>> over time, there must inevitably be interchange with the north, and therefore china has incentives to play for time which over and some longer-term

sense will lead to a more normal north korea that does not see its security depending on the possession of nuclear weapons. early in the reagan administration, there were initiatives made by the korean leader on behalf of the north koreans to establish a trilateral context for negotiations. dong was carrying some of north korea's water. it is discussed with the secretary when he visited beijing in september 1993, followed in a matter of weeks by the bombing in burma. intended to bring is more

hopeful expectation to an end. the story has been repeated in one version or another many times. so, i don't want to dwell on this history, too much, but it does suggest to me that history and geography -- the understanding between the u.s. and china continue to limit possibilities for more meaningful movement, a least in the near to midterm, in pursuit of shared goals. there is to be sure cigna began debate in china. it comes and goes. it is certainly the atmosphere in which barry sharp views of north korea can be expressed contents to be a function partly of north korean behavior. in the the immediate aftermath of both tests, the political

environment that beijing is more conducive to openly express anger and frustration at the north, but with china ultimately reverting more to a policy mean. this has been evident, for example -- we saw significant cooperation between the u.s. and tunnel in the aftermath of the second nuclear test, but then last year we saw, as north korea sought to make some more flexible gestures, the prime minister wen jiabao and the prime minister of defense but traveled to the north. even as the chinese and the size they were holding, adhering to the spirit of the un sanctions, it would appear to many that

china had decided to make, if not a fundamental commitment to north korea, at least a deeper commitment focused much on economics, but more broadly keeping things in check and begging the issue of whether the u.s. and china were relief on parallel paths. the aftermath of the second test is that the obama administrato administration and the size and still does that we were at a critical inflection point on the question of nuclear proliferation and could not tolerate a situation to simply acquiesce to north korean actions. we certainly did not want to compensate north korea for its actions. does chinese support for north korea it in effect give them the support necessary, that they require, in order to dodge the

pressure? bottom line, it seems to me, the chinese leadership as distinct from chinese analysts and scholars, has yet to be fully persuaded that non- proliferation compared to some of china's other competing interests, calculations, and needs, trump's these other concerns. china would do what is necessary to uphold the letter, and perhaps the spirit of 1847, beijing has yet to demonstrate that it is prepared to put this wider array of its interests at risk of. this leaves us and the situation where although there are areas of cooperation

between the u.s. and china, there are also areas that are problematic. what do we do about it? the administration including our speaker has emphasized at times that the u.s. needs to offer a strategic assurance to beijing. perhaps we want the same from china. beyond that, the question is whether we can get to strategic clarification. are we walking from a comparable set of policy priority stackshow compelling a mutual interest is there in the goal? or does' s larger set of interest as the immediate neighbor trump coordination? are the means by which we can move to a more complementary discussion?

because absent that frameworks, north korea may find itself with some increased room for maneuver. what we should be asking beijing about is to reinforce whether there are are ought to be shared national interest that emphasize the risks to both countries opposed by the nuclear weapons development? i worried there's a tendency to give north korea to much of the past. jack has alluded to some of this because there fissile material, among other things, are totally unconstrained, subject only to their technical and industrial limitations. the potential costs including for china in terms of regional stability, seems to me quite

self-evident. it has the potential for a longer-term undermining affect on the u.s./china relations not to mention those with the rok for china. it also creates an unhealthy precedent over the long term for the non-proliferation regime. jack asked before whether the u.s. had a true the done. we might want to ask the same of china. their words are appropriate. china says it wants to work actively for the de-nuclear reservation of the korean peninsula. that is good, but there is a larger strategic context year and a set of actions that may be needed to advance that. that we need to import more coolly to the chinese. so, i see china like the u.s.,

confronting some unpleasant policy choices. on one hand, we could say china could in 1 context make some kind of commitment it will protect and defend north korea. i don't think china seeks that today. it does seek to preserve and provide, and sustain for north korea. heightened political and economic support this seems at first to be independent of north korean behavior. alternatively, we might want to see china move more towards an active prodding of north korea. even distance itself somewhat. but i don't see that coming anytime soon. i believe we have a set of overlapping interests better self evident.

