ports and visas for them to getu out of france and nazi-occupied france into spain and eventuall to the united states and save them and save their body of intellectual work for the western world. that is a hero -- >> guest: thank you. thank you, caller.o >> guest: great hero. in fact, we put in the book in that list that you have, myy favorite person is -- [inaudible]rite i had anne frank in the book originally. the woman who saved and hid annt frank's family from the nazis, and now here the nazis come rushing in, and they raid herth house. and at that moment she can say,i oh, i didn't know they were up there and could apologize.didn she never apologizes. and what she instead does is she tries to bribe the nazis, don't take these people away.aw so they tear up her place, they go rummaging through her stuff. the one thing they forget about

is this one book, anne frank's diary.t miep gz gies is the woman who saved the diary, she's the one who preserves it, and when ottia to frank came back and said my daughter's dead, she never read the book. she kept it for anne frank, shee handed it to her father, and she said, this is your daughter's legacy to you, and that's the. reason we have anne frank's diary. .. gies saved it. >> host: quick, how much political research goes into the thrillers? >> guest: listen, i wish we didn't live in a world where we don't get our news from comedians, and we get jokes. i realized over the year, people like to get the real facts out of my books. i take that seriously. i take that trust seriously. it takes me at least six months before i can start writing a thriller. if i'm going to show you the

secret tunnels, i'm going to research. i can write whatever i want. but i'm going to get of this one i sold ten copies to my family. we have x million copies in print. the only one that matter are the ones to my family. my mom -- i went to a headquarters a couple years back and said to me guess where your book sold more than anywhere else and i said i don't know. eight million new yorkers in one place. washington d.c. our rights rulings about washington. the 1 place where my books sold was boca raton, florida. one mile from the furniture store where my mother used to work. my mother single-handedly beat eight million new yorkers. that is the power of a mother fighting for her son. >> host: here's his nonfiction book, heroes for my son.

>> author mitchell bard argues the internet lobby influences the united states foreign policy goals in the middle east but the real power lies with the arab lobby. he presents his book at the skirball cultural center in los angeles. it is 1 hour and 40 minutes. >> thank you for making this possible and all of you for braving the traffic in los angeles, i can sympathize although i have lived in washington d.c. which i believe may have supplanted los angeles as no. one for worst traffic. it is always nice to get such a warm introduction. when you speak as much as i do you can't always be sure. at one event a person introducing the said i do not have to make a long and boring speech because we have invited mitchell bard for that purpose.

just to give you an idea what a genius you have before you tonight. at one recent event i was speaking and getting ready to come to the event and was getting dressed and pulling on my pants and as i did a realized they were a lot more snow than usual and it dawned on me i had brought my son's bomblets the suit instead of my own. in addition to all the wonderful things dorris said i encourage everything you want to know about everything from anti-semitism to zionism and also talks about the lobby as well as the fact that you can sign up on the web site. people ask why did you write a book about the arab lobby? i have been doing research on

the domestic influences in middle east policy for 20 years. i was just down the road doing my ph.d. dissertation on that very subject at ucla back in the mid 80s and my first book was about the influences on u.s. middle east policy and i looked at the israeli and arab lobbies and have been doing ever since but it is in the last few years that the israeli lobby became obsessively scrutinized, demonize and mischaracterized that it became clear to me there was a need to bring greater attention to the other part of the equation involved in middle east policy. you had what really were a series of mostly crackpot theories about an all powerful israeli lobby given special credence when a couple of academics wrote a book called the israeli lobby that suddenly

gave some new credibility to what really had been dismissed as conspiracy theory is up until then. what i wanted to do was read to the attention of people who had never heard of an arab lobby the fact the one has existed and in many cases the lobby is over and in some instances more powerful than the pro-israel lobby and to let people know that not only does it exist but when and how it has influenced and the ways in which it is threatening american volumes and interests. what is the arab lobby? for one thing it is a many headed hydro. one of many reasons it says there's no error blobby because it is difficult to pin down. you can't go down to eat street in washington d.c. and see an arab lobby building the way you can visit the american is

republic affairs committee headquarters. there is no central address. there are really two components of the arab lobby as i see it. one is largely driven by oil interests and that is led by saudi arabia primarily with the backing of arabs in our state department. diplomats who have particular view of u.s. policy based on the idea that the most important thing to the united states is securing the supply of oil and in order to secure that we have to keep the saudis happy at all costs and there are other aspects that are interesting but i will get to many few minutes. oil companies have their own profit oriented interests and to a large degree also defense contractors who have interest in

being able to sell as many weapons as possible to this audits and other gulf states. the other elements of the lobby is one that i describe as the domestic lobby which is comprised primarily of arab-american and muslim american organizations, some of the 9 evangelical christians and some of the state department arabists. the focus of this part of the lobby is the palestinian issue. that is not pro palestinian or pro arab but more anti-israel. if you look at their resolutions and their lobbying agenda in congress with very rare exception is focused more on how can we punish israel for creating divisions between the united states and israel that is in trying to help advance the peace process or help in some

way the palestinian people. the arab lobby has one essential disadvantage to begin with and that is it is very difficult to see how they could ever represent, quote, the muslims or the arabs because there are 1-1/2 billion muslims with a variety of different approaches to their face. you have 21 arab countries with very different and often competing agendas and so there is no way that any individual organization or group of organizations could represent, quote, the arabs. the other problem is they have very small numbers. there are very few arab-americans or muslim americans in the united states keeping with that small population the vast -- not the vast majority but a significant percentage of arab americans are

lebanese christians who for the most part disagree with the agenda of the arab lobby. they are not particularly concerned with the palestinian issue work creating divisions between the united states and is room. the reason they're in the united states in the first place in many cases is because there were driven of their homes in lebanon by the palestinians or the muslim groups in lebanon. so they don't sympathize so you have a very small minority within a minority of arab-americans who are supportive of this arab lobby agenda and the third major mitigating factor that minimizes the domestic lobby's influence is the lack of political support. if you look at the latest gallup poll 63% of americans sympathized with the state of israel. 15% sympathize with the palestinians. this has been a historic trend.

