comprehensive legislatio if its psible to decarbonize the economy,hen it wille very difficult for climate diplomats to put pressure on other countries to do the same because we won't have any credibility. that legislation needs t deliver financial support to vulnerable countries. they have yet to seriously follow through with the commitmentshey have made through the past two decades. we are rightly criticized for moving the goal posts, we made some importantents on finance in copenhagen. 30 billion colleive finance between 2010 and 2012.

i think it's critical that we ough with that pledge to help the countries that desperately need i but also to build crelity that wl be that's my introductory comments and look forward to hearing what bill has to say. [ applause ] >> i think there's got to be a clean energy politically correct way of saying that. in this case it's bringing coals to west virginia or china. because that's really at some

level the heart of the story o whe it starts in both countries. st going back for second, i do want to say that ken's work has really been half breaking in preparing for this i read- international and policy. and n'swn congressional testimony last year, last fall. i start this with ideology or political ins. i will be a little bit more down in the weeds both of which are

in fast forward as ken mentioned which wi be out this friday. from that we produce just under 6 billion tons of carbon dioxide a year. china produces 90% of their and by 2050, in order to com we

need to get global gigatons down globally to 15 in the next 40 or so years. that's a huge challenge. it's a huge challenge of technology. it's a hug challenge of finance and rechanging both the regulatory nature and how the economies themselves operate. so it'sot surprising that somebody who knows a lot about politics. this is described as the most difficult political transaction the history of mankind and i think that's fair t say. if you think about what it took to get health care passed, this

is rghly a sixth of the u.s. economy, that's about the same size as o energy economy and we have to dohat in 190 countrs around the world starting with o the most politically complicated. from a mater standpoint, that's how the interests themselves are. both systems, political and economic systems are starting to understand what it takes in one another's countries to make that transformation. both countries are adjusting to that challenge. in the united states the challenge that we face as my

colleagues have recently described. we essentially have parliamentary parties. our parties have become more polarized and more hardened. we don't have one on the energy it's done the same. what you have seen in pub welcome awareness is a growing acceptance of climate change in the center part of the country where the bedrock of public opinion is. the political the rigor several decades has been quite suspicious. among the center you have seen a growing awareness and accepta e

ceptance. in the last year or so, there has been a small set back for a number of different reasons the issue has become piticized again. the science has become politicized. still among moderate independent voters there is a belief that climate chge is real. . if youench mket against 15 or 20 years and advance in belief. but that has not impacted politicabelief that much. it wase on a pure party line vote. one could look at it as a hig water mark in that seven or eight republican members of congress voted in favor of bill which wasxtraordinarily the reason that those seven of those eight in favor of it

was that back obama had won eir congressional districts d ha happened to win. an of them had specific reasons for voting for it. two were from the new jersey shore where issues also poll quite high. one was from a swing district in illinois. another member from upstate new york is now barack obama's secretary of the army already from aerate strict, alady somewhat leftleaning. so youee on this iss almost all republicans voting agast with a fewoming over and almost all democrats except for in heavy coal states a number of states opposing.

there are again it is forcing members in their pries to vote in favor or votegainst these kinds of legislation and the same may happen on the democratic side. we'l see whether or not lance lincoln in a democratic primary is forced to be more in favor of climate llation than she might otherwise be. on t china side, climate change is not a huge area of public opinion concern such that it exists inhina though it is owing. what you have is very,ery high understanding of the issue among

policymakers thoug they themselves are divided on the issue. and that division broke most openly in the run-up to copenhagen actually at copenhagen itself if you are interested in that exchan go ken on our websitehere is a terrific exchange of what happened there. it was a critical as a moment for u.s. china cooperation on climate change because we saw literally the two heads of state negotiates with one another and turning and.

>> what that ans, i th there is violent agreement on what that means for the next set of years. both the u. and china are not particularly wild about binding treaties right now. the reason in the united states is passing a binding treaty means going to t senate and getting 67 votes a that's, getting theional seven votes is nearly impossible. on the chinese side, again, china can understand what it's energy profileks lik till 2030 but beyond that it's difficu difficult without having done so in terms of a legally binding agreement that the are

negotig internationally. copenhagen is politically bit not legally. the untold story. right after barack ama's inauguration where they went to china. a number of different bilateral ntact points both the cabinet level and ultimately at talkin about how the u.s and china conspired to break audiotape legally binding treaty. at some level that's true but that may be a good thing bause

it allows the whole world system to try to move forward on th. at the national level and athe international level youee this kind of cooperation. trying to go against what tremendous vor was pointing to. for the launch of a wind turbine plant bui in nada to build a wind turbine farm in texas. that kind of cropuation is happening in china as well. a.s. based company is building an all-electric vehicle in china using chinese battery

technology. it seems likely, actually, that there will be something call ed against companies that have not adopted comprehensive climate and energy legislation. so if the united states - in order for the united states to pass such legislation some

people consider them to be legal, some to be illegal. the biggest is when these thing get phased in. they get phased in in a 2030 frame work that appears to be enough time for china to estaish enough domestic rules and more importantly than the rules, the ability to implement the rules so tt onean say whether or not they have acted on climate change. it it's setting a stan dhard we haven't proven we can liv up t and the chinese haven't had an opportuny to demonstrate they

have the domestic capacity to move forward on. finally i want to sketch out cropuation that the two r countries can continue to rk on. pethe biggests the issue that came up at copenhagen which is the verification and accounting of emissions in developing countries. this is an enormous issue of enormous complety. the reason for opposing this, although they did end up aknologying this, but as again the lake of governmental capacity within china to you can simply look at the fossil fuel inputs that a country takes. how much oil they , how muchcoal, or mined

domestally. the key thing for carbon emissions is not just how much you use but how effectively and efficiently you use it. that means going in and looking at the actual technologyt you have in place. and the chinese have cause for concern about that because it reallyns up almost their entire economy to external monitoring and verition. in addition to that, you are doing it the context of politically binding agreement something that could be legally binding and there is a great ncern among chinese that they d bening themselves up and giving away their sovereignty. that is an enorm issue to work on. are there ways to monitor emissions this i a critical set questions moving forward. i think there needs to be a

greater understanding of what this border permit would look like in the united states and china. this comes to an issue that can and david pointed out a while ago and is a critical area. we've talked aut national and international cropuation. the four big players are big, complicated or federal systems. you have got almost 70% of the nuclear power reaorin the world. this is really critical and a lot of the regulation in the united states on energy and environmental issues is done at

the state level. that's where the experiences are. in the last ten years from the failed negotiations where the u.s. ended up not ratifyind th walking away fro the table. thgreast change has been at the state level. what's happening in the uk, what's happening in france, how they regule on this set of issue. they canrnbout international diplomacy. people forget that when bill

clinton. he really learned to talk about the gl economy. >> and then finally, this issue of nuclears different. china is ramping up quickly. it obviouslyas an important non-proliferion de. it has important financing nengss to it? its auge regulatory challenge? they have annoued they want to double the amount of nuclear regulators in the cotry. we have enormous experiee with that in the united ates. there is concern that we haven't replenished ouronrn becae civilian nucle reactor s. as many as 30 permit applications forew nuclear reactors in the next ten years. this is a huge area for

uation between the united states and china and one that i would encourage very much. my 2minutes.have pbably used [ applause ] >> t you very much. between the two of you you have really covered the landscape here. we have a couple of roving mics and we'll bring tm to you. briefly indicate who you are and if you want to direct your question, feel free to do so. before i ope it up, i want to ask one question of both panelists just t get the discon gog. in terms of how the world begins to come to grips with climate chang change.

my question is for the u.s. and china what are the biggest - big ticket items that we're really concerned about? are there a couple of things that we should all be really focused on over a ten-year perspective. i divide chinese mitigat opportunity opportunities comes from reducing the amount emissions through lower energy demand. that's both in terms of technical efficiency ande importantly through the stcture of the economy.

the rapid growth and emissions that we have seen in china in the past decade was not the result of less efficient chinese production and it wasn't the result of faster growth than the decade preceding. it was chang in the sucture in chinese economy from will have a massive carbon dividend. much greater than any tech anylogical initiative or pricing policy. so that i think's the most important in the near term in the long term it's about changing theources of energy.

in 20 years. is gng be getng the regulatory frame work in place. if we toent -- we have an portunity right now whereur buness as usual missions are lower. the eiua reported that emissions are down last year on the year prior. that makes meeting the obama easier.ation 17% targets a lot we're at this juncturere it's cheap for us to act and where doing so can solidify that wie the long term cost of

action much, much less. but all of that is going require policy. i think the u.s. worry about china is which part of the chinese government engages in the negotiations? is it the cooperative part that president obama founded when? or is it the part of the chinese ating team that really saw the copenhagen process as someg that they could use to delay domestic action on the of china.

whathat means for t negotiations moving forward is every one of the pieces of the t agreement -- about a three-page agreement has no standing right now a taking one piece apart from the other pieceo the u.s.'s biggest afear is t promise that made it at copenhagen ends up getting boggeddown. this is what happened for three

after kioto. was negiated with three yearseft on the clinton adminition clock. there was a big dog fight about wh emissions trading meant. after three years of negotiations, the negotiations bre down while everybody was counting the votes i florida in december of 2000,here was a u.n. climate meeting in amsterdam. we can't let that happen with what happened in copenhagen. so the u.s. will look to c to see that it backs a constructive force in the u.n. process.

from the u.s. in the internationasettg is t not walk away from the u.n. the u.s. started this major economies forum. the. tries to bring climate change the u.n. process can be so -- poorerountries don't trust china. th i tes the u.n. process seriously. it will only take the process riously if china is not abstructing that process. >> thank you. the floor is open. back here. again, i would remind you to please briefly identify yourself

and if you want to direct your question please feel free to do so. >> yeah. i have a couple comments and rsis international issue. china and u.s. both are big countr -- i the airport, then he come to singlet's talk so i can really understand. and also this conduct by the united nations. and to all the united nation agreement is not binding.

and the particularnessolved soverey. and this is a basic problem in the congress consider this particularly mention in congress. and those are v. >> we have a of people who want to ask questions. >> i don't have a question.

only a comment. >> one issue that i want t see if you could clarify for us. there was som confusion as to whether china said it would be asking for part of the transfer of t financial assistance. it was sort of -- where does that stand? perhaps you can us a little bit. if china were to agree to that that would give tremendous leverage. it would put a lot of pressure on the u.s. >> one who spoke to the

nancial times is c be a very expressive speaker. and whether he was squoted or kind of going bind , not sure i think there's a fairly wide acknowledgment within the inese delegation that the financing that's made available that more vulnerable countries will be first in line. >> i just only have one to add there. everything that tremendous said is exactly right particularly about official government financing.