but getting there and finding the effective means and understanding continues to believe us. and it remains uppermost on the agenda that both beijing and washington need to confront. >> thank you, jonathan. [applause] let's now shift the geographic focus to the persian gulf with ken pollack. >> thank you very much. i'm going to give my top backwards today. i'm not going to speak back words. some day if i could pull that off, you will all be invited. i was taught you should start with your interests, and then

the threats to the interests, then lay out different policy options to address the threats to security interests. then choose the best policy option and make a recommendation. i will start in reverse order. i will lay out the options. talk about which best. then return to the threats and interest. unfortunately, when you are talking about iran, the options all stink. there are no good options on iran. the only things we are arguing about these days its which is worst, and which is least bad. when you deal with a bunch of really bad options, there's a tendency to push the thinker and argue were towards inertia.

you want to walk away. maybe focus on an easier problem to solve, like north korea. that is not a very good option for talking about iran. the potential downside, threats to our interests are the reason. it is useful to begin with the options. then think a little about the threats we face, which can then be seen as potential repercussions, consequences of inaction. at some novel it is well known to the group the preferred option to the u.s., a process of increasing the harsh sanctions to put pressure on the iranian regime. this is not a policy the u.s.

government or establishment came to quickly are easily. it was the product of a long process of debate and trial and error. but with the iranians and with other allies. over 31 years of the existence of the republic existenceiran we have tried a bunch of different policies. we have tried everything from unilateral concessions to undeclared warfare. none of them have worked. today when we look at iran and what we in the rest of the world are so concerned about, we place hope and the idea that harsh international sanctions can succeed. frankly, nothing else has so far. there is no question that this

will be very much along shot. the iranian regime has resisted other actionsanctions in the pat the kinds the u.s. and allies are pushing for. we have had a very important change in the nature of the iranian regime. on june 12, 2009, about a year ago, iran held presidential elections. there were many who were unhappy with the course of those elections. they believe the elections were rigged, stolen, and the man supposed to lose, president ahmadinejad, who was supposed to lose instead won. there is a lot of evidence to show the elections were raped. whether there were big enough to make him win, who knows?

it may be true that the elections were rigged and he did win. all that matters is that after the elections there was a wide spread revolt by a large segment. that was the single greatest threat to the iranian regime and is 31 years of existence. an important event happened in response. it contracted within itself. the groups we intend to call moderates and pragmatists, even some mainstream conservatives, and some reformists, recommended making concessions to the opposition. the hard-liners all said no. the supreme leader sided with the hard-liners. his reading of his own coming to power of the islamist republic

of the revolution that overcame the shah -- what doomed the shah was making concessions. therefore, there would be no concessions. in doing so, the leader systematically went about excluding all the voices of moderation that had been prominent voices. today we have seen a significant narrowing of the base of the decision-making apparatus. frankly, we have the hardest line group of people we have seen in iran since 1981. they're not interested or concerned by sanctions. they want the nuclear program. in many cases, they want nuclear weapons.

they want enmity with the u.s. and believe that the u.s. and west are their enemies. they all believe that iran is more important to the rest of the world, then the world is to iran. in fact, many of them even believe that sanctions will be good for iran because it will encourage greater autocracy. it is all nonsense. the problem is that some point in time that it could be proven wrong -- it could take a long time. it is worth bearing in mind that in the 1990's the international community embarked on a similar program with libya. we imposed comprehensive sanctions. the response was hah! we cannot

last recensions. they were proven wronn. not surprisingly. it took between eight and 10 years. let's remember that iran is more powerful than libya. it could take a very long time. we tend to focus on the sanctions. honestly, all other options are much worse. first, there is engagement. to its great credit the obama administration tried very hard to implement engagement during its first 10 months in office. long after outside observers, myself included, said to them, it was great you tried, but you have to realize is done. this regime is not interested. they clung to engagement, wanted to believe they could come to

deal, find a way through peaceful negotiations to resolve differences with the writings. by the fall last year they finally figured out that it would just not work. the iranians were not interested. they came to that after many other, even most other countries around world recognized this. it is probably true that the chinese took even longer. even beijing has realized that iran is not interested. we saw a senior delegation from china go to take ron -- tehran and try to convince them that the world means business. there were badly disappointed by the obnoxiousness of the iranian interlocutors.