has only gotten worse over the years as israel has gone greater support. it is very difficult for the arab lobby to go to congress and make a case than they are representing the national interests or the views of the american public when there's very little evidence to show than the american people support their positions. so what they're blobby has done and this is particularly true of the saudi's is to take a top down approach as opposed to bottom-up. the pro-israel community has always prided itself on being a grass-roots movement. to mobilize the masses and influence members of congress and other decisionsmakers. the error blobby in general takes the opposite approach because they don't have the means to reach the grass roots. they don't have the numbers or the public support. and it tried to do directly to the decisionmaker that influence the few who have power over the

many. one of the reasons the pro-israel lobby is very transparent is because you see the out there lobbying congress in a very visible way and the records are all public whereas the arab lobby does most of its work behind the scenes. you have cited government officials, diplomats, ambassador to the king in particular going directly to the white house to talk to the president or talking to the secretary of state and often we don't know that these talks are going up. we have the saudi ambassador for more than 20 years who used to play racquetball and tennis with david jones and the tub decision makers in our government and it was something the average person would never know about. and explaining the whole study approach to influence american policy basically what we want to do is take care of people when they leave office because when

you do that you would be surprised how nice they are to you when you are in office. they have the reputation of worthy years of taking a very good care of former government officials who end up in consulting jobs with the saudis or working in the defense industry or various think tanks and end of making a very comfortable living in thanks in large part to the fact that they were very pro saudi when they were in the government. this is a very bipartisan approach by the saudis. they do the same thing with every president. they give money to the presidential library and support the first lady's causes. sometimes they do it before the president becomes the president and sometimes after in the hope of showing government leaders or presidents that there's a good reason for them to be pro saudi. one of my favorite examples was the case of bill clinton where you had at one point of this

obscure southern governor went to the saudis and said i would like you to fund a middle east studies center at the university of arkansas. the saudis probably looked at him and fought wears arkansas and told the note. then not too long afterwards this obscure southern governor suddenly is the democratic candidate for president and suddenly the university of arkansas gets 3-1/$2 billion for middle east studies. than this obscure governor is elected president of united states and shortly after he is inaugurated the university of arkansas miraculously gets a check for $20 million for the study of the middle east. this is one of the ways that the arab lobby operates and has been very successful. i want to be clear that most of the folks who write about the israeli lobby, i do not for a

second suggest the people who believe in a pro arab position or pro palestinian position or pro saudi position are not entitled to lobby for those views in our democratic system of government as long as they're doing it according to the law and it is transparent. they are entitled to do their best to try to influence u.s. policy. i also believe that the arab lobby is not all-powerful away some have said about the israeli lobby. they have a great deal of influence but some influence over some things some of the time and policy is actually very nuanced and sometimes the israeli lobby wind the issues and sometimes loses. the same is true of the israeli lobby but it is naive to believe there wouldn't be two rival lobbies. if you think about any other

issue weather is gun control or abortion rights or health-care it is never won a side issue. other organizational interest lobbying it. so the notion that somehow the pro-israel community would be the only ones trying to influence u.s. middle east policy never made any sense in the first place. now as i said, the most powerful part of the lobby by far is the oil lobby, the saw the lead part of a lobby and i cover a lot of this and the board going back 70 years. we can't go through all of that tonight so on want to focus on a couple things. when you think about saudi arabia today, you say of the saudis have a tremendous wealth and the greatest oil reserves. of course we are going to be willing to take their interests into account but the remarkable thing i found in doing research for this book is we had the same

attitude of letting the saudis, worse us 70 years ago when they were just discovering oil. they hadn't pumped a barrel yet. we didn't need any of their oil and they were essentially bankrupt. they carried their wealth around in a treasure chest in the desert and when the king got through handing out money to different tribes to keep them loyal. he turned to the oil companies to say i need money. then the oil companies would turn to the u.s. government and say the king needs money and we would give them money. through the last 70 years the saudis consistently threatened to somehow take our oriole way to someone else that we didn't continue to do their bidding. so we essentially have a faustian bargain we have signed with the saudis over the year

where the saudis care about one of thing only and that is the survival of the royal family and they recognize the best way to survive is to have the united states keep them in power. our interest is in getting access to the saudi oil so we have a bargain. exchange for getting the oil we agree to keep the royal heads on the royal shoulders. but this has certain negative repercussions as well because when we by the saudi oil profits are partly to keep us addicted to oil. they behave much like drug pushers in manipulating the price of oil in such a way that they keep the price high enough to make a good profit but low enough so that we in the united states and elsewhere don't feel

sufficient incentive to invest in alternative sources of energy that might change our relationship with the saudis and to give you an example you would think that the saudis would want to make as much money as they possibly could still a couple years ago when the price of oil hit $147 a barrel you would have thought the saudis couldn't be happier and they would just hope it would continue to goes through the roof but at that very moment when oil was at its all-time high, the saudi oil ministers said we believe the ideal price of oil is between $70 and $80 a barrel. guess what the price of oil is today. the average is about $75 a barrel. interesting coincidence. you can look back as far as 1967 when the u.s. government understood the danger we were in.

