the author craig robinson coach of the oregon university and there's a month and a half of training to go and the season begins. he's the brother of michelle obama. thanks for spending time with us here at the national book festival. >> thank you for having me on.

>> he served for 43 -- 43. 34 years in the u.s. army. [laughter] >> rising to the rank of four-star general, and capping his military career, nato supreme allied commander, europe. he was with the first division in the non-and one action against the enemy, shot and continue to wreck is meant against hostile forces. he has had several tours of duty at the pentagon. while holding command in europe he was involved in action at the balkans. he retired in 2000 was a democratic candidate for president in 2004. he has received the presidential medal of honor, the nation's highest civilian honor. as an author he is written waging modern war, winning modern wars, and his latest book, please welcome general wesley clark. [applause]

>> david, thanks them a good action and thanks for the hospitality or at the national archives. it's a real honor and privilege to be here with these distinguished historians and authors, and men who really know their subject matter. we're talking at the american civil war tonight but also talking about leadership, generalship. and just if i could start off with just a couple of observations to try to set the stage for the panel. of course, the civil war, it's unique in american history. it's such a transformative experience. it involves so much of our nation, and it was thought right here. people left their homes and went out to see a battle for a day, bringing a picnic. newspaper correspondence participated on both sides.

of course, there was espionage and back and forth, and these generals had known each other. they spoke the same language. they studied the same texts. they started with about the same weapons, although they didn't finish with the same weapons. there was so much familiarity with this. the slaughter was incensed and it was so transformative as a nation, that today, you still find memories and the legacies of the civil war, particularly in the south, and the name of some of the biographies, the generals that these gentlemen have written about, still it evokes small passions -- strong passions and parts of the country. you go to battlefields and you will occasionally run someone whose family has the letters of a soldier who served there. it's such a personal expense. and even today, almost 150 years past its commencement, it's

still the most discussed, most understood, the most studied and sometimes a most misunderstood of conflicts. there are people watching this show who i am sure our experts. i'm not an expert on the civil war. i did serve our country. the gym and did get there all noted authors, but none of us, we've got to be a little humble here because even though they understood it, none of us even though we might, you might be surprised by looking at us, that none of us were actually there. we weren't in the civil war. [laughter] so everything we learn is from our study, and we are studying it in english, and there are other people out there probably in the audience who also have studied it and know their own opinions. so we are conscious of that. we want to get you involved in this discussion and make it real to you. there may be others who aren't as many with the civil war, but it's pretty easy to explain the

big picture, the country broke apart over eight several political issues. and one side decided that it would secede any other side decided that if it allowed it to happen, it would destroy the harmony of the union. and on that basis, armies were raised in families were sometimes split up. in a great struggle ensued for four years. before it was over, modern america emerged with the industrialized north that became the leading power in the world shortly thereafter, the leading economic power. and so tonight we want to talk about that experience, and particularly as seen through the eyes and ears of the war. and their characters. generals have always held a special place in the united states. in the army we always said the army is older than the united states of america. we formed the united states army

in 1775, before the declaration of independence. and george washington of course was our first commander in the american army. he was our commander in chief. and he was the first real national hero. and the greatest national hero of america. and after that, the next national hero was general andrew jackson who saved the union at new orleans, and kept the british out and brought a conclusion to the war of 1812 on our terms. in the civil war, a cousin the enormous magnitude of it, other leaders emerge, heroes. and we'll try to memorialize and understand these men in this series of books that you have these are biographies. we tried to write it anyway they are crisp and meaningful and pertinent, with the right details to give you the insight and enough richness of detail that it's not just a summary, but moving quickly enough so

that if you are not a scholar or lifelong expert, you still get the gist of what this is all about. and so, that's the basis. but what we have never done together as a group is, we've never sat around and rehashed these generals. these gentlemen on the stage, they are not one trick ponies. i mean, they know war. they have written about other wars. they have written about other generals. so we can have a pretty broad-based discussion here. and i thought i might ask just really going down the line, if i could just ask each of our authors to give a quick sketch for the august. tell us about your background or how you got into this, and tell us what you think the assets of the general is that you've written the book on. how should our audience envision this general. who was he? so maybe we could start with john davis. could you begin?

>> certainly. thank you very much, general. and thank you, folks, for being here. in the spirit of self-disclosure, i was born in savannah, georgia, so i sort of grew up with the civil war. and i still have a few -- with the general sherman. [laughter] >> i was a journalist for 30 years, and served some time here in washington and vietnam and around the world. chasing conflicts, and i got to know the enlisted men, as well as the officers, and watching the decision-making process of the commanders. eventually i got into writing books, and i have written about 23 now. but many of them have had a military context, but i had a real understanding of the chain of command. from the enlisted grunt, all the way to the men who wear the

stars. and whenever it was suggested to me that i write a book on stonewall jackson, it was a thrill because this was, for a boy from the south, you know, the name of stonewall jackson just invokes magic. and i wanted to get to know more about him, rather than just he was a great great general. as i start to plunge into, and i thought i really knew a lot about stonewall jackson to start off with, i knew nothing. he turned out to be most interesting that i never met. you know, and i think we will go into some of those details later, but he was an amazing character in which he was stubborn, he was fanatical, he was a genius in some ways and then eat in others. but he always -- and then eat in others. even to the point of running

himself physically into the ground sometime where he couldn't do it. but he would tell robert e. lee that something could be done, it could be done. it might come at the sacrifice of a great number of soldiers, it would be done. that was the last point from my studies about the civil war, was the sheer magnitude of the killing fields involve. not talking about what helicopter could get shot down and five people died. we are talking hundreds of men, like these battlefields that we will talk about. they are fast that if you have been out to some of them, go and get a real sense of it. general. >> thanks. and i want to turn to noah andrew trudeau. you with a biography of some of jackson's big boss, robert e. lee. tell us about yourself, and for those who don't know robert e. lee the way that some of us from the south do, tell us about

that. >> well, i find myself sitting here a new yorker got to write about a virginian. but actually i count, i worked for many years for national public radio and i think i've learned a lot about just taking open mind to a subject and approaching it, going with the evidence takes you and not to be afraid of coming to conclusions that may come against the grain. i had encountered lead quite a bit in a number of my books before they're because i've written a lot about the eastern theater. so he had always sort of any character on the stage, but never in the spotlight. and i was kind of -- i was grateful for the format that this has, which is really compressed. so you really have to decide very quickly what was the important things to say and how do i get to the in an interesting manner. that jimmy was the challenge of writing this kind of book.