that is als controversial. china and india have already benefitted. the real question moving forward, i think, once we get past whether or not the accord has any standing internationally is how those systems operate and how much of the shared goes to china and india and that is a huge question going forward. >> how much of the chinese stimulus package went towards green projects has it all been expended? or are there still opportunities for u.s. investment that ty might find in that area? how is the balance with the technology lead you mentioned the chinese batteries. are there other examples of

that. i want to bring ken in because he may know more. i actually don't know the answer to that. a lot of this stuff alrea in line and got packaged as stimulus and expedited. it wasn't that different from ours i somesense. and on the new technoes, i think we should start pulling ken into the conversatiofor a while. he has been on the ground. that, you know, the chinese s investment in this isoth considerable and likelyo continue and expand over the

time horizon and how much of it is going be used internally and how much will be used for export. it doesn't necessarily translate into emission reductions domestically. this may simply be another export opportunity for china and that's one of the reasons that people are very concerned that china is not talking about an actual target. at what point that kks in is a real question. i think this technology point is really critical one but it's not yet clear fro a climate standpoint how it plays out. the last question is the one that i fin most interesting which is capturi chinese intent. hink what we have seen is this is a country that is no er a black box that you can't tell domestically what's going on. for me the most interesting thing that came out of post copenhagen is the dwhat erupted not just at the negotiating

table but in the weeks there after where you had chinese scientists saying china had not committed to enough. but a number of chinese industrialists and people who had always seen the government as spurring economic growth saying that china gave away the store at copenhagen. so a debate is breakin out on this issue that is just under beneath the surface. people are probably not good at negotiating government polic and then just in the last few days we have seen there i a lltreet journal story today. the chinese emissions intensity backslided where they hadeen

making progress. suddenly it seemed there was a 3% decr as opposed to the 14%increase that had over the previous year. it's hard to say what china's intent is. the govern seems committed to the plan at copenhagen wh is described as a ound-up bottom up approach. what does a country's leadership think it can do and let's use the next set of years to nchmark what it does against what it thinks it can do. >> on the basis of that answer, i want to get bill to join the china center staff. youeally know your staff. >> i can add a point on the stimulus. most of china stimulus ask i am sure that ann will talk about this. but whether it's directly in the form of fiscal allocation crease bank lending.

high speed rail will reduce vehicle miles tvelled and reduce bottlenecks for coal transport where you have trucked idling on highways. between the service sector that doesn't use a lot of energy but uses a lot of people which is why beijing wants to grow that sector and the heavy industrial ctorhich uses energy but doesn't use people has swung in a more energy intensive. that beijing has been trying to engineer that m more difficult. whether these projects have a dind in terms of their lower energy footprint that compensates for the near term blip that shows u in the

statistics. that remains to be seen and depe o how that happens. that's been a short term effect. >> in the u.s. have a similar -- the challen of the me tricks on this can be see in our own cash for clunkers program. some pple gue it takes inefficient car off theoad and put fuel efficientehicles there. it kept the auto industry moving. one of the reasons we had emissions 9% lower is our economy crashed. cash for clunkers got the economy going inhe auto sector and ession will likely increase. >> i was smiling that one of them was going answer a question. back here if we can get a mic

back here. >> i taught in western china for two years and i am aware of how alert the universities around china and e students are for thneed for fightin climate change. i am always appalled in the discussions here in the uni states. the need to go much stronge in china where there is so much more poverty in the west. and the n for development will be greater. and the need is so very strong.

it's the one quarter per capita that keeps popping in my head. >> the problem with per capita is the number of capitas also make a difference. you end u with all of us have responsibilities . >> so that's true. of course, and that's part of the equity debate that makes this s challenging. india would offer a target, has ofd a target that our emissions will never exceed the west. china will note that deal. china will do the same things thu.s. clearly china is in a different

ple. clearly the kind of level of ambition that suld be expected from china is lss. the view that whatever is appropriate per capa income and emissions far lower tn a vast swath ofevelopin countries. if yk at the 20 poorest developing countries that were classified as developed, today the top 40% are richer than that cluding singapore that's the third richestry in the world, all of the middle east, and a large swath of emerging economies as well. abt equity, about per capita emissions, about income levels and what appropriate allocation and respoibility is. but that has to be a conversation that's bed on

more than everybody who is stuck in thatreaty that we signed in 1992 gets to take action. the united states has gone on record at the copenhagen accord saying it's going cut emissions by 80%. chinese have said it will cut the growth of emissions but everybody accepts that chinese emissions will continue to gr but the emissions as the only standard is a troubled standard for a co reasons. rinow per unit of economic output, china actually reduces -- produces more emissions than united states does. and india is slightly more than united states. as their economicoutput

continues to rise, they are more inefficient than we are. and then as ken said, theumber of capitas really does matter. this is where population growth is an important issue. i wrote an op ed on this last summer and a number of my friendin india teased me that i am now known as the man thinks there are too these formas are quite tricky. and simply using per capita as a standard aspposed to per capita emissions per unit o gdp which is really where the conversation ise going tos probab important distinction.

>> let me just add a footnote to we were at a conference in aspen. at the end of that conference in the session, one o the key representatives weave nothing in cn with china on climate change. thing. they have technology that we don't have. they have manufacturing that we don't have. have wealth thate don't have. they create damage that we don't create. we're the ones who suffer. as soon as you put us in category, we're dead so don't d it. the world is enormously more

complicated than that. all kinds of things. you can structure equity arguments to suit yours on this. if we fall consider pli short, get really serious about this issue we're all in deep, deep trouble. >> i want to probe more on the domestic politics. i am interested to get your assessment of where each of these two countries stand

respectively on the two components of this politically. one is the awareness and acceptance that this exists. more tn that. so, in china and in the united states, you are reading today, you know, if we had a scale of one to ten, one being it's all hoe kus poe kus, ten is sort of the it's too late anyway. and second, depending upon your answers to that, where are we on the second piece of that which

the capacity to put together policies that we'll actually get something done? >> we are down from maybe a six last ar. china is maybe higher than that. prably six or seven. i think theres an intermediate ep that you have to look at between that question and the policy action. and in the long term effect below where we do. we're at four on the belief scale. but the good news is as i said in my remarks, when you start to translate that into policy there are a number of other issues that have the same m as

addressing climatenge the industries that areoing create employment coming out of a recession. will be motivated by a collection with climate proba being if not last, next to last. i would not be surprised if senators release theirill on wednesday, climate change is mentioned. that w be the headlining pieces. >> not much of a disagreement. the polls always ask the

question differently but the numbers had been 75% of americans thought it was a serious or somewhat serious question two years ago and n the number is around 58%. areouilling to actually pay mething for that? e numbers get scy. that said, what is -- i tend to be a bit of anoptimist. there are two things driving action in the united stat. e is that there are a number -- quite aarge number of moderately inclined legislators that actually understand the scientific challeng challenge. people like dk and lindsay graham and others who identify with the iue and that extends

all the way down inde school level. getting into our prius on sunday d my 6-year-old yelling at me for turni on the air-conditioner. and i explain to her thathis is an energy efficient car, we are polluting the environment. we send our kids to a public scol in the middle of west virginia which is not bedrock middle america. in that sense while i think the oil spill in the gulf of mexico on the one hand makes ts a much moreifficult deal to pull together. this ie that includes provisions for drill baby drill for more offshore drilling.

there is sort of a moral charge in the next generation charge t this that ink the oil spill helps draw attention to. 50 million -- ken will tell me the right number, tt live in rural poverty dying to move into th cities and work infactory. th extraordinary impact that natural natural environment pla on chinesesociety. having that many people living in rural perty in particular westn chinahich is an arid place, the impacts are felt in a

rect way. you know, i remember k in his office showing me threlief map of china, and when you look a how much of the country depends upon the himalayan sourceven if the ipcc got the date wrong about when they could expect the himalayan glaciers to disappear, the fact that, that runoff from those mountains would be affected in a warmer world is a big issue that really worries the chinese that water tables are droppingn t of china. you know, it is an enormous set of challenges it apprs from everything that i have heard and chinese authorities believe it is a coming crisis, and they want to gethead o it. they face the challenge of an expectation of7% to 10% economic growth per year to kee the rural countryside. that is biggest constraint to the extent that they caner that economic growth in a green way, i think that is terrific for them, but they also know that they have to keep the

onomy grow, and they don't want to impose any constraints on them. >> you know, in front of the camera there n back. >> my name is bowe and i'm -- trevor, it is good to see y want to ask this question to the panel and possibly dr. lieberthal. no one undermines or doubts the efforts that the chinese government has been going through. you go through the landscape, tural gas accounts for 3% or less than 4% of the total country's consumption and even shale gas w account for small percentage anduclear less than 1%, but even if the country builds to 100 nuclear actors, nuclear will account for about 5% othe country's energy consumption so that the bulk of the energy consumption

comes fromco. right now, they are providing lesshan 1% of the country's total consumption thus the possibility to install solar and wind and nuclear ergy cane intensive and polluting. if youook at the landscape, then you tend to conclude that the two serious areas where impacts can be very, very significant are eney ficiency and the other area is coal, because coal is providing 70%, over 70% of the untry's total 70% consumption and by 2030, it is still goingo be 60% of energy consumption from coal or over 50%. but, but, then, you wonder, how the unitedtates can make impact or have influence on the country's cleanoal consumption or energy efficiency. if you look at the energy efficiency implementation in china, the success is lacking, because of lack of financing for

energy efficiency. china accomplished a good efficiency record in 80s and 90s with annual decline o 5% of the intensity, but then record was reversed in the new millennium, and now the record is pointing to the other direion, again. so m question is -- >> can you get to the question. >> my question is the then you tend to be pretty pespessimisti and c the united states have impact on the efforts of china, to have the internal problems, the internal challengnd so my question to the panel is united states can have impact o china's efforts to reduce co2 emissions going forward? thank you. >> let me take a stab at the first bit of the assumption that you are prefacing the question on where the u.s. can have impact, because they are two separate questions. you are right, andt is why i

broke down freedom of movement for the chinese energy system, aed on the near term which is about move down demand curve, because you cannot substitute out at the 100 giga watt level that china is installing power capacity alternatives to coal, andis no because -- i think it is critical not to assume, because a country has a coal endowment that you are pinned to coal as a resource. it is all about economics. you can have a lot of coal in the glounlround, but it is not effective for you to use it. the reasonou have a coal fir system, is because you have a coal fire system to have a scale of doing 100 giga watts a year and real easy for a chinese design shop to comep with the turnkey and super ability to get it on the grid, and given a skill to turn it to coal is going to take while. china won't g that skill to

get that to scale that of coal fired eequipment. its for theime bng structure and efficiency of the economy, because it has a long lead time, the nuclear power a ccs and whatever the load solution is going to be, it is a long lead to get the supply chain in place. 2020 is not the decisive factor for the window because you can see a pathway for china, a hard pathway, but a consistent with 2 degree world with improvements of technical efficiency in the next decade followed by deployment of more nuclear power and more cts after that. in termsf where can the u.s. make the best inenons, y know, after kind of ee in the past year, we announced seven u.s./china clean energy

initiatives in beijing ranging from shale gas to renewable energy, to energy efficiency to coal tolectric vehicles, and, and all of those are important of co-op rigs. think th i think that we have to be realistic in our view of how much or work ther is going to change needle in either country. as bill men in the u.s. we are at $2 trillion energy economy china is a $2 trillion energyeconomy, also. there are areas where our work together have a catalyt effect, but ultimate i l it is domestic policy that drives change in the markets. so where is the work together most promising? in places where there are er stitutional knowledge or infrastructure bottlenecks to wide scale deployment. bottlenecks to the kind of effectiveness of the policy incentive put in place to catalyze energy.

