possible even the most august the american president were to hk of it, the north koreans would not budge. the north koreans are very difficult are the north koreans are skeptical and suspicion of beijing. and i suspect the iranians, well known for resisting any pressure from outside, highlys, -- nationalistic would not necessarily been just because of beijing would ask them to do so. so it seems to me a very act interesting question, if you were to have a fully committed leadership in china, that reallo wanted to try to bring either on these two regimes quote unquote to heal, really put the screws to these regimes in the order, in the quest for nonproliferation policy. would that really succeed? if the answer is no, should they u.s. back off? is yes, thentwer should the u.s. pursue some kina of a policy that makes thesewers regimes whether iran or northind

korea, more dependent on beijing so that beijing can no longer claim as it has in the past we o don't have the leverage. in other words, should the u.s.o pursue a variant of the 1950snoe strategy that we had toured thee soviet union and china? the open up slightly to moscow, put tons of pressure on beijing, and pressure beijing into becoming more dependent on moscow so thag the noise of the soviets and create dissension in that relationship, and yet at the sot same time create leverage that beijing could then effectively at some point in the future, as i'll be recognized, be called bg upon to use by a future or current american administratione that could then compel beijing to recognize that logic. thank you. >> that's a good question. compe i'm going to ask the panelists to give short answers.ing to a e start with jack and then mov down the line >> thank you, scott.panelist nkhaanswer is, in my opinion,

beijing is not deliberately doing this, but yes, it is by oi its actions extending the problem. but i concur with the october 5 visit of last year reversed what i described earlier that moment in time when pyongyang was as thinking it was on the wronghen path and needed to do something, after the wind as it, the north koreans absolutely reversed course and it gave them a new lease on life. them new lt believe the sanctions would affect them. they understood the lifeline that the chinese were providing was substantial. but i don't agree with the second part of that was if the chinese adopted all the u.s.nesf hard line positions the north koreans would not budge. i think reverse is true. the problem is you are not going to get the chinese to do that.sn i think jonathan put it best bys

saying that until the chinese own national security interests from, if proliferation issuesowc trump all the other concerns, --ere will be on the same concern. th't's not going to if happen. >> a couple quick comments. first of all, it does to dollarc figure is a fraudulent number. a i mean, the chinese actually don't have that much at risk in a purely economic sense.e i would also contest that they have a real defense relationship. part of what one was seeking to establish when he went there in a r different way was to make -- this is but a process over longer period of time. and effect to say to the northra long koreans that we are not tethered to sayr strategy as such, it not tt mean what they're going to hang the northet koreans outo dry, but i think the chinesehat nve been fairly explicit to the

north koreans going back to as early as the mid 1980s foroing where there is a defense for commitment under circumstances where north korea was attacked, but certainly not beyond that. i would agree with jack that to. some extent the new aid packagee from china had given north korea a kind of get out of jail freeew card, to an extent. but again coming back to what if said in my talk is there extent. something the chinese think they know that we don't, and i guess the best case scenario i could ess thou is that there is still a believe in significant quarters in china that, over a longer period of time, particularly after kim jong-il qnificantot to say all the sudden overnight you go to someg sort of transition, but north korea cannot indefinitely, you know, for ever defy the laws ofr gravity politically and economically. now again, as you know there's been lots of predictions over

the years that began as a atnowe hand. waves of this.ye were going through another cycl. of this right now when this is o resilient determined regime thas really doesn't depend that much on the outside world, but if they depend on anyone, it is china. you know, again, i think because china is the immediate neighbor, this does inhibit their options, but there's a kind of, in some toome exte least a kind of quiet, i don't want to call competence, that's way too strong, a believe that over tim- this will not be sustainable. indeed, as you know there's lots of anxiety in some south korean quarters that mike goodes the chinese are gobbling up what kon ever is there to gobble.gobbliwt i don't quite buy into the idea that north korea now becomes as i doince ofther china. but you could paint a pictureo t over time where there are

avenues that china had. indeed, if you look at what hu ifook ataid to come to deal on his visit, there was this five part list, we'll go through all of it, but he was basically mapping out what a normal outationship would look like between china and the dprk. they don't have it.na jim did not allude to this. is independent of course of the. nuclear weapons issue, and that's in effect the chinese say that they're setting aside that question just to see whether or not they could put the pieces in place over time for a more, a more normal relationship. and that presumes a system thatt decides that its long-termonshi. interests are in some measure at des it least, to achieve a normal or quasi-nor relationship with theo outside world.chieve a one last point, one thing that oe about thes north at this point is the degree of dependence on china has grown significantly. grown