and i realized when i first got into the civil war it was still the age of whether douglas freeman books and clifford down the books were the standard books of the field. and now we know that they tended to glorify and even deify to large extent. and i was fortunate of going through that whole period where i think hole three evaluation about lee. and what i then tried to do in this book was walk you through a remarkable career, as much as possible, seeing it through his eyes. i do the battles almost entirely from what you lee now and how did he know it, and why was he right, where was he wrong? and i'm hoping out of that process, a picture emerges of him that is i think both honest to his skills as a military

professional, and i hope fair to him as a human being, a citizen of the south caught up in that great conflict. >> thank you. that's the southern side, and we're going to try to come back to that in a minute. i want to ask steven woodworth if you will talk about a name that inspired fear in the south today, and in the hearts of many of us who grew up there, and that's what he sherman. >> well, again, i am stephen woodworth, professor at tcu in case you couldn't tell. like general sherman osborne in ohio, so i'm a yankee. and you can tell by my lack of an exit. but general sherman was a really interesting character. -one of the most fascinating maybe the most fascinating generals of the war overall. he was a brilliant man. he thought incessantly, and he talked incessantly. one observer said that ideas would even come from like shots aren't repeating rifle, one

after another after another. he tended to talk in extreme ways sometimes. he said things that were rather extreme, and i think that's part of his reputation. why he has the reputation as the genghis khan of the civil war, until the hon or whatever you want to say, because he talked more destructively danny acted. he also would probably get a chance discussed later had some shocking anti-portal ideas about race. when he was talking. but thankfully he behaved better than he talked, most of the time. he was a brilliant general, not perhaps the same way that grant was. sherman found other ways to a conscious purposes, and so he had his sort of different sort of brilliance as a general. but a fascinating and completely. >> thank you, and john mosher, you wrote the story of the first

american supreme, real supreme commander, ulysses grant. >> that's right. >> tell us about yourself and how you see grant. >> well, i'm so like you. i was born in arkansas and i had to move to louisiana, either that or have my front teeth removed. [laughter] i sort of saw and i had relatives, ancestors on both sides of the war. my background basically is in european art it in the first and second world war, and so when i came to write about grants, my original interest in grant was he wrote great underappreciated american literature in his wars that which mark twain got published. it's really some brilliant writing. for joint grant didn't talk much about himself. he talked mostly about descriptions. but i brought to that a somewhat

different perspective. and certainly very much the idea of grant as the first free commander, but also that grant was, as sherman, one of the great, the truly great american generals. someone asked as sherman dd think credit should be included with wellington, napoleon as one of the great soldiers, generals of the 19th century, and sherman said, oh, yes, but i think history will rank in much higher than that, or higher than that. which may have been just sherman popping off. but i think that was too. when i wrote this book, one of the things i really tried to bring out was to the extent to which you could really compare grant with those three, and particular with wellington, who was like a grant, never fought a battle that he didn't win.

and also, managed to do something i think that was quite remarkable, which is he was able to command armies in the field, but he also was, became, finally, when lincoln had a fit of sanity, the supreme commander, the overall commander. that's a difficult transition to make. i think we all recognize that the world is full of people who are brilliant at one level, but they don't do so well at the next level. so great to me was fascinating because he was functioning effectively at every level, including the highest, which is where he ended up. then, of course, he became president. to a certain extent i think it was probably a step down. i mean, seriously. i was reading truman's letters that his wife wrote in the first world war, and truman had been off to college see was an artillery officer but he really hadn't studied to be able to

stay in the army once he was in france that at one point he wrote to his fiancée, and said i'd never worked so hard in my life as i want to be a part of this great adventure. if i'm able to participate in it successfully, this will be the part, the high point of my life, the part i will remember forever, as my great achievement. and i thought here's the man to be president of united states. so, you know, i really do think to a certain extent the triumph of success for both men was probably greater than becoming president, as great an honor as that is. >> war is a crucible, formative experiences in which characters, oath in the field and shaped. we take these men as great generals that we have written about here, based on a couple of criteria. first of course, they are known.

i mean, you have to any of the southern side, the most famous generated and we never had a role comparable to that of grant. in the north you that grant who was the overall ultimately the survivor in the war between the generals. he made it up, he won lincoln's confidence and won the war for lincoln. you had stonewall jackson as an incredible, inspirational commander who led one of the most classic maneuver battles in history. it is still study, the valley campaign. the ferry, the movement, the faint. his leadership of the troops, and you had sherman, who was an innovator and a tremendous team builder in his own right. but also had the courage and good sense to learn from his experiences throughout the campaigns and the civil war, became greater and greater. these men are all men of recognize achievement, but beyond that and the fact that

they were newsworthy and written about at the time, and admired in the reunions of the army, the grand army of the republic and so forth, years later. what is it about them that makes them a great general? is it the way they were brought up? was at the judgment? was it the courage? was it their spirit? was at that figure they cut off on horseback works if you could just name, pick one quality of the guy that you wrote about? and let's throw it out there, and let's chew on it a little bit. let's start at the bottom and work up. stonewall jackson. he was, you know, he never commanded a theater exactly, but he did commend the valley. what was it about jackson? >> most it was the fact is men believed in him. it wasn't necessarily that the south as a whole, he was right first, a major from vmi.