one of the state department arabists wrote in 1967 a study about the dangers of being so dependent on middle eastern oil and he said 67, we need to invest in alternative sources of energy. what he said, in conclusion it is not feasible at this time so what we should do is have less strong ties to israel. and this is essentially the relationship the arabists believe in. then the answer to our problems is not more investment and alternative energy but reduce our relationship with israel. what else did the saudis use the money for. one thing they do is they bar arms. they want the latest and greatest weapons and as she also

mentioned the fact is number one they don't need them and number 2, they can't use them and so we have given them over $100 billion worth of arms. we are about to have the largest arms sale in u.s. history and another $60 billion under the pretext that this will somehow help them defend themselves against an israeli -- iranian nuclear weapon and it is complete nonsense. we saw this argument in 1981 where the saudis had to have our latest and greatest radar plane and the administration was going around capitol hill saying to the pro-israel members of congress who were worried, don't worry. the saudis are incompetent. they won't friend and e-mail and to the other members they would say we need to give this to the saudis so they can defend themselves against the soviet union and nobody seemed to recognize the paradox that the saudis would be so strongly to take on this vote that -- soviets but not to bother the

israelis and we hear the same argument made today. why does the united states along with this? one reason has to do with lobbying of the arab lobby where the former ambassador of saudi arabia says what we need to do is go district by district and show how many jobs will be created by these arms sales so we make of the jobs issue more than a security issue. also the pentagon wants to sell these weapons because what happens is the selling blocks of f-15s to the saudis they can lower overall cost of an f-15 to the u.s. air force and to keep in service weapons system they might otherwise have to cancel them weren't getting enough orders. the pentagon sees this as being in their interest and certainly the defense companies believe it is in their interests. and it is partially a transfer of wealth.

we give the saudis billions of dollars for oil and they give it right back to us for these arms. there is an interest you can justify but there's another problem with how this relationship works and how this money is spent and the dangerous thing is that the saudis are at the same time undermining our interests in the middle east. they are undermining our values and directly and indirectly threatening our security. let me tell you how. how did they undermine our interests. one way is by supporting terrorists. for many years one of the principal supporters of the p l o at the height of their terrorist activities were the saudis. more peaceably large donors and supporters of hamas. the problem with supporting hamas a specially recently was that weakened the party whose

america's favorite palestinian who we would like to see make peace with israel because he is a relative moderate but with the sunnis strengthening hamas they were undermining the u.s. strategy for pushing the peace process forward. you go back in history there is another example, perhaps the most dramatic example of how they sabotage peace within the camp david negotiations where anwar sadat told jimmy carter that the key to securing the israeli/egyptian peace and expanding it to comprehensive peace in the middle east was the support of the saudis and jimmy carter said don't worry, i and jimmy carter. the saudis will do what i ask. they have assured me they will support the peace process. low and behold, they didn't. they did just the opposite.

they led the arab league effort to ostracized egypt for a number of years and did everything they could to make sure no other arab states would join the peace process or that the palestinians would enter into the talks. as i will mention in a few moments they're continuing the same approach of undermining the peace in the middle east today. this is one way they are undermining our interests with peace and stability in the region. the second thing they undermine is values the united states believes can. freedom, democracy and human rights. saudi arabia is the most in tolerant country in the world. they are anti-semitic, anti christian, and i any non muslim minority. and also our regular cereal human-rights abusers. if you talk about what apartheid

state there is in the middle east there is one. it is called saudi arabia and the way they treat women and yet the united states has essentially stood by and allowed the saudis to abuse human rights for years. american citizens have also been subject to discrimination by the saudis and for many years, you can read these incredible remarks by the state department officials who would say the fact that they won't let jews in or are discriminating against jews is okay. it is their culture. we don't want to rock the boat or make an unhappy so for many years we were complicity in discriminating against our own citizens in saudi arabia for fear of making them unhappy. one example in fact, a u.s. president standing up to the saudis, the only one i can think of the girl was in the 1960s, john kennedy, told the king of saudi arabia you have to end

slavery. a century after the civil war in the united states the saudis were practicing legal slavery and he said it was unacceptable and the saudis at least legally outlawed it after kennedy put the pressure on which says to me that if a u.s. president does use his influence and does use our political and economic and military leverage we can change policy. and we in the united states have to accept the saudis have their own culture and can do what they want in terms of discriminating against their own citizens or how citizens. finally, how does the saudi policy threaten our security? the principal way is sponsoring terrorism. undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence stuart levy said,

quote, if i could somehow snapped my fingers and cut off the funding from one country it would be saudi arabia. the fact is the saudis are the principal sponsors of a variety of terrorist groups around the world and because americans came to see them as sponsors of terror after 9/11 when 15 of the 19 attackers were saudis they began to invest very heavily in trying to change their image through public relations and lobbying. since 9/11 they have invested close to $100 million on various public relations firms, case free lobbyists in order to convince the american people and congress that they are not really supporters of terrorists but they are somehow cooperating with us in the war on terror. they have also invested

