will be seen as something, somewhat to one side and i think president obama's polls are really not that. they are higher than president reagan's were at this time, so i have great confidence in his ability to lead this country and be the 13th caesar. >> host: an unlucky number. ..

>> the ticker the, i think he is a man of knows deep social responsibility and to use somebody like roger ailes the master of dirty tricks and that kind of approach to the election is a very, very sad commentary

but i still feel very optimistic. i have written pretty well. [laughter] when you travel abroad and see other countries have to deal with high unemployment and a great deal less freedom of thought too. >> host: on the personal biographical level, what was the biggest surprise to you in the course of routine this book? >> guest: the life of ronald reagan. you know, the story of the attempted assassination in 1981, and is almost 70 years

old somebody shoots and will lead to an two do extraordinary things and it pierces within a couple of millimeters of his heart and get to him within minutes of george washington university they could not have written in such a script. [laughter] with the air traffic controllers' strike a few months later with obvious geopolitical consequences. it is hard to believe we are [laughter] afternoon but the book is called america's caesar from george

w. bush i highly recommend it. thank you so much. >> it is my pleasure. >> i am a historian at the spy museum i'd like to say i have been there 11 years and that is the mistake of love to take credit for that but i appreciate it. we had the international spy

museum it was obvious the fed when we heard mi-6 would do unauthorized history it was obvious to get on board when the chance came together to work with politics and prose because we are you nervous fans of your work year and i would say we have the opportunity earlier today to record a podcast with professor keith jeffery and it is wonderful to be the venue. if you are interested in the spy museum and defense there is literature in the back i would highlight the november november 2nd event at highlighting the mumbai terrorist attacks. our real test keith jeffery i would like to make a personal note, professor jeffrey was part of the committee of the, had to defend my phd dissertation

earlier this year ff and he has some extremely tough probing questions on someone who believes turnabout is fair play 90 expect you to ask equally tough and probing questions. [laughter] but he passed me so i expect your questions to be fair. but like to get off the stage and thank you to politics and prose to work with you and let's get this started. [applause] >> first, i want to introduce a surge on scarlet who was recently retired about one year ago as the retired chief since they don't say director in britain -- britain. mi-6. sir john was one who

commissioned the history of mi-6 back in 2005 for i just heard it was around the middle of 2009 it was then delivered so it is about a four and a half year effort that we have here. i want to welcome keith jeffery to has come to talk about his new book. he is a professor of history from queen's university in belfast and was commissioned and the secret intelligence service is a proper name as i understand it mi-6 was the cover name as adopted from the second world war and

just stock and james bond has done his part bidding inter-american muybridge. the book is a history of the first 40 years the secret service theo's very strongly that all of the activity post 1949 are still too close back in our history to be accessed by the public. so this evening we will have an evening of disguises and forgery and invisible ink.

which were the stock and trade of mi-6 and as one of the members, i don't think the was strictly a member but a friend of many members was ian fleming. and he spent a lot of time with these spies and one of the wants was harry charismatic and his name was wilfred. he had a fluent russian speaker and in the 1930's head of the paris station and was known for chasing pretty women and driving fast cars and for his tremendous charm and savoir-faire, wilfred would sit and tell ian fleming a

lot of the venture's of his, his secret adventures come by then at one point* he told the in funding that it seems the stories he had been telling him showed up in the next movie of james bond. [laughter] james bond is certainly the one who made spying a known activity in this country. so here are two gentlemen here, a scholar and a spy. sir john o.r. professor jeffrey. who would like to start? >> it is a fantastic and wonderful privilege to be in

this famous bookstore because everywhere i went down and they said what you're doing in the united states and i say i am going to this the bookstore you would not have heard of it. politics and prose. politics and prose? everybody goes there. [laughter] jimmy carter, there is a silver lining. [laughter] i got on and the diane programme even then i was disposed and i hope he will come to promote his book. but we will just chat a little bit about this work for a bit but we want to give you time to ask questions. we may anticipate similar questions that you want to ask but we have to see how widows. but not too much longer than