but the people he brought to the war have known this guy enough that they would follow him, these young men would follow him because he had a sense, not a destiny. he didn't think in terms like that. he thought of updating the goal, what i have to do to complete this job, and whether it was just training the troops in the rain, or taking harpers ferry. it was all the same to him, methodical, grind it out, but it can be done. he never had a sense of defeat. that was passed on to his name. i think they would basically follow him anywhere. and has legend grew certainly the leadership of the south and robert e. lee bought into that, that stonewall could get the job done. and he proved it over and over and over again. but he had his faults. there's no doubt he was a man who was too pious, to set in his

own ways. else thought. and that was all part of it, but he was so sure of himself that the men behind them felt that stonewall is better. i will do it stellenbosch says. he was a leader in the person, stonewall jackson was not part of the rosy punch in the south that he was a dirt soldier. that identity between the men in the ranks and supreme general as far as they could see really worked. >> there was a real chemistry between stonewall jackson and the troops. he wasn't one of the troops but they respected him. he respected them, and it was a bond there that was beyond the subordination of rank and privilege that characterizes the forces, and maybe that's what really won in the acclaim early from his first action i guess at

manassas when he held, right, and got that nickname, stonewa stonewall. but he had that bond with truth. was at the same with sherman, would you say, steve? was that what made him? was the essence of the man in terms of leadership and? >> that was early one factor created by the end of the war. his troops called him uncle billy and there are many stores around about that the report that he had with the troops. and a trust that they had. certainly by the time they're marching north up to south carolina and north carolina, his troops, his men had the supreme confidence that uncle billy will get us through. no matter what. he cannot -- we cannot be defeated with him leading us. i think if i were going to boil down, i would say would come down to the product of a brilliant mind with also tough mindedness.

that he was determined to get things he had to get done. he suffered some setbacks. you can look at his career during the wars, early in the war when he was thought to be in and he overcame that. he had a setback. about midway through the were. overcame that. came back. so he suffered setbacks. as you mentioned, he learned from his mistakes, and develop new ways. he found that he did like making frontal assaults. he did want to do that anymore. even other ways to get the job done. if i were going down i would say that was his factor. >> he was a heartening. he was hard on his troops, and he was hard on the civilians. he certainly got a meditation for not having much empathy or sympathy. he was there. he was mission oriented, wasn't he? >> he was. the reputation of sherman is fascinating because early in the war he has the reputation of being hard on his troops.

the famous incident where lincoln comes and visits shermans can't a few weeks after, our maybe before, the first summer of the war. lincoln comes there and wandered shermans to one of shermans officers is not happy. he had been openly threatening to go home. he was going to go home. sherman said if you do i will have you shot. so lincoln is there at the camp and an officer walked up and said i have complained. he said i came to sherman with my issue and he threatened to shoot me. the famous line when they could look at the officer, look at sherman and any length of two that says in a loud stage whisper so everyone around here as well, if i were you, if he threatened to shoot, i would not trust him because i believe he would do it. [laughter] >> sherman will be hard with his mentor and early in the war. but at the end of the war sherman, the men feel this closest to sherman. he is all coal billy. they are calling that two essays that. a lot of generals had nicknames

behind their back. his men would come all coal billy to his face. they would be marching by him, pleasant day, all coal billy i guess we'll be taking lee in the rear before long, all coal billy, to his face. a great report with his soldiers by the end of the war. >> if you look at the higher level of the south, go to robert e. lee. robert e. lee, he was like the heisman trophy winner. he's the franchise quarterback. he was so good before the civil war that they offered him the command of the union army. his patron was in the white house, as the advisory, military advisor, abraham lincoln. and yet he chose to go with the south. he was a loser. i mean, his army was defeated. and at one point and a climactic battle, at gettysburg for which his own generals disagree with

him on his judgment there. so no, how do you come to grips with the? what is it that made him what he is, he is referred, respected, admired, we celebrate his holiday in the south. and, you know, people still talk about him come and there's more kids in the south named robert e. lee something and that you could shake a stick at. but he lost. what was it about lee? >> there's this moment of transformation for lee that i have to tell you i still don't understand. happens outside of richmond in 1862, the confederate army is steadily retreating ahead of the mcclellan's army pushing up the peninsula. and then the commander of the southern army, joseph johnson, is wounded. and the president of the confederacy turns to his chief military advisor and put him in charge. up to that point lee had been on

the sidelines. even advisor. he had been sent to a few trouble spots we haven't really performed very well. as a professional military man, the most it ever commanded were a few companies of calvary and texas, in terms of military force. yet the day he took over he was the robert e. lee that all of you imagine him to be. there was a clarity of purpose for each circumstance that he was in, that enabled him to throw away the chaff of a battle. i mean, i'm sure you will know better than i, that any moment in the midst of a very complicated battle, the officer in charge is being pummeled with contradictory information. and it takes a certain internal sense to sort of say, this is

important, i can ignore this, i can't believe that. and then to act on it. this was the lee quality, and he had a very bloody learning process in the campaigns, seven days, where he lost every battle just about, lost human does casualties, but gained amazingly low self-confidence and the confidence of his troops because they realized he wasn't a runner. he was a fighter. and i think that was an overall spirit of the southern soldier. and i think they came to respect him for that. and it's interesting, he is the partition of the screw. all the other three got dirt under their fingernails. lee you don't imagine with dirt under his fingernails. and, in fact, i think the nickname they give them tells you that. mars robert, master robert. and so it was his performance

and his ability to route at various to really just see through the clutter, and to figure out what i needed to do to get done what i believe has to be done. and i think the soldiers came to respect that, and he had his flaws as a commander, but overall we see him as that sort of figure who could take an impossible situation, sorted through, and take the necessary steps such as a chance for bill, to turn what could in a disaster >> what turned a chance or so? describe the battles of the audience gets a feel. >> for lee the judge was basically he was the middle part of a sandwich. the union commander, joseph, had come up with a very good plan to leave a substantial force, pinning the in place at

fredericksburg while he took the bulk of his army on a very wide swing and came in behind them. and so basically lee has a commander's worst nightmare that he has superior forces on either side. the expectation on the union side is that he's going to throw his hands up and start to get how my going to get the heck out of here with as much of my army as i can save. and that was never lee first, second or third thought that his first thought was how to get into these people. so he very quickly prioritized, determines when the most important danger is at the moment. takes the risk. this is the other thing. by that ability to focus on what needed to be done, he then accepted the risks of doing it. he realized that the force of fredericksburg was the fate, and he needed to respond to the real threat. he left a very small covering force, took the bulk of his army

out to meet the main union threat coming in against his rear. than it was the brilliant improvisation with someone jackson, further split his army, sent jackson around to strike the union at its multiple flight, which completely turned the picture around, and resulted in the union army ultimately pulling back. interestingly, i hold the opinion that we felt that chancellor bill was a failure for him. he wanted to destroy that union army. and at the end of that terrible, bloody series now, he told more than one officer, they're back across the river. they're ready to do whatever they want to do. i have gained nothing. and this tell you a lot about the fact that he was already looking at the endgame here, and was still able to do with that and i think it was that focus and effective soldiers at that point were willing to do anything for him.