$130 million in higher education in an effort to change the perception of the next generation of americans. they want the next generation to see them as our crucial allies in the middle east. they want to see the next generation undercut the alliance the clean united states and israel. they want to promote their own brand of islam and they want to deny the existence of any radical islamic threat to the united states or anyone else. of even greater concern is they're trying to spread some of these values they have about the educational system into our educational system. in one school there was a map on wall of the middle east that was missing just one country. can you guess which one?

israel. and they had a textbook that talk that the jews were conspiring against islam and in their twelfth grade textbook it says on the day of judgment the trees will speak to the muslims and say servant of god, the jews are hiding behind me. come and killed them. it is not just about jews. they also quote from another part of the koran in which it says that jews are swine. the unbelievers of jesus's table the christians. these are some of the teachings that very common in saudi textbooks that are finding their way into the united states. that particular school i am talking about is not a site in pakistan or taliban school in afghanistan. it is a saudi funded school in

virginia. if you read the israeli lobby, you will treated to this notion that the israeli lobby is all-powerful and this has become a constant theme that you can read in state department documents going back years that somehow this cobol of jews is exerting too much influence on u.s. middle east policy. i think you can destroy the entire argument with just two words. barack obama. [applause] >> this is a non-partisan thing. another word is george bush. george h. w. bush. or dwight eisenhower or jimmy carter because in each of those cases you can see that by no means for these presidents kowtowing or listening or being

controlled by the pro-israel lobby. let me talk a little more specifically about the case of barack obama and where we are today in the peace process to show you a case study of the arab lobby's influence. the israeli lobby's basic philosophy is the government of israel has been democratically elected representatives of the people should decide the fate of israel and should engage in direct negotiations with the arabs, palestinians and other arab states to negotiate a two state solution, is the preferred result. the arab lobby has a different approach especially in the state department. they believe a number of things. one, israel has become worse. israel is not going to make peace on its own unless the united states uses its power to force them. they believe that israel, the

israeli people are either too stupid or image shore or evil to know what is good for them and they should be saved in spite of themselves. a very famous article written by one of the state department officials was called how to save israel in spite of itself. a third thing that is common belief in the arab lobby that the palestinian issue is the most important one. if we just solve the palestinian issue than everything else goes away despite the obvious problem of afghanistan not going away, palestinian peace broke out tomorrow or the sunni and shiite woodstock killing each other in iraq if there was peace in the palestinian issue and sell on. you can list a number of cases to disprove that but that is the basic belief and finally there's the belief the united states has to be actively engaged in peacemaking because if we are not constantly pushing there will be this vacuum that will

create instability usually filled by violence and bad things happening for american interests. if you look at those two philosophies of the arab and israeli lobby and look at the policies pursued by president obama it is pretty clear that he is not pursuing the israeli lobby agenda. he is pursuing a policy more consistent with the arab lobby. you can like it or not like it but we just laid out in terms of whether president obama is accomplishing the goal that he set for himself and the first year. when he came to office, one of the main points of his campaign is he was not george bush. that his domestic policies were going to not be george bush and would be very different and his foreign policies would be very different and this applied to the police policy as well. in the case of the middle east, he wanted to show that he, unlike george bush, is a friend

of the arab and moslem world and one of the first things he did -- the first interview he gave was not to the washington post or the new york times but an air of publication and one of the first -- the first major foreign policy see -- speech was where? cairo. he went and gave a very good speech in cairo. i thought was a very good speech the personal trying to explain to the muslim world and make the case the united states is not in any kind of conflict with islam or the arab world and we want to be on good relations. perfectly good speech, nothing i would complain about but the problem was what was the impact in terms of the muslim world? all of a sudden the muslim world falls in love with barack obama as a result of the speech? they didn't. if you look at recent polls you see that he is not particularly

popular in the arab and moslem world. he is more popular than george bush, but not by any means won them over by his policy or his speech and one of the reasons had to do with listening to the erebus and making a mistake where he gave the speech. why was it a problem to speak in cairo? if there were a couple reasons. one is cairo is one of the most repressive countries in the middle east. it represses muslims. the muslim brotherhood in particular. so if you are in the muslim world and you see the united states president going to a dictatorial regime to speak their to bolster their president, what is the reaction? so much different from george bush, look at how he is reaching out to us, the reaction in many places was he is just like all arrest because here he is

propping up a dictator who happens to be pro american and one that is actually repressing muslims in his country so it backfired in a way. the second thing that happened was he was led to believe by his advisers that what was important was to publicly criticize israel, go after the settlement issue and make clear that he was going to aggressively pursue a palestinian/is real peace leading to a palestinian israel state. there's nothing necessarily wrong with that approach or that goal but the problem was he was led to believe that this was what the saudis wanted it if he did those things they would go along with his policy objective in the middle east. so what happened on the way to cairo? do you know where he stopped? no. you don't know because nobody wanted to report about it. it was kept largely secret until

many months later that he stopped in saudi arabia. he went to the king and he said ok, i have been making an issue of the israeli settlements, making the palestinian-israeli peace issue a high priority and pushing hard for a palestinian state. now i want you to help me and one of the things i want you to do is make certain gestures to israel to show the israelis that if they make peace with the palestinians that at the end of the day there will be some normalization in relations with the rest of the arab world. and king abdallah said jump in the lake. and for months after words, similar things wind on antiques time the saudis, hillary clinton with the president or his other advisers jump in the lake. we won't do anything so he was led to believe that if he took these steps that the arabists have always advocated that it