so, engagement is highly unlikely for some time. we can hope that the wrong man's will mellow, realize they're in too deep. that isolation is bad for them. we can hope engagement will be realistic again, but it is not today. at the other end of the spectrum, there are people in the u.s. pushing different options. i suspect the voices will become louder in coming months. there is a group out there who wants to bomb iran. i am an old military analyst. i'm not exactly a shrinking violet when it comes to the use of force. if i thought there were good military options available, i would be glad to explain under what conditions. but i cannot come up with a good scenario for the use of force.

i will simply say in summary, it is highly unlikely wood stopped the run and nuclear program. the best estimates thaare that t would only set back the running program by a year or two. it would create the perfect opera should be for iran to withdraw from the npt, to bury its programs deeper, embark on a massive program with the support of its own people. it would likely rally the iranian people around the regime. what is more, the run-ins' would likely retaliate and the variety of painful venues to the u.s. it is true that iran is much weaker than we are, but the

running scandal lot of damage in the middle east. it is not a region that needs more damage. certainly not to american interests and western interests there. the other option of their proposed by those on the right is regime change. to help the iranian opposition overthrow. it's a wonderful idea in theory. i think it is something to look hard at. for the first time we do have a large, legitimate popular opposition to the government. we ought to look at ways to help the opposition. the truth is, the regime has demonstrated it will not go gently. if scholars have taught us anything about revolutionsm and they have taught us only one

thing -- it is that revolutions occur only when the regime loses the will or capacity to use violence. unfortunately, this regime has lost me there. it is not likely to do so any time soon. we can hold out hope that at some time there will be regime change in tehran, but not any time since. so, if you don't like the harsh sanctions option, the alternatives are worse. i hope you don't simply say this is too hard and we should walk away. that is not a good answer either. then you must consider the consequences. that brings me to the threats and interest. i will go into too much detail. there are two broad set of problems that the u.s., its

allies, and china will all face if iran is not convinced to give up its nuclear program. the first is the iranian threat to the middle east. some repair work is to be done here. many people are screaming about how the country's acquisition of nuclear capability means the entire world will explode the next day. it is not accurate. iran is ruled by a group of people who are aggressive, and two-american, but they're not irrational. we have seen a derecognized deterrents. they're subject to the force of them. they do comply with its various structures. it suggests it is highly unlikely that the rains would get in a clear weapon and simply throw it at tel aviv or the

saudi arabian oil fields. it is also not likely that the iranians would give a nuclear weapon to terrorists. they have had weapons of mass destruction for about 22 years. they have supported terrorist groups for 31 years. they have never seen fit to mix the two. beth had very good reasons not to. it does not mean there's not a threat to the stability of the least fromiran's nuclear capability. there is the potential for israel to go to war with iran. i think it is not likely. i think it is an overblown, but not irrelevant fear. the bigger problem is that iran is an anti-status quo power. one the sees the current status

quo in the region as one inherently to its disadvantage. one is six constantly in with all the means at its disposal to overturn. it means iran 6 instability. whenever it sees it, it does all it can to stop it. its arms violent groups whenever it can find them, that's terrorists of all kinds. they are non-denominational. anyone looking to overturn the status quo, preferably by violence, typically can find some help from erroneous. the middle east does not need any more help on that issue. it has plenty of instability. when we think about american and chinese mutual interests in the

middle east, to ensure a free flow of in expensive oil is at the very top of that list. everything else is a distant second. the jig of inexpensive oil. the runyon actions have been among the most threatening to that. iran with nuclear weapons and with capability of any kind, and iran which believes it is no longer vulnerable to american retaliation will feel emboldened. not just in love and on or palestine, but in the iraq and saudi arabia. -- not just in irawq, or palestine.

