with respect to a broad rewrite of the communications act. and so, and again, that's not an easy task. it's not a quick task. but that is something he does have familiarity with. >> host: gregg rothschild, if mr. waxman maintains or retains his chairmanship, where do you see as focus? >> guest: again -- >> host: particularly when it comes to rewriting of the tele- >> guest: as you both know he spent the last human to the last congress attempting to gain some kind of consensus around the issue of broadband regulation. i would think assuming he maintains a chairmanship, so try to continue those negotiations, work with republicans on the committee, work with the industry, work with folks in the democrat and republican party to pass and give the fcc clear direction on broadband

regulation. on the senate side, senator rockefeller has been following that issue very closely and was involved in stakeholder meetings on the subject. ..

>> please be seated. >> good morning, everyone. we're going to take up the first case that's on the calendar, and that is the united states of america vs. the state of arizona. we allotted 30 minutes per side. the appellant wishes to save time for rebuttal, that's fine, just keep an eye on the clock.

it's counting down. with that, a reminder, we're ready to begin. does the state of arizona -- >> good morning. i'm john bouma. i represent the state of arizona and governor january brewer who is with us in court today. i'd like to try to reserve five minutes for rebuttal. >> that's fine. >> your honor, arizona is trying to deal with the problems that arise from a federal immigration system that even president obama acknowledges is broken. arizona is a border state, and it's on the very front lines and there's serious crimes that are

involved in the drug trafficking, the human trafficking, human smuggling, and the other activities, the coyotes who thrive because once an illegal alien is in the united states, the chances of removal are so low that basically crossing the border is same as crossing the finish line. with a federal government that's been unable or unwilling to solve the problem, arizona passed the public policy whereby they wish the arizona law enforcement officers to assist in the imputation and enforcement of federal immigration law to the maximum extent permitted by federal law. the district judge apparently deciding that arizona law

enforcement officers would forget their training or experience or the constitution and act in an unconstitutional manner has enter in an injunction that basically preserves the status quo, and that status quo is simply unacceptable. >> the district court focused on four provisions; correct? >> yes, sir. >> that's all that's at issue here. >> what's that? >> we're just focusing on that. >> yes, sir. >> mr. bouma, forget the arguments you would address to the legislature. tell us how the judge was wrong own each four if you would, please. >> okay. with respect to -- i think we first start with the proposition that this is a facial challenge, and she mentioned the challenge, the

standard for that challenge principally that is no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid. put another way with respect to each of the sections challenged that is unconstitutional in every conceivable application. >> let me ask you this. you mentioned solerno. is that principle somewhat intentioned with the government's argument here that these provisions are preempted completely? >> these provisions are not preempted completely. they -- in every instance comply with a congressional objectives and not a one of them that does not comply with obvious jexes and do not conflict and can comply with state and federal law in each particular instance, and none

stand as an obvious -- obstacle to the full objectives of congress. there's no expressed preemption. it's just field preemption which is the field of immigration which basically decide who should and should not be admitted into the country and the circumstances under which a legal entrance should remain, and decanis tells us the rest of this is under the police power and that every regulation of aliens is not a regulation of immigration, and so we're back to the proposition there's no expressed preemption. >> tailor that argument to section three. >> with respect to section three. >> the registration. >> yes, sir. arizona passed a set of standards or laws essentially the same as the federal law,

1304 and 1306 saying if you're in violation of that, you're in violation of state law. now, that is consistent with congressional objectives certainly. the fact that the administration doesn't choose to enforce them shouldn't mean that congress doesn't want them enforced, particularly when you look at what congress has done all the way in encouraging state and local officials to assist congress and if you look at section 13, 1644 and such -- >> mr. bouma, on that point in hinds the supreme court said that pennsylvania adding as a misdemeanor the failure to register under pennsylvania's act was treading in federal ground. we have under section 1304 and 1306 a well detailed and

regulated policy of what documents immigrants or aliens should carry in this country under the federal statute. what arizona is saying is that's fine, but if you don't carry those, we're going to put you in jail for up to a year or fine you. isn't that so? >> your honor, i think the arizona statute has lesser penalties than the federal. it goes 30 or 60 days. >> okay. even 30 or 60 days for a demeanor. >> congress has stiffer penalties than arizona does. all arizona does is comply with the rules. >> is it your argument that is state can take a look whether the federal government is enforcing its laws and if the federal government is not enforcing its laws, it can enforce the laws for the federal

government? for instance, if i don't pay my income tax, can california come along and sue me for not paying my income tax? >> well, i don't think california would be interested in forcing the income tax, but california is certainly interested in seeing that the people within its border comply with the rules because arizona's bearing the brunt of the federal government's failure to enforce it. you mentioned hins. that's a conflict cay. it did not say there's no room for the states to work in this particular area. as a matter of fact, there's a particular paragraph in heinz that says the concept whether this is in the realm of both is specifically reserved, so it's the heinz conflict case and the scheme was with the government scheme. this is not totally at odds with the government scheme. this is doing what congress

says. the fact that the administration won't enforce what congress says doesn't mean arizona should have to bear the brunt of it. how do they come in and claim preemption by we're in the field, but not doing much about it? we choose not to enforce it. >> how about section 2? >> section 2 is a provocation of what people are already doing, and almost every jurisdiction they do it on a discretionary basis. they investigate suspected illegal aliens. all the duty does is quantify what both the united states and the district essentially said is constitutionally permissible. >> let me ask you this question. it seems to me reasonable for them to ascertain the status of

the person they're after, and ascertain it from a federal source, but there is al the provision that in the case of an arrest, the person will not be released until that status is determined. now, i don't know any provision in federal law that goes that far, and suspect that getting into -- isn't that getting into federal territory? >> the provision that you're talking about which is the second sentence we think has to be construed to be inconsistent with the first, third, and fourth sentences of that paragraph at which point the only people who are investigated are those who there's a reasonable suspicion on alien -- >> no, that's fine, but no, my question -- i think i want to focus on shall not be released until it's

determined. >> yes, and that's -- that can only be determined in the context of the 4th amendment. >> yes, i understand all that, but how can we construe it so the detention does not exceed what would be the federal law? >> the statute specifically contains the provision and basically i can tell you it says that it will be construed in accordance with federal immigration law then to preserve the constitutional right of all persons and the privileges and immunities of the united states citizens. that's part of 2b. it means it incorporates the 4th amendment standards. >> all right. let's suppose a citizen arrest

would reasonable belief that they've committed a felony, and then they post bail, and they are able to get out, but then the statute says, no, you don't get out until your immigration status is determined. how do you reconcile that? >> ordinarily if they go to jail, someone is going to determine the immigration state because it requires much -- >> no, no, i can see that, and often that will be done, but this is an absolute statement, shall not be released until it is determined, and they're on bail, but then the statute kicks in, doesn't it and says they shouldn't be released? >> well, if you take the other provision, you have to go as far as the 4th amendment allows it and turn them loose. if you can't determine within a reasonable time what their

immigration status is, that statute specifically provide that you have to turn them loose under the provision of being consistent with the constitutional rights of all persons. >> mr. bouma, suspect it true if the -- isn't it true if the immigration service picks up an illegal alien, and we're in the process of determines whether he was legal or not, the statute requires him to be presented to an officer within the shortest time possible to be admitted a bail. >> yes. >> what would happen here? >> i think the idea is to follow the usual procedures. we have reasonable suspicion. the next thing you need is probably cause, and then the next thing you have to do is let them go if you can't identify them. >> on bail? >> on bail or otherwise. >> would you clarify for me, there's some debate between the

parties just about how sentence one and two are to be interpreted. i'm just curious about how you envision the statute working for the officer in the field. >> well, in the first place, officers -- i'll just start with the proposition that officers certainly understand the concepts of reasonable suspicion, and probably cause and the stops and how long you can keep somebody, so then the statute, the second sentence has to be construed only with respect to those about whom there's a reasonable suspicion, and that's consistent with the first sentence in the third and fourth sentences. secondly, you know, i think the court failed to apply three principles here with respect to the section. one is to interpret a statute in a constitutional manner. two, interpret it so it's

sensible without an absurd result, and third is have it be consistent with the legislative intent. the legislative intent is to deal with illegal aliens. you know, arizona has a long tradition of hispanic population, nobody's trying to -- >> to follow-up on your response, the statute goes on to provide that if a person is detained and produces a document like on arizona driver's license, that's a presumption they're here legally, but in the case the judge was pointing out, what happens if they produce a valid driver's license and the statute still has to verify they're here legally? >> no. >> that's it? if they have a driver's license, that's it? >> right. >> they don't have to comply with the other statute. it's all over? >> correct.