would result in positive gains from the saudis and it didn't. the third thing that happened was in relation to the israelis. by coming out opposing settlements, he might have gotten a fair amount of support from american jews and israelis is he had limited his call for a freeze to settlements in the west bank. but what happened was he called for a freeze of settlements in jerusalem as well. for virtually all israelis, right, center and left that is a red line because jerusalem is the capital of israel and for barack obama to tell the israelis they don't have the right to build in their capital back from their perspective is like israel telling americans they have no right to build in washington d.c.. it was going too far. we might have gotten support

from part of the israeli public and part of the american jewish community that doesn't like settlements and would like to see israel give them up, by doing that, making that mistake he undermined his own goal again of trying to get pressure on israel. the other thing that happened was by focusing so much on the settlement issue and publicly criticizing israel without at the same time seeming to put any pressure on the arab side he alienated most of the israeli public so that according to one poll 4% of israelis thought that president obama was a friend of israel. most people in washington think barack obama is a friend of israel. but it doesn't matter. what matters is what is really sink and whether they are right or wrong as long as they have the perception that america is not behind them it is impossible for israel to take risks for peace and whatever israel does in terms of negotiations with

the palestinians in going forward is going to involve risks. they need to feel america is behind them and by his approach they didn't feel that. was undermined again, his own objective of trying to get the israelis to move forward on the peace and at the same time it also didn't work with the palestinians because two things happened with the palestinians. when the palestinians saw that even after obama made settlement such a big issue basically the israelis continued to do some building. they didn't stop entirely and wouldn't stop in jerusalem and from the palestinian perspective and the perspective of much of the arab world obama might be very well-meaning but too week to force israel to do what they wanted. the other thing that happened in terms of palestinians is they never refuse to negotiate because of settlement. since 1993 the palestinians have been negotiating with israel

even when settlements were being billed. there was never a demand for a freeze. just a year before obama demanding a freeze they had been in negotiations with the prime minister who offered 97% of the west bank for a palestinian state which they turned down. so once obama said we want the israelis to free the settlement's only the palestinians could not say we are going to be left less hard-line than the americans about this. we have to go for a settlement freeze too. so what ended up happening was in 7 coming forward to negotiate with israel they refused for nine months. so whether you like his policies or not, just by his own set of objectives the first year was a failure on just about every -- in every way because he took the arab lobby's approach to the middle east.

things have begun to change. things are changing in part because president obama is a pretty smart guy, a good politician and recognized it didn't work and he replaced some of the erebus who were running the show who were influencing him on middle east policy with a guy named dennis ross who is the world's most experienced peace processor and we seem to see some evidence that he is having an effect because when prime minister benjamin netanyahu came to washington the second time he was treated very well, given a very hearty welcome as opposed to the first visit where he was humiliated and instead of beating is realistic say are using carrots. they want is real to continue to freeze on settlements but rather than beating them up with some threats they have reportedly offered them a variety of

carrots in terms of different things the united states is willing to do if they're willing to extend the freeze for a couple of months. at the same time they are much tougher on not accepting the idea that he shouldn't have to negotiate and it is just a concession for him to visit the table and exchange for israel freezing the settlements and there is much greater pressure and recognition that this was an obstacle for the past year or two in negotiations and he has to be pressured. we see a real calibration, necessarily have adopting the israeli lobby position only but moving away from the arab lobby influence that icing was taking him down the wrong path the first year and now we see some hope that there will be negotiations down the line that will lead to a peace settlement.

let me just finish with a historical anecdote so that we leave on i hope a more positive note before i take questions. that is either when things looked pessimistic as they may today there is historical precedent for thinking peace is possible. in 1947 you know who was controlling palestine? great britain. they decided to turn the question of what to do with palestine over to the united nations. why did they do that? they believed that the un would never be able to get the jews and arabs to agree on a solution and would throw up their hands and say do whatever you want. so the british adviser was talking to one of the zionist leaders one day and he said how did you let us take this issue to the united nations? don't you know the only way to get the jewish state is if the united states and the soviet union agree?

that will never happen. it never happened. it can't possibly happen. a few weeks later for the first time in history the united states and the soviet union agreed on the partition of palestine into a jewish and arab state. for 30 years guys like me talked to groups like you saying it will never happen. can't possibly happen. i can show you all the propaganda where they used to say anwar sadat is just like it there. hitler decided to go to jerusalem in 1977. he broke the psychological barrier, subsequently made peace. it took 15 more years before king hussein had the courage to make peace but he did and so today we have peace this week israel and two arab states. two muslim states which suggests to me it is possible to have peace. it may be in 30 years or 15 happen much sooner. thank you very much.

[applause] >> i am steve goldberg. i will ask some questions that have been selected already and others are being brought to me. first question. is there any reliable evidence the personal not just a rumor that the arab lobby helped suppress evidence of potential complicity by the royal family in the attacks on 9/11? >> did the arab lobby suppress evidence? related to saudi involvement in the 9/11 attacks? there is no hard evidence i know of that the arab lobby perce suppressed that. never came out in the report that continues to be classified that certain members of congress

have suggested involved information about saudi involvement. a lot of what they do doesn't necessarily have to be direct. it can be in direct. the notion that people know that if you make the saudis and happy, bad things can happen and sometimes there have been more explicit threats as in the case of the lawsuit by survivors of 9/11 against a couple of saudi royals and the reports were that the saudis printed large amounts of money from the u.s. economy and they have done that on other occasions as well. >> how have the saudis been lobbying the u.s. administration with respect to the iranian threat? >> how is the arab lobby lobbying the government on the iranian threat?