so the u.s. and c are bum 7g up against thed wall of wind constraints for broader wind deployment, because you have instd the most wind turbines in west texas or intramongolia and getting more wind will require more ibs tugsal changes in terms of the governance and techgical innovation. there is a whole therereater than the sum of the parts in terms of the two countries sharing expertise there. is areas of energy efficiency finance where our shared knowdge can b really transformati, but ultimately, we are not going the change china's energy system and china won't change ours, its domestic policy that will do it. >> i am afraid that ourime f this panel is up. i want to mention a couple of the logistical items before thanking o panelists. one is the presentation by deputy secretary feinbergill be here in this room, and please

be here and be seated by then if you want to be here for that. and secondly, for those don't have plans, there are sandwiches and coffee and cookies out in the hallway. feel free to go out to enjoy. and those here at brookings appreciate us removing alltenin premises today. want to thank our panists for getting this day off to a terrific star weook forward to seeing

going. 21,000 or the 30,000 troops have arrived in the country and many have been involved in the recent successful military operation around marjah.

others will begin restoring security in kandahar, it is likely to be crucial to the overall success in the country. we've seen other clear signs of success in the fight against terrorists. the president's new strategy helped lead to the captain of the taliban second-in-command the former taliban finance minister in the so-called shadow governors of the afghan provinces. the most significant captors of afghan taliban leaders since the start of the war in afghanistan. we'll i'm pleased with the recent success in afghanistan, i anticipate others many concerned remain also we successfully cleared marjah the taliban still appears to be able to infiltrate the town and threaten and kill those who cooperate with american and afghan security forces. this may not be an anticipated. it takes time to build the confidence of the local population but i worry some of this may point to the weakness of the local government that

cannot easily deliver the services and the governments needed to help convince residents of marjah to join the right side. now while we have increased force in afghanistan our allies have begun to send additional troops. today they've had about 50% of the 9,000 new troops they pledged after president obama's december speech. but serious concerns remain about our ability to train the afghan security forces who will have to assume the burden of providing security at combating terrorism in afghanistan without more international trainers. i'm pleased secretary gates decided to send additional u.s. military personnel to fill the gap but it's a short-term solution and it's not a long-term fix. this concern relates to another. in a recent meeting nato endorsed a process to transition the lead for security to in some districts from u.s. and allied troops to afghan national

security forces. i think all of us would like to know more about this process as well as its implications. what progress do we have to see before it can transition to afghan leader and what does this mean for the national troops in the district? are we talking about progress among the afghan security forces or must the district also be the government? finally a quick word of congratulations and one of caution. it department of defense recently delivered a very good on-time report on progress toward security and stability in afghanistan. thank you for that. unfortunately a similar somewhat higher level of metric report filed by the national security council was very disappointing. it's my hope future reports most closely resembles the one, two, three, zero reports and prevent real information. congress cannot judge progress, glorified press releases.

again, think you for coming today. i suspect this will not be the last hearing on afghanistan. this committee will hold this year. i appreciate you working with us to insure congress can conduct its constitutional and appropriate oversight of activities. we are very pleased with your work and with your appearance. now from my good friend the ranking member of the gentleman from california mckeon. >> thank you for holding this hearing on afghanistan. i'd also like to welcome back undersecretary defense michele flournoy and lieutenant general john paxton. i look forward to the testimony. we are a nation at war. the attempted terrorist attack in new york city times square serves as the most recent reminder we face dangerous enemies to threaten the safety of security of the country. the extraordinary men and women of the military and their families need no reminding of this threat.

they know all too well the sacrifices and to the commission that it takes to keep this fight off our shores. a lot has happened since the president stood before the american people and made the case for his afghanistan pakistan strategy. over half of the 30,000 forces authorized by the president have our life and in the country and our conducting operations in southern afghanistan. they are operating with some constraint both political and operational and this is where i would like to focus the remainder of my comments and questions. in my view, this body the matter which side of the all he resided and this committee in particular has the moral responsibility to ensure this war is in default with a minimalist mind set or an eye toward the of the washington political bloc. nearly 18 months ago amol michael mullen told this committee, and i quote, in afghanistan we do what we can. in iraq we do what we must.

when it comes to free sourcing efforts in afghanistan on a remain concerned we are not doing everything we must in order to ensure general crystal and his commanders on the battlefield of the time, space and resources they need to succeed. let me be clear. i have the utmost confidence that general mcchrystal will get the job done. but some from washington raise the risk in increasing casualties. if authority thousand troup capper put in place by this administration is sending the wrong signal to our commanders and forcing military planners to make difficult trade-off decisions between combat troops and the key enablers. i'm particularly concerned we are under resource in force protection capabilities. it's my understanding that there continues to be a serious

indirect fire threat to the u.s. coalition for operating bases in afghanistan yet the current force protection systems that protect the fobs and iraq are not deployed to protect afghanistan. this is disconcerting especially given the fact that we have evidence that such capabilities have saved hundreds of lives in iraq. today i would like the witnesses to explain what modifications have been made to the original joint operational need for the response to put in operation involving freedom and why these changes were made. why are we addressing this particular force protection shortfall differently in afghanistan than in iraq? specifically why are we deploying contractors instead of military personnel? it's my understanding if we get used military personnel like we did in iraq this capability would already be over in

afghanistan protecting lives. while i focus on the impact of the troup cap on the field in a certain key enablers the cap becomes more problematic when you consider some of our nato allies are not meeting their commitments and others will be withdrawing their forces from southern afghanistan. for there is admiral mike mullen's comments suggest there was a time many thought of the two has a struggle for resources resulting in the haves and have-nots. iraq was the haves and afghanistan was the have nots. my suspicion is the mentality of the have nots me be impacting help commanders are implementing the resources they do have in afghanistan. for example in iraq there was a capability called task force oden responsible for killing or capturing over 3,000 insurgents as they were trying to put in ied is basically turning the ied

placer into a suicide mission. in afghanistan they are standing at a similar task force oden capability however, it's my understanding this capability is being used differently than i was in iraq. instead of used to specifically go after ied placer his id is being incorporated into the big picture requirement. i am unclear if this is a tactical decision or the result of the signal from washington to operate under the ceilings we have been given. last, i've raised concerns the emphasis in the strategy appears to be on ending the conflict rather than winning. i wish the president would use words like a victory rather than transition and redeployment. this morning i hope to get a better understanding on what transition actually means. how do you explain the transition to the afghans, to the enemy and to our forces on the ground?

mr. chairman, i ask my entire statement be included in the record where i address other concerns and questions. >> i certainly thank the gentleman. secretary flournoy, please. >> german skelton, congressman mckeon, distinguished members of the committee, it's good to see you all again. thank you for inviting us here to testify on our ongoing efforts in afghanistan. as you know the administration score a goal in the region is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al qaeda and insure the elimination of the al qaeda safe havens. a critical component of the strategy is a stable afghanistan with governments and capacity to ensure afghanistan can no longer be a safe haven for al qaeda and insurgents. the u.s. and afghanistan also have shared interests that extend far beyond combating extremism and we are working to

develop an enduring partnership that will serve both of our nations for years to come. when i last testified before you on afghanistan we face a pretty bleak situation. early collision gains have eroded, the taliban was reassigned and afghan confidence in the coalition was in decline. president obama ordered an immediate strategy review when it came into office and added 38,000 troops in the spring of 2009. after general mcchrystal's assessment last summer and for the review, the president said it to deploy additional 30,000 troops in december of last year. today, over half of the forces have already deployed and almost all of them will be in place by the end of august. more than 9,000 international troops have also been pledged. isaf is focused on protecting the afghan population and partnering with the afghan national security forces to build their capacity to conduct and leave security operations. the civilian surge is also

moving forward. we have three times as many government civilians in kabul as we had a year ago and over four times as many civilians outside of kabul. the evidence suggests hour shift and approach is beginning to produce results. the insurgency is losing momentum. though real challenges and risks remain, we see a number of positive trends. let me highlight a few. as you know we are executing our strategy in close cooperation with the afghan government with our coalition allies and other partners in the region particularly pakistan. our consultations with partners have led to a greater sense of unity of effort and a common strategy. also changes in collection tactics have substantially reduced the percentage of afghan civilian casualties caused by a coalition actions to about 20%. this has produced significant positive shifts in afghanistan attitude towards both isaf and

afghan forces. building the capacity of the afghan national security forces remains a significant challenge but there are signs of progress. currently the afghan national army strength as well of the april target, and the afghan national police are well on their way to achieving their growth goals for this fiscal year. that said, we continue to face trouble and is associated with recruiting, training, retention and attraction in the ansf. isaf has intensified with all levels of the ministry donner to the local units. but shortages of trainers and mentors persist. the afghan government has undertaken a number of initiatives to address these issues including raising the salaries of ansf and equalizing pay between the police and improving the quality-of-life and trying for police and beginning to address corruption. there is, however, much more work to be done to do about commensurate rule of law

structures. more broadly, our emphasis on using desolate assistance to support sustainable governments similarly appears to be paying off. in clear areas such as the valley in the regional command south and other conditions for implementing the runs and programs of the district level are being created. and we are seeing international and afghan actors both military and civilian working together to effectively in power and legitimize the afghan government at the local level. despite the alleged corruption the polls suggest a majority of afghans about 59% believe the government is headed in the right direction. we've also seen positive steps taken by the karzai government at the national level. for instance, president karzai recently issued in turn guidance for the execution of reintegration programs. he will issue final guidance after the consultative peace journal later this month and we expect to be able to support the afghan reintegration program

authority by releasing funds authorized by this committee and the congress in the fy ten ndaa. karzai and his members of cabinet as you know will be visiting washington next weekend highlight the continued support among afghans for our involvement there and the afghan appreciation for the sacrifices being made by vince u.s. troops and civilians. during president karzai's visit we also expect to discuss the nature of the long term strategic partnership between the u.s. and afghanistan including the long-term economic development, security cooperation in areas such as law enforcement, judicial reform and educational programs. as you know, our military operations and helmand continue and we are also engaged in planning and mishitting efforts for future efforts in kandahar. i will leave the specifics of that to the licht congenital paxton but i do want to note for

isaf and the person the operation was the first large-scale effort to fundamentally change how we are doing business together. and helmand protecting population has been the top priority along with ensuring the military operations pave the way for afghan led governments and if element activities. preparation for the helmand operation included extraordinary levels of civil military planning and engagement with afghan partners at every level and we feel the collaborative operational planning process was critical to getting afghans a sense of ownership and investment in the success of our joint efforts. i don't want to suggest achieving success in afghanistan will be simple or easy. far from it to get kandahar for example will present challenges are fundamentally different from those that we have recently encountered and helmand. inevitably, we will face challenges, possibly setbacks' even as we achieve success.