the current status doesn't give you that -- >> that doesn't seem to be what the statute says though. >> sir? >> that doesn't seem to be what the statute says though. >> it does. if they have a driver's license it's presumption as being taken care of and they're gone. if you go back to the concepts that the statute is intending to deal with illegal aliens that there is illegal aliens we're talking about and if you try to interpret it the way that either the government or district court did -- >> then answer this part of the question. >> okay. >> it doesn't say it is conclusively presumed to not be an alien by the presentation of an arizona driver's license. it says a person is presumed not to be an alien, a presumption that can be rebutted by a conversation between the officer and the alien which indicates reasonable suspicion that he has

not an alien or an men citizen. you can see that. >> you're absolutely right. as a matter of fact, very often in practice the first thing the alien tells them is he's not a citizen, and that takes care of the reasonable suspicion usually. >> if we were to interpret the statute in the way that is constitutional -- [no audio] >> yes, it would. >> address two others that the district court -- >> yes, sir. i'll talk about five. >> whatever one you want to begin with. >> it's the issue of whether you can, whether you can make

criminal penalties for being employed, to attach a penalty for -- people who are unauthorized to work, to penalize them as a way to discourage the men from working. that is clearly consistent with congressional intent, the reason they are unauthorized workers is congress made it clear that they're not supposed to be working. congress has chosen to first try to deal with it from the employer's stand point, and in that particular instance did put in an expressed preemption provision, but it was a partial expressed preemption with respect to employers, and they

didn't put it in with respect to employees nor is it clear if you look at the statute or anything congress has done is there any clear manifested intent to preefferent the area of employees. this is a problem because, you know, -- >> i'll tell you what the problem is, mr. bouma, is your argument is something that is foreclosured to us. judge ferguson found and wrote that the congressional intention was not to punish employees. now, right or wrong, this three-judge panel must follow that rule. we are not an em bank panel. tell me why judge ferguson's opinion in national center does not bind this court. >> well, judge ferguson's

opinion, and that is one to the legislative intent and to determine the legislative intent, he looked at the hearing that consistented of a five-person committee, three of whom were present, and from that, he designed the legislative intent, and that seems a long way from being clearer and manifested -- >> let us suppose i stipulated the fact that mr. -- that judge ferguson was absolutely wrong. i agree with you let's say. i don't, but -- [laughter] i say i agree with you. how does a three-judge panel of the 9th circuit overrule another 3-judge panel of the 9th circuit on what the legislative intent was? judge ferguson found the

legislative intent on a bail order of an immigrant of an alien which said that he couldn't work during the period of time of bail to be inconsistent with the legislative intent which was not to punish workers while they were awaiting their asylum hearings or other proceedings on immigration, but to let them work and earn money to feed themselves and other charges. that was his idea. now, judge ferguson, rest in peace, may have been wrong, but how can we turn that around and agree with you? >> i think you are in a position should you decide to decide that it was simply wrong. >> well, our -- we aren't allowed to do that. we're bound by the prior

three-judge panel. if there's a change in the supreme court or by a statute -- the case poses some problem to you with respect to section 5. how about the final section before your time runs out. you might want to address section five. >> okay. with respect to section vi, that is a provision that is consistent with a federal statute, 1252c. it permits an arizona law enforcement offers to write the law unless somebody is removable from the country, and the idea of that is to permit arizona law enforcement officers to work with them and hold suspects when ice tells them they want them

held for people who have been removed, convicted of a crime or a public offense and who have been removed -- >> doesn't this statute pose the same problem with respect to arrest and detention? >> i don't believe it does, sir. >> why not? >> well, this is somebody once held and somebody who committed a federal offense and has been removed or returned to the country. they are here illegally and there is subject to arrest and detention. >> excuse me. it's not restricted to the -- >> but that's an example. somebody who has not gone or somebody who has gone and returned. either one would apply. they are both clearly removable. >> it also goes to somebody who is arrested, they run a national

crime information center check, and they find that he was convicted, sentenced, served his term for second degree murder, and is free. your arizona policeman can arrest him because he's removable. >> that's right. >> because of the ina? >> that's right. >> the judge made it appear very complicated about who is removable and who is not. >> it may be clear in some cases like murder or bank robbery or sexual abuse of a minor which is cause for removal even if the sentence was served, this is a fasal challenge, isn't it? >> clearly the ice maintains a

data base of people who have been removed and a data base of those convicted of those crimes. >> hasn't the federal government through very elaborate scheme established a lengthy process for determines whether somebody is removable or not? >> there's a -- >> there's a lengthy process. nothing you can call whether somebody committed a crime. there's some obvious ones that judge alluded to, but some aren't. >> whether a particular afns -- offense is a serious felony. >> justice stephens made it clear there's a whole lot of areas that it's clear, but i guess the main point is this is a fasal challenge and that's the main point with respect to each of these. there are certainly circumstances in which it can be

applied in a constitutional manner. it is not all -- it is not unconstitutional in every conceivable aspect. >> i'm still trying to understand how this statute works. that is an officer determines by running a data check that somebody is convicted of, i don't know, second degree murder or whatever crime you want to pin point, they arrest him without a warrant, they take him into custody, and what do they hold him for? >> before they arrest him, they id him. they have to have a lawful stop or detention and then they have to have a reasonable suspicion. now they checked, found out who the individual is, and that's important because until they do that, neither ice nor they who they have.

it's a theory of congress and clear communication with ice because you don't know who you got. you can't catch them unless you know about them. they reported that, and now they both know who they have. ice says we want to hold him. >> we don't know -- >> i'm sorry? >> we don't know this is a removable office. >> then if you're going to talk about people acting in a constitution flail manner and -- manner and get back to the fact you assume they will and secondly this is only a facial challenge and there are constitutional applications, this can be applied in a constitutional manner and assume the police officer lets that go. >> how long does icef have to get back? 24 hours, 48 hours, a week? >> i think you're talking about reasonable suspicion or probably cause is 24 hours in both. the truth of it is look at the experience and statements submitted, they get an answer

back within 11 minutes. >> okay. all right. i'm passed my -- >> do you want us to construe the statutes of you can only have the arizona asks for a ruling? >> i don't think it's the only time it might happen because as i said there's some relatively clear things. they could perhaps arrest him, but the concept is basically to provide the authority that is required if you're going to have the statute, 1252c, that needs authority. there may be authority, we don't know. this is to clarify that. i'm past my time. thank you. >> thank you, counsel. >> good morning, and it please

the court, edwin kneedler for the united states. before discussing the provisions at issue here, i want to layout the constitutional structure and preemption provisions that govern the provisions. the constitution of the united states, that's the subject matter of immigration in the national government -- >> no. national government, no, in congress. >> in congress. >> there's a difference between national government and congress. >> well, congress in the enacment and the executive branch in the execution of the law under article ii and the interfeengs of the execution of the law -- >> as long as it's done fairly and well. >> yes. and this is because the subject matter of immigration which is the treatment of foreign nationals within our borders is a core aspect of foreign relations and one of the purposes for the adoption of the

constitution was a concern that individual states would embroil the entire nation in disputes with other countries, and it's important not to allow for a patchwork of state laws, but rather for the nation to speak with one voice, and in this context it's particularly important to protect the right of the u.s. citizens abroad if their treatment. >> has there been any adverse foreign relations since the year 2007 when the state of new jersey adopted by order, not by statute, a similar requirement to its police force that anyone who was stopped for an indictable crime or drunk driving should have his immigration status checked? >> well, i'm not aware of a level of dissatisfaction or concern that has arisen now. >> secondly, how about the same

rule in rhode island? has that led to our foreign relations being deteriorated as a result of checking immigration status? >> there have been concerns expressed in recent years. >> in rhode island or new jersey or just arizona? >> the -- the deck collar ration explains this particular rule brought to the floor a broader concern, concern that is applicable to law. >> does any other state in new jersey, pennsylvania, or nevada or any other state ever issue a declaration that the legislature declared that the intent of the about is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in arizona? >> no, and i think that's an important point. this is an extraordinary state statute that has additional criminal penalties added on top

of those adopted by congress and a mandatory check with dhs any time there is a stop and reasonable suspicion. section i of the act describes these precisions are designed to work together to have enforcement and adopt the public policy of the state of arizona that is independent and outside the control of congress and or out of the control of the national government. >> that's part of the statute? >> pardon me? >> does it say they operate outside of the control? don't put words into the statute. >> i'm -- i'm -- but -- >> it's statutory. >> it's a consequence of what happens. if i could explain -- >> no, i'm well aware of this. concentrate on the provisions that -- >> i would like to switch to section iii in particular which establishes a state crime for failure to register or carry a registration card as required by

the federal criminal statutes, but it only applies to people who are unlawfully present in the united states, so in effect criminal law is an unlawful presence. those prosecutions are brought by the state, not to the control of the united states government. that's preempted for three reasons. it's a direct regulation of and part of the direct regulation of immigration. it follows the states in position of criminal sanctions over and above and on top of those same state prohibitions are themselves are preempted. >> you don't have to spend a great deal of time on section iii. >> okay. i do want to make the point though the other provisions were designed to work together with section iii so if there was a

stop -- >> arizona does nothing more than to complement the federal scheme. >> the scream court said that the registration was an issue there and this is built on top of that. those occupy the field and the court said a state may not add on regulations and punishments on top of that. we think it's exactly that. there's conflict preemption here because it legalizes presence here in the united states because it only applies to people who are unlawfully present. as we explained in the brief it is contrary to the policy of the united states in statutes and consistent with international practice not to criminalize mere presence in the united states, and so for all of those reasons, we think that that section iii is preempletted because it is direct regulation of

immigration. if i -- if i might unless the courthouse has further questions on section iii, i could switch to section v of the statute -- >> that's fine. >> the employment of provision. with respect to section v as the court pointed out, this court's decision ?t national immigrant rights case did analyze the backdrop in the enactment of the federal prohibition of the employer sanctioned provision and recognize that congress considered and deliberately rejemghted the possibility of imposing sanctions -- >> i think you heard the judge, it's commonground. we a bound by that decision in the argument. >> yes. >> do you need more?