30 minutes and we might just talk around the subject a bit and i want to ask sir john, why on earth does this organization commissioned the work in the first place? >> it is not as obvious as it may seem in the united states because perhaps as many of you will know, of the culture around intelligence work in the united kingdom has been fundamentally different and also very, very secretive. the service has made an obsession or passion of secrecy. secret service only the secret things. if not secret it should not we doing it. [laughter] that has always been the profound logic but it is not

always followed by other secret service. [laughter] there is a good reason for that because generally the lifeblood of the business if you don't have the ability to keep your secrets, something that is true generally and our profession, it was not obvious to rights or authorize the history and allow an outsider of whom we had no control into our service archive. why did we do it? when it came to it in 2005 i was chief of the service for a few months. the issue as to whether we should be doing something like this had been on the

table from when i started. the idea was around but it just have not taken a precise form. cahal -- in 2009 by some distance it makes us the oldest continuously active intelligence service in the world. in addition to the fact we were seeker and needed to protect their secrets and have this very long history, we also had a strong requirement to find a better way of explaining to the great british public what it was that we did and what is the purpose? what did it do what did not do? what was the role and government? what was the objective?

what was the character and psychology? the reason i say that in the united kingdom, the intelligence service for many years was an important part of government and it is not any less the case now but more than it has ever been. in the government now you need to be transparent. it is accountability. it is hard to be transparent if you are secret. [laughter] but a great number of myths have that went up around our service. in james bond of course, would say it benefited greatly four isidro organization, we also happen to be one the most

famous organizations in the world. [laughter] so there was quite a contradiction inherent in our history and existence. we have the method whether we like it not, we don't have to encourage it. it is there. my own view, it is unhelpful and i certainly feel profoundly it is not a good idea to base your professional activity and reputation on a mess. -- meth. the myth is that we have a license to kill. the means you also a license to tortured as the surprising that people think all sorts of things if they believe the basic myths so i

try a strongly to put that right how you do that? we have a lot of mystery you try to put these together to use that to put facts about our past four people could see is possibly relevant today. how do you do that? on bringing in an outsider by having no control, by having authority and a field and somebody known to be of independent judgment. you let him loose in the archive with unrestricted access for absolutely vital. his brief is to rate the full story of the service within the point* decided. has to be a full story. it cannot say we will not allow you to write about the aspect other wise the credibility is undermined.

that is the logic that led us to 1909-1949" that sets out for you, i am telling you that now and everybody else, what the policy decision was. has it then successful? that is the test we are undergoing now and all of you will conclude one way or another if it has been successful or not. >> host: the point* seven dependence is absolutely vital to me. i am a scholar. i have a reputation to defend. i don't want to write a history if it comes across as glossy corporate promotional document, the whole exercise is officiated but on a whole series of levels that is not a good for my reputation baidu have

a get out of jail free cards if somebody says you have not told the truth i could say my lips are sealed. [laughter] i don't have to play that card but being the person -- per-cent sufficiently trusted three crewmen process was like a mixture of the old and a new style. then as you are tapped on this salt -- shoulder say my book i have something interesting for you. you do that.

would i be interested? have been privileged access with some historical work of course, i said yes. this is the holy grail of british archives shot so tight nobody sees it all. and they are exempt for freedom of information. i am a kind of holy grail and even better, left free to select any books that you want. [laughter] it is not to be encouraged i am sure.

[laughter] so those afflicting attractions they can be yours. so those have to be tempered and the ethics a professional career in history might have given me. in the end you don't have to trust me you look at the book and make up your own mind. some of my peers think because the i am joe's and i imprecise way the worst person to do the job and that disqualifies me but that is the way it is. i was never going to give up a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity the first but

the only history of this organization it is hard to resist and of course, there is no pressure there. with the professionalism, 30 years experience that is what i do. the subject matter is interesting but that is what i do it. the interesting and difficult part is the building and that is where the risks come in and there may be risks to the service as well as be i don't know if you want to look at the problems there might be about material which you could not release.