as i said, the principal concern of saudi arabia is the survival of the monarchy. the saudis and the other gulf states are petrified of the iranians much more than the israelis because they are a lot closer and the israeli -- iranians make no pretense about their designs on parts of the gulf. they occupy one of the islands owned by bahrain, they're constantly having border disputes so the saudis are scared to death of the iranians but the saudis are very scared of how they are dealt with. that if they don't think the united states will take action against the year iranians, they will do one of two things and have already done both leaders bill that is to try to buy off the iranians. they have gone and had meetings with iran in the past to try to

appease them and at the same time they are finding a nuclear cooperation agreement and there are likely to pursue a nuclear weapon. one of the biggest dangers about the iranian issue, is not iran getting the bomb but the fact that if they get the ball the other arab states will want it to protect themselves from iran, the saudis first among them. >> is it possible for a pro israel organization to combat the arab lobby, aimed at destroying israel and if so how would you recommend it be done? >> can the israeli lobby, that the arab lobby? one of the things people ask sometimes is if the arab lobby is so powerful how come u.s./is relations are so strong and palestinian relations are not strong. most of the arab lobby is not

competing directly with the israeli lobby. the saudi lobby is mostly focused on what is good for saudi arabia and cares less about israel. one time the saudi and israeli lobbies tend to clash has been over arms sales and that hasn't happened since 1981 when the arab lobby defeated the israeli lobby. as far as the arab/american domestic lobby groups they too clash but it hasn't been a very fair fight because the domestic arab lobby groups have not had much success because they don't have public support. they don't have a positive agenda and most members of congress are interested in separating u.s. policy from israel. with the pro-israel lobby does it is what they have always done which is to try to convince the american people that it is in u.s. interests to strengthen the

relationship. not necessarily to be anti anybody else. the israeli lobby of the one that helps the egyptians and jordanians get foreign aid. they have not opposed aid to the palestinians. they tend be more helpful than antagonistic. the of this thing about the saudis that is interesting when you read the state department documents is the saudis don't like israel. they would love that israel didn't exist but for the most part israel doesn't bother them. it is not a threat to the monarchy. what you would see is in some of the meetings, u.s. diplomat would be talking to the saudi and the saudi king or foreign minister would say something like we really don't like israel, we wish you would do something about the israelis or stop supporting israel and that would be in the first thirty seconds and then they will say what we really care about is -- first they were afraid of

hatchets and the '50s and then nasser as they were afraid of in the 50s and 60s and then the soviets in the cold war and now is iran. they say we really don't like israel and wish you wouldn't support israel. when they talk to barack obama but you can be sure in a couple minutes ago as to the earlier question and they say what we are really worried about is the iranians because they know is real won't attack saudi arabia but iran might. >> you mentioned the victory of the saudi lobby over the pro-israel lobby with regard to the sale of weapons. have has the power of the arab lobby waxed and waned since that time over the various ten years of the presidential administration and how much of the change in their influence is >> that is a good question. i am not sure the power has waxed and waned. in terms of the saudis it has

been consistent. every president has given in to sa the coercion and there's always talk about how close the bushs where to the saudis and it is true that a close relationship but so did every other president, confirming their willingness to give in to the saudis in terms of arms sales and various policies in the middle east. i don't think it has waxed and waned at all. it has been fairly consistent. but the question is a good one because the most important factor in determining u.s. middle east policy is the president's ideology. not just about lobbying. what matters is what is the president's world view? the lobby that comes the closest to the president's world view on any issues that tend debt is the one that tends to have influenced. the presidents have their own views on all these issues but

when there is some question or conflict between the views of advisers the one whose views are consistent with the president's ideology wind. to give you the example of the truman administration, one of the most pro israel presidents, one responsible for supporting partition, for recognizing israel and he accepted the advice of the pro israel lobby and pro israel advisers who wanted him to support partition and the recognition of israel but at the same time he also embargoed arms to the jewish faith saying it was more difficult for them to defend themselves in the war of independence. why did he do that? he went along with the advisers from the state department convinced him that this would be a way of reducing blood shed. part of his ideology was he was

hoping to avoid bloodshed. this is one way that you influenced presidents. take barack obama for example. you can't prove all the time where the lobbying influence starts and where it ends. in the case of his views on settlement i suspect he has strong personal opposition to settlement and somewhere earlier in his career someone put the idea into his head or influenced him in a way but today i don't think he needs. to avoid settlement. that is something he feels strongly about. >> do you believe there will be lobbying in support of a u. n unilateral declaration of a palestinian state sometime in 2011? will the saudis and other arab nations be pushing that along with europeans and our if that is going to happen can pro or --

that that? >> will there be an effort to declare a unilateral palestinian state? there has been more and more discussion of that. one part of the arab lobby i don't talk about much, are talk about a little bit at the end is the foreign component and that probably in some ways is part of the strongest part of the lobby from the europeans, united nations and some of these international nine governmental organizations. europeans have already said they are prepared to recognize the state of palestine. one thing that separates the desire to have a unilateral palestinian state and actually having one is the u.s. position that as long as the united states is unwilling to recognize the state of palestine, hasn't been created through negotiations it is not likely that it will be created.

there is pressure from european governments and arab states. it won't happen unless the united states is convinced of it and as of now i don't see evidence of that and the israeli lobby certainly will lobby congress to try to minimize or pressure the white house to support such a thing. certainly it is a legitimate consideration that if for some reason president obama decides to change his views on that subject a palestinian state, just like that. >> you mention the arab lobby donates money to people after they leave office including presidents with their libraries. how much do you believe arab money worse on the money has influenced former president carter and now clinton to come out against israel?