we need to recognize things might get harder before they get better. we are challenging our adversaries in new ways in the insurgents are intelligence and in adaptable. they will find new ways to respond and to maintain tomentum we need to continuously refine and adapt our own tactics. but at this point i'm cautiously optimistic. i believe that we are developing the conditions necessary though not yet sufficient for success. we finally come and i would argue for the first time we finally have the right mission, the right strategy, the right leadership team in place and we have marshalled both the international and afghan resources, civilian and military to support this mission. afghanistan is our number one priority. general mcchrystal knows that he can ask for what he needs. the president has given the secretary of defense the flexibility to provide for additional forces particularly when force protection is needed. as we move forward we will

continue to refine our approach and i believe we will continue to make progress. i want to think this committee for the support you provided to the troops and to this mission this far. i would urge you to continue their support in considering our current budget requests before you and i know that general paxton will address the operational matters in greater detail and we look forward to your question and comments. thank you. >> thank you so much. general paxton. >> good morning, chairman skelton, ranking member mckeon and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for your time today. this morning i would like to provide an overview of military operations in afghanistan. as secretary flournoy printable we are starting to see conditions we believe are necessary for success and afghanistan. most important of the conditions is having the right leadership and strategy in place. in 2009 after assuming command of ideas to get general

mcchrystal conducted an assessment of the situation in afghanistan. he developed a campaign plan that was designed to provide a secure environment that would enable and improve governments and diplomat in afghanistan. at the heart of the campaign plan are four requirements colin code to protect the afghan people, to enable afghan security forces, to neutralize and malign influence is and to support the extension of government. general mcchrystal has gone to great lengths to ensure all of our operations in afghanistan are directly tied to achieving these games. the central tenet of the campaign strategy is to protect the populace. we are fulfilling this bipartisan efforts to provide security and extend governance and high density population areas on the insurgent groups currently operate and by reducing civilian casualties. the reduction of the casualties is another key component of the efforts to protect the people in afghanistan. general mcchrystal has repeatedly emphasized his point at every opportunity.

in fact hour own force protection is closely related to gaining the respect and support of the afghan people. ied is remain the number one killer in afghanistan accounting for 60% of the total casualties. in some areas over 80% of our ied discoveries have been a direct result of tips from local nationals. we are convinced these are a result of the relationships that we are building on a daily basis with of the local population and the protection that we are providing. clearly the support of the people of afghanistan is essential and relates directly to our own safety. regional command south is currently with operations are in afghanistan we are expanding security zones enhancing freedom of movement and increasing the confidence of afghan national security forces and partners by the growth of the partner concept. the real prize in the south is the key city of kandahar and its environs. kandahar city is of huge importance nationally and is the capitol of the south. it is a rich culture and history

and is the key economic help and of great importance to the taliban movement which originated in kandahar. the insurgents had a degree of freedom as recent subside bombings of demonstrate and the local police lack sufficient forces to prevent insurgent activity while the government also lack the capacity, credibility and resources to operate effectively. the people of canada are caught in the middle of confrontation and a demand better security and economic to the moment, and the government in touch with and responsive to their needs. our operation in kandahar is named hamkari that means cooperation. it will be conducted without can partners in the lead for operations. focus of hamkari is on providing kandahar with credible effective governance that gives the population hope for the future. more effective government will deliver security basic services and employment. but these ends are achieved the

people of kandahar will reject the insurgency and support the government. the plan for hamkari were in proved to be approved on the fourth of april by the president when he visited the city. over time it will deliver security the people kandahar desire and to all the insurgents from the city and outlying districts by steadily restricting freedom to operate. and more capable representatives and responsive government to bring the economic development and will fall the areas that we need. hamkari is not about highly kinetic military operations. it is about applying the combined resources of the afghan national army, the afghan national police and isaf and supporting the governor to improve the security within the city and in the populated and fireman's. hamkari will bring the government and people closer together to make for a better future for kandahar. the recent clearing operations by the afghan national security forces, the marines and british and gillani were in fact shaving

the operations for this upcoming event and operations in and around kandahar. there are several significant differences between hamkari and the operation in marjah. of the size and population are different in canada than in marjah. in marjah isaf forces relied on kinetic operations to clear the insurgents from the populated area. in kandahar s general mcchrystal recently indicated, and i quote, there won't be a d-day that is climactic. instead there will be a rising tide of security for the local population. our current assessment is a positive trend suggests ansf growth and improved security, governments and to the limit in the central element or a result of recent operations and indicate that the campaign is on track moving in the right direction. previously the trends in some areas of the country have been are arrested while trends elsewhere have been starting to advance the positive direction.

current trends remain tenuous until more permanent and effective governance is established. in the areas being secured. indoor and stability is dependent on the government of afghanistan's ability to deliver a credible, local governments and essential services and to expand economic opportunities for its people. real progress will be confirmed only when the afghan people believe that lasting security stability have been established in their areas, and this will take time. people's perceptions typically change more slowly and a lag behind the actions but actually improving the conditions on the ground. as i conclude my remarks as did secretary flournoy i would caution everyone that in spite of the recent success in the central helmand we shouldn't underestimate the challenges that lie before us or that underplay the need for the result in the days ahead because we continue to fight intelligent adult will enemy. thank you for your time this morning. more importantly i think you for your support of the troops, their families and the mission and i look forward to your

questions. thank you. >> thank you for a much. again, we appreciate your being with us and your excellent assessment. both of you come with me in your mind's eye. my hometown, lexington, early in the morning go to a local coffee shop and a fair are seven or eight of my gentlemen friends sitting around drinking coffee talking about football games and baseball games that are coming up and i introduce you. most of them are veterans of the vietnam or korea, and one of them turns to you and says are we achieving success in afghanistan? another one turns to you and says when do we declare victory in afghanistan?

and i step back and let you answer the questions. madam secretary, the two questions. >> chairman skelton, i believe we are achieving success. we are on the right road for the first time in a long time in afghanistan. so that is the assessment of general mcchrystal that we hear weekly in our conversations with him. it is the assessment in our u.s. government team on the ground. are we done yet? of supply not. are there more challenges to be dealt with? yes but we are on the right path and things are starting to move in the right direction. in terms of how to define victory i think that victory -- sprick i didn't say defining it. the question was -- >> i'm sorry, when is victory. >> my friend asked you are we achieving it.

>> i think when it is victory is based on achieving certain conditions and that, to me, is making sure that the government of afghanistan has the capacity to exert its sovereignty over the territory to deny al qaeda and its associates safe haven in the country and to maintain stability so that it can continue to develop on the way forward. that relates to the core goals we've defined for ourselves in this mission. >> general? to questions. >> in terms of success, and i too believe we are achieving success on the ground. the definition of success, well, the indicator of success, it is true for levels of violence or up right now and in some areas both the attacks have been up and the ieds in particular are up, but as i noted earlier, what we are seeing is in some cases

up to 80% of the local population letting us know with the ieds already and that contributed to a reduction in the number of casualties and increased operational efficiency in marjah and its a expectation that as we have better partner and, more partnering, more afghans in the lead in the planning and the execution we will see the trends continue as we move into kandahar. in terms of victory, i believe that the indicators for victory are there is a lag between the execution and the indication and it is indeed very dependent on the demonstration of both capacity and credibility of the afghan people, the security forces and the governments to actually lead and provide security and provide opportunities for the people. but the more that the polls indicate as they currently do, then the believe in the afghan

national security forces and all isaf and they believe the current operations are generating potential for a better life for them and we are on the right road, sir. >> thank you so much. mr. mckeon. >> thank you, mr. chairman. in my opening comments i stated that at merrill mike mullen told this committee in afghanistan we do what we can and iraq and we do what we must 18 months ago. and actually this statement was made december of 2007 swy wanted to correct that for the record. as i stated earlier, i'm concerned that the 40,000 troup cap for afghanistan forcing difficult decisions to be made when it comes to finding certain key enablers including force protection measures for via forward operating basis do we have a troup cap in afghanistan? >> we do not have a truck cab.

30,000 is the number of forces the president has approved. it isn't a cap, per say petraeus bac that is based on the assessment on the ground and the assistant subject to review both by general mcchrystal and back here in washington. and the 30k that people refer to is just one component, sir, because we have an additional nine to 10,000 of nato forces and then we have what is now in route to 134 afghan national army and up to 170 some afghan national police. so you have to look at the composite mix of all of the security forces and we are trying to strike the balance between u.s. coalition force and the local nationals. >> so you feel there is no cap and general mcchrystal put call on all of the resources that he felt he needed? >> indeed he has. he's come back to ask for more and it is a constant series of assessments which i personally get involved with on a weekly

basis to take a look at the flow of forces and what should go next door in addition to. >> let me talk on a little bit about the enablers in iraq versus afghanistan. can you answer the following: are we addressing force protection on the fall differently in afghanistan and iraq and if yes, then why are we deploying the contractors instead of military personnel? >> sergel our analysis of the force protection is no different regardless of the theater, and it is a strike the balance between is the threat direct fire, indirect fire, aviation missile and then you take a look at the appropriate indications and mornings you would need to identify where the threat would come from. i would tell you that as we look to increase our footprint and boots on the ground presence in afghanistan we also look to bring in what we commonly called the enablers that you need to have to provide the force

protection so additional military police, additional combat engineers and routt clearance and part and parcel of the package thanks to the efforts of this committee in the funding has been the elevated line of sight which would be the persistent ground surveillance, some of it on the camera and on the elevating telescopic polls from the vehicles, some of it tethered balloons, some of it mandy and some of it on man. so all of our isr capabilities provide us the eyes and ears that we need to since the environment there. and if you look at the sources of the fire and the casualties, the indirect fire in afghanistan is not what it was an iraq. it is the ieds that's the largest component first and then the small arms fire and things like the grenades second, it's not indirect fire but the assessment process in iraq and afghanistan are identical, sir. ..