>> guest: talk about risk in that way, more i realized in the beginning, we were taking a risk by allowing this project to proceed because wants a did it was unthinkable it would stop and wants we were committed we would have to go through to the end. can you hear me? but the reality was neither i nor anybody in the service , and none of us could know for certain especially over 40 years that either there would be individual stories are issues that would be there that when revealed in public, would be shocking, not just embarrassing for as you will

see when you read it but nothing that we would be ashamed given the period of history which is being covered and the terrible things that have happened all the we were clear the country was on the right side of the argument. the other risk although maybe more likely it just wouldn't be a particularly good story and not enough excitement or achievement and more failures and successes and it would come out looking not too brilliant. and there was a perception out there for many years and written in the late 1970's, the big thing about british intelligence was the greatest single goal achievement ever and that

overshadows the human intelligence work and the widely perceived idea did not add up to much during the second world war. that was a risk but somehow confirmed. i was not as conscious of those risks says i should have been because somehow knowing my service as i did, it was a profound faith when the story was told properly in its entirety by a professional, it would come out right. and i believe that has. actually, it has come out better than i had expected in my rational moments. [laughter] >> host: that is the risk from my point* of view of course, more technical levels and a more tactical

level, other risk would be that we would not be able to say to allow the historian to include something which he really felt fundamentally that he had to include. there are bound to be intentions of course, it is a historian's sense of duty to publish whatever he can including the identities of other agents and officers as he possibly can and techniques where he can. naturally the service will protect that if he absolutely has to come but i might ask you what he feels about those tensions and given his awareness of the risks he was taking when he started, the head that has come out satisfactorily from that point* of view. >> host: my job as a historian is to reveal

secrets to tell the open story as openly and transparently as possible. with a whole range of these things. the services instinct is to keep secrets. and inevitably there is a tension there and from the very early stage, i discovered there was prohibition on gaming agents. if you are spying for the british intelligence against a german and 1933 or 34 or 35, if you are given that your secret is safe with us forever in perpetuity it is a non-negotiable compact and essentials trusts. there is a very important theme running through the buck. the making of the book is

trust that governments trust of their organizations to be straight and speak as it were, truth under their brand trust their organizations not to go off the rails and why the public should trust them not unconditionally because you need accountability but with a case officer is a core relationship from the very early stage with the service for the first time name and agent. i could be s this by the investigative journalist journalist, no. he would go to jail before revealing his sources. that kind of relationship i was going to say secrets of confessional but that area of the catholic church. [laughter] there is the man i defused

on the confessional. [laughter] so that perhaps is not a very good analogy. i don't want to trespass any way. [laughter] the official history i like that but i will not write that. but if you had spied against germany, come 194-5446 you may be please to tell your story particularly in wartime say right the member states memoirs after words. those who told their own story and their relationship with mi-6 then i could name them. another category of people said they spied for mi-6 who didn't. [laughter] not just enough to say i spied for british intelligence, i had to five and corroborating proof in

the archives. that was quite important restriction. the second level is the question of officers. there is a distinction to be made between officers and agents. james bond is an officer and an officer is on the central staff of the establishment of the organization and usually, although not come usually a british national and would employ a a foreign national to do this buy paying for him or her as it happens to be provide tried to persuade the service to have a moving headline that you see in the movies to say james bond is an officer not in a gentle. [laughter] just to get the message out to but there were some

practicalities for doing that the building was not the right shape for something. [laughter] but historic we the agency has never named officers. until the publication of this book, the only officers named associate with the agency were the chiefs. then beyond that come with the only people officially and knowledge or associated with the chiefs common be and my full-time research assistant in belfast to do all the hard work program sorry he is not here but budgets are tight. i am bringing him back as a souvenir from the spy museum. a 10. he would like that. [laughter] but for the first time it was agreed that i could name officers. one of these alleged models

for james bond but the service, until this movement -- moment in this book officially acknowledge people as officers. that is a real advancement a point* of a change from one situation to another. did not mean i could name officers because there was a real problem because people do not say what they do. remember going to a conference 15 years ago i remember a business card that said the cia. it was astonishing there is a much different culture that illustrates this that i spoke of earlier. there is important stuff revealed for the first time.