>> it's clear that lee was a brilliant men. and was an attrition and hit great experiences growing up. he could hardly find a greater contrast. with a supreme commander, as he later in march on other side, but with grant, right, john? grant was first welcome he was a lot younger then robert e. lee. he didn't have all of the experiences, but he tried his hand at business. he hadn't done too well, right? >> right. >> and kind of as a last throw goes into the military as what the heck. at the politics way into the command of the force and what happened? what was it that made grant what he was? he was out and an obscure part of the war. the war was where lee was. grant was out west. how? >> i think that's two questions basically. and really good ones. i think the first thing is that when we deal -- we get into

certain category of genius. i like the transformative express with lee. you get to a certain category of genius and you just don't know. and particularly when you have people, i think being a general in the situation that these men were generals in, where there was no way to predict how they would succeed. grant simply had this instinct of ability to see the situation and act on it. and that's like marlboro who also hadn't done much. and there's nothing in wellington's background really to suggest that he would be the success that he was. you just don't know. i think one of the things that

he had that comes through very quickly out of the minute he takes command, is absolute self-confidence in what he is doing. and he communicates that to everyone under his command. he sees, as lee did come he sees the situation quite clear. i was a going back to the second part, grant realized that the war was going to be one in the west. i mean, the civil war, the interesting thing is its short trip is that first of all, all the people engaged in directing it are professional, have had professional officer training. i think west point at that time, west point in in the 19th century was one of the best universities in the world. spent west point was ranked number one in 2009 in the united states.

[laughter] >> these guys, these people compared the bulk of french and british officers, who are extraordinarily well-trained. so this was a war, and they directed the 60 major engagement of the civil war, west point graduates were in charge of both sides, and i was all of them. and when i mentioned that, somebody always pops up from virginia and say the my. which was the other, the other one. all these people were really well-trained. i think when you're talking about poker's maneuver to say which lee, so the strategy is just fascinating. but the war was basically going to be one in the west. and grant perceived that. he was fixed on the best way to come%. and like all the other generals, he had great difficulty. i think one of the problems he

had that he shared with lee was that initially the key instances he was never given the resources that were really necessary to do the job. if you remember, i mean, lincoln was a great leader and a great president, but he was not all that great at military strategy. he became a sense with east tennessee for some reason. he became fearful that the french were going to invade texas. there was a big diversion, and napoleon's famous remark, he said this would be a great plan to stop smugglers. and, you know, the prewar army had basically been treating like a police force, scattered these little packets all over the country. to a certain extent, institutionally, even when the civil war started they kept on doing that. but yeah, the focus in the

absolute calm that grant had that he was, he saw the situation. he knew how to deal with it. he was going to deal with it, and he believed that he had the manpower to do it. he really put a lot of faith in his soldiers in -- soldiering. very realistically. like wellingtons famous remark when he saw his army, some of his men fleeing, running. he said, some is that running away. he said they will come back. they will be back. there are times in combat when everyone becomes afraid. and rightly so. and grant understood that. he planned, that with it accordingly, but it's fixed clarity of purpose, and is absolute calm, this image of grant sitting on a tree stump riding out orders with shells and cannonballs around is not made up. i mean, he had absolute, you

know, calm at a time when other people didn't. and i think that's a major factor. but basically when you talk about certain categories of genius, hey, there is no accounting. it's like napoleon's famous mark when he was asked what he look for in your generals? and he said, success. so the person said, what makes a successful general? he said, luck. [laughter] >> that's the problem. >> one of the things that you all said is, you of all, and in terms of character on his mental acuity, that they got the job done, they were intelligent, the soviets -- in armies, they always look for the develop leadership. in the united states army we had our own list of traits that you were taught to get used to be on the officer efficiency report back in the old days that it was the quality, you had to be enthusiastic and four so i have initiative and enthusiasm and integrity. went through the whole list of

things. as a lieutenant you get graded one to five on how well you exemplified each of those traits that the soviets had gone through their own studies from their civil war or from the war against the polls, and to finish that off in early '20s. and their studies of world war ii and afterwards. they had their own list. one of the traits they had we did ever quite pick up his something called for site. they look for people with foresight. you are mentioning, john, grant in these strategic judgment. do you think foresight was his strength ?-que?-quex wasn't lee strength? wasn't just the difference between the two men and foresight? are a different enforcement i was at just the difference in material resources? could lead -- could a lee -- could they the same essential intelligence but placed in

difference circumstances? >> i think the problem, the problem basically, the north only had one way to win. and that was they had to physically invade the south and defeat the army, conquer its territory. nothing else would work. there's this widespread idea that the south was doomed from the start, became a great myth at some point. i don't think that there's much real foundation to that. the south, the problem to me is that the south, southern, the south had was they had three or four strategies, each one which have been successful, probably would have worked, that each strategy had its very skillful and intelligent proponent. and the result was they didn't really hit upon either one of them. none of them were wrong. if lee had been given the resources passionate lee idea of taking the war to the north and

frightening the bejesus out of them and terrorizing them and bringing them, that would've worked if you been given the resource. joseph johnson is greatly underrated, british really thought he was the best confederate general, of course they were the british. anyway -- [laughter] >> the guy who thought that, ian hamilton, was by all accounts the top british general. they thought he was the best person. when you read his writings, he was very dashing he will well produce intelligent. he was educated. he really stood out. he was the general. so there you go. the southern generals, no, they never hit on a strategy. and the point at which lincoln basically surrendered the

command to grant, to let him apply the strategy that grant saw, okay parks that were basically was going to come to him. so in essence i think the difference, many different was lee at that point lee had a losing hand. by the way, someone asked lee at the boy said, you know, grant was basically just an accident. and lee said that's no compliment to me, sir. [laughter] >> he said i have studied the records of military history, aged and modern, and i've never found a general to be granted equal. i do not believe there's any general in history to be his equal. now, i don't think that's the i don't think he was rationalizing him because he lost. >> a lot of us in the south felt it was the other way around. >> that's right, exactly spent and i want to ask noah, and look, lee did more with less,