we have isr task force here, which is pushing all those assets forward, again manned and unmanned. we have a task force which is our ied over there, and we are looking to get both full motion video and manned and unmanned aerial vehicles up there so we can detect movement of the enemy and movement of perhaps the sympathetic local nationals that may be either scaling or putting an ied's, so i think that

capability is there and as i mentioned a minute ago some of this is just a leg as we increase our footprint on the ground. we are surging with them and bringing behind extra eyes and ears that will do the exact same things in afghanistan as we did in iraq. >> do we have more of these uavs's currently in iraq than in afghanistan? >> if i could take that for the record and get back to you sir because we are drawing down obviously and iraq. we are trying to keep sufficient amount they are to cover what will be, our advise-and-assist brigade that stay behind. there's a difference in the geometry of the battlefield. some folks would believe that as you drive down, the boots on the ground, you could draw down all all the extra enablers and that may not be the case, as general odierno have articulated, that you still need extra eyes and ears out there because you don't have the physical presence on

the ground so we are trying to strike a balance between how quickly we can drawdown in iraq and how much they can build up in afghanistan. some of it is the traditional forces. in other cases we need them and both so we are procuring more thanks to the effort of the committee to buy more full motion video and oir indifferent things like that, sir. >> it seems to me and iraq where we pulled the troops out of the city, and there are more in reserve positions right now where in afghanistan we are on the offense, and it seems like to me, i am not a military expert, such as general petraeus and general mcchrystal and yourself, but i would like to see those numbers, because it seems to me that more of those enablers might-- in my humble opinion should be where we are on the offense and where we have more troops actually in the line of fire right now. >> yes sir, and i will take that for the record and certainly get

you the numbers and then the actual discussion of how many and where they go, we can certainly do that in closed session if you would like sir. >> thank you rematch. >> i thank the gentleman. mr. ortiz. >> thank you mr. chairman, secretary for knight and general paxton. thank you for being here and providing your thoughts on security and stability of afghanistan. a few days ago it was announced that the united united states we sending an additional 850 soldiers and marines to train local security forces in afghanistan from approximately 90 to 120 days. these trainers are seen as a stopgap yet there is still a charge of plans conducting this critical mission. the way out of afghanistan is to have capable local security forces. what is needed to fill this critical shortage of trainers? i think this is one of the big problems that we have.

and how are our allies filling these critical shortages, and how will the choice of trainers affect the handover to local forces? maybe you can enlighten us a little bit on that. >> i think the institutional trainers for the afghan national security forces, and then having mentoring teams, what we call omelettes out in the field to continue that training and leadership development as they actually operate. that really is a sort of intent of our future success. this is absolutely critical to building capacity. as we seek to grow bnsf and improve its quality, the requirements for the training, that training capacity has gone up. we have been pushing our allies to step up up with us to meet those new requirements, and any

of them are doing so. it remains a work in progress. we have not-- we have made progress toward that goal. general paxton may have some of the specific numbers but we are not all the way there yet. the u.s. forces, the bridge, is simply to try to meet some of the near-term requirements as we continue to recruit our nato allies to step up with additional trainers, but we don't want to lose time. so we wanted to go ahead and plug the near-term gap, and get general caldwell who is the ahead and take some additional resources to continue the momentum in these very important efforts. i don't know if you want to add any comments. >> thank you man. yes sir, obviously the training of the police and the afghan national army are a critical function, not just critical but critical functions we have to accomplish so general caldwell

is over there with the nato training mission formerly-- and we have sent additional u.s. forces over to assist them, almost to belgrade teams worth to do training for the army army and police. nato has had almost three to 4000 more since the president's announcement in december, but we would like to get additional nato contributions there and some of the nato members perhaps we look at their combat footprint to see if we can change those into trainers and enablers. so what we have done and what your comment reflects there is that in the short-term we still have a pressing need for trainers and we are waiting for long-term solutions that we have sent an army battalion and three increments of marines over there to fill that gap in the short-term, sir. >> i remember we had a high-- of awol's. has that gone down some? are we still having the problem we had before were they just wouldn't come in? >> there is minute mark a change

since december in terms of both their absenteeism which has gone down and then their reenlistment and retention rate which is gone up so it is not only in the short-term in terms of showing up for duty but in the long-term in terms of their commitment. some of this is due to success on the ground and some of it is due to change in their pay structure but we believe these are both good news story sir. >> it is encouraging to see that we are beginning to get tips from the local citizens as to where to locate some of the ied's and staff. what about the training camps? i mean, do we have any knowledge? are we getting any tips on the training camps because we see, just like the other day, naturalized citizen from the united states goes down there to train and-- is that hard to detect the training camp where they are training the enemy? >> i don't have some of the tactical specifics at my fingertips are but a obviously these are safe havens in sanctuaries and sometimes they are indeed difficult to find.

the more that you build confidence in the local populace and the more they tell you routes that you have freedom of movement on our areas where you should not go or they help you detect ied's eventually you get to the point where you can say, who lives in this neighborhood and they will take you to other areas. so we watch it very closely, sir. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. mr. bartlett please. >> thank you very much. want to return to the coffee shop across the country. there are two other questions being asked. the first is, why is not the afghan war the ultimate exercise in utility? because even if we do at no one else has ever done, alexander the great, the british empire and the soviet empire even if we can accomplish what none of them have ever accomplished it won't make any difference they say because the bad guys will simply going to pakistan. then if we spend i don't know how many more billions of dollars in how many more dead included kids to drive them out of there, they will go to

somalia and yemen. it is quite clear that we cannot deny them sanctuary, so why is this not the ultimate exercise in futility? it is noted that they frequently, the citizens there choose the harsh movement of the taliban compared to the corrupt rule of the karzai government and our very presence there recruits the enemy. there were essentially no al qaeda in iraq before we went there and then there were a lot of al qaeda there after we were there. i asked the state department where they imported, they said most of them were in fact de novo so our presence there creates the enemy. the second question is, why are we following osama bin laden's playbook? this is a hugely asymmetric war. mohammed with a rusty artillery sharing a few dollars worth of electronics and just one of our responses to that have cost us $40 billion. that is mrap's, one platform in response to that.

osama bin laden is on the record as saying they will continue this guerrilla kind of war until they bleed us dry. so two questions please, weiss is not the ultimate exercise in futility and why are we following osama bin laden's playbook? >> congressman congressman in response to the first question i would draw a very sharp between the historical experience of many in afghanistan who were there to conquer, versus our mission in afghanistan which is to enable the development of afghan capacity to exert sovereignty, go over their own, over their own territory. i think your point about pakistan has informed the fact that we have taken a regional strategy. we need to pressure al qaeda and its associates and deny them safe haven on both sides of the border comment that is is exactly what our strategy is designed to do. support for the taliban in afghanistan is quite week.

very little popular support, and that creates great opportunity for us to help develop and afghan institution and capacity that are a viable alternative for the population. and in terms of osama bin laden, again i would just say that we don't have the option of allowing al qaeda to have freedom of movement and sanctuary, given the threat they pose to our homeland and to our vital interests abroad. and i think that if you look at the totality of our campaign, on both sides of the afghan-pakistan border, and globally, we are having tremendous success in putting pressure on this network, and disrupting their operations and denying their ability to launch spectacular attacks. so, i think that we have to take

a global perspective and i think the strategy is actually bearing a great deal of fruit at this time. >> the questioner notes that in iraq we actually increase the number of the enemy. are very presence there did that admitted by the state department, and assuming success in afghanistan and pakistan, they will simply go to somalia and yemen. it is clear that we cannot deny them sanctuary, so the question still remains why is this not the ultimate exercise in futility, assuming success? >> again, sir, i think the facts suggest that we are debilitating the network, we are putting pressure on the networks on a global basis. and that denying them sanctuary is critical to preventing their ability to attack our homeland and attack our interests and our

forces and our allies abroad. >> a second question, why are we following osama bin laden's playbook in this hugely asymmetric war? >> sir i would differ with you. i don't believe we are following is playbook or go actually, is playbook isn't working so well in terms of advancing al qaeda's aims right nowãnow. >> thank you, i yielda's aims right now. >> thank you, i yield back. >> the gentleman from mississippi, mr. taylor. >> mr. chair i'm going to yield my time and. >> mr. murphy is recognized. >> thank you. i am over here. it is hard to tell when we yield around where we are going. i want to look a little bit for direction as to where this is all headed. i was in kandahar two months ago on the ground talking to people that were there, very impressed with their efforts and what we are trying to do to stabilize the area and provide security there but one of the things that jumped out at me was where it is to go from there?

i have no doubt our soldiers can provide security and get on the street so they can drive the taliban away but where's the next open one that really stuck out to me, some of the locals said to me we don't have any reliable electricity. we don't have an economy, we t so't ruxtur businesses. i can have you made with 20 local businessman who cannot run their factories because there is no electricity. there were 2 megawatts for the bus to pe city ofadedd. based needs 10 to 12 megahertz a day so we are sitting there trying to prareade seidity and also at night lighting up this boardwalk of broadway liidis and the peking e are saying we can't get any power but you guys have it over there. where is the nee' that so we ldivide security but then what happens to let people start to function in that environment to allow us to get away and to go next, and they get specifically do we have a plan for eleliabicity in the local econoy there? >> sir, i would like to come backget r the record with a more

detailed answer on the specifics of rectrical king eer generation foradedd. my understanding though is that is part of the larger planget r that area. i think the real shift we have seen coming out of our, the strategy review when we are putting ag aitional civilian resources on the ground alongsa ae our soubbt is that we have had much more integrated civil military planning where we, in designing our coualorinsur. y campaign for an area, we are actually harnes rug the development piece to suppo un the establishment of more were credible and capable afghan government-- governance at the whecal and provincial level. my understanding is that this is a rehy is reduyed and it is pan of a longer-term plan for that area, but i would like toswt re?k to yogeon theto gecific details if i may. >> sir, i will join with the secretary andswt back with you on specifics but as some of you know there is this-- in southern

afghanistan. >> three years before the power will impact is. >> urica- and that tha hes pfic of a wheng-term plan. we can develop areas like that. >> is a thpecifi years before we think that govercrece is coming? before there is electricity to have an ecdon''t ha is hard to imagine peking e will start to y this government is really working for us to does that mean it is our redetaionsibility for that long? >> we authority move some . rator cauthity into the area but it is a slow process that develops. this is theto glonficg aif of te timeline between let me get the generators and then when infon thestructure is in place m in a power surge to deliver. >> i use is more vague bigger point, which was what i also is was that we have got a catch-22. they can'tswt the cr supbility to build popular support behind their government unt hadthey can betivebuifor peking e. we aren't comfortable letting them deliver any other forr aent wo an retil they stop having the corruption problems they have because we save we don't wainf we are not going to

crecve you the money because we think you are going to steal . >alal great but if we provide security and your development foting us e doing the development why would anybody turn to us. three to the taliban, and forge theanybghan gover3 ment, so what i want to understand is how are we going to make that trcorour,on, how are we going toswt to the point where the afghan governments are on that hat and we are atuthiast two if not tspe or four. >> i think two points that i itld maonomninge that are very this-ort wou issues you are rac. one is to make sure that the prt priorities in an area are more tightly integrated into the overall campaign plan for that area. inadedd. process is starting to happen more than as in the past so i think you are going to see a realignment of some of our development efforpoin to ounde

closely sue are un the secand id governance objectives. >> so are we stfic ounde devel steent morup to the afghan government in the region? >> the second is bad we are hking muver.e s by muver.e s to develop the internal capacity so that they can receive actarynt for, track and be actaryntable for pulling money through the minist@ p, so we have set ourpaives a serieg aif progressive goals to flow more and more assistance through the keyanybdeveln muver.tries, but t require certifying them to be able to handle that in an accon thlly the process of doing that. i think we have done our,o or three and we will do anheirer oo or three in the next coming months. >> my time has expired butare we taryldswt the metrics for how that certification works, i'm really interested in thces3 ptall seal corruption and against and how weswt ourselves out of being