>> if i could just add one point on that on section v. >> do you have to do it? [laughter] >> i feel ruly. >> i'd like to underscore one point why the court is correct in its evaluation, and it's just not a registration history point which the court addressed in the ncir case, and that point is that the 13 and 24a of the federal act has specific prohibition requiring an individual employer to attest he has lawfully present and authorized to work and there's criminal sanctions in the federal act for violating that provision. significantly, there's another provision in 1324a that says the station that the individual employee makes may not be used for any purpose except to enforce the federal statute, and to us that, that clearly shows

that congress contemplated that the employee's involvement and the connection with applying for employment could only lead to federal consequences and that there would be no state consequences. that's the point that was not made in the ncir. it's a textual point. >> if there's a declare ration, the state in which that perjury is commitmented, the state cannot prosecute him? >> i believe that is probably correct. to putting that to one side, it can't make the employment itself unlawful. whrrnt -- >> why do you believe a state could not prosecute a perjury committed on a federal document? >> well -- well, if it's -- if it's regulating perjury against the united states in the same way that section iii is

preempted, so would that be. it's not up to a state to prosecute false statements to the federal government. >> do you have any authority for that? >> the supreme's court decision in the buckman case a case involve the with the fda and the supreme court said the relationship in the context of fraud within the federal agency and those whom it regulates is a matter to be addressed by the federal government, and the state could not create a civil cause of action for fraud, and again, there's no need for the court to decide that here, but -- >> i'm not talking about a civil cause of action. i'm talking about a criminal penalty for perjury. >> well, but again, if the question is whether the state would have authority over the subject matter whether it's criminal or civil means, we don't think would -- >> is there a case you have in mind where the state is found not to have ability to prosecute somebody who perjury themselves to the federal government in >>

i'm not aware of a specific case, but again, that relationship would ordinarily be governed by federal law, so i addressed the two criminal provisions that the state grafted on top of the federal scheme, and now i'd like to turn to section 2 be of the act. >> as you talk about section 2b, i'm interested in how the house fits into the scheme. >> we believe this is preempted on its face, and we believe, and let me explain why. i think it's consistent with the solerno stipulation. >> you stipulate this is a facial challenge. >> yes, it is. we believe this provision is unconstitutional in every application. what we object to and preempted in this context is the mandatory nature of the requirement. we do not question the authority of the state in a state law

enforcement officer for example in the course of an ordinary stop or either traffic stop or stopping someone on the sidewalk to question someone about his identity, about his status and check with ins or excuse me, dhs because indeed federal officials rely often upon information and glean from state and local law enforcement. what is problematic about this is the mandatory nature of it because what the state has done is to harness the federal enforcement apparatus in aid of the separately constituted state mandatory criminal enforcement approach to the immigration laws. >> let me ask you if that's the theme of your brief, but why -- isn't congress capable of saying

no? if this is a burden -- >> congress, congress, congress could, but we think congress had already said no. >> well -- >> let me -- >> is there anything in the statute? >> that's interesting. >> well, yes, there is. we think where it is manifested most clearly is in the provision of the act in section 287g or 1357g of title a, and the first nine sections of that provision and this was enacted in 1996, established a mechanism under which dhs can enter into a cooperative law enforcement agreement where the state and local law enforcement or correctional agency and under that provision the state officers may exercise authorities of ice officers

including doing checks in appropriate circumstances, but the act makes clear whether it's an agreement like that the state and local officers have to act under the supervision of officers and have to follow the priorities in terms of law enforcement. >> under g10 it says no -- not with standing. no provision of this act will stop the -- nothing in the subsection shall be construed to require an agreement under this subsection in order for any officer or employee of the state or political subdivision of the state to communicate with the attorney general regarding the immigration status of any individual including reporting knowledge that a particular person is not lawfully present in the united states or otherwise to cooperate with the attorney general in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens

not lawfully frent in the united states. so 287g officers are under the ag, but under g10, this doesn't stop regular officers from doing exactly what i've read. >> our position is not that they're not authorized to. our objection is that the state statutes mandates it. >> they can state how they want to use their people, right? >> i don't think so with all do with respect. an greermt is not required for state officers to cooperate, but the important language is cooperate with the attorney general. when one utilized law enforcement officers to assist a second sovereign, i think the background understanding would be it's the second sovereign whose laws are enforced who takes the lead and the other officer here, the officers of

arizona is assisting the second sovereign of the united states. >> that's nice and well as subsection be, but listen again. to communicate with the attorney general with regard to the immigration status, it doesn't say communicate when the tone -- attorney general wants you to communicate. this is a right under the federal statute for the local people to communicate with the attorney general. >> section 10 says that's part of a broader relationship, and again, this is demonstrated again i think by the text, paragraph a says to communicate with the attorney general, and b says otherwise to cooperate. >> besides communicating? >> but the otherwise to cooperate, the otherwise refers back to a. the communication is part of the cooperative relationship between the state and the federal government. >> isn't the obligation of the federal government made very

clear by sections 1373c, 8usc1373c which is entitled obligation to respond to inquiries? the immigration of the naturalization service shall, mandatory word, respond to an inquiry by a state or local agency seeking to verify or ascertain the immigration status of any individual ect., ect., ect.. it doesn't say whether we want to or in our discretion or when we have funds available. it says shall. >> our point doesn't turn on the response that dhs makes. it turns on the conduct of the state and local police officers who would be -- and by hypothesis are making inquiries of the aliens before we even get to what is submitted

to united states. they stop someone and prolonging that stop by hypothesis they mite not otherwise do it in the absence of the 1070. >> they might not do it or they might do it and this is a facial challenge. you have to prove every time they would stop someone that's an unconstitutional stop. >> no, our burden is to show every time the mandatory application is inpermissible because it takes away the discretion of the local law enforcement to decide whether to persue a local -- >> what about section ii? it says if you have reasonable suspicion if it's practicable, if it won't interfere with the investigation, then you can request the immigration status. >> those circumstances it is mapped toir, and those --

mandatory and that first sentence does not provide for the state or local officer to take into account federal priorities. the only thing taken into account is the state and local officers own set of priorities. >> what set of priorities? >> well, as we explained in our brief, the secretary of homeland security through ipes established priorities for example in the enforcement of the immigration agent. >> there's nothing established by ipes as responding to the obligation to respond to inquiries. >> yes -- what i'm describing here doesn't go to the response to the inquiry but the conduct by the believer when he en-- encounters someone on the beat. >> you want him to say what would the feds do in this case? >> no, what would i do if left

to my own law enforcement judgment knowing what the feds approach is with respect to particular problems. >> they're told what to do. they've been told by the arizona legislature and by the governor what to do which is if you have reasonable suspicion, if it's practicable, if it won't interfere with the investigation, run an immigration check. it takes 11 minutes according to the last speaker. >> and, again, our problem is that the state has mandated it. >> let me ask you this. before arizona passed this statute, this provision, and let's assume no cooperative agreement, could the sheriff of some local county say to his officers, whenever you make a stop and you think there's reasonable suspicion that the person you stopped is here illegally, you run a check with

ins. >> that presents the same problem. >> why? it's not mapped toir. the state didn't say it's mandatory. >> well, the slfer has. if the sheriff adopts a policy and for these purposes and another a policy for the sheriff in how matters are to be conducted should be regarded as having the force of law intended to bind the officers who work for him. >> it's priorities. the sheriff decided in his discretion in running his officers and directing his department. in that situation it's not solely the sheriff's concern coming to the enforcement of the immigration law. >> the officers say, i made a stop, looks like this guy is illegal. he says -- i'm going to call. i'm going to check. what's wrong with that? >> well, you know, at some point what an individual officer does

may not rise to the level of the legal problem, but even in the case of an individual officer, if there was an issue, that would be worked out in the cooperative relationship between the federal government and the states. >> i don't understand why an officer couldn't independent of this law and even in light of the existing federal law we talked about, couldn't he on his own call about a particular person he detained? >> he certainly can, but let me -- >> it seems to be permissible. >> it is. but there's another aspect that is important in underscoring what they are trying to accomplish here and that is the private right of action. >> no, let's not get away from this point. i read your brief. i read the district court. i heard your argument, and i don't understand your argument. we are dprent --

dependent as counsel being responsive, focusing, trying to help us not go down and fall like soldiers in the defense of some position that's -- you keep saying that the problem that a state officer is told to do something. that's not a matter of preemption. it's an appeal and cut off communications. we don't want to have this information fought, but it hasn't done so. it makes clear to you it has not done so, and, i would think the proper position would be to conceive this is a point where we don't have an argument. >> with respect, we do believe we have an argument, and if i could make two other points that we think critically underscore that. first of all, the mandatory

nature of section 2 be is coupled with the private right of action that provides any citizen of the state, not just the sheriff running the department, but any citizen of the state can bring a private right of action if there's a policy of not enforcing the immigration law to the maximum ebbs tent possible. this is a powerful incentive to pursue questioning and circumstances which ordinary law enforcement would not call for. the state has singled out this one subject matter of immigration for the extraordinary mandatory requirement in a subject matter that is exclusively federal in prosecution and enforcement. the other extraordinary thing about this is it's geared to the reasonable suspicion standard. that is a familiar standard, but it's familiar in terms of authorizing or permittings law enforcement. it is a purposely low standard,

lower than probably cause, but it's a standard whose application daily depends upon the individual judgment of law enforcement officers in the field often not exercising that power to the hilt because of the recognition that maybe they should be applying a standard above this. this standard is now transposed from a permissive authorizization in its usual application to a mandate every time a state or local officer encounters someone on a beat and all the circumstances might lead to a judgment that there's reasonable suspicion that that person is unlawfully here. that officer must pursue the manner and ask questions. >> is it similarly permissible if the state of arizona say every time you stop a person, you have to check him with a