it has tried to overthrow every one of those countries including egypt, except the uae. it is not an idle fear. it is very real and significant over the long term. the last thread will mention is the water one of non- proliferation. right now for many countries around the world, non- proliferation has a very mixed record. there are countries out there that the international community has punished severely for pursuit of nuclear capability. i put libya in that category, iraq, and even north korea. north korea paid a price that no other country on earth would be willing to pay. it actually did help to reinforce the non-proliferation norm. set against those three good cases are three bad ones.

israel, india, pakistan. they acquired weapons not scot- free, but at a price many others would consider acceptable. iran will be the decider. it is and put them because the entire world, including all five members from a permanent members of the u.n. security council have stated clearly and repeatedly that iran cannot be allowed to acquire this capability. we now have four resolutions and the security council under chapter 7 of the charter that makes them binding on all members. stipulating iran cannot be allowed to have this capability. if iran acquires it nonetheless and does not feel it has paid too high a price to do so -- which is why the obama

administration has tried to demonstrate there is a real price to be paid -- if iran is allowed to acquire it anyway was see the non-proliferation norm began to erode, if not collapse. it is highly likely that the saudi arabia and the uae will acquire capabilities of their own. they're making it clear to iran that this is meant to match their capability if the iranians don't cease and desist. the saudi arabian officials have told u.s. officials that if iran acquires a nuclear weapon, they will acquire 12. people talk about turkey, egypt, others. and less convinced about them --

you will see other states follow in the suit. beyond that, if iran can get nuclear weapons, a country that everyone else realizes is a tremendous threat to international peace and stability, and prosperity, why should others stopped? do brazil and argentina really believe the world will treat the moors? . .

>> out of about chinese policy, not u.s. policy. -- i will talk about chinese policy not u.s. policy. " i would talk about the extent to which chinese and u.s. interest overlap regarding tv u.s. -- of the iran -- regarding the iran issue. the logic is easy to understand. one of five members of the permanent -- one of the five nuclear weapons states under

the regime, china's interest isn't year and other -- china's interests is in having fewer capabilities. it is the same logic as the united states. we have converging interest. -- we of convergent interests.

the united states has a lot of problems with these countries -- iraq, iran -- but not china. china, unlike the united states, has never compensate -- has never contemplated war with these countries. united states has. we had two wars with iraq. we had the war with iran in the 1970's. we're now debating whether there will be another one. we continually confront this question of war or peace with these countries that we think nuclear program. china does not. china has had fine and cordial relations with iran and iraq. the second cut is that, although we share brought interest in

non-proliferation, on closer inspection, there is a series of very significant, divergent interests regarding the importance of nonproliferation in the middle east. why is china so unenthusiastic about u.s. push for abiding sanctions -- for tough sanctions? this is not new. they have opposed u.s. sanctions since 1980. that was when iran seized american diplomats and held them hostage. the u.s. administration and the carter administration responded with sanctions. china said they thought it was a bad idea. on the one hand, opposed the violation of diplomatic privileges involved in the seizure of the hostages. .

>> to characterize china's policy toward this, i would say that china has delayed the process and sought to limit the scope of the sanctions so that the sanctions would not really interfere with the substance of china's economic or political relations with iran. maybe to delay and water down, you set the terms of the sanctions. if you look at china's statements at the iaea board of

governors, you see a lot of objections in this direction. not only currently, but going back to 2003. and china would say that they are standing on principles. and china has a number of principles that it feels are -- for example, the principles of insisting that this question be solved by dialogue and negotiation. that any use of military force or threatened military force would make the situation more complex, would be antithetical to a resolution, and all reference to the use of force, the possibility of force, should

be ruled out, and all parties should resolve this through negotiation and dialogue. or the resort to sanctions, making the matter more complex or more difficult, and does not move the situation forward. instead, it moves it back. and another level of the same objection, the united states is far too willing to resort to sanctions and presumes to bully countries around the world, especially in developing countries, through the frequent resort to sanctions, and this is not a good way to rumba world -- around the world. a lot of chinese things that the doctor just mentioned, a lot of chinese analysts suspect that