>> in terms of carter, if you have seen his diary that came out you can see that he was no friend of israel when he was it is quite remarkable when you about every israeli leader he has nothing good to say. but he loves every arab dictator. the guy who murdered 20,000 of his own people, wonderful guy, great sense of humor and great cheesemaker and the saudi king leading the apartheid government, great guy, terrific pieces is even though he undermined camp david and on and on. i don't think the saudi money afterwards to the carter center and they have given a lot was a major influence. i think carter already had his own views towards israel and a

variety of people ask why is jimmy carter so anti israel? why does he have the attitude that he does. there are a few reasons. one is carter tends to confuse his initials fifth with someone else with the same initials. and [applause] ..

>> bitter or about that which, by the way, also the settlement freeze for three months didn't work then and was a good precedent for why it's not working now. and finally as we talks about in the diary, he's very bitter because he was defeated for election in part because jews abandoned him in droves, that he got the lowest jewish vote since any democrat since, i believe, 1924 because american jews did not believe he was a friend of israel, and he seems to be totally puzzled by this now. oh, as far as clinton, look, clinton was, i think, along with george w. bush if not the most pro-israel president in history, you know, in a close tie.

and whether he's now saying changes that are not the most sympathetic, he said something that was, quite frankly, idiotic the other day, blaming russian jews for the lack of peace in the middle east it seemed, but you have to understand that he is trying to help the obama administration, he's trying to help his wife, the secretary of state, and supporting their policy. and i don't think he's turned against israel, i think he's certainly remains a friend of israel and as president he was a great friend of israel. so, you know, even friends of israel, though, keep in mind -- and i talked about this in the last book i wrote called "will israel survive," i talked about george w. bush who i said was, along with clinton, the most pro-israel president, but you could take a whole list of decisions that he made that were anti-israel in a way or were critical or punitive against israel. no president is going to do everything israel wants, and

that's okay. >> if israel and the pro-israel lobby began to take the position that the evidence shows that a palestinian state would be a mistake and contrary both to the safety and security of israel and to the stability in the middle east which is the united states' interest, would there be any possibility of turning around the ship which is heading in the direction of pushing for a palestinian state? >> yeah. if pro-israel lobby in america concluded that a two-state solution was not in israel's interest, would there be a way changing the policy. the basic philosophy of the israeli lobby has been that the people of israel living in a democracy have the right through

their democratic representatives to determine all issues related to peace and security. and that the government of israel makes those decisions, and those of us who are 6,000 or more miles away are not in a position to tell the people of israel who have to live with the consequences, whose children have to fight in wars and go to the army what they should live with. that's the -- [applause] that's the tradition alice railly -- traditional israeli lobby position. and if you don't have that position, then what consistent basis could a lobby have for policy? if you don't go by what the israeli government wants, is it just by the majority of a particular group of jews in a particular place or a particular jewish organization or pro-israel organization, or how are you going to come up with a policy? it's very difficult to conceive of how you would have any kind of consistent policy that would

make any sense if you didn't do that. now, there's another lobby out there that has taken a different view, and it's basically the arab lobby view that i described earlier which is we in america know what's best for israel, and the israelis are two, again, stupid, immature, politically-constrained, evil -- for whatever reason, they can't do what's best for them and, therefore, the united states has to go and beat them to a pulp until they do what's good for them. and that's the view of a particular lobby here who is unsatisfied with israeli policy. and because they can't win over the people of israel to their point of view, they're trying to force it on the people of israel. and it's the same thing with the argument, the people who are unhappy with the israeli lobby. the problem isn't that the israeli lobby is all-powerful or that the people like walt or

jimmy carter are silenced and don't get to express their view, the problem is their views aren't persuasive. they've lost the debate, and rather than simply accept the fact that most americans don't agree with them, they believe that somehow they're being persecuted and that the policy should be whatever they say it is even though that's not what most americans believe. so i think to answer the question, no, i don't believe the israeli lobby is going to change the policy of the state of israel. the state of israel has come around for whatever, for its own reasons from the belief one day of palestinian state being too dangerous to the idea of a confederation with jordan to, now, the last several prime ministers believing that two-state solution is the best opportunity for israel to have peace. and, again, the israeli lob by, i'm not going to advocate position one way or the other. i'm just going to tell you the

position of the establishment israeli lobby is to support the elected government of israel. >> and if israeli government were to revert back to the original position -- >> we'll spin our heads around like linda blair. >> right. [laughter] but if it did that, would there be a possibility of getting the christian zionists and the jewish organizations to back the israeli government in now rejecting a palestinian state? >> look, i don't foresee the policy going backwards. for a whole variety of reasons. but as i say, i mean, this is one of the things that i always found absurd about criticism of aipac, people who would say aipac's become this right-wing republican organization. aipac, whether you like it or not, goes by the policy of the government of israel. and if government of israel tomorrow says we're giving up the golan heights, aipac is going to come out with talking points for why israel can give up the golan heights.