national crimes center to see if there's any warrants? >> that is a regular part of police -- >> or every time you stop a person, you have to take his fingerprints? >> in that circumstance, the state is regulating its own state law enforcement. if the state wants to say -- >> not necessarily. if the national center has outstanding warrants from the state of california, that is not an arizona crime. >> that's the information the officer might find from the ncic, but in terms of pursuing the ncic the difference is the state singled out immigration saying pursue immigration in the way you don't pursue any other state responsibility. >> there's no interest in seeing the illegal aliens should be removed? >> the state certainly has an

interest in that, but it's important to focus on the fact that the incutter between the local law enforcement officer may be on the street or in the school with a student who's been in a fight and the officer may have some suspicion that the student in school might be unlawfully present. all the sudden this law requires that that i accident be pursued. the state cannot remove or prosecute the person. it is an intake for ultimate federal enforcement of the law. >> but the state can deliver an illegal alien over to the federal officials, and they may result in that person being removed from the state of arizona. >> but in the field the cooperative relationship again which all federal state cooperation law enforcement works is there's communication about that. before the person would be

brought in, there's communication between the local law enforcement officer saying what do you want me to do in this circumstance? what this provision, 2 be does, is stand as an obstacle in every encountered to cooperative relationship between the states and federal government because it creates a state enforcement priority and a state mandatory enforcement approach. that's by this private right of action and geared in an unprecedented way to the use of the reasonable suspicion standard which as i said has always been -- >> okay. >> one to be authorized, but not used in a way to compel law enforcement. >> your time is rapidly decreasing here, and i'd like you to respond for a few moments to the argument with respect to section vi. >> okay. with respect to section vi it presents the problems that the

district court identified for starters. as the district court pointed out, the section vi, the parties agreed in the lower court is geared to a situation where the crime is committed outside of arizona because there's authority within the state of arizona to arrest someone to make a warrant of an arrest of someone. >> no if that person already served a sentence. arizona couldn't allow a warrant for arrest. >> no -- >> but this section does allow that. >> no, that -- that's true, but that is not a justification there was put forward in the lower court. >> it's a justification they talked about in this opinion. >> she noted it. >> she -- >> the parties didn't address it, and if that's an justification, that can be considered. this is just an injunction stage. >> if you're to win, and if that

were considered, you would be likely to lose. >> no, i think it continues to present the problems that the court identified because there's no requirement in section vi that the state or local officer contacted to find out whether a defense is removable. the officer has to make a judgment as to whether the public offense in the other state is a public offense in arizona and decide whether it would lead in turn to a removal. >> like suggested earlier, second degree murder is the crime. >> well, in that situation, it would probably, you know, it would probably be possible to make that determination. ..

>> is that they can sense this? >> pardon me? >> is that a confession? >> if not in written in the wake. it was written in a way that required that ice be consulted before the convict was taken. after all, the statute was only on aliens. and that is the concern. so if it was written in a way that required the trigger, we think that might be different, but it's not. if i could just come back -- >> could it be construed that way? >> it's not a question of

construing. >> you are the counselors say, arizona seems quite willing to accept the construction of it. >> well, i think they discussed that in to be. in six there is no language that could be read into the statute or construed to require a prior checking with i.c.e. >> they look at the stan schuett as a whole. to communicate with the federal government. >> but there's no requirement that be done before the local officer make a judgment on its own and we think that's contrary to the general cooperative law enforcement. if i could just return for a moment because i see my time is -- >> i let you go one minute. but make your point and that's it. >> i just want to say the arizona statute with its extraordinary mandatory investigation has to be considered in light of what would happen if every state in the union did this. and the united states nation as

a whole is responsible for other nations for the ways in which their citizens are treated within the united states. if every state did this, we would have a patchwork of laws that support circuits decision, which struck down a similar law concluded. and it's also important that the supreme court recognized in hines first whip it good how this can affect the citizens because another important fact for under law and immigration is to respect the civil liberties and not put people to surveillance because of the mandatory requirement is not minimal reasonable suspicion we think raises the concern very profoundly. >> thank you. >> just a few quick points. >> sure. >> if this is about regional, minimal -- reasonable, minimal

decision, i -- lopez took care of that. ins lopez beat the nose. whether the supreme court specifically said that reasonable suspicion was a suspicion standard to protect those lawfully in the country. so it's been a time-honored standard. i don't know how sudden it becomes so minimal. secondly, this pure speculation -- again, we're talking about a facial challenge here. but it's pure speculation that faith officers will check out people they otherwise wouldn't have checked out in their discretion. the idea of the statute is to admit those people who were previously been subject to sanctuary policies to make those checks. the third thing -- >> it does make a reasonable

attempt shall be made. it does seychelle. >> we encourage them to do it. we've got to know was there. >> by the generous reading of shall. [laughter] >> thursday, -- >> i'll take it. >> pardon me? >> i'll take it. >> thirdly, you mention to case to case management to look at it during the argument a little bit. i guess the point i would emphasize is that particular case addressed whether dhs had the authority to enact those regulation and did not address the subject of whether the states in the exercise of their power as indicated by decanted and other cases could address that particular subset. in the national center case also

failed to apply the presumption against preemption of state law because they weren't dealing with state law. they were dealing with an administrative application. >> is mr. perkins then rationalize the intent as whether to punish employees as a condition of bonding amount? >> yes, sir. >> why isn't that general premise what the intent of congress was, applicable not only when dhs does it, but when the state does it? >> dhs doesn't have any police powers to begin with. secondly -- >> that was the intent of congress. if the intent of congress is not to be black by judge ferguson, just because it is in one room another room, dhs or the state, doesn't stop it from being

black. >> i was tried to address your question about, even if you agreed with me, which you weren't sure you did, but the legislative history, whether you are bound by that opinion. and my answer would be i don't think you are because he did not address the specific subject before you. he did not address the subject of preemption against preemption or the police powers of the state. and i think he was wrong with all due respect on legislative history and would take a five person committee of three people present to say that the legislative history. that's a little bit of a stretch. >> euro for your time. i'll give you a minute to sum up your points. >> okay. your honor, we think that all these provisions are consistent with congressional objectives. its congressional objectives that cannot rather than this administration's priorities. and you know, there is no reason why arizona should stand by and

software the consequences of a broken system in arizona has 15,000 well-trained and capable police officers, law enforcement police offers on the ground who can help fix the system. that is what arizona wants to do, so we ask that you vacate this injunction and allow arizona to get on with taking care of the health, safety and welfare of the citizens and i appreciate your time. >> thank you. we appreciate your argument. the matter will be submitted at this time in the court appreciates the vast interest in this case. thank you. will be in recess for 15 minutes. >> all rise. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> in a few moments, former homeland security tom ridge.

>> now, former homeland security secretary, frank cilluffo on emerging terrorist threats, hosted by george washington university homeland security policy institute. this is an hour and a half. >> to have a conversation, to get a sense of where we see the threat environment, where we see priorities that need to be addressed and we're governor ridge sees the future to a large extent occurring. and he and i will have a conversation, but then we want to be able to draw upon all of you in terms of questions. let me also welcome our c-span audience who was watching life. we've got a number of television cameras here, so governor, let me start with the first question. and i mean, the alone you've

seen tons of various cases that come to the headline. firstly, the euro class. a lot of attention focused on how the threat has metastasized and were no longer dealing with simply al qaeda senior leadership, but you've got al qaeda's affiliates. you've got eight jihadist threat in the united states as well in terms of homegrown terrorism, those that aspire to al qaeda's ideology. what keeps you up at night? i mean, last week you had not only the aqap and the al qaeda and the you have a naturalized citizen from pakistan who had attempted to travel overseas, but was also planning and plotting attacks, farooq ahmed on the d.c. metro. so it comes in very sizes, flavorsome forms, what keeps you up at night? >> very similar to your question

i got from an audience several months after i was appointed as the president assistant -- assistant for homeland security and the advent stood up and said, what keeps you up at night? i said i don't want you to take this the wrong way. i sleep well. i just don't sleep much. [laughter] and i think the reality is that there are certain things that i believe this country and i know the professional securities think about, but i accept a post 9/11 world with the norm, but with the reality that the jihadist scourge is global, that we're going to be dealing with it for foreseeable future, perhaps many generations. and i would accept that reality into everything we can to reduce the risk, and manage the risk, reduce the threat and leave the

worrying and the sleepless nights -- and there a lot of those folks that have them, to the intelligence community and the law-enforcement community and the soldiers, brave men and women we have overseas. in terms of anxieties and concerns, i think you've addressed some of them even in your question. it's not just al qaeda anymore and bin laden. it's al qaeda and the arabian peninsula. as the foreign fighters that are going from western countries to get their training in pakistan and afghanistan. sometimes than going to other places in the world to actually fight, but often as history shows, going back to the homes where they know the culture. they know the environment, this can be simulated in a become a threat, the werewolf. so i think from an operational point of view these al qaeda, we have to accept is a far more complicated we're living in and there's more sympathizers that we not only wish us harm, but

the world harm. on the policy side of you, i think we'll get into this discussion, there are some concerns i have in a post-9/11 world, where he think our response has been -- has lacked the sense of urgency that existed after 9/11. in certain areas the sense of urgency still exists and hopefully in the months and years ahead they'll be back to some of these issues which i suspect you and i are going to discuss in greater length down the road so i'll hold off comments. >> there are some things we haven't done yet and we'll talk about those in just a sec. >> to the point, if you have to prioritize major areas of unfinished business and granted, homeland security as a discipline is a forever discipline. we need to constantly be thinking ahead of our adversaries can base their actions in part on our actions. what do you feel the major areas of unfinished business are? and what are the assessors start

to back so those? >> well, i think there's a continuing challenge with the novel that the united states, but the broader international law enforcement and intelligence community to again sift through all the threat information and determine what is -- that information that is intentionally actionable and act upon it. it continues to be a challenge. and frankly i don't think we've quite got it -- we haven't done a very good job in this country i believe. we've developed a processes. we've developed venues where people are theoretically defended information that other analysts can access and to draw their own conclusions based on what they know. i think at the heart of combating terrorism misinformation. i mean, we spent a lot of time and a lot of money in this country and around the world looking for detection equipment. and we should always use the best technology available to help us, whether it's the force

and airplanes, et cetera, et cetera. at the end of the day, the heart of combating terror to some is among the weapons, but the ied, information relative to the potential perpetrators. and there's no reason for us to think we have a system refined very well or to the inquiry still have the ability to share it to share it down to the local levels. so i think that's significant concern, that this administration and future administrations and the broader global community is going to have to continue to wrestle with for the foreseeable future as well. >> well, looking back to and we spent an inordinate amount of time dealing with the information sharing issues and looking at both the horizontal and vertical, a top-down, bottom-up, especially when we're dealing with homegrown threats, that it would be naïve to assume we're going to clean metal from the central intelligence agency and overseas intelligence capacities. where do you see that going in the days ahead? and what is your thought on the fusion test?