usually that's not north korea's style, but having got the unit' states.no they have lost south korea. they certainly don't have japan. in the russian case, the north koreans still owe them about cer $8 billion bid the russians have tried very hard. it's a very unsettling picture, so as richard said, before the question was posed to mr. pollack and is a question for a private equity firm, richard said to me, it's got to be, who's interested. again it's not easy nor quick - could be a- productive societygs and system under alternative kob circumstances. but it's a long way from hereve today. in front that i think the cer chinese have just decided to play ata waiting game in which e again they could be disappointed yet again, but it is also a way in which they think it's kind of a damage limitation strategy.whh but it begs the iseysue about hl much there is intrinsic concern about the existence of some kind

of nuclear capability of thethec north, some kind of a believe o that the north will still be n constrained from undertaking major risk-taking behavior, but that remains to be proven. >> they have significant leverage with iran in terms of engineering services, in terms of involvement insignificanlevee infrastructure, and evolving of the oil industry, new field and so forth.he china has capabilities the same chinassia doesn't have. so russia can provide cover and security in terms of have development, the economy the way china has. will china agree to enroll that back? that's now the question. no. but the other point you raise, what should be the u.s.? approach? i reallythat doubt that trying o

pressure china would be thate chfective. effective. my hunch is that that would confirm the chinese notion of america as a bully hegemonistic power prone to power politics and this type of thing. i think more effective would be to solicit china's genuine partnership in the cooperation and deal with these issues. i mean, that appeals to maintain the payroll for development. it flatters china's notion as a rising global power.acro in it provides a framework for dealing with a problem of power, great our secession and war and peace and china could grow into the steps of the incumbent great power.into the ste so that wouldps offer, you knowi think an appeal to china for at woue partnership to deal with these things.al but probably pay off better than it wttempt to drive a way -- wedge between.

>> thanks, richard. i love your question, scott.ou, i would answer a little morehar. bluntly in terms of is china the problem.. i would say no, yes and yes.tly. know, china is not the problem if the problem is the iranian nuclear program and how do you turn it off. probl if th as i described, the real problem is iran.s iran. it would certainly be helpful to have the chinese on board, butce nobody is saying even ifir theiu chinese were on board that would be enough to stop the iranians in their tracks. he sense and actually i applaud you, i want to make a joke at the beginning which at least you know i was a former member of the clinton position, so it depends on what yourpends definition of what is is that it is isn't stopping to nuke a program, no. if the is is not proliferationb, and yes, there i would say china is part of a problem because heain if what you are afraid of it is iran acquiring this keep

billy would send a message which would prefer proliferation at ay whch greater pace than we've olifertic the past, china's unwillingness to section iraq to make it clear to other countries nhat there is a steep price to a be paid for this kind of defined international community, then that definitely is a biga p part of the problem. problem.y third point is somewhat different issue which is about stabilizing the middle east. here, john, i was so struck in your comments, listening too st everythingru you were saying abt how you could have taken every, limost word for word, and actually made it about american policy in the 1920s, 30s and '40s with hegemonic are being great britain. 192 that is exactly almost word for word how 1 the united states hed about great britain including thatalmost on principles, them being a hegemon, all of these, everything. it's just remarkable.ut gre and we it also gets to is in many ways china is, in fact,

treading the exact history thats we went th, rougchinh in the mie east. i was also struck by your pointt that the chinese just don't buy it when we say we have this mutual interest. again, the british kept trying to make that case to us. we didn't figure it out until it was too late. in fact, later than that.that c i would argue in 1973 is when we figured it out. out and we figured out way too late and we've been trying to play catch-up ever since. where i come back to his i comletely agree with you, john, partnership.pl with p.d here i do give the obamartni iministration credit because think that's the i did they have been trying to make about what it means to be a stakeholder. and i think a big part of it is makeng the chinese not repeat our mistakes. being give us a little bitpart o of credit and that i think thes british really work hegemonic in a way that we are. really work but nevertheless, the british didn't have some good ideas that em tended to ignore about the hg importance of this region and

their role in providing a public good that we tend to simply ignore. i think a lot of what we needneo do with the chinese is to kind w of come to an understanding about those issues. and yes, as partners move forward in the middle east.yes, >> for any officer from the british embassy here, ken was talking about britain in the >>st. [laughter] >> i thought i would also say that in my limited understanding of both north korea and iran, i ihink they commiseration at the hands of outside powers is a core part of national and state identity, and so that constrained, you know, whatever that constran do, however sort of strong their capacity and will is. >> thanks.ir capacity do mostly asian and north korea, as you know on these things, i'm totally asiana innocent on how tond think about