we want to talk a little bit before questions but are there any you'd like to draw the reader's attention? >> particular operations i'd like to mention here that i appreciate and what a case officer that is what i spend my career doing and nine the finer the code name given to this agent a naval engineer with his services from 1914

with british intelligence and had previously been in the imperial german name -- navy but had been sacked because he had insulted a relative of the kaiser in some way. it is a dream of the foreign intelligence service to have an individual stores, one individual source who is at the very heart of your most important to target. that is the best thing you can do and worth and a number of second or third division sources for you want them too but that critical character can make some much difference. one the german high seas fleet were destroyed by the

more powerful it slipped away and then got back to port and then missed his chance and it was expected to destroy because the royal navy was expected to dominate but also escaped without too much damage on the grand fleet from the british point* of view instructions went from london to brief task t.r. 162 visit the stockyards in germany and report on the high seas fleet that very day he got those instructions and went into

germany and the next month, four weeks he visited 10 naval dockyards and pretty comprehensive we looked at the ships coming back from battle there was a report a detailed account which showed correctly much more damage than it had admitted in public and sent immediately you can see on a copy of the report, across the top 100%. that is what intelligence work is about. the this lake be working all my life for the human intelligence service. that is what it is about. o also a good draw your attention 22 other stories.

one refers to the work of the flying bombs and rockets the july 1944 against london western city is the subject of the attack. of the secret weapons began in 1942. late 1942 the first report came in from agents who visited germany. there were nine british nationals of course, but to other countries nationalities particularly from scandinavia but that was the first indication and that i had something was up a bug in april 1943 a

volunteer and left a detailed report the station came from a fourth labor and then came back a message at this is fantastic and get what you can. substantially not entirely on the basis significantly reporting there was substantial damage much of the work had to be transferred elsewhere and it was delayed two or three months at least 10 there were subsequent raids the

leaders of those groups and the overall effort and they both constant attacks those are critical -- critical if the wind was launched against london before d-day instead of one month after words would be a profound effect on the timing of the invasion of europe to put it mildly. >> host: we can talk forever because it is full of extraordinary stories. but i think we want to give you an opportunity to ask your questions.

>> the first four point* and the soviet union he provides

a lot of information from south russia in the first instance we have the reports that are in the buck quotations and later from moscow and st. petersburg brumbies earliest moments moments, his political commitment the compliance spying or four the british

because he wanted to bring down the bolshevik regime and that populated all of his activities to such an extent he was blinded to the necessities of intelligence gathering of the bigger picture and began mixing politics and intelligence with his case fateful consequences the trust that lured him through and there was the staten island as man and the baltic to encourage him but when he comes back to see his old pals and estonia and it says okay it is probably safe in this particular moment and he never came back. the trust is a very successful soviets operation

of mi-6 of which it did not succeed at that moment. >> said he was not really acting on central staten island s orders semi he has became a maverick flying solo. >> with the intermediary between the first world war and the beginning and middle of the second the world war, the mi6 helped i guess have the early development what underscore that development? and a stand with german

machines, the enigma of but other than that that they were sharing that with the americans, who would enable the british to organize the americans from basically being a scattered naval and military intelligence to centralized intelligence system? >> it is crucial and the crucial underpinning to which there is a special relationship of the second world war and then intelligence but what happens, the head of mi-6 in north america who is a canadian, stevenson is a troublesome character for the historian because he did wonderful and important things but spent his later years burnishing his reputation too such an

extent it undermines its. it is a extraordinary greek tragedy. very, very difficult. it is quite difficult to detach from what he did from what he tried to get people to save what he did after the war but here is this close human intelligence of a liaison and friends with bill donovan first world war hero that sort of thing. and he encourages donovan in trying to create an american equivalent and a british special operations, there are problems about that as well. and of course, donovan is a friend and they were classmates who immediately you have this human

dimension to bring in an important component of modern where five-- warfare which the institutional rivalry, fastidiousness and you don't read other gentleman's mail and we don't need to know about the rest of the world because we are suspicious unto ourselves those contributed to the foreign intelligence capacity but nevertheless the challenges emerge and the united states got off very quickly to develop that. >> i have been rather cautious about claiming a two big of a role because there was a point* when he was very important and there is a perception that the british saw themselves as being superior andrew

threatening to gobble up capability because they had a head start but once resources were applied they got along very quickly and developed a massive capability of their own which was well beyond any capability. >> i have a question that goes to the fact the oldest institution. when you read the history is of the centric coerce we're the nature of people working there it occurs to me that the case officers have to be strange in their own way that you have well motivated people who have motives like revenge or evade transaction they just want to go from the budget but then there are the others. could you talk about one