>> first of all, it first but as we have a proliferation of fusion centers who haven't designed a model. every power building fusion centers, but we don't have a model for a fusion center. so it's not quite -- sometimes they think take quantity as a substitute for quality and the protocol necessary to get the right kind of information for decision-makers and then the culture, the willingness, the attitude to share that information on down. i said many times the department of homeland security -- if the federal agency. but homeland security is really a national mission. so we need not only good fusion centers with standard protocol, that is simply a standard protocol and our operations centers based on the national emergency management priority we felt when i happened to be secretary. so everybody operates the same way. we also have to create an

attitude that not only certain people need to know, but there's also an attitude you need to share, but she but she needs to effeminate. because there's no way possible that there's enough federal employees at some point in time there's going to be the cop on the beat and the cursor control, other folks in the community that have to be shared from time to time, information of what's on the alcor. as i like the idea of fusion centers, but i think a long time ago we kind of got confused. we threw the name out there, built up a bunch of months and we feel a lot better. i frankly think there's too many of them. we still don't have the protocol we need to make sure they're effective. >> would you agree that there is still a need for a genuine intelligence requirement setting process? you still have the fed meeting well, but to an extent guessing with antivirus state and local. in the cut state and local outside of maybe n.y.p.d., l.a.p.d., miami, and a few centers of excellence to collect a lot of information.

but it doesn't really come together in a format for a contextual environment where you can site for instance signal from the noise. do we need to invest in people now? is it analytical capacity? >> i think it's analytical capacity, but it starts with a notion that you have four or five urban centers of excellence. these mayors and their police chiefs in their communities have expended a lot of money to build that capability. but those resources aren't available to all. so what should the federal government's will be in that environment with these other fusion centers in these communities where they don't have either the leadership of the dollar to do what they're doing in new york and l.a. in places like that? i think the person you do is take the best practices and protocols from those that exist, that is pretty much defined contextually, have framed what kind of information we need to know, what is the kind of information we need to share? the federal government will go a long way in providing certain,

not just technical requirements, but information requirements that is basically a template, but everybody is operating to the same template. what you think the state and locals need and what do you want the state and locals to push up the chain to you? and i'd like to think were in the process of creating a template. and there's some conversations and people in and around construction of fusion centers and i don't think they're there yet. >> i would probably share that. now, looking overseas and looking to friday's case in particular, highly unlikely? maybe you can disagree with me, that had we not been provided good human intelligence and good intelligence from an ally, we would not have been able to detect the explosives, the ieds that were delivered. >> i think the facts are undeniable, frank. i think the fact that two of those ieds were on the plane

and they manage to get through whatever technological or visual inspection systems that existed. but i'm going to say -- and again comes the question that keeps you up at night? i think the united states and the rest of the world, one has to recognize that the forces of the globalization of most of us think are very positive: transportation, finance, commerce, also become conduits for the parrots. formerly contained in the united states, hundreds if not thousands of planes filing and none of the united states on a global basis. tons and tons of cargo. now, just think for a moment, be rational about it and think about it. we need more technology. and i certainly think will do and will find some. but do you really believe in the 21st century world will be able to inspect every single envelope, every single -- every single item that's placed in one

of those large containers? every single item that goes into a cargo hold, whether it's become commercial -- will make it one of these days. but the regularization regularization globalization and the challenge will have to accept as part of the new norm we live in. >> and to continue to invest in our relationships, our intelligence relationships. >> absolutely. this is an answer actionable intelligence are stabilized. i know there's some speculation as to whether they are buried there from our packages out there. what i miss not being in -- i miss not knowing. i really miss not knowing. i get bits and pieces and i have some friends work unit. and you miss not knowing. at the end of the day, good intelligence promotes aggressive

action, which prevents attacks. we've been lucky on many instances in this country so far. i don't know who said you'd rather be lucky than good. i like to rely more heavily on good and effective intelligence gathering and interdiction than just been lucky. >> i think that that is spot on. and as we stay sticking with overseas, are there any countries in particular he been impressed with in terms of their own domestic intelligence capacity, foreign domestic -- foreign intelligence capacity, that perhaps we can learn from? i'm thinking maybe the security service in the u.k. or -- >> well, i never do with the foreign intelligence operations on a day-to-day basis. frankly, what you do, frank, you probably have more insight into that than i do. there's historically been a great relationship with our

friends in the u.k., australia, canada and the like. what i'm going to say, during the past several years when there's been quite a bit as international disagreement with certain foreign policy actions this country is taken, that even when those leaders were outspoken in criticizing the united states, their law enforcement communities and their intelligence communities were working hand in glove with us. and i don't think that has been abated in any way. i still think we're working very, very closely together, even though there may be some public policy debates about what were doing in terms of global foreign policy. >> i think that's a critical point. regardless of where the country may stand on policy, the relationships of any security service with law enforcement, public safety and homeland

communities must never rest. the mac and there is no substitute for it. i guess at some point in time, and i'm going to say this. it was interesting about the recent alert vis-à-vis europe. and i'm going to say this. there were some people in europe and in the early days of the department. i've met some people in the united states to thought we raised publicly the notion of a threat prematurely or we were properly -- didn't have any sufficient information to do that and they were concerned we were been overhyped. i would disagree in those few occasions we raised at a certain level. before the europeans to express a concern and for that concerned to go public in the lead me to believe that regardless of who or what the sources were, they were considered to be credible sources. and i think like anyone else about when we get into the wind

system, i think americans would rather deal with the known than the unknown. would rather do with the threat is possible. the greatest fears -- the dark, the greatest fears the unknown. americans can do with information improperly shield. mccoy found out about the bombers the other day. we got the information from the u.k. we get there were ieds. we knew where they were coming from. not there was any present or imminent threat because of those two ideas because we had dissected them, but i think the edibility entrusts associated with citizens to do certain things is predicated over a long-term relationship that when appropriate they will be willing to share information and not keep a close hold. and i think that's an important part of how we begun to adjust slowly an extra blade and a very positively to what i call a multigenerational threat of islamic extremists. >> governor, you brought up the homeland security advisory of

risk communications in general and alerts. and i've been very outspoken when we have information and we have a responsibility to share that information with the public. a vigilant public had historically, including two recent cases here, faisal shahzad and our so-called booty bomber, lots mood undulate palette. mark mood. but she was so not only communicate to her own public, but also potentially to the adversary, which can be disrupted. it can force them to either were unto you, so they may either buy us time to roll them up, to rollup or it may force them to trip out. where do you think we have to be going in terms of communicating risks to the public? >> first of all, the point you

made to the times square bomber, it was a vendor -- a vigilant -- [inaudible] be alert, be aware of your surroundings. if you see something usual, reported. the incident in the airline, a vigilant passenger probably enjoyed most of the fight over and he saw something that was really bizarre, unusual, an aberration, out of the ordinary, acted upon it. so we talk about what people say beware of your surroundings. be aware of your situation. and again, i think the challenge -- and this is a very -- a very difficult responsibility for those who have access, first line access to determine what they want to share and with whom they want to share it. but in my judgment, enjoy a lot better at sharing some of that

information, even if it isn't actionable. let me give you an example. there are occasions when i was secretary, when there were certain threats of information that came through, involving let's say a city or two. and there was a recurring theme. and the threat while seemed certainly possible, but there's nothing to suggest he was imminent. on those occasions, since it was consistent, over a period of time, there were a couple of people in that state that we advise what we relearning, what we had heard. not for them to take action. fill in the event that was collaborated or for whatever reason we thought it was imminent, we could pick up the phone, call them and hopefully they would've trusted us to say we know you've been watching this for quite some time. you have been communicating to us. and that's the case. like now. again it's the need to know versus the need to share. and i think there are times

particularly now that we weren't sharing the information is sometimes in our best interest, even if it's not actionable because you build up trust in you build up credibility that way. >> governor, on this particular theme having been on the outside where you say you miss having the information. but i think it's fair to say that rarely do we get to when and where. the reality is intelligence, their estimators. but not clairvoyant and on the analytical side. we know when aware, we don't have a communications challenge. >> if you have the when and where you've got them. >> you've got them, exactly. >> is probably the most difficult job in this absurd that the global community has against the scourge. what is real, what is unreal, with actionable, what's on actionable? at what point do we share? and it's not a science. there is no equation. it's an art.