the proliferation, implications. so it's fascinating to me, ken especially talks about it, the iranian means and how you go down the list, why does it mean that, why is it their interest to have iran their intimate? the parallel is drawn, the north koreans, they all have to. i know the answer to that when. if you're an asian country and you get the bomb, you a automatically become a first strike for the chinese. so why is that in your interest? you can argue that one but it seems prettyfor the clear.hat e because otherwise really you are left with one thing. we sit back and let this happen, or we have to say to ourselves we will take the chance and roll the dice and really use a

military option. and that means screwing wrong i th bombing the k. that's what one gets from listening to you. i don'td mean that an argumentative way.from list person sitting next to me said yet. it isn't that bad and nothing wi have works andn nothing we havs will work as long as his regimei is in place and what of the do s option to have if it is really otheiferation all of a the midde east period, that's it's going to happen. >> banks. pro i appreciate youli asking for that. i was waiting for some and ask . that question. [inaudible] >> there is another option.h is containing a nuclear iran is not going to be fun. it's not going to be easy. but there's no reason that it's impossible their it's more thes same we can contain the soviet union and the subunit was a lot bigger, meaner, stronger than

iran.ion fairpoint.gher and but iran is going to be hard in other ways. is we're already looking hard at what he be one. hard.gain i don't want to suggest that containment isn'te. possible that i just don't want to point out the not want to dis which is even if you match in iran is the best of intentions, which i don't, especially givena evenf youe of leadership since june 12, 2009. but even if you do, during the cold war with the soviet union,- which didn't want to incinerateh us, we nevertheless got into some very, very nasty crises with them over the cuban missile crisis, cuba most are busy butvr the also berlin several times, the middle east a couple times. what we learn from thatlin experience is is ever takeswhat three things to make crisis management work.o make cris m there are both sides understand each other, basically, having good communications and the two

haviership's being able to signal each other in ways thatng will recognize to each site. that's how we got through all this crisis. being we have none of that with iraq. none of it. none, none, none.hrough those we don't understand the iranian. they serve a don't understand ih that we have notifications with. them. and all of our signals areanian. misunderstood by them and all their signals are misunderstood by as. again, i don't want is just containment isn't possible. i believe it absolutely isot possible. it's just going to be hard.oluts >> i would argue the trajectory the north korean issue is inue precisely the same direction.f that we end up with containmente but if it's hard enough to get. china and russia to go along with what we're doing now, just think about much more difficult it will be to get them to go along with that. go alo ken, i will give you the lastt question, and then we will give each aspect right here.

each panel is a chance to wrap up briefly. panist >> ken, brookings. forgive me if this question hasp been asked. >> forve duck out for there. it seemed to be what bothn jonathan and jack were saying would be, that the u.s. should think of what we should do would be a wakeup call fort e north korea, reinforce redlines, we've allowed them to marchwakec without consequence. i wonder whether you could suggest what we might be able to do that would be of consequence, he context of ourld you policies at this point? t or is that something that wouldt be nice but there are no realistic opportunities for its do? something jonathan?option? >> ken, we heisley may be confronting soon an opportunit , dare i say, less with respect to the nuclear weapons capabilities and more with the. >> to their actual behavior. bd this is over the result of

the investigation, which is multilateral as jim steinberg pointed out earlier. the north koreans, despite their despit rhetoric to this is at a lot of levels this is a very diminished state. there is diminished state that is now in possession of a minimal capability whether they could deliver a weapon or not we don't know.nuclear whether they even want to deliver a weapon or not we don'n deow. this is what we're bumping up against war don't really understand, but i do think that there had been some historic episodes where they have and cal w sober. not arguing been i see soaring one else go off half cocked. quite the contrary. but i think what we may be sobe. facing to just follow up on what chris said a couple of momentsye ago, is the need in some sense for an innovation strategy, aki statement strategy that finds us again much to china's chagrin is

might add if it happens to be more militarily active in an effect, compelling south korea in a lot of ways to turn its, attention towards the continuina problem that they faced. to be frank i think in a lot of ways, the president of the rok y really looks upon his own counter of a major actor in and of itself that he would prefer to see unification but he as a o doesn't have unification, south korea will haver to find its strategic and economic destiny apart from that that. norway's they'll have to maketi. sure that north korea isthere inhibited from use of any of ita capabilities, lest bigger risks do transpire. one of the pointer, and i can't emphasize this enough that it does seem to me that the challenge for the united states and china him and others, is noo to allow political space to be created between them, such that we lose sight of fundamentally a