with guys like stonewall jackson working for him. where s. grant had this overwhelming american superiority and technology, and he had the power of the united states of america. the north was unable to put, despite his great population advantage, when you go back and look at the enlistment and the numbers, the north, a, didn't have as great a long advantage of men to put in uniform. and the second thing was that they kept sending people off on wild goose chases in louisiana and all sorts of other places. so that grant didn't really have this overwhelming advantage. which i certainly am and, you know, i think that's what agree with you, grant did more with less -- lee was a genius at doing more with less. >> compare, take us through, no,

and john, you also jumping on this because you're working the same battlefield here. compared the way they handle the mastery of the art of war to grant. >> it's important to point out first out on one hand, lee was very advanced and understand the relationship between the military and civilian. he was one of the few confederate generals who treated jefferson davis with something approaching respect. most of the other generals, joseph johnson and others, i think always put up with them. but what this didn't mask was the fact that lee was very subtly able to undertake a strategic approach that ran counter to what davis believed in a. jefferson davis believed in essentially a defensive strategy. we draw the line around the south, and where ever they come in, we throw them out. and so he would shift the

resources around here cuba chase after small little corners to try to do that. lee believe that you have to defeat the army in the field that represents the greatest threat, and then they will talk peace. so, his early period through gettysburg is really aimed at pushing against the enemy to force that fight. even if it meant getting out of the south. which was a really psychological moment for the south because, in fact, on his first campaign, north into maryland, a number of soldiers dropped out was really amazing. but lee had to deal with that. and he pushed that strategic vision forward, through gettysburg, where i believe in, you know, he felt again, if you look at from lee's point of view in gettysburg he believed he had

the superior army and spirit and ability. he had many important advantages, which we now know, some of which were imaginary. but he still believed in them at that time. and he couldn't deliver the victory. and if he couldn't do it then, he came to realize he couldn't do it. and he then, i think, changed his focus and had a moment of crisis because there's a moment after gettysburg where he submits his resignation. and it's a serious -- it's not a gesture. it's not trying to say, i'm going to show you how important i am by threatening to quit, because i know you won't find me. is not that it all. i think he seriously for the moment doubted that he could do anything to change the situation, which i guess for a general is probably the worst possible thing you could have, defeating that has gone out of your hand and the whole approach is no longer valid. >> he found a new purpose, which

was to buy time, even hoping some in the west might change, or that the south and north which is weird enough that they would come to the peace table. and so he adapted to that situation, and, you know, did in the spring of 1865, i think comes the last big shock where it is going to jefferson davis is not prepared to accept any compromise. opportunities were there. i mean, lincoln made it clear, if you just say you agree to talk about coming back into the union, everything is on the table. and davis -- davis believed, it's a little like the alice profit in world war ii, when the prematurely announced we will only accept unconditional surrender. that wipes out the moderates. a people who might have moved the country toward a peace negotiation are disenfranchised

because at that point it is surrender or death. and that's what davis was pushing for. he truly believe, and -- even in 65, that the south would rise literally and comeback together. and lee realized from the mechanics and the numbers it wasn't going to happen. [inaudible] >> yes. >> even after lee surrender. that's what they tell jefferson davis my guys are whipped. they have taken a horse and going home. he i guess had the satisfaction of settings tabs and davis strait, but speed in the american character, and it has been the american way of war, basically win wars don't indecisive the, we don't like it. and we envision that they would end that way. like world war ii with unconditional surrender their it

touched a strong nerve in the american body politic. but going to the strategy of this, and you look at it, don, jackson had come he had an amazing feel for what the enemy would do and how to position forces and how to react and how far he could push his men, didn't he? i mean, if you had given jackson and army like grant had, what he would have done, my god. >> that's the great game of stonewall jackson come is it still will have lived, fill in your own theory from there. but importantly stonewall jackson didn't live. and because of that lee didn't give me his right arm on the battlefield. is operative in the field was stonewall being able to follow up with these enduring this. but we have to remember that the battlefield is such a confusing place. the same kind of role was played

by jimmy stewart. and if jeb reported in, galloping around, doing this without, then that gave lee a lot more information. but sometime jeb didn't quite make it there and that left the great general blind as we would find out at gettysburg, until there was much too late. the tactics were one thing for the south, and stonewall's ability to foresee down the road was amplified a lot by many of these officers who fought each other had worked together in the war with mexico. they knew each other. they were at west point. this was really a family reunion in a very strange sort of way. and to a point where lee at chancellorsville once said something they're going to give me a general that i can't, that i don't know, i don't know how

to defeat. because he was running through them at that point. a little help and that is in this room right now is general mcclellan, he was the main problem with lincoln right first it because the men had everything together. and kept them on a pretty ground-based. he just wouldn't fight. but he also wouldn't give up. >> his job. >> his job. [laughter] >> and he wanted lincoln's job. so they can always have this pesky gnat over here that had a part of the population behind him they didn't look so good or talk well. but stonewall i think in the value -- the valley, for knowledge art in the war -- early in the war he appointed a killed with topography. that was one of a sequence.

he knew those hills. he knew those valley. he knew those hidden roads, because his man went and walked over them for road over them. the north did not have that advantage. so he knew where the cuts were and he knew how deep the valleys were, and that was just wonderful knowledge that the enemy did not have. everybody couldn't do that. the battlefield would much too big. i have to disagree about whether the south could have one. i think it was doomed from the start in this, you know, things like new orleans felt that that was pretty important. it was just knowing away -- knowing away. our backs were against the wall. you had to leave everything on the battlefield because those yankees were going, by the way, yankees was a bad word in our household. and they're going to come in and steal the horses and a terrible

thing to the womenfolk. so, you know, it was really does david against goliath, us against them, which was great for morale. and jefferson davis and all the generals understood. but it was a glorious losing cause that i don't know course it was looking back 100 years. you know, and then gone with the wind had finally explained it all to me. [laughter] >> done, you do, what we've been talking about the whole time here, the mental quality, talk about intelligence, strategic insight. stephen, which is it early on, rang a bell with the. you take a look at point fishermen who came back from some real adversities. and john conyers talking about grant sitting there writing out some of those with cannibals crashing around and so forth. and noah, you mentioned it with lee. and don you mentioned it with jackson. i want to get something that people don't ordinarily associate with generalship, and