level back of management and how you deal with case officers may not be jaded or feel said they are persuading these people to risk their lives to the trade their own countries? [laughter] looks it is a little awkward nine no-space mekhi will speak to the extension sees of the case officers. [laughter] >> it seems it is a strange personality. i want to persuade people to wracked help their fellow countrymen. >> it is not strange adderall. [laughter] and i have never done so. and my profession of persuading people to feature a whenever it is these are

that i believe to be dishonorable i have never been in a situation where have persuaded to do something against their well -- will or inappropriate forms of pressure that was regarded as a dishonorable and not right for a gentleman from the very beginning it is deep in the culture the best agents don't work for reasons like that but the believe what they're doing. i have the good fortune to look day's work with exceptional people who never saw themselves featuring their country but serving a a higher and more noble cause because it was of the country but the people who were running it. it is absolutely possible to stick to the straight and

narrow. >> i guess i made you sound worse. [laughter] but the case officers who were unusual? i never thought i would go into this job. >> in my day that was clearly true because we did not know they existed in but now it is a different matter. my colleagues in the service , but abnormal they are very able people and intelligent people and a few individual list but team players. >> a couple of probing questions put the point* we're talking about

1909-1949" what is a you arriviste proud of? what do wish had not actually happened in the history? [laughter] and the second, bain the refuge of a scoundrel, i have heard people say in the service one is expected to put one's country before one's family and one should not hesitate to lie to one sligh four lump ones if it compromises the history or the service of the country or the interest of the country. to what extent did you subscribe to that of the you? >> on the first question end, there is a lot in the book of which i am not proud. the totality i am proud but individual instances there are many of which i am not

proud. too many. because keith has not spare us in that regard. it was a disastrous situation and of course, the story cannot be told because the book stops in 1949 and many people seem to think that was because we did not want to tell the full story. [laughter] that is conspiracy theory i am afraid. there are other reasons as i have indicated that there is quite enough to make it clear what a catastrophic situation it was at this very able man at the center of service the average is when two officers from that

station have an absolute the disastrous second war and the word into a trap who convince them they were plotting to overthrow hitler so an elaborate thing was built up and then the kidnapped from the cafe than spent the rest of the war in concentration camps after being interrogated of our information and one was the senior officer who just got carried away. the moral of the story perhaps is the vanity that took over to end the war on his account. what he was backed up by to wish politicians.

and on the second point*, the refuge of scoundrels they're very many patriotic people here that feels strongly of the service to their country and i don't suppose they are scandal -- scoundrels. and patriotism is what drives the intelligence service and drives public service and service to your country and i can testify to the fact the same way that it drives to this day. >> of of those that you love? >> if every soldier that goes often fights for his

country at risk and a war or military campaign, it makes it sound awful where fundamentally your duty takes you. i don't get the feeling if i look at my colleagues who worked extremely hard they are great people and they would probably say their family comes first but in their behavior it does not look like that but that is true in a lot of organizations that are high-powered and effective and successful. i don't think it is fundamentally different.

>> we are running at a time we have time for two more questions than we have to shut down. >> the story that took place at the end of world war i the british intelligence felt the treaty of versailles would not do it and said in the operative into germany so by the time rolled were to took place he was a major general responsible to get the germans to use of their resources. does that make sense? >> i'm sorry. i wish it were true but it isn't. >> i have no evidence of that. one of the things the british did not do in the period that i looked at as opposed to what the soviets did, they did work putting and long term penetration

agents. the best that come from mi-6 of our walk and like tr-16 and other good examples of zero the highest level of access tend to be not 70 sen to and as a graduate a german bureaucratic position but it is indeed in 1919 it was not the potential anymore and a separate issue of not taking sufficient these seriously laura paying too much attention and horror too much to the soviet challenge so it is not part of the modus operandi as the first 40 years and the opposite of

that as a concentration a clever young man at the best university and in fact, work greatly to their benefit i am sorry. even if it is not the service work in a way. >> my question is about the holocaust because i assume mi-6 had an affirmation about the concentration camps and the debate of the merits and disadvantages of trying to do something to stop and the slaughter of the people. i wanted to hear about the internal debate and the

decisions made.