shared objective to prevent to p-term a nuclear armed north korea. and the risk right now where there's this kind of separatear. task, if you will, on the one hand the united states holdingud two in a very consistent and very explicit fashion, do not compensate the north. were as china and its own interest is seeing a basis for top if not building up the north, at least keeping them on bume kind of a lifeline. that is worrisomeil only because it creates room that the northee koreans have shown historically they are only too capable of thh exploiting very, very effectively. eloitinhey way, one last pointi would make the didn't come up iy any of our discussions that wars an entire separate session, and that is the degree to which iran and north korea in draft on hole to whi right of programs, because then

prrare really talking about a significantly more worrisome scenario, something that mighta even get china's attention.sceno >> , jack, do you want to? whether you start wrapping up. spent wrapping up answering the question. i do think that, unless we do something, and your words, as al wakeup call to north korea, we are, as richard pointed out, as headed for a containment policyh that doesn't get us anywhere. fa you have to be very lucky with north korea, that that's a veryt effective. anywher so what i have suggested that we understand the full nobility of north korea was important to them. and to them it is movement towards 2012 in terms of some occessful economic progress that enhances, from theiromic perspective, the transition from current leadership to future leadership. and i think that we need to getu inside of that decision cycle of

the north koreans and again to interrupt it to the point where it causes the koreans greato concern that their stability of the regime is at risk, theit cae future beyond kim jong-il is ata risk. and then give got something that may very well get theirg attention. >> jonathan? >> jack has reminded us that, although we doat nottent have ey means of entry or influence ints the north korean system, that consideration of how you do this and what kinds of tools at ourto disposal warrants much more careful consideration than we have given it to this point, i onuld only conclude to say 2012i on going to be one hell of a year between north korea, south korea, taiwan, the chinese in succession, and i think is goin, to be an american presidential election, do.

>> john? >> i was struck by the congruent between jonathan pollack's description of chinese policycon towards korea and my own take ok chinese policy towards iran. and it seems to me in the case y of iran, there are eight deep domestic routes for this. china's public opinion has been educeded in the least sends and 90 a night to be deeply suspicious of the united statese and as public opinion is -- resonates through the internet and in a place with succession politics so that any leader that aspires to be the paramount leader cannot afford to be weakt in giving with the united states, or to be willing to play second tilted u.s. activity and so forth. so deep roots in terms of domestic policy. is also fid i think, the chinese

political system is fragile in many ways, and it lacks a -- legitimacy which leaders based leg an election staff, which leans that i think the chinese leaders are very cautious because they are afraid of beinf embarrassed. and if they undertook to be partners with the united states they would be second fiddle, any i think they perceive a great danger of sat back and failure and criticism.e so in terms of addressing the of fundamental question of how to persuade china to move towards closer, genuine cooperation with united states, i think we needid to be cognizant of these deep domestic routes of china's residents. >> ken, anybe final words? deep, >> just a very quick one. witches, yeah, i'm struck onces. again in this conversation about how difficult it will be to have this relationship with china it woulda middle east moving for. but also of course how importanh

it is. me of my great fears is, againf motivated by john's description of chinese thinking about it w motivatedy in the middle east.y johns the experience of the united states in the middle east is a adolescent we want to cover thec region. all who want to do is get the i hell out, pardons my french. all the usa's ever wanted to do is to lead the region behind and have nothing to do with it. even the bush administration, the whole goal of conquering thr iraq was to put our guy ination, tharge, he would be good and leave us alone ande we could wo away. and what i would just be afraida of is the differences between the united states and china, while somewhat dizzy recognizing, we haven't talked about thetween th importance ofh le chinese power and influenceni in the middle east. i would to save for that to be yet another incentive for americans to walk way from the hate east because that's beennr the a bane of our policies over years.t 50 >> thank you very much. we will take about a 10 minutenk break. i made a pledge to kene

lieberthal that the audience i delivered to them would be as to large as the one that i had. so please don't let me down. second, i would like to thank the various brookings people who have helped l make this event possible, communications act, mo staff, especially kevin foley.os third, i want to thank the panelists for really outstanding session. to thank you very much. t [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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this panel discussed the economic relationship between china and the u.s. it's about an hour. >> the final panel of a long and very interesting day. this panel takes up a topic that is normally the u.s.-china topic which is the economic trade side of both bilateral and multilateral he. we clearly have the u.s. and china clearly has highly interdependent economies. and the