that's courage. we think about courage in modern-day life, you think a guy like on the murphy, world war ii, congressional medal of honor winner. he was there jumping off banks and financial guns directly in the face of the any. he was a soldier you think about battles like iwo jima and okinawa where our forces can face-to-face with terrible and tough enemy. but we been given may be short shrift of these general, the personal courage and moral courage, haven't we? was an important quality that makes these men great generals? stephen, start with sherman. >> we've been talking about several of these men had a transformative moment. and really for sherman, he is transformed moment in the were i think relates to battlefield courage. it really was the point at which i think they turn around for sherman and he was able to apply his genius in the way that was helpful. talk about foresight. shermans part of was his

foresight would work against them. he was more. you would assume party would tend to think his mind that his enemy knew everything about his situation, and then he would assume his enemy would make the best possible moves for that and that scared the daylights out of him. he said so. grant doesn't mind what the enemy does not, but it scares me. he had this problem early in the war, possible mental breakdown. and get sick second chance. for those of you who are driven away with this, grant is in command of the army, but sherman action has the command of the five divisions around shiloh church. they are getting information from their scouts, from the picket line when the scouts are going out, getting information that the confederates are approaching. the question was often ask of was the army of the tennessee of shiloh. the answer was expected.

the army of tennessee troops were moving forward an initiative to combat. but sherman was surprised if he was a far as, the day before the battle, many were coming in to headquarters, he was ordering them to be put under a bed for bringing false reports to headquarters. and even that morning, he accused a subordinate officer who reported this, he is on the battlefield. not a battlefield yet, the confederates were literally within a couple hundred charge closing in under cover of would. and sherman is writing a long, and his troops have been telling if the rebels are out there. and he is looking to one flank where they think they cited the confederates that at that moment the confederacy emerge from the woods about 100 charge the way and leveled at the rifles. someone shouts, general sherman will be shot. and they yelled general sherman to look to your right. shermans look at that moment, talk about transformative moments that at that moment, my god, we are attacked. [laughter]

>> and that that, wounded in the hand, it kills his orderly. his order is shot to the head at that moment. this is like the low point of the war for sherman. isn't everything wrong. he has really messed up. a really smart guy, and this is an amazing, a really brilliant guy who somehow made every decision wrong. and here he is, he has been taken by surprise. but he makes this transformation at shiloh under fire. he is amazing under fire. it's almost as if the pressure of battle, the adrenaline rush or i do know what it is how i haven't been there so i don't know. but somehow this stays his mind, which normally race is too fast and generates ideas. the adrenaline rush of battle scenes to steady sherman. and he becomes more calm and more able to function, and more able to think clearly in battle. and his soldiers write extensively about what an inspiration sherman was. he had three horses shot out from under him.

he suffered another slight wound. but grants that i never had to worry about the part of lined sherman was holding. i knew he would hold. should have a much bigger have part about that we previously thought. most of the confederate army was in front of sherman, and he had to give ground eventually but he held them for a long time to really save the union at shiloh. and that only does he do a great performance there, and through tremendous herzl courage but he also seems to come if this is transformative for him, he realizes he can do this. and what is different for sherman from now on. >> so personal courage, physical courage to build a stand and take it was a big part of the leadership of these gems as i think everybody has acknowledged here. but what about the moral courage? talk about not only physical courage, but the moral courage. take the case of, you mentioned, noah, earlier about lee. is a man who must have looked,

he must've felt a certain degree of hopelessness as you indicate. a of generals lose in retreat. look at rommel. here's a guy who is fearless and bold when he was pushing the brits across north africa. but when the tables were turned, he got sick. he lost his grip on his forces, and a lot of things went wrong. and get lee live with this every day. what about the role of moral courage in this? did he have it, lee? >> absolutely. and i think it sustained him, i mean, physically he is not a well man at various points of the war. and it's really this, visit this combination of a sense of purpose, but also a sense of obligation. i think, forgive me for trying to presume on your expense, but i'm guessing that the great commanders have a certain sense

of responsibility to their men. .. i >> a general can't do much to stop a bleeding man from dying, but i think lee balanced that professionalism with the kind of the moral sense of the business he was in, and came to find that

the balance that was necessary -- because otherwise i think it would destroy an awfort in command -- officer in command if he began to focus exclusively on what his decisions were doing to human beings -- >> that's right. >> that respected and trusted him. i think lee found that balance and even at the very end, clearly, clearly in a way, the respect his man had for lee grew as things got worse. >> and lee had the courage to make tough decisions when there was no really alternatives. >> he made the decision to surrender. >> there's a fine line of moral courage in standing up for what you believe and taking on the doubters and so forth. there's a fine line between doing it the right way and maybe going too far at times. you were saying something about stonewall jackson being a little

bit self-righteous in approaching things, and he was a man with strong convictions and didn't hesitate to voice them, and how -- what's your sense of where that took him and whether it was a good trait or maybe an access? >> it was probably his central trait because he didn't care what other people thought about him. he wasn't after fame. he wasn't after glory. he was who he was, and he was late coming to religion, but boy, once he found it, he decided to become a christian. god was right there in the saddle with him. a general once told me that he wouldn't give a glass of warm spit for an officer who was afraid of getting shot. well, stonewall used that same kind of analogy or same kind of feeling with every man under his command. you're all expendable because

we're here for a purpose and to do a job, and if you run out of bullets, you go to the sword. you run of that, go to rocks. out of rocks, use your fist because i'm here and that's what i will do. he did not tolerate waiverring in his beliefs, so his moral courage -- i mean, he was very self-righteous. there's no doubt. in addition to being an acute hypochondriac -- [laughter] you know, he was a religious nut. [laughter] there's no other way to put it. therefore, he was always right, and his men responded to that, but for some strange reason, he stands there like a stone wall, and he's always right, and one of the greatest points of pride after the war was for a southern man to fight with stone wall, well, a lot of men did fight with him.