the ones doing the nation-building and that the afghans buthe a their own natio. >> u thank theswntlemamet mr. jones. >> mr. chairman thank you ve@ p much andbandam seemamory, . ral paxton thank you for being here today, and i would ct e to stfic 't ha questions by reading an e-mail i got recently from gotmondswneral that i have tremendous respect for. the only real shot we have of o p so owof sureal elop has ben we haars of stity afghan army and police. a ve@ p tough thing to do. uri rid of corrung thon in the government, good luck with that front. not to drive the taurityan into the arms of local populations. it was a fairly long e-mail that ira not at liberty to say his

name, but i e-mailed him because i am very concerned ab, and f rs of engtorsement. i had had a conversation with the father of this marine who useme,illed, e-hn bepmeard,. then i go back to another article in marine times, left to die, thnanc caive dget r help. that was your army leadership refusing the battlefield. i realirec you ares. the confidens hand the support of the afghan people, but i go re?k to the coffeeshop that the al cirman told us about. i hear this frequently back home in the third district of north carare gina. on the camp lejeune marine base on the airget rceour people are wonderings. if you don't have input, this is

beginning to soqued like the pre lejous addelistslion, in irq or go you brief the congress and surm not being crour,cal. i want you to fully rederstand that. you brief the congress and well youme,now, we ar@ p all tiously optimistic. we are going down this road and thatis ct e we arebanking progress. i am sure we are making some ldigreelop . i don't doubt that that i will tell you that reading this article in "newsweek", scandal andanybdevelver.tan. thetifclusive story of how we have wasted $6 billion, dow biloamet a coy rcar andve@me,nveficgficge force that may cost us the war. i really want tos. , and fnew is chairs a year, two years, three for areto gendingo ullions and

trillions in a 14th century country. where coy rng thon, that we cans control is getting some of our people are invited overgire. we can't evento geak thed r language hardly. so the point is, at what point wilus ayouwe haay to t wan cong. do you believe you can say, we are at the point that we have one the endpo el ofnewat we are e sing to achieve, because madam secretary, i feel for this admini poito hion as well. ibande that point. this is something they inherited and we have to fire. terrorisdo3 aro cof the world, but sticking 100,000 of our troops over in afghanistan andinvkinng them,arw theyce reelop you from the let you shoot back and if they fire at you from theionsre. you don't ucot. that is not fair to these kids and it is not toowithir to thga parentt wives and husbands.

i guess that is the question. >> senator i'm going touthit . ral pacorrunirmdreelop irmdressd the particulars of the rules of engpacment because thnanc thinki is moreng a engb,d to do that, but let me first take on your canhyn,newderh i ths ov is cofking stanticubto hand real t the challenges of capacity bs. afghanistan is a coquetry that has been in and out of war for 30"non tha. in that> ind of en lejronment corruption can take root in a society writ large. it is a problemget r other tary,urits in the region as wel. i think we are seeing renewed comgresstmenpoin to de engng . ythink wan ldiblem on the afghan side.

we are t@ ping to chap incentive structures that have motivated coy rng thon in the pasrene you areionsre., it used to be that police did not pick a living waat that rit en wouldban0,a living wage by policing the local population. pmealpmealpmealpmeall

we have to move along, but go ahead. >> thank you are. congressman jones there is absolutely nothing in the tactical directive that prohibits or limits any service member, marine, soldier from appropriate self-defense. what is in the directive is the conscious application of close air support to make sure that it is not a target or something that poses self-defense that you have done due diligence in terms of assessing collateral damage, whether it is for infrastructure or for children, for noncombatants, but there is nothing in there that prohibits either the commander or the individual holder from doing what he needs to do on the ground. >> dr. schneider please. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you all for being here or go once again. you are regulars here in the last few days. i want to talk about resources.

secretary flournoy you had talked about that earlier. i remember general jack keane testified, now retired, that when he was chief of staff of the army in the end of 2002 resources began being moved out of afghanistan in anticipation of the march 03 invasion of iraq. his recollection was that was utterly. then we began hearing almost privately from the commandant at them former marine-- made the comment that we have a policy of clear, hold and build but we only have enough troops to clear. we don't have enough troops to hold and build. secretary gates from the bush administration made some comments that he was concerned about the troop strength. mr. king has referred to the december 2007 statement by admiral mullen. my concern is that the continued discussion as if we are still in that mindset. the ranking member opening statement refers to a have not mentality. is there have not mentality that

would be permeating our military commanders making-- thinking they don't have adequate resources? >> that is certainly not my impression. i think general mcchrystal's assessment was to tell us what he thought he needed to be the priority mission and to get the mission right, and i think when you look at the u.s. forces that have been put in and the nato forces that are being committed, the afghan forces that are being grown, he believes he has what he needs to do the mission. and i think one of the things that secretary gates has always said is, we have to make sure that we balance our approach here, that i'm the one hand you want to make sure you have enough forces in afghanistan to ensure that you don't fail in the mission. on the other hand, you don't want to go overboard and become, come to be seen as a force of occupation. so we have listened to general

mcchrystal very carefully and what he told congress in december and what he continues to say is that he believes he is getting the resources to carry out his mission at this point. i don't know if you have anything to add. >> again, part of assessment and try to figure out what you need both by people and their resources and when you needed and where you needed him a constant risk assessment. i think most members in uniform, if you asked them how much do you need the answer would always be more because the more you have, the less risk you have to assume that we try to constantly assess how many people we have and what types of capability we have and then does that sufficiently mitigate the risk, and it said they most likely or in most dangerous course of action that you are going to mitigate against. and secondly sir, as we look to increase the capability and the capacity of the afghan forces to make sure that, as they shoulder more of a burden and we can requisite stand down and do perhaps less. we teach them, we show them and

we lead them and then we turn it over to them. >> i appreciate your sentiment today. i hope if that were to change six months, year, 18th-- 18 months from now that you did not have the resources you need i hope you would express the same level of candor. i yield back mr. chairman. >> mr. turner please. >> thank you mr. chairman. i thank both of you for being here today. i have two questions. one concerning the troop cabinet and one concerning drug trafficking. the first question general paxton is directed at you and it is building on mr. mckeon's statement and other questions that other members have had during this hearing. people are very concerned about our ability to be successful as we are looking at the constraints you are operating under. so the question is, what enablers that nato allies and the afghan security forces relying on for the new united states to provide and how has

the troop cap of 30,000 impacted our ability to support the u.s. allied forces and the afghans? as isaf coalition add 4500 of perhaps 9000 troops pledged in conjunction with the u.s. surge and his afghan security forces grow how are we ensuring that our troops, the allies in the afghans will have access to the enablers that they need? >> thank you sir. we have looked very closely at the enablers and no surprise that, when the u.s. comes not only do we bring the preponderance of the forces but we bring the preponderance of the enablers, so we have more aviation be it from lift or for medevac. we have more engineers for route clearance, so when you go to our nato allies in the coalition forces, you look for them to bring a requisite share of those capabilities that they are able. secretary gates just spoke at istanbul several weeks ago and offered that we would take a look at our obligations, which

this committee rightfully told us to take a look at in iraq several years ago to make sure that, by resourcing allied and coalition partners we don't necessarily jeopardize u.s. forces first curt. we are at the point now with our production of mraps and are equipment on the ground that we can take a look at those capabilities that we could either share with partners or offer to sell to them are put in the mfs program so there is an increased capacity and willingness on the part of allies to fund for themselves, to source for themselves and then we also have the capability of sharing with them in areas where we are partnered together. >> everyone continues to be concerned about how those resources came out of a total resources that are applied and whether or not we have sufficient response to meet our needs. on december 21, 2006, the atlantic council, general jones

stated that the a kealy's heel is the narcotics problem. general john suggested solution has to be broad if not one thing, there is no recipe for this, not just eradication, not substitution but a lot of things can be combined to begin to wean the economy. or specifically had called for one a judicial system that is functional, two police reform, three involvement of the afghan government, for extending the reach of the afghan government of pakistan. i know that when we look at at the issue of the drug trade we have to be concerned about how do we address the issue of the money, the cash that flows through the drug trade. the transportation routes for drugs themselves. the labs that are producing the drugs. the fields themselves, where we need to look for an economic shift. part of the problem has been a lack of an assessment of a

complete to-do list and then execution of of the to-do list. according to a recent report by the national security council, a new u.s. counternarcotic strategy for afghanistan has been approved to my understanding and has not been briefed on this new strategy and that we don't have back here for our staff. i'm very concerned about this and what can you tell us about this new strategy? i would like to hold up this chart. this is a crs report chart that shows the afghan drug trade. as you can see, the last four years and if you folded in half you can see what the normal production is up narcotics. the last four years have been their own surge, the narcotics search and that is really i believe the root of what we have been facing facing in afghanistan. as we try to address the issues in afghanistan but don't address this drug trade we are going to continue to fund a few our adversaries. what can you add to that discussion please?

>> we did refine our counternarcotic strategy is part of the review. and i'm happy to invite our-- to come up in brief this committee if you have not been adequately briefed. narcotics is a key funding stream for the insurgency. we have established a threat finance velvet looks at the nexus of narcotics in the insurgency, to go after that. we have also helped train afghan forces that are specifically focused on drug interdiction. we have crop substitution programs underway to try to transition farmers to look at crops. wewe are focusing infrastructure development to make sure that once farmers grow grow illicit crops that can actually get them to market, and so forth. i think in areas where this has come together, for example you have seen a drop in poppy production. rc south is the new area of focus, what we will be putting

up elements in place to make the same kind of progress there but we would be happy to come back up and brief you, sir. >> thank the gentleman. the gentleman from connecticut. >> thank you mr. chairman. secretary flournoy, and answering mr. skelton's question, you have a definition is victory as the point at which afghanistan has the capacity to assert taliban safe haven, which really seeks in my mind to prioritize the need to get the functioning, security forces. the "new york times" yesterday quoted a pentagon report, which said that the most significant challenges is the fielding of qualifying-- and i know mr. ortiz touch on this earlier but again, the story list of the fact that nato and u.s. agreed to 5200 trainers last january. there are 2700 there today.