you have to make those difficult calls in a hot sleepless nights. because they're not quite sure they got the dark gray. and i'm sure that by and large these men and women who have remarkable jobs that there is one where you're coming or going to be an addiction that's not a problem. >> absolutely. and let me just put to bed if you think this is a correct statement. i'm not familiar with politics other influencing those decisions. >> it was very interesting how the security system was designed. and when i look back at my service as secretary, i say to myself, i was such you are fairly affect as communicatively, but she never got your point across. and the point is this, for the first couple of months, normally going over to the department of justice with attorney general ashcroft and the fbi are bob

mueller and the three agencies and the cia would take a look at this information and really believe that the threat was imminent and we held press conferences. and we talk a little bit about it. didn't have too much information to share. that would walk away from the podium. i think the third exercise of that tour, not only did we look at the bewildered faces of the journalist, the remember we finally said to each other, we've got to do better than this. i remember walking up the stage and turning to one of five jurassic individuals -- special operations guide, john mitchell. we've got to do better than this. we came up with the great advisory. elected.com, safety department, other countries. and here's where you feel it into medication. first of all, the decision to raise the threat level was only based upon a consensus among the majority of the president, the homeland security cabinet.

the president can raise the threat level. i couldn't raise the threat level. it was a consensus. but the real challenge around the threat system is on the private sector in the state and locals said he goes, you're telling us, what you want us to do? and again, we didn't do a good job of articulating publicly at the time for every level. they could abuse colors, could at the numbers, could've been the alphabet. but there was a surgeon prescribed level of security would go chewer comedown. and that's why we try to design a program we could do surgically as well. so secretary napolitano had a secretary chertoff and i am a couple others in a couple months ago to talk about it and they were trying to refine it, to make some changes because i think we all believe that it's not necessarily to tell you there's a threat, and in

response to whether it's a national, local pre-describe security measures, put them in play. >> and i think that some good advice. and i know we have some russian television stations here today and they've just announced they are going out a color-coded alert system. so i think tagging action based on information -- >> the level of threat should cover your levels of security and have to be predetermined. and that makes the system very effective. if you're just alerting the public, but the good thing. but the other thing is that we met more often the president of homeland security council and concluded it wasn't enough to go up, number one. and number two, the cabinet agency that probably was the most resistant and at the highest threshold in terms of intensity of security and accuracy of security with the department of homeland security because we ended up dealing with

the governors and the mayors and the police chief. so again, i like to take some comfort in knowing it was always rigorous, vigorous debate and we met more often not to raise the threat level than on the occasions when i would go in and tell the president the recommendation was raised. >> a couple more quick questions on the threats on the specifically. and i've raised a number of my european comments, but the passenger range network, pnr, which was negotiated with the e.u. through 2014. there have been some changes between the commission and the parliament that are reopening this agreement. for privacy concerns and no one suggested privacy concerns are significant. they are. if you look at pnr beyond anecdotally, it did play a role in stopping faisal shahzad or

times square bomber. it was acb t. officer who intercepted and that the airport. najibullah zazi, which if we were to put a light meter on the threat since 9/11, i think that zazi is blinking red. this was an al qaeda central, an afghan natural citizen who had intended to travel overseas to afghanistan to commit -- to join the taliban, was intercepted by al qaeda, brought to waziristan, trained and sent back to the united states because he was a clean skin familiarity with targets. all these sorts of issues. so you've got the zazi case and the case, a.k.a. david hedley case. it has played a role in preventing and capturing terrorists. what are your thoughts on the pnr agreement? >> first of all, i think the international aviation community should be encouraged one, to set

standard out. and security procedures and airports to begin with, depending where you travel. we've all seen various degrees of security. secondly, i think the pnr and record information should be universal. i mean, i just happen to think if the world -- maybe just the world is willing to accept the risk associated with not sharing that information, but there have been so many instances where the jihadist have struck outside the united states. there is a continuing, continuing reference and user planes either to transport the perpetrator or the terrorists. i don't think they're going to turn into a missile, but turned into a target for an attack, but i frankly think pnr request out to be universal and we had to get them from everybody. i know that takes a lot of heavy lifting for the state

department. a lot of heavy lifting for homeland security. but at the end of the day, if you want to again, think about manage the risk. it's about reducing the risk. no matter what you do, you'll never develop a failsafe system. but you want to reduce the threat and reduce the risk over a period of time. i think this information not to be international. and by the way, we should not ask for what we're not willing to give. i remember having a conversation with my colleagues in the european union when i was secretary about passing the name records. initially, frankly, i think we've asked for information that wasn't terribly relevant. all i can make as we set the standard. if we want universal name information, let's decide what would be willing to share with american citizens and ask it of them. because the research may have every right to reciprocate, particularly since we know and have reason to believe you have

not only sympathizers, but american-born terrorist or legal residents who have left the united states in god to be trained elsewhere are gone actually to fight elsewhere. so some of their information should be shared. >> and just to underscore, expanding the pnr process beyond the european union. and you just put a fine point on it, it's the ability to do travel and pattern analysis that you couldn't otherwise do. so i think that is significant. >> it doesn't take a difference. >> absolutely. >> everybody gets a little concerned about the term profiling. but there's a certain pattern of travel, a certain pattern of activity, whether its customs and border protection in this country or customs in other countries, or those officials. its officials of a sovereign country, when you enter into the country is a privilege. it is not a right. dailies have the right based on your pattern of travel to pull

you aside and make some inquiries of you as you step into their country. >> this is me speaking, not you. but profiling has been given a bad name. we do it every day at law enforcement and intelligence. without it we would decline. it's hallinan forest and utilized and how is protected in terms of oversight. but i don't think you can do this business without it. >> is all about taking that universe of potential risk and individuals and try to reduce. chances are you may finally get that one actor or to act yours or perpetrators tried to reduce, trying to manage the risk. and having access to patterns of travel is the way you begin reducing the risk -- your oversight on what might be congressional. >> looking inward a couple -- another general question.

i mean, you've seen an escalation in uav and drug activity in the fontana region. and this they had the intent or the political will, they would be the ones driving some of the sufferers. but time and space is what terrorists need. if you look at whether it's somalia or the style, it's ungoverned space. that's what they're seeking so they can train, plot and courtney. would you support -- and i've been again very outspoken supporting the drug activity, not because i want to, because time and space, time and space. put them on the back heels. do you support that activity? and looking to gannon and somalia, which are very difficult situation, i would suggest light footprint. a significant footprint. again, the capacity doesn't

exist in digitally by the yemenis or the somalia. where do you think we go from there? >> you've been pretty clear the use of the uavs have been pretty protective. for this administration, the previous administration in the future administration was to watch the diplomatic client when you're using somebody's airspace. i mean, it was interesting there was a public report that there were canadian fighters following one of the planes coming in from europe that we thought had packages, but we got over u.s. guys and it was handed off to the united states. the solders, whether they're strong, powerful, known globally or just human feelings are troubled states, they're pretty -- don't appreciate violation of years race. but there comes a time when you have to watch the diplomatic

line. but it is about reducing threat to this country and other countries in the region, reducing threats were soldiers on the ground are actually dealing not with a threat to america, the threat to the broader world in general you have to be aggressive and deal with it diplomatically the best you can. >> tomorrow, people go to the polls. homeland security. nine years after 9/11, it doesn't seem to surface as a campaign priority. is that a sense of -- are we being rolled into a sense of complacency. is it too difficult to address? what should voters be thinking about tomorrow when they pull the lever? >> i can't think of too many elections in my lifetime where america's role in broader global community, be a particularly when it came to national security or military affairs really drove voters.

still driven more often or not taking i -- they are driven by issues that are more economic. and right now it appears with -- i'm not going to do the recitation. we all know what's going on in the country of percolating. unemployment is too high. will said that the elect as officials are pointing against each other. but what i found interesting and listening to the few debates where there is actually top issues. we say they are focused on issues rather than one another. but that's maybe 2012 after the rally reminded everybody of civility and everything they're supposed to be doing. but talking about humanity and prosperity are linked. you can't be economic if are not strong. it's a national security point of view. these tiny but ended notes to explain it.

whether you're fighting a global scourge and a much complicated environment these days, i'd like to think entirely convinced most americans in order to be secure you've got to be economic strong. to be economically strong enough to be secure. to give you an example, it's a manic go, but it's telling. shortly after 9/11, president bush asked us to stick around for one of the morning meetings. and so we did a good job of security and our friends we have commerce to a screeching halt. and i'd like to try and work out an arrangement with our canadian friends and hopefully our mexican friends to build a smarter border. we went to an assembly plant in flint, michigan. general motors assembly plant. he put the chassis on the front -- eight or 10 are processed. the caesar made over in canada. good, just in time. somewhere along the line, seats are made.

probably put a computer chip on it. drop it down into the truck and it goes across the bridge in the tunnel to flint, michigan. he got to see in our age, maybe our 10. what if the seats are stuck in a bridge or tunnel because he ramped up security. what happens in the plant? nothing happens. so i think we need to understand the 21st century world and forever more, security and prosperity in her side at our borders. and right now the economy is so troubled. i mean, there's people out of work. people worried about their mortgages. and even if you are safe and secure with your mortgage and you feel pretty good about your job, you do worry that your neighbor. so it's no wonder the economy is the issue that seems to be driving others. what i'd like to think that down the road we think more in terms of at least add that to part of the equation. i don't know many people who vote for president of the united

states because of how they feel about their ability to interact and influence in a political world affairs on the globe. i just don't think most people do that. and i think we better start. >> sticking with that team, high likelihood will have a different congress in january. potential opportunity for homeland security issues to be elevated. i remember when you were secretary an awful lot of discussion on the aba committees or subcommittees that have some resemblance of oversight of your day today at committees. and if you think about it for a non-homeland security, imagine trying to run a company and had 88 outside boards of directors with very different opinions trying to micromanage your operations beard and he did not have a lot of flexibility in terms of spending. some of that is improving.