he pursued his goal, but drove the north crazy because he new what was going to happen, and he was willing to spend that force because he felt it was the right thing to do and proper thing to do and the military sound thing to do. >> of course, he drove lee crazy too, didn't he? when he wanted something or felt something was his do, he demanded it. >> yes, he has driven a lot of people crazy including me. [laughter] >> back to moral courage on grant. how could he, how could he not be sensitive to the slaughter that resulted from once he started the wilderness campaign without really a clear tactic in there and really tough terrain, and he knew what the losses were. how did he do it? >> one of the things we forget

is lincoln thought he was going to lose the presidential election coming up, that the only -- grant and lincoln were both convinced in lincoln lost the election since the democratic party platform had basically been quit that that would be the end of the war. grant thought he had no choice but to hang on to lee and keep the war going, and he did. he also didn't have the resources that he should have had to have really made some of the moves that he originally had planned, but he did have a strategy. i think the interesting thing to expand this a little bit about the world courage is that the fascinating thing about this period in war fair from 1816 to

1865 it's really the only period we have when generals commanding in the field in charge of large armies, not just divisions or small groups, but real, the armies on the scale of the civil war, okay, are still have to exhibit personal courage because they have to stand up and lead and be shot at. if they are to do their jobs, there's an abrupt change that happens in war fair in the space of five years, you know, in which senior commander, someone in grant or lee's position is much removed from the battle. he's depending heavily on staff, and those are people who not only are out there getting shot for him, but to a great extent, they can cover for his inadequacies or his problems. one of the fascinating things about these generals, i think, that we see is that we really see how they reacted under pressure and how they responded

because it was them. there wasn't anybody covering for them, and in every case when you talked about lee being sometimes forced or didn't show up like he was supposed too, grant had some appallingly bad generals hoisted on him for political reasons that he couldn't get rid of until, you know, i mean, so to a certain extent they all had those problems and they all triumphed over them, but it's the rare combination, i think, that draws us to these men that they risk personal danger, they had the moral courage to stick to their beliefs. they really believed and at the same time, they were willing -- they tried not to take unnecessary risks. they were all aware as professionals that the first,

the first principle of the military art is getting your objective with the minimum number of casualties. the problem is which grant put in a nutshell is sometimes you just have to go out and whip them, and the heart of genius which all of these men, i think, possessed with knowing when that moment is and that you're convinced if you go out there you can whip them like grant and sureman in the first day, and grant said, we'll whip them tomorrow, and he was absolutely right. >> that's a good point to turn to the audience because i know you've been wanting to jump in on the questions and some of you probably have personal favorites here in the generals and specific battles you want to talk about. i want to open it up to the audience and take questions about generalship in the civil war. you have your hand up.

>> let's use microphones. >> okay. we have mics on both sides. sir, you're up. >> yes, i have a question about robert e. lee. when he was in the appmatics campaign and looking at ultimately facing the defeat, why did he reject the option of guerrilla warfare? can you explain that in military terms and miranda rule terms? >> -- moral terms? >> i have to explain it in class terms. lee was part of the class and when you think of the southern society with the slave population and the poor whites, the biggest nightmare was social chaos, and they saw the break down of an argued -- organized army where there were

rules mostly followed to turn into the guerrilla situation where there were no rules as being a worse option for a southern leader. i mean, when you look at various commanders, joe johnston, richard taylor fought any effort to break down his area of control into those kinds of bans, these were men for whom while surrender was a terrible thing, social chaos was worse, and i think it was made on that basis rather than any military basis. >> thank you. >> we have another question up here. >> well, it's a quick question at the risk of being thrown out. did you run across admirals in your studies and lincoln had this wonderful fellow named peter who was an admiral and his

secret weapon. did you run across any research on him or know anything about the admirals in the civil wars? >> actually, i just did a couple articles on the red river campaign an i know admiral porter well. >> oh, okay. >> he had a way of evaluating the army commanders, and he had absolutely no interest in political generals of which there were a large number, but if a general was straight with him and delivered on his promise, they were friends for life, and that was sherman and grant who became his two buds for that reason, and you read -- he wrote constant notes to the secretary of the navy and said things are terrible here, if only sherman was here, we could get it all right. you know -- >> thank you. >> yep. >> thank you. next question? >> general, you eluded to something earlier that's interesting on what you talked

about tonight which is the familiarity that the folks had from west point and serving together in the military before the war. i'm wondering, you know, it's been well-known since studies were done on ronald, but it was from a distance. how does that familiarity play out how all the generals used their intuition or knowledge of who was on the other side and how that might have changed the course of the war? >> maybe i can ask it this way and pick an incident if one stands out in your mind where knowledge of an opponent guided the result. >> he knew him, he knew -- i would say basically that the answer to me is that lee and grant really knew their opponents very well. lee's remark about maybe i'll run into one i don't know, but it sort of backfired in the since that the union generals by the time, late 18763 or 64, the

mere mention of lee's name made them nervous. they were like, gee, you act like lee is going to jump out of you from the north, but it certainly, on the one hand, it's made things easier for the people who studied the psychology of the other side, and grant certainly had -- lee, of course was older, and general clark said a thing about the age difference. we need to think about the age differentials here that lee and grant met once inspect mexican war, but they -- lee, lee was really o limpian in the sense of age. he and joe johnson were looking down because they were older guys. i don't think it worked quite the same way with them like it

did with grant who was much younger and really seeing it sort of from a distance as -- >> i guess just to put a footnote on that, one thing in common with the guys is they all studied about the same thing. >> yes. >> they studied that napolitan. there was not a good war by the time lee and grant an even customer graduated. it back back to military strategy and common mind set was a common fact on it. >> first, i want to make two comments, and then two questions. first, thank you very much for supports hillary in 2008. [laughter] >> well, one of the things we talked about is politics and generals, and i like to keep this on the generals.