all but 300 are u.n. and secretary gates has been working hard to try and extract the bodies that were committed. but at the same time we are flowing 30,000 forces, and clearly this is so important, to have the trainers there. i mean, at some point it seems that we should just do it and stop sort of waiting for that commitment to materialize, and why a are you, and? >> the decision to deploy the additional u.s. forces as a bridge mechanism is the cause of the immediate gap which is needed now. we want to continue to incentivize our partners to step up with additional training contributions but this is a priority and we will plug those

gas. the other thing that really makes the difference here is the shift in general mcchrystal's strategy which puts an emphasis on partnering so that every ama unit, every afghan police unit has an isaf or u.s. partner. that is continuing to training in the field, mentoring, doing leadership development, and so there is the institutional training piece which is critical, but the partnering is where you are really going to float further develop your force and his competency to take leadership over time. so that is an area of focus, and we are putting about as much energy as can possibly be put on this, i'm closing this gap, sir. >> the training is holistic too so we are looking to train the ministries as well as the police in the armed forces and within the police, the local police, the ancop so it is across-the-board. we wreck nice in addition to the

training in general and across the board in specific there is a unique requirement to train leadership so one of the things we want to do is get u.s. forces and then allied and nato coalition force trainers there to concentrate on nco training in officer training also to serve. >> to you? challenge the numbers in terms of, again the commitment that was made and where we are today? >> i don't have the specific numbers. we know there is a gap between what was place in what is shown up and that is why the bridging solution is in there. the 850 that was alluded to is indeed part of an army battalion and then increment of marines that are going over there, the chief of the staff of the army said these are available and ready and kelp-- and help the bridging solution and some of those have a backfill mechanism

so if by the end of their normal tenure we had three months, four months, six months we don't have the l.a. contribution contributions we can backfill again. we don't like to do that. we got like to get solutions from nato allies but we can do that, sir. >> i guess, and i am so, i understand your point that we want to extract those commitments that were made, deal us a deal. but on the other hand, the president's goal of 2011 as sort of a turnaround., and somebody who was over last week in lake connecticut national guardsmen who were hit by an ied easter sunday morning. waiting for a nato allies, time is the enemy and if the training piece is so critical, and getting to that point that you defined as sort of success, just seems that we should just do it. we should just move. >> sir, we will come back with a more forceful explanation but

the gaps-- we are moving to address those now, and the rest will follow over time. but we agree this is the priority, and we are working with-- to address it as quickly as possible. >> before i call on mr. klein, let me address the potential of kealy's heel-- achilles' heel that we have to overcome before we can use the word success or the word victory. in each of these is a serious potential achilles' heel. pick out, if you would, do one

or two of the list i gave to you that are the most serious. first, the corruption within the afghanistan government. next, bad governance of the afghan government. next, bad military strategy. next, the afghanistan security forces collapsing. next, pakistan refusing to help fight the al qaeda and the taliban. next, the lack of resources to the fighters. next, the lack of resolve with our military and their allies. next, the logistics route being

shut down, and laugh, the regional countries acting to undermine the afghan government and support the taliban. which of those concerns you the most? which could lead to defeat in not allowing us to use the word either success or a victory? madam secretary? >> sir, when i look at that long list, i think that actually we have the right military strategy in place, that the development is challenging but is moving in the right direction, that we are seeing pakistan step up to the fight, that we are putting the right level of resourcing against the problem and so forth so i think the ones that really

will be the greatest challenges longer-term are the involvement of regional, other regional stakeholders and ensuring that they do not interfere it and are undermine afghanistan's progress toward security and stability. and, i think overcoming decades of war to establish strong and good governance at all levels in afghanistan, not just at the national level but at the local level where most afghans actually experience their government. >> general? >> mr. chairman i wrote down the nine of them and i highlighted the same two that secretary flournoy did. they are all critical. they are all important. they all sometimes can appear tenuous but we have both the capability and capacity ourselves in the united states certainly with their allies in nato partners in the growing and capacity and capability with the

government afghanistan and the afghan security forces. i think we are well on our way to tackling five or six of those, so my biggest concern would be those that, for lack of a better term, the longest lead time before we see measures of success. so how they demonstrate good governance within the government of afghanistan and then how we get cooperation and support from regional actors and neighboring nations are the two that concern me the most, sir. >> thank you so much. mr. klein. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you for joining us again so quickly after your last visit. i must say that i was surprised and pleased to hear from both of you in response to mr. mckeon's questions about a cap, a troop gap but there is no troop cap so i take it to mean from that that is general mcchrystal, general petraeus need another 5000 or 10,000 u.s. forces, that that is

fine. that is something you would take up. there is no cap and if they need them they go so i'm very pleased to hear that. that relates to a couple of other questions that i have. one, if for the record general, i think this would come from your shop, we understand that they were free force packages that are deploying to afghanistan and they contain combat forces and enablers, and if you could get for us to break down in those packages a combat combat force enablers answer, i hate to do this to you but we are going to mark up the mdaa next week so if you could get that for us this week for the record, i assume you have them already and we would like to see that. then, in light of the troop requirement, do we are to have a plan, either one of view, a plan in place to backfill the dutch canadian courses that are leaving in 2010 and 2011, and if

you have a ready answer for that i would take it now and if not i would be happy to take it for the record. because they want to get to another issue, again related i believe to the requirement for forces. that was raised by a think the ranking member and perhaps some others, and that is the joint urgent operational need that came from centcom, richly back in july of 2009 for warning and response capability. i want to focus on that and not force protection in the large. there was an urgent need that was identified back in july 2009 , and they worked their way up until march of this year, when general petraeus told this committee that they were exploring the use of contractors to meet some of the requirements contained in this. so my question is, has that been

modified, and if so, why? and is it true that we are looking at contractors because we either don't have a u.s. forces or decision has been made not to use them. i will tell you why i am really concerned about this is if we were to use the model we have in iraq we would have soldiers with a lot of that capability in place in our-- we have u.s. forces over there and i have a personal familiarity with that. my son happens to be not only in one of those the commanding one of them. we ought to be providing them with the security that they deserve, so the question is, are we looking at contractors and if so do we have a contract in place? if not, why not because we are possibly not providing force protection that we ought to be doing. >> yes sir. i will start with the juon and

then i will see if we have time if there is to go back to your other question on that. the juon is a process, and it is obviously requirements based in general petraeus did submit it. it is under review right now, sir. >> general this is an urgent need, right? that is the acronym. it is an urgent need. and i would think that force protection would indeed qualify as an urgent need, so i'm a little bit concerned about-- that this is a process that is dragging out and according to our understanding and that is what i'm getting at, are we still, hate to use the word dithering, but are we still wringing our hands over whether not we are going to use contractors and are we not getting a contract in place? the with that sir, i will take it for the record to find out exactly the status of the requirement and the thought process of who is best equipped whether it is military or civilian to actually work with the system, sir.

>> mr. kissell, please. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you madam secretary and general for being here today. following a little bit on some of the questions we had before, and we want to go back in time to go over year ago general field, commander cigar was here and told us basically we are making a lot of the same mistakes in afghanistan that we made in iraq in terms of not working with the local people and not giving the people what they needed. projects of the were not being properly surfer advised and i invited the general to come to my office for an update, and he reiterated a lot of the same problems, and and said we had made some progress and the general's quarterly report came out last week. i wonder if the general looked at data and where do we stand in terms of where the special

inspector general says we now are interacting with the afghan population? >> sir, i would say that one of the things we found coming into office was that development efforts in afghanistan were not fully harnessed to an overall strategy. there was a lot of good effort going in, but a lot of different countries contributing and a lot of different ways based on their own national goals for afghanistan. it wasn't all pulled together in a strategy and one of the real changes that we have seen under general mcchrystal and ambassador eikenberry and with the civilian surge is an integration to try to ensure that all of our development efforts, the international community are actually fully synchronized with ensign support of the governance and security objectives of the counterinsurgency campaign.

and so that is something that has been happening over the last several months, and i think that there are areas, particularly in the south and east where that is coming together in a much more integrated fashion, but given where we started, that is still a work in progress, but we are very much trying to respond to some of the insights and lessons learned that were in the sigar report. >> i think the comments made earlier that those afghans interact with local government, and this is where the report just seemed to show that we weren't paying attention, that we were building roads that could not be maintained, that we had energy projects that they either neither had the diesel fuel for, could not afford it or could not maintain it. there were several, i think it was 19 out of 36 governors that were saying we were not asking them their opinion before we did things, so we do need to watch that because that is in my mind,

a great measure of how we will have success with the afghan people. i will be contacting the inspector general and asking him his opinion. i would like to follow up with what mr. hynes said in terms of, if we need to be providing more security for our fahd's, that is something we should be doing. with that i yield back. >> mr. kaufman. >> thank you mr. chairman. first of all secretary flournoy and general paxton thank you for your service to our country. general paxton, would you agree or argue that the center of gravity for the taliban is this ability to control the civilian population overtly or covertly through a shadow government and the exact revenues from them? >> i would agree with that sir. >> then in looking at the

operation we are going to do next in kandahar, which is the basis of the taliban in terms of that is where they originated from, if we were able to deny them that, the ability to exercise governance over the taliban people as a shadow government or covertly, what does that do in terms of-- i mean from an overall perspective in terms of the war in afghanistan, in bringing it to a close? >> the first step obviously, it denies them the physical freedom of movement. it denies them the emotional, intellectual, the governance freedom of movement so if they have a populace that they can't reach or a populace who does not believe their message or who is unwilling to follow them than the fertile ground that they seek to either control physically or to institute some terror, either high-profile attacks, intimidation, unquestioning sharia law, so

that they have lost that opportunity there. what that does is give both us in the short-term and more importantly the government of iraq in the long-term operating room and breathing space so that they can build loyalty. they can get schools going, health clinics and give them the evidence of social services and infrastructure but the people of afghanistan need. >> i was in afghanistan in november and met with general mcchrystal at that time and asked him prior to the president making his announcement as to a timetable that we would in fact begin to be able to draw down our forces in 2011 was the objective of the president. i asked general mcchrystal, if he got the troops he requested, when could we expect to draw down our forces? he said, 2013. keep in mind that, and i asked him-- he was referencing the

40,000 at that point. now, he got 30,000. 9000 were from our coalition partners. first of all, could you respond as to what the net is in terms of coalition partners since some are withdrawing a number 2, to what extent are those coalition partners that will exist going forward have caveats that keep them from participating and certainly kinetic operations? >> at this time mr. kaufman we have 46 and djibouti nations in afghanistan, including the united states. it is almost a 50/50 split. i think it is 22, 23 and one that are caveat free that can do anything and some of them the national caveats, while certainly restrictive, are not preemptive. that does not perk route them for what they can do. i know the commanders on the ground take a very close look about how they assign battle

space and how they assigned missions to get the maximum use of each of the contributing nations when they get there. i would have to take a look at the master plan to see in the aftermath of kandahar, as we stay there in days ahead, where the lay down a forces may be and i could get that to you if you needed or her guess the general path and i appreciate that. secretary flournoy, i was listening to your statement, it and in defining the mission as it exists now and in this administration. i think in one point in time you said it was about keeping al qaeda out of afghanistan. and then you qualified that further in terms of al qaeda and their associates. what is the in-state? is the in state potentially, since you did mention the taliban, is that a coalition government that would incorporate the taliban or elements of the taliban?