the real u.s. objective is regime change in iran. even if the regime changes not one factor, then u.s. interference into the internal affairs of iran is one factor for the current u.s. cry for sanctions. principles -- a couple of observations about china's stands on principle. its protection of principle, its use of principle to oppose u.s. policy. the first observation is that china stands on principle as a way of protecting china's economic and political relations with iran. china receives about 12% of its imported oil from iran. iran has a lot of very rich

copper deposits, undeveloped copper deposits. 80 something% of china's imports are crude oil. another 12% our mineral deposits -- are mineral deposits. china needs that and iran has a lot of them. iran is also a big market for chinese exports. capital goods. prior to the revolution, in 1978, one year before the iranian revolution, china's trade with iran accounted for 1%. in 2009, china became iran's major trading partner. iran is a big and important market.

they have very ambitious development objections. iranian engineers and manufactures wood often prefer german equipment or french equipment because of technological capabilities. they really do not like the chinese stuff because it is not as good. those factors are set aside. in effect, u.s. sanctions have opened the door and allowed china to shoehorn itself into a very lucrative and big and important market. export promotion is the -- china needs export markets and iran is a big export market. the first cut on china's stance in defense of principles is that the stance serves china's interest in developing friendly, cooperative relations between the peoples of two countries in accordance with the five

principles of peaceful coexistence. a second observation about the role of principles in chinese foreign policy is that principles served interest. i question the chinese leaders. when they decide to stand firm on chinese principles, or to be flexible on the application of those principles, is whether defensive principles or flexibility of principles * china's interest. -- serves china's interests. what chinese interest would be served by flexibility on these principles? the main chinese interests that are served is protecting the

favorable macro climate for china's development drive, which began in 1978. through protection in the global capitalist system, which for better or worse, was dominated by the united states. since then, china has desperately tried to maintain amicable relations with the united states. the problem is, from the chinese view, the middle east is the lowest for american drive for world domination. during the cold war, the middle east was a center of contention between the superpowers with both of the two superpowers

wanted to control the oil of the middle east. we need gasoline. there you go. the two superpowers sought to control the middle east during the cold war. the disappearance of the soviet union has created a very unbalanced situation. the crux of that is in the middle east. in this unbalanced situation, the united states has seized the opportunity to push forward aggressively with the drive to bring the oil of the middle east under american control so that the americans will have their hand on the oil spigot of the middle east and say you can have some and you cannot have some. the countries of the world who need oil will need to get from the americans.

the unbalanced situation of the middle east released the united states to which the first hegemonism war against iraq and 1991. china's view is that both sides are head chemigemonist. and then the 2003 war, and so forth. some believe that in the american heart of hearts, in a secret blueprint in some office in washington is the -- iran is next on the agenda. the problem is, from china's perspective, you have got to have good relations with the americans. the middle east is the center of the american drive for hegemony. the americans are doing a lot of bad things in the middle east, but that is a region of the world that is pretty hard from

china's strategic interests, which are in the eastern pacific and southeast asia. americans are doing bad things, but at least they're not doing it in an area of crucial concern to china. by the way, the americans might exhaust themselves and wear out their national will, leaving us in a better situation. what this takes us back to is flexibility on the application of principle. of course, if china is going to be flexible on the application of its principal, opposition to the use of sanctions and interference in internal affairs, if china is going to go along with the americans, it needs to get a good pro quo. mr. steinberg said this morning that china does not seek a quid

pro quo. that might be the situation. china's interactions with the united states in earlier per iods, for example, in 1990 during the first iraq war, or in 1997 when the u.s. pushed for chinese disengagement from nuclear cooperation with iran. in both of those junctures, china sought and received from the united states a quid pro quo. china will be flexible, but i suspect will need some kind of satisfaction from the united states. there are several other areas in which china's interests are not conversant with american interest in the middle east. let me go further and be provocative. perhaps -- there are other ways that chinese interests may be