>> well, like washington, typical washington, since those 88, it's not proliferated 288. so i'm not sure keeps going up bigger and bigger. would you like to thank -- i mean, the 9/11 commission which has been well received and a number of the findings have been recommended, including the creation of the department and many others. yet congress hasn't looked inside of themselves should be able to reform some of their activities. does that still bother you? >> i'll tell you what bothers me is the congress informed the 9/11 commission after the tragedy of 9/11 along with the recommendations of unlike other commissions and other studies, congress pretty much ignored some of the critical recommendations. they ignored interoperable communications. they ignore the reality that you really don't have strategic partners involved in not only

the planning of the growth of the department of homeland security, but for oversight. i mean, you can't possibly have oversight when it's over a single department. in these early days, we could use strategic partners. if the forthcoming? absolutely. should it be considered constructive? absolutely. when you have 100 plus committees, you don't have a strategic partnership. and i think i like to see this congress go back -- i can say this because i was in congress. if he walked through the halls of congress today or next year sometime and see congressmen running back and forth or senators running back from hearing his subcommittee hearings, they're all completely with too many committees and subcommittees. trust me. it's all in the letterhead. but then ask them to give up jurisdiction or reduce the number of subcommittees that are pushed back.

i'm not saying that as a criticism. that's a fact of life. if they really want to be engaged in this or other issues they really ought to streamline the process. and i think i'd like the new congress to do, i still have not not -- i still don't understand, this goes back to an information sharing question we had before -- what happened at fort hood. and i still don't understand how the abdulmutallab.on the plane. we talk about connecting the dots, a term we use after 9/11. every once in a while the information is like a big red dot that flash is. and somebody should be acting on it. the question becomes whether or not congress has been well-intentioned, but has built so much process into information

sharing, that process has been substituted for judgment, good judgment. and i'd like to see them again go back and see that information is most critical and important thing you do against these jihadist, go back and see how the system is working. it seems to me it's not working very well. >> i would -underscore it's the lifeblood of all the national security. >> i certainly don't know why they didn't get the visa. we don't have a lot of intelligence, human intelligence. the father comes and says i think my son has been radicalized by the way using admin. we all know about al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, plop, plop, blob. if you his visa, the only country can't go to the united states. i mean, it's not even about the debates and being politically

correct. when you have certain pieces of information, should you not act independently or do hit the send button to push the decision-making of the chain of command? will here come pushing decision making up the chain of command level isis because you have to act minutes later. >> and it did cost us lives in fort hood. one of the challenges and this is not only the homeland security perspective, but rearview mirror playing. we often arch into the future backwards based on yesterdays wars. and one of the challenges i think is it's recognizing we've got predator. but our adversary, whether it's al qaeda senior leadership, whether it's al qaeda's formal affiliate or whether it is this dude that is becoming more and more difficult to conserve, haqqani network, they are all ascribing to al qaeda's global

ideology. the question is how do we go about doing prioritized plan in the future? take last week alone. and too often washington teaches these as an either/or proposition . last week you had the farooq ahmed plot to bomb the d.c. metro. and historically, terrorists have often seen training and rail and surface transportation as target of choice. i mean, 311, two major in the united states. the brain fitness case. another new yorker traveled overseas to commit terrorist acts. came back and was traveling the long island railroad. same i traveled every to give the young man. or najibullah zazi. this is another i would say al qaeda central -- again, subways. but we had a reminder just on

friday that aviation as well. so these aren't either or proposition . but how do we get to the point where we enhance some of our surface transportation, but not at the expense of aviation security? would we go from here? not to mention the big system. we cannot have a tsa equivalent. we never get it to work. >> i think public transportation has been and will continue to be a challenge because there's a certain level of security measures you can embed before you compromise the purpose and utility of public transportation. i don't know about any of you are all of you, but i know i've rushed down the stairs to get on a subway in a lot of the cities around here. i'm doing a lot more rushing by myself. besides, the matter is it's a fact. and so you say to yourself, if you accept the notion that you cannot go back to having a

discussion with my fellow countrymen and fellow citizens about managing the risk, understanding that it is impossible, regardless of the resources we would target to eliminating it, you'll never have finite resources because government has so many other awesome responsibilities to this country in so many different dimensions. you say to yourself, have we done all that we can vis-à-vis public transportation, knowing that it's not feel safe. have we done all we can without compromising its futility. so one time, there may be more kinds of detectors. there may be more technology. you do have more surveillance. individuals and some bomb sniffing dogs. the ladies and gentlemen, it's not an assumption of risk.

or managing the risk of the country. and i'd like to think that god prevent something would have been that i think it was in july of 05, the bombings in the u.k. and i think they have their equipment within 24 to 48 hours to replace the buses and it was business as usual. they do it in israel all the time. so you have to save yourself were going to do what we can to reduce the risk, to eliminate it. as a country we know that our professionals are well-intentioned, well resourced, even in a perfect system are not going to be able to avoid a terrorist attack. if one occurs, will do with it. so let's take a operational security to a level that it doesn't compromise whatever the public transportation notice. and that's out there. you have to accept some level of risk. that is the new norm. >> no shortage of time. i want? questions and then maybe opening up to the audience here. but coming closer to our

backyard, i would argue and please agree or disagree with this characterization, but i would expect that mexico is today and the mystery folder and narco-insurgency. it's claimed 20,000 lives since january 2000. personally, would you agree with that characterization? and secondly, you got a dhs role on border security and other components, but there's a bigger role just behind dhs. where do we go from there? >> do you agree to characterization? >> i do. one could say that columbia differs a little difference because the narco-insurgency argues it would overthrow the government. others would say i like the narco-insurgency because they think it's the immediacy and the context and the overwhelming nature of what the mexican government is trying to deal with down there. they may not try to overthrow the government, but you've got

these cartels up and down the mexican peninsula. they're certainly going to undermine. they think is an extreme situation that requires us to reach out into everything we can to help president calderon. there are several challenges associated. one, relationships we have between intelligence of law enforcement communities on both sides of the border is probably not as mature and in certain areas? the credibility and perhaps relationships we have with friends to the north. we haven't worked together that long. and even the president himself has admitted they have a lot of problems with corruption, et cetera and bribery with the local police forces. so understanding extenuating circumstances the government is operating. i think a couple years ago that congress appropriated past of something called the marita initiative. that is down to 1.3 billion or

1.6 billion. i've also seen estimates only two or 3% of that money has and extended. the question becomes what are we waiting for? the second question becomes is the effort to help our friends in mexico stalled because of a turf type between the three or four agencies that would naturally oversee the relationship with mexico? state, homeland security, justice. you can name them. who does what under the umbrella of the merida initiative is pretty important. ..

>> initially weaverbird dealing with the cartel then do start to deal with obviously of the country within the country and of course, but then the challenge with organized crime, they usurp the authorities of legitimate government. >> absolutely. >> they don't necessarily want to run the government but control the space and want the government to get out of their way. they don't want government interfering.

to that extent along our border is a recipe for continued unrest and greater drug smuggling and the drug trading and murderous activity on this side of the border. it is a matter of time. >> and correct me if you disagree also in our neighborhood, you have real challenges with venezuela and ahmadinejad, why don't they pay attention? tsai fall victim two this myself price spend so much time worrying about the middle east and southeast asia but this is close. >> probably not close enough to that issue to give you

some inside explanation why historic three administrations of both parties ignore our relationship with central and south america i'd like mexico a little bit with central america with the emerging economies of all stock vermette -- democracies then to make a state visit zero or two and that is about it. we just talk about columbia up. if you believe as i do america's future for prosperity and economic reason is tied to our ability to engage, why don't we have a free trade agreement? why don't create not only law-enforcement also economic? take one on with all good in a shot and chavez?

he is problematic and obviously have stirred the pot and does one wonder? it is a leap of imagination to think there venezuela connection, i could become a training ground for some extremist 10 south america? is it a leap of faith given the support for hezbollah and hamas? while those sovereigns will do what they do to build that relationship around energy and harassing and challenging america every step of the way is there a and incumbent upon us with security and law enforcement to create stronger economic ties with other countries in the region? >> your opportunity for relationship building you

have to be there if the state your presence and you have to be more aggressive than a public way starting with the white house. >> starting with you but we've neglected the soviet union with missiles in our backyard. five no question and then we open it up and this is looking much closer. i have never had the unspoken thought. [laughter] but what came to the other big gap there is a lot of discussion with the inoperable communications and shame on us we're still talking about this today. the obama administration seems to be at odds with the specter related issues that could be devoted to the first responders. is this something you share my concerns? >> it is a good place to

start with the 9/11 commission everybody years of horror story of the first responders at the twin towers they fully there are other four stories with other incidents not terrorist related but the same concerns existed. went emergency the perfect -- personal to community in a timely way of the fact the 9/11 commission recommended that for broader public safety community as the community beg to for nine years if the fact that the investment dedicating spectrum to a broad ban public safety network would not only assist us to be better prepared for an attack, not just terrace but what about a mass casualty of our natural disaster? or just a single horrible car accident?

