. the motivated there is not the presence of the united states, but the fear of the actor. so taliban is one that won the civil war in the 1990s, fair and square. they are read of the situation is once the americans get out of the way they will win again. it's a pretty good case to be made for that. the taliban may agree to negotiate to create a decent interval, by the taliban is

opposed to give us a decent interval. they would like to win the way they want in their minds against the soviets. so i think mcchrystal is executed the best conceivable policy. now, we also have to matter what mcchrystal said. the policy we had was a no hope, couldn't win. the policy he proposed is not one which will certainly succeed. it's just a better policy than the previous one. and i think that's quite correct. as to what happens to afghanistan, it is increasingly a decision to be made by the taliban, and i suspect but albus of pakistan. that it has to do with our military operations on the ground. >> this is john richardson. i guess i am back on

afghanistan. if you take the long historical view, and you were king for a day, what would be wrong? will be the tremendous benefits for having a million half people's liberation army should put in afghanistan got it would encourage the russians to think more clearly, encourage the rogue states like pakistan to think more clearly. i think it would also have a sobering influence on iraq. >> if the chinese were crazy enough to do that, yeah. these are all things that could achieve. none of which the chinese care much about. the chinese learned a lesson in korea. power projection is scary. it looks good, but they lost about a million people. the chinese have been cautious. to push a million and a half tripped over the hindu bush, keep them supplied, keep them motivated, keep them from playing to brooklyn, these

things are all enormously difficult to achieve. and so i would say that in a moment of madness, the chinese may agree to the. you would be taken away and medicated. [laughter] >> rotary international. i'm going to ask a very simple question. i think of art indicated that foreign policy essentially not made in foreign ministry. at lisa not by itself. so my question is what's going to happen? >> there will be speeches. [laughter] >> excuse me? >> there will be speeches. last year, the erg on stage

hysterical outburst that israel is required more beforehand was going to happen. i thought there was a good case. there's always something that comes out of that most. i just heard the arenas are going to be sending a delegation. got those will happen. essentially will come out is a bunch of people restating their position. appearing enormously more reasonable than they really are. mealtime to publish meaningful op-ed pieces about the possibilities that open up at davos, then everyone will go home and forget about it. >> i'd like to respond to your -- howard. i would like to respond to your last question that you ended your speech. and it was can we live with a

nuclear iran. we live with a nuclear soviet union, britain, france, india, pakistan, israel. so i would say yes, of course we can live with a nuclear iran. the most prominent effect of having nuclear weapons is that it tends to moderate policy. it tends to make people think very deeply because of the tremendous consequences of use of nuclear weapons. and i should think that the iranians, just like the chinese or the soviets or any of the other nuclear powers, it would have the same effect on them. and the consequences of using military attack against iran to try to deprive them of nuclear weapons it seems to me would

only slow it down and would be catastrophic for the united states. >> i tend to agree with you but there is another dynamic at work. it goes like this. i think the primary reason the iranians want a nuclear weapon is survival. they want to guarantee their regime. from israel's point of view, the existence of an iranian nuclear weapon could potentially represent an existential threat to israel. will you bet your nation, your children, on the intentions, proper intentions, of iran? the united states was in a position to handle a balance of terror, not only because it had counterterror, but also because the united states is a very large. a rogue launched by a crazy

missile officer may take out chicago, but the republic survives. when the israelis look at the problem, they asked two questions. your and my view of the effect, sobering effect of nuclear power may well be the case. what will i bet on that? everything? which is the more certain course of my children growing old? accepting that debt, or taking preemptive action? and so you have one player in the game, israel, with a much narrower tolerance for risk than any other potential target has in the past. the unknown factor is not what washington wants. i think washington has made their decision. that the risks and the costs of an attack on iran are too high.

and the reason it's too high is not because it is not militarily executable, and i think it would be put back like a bit more, but because the iranian response will be threefold, unleashing hezbollah, de- stabilizing iraq, they are raising high, here we are. and mining the straits of hormuz, and when they mine the straits of hormuz, we have done a very careful caregivers of the cost of oil and it comes out at lots. when the united states takes a look at what iran has, it's a no-brainer. let it go. when israel takes a look at the same equation, they come up with a much more complex and difficult answer. in this particular case, israel

does not have the military capability of taking out israeli nuclear weapons. ask an israeli. the route is israeli air force can't conduct a multi-we campaign. they can however launch nuclear weapons. the threat of israel launching nuclear weapons will push the united states into an impossible position. they would rather carry out the attack themselves than have that happen. so the problem that american foreign policy has at this point, you and i share a very similar viewpoint on the iranian weapon. the israelis may not. they won't. and if the israelis push the envelope on this the united states will have to make decisions having nothing to do with the wisdom of the fact but the consequences of an israeli attack in the form they take. so once again, the national interest of one of the players as perceived by