served by the failure of american policies toward iran. china's objective is multi clarity. the long-term objective, there's been a long term the day and china. the broader idea is that china should seek to move the world's in the direction of multi polarity. and the failure of the u.s. policy directive, i think, would diminish american prestige and influence in the world, and put china in a better position. in terms of china's energy security, china would receive certain advantages from a nuclear iran. one of china's fundamental

problems in energy security is the same lines of communication, the movement of oil across the indian ocean, and so on and so forth. china's solution to the problem is overland pipelines through kazakhstan or pakistan or me and yanmar. one of the problems is input to it in the event of some kind of u.s.-china confrontation over taiwan, where with china find some country that was willing to endure the united states by putting oil into those pipelines to pump to china. probably not pakistan, and not myanmar. iran would probably be the best bet. a nuclear-armed iran would

probably be more willing to do that. don't the united states and china have a convergent interest in the uninterrupted supply of oil from the persian gulf at safe and moderate prices? we have heard that argument again and again. that is basically an american argument that we pitched to the chinese. my sense is that the chinese have not bought that argument. a couple years ago, a colleague in washington and i spent a couple weeks in beijing in talking to chinese analysts and retired chinese diplomats. we deliberately pitched that argument to the people we met, with the exceptions of a couple of profs. we did not get any takers. the basic response was -- you americans want we chinese to be junior partners in your hegemonism, and we are not

interested in that. that was pretty much the response across the board, except for a couple of professors. there may be people in the chinese diplomatic apparatus who do not agree with that line. my sense is that they're not very influential yet. they may become influential, and i hope they do, but my sense is that they're not yet influential. bottom line, i think united states and china have convergent interests in preventing iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capability. the interests in that regard are very asymmetrical. there are very few american interests that would be served by iranian nuclear capabilities. unfortunately, i do not think that is the case with china. in the case of china, there are

several interests which would be served by a nuclear iran. those are my views on the situation. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. we have two situations, different in some very profound ways. in each, the stakes are high and the options are poor. the convergence of u.s.-china interests is not as great as the administration would like us to believe. the degree of cooperation is not as great as one might hope. now we're going to open the floor for about a half an hour of questions. i have some for the panel, but i will defer those. we will start with the gentleman right there. >> thank you. good afternoon. i am richard harris from

momentum private equity in new york. mr. pollack, it seems the thesis of your talk could be that pretty much all lobohope of a negotiated bargain with iran -- in a administration, is anyone letting the strategic ground wework for naught if iran gets nuclear devices, but when? >> it's a great question. no. i think it is a very big mistake. it has taken the administration a lot of time to even go from

preparing the american people to move from engagement to confrontation with iran. it took them a very long time. secretary clinton has been almost alone in going out there and seeaying engagement has run its course. they have a good argument that they make in private to people, including the chinese, about how engagement is not off the table and we prefer engagement. we need to turn the active phase toward pressure predicted very good line -- it is a very good line. they do not use it in public. i think you are right. we have to be very realistic about the likelihood of all of this working and the likelihood that there will be a nuclear iran at some point in time. politically, the president backed himself into a corner by saying this would be unacceptable.

he said it during the campaign, and you could understand why he said it during the campaign. in some ways, that was the minimal position he felt he could take. he has not moved away from that he has had a few other things on his plate. i do not think this has been a high priority for him. i think it's a very real problem. at some point in the next five years, we will wake up and realize of the policy has probably failed, and we are dealing with a nuclear iran. that's what we're doing a brookings. it would be helpful if the administration would get the american people ready for ait. >> scott garrelharold. a question for the panel as a whole. it is time of the problem -- is

china of the problem? from one perspective, looking to premier wen's visit to p'yongyang, and the words that were said about china and north korea having as close a relationship as they have ever had, and some large amount of money, >> current policy is not actively causing north korea to have to face any consequences northis actions. similarly, doctor garber, as you know, beijing after the uprisings in tehran last year spent crowd control devices,s in political support, any number of activities that shield the devid iranian regime from its own, ths effect t of its own actions.m however, the other action is, jack having to with north korea, i'm sure you know is that even china, at its most