where a first responder community are emergency service personnel tied together with broad p.m. to. the network to stream video, voice, data, it is unconscionable for a lot of folks of the private sector say we will let them use part of the spectrum but there is plenty of their if the commercial world and they're looking at a piece of dedicated spectrum then they could lease and i would rather go the other way. we should start with some spectrum just for public safety community. another 9/11 commissioned recommendation falling on deaf ears. a lot of services and public tributes to firefighters coming first responders to build memorials and send contributions. that is great but i say to

the congressmen in particular of 81 to do something significant, maybe there will be fewer memorial services to go to if you build the broadband safety network that is the ultimate commitment to those whose serviced under a difficult task and an investment that improves the quality of life in america a generally. problems were so visible after 9/11 but does not literally improve the safety of our communities across the country regardless of what incident? >> that was strong. let's open up to questions and please wait for a microphone and identify yourself i am a senior fellow here. were you touched come on a

few instances but could you talk about the private business sector? their tango between what kind of information passed to them and how it is shared, , etc. >> public-private? the government is well-intentioned without the total engagement and participation in support of the private sector. frankly, a lot of that has happened without any public initiative for public money. the big challenges we ran into common number one a lot of the other departments didn't think that we would basis and more important they ran into a cold war mentality but a mind is set

to, inertia that these organizations have been doing business a certain way. our mind set to was we will tell you if we think you need to know and by and large one individual from one of the three alphabet agencies told a to start working with me frankly i don't think you'll ever need to know much. bottom-line, when we a gauge the private sector they act responsibly that is a continuing challenge to respond to a threat and one quick example we have the hard drive out of pakistan identifying surveillance tapes on five buildings new jersey and new york and washington. remember we raise the threat level in 2003 which became controversial. i would do it again under the same circumstances i put

my foot in my mouth and i regret the but two editorialize my own comments but to show what it had done two years later was entirely different because you are more worried about your customers come when employers and employees and you are critical to the efforts i who presumably this of ministration does that as well. >> there is the supply chain resilience if you look at the recent case, a third party vendors not just said guest traveling at ibm been demanding more out of the supply chain. >> stock but with 9/11 putting security protocols at the other end of the supply chain you do that and

ridden expect stations factions or securing individual packages and there is time of secured containers. things that you tried to avoid a single point* of failure in the system into except that responsibility and is paying for it too. >> my question is in the aftermath of the terrorist threats, president and after the statement politically motivated with the elections, but otherwise he would not take a stance on the issue. do you agree with that characterization of the administration's response and whose call is it to see how much or what do you reveal to the public? >> first of all, i was the subject of the same kind of

criticism on occasion when i would raise the threat of all right before the elections i guess august 2004. it falls on deaf ears. i don't think anybody costs will use the threat to level to try to effected political outcome which i thought was interesting, not necessarily commentary was the president made the statement rather than the secretary of the department of all the and security but those are the decisions they make in the white house of new shows up on the sunday show? decision made in the white house but there is another point* of view that the president wanted to make that statement to reassure us. the highest level labor doing all they could. i don't go there. it is inappropriate and of think a president would do

that. >> al qaeda has targeted elections with the outcome of the madrid. >> they have not affected the outcome but the second part of a question, i don't know what the decision-making process is with the threat advisory system anymore other than being an orange airport it has not been used. according to the old system that must mean whenever they see coming across the daily threat reports has not generated the need to go public. i can only assume that to be true. >> quote questions about rules fighting terrorism the clinton administration relied on criminal law and push the administration went conflict with problems of the geneva convention but neither is a good fit. the obama administration is

a hybrid but should this be an evolutionary process or the continuing threat in the traversed century city we have an international standard for dealing with terrorism? in the 18th century we made new rules to do with piracy. do a prefer the system now or too seriously looked at in a system? >> >> these are the question that you could ask is everybody could hear it. >> and terms it actually wrote the opinion piece in "usa today" whether it should be treated criminal or a hybrid or conflict or a higher bid there of soap looking at that. >> i appreciate the question because i do believe terrorists are not traditional prisoners of war

or traditional criminals. i do believe it is part of america is responsibility dealing with the global threat and the jihadist in a way consistent with our value system because of america it is a product, we don't want to diminish the brands. that being the case, i personally but favor to have long discussions all, almost a national security court. i like the idea, a due process is part of the brand. guantanamo was the right thing to do initially but the reason it caused much consternation because the rest of the world could not believe america would pick people off the battlefield and leave them there forever and it wasn't consistent with the american brand of due process. my judgment was never about

the location but adjudication how do determine if they should be there or they were at the wrong place for the wrong time or wrong forever? both have occurred. how do you adjudicate? at the end of the day we have to look at a national security coalition perhaps presidentially appointed with a three court panel and have them deal with the fisa applications and habeas corpus and counsel, rules of evidence, transparency is essentially important and render a verdict and move on. that is what we should do with the terrorists. i have a tough time consuming criminals ladies and gentlemen, the biosite have by prosecuted and defended criminals.

i never met anybody who was willing to blow themselves up to achieve their goal. that does not quite fit in with the asymmetric bid made and the tactics are different but rules of evidence have to be different they cannot be quite as transparent as long as everybody knows them, representation rules of evidence and adjudication and to move on. >> of recapture bin laden today, do we read him his rights? >> no. we throw him in jail and give him a lawyer and move on. he has the right to counsel. and will be heard in front of the independent group with the rules of evidence will be different than in a criminal court.

some of these prosecutions maybe easier than others but you still have to protect your resources i have to believe rules of evidence will be different and the military tribunal still make it because they were established during the course of the war with a quick resolution of the enemy, and to do with them at the time. they are not a fit this time either. >> good to see you again governor. you mentioned safer stronger better the department of romance security building this a for stronger better america. since we have talked about infrastructure, rearview mirror created policy, whether or not you believe we have the proper balance between national preparedness, and fizzle out -- physical security measures?

>> the parts of homeland security that was embedded embedded, with a terrorist attack, oil spill, not necessarily oil spill. that is different but fema. candidly, i am not privy to the work they're doing in the area. but the broader responsibility, the question is, are we giving them the resources? and more importantly the state and local government to build that to prepare the infrastructure. a couple of things. we add county and state government to get together

to help us design the operations plan down at the county level. if you get the disaster center everybody operates who will be there? what our roles and responsibilities? and also design a national response plan that was never given a good chance that katrina designed to put in place but even in those instances, you have to be mindful people are subject to change and modification and alteration based on your relationship back to the local first responders of the apparatus exist with the mindset, i don't know but to help preparedness if they have the broadband public safety network. i for one argue for the math to be involved provide

health to rewrite the law creating the in the with a bunch of trade rose jumping around my district so you just have to make sure the relationship they have with the locals, my answer is long winded and i am sorry but i thought homeland security was a big monolithic structure in washington but then break it down i thought regions would be helpful. we have the integration team of people from all of the agency's to break it down with eight regions dennis -- united states build on the traditional missions of other agencies coast guard had separate mission and fbi then embedded with only a security. it made sense and for me it meant the rubber was in charge you would have the

relationship with the governor, the mayor, big city police chief and helped to oversee the training exercises come and help allocate fellow integrated network. >> it is still sitting on the shelf. >> if you have to reach an four or five years before katrina, home as security director had a relationship with the mayor and two or three governors involved, overseen the training exercises, you could not have kept some of these from breaking but i think the outcome still would have been dramatic but it have been in a better position of the federal-state local government were working together before it occurred. >> let me second that we spent six months writing a very lengthy report i am not sure anybody read.

[laughter] >> i did. like the health care bill. i read it. [laughter] >> building on that at the wing young men and women died and that is why we have the need. >> their response plan we had under the circumstances circumstances, all cabinet members signed off so that is something was so dramatic get overwhelmed state and local like katrina, this individual could call on the resources of everybody to respond as quickly as possible. >> we have time for a couple more questions. >> i am with touchstone consulting group. are you surprised the

aviation supply chain is a preferred target? obviously b.c. rail but does it surprise you that mood 10 years after 9/11 is the preferred choice? just curious on your thoughts. >> it is not a surprise. it is a theme and at that has recurred in my almost four years there periodically. one of the reasons because it on seoul's the entire world because of how we live in the 21st century and affects commerce and a major way and what 9/11 did to the commercial aviation industry as they understand fully it is another incident involving a commercial airliner whether passenger

or not what have huge economic repercussions that would dramatically disrupt economic activity around the world. >> as pan am 103 did at the time. >> good morning governor. james reed. you were in fortunate to experience the political aspect of american security by serving in congress as well as the management perspective and mentioned the red tape involved with many subcommittees in congress. how do suggest to strengthen the links between the branches of government and security? >> wonderful question.

wonderful question. we have been reminded from time to time of the ongoing threat because of incidents and anecdotes powerful reminders. i think in time hopefully the political leadership of both parties will have these public discussions in a way to help americans understand the long-term nature of the threat. we should not be breathless about it. it is not a country that lives in fear. we should remind ourselves that when we lived under a different norm as then the cold war we had thousands of missiles pointed at the soviet union, a committed

the resources to dealing with the threat to and the professionals and underneath a nuclear umbrella the challenge for the foreseeable future not to be with our value system but to do it in a way to keep the public engaged and defenders to pick out the times square the bomb did not go off 31 the passenger to explain these are the anecdotes to read about and going about in a very methodical way to become a part of the dialogue. but it does not hurt to have a discussion to make ourselves safer and more secure. part of the dialogue which it has not been for a long

time. so that is a great way of doing it. it is a fact of life. >> we have time for another. >> good morning. the freedom of speech that america enjoys three now have the internet and the information out there. the terrorists use at as secure communications like second life and world of for kraft what should we do? >> is difficult to secure the internet but we have also discovered they have a public messaging campaign and a narrative that is much more appealing to the radicals in the use of the