>> thank you. the other comment i wanted to make is that i wanted to find out if you do any this stuff in public schools? i have a 5th grader and a 7th grader, and they are not studying the civil war which we find very upsetting. we're in california, and we just want to know if you have been going to public schools, and what kind of response you are getting are if you are going and if you have met the descendents of these brave men? >> well, i want to turn to the panel to discuss those questions. are you all presenting in schools? are you dealing with the high school audience at all on this in >> actually montgomery county asked me out, and i went out there and talked to an advanced history honors class, but i have to say i made a men tool, you know, part of what happens when you talk to a group, at least for me, your first step is the size of the group.

is this a group that wants to know battles or a group thatments to hear -- that wants to hear stories? i took this school group and said, it's a lot of good stories, and they surprised me with a few questions about tactics and things, so it was a good experience, but it was clearly like a one-off kind of thing. it's not part of any program, but i will say i think any of us who have begin talks especially to civil war round tables at some point someone is going to come up, and it's great, great gran dad was in this regimen in this battle and sometimes they have a personal piece of memorabilia which is touching or letters to talk about, and that to me is a wonderful connection and reminds you part of why, i think, this is still a part of the american psyche because it's just so many people among us who

in the blood can trace back to the eventings. >> is elementary school too young for civil war historians? is it an interest of the history of the civil war? >> well, now i'm going back to my education courses. it's a question of perception. >> i think it should be taught personally. >> i think that's the kind of issue that local school boards deal with all the time, and someplace in the south, i promise you, it's taught. [laughter] >> well, we need you out in california. we need you in california. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> yeah, thank you. lee was such a complex, interesting character, and i mean, most prom innocent among the -- prominent was the idea of him being a gentleman, but there was an interesting moment, and i'm sure i have the facts wrong, but i believe it was at

fredericksberg when the troupes were learn lining up on the bottom and his troops said something like if war wasn't terrible, what a mag nigh sent moment this would be, just the majesty of the troops lined up. i don't know if you recall that moment, but what does that reveal about him and his character and just the idea of war can be, you know, terrible and mag magnificent and just itching to get into battle and really do some serious damage, i mean, -- >> well, let me say first of all, the quote is a little different. i think he says it's good that war is terrible, otherwise we would grow too fond of it i think was the quote, but it points out that the civil war probably because of the weaponry transition which required the di ploimentd of --

deployment of troops in mass was the last war where the page gentry of war was still an element of experience. gettiesberg, -- gettysberg and the moment of north carolina emerging from the woods on july 3rd, and began to form up against that advance, read the union accounts of the momentary awe of that experience of the sharply formed lines, the flags flying, marking off the various regimens and brigades and divisions. it was still a part of war making in that space. it was obviously in the way out, but there were times where it was an element, and it was something to behold with awe.

>> pagentry aside it's the challenge and the intensification of emotions and comradeship, and if you read the accounts of men and women coming back from the recent experience is they miss the comradeship they were with. a lot reenlisted to go back again. i'm sure that it's not robert e. lee's character. he's expressing something that's more universal and there was a "new york times" reporter named kris hedges i believe who said war is the act that gives meaning to our lives, and he's talking about how this sense of war sweeps through societies, and he was in central america in the 80s and talked about this incredible intensification with emotion associated with conflict. it's a suspension of normal

life. it's the constancy of danger and threat of death which gives light this extraordinary lucidity that when it's over, then life goes back to the normal shades of gray, and so it made be that lee's statement was more about pa pageantry, but there's something in everybody who experienced this that it brings people back to reunions and holds people in the grip of their emotional experiences and war is some of the most formative time in their lives. this gentleman has a question here. >> yes. i'd like to ask this question. can you mention the two things that grant did that none of the three other generals did if you combine them together? not only did he capture and destroy three armies, but as

general and president, he cared more for the black man than the other three generals and befriended two great writers, semimule clem mons and henry james. grant made it clear even in the memoirs that freeing the black man and making him a full participant in american society was the main reason why the war was fought or should have been fought. you haven't really touched on those two matters, especially the second one as general and president, he knocked himself out for the black man and the only president who pushes an antilynchs bill. >> is that a question? [laughter] >> well, it's a plea and can you expand? >> it's an opportunity i mean, to talk about -- >> well -- >> moral character. >> i think the very brief chapter i wrote i tried to deal

with that because grant was the only general in the series so far who had actually been president, and my argument was he was a greatly underappreciated president whose reputation was mangled by a lot of presidential historians, and moral courage, doing what he thought was right was very much the part of that, so, you know, but i would not go so far as to say that to single him out as though, you know, i think had the situation been reversed, i think robert e. lee might have very well done some of the same things. i really would go back to the fact that these men all knew each other at some level. i think that their behavior, i mean, if you read longstreet's commendations of grant, for example, i mean, whatever the problems were for this group of people we're talking about, you

know, the core, they were gentlemen, and the real best sense of the word, and i think they all had their faults. i know you didn't bring it up, but i didn't get into grant's drinking either mainly because in my view sobriety is a greatly overrated virtue. [laughter] but, you know, they all had problems and when you talk about lee and grament at one point was shafted so badly, he felt he had to resign as well, and if washburn had not intervened and made them aware it was political suicide for him in the quest to become the leading general on the union side to ditch grant, he would have done it. he tried everything he could to knife grant, so these were men of enormous character, all of them were, and i think that's what the authors would tell you. >> yes, yes, i think we're out

of time, unfortunately, and there's a lot of issues to cover, but i want to thank the members of the panel for their participation tonight and the great job in writing these books, and let's give them a round of applause. thank you. [applause] [applause] [applause] >> thank you. well, now let's continue the discussion. who was the greatest general after all? [laughter] thank you all very much. [applause] >> westerly clark -- westley clark was the commander from 1997 until 2000. a testing of courage and southern storm, cher man's march to the sea, steven woodworth is

a history professor at texas christian university, and john moeser writes on history and the secret mission to avenge pearl harbor. for more information visit archives.gov. up next, booktv went to a recently published book third world america, politicians abandoning the middle class and destroying the dream. it's hosted at a prief of private -- private residence in washington, d.c., and the program runs just over 30 minutes. >> how are you? >> you don't even --

>> [inaudible] i have to warn everybody. >> she was doing all the stuff, and you didn't know it. [inaudible conversations] >> no, but i think you need to warn people. >> yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. >> you can wear a sign around your neck saying i'm wired and be careful. [inaudible conversations] >> thank you very much. >> what things are you doing to promote the book? >> i have been around the country, and on behalf of the

third world and i have been sharing stories of overcoming obstacles and -- [inaudible] >> i want to talk about the elections and we're less than a month away. there is a lot of talk that the golf course op is taking -- gop is going to take over the house. do you see that happening? >> well, anything can change between now and the election, and i mean, that's the amazing thing about politics. what happens between then and now and two years ago; right? it's incredible, so right now, what matter ises to -- matters is to have a -- [inaudible] >> also, what is