>> i think the key from our interest perspective is to deny any safe haven for al qaeda and its associates. i think that, in any situation, a coin strategy and military dimension takes you so far and at some point there is a political set of outcomes that are reached. we saw this in iraq. i think we are the afghan, we are working with the afghan government to try to get a better understanding of the processes they will ultimately lead on both reintegration and reconciliation. i think it is very important to set a set of criteria for who will get reintegrated back into afghan society and how. and whether it is disavowing al

qaeda, laying down their arms, abiding by the constitution or go those are the kinds of criteria that the afghan government will need to articulate as they get to the point of defining what an acceptable political landscape looks like, and we will certainly be in deep conversation with him about that. >> thank you mr. chairman. i yield back. >> mr. henry. >> thank you chairman. secretary flournoy i hate to beat a dead horse but since several of my colleagues have repeatedly reference referenced as opposed to 30,000 person troop cap, can you give us a one word answer, has the administration opposed a troop cap in afghanistan? >> know we have not imposed a troop cap. what president obama did in december was to approve 30,000 additional troops to afghanistan and a degree of flexibility for the secretary of defense to authorize further support of

force protection. >> has general mcchrystal requested additional troops? >> there have been a couple of cases such as. >> in general he has not sir because we are in the process of flowing all three of the sports packages and the obligation would be that he would take a look at how they met the mission on the ground before he came back. we have made some adjustments both in terms of combat forces and trainers on the ground so we have made a modest adjustment to the number. >> and you think the general mcchrystal would continue to feel free to make, to request those kinds of adjustments if he feels it necessary? >> absolutely, sir. >> do you think is the interior defense, the president or anyone else has ever ordered general mcchrystal not to make those kinds of requests? >> know sir. ..

his staff and the people who are training the trainers if you will. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i will yield back. >> mr. willson. -- before mr. chairman and both

of you for your service madame secretary and general, thank you and general i had the honor last august to visit with the marines at camp leatherneck, camp bastion. it was inspiring since i represent parris island to see the dedication of the marines. i particularly appreciate what both of you are doing because i'm the co-chair of the afghan caucus visited the country nine times i have great respect for president karzai for the defense minister or and of general mcchrystal and petraeus we have an extraordinary team there. firsthand my former national guard unit, the infantry brigade of the national guard searched for a year in afghanistan led by

general bob livingston and i visited with the troops from south carolina every three months and i found there was an extraordinary relationship between american forces and the people of afghanistan to the point they identify each other as brothers, american and afghan brothers so i'm hopeful. perfect, no but very helpful. with that, the ever-changing situation. what is the status of the cross border collaboration between afghanistan and pakistan and have there been significant changes in the past year? >> thank you, mr. wilson. we were here with of the committee last week to talk about pakistan and there have been positive engagements and positive changes on both sides of the border within the last year and this includes a master of the down for border coordination centers, some bcc and cc and we've been able to

work with the pact mill on their side of the border as well as national security forces for manning and equipping the stations. two of them are fully operational capable what this time and we are looking for the location and the manning of the others, so all of that demonstrates the degree of trust in that transparency and degree of equal procedures if you will so there is mitigates lessons and tension on the borders of that's a good indication and positive one within the last year. >> and i am really hopeful in my visits to islamabad and other parts of pakistan. to me it is clear it's mutually beneficial the security of both countries. it's been expressed concern, but in regard to training security forces, psychiatry gates last week or recently announced 350 additional trainers as a stopgap measure to fill vacancies.

the problem has been the nato allies fulfilling their obligations and i was very happy working with ortiz, the chair of the romania caucus to find out last week from the ambassador of rumania they are now increasing their participation from 1200 troops to 1800 troops so there are some positive stories that really should be told, and i know that on a visit to bulgaria the people are very proud of their participation and recognition but what is being done to increase participation from nato allies? >> the secretary has raised this at his mastery of a secure clinton had hers. we've had numerous visits, calls, etc. and the majority of our nato allies are stepping up since the strategy review was completed in december and they

are offering above and beyond what they already offered. they are offering more trainers. the challenge is the gap is still fair so we are asking one another to step up even further so we will continue that process. but i think you are right to get a number of countries have stepped up substantially with institutional trainers and omelets and palmer's since we fast. >> it was interesting last week i had the opportunity to meet with a foreign minister of bulgaria and they are so proud of the american bases that are now in their country and they did when now, general, they would be very happy at such training bases to provide for advanced training for personnel prior to being deployed and they've got the capability, they've got the bases and the citizens support within the community. but again, thank you both of you for your service and when you

are doing by defeating the terrorists overseas. thank you. >> ai thank the gentleman. the gentleman from mississippi, mr. taylor. >> thank you congenital and ms. flournoy for being with us. for what it's worth, also met mr. karzai, and for what it is worth my reaction was just the opposite. if i had been present when he threatened to go to the taliban, my response would have been don't let the screen door hit you in the rear end for what it's worth. having said that, ms. flournoy, reading a book by a russian infantry officer called the bear went over the mountain. it's mostly about tactics. but what is disturbing about it seems to be the same and bush in the same places going over about a tenth or 12th year period and the talk about training the afghan army and training of and afghan police and we know for years after they left the

government they set up was gone. now i appreciate the general. he got to be a general by being a can-do guy. i'm going to make the best of my search mission and i'm going to make it work and i appreciate you going to work in the department of defense. but what realistically makes you think the outcome is going to be different this time? >> what makes me think the outcome will be different is the fundamental objective of the mission and focus of the mission is different. institutions built under hostile occupation don't tend to have longevity and credibility with a population. institutions built with support of the population -- have a lot more chance of succeeding over time. that's what we are trying to do with this ansf. >> i appreciate you saying that. i've not live in afghan -- afghanistan.

laurie stewart did. and told me after living there for years and walking across afghanistan that the afghans mockingly refer to karzai as the miracle bowl because once you get outside the city he's got absolutely no influence so how would you respond to that? and that is coming from someone who's lived in afghanistan. >> again, i think that most afghans experience government at local level and the building up the credibility and the capacity of the local institutions, the district level and so forth is where it is clean to influence the judgment of the afghan people and i think the progress that we have seen at that level and frankly increasingly competent national government in terms of the cabinet president karzai has put together is changing afghan attitudes. this poultices 59% believe the

government is heading in the right direction. i don't think you've ever had a poll in afghanistan say that before. and that is in response to changes they are experiencing on the ground. are we there yet? absolutely not. are we starting to win the right direction? yes. >> how would you respond to an equal perception of majority of the afghans who think that karzai's brother is the biggest narcotics the war in afghanistan? >> i don't think it's -- i don't want to focus on individuals -- >> that is the president's brother. that's why i feel we should focus on it. >> it is very important to look at the government's at all levels and the progress that's being made across. >> if the president of the country can't tell his brother to get out of the narcotics trade, if some of the united states military is renting property, if we can't turn around and as a condition of the lease on the properties they by

the way, are you going to get out of the narcotics trade, where does it begin? >> no, sir, i don't feel -- it's appropriate for me or frankly i'm not qualified -- i'm not the person qualified to evaluate specific individuals or cases but likens a -- >> and who is? >> well, let me tell you what i've seen when i came back i have seen a place that had no afghan government whatsoever for years and in the last six months after some very difficult fighting on the part of international afghan forces we have enabled a district to governor who was queen to be put in place who is working with local tribal leaders working with the international community to funnel aid to projects getting benefitting the

population, getting their buying in and for the first time, creating a district governor center that is the go to place for the afghan population. that is the model we are trying to the plate. if the fact it is possible that has been called the heart of darkness by many authors writing about afghanistan, the fact that it is possible means that it is possible elsewhere in that country and that is what we are trying to achieve. >> how long do you think president karzai would live without the american military protecting him? >> i am not in the position to speculate -- sprick don't you think that puts us in a position to at least dictate terms of engagement like narcotics, like honesty in government? >> i'm sorry -- >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank the gentleman. mr. conaway. >> in the interest of maintaining the center and and and fun you are having i will go ahead and ask a question.

walking across the street today the health care vote was going on, some body stopped me and sit aren't offended the president during this momentous occasion is watching the basketball game and i said no i'm not offended by what the president is doing this afternoon. what i'm offended is the fact we have had a fight going on in afghanistan for six months that the marines have been in hammer and tong and not one word about the wonderful success that those men and women have been doing from the white house to read a lot of talk but nothing out of the white house. that offends me. it does offend me the white house has dealt to recognize the hard work you just referenced miss flournoy and so i hope you get a little bit more attention to the success coming out of there. >> i want to say for the record don't believe that is accurate it may not have gotten adequate press coverage the president certainly hasn't been silent.

>> we look forward to him getting what he wants to get out, ms. flournoy, we can have a tussle with you would like. that wasn't my intent. and the generals came back and generally we get a report from a general but said the focus on intelligence and afghanistan was over balanced toward finding bad guys and dealing with bad guys and that it needed to be more of a balanced approach so that our company and a squad and commanders on the ground knew who the players were and who the good guys were and bad guys were and what the crops were and all the stuff you would normally need in order to do the full spectrum job the fight in afghanistan in false, killing bad guys is front of the west absolutely. general paxton, your assessment to the rebalancing was that the case we had new resources to the system so that the commanders to

know what's going on around with respect to the economy with respect to everything else that isn't kinetic in a reflection of that report from january. >> when you're doing the shape we're told bildt has to be any focused its population focused in terms of the strategy with the tactics have to be focused on who you think the bad guys are and where to think about guys are and when you know about them so it is a constant drive for more intelligence and we've tried to strike a balance between intelligence assets whether it is the is are over here or the line of sight between what's available in the strategic level and the operational level once we go to the tactical level and have a feeling that the forces and capability is adequately meeting the needs or is projected to meet what we think will be a current gap and the need. one of the additional response to these i have for the secretary is to sit on the senior integration group that

used to be the counter ied task force comes dr. carter and donner taking a look about a clipping side and make sure we have adequate technologies, capabilities, requisite training so that we can identify ied material and border crossings where they come from. the kinetics and so they're there for by the same token if you are trying to make sure the local folks see it as more of the solution as opposed to just the police and making sure those commanders have as much information as the need. and i planned on the general's name and i apologize for that but it seemed to be brought them just who the ied guys were and focus on the bad guys as opposed to information commanders need

to know the year digging a well over there would be really important versus paving a road or the fees are the folks within the community who are above opinion leaders and making sense and others and there are three bad guys over there that have been there for an hour and a half and we've done all this stuff, go shoot them. but the issue is in the counter insurgency you have broader than just killing bad guys. sprick the development of human intelligence the way we train our small unit leaders we're spending an adequate time on the national training center on twentynine palms and home station trimmings for hammill. >> down range they've got the tools they to exploit the training? >> yes, sir i am convinced they do. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. sprick i just received a note i have votes in just a minute but madame secretary, general, thank you for being here and a lot of

the questions you've been receiving have been very specific i want to go to a couple of broad questions. the primary goal of afghanistan is defeating al qaeda. start with that. semidey feeding al qaeda and its associates. >> how does this strategy we are doing in afghanistan right now facilitate the goal of not just defeating al qaeda in afghanistan and pakistan but worldwide. sprick afghanistan pakistan, the border region has been the sort of lowercase of the heart and if you will al qaeda for many years and so i think denying them sanctuary and safe haven disrupting them has a powerful impact on the global network to make sure the afghans and pakistanis have their own capability to do the denial in the