i can tell you how many years since '73 the israeli lobbyists had talking points for why that is bad for israel's security. but if israel decides that that is something it can live with, the pro-israel lobby's going to support it. and just as now the pro-israel lobby supports the two-state solution and the creation of a palestinian state. not everybody likes it, everybody, i think, understands that there are dangers and problems, but as long as that's the government policy, that's what they're going to support. if somehow a new government comes to power with a completely different perspective, if something happens in the middle east that causes everybody to change their views, if there's a fall from power in jordan and suddenly the palestinians take over jordan, you know, hezbollah takes over lebanon, the muslim brotherhood takes over egypt -- all things that could happen, by the way -- you don't know what change in policy might be. but for now i don't see a reason

why we're going to go back to a confederation with jordan because the jordanians don't want it, and most israelis agree that they're willing to give up territories in exchange for peace. >> is the arab lobby more influential among either political party? >> is the arab lobby more influential many either political party? not really. they aren't very influential within the parties at all because, again, you have very small numbers. they contribute relatively little money directly to campaigns, and most of what they do is, again, focused not on the bottom-up and on the congress where they have a difficult time having influence, but they focus more on the state department and the white house where they can have direct influence, and it doesn't matter whichever party's in there. the state department, it's a permanent bureaucracy. and by winning friends in the

permanent bureaucracy, then when the parties change power or the white house changes hands, it doesn't affect the state department that much because you have these entrenched arabists trying to keep policy consistent with their views. but if you look historically, i think probably there are more arab-americans involved in the democratic party. they've had, probably, greater access through the democratic party. not a great deal of influence, but they're overwhelmingly registered as accurates. -- democrats. whether they have much influence, i don't think so. >> you mentioned that in washington, d.c. president obama is considered to be a friend of israel. based on what? [laughter] [applause] >> one of the problems with assessing the u.s./israel relationship is is that it tends

to be entirely through the prism of the peace process and what's reported in "the new york times". or on cnn. and the u.s./israel relationship is not the peace process. whenever there is any kind of tension in the peace process, it gives the impression that the relationship is in trouble, that there's a crisis, that whoever has caused the tension is somehow critical of israel. if you look, though, at the broad web of relationships between the united states and israel, they're stronger, deeper than ever before some of which obama has contributed to in terms of a hot of new military -- lot of new military cooperation. they've just agreed to sell israel the new, most advanced stealth fighter plane. there's been a number of other military developments. israel is being the -- the

united states is fully funding one of the anti-missile systems. there's a lot of cooperation going on that you don't read about in "the new york times." it's not sexy, you know? each of the 50 states have relationships with israel. something like 22 have their own agreements on a state-to-state basis. states like california do something on the order of a billion dollars worth of trade with israel every year. you have relationships between most of the universities in the united states and universities in israel. you have exchanges of police going to israel, of various security officials. you have all kinds of things going on between the united states and israel that just don't get the publicity which are really the true indicators of the strength of the relationship. and president obama, as i said, i think that he pursued an approach in the middle east in the first year which, by his own

standards, was counterproductive. but in terms of his overall interest in, i think, middle east peace, you know, i'm not convinced that east anti- he's anti-israel. there may be things that he could do that some people would like percent, but i don't think -- better, but i don't think that he's got a particular animus against israel. >> final question. how warmly received has your book been by the arab lobby and by its market in the united states government? >> how warmly received has been -- everybody loves my book. [laughter] just ask my mother. [laughter] there's been, the reviews have been pretty positive. most of the arab lobby wants it to go away, and i don't think they want o talk about it. but, you know, it's interesting when you write a book because you find out some very interesting things about how people review books. for example, you, one thing you

discover is people like to review books without reading them. [laughter] and it's sort of like a ponzi scheme where one person reviewed my book and didn't like who wrote the blurb on the back, and so said nasty things about the book, and then someone else then quoted the first guy, and then the third person quoted the second guy, and money of the three actually had read -- none of the three actually had read the book. or another guy who criticized the book for being lightly referenced, lightly footnoted. ladies and gentlemen, this book footnoted. so, you know, you take some of the criticism with a grain of salt, but overwhelmingly, you know, the reviewing "commentary magazine" or the national review online or alan derek wit's review that was in the jerusalem post and the daily beast and a variety of other places. there was a full-page q&a this last week, so i'm pretty pleased with the reception it's gotten

because this is fundamentally based on research. this isn't my personal opinions. this was based on hundreds and hundreds of documents, primary documents from the state department, interviews from the leading state department officials who were involved in making policy. this was many years in the making. so i'm pretty confident that this is something that can stand any criticism and will inform you, i think, about a great, a great deal of things that you probably never knew were going on behind your backs. and that now that you know, hopefully you can do something about it. thank you very much. [applause] >> call this meeting to an end, and mr. bard is here if your questions have not been answered. >> my book, i think, is outside. i'll be happy to sign them for you. >> this mitchell bard -- for

more information visit mitchellbard.com. >> elijah griswold, what is the tenth parallel? >> guest: it's the line of latitude about 700 miles north of the equator, and i spent the last seven years traveling between the equator and this particular fault line, so il always remember last is flat. that's from -- lat is flat. that's from third grade. so traveling within thisn t bandwidth 9,000 miles throughe southeast asia looking at whatt happens on the grounasd when christianity and islam actually meet.rist because the single fact that i really began with is that four out of five of the world's 1.3 billion muslims do not live in the middle east. they're not arabs.s they're africans, and they're asians, and they live within the state, and this is where, basically, the southern edge ofs the world's muslims meet nearly half of the world's two billion christians who live in africaion and southeast asia.ve i

some people refer to this areaas as the global south.fe it's kind of the new moniker. it's a little bit clunky, buta it's certainly better than developing world. and so here most of the people of faith in the world live, andf they meet each other. and so i wanted to see whatme actually happens on the groundt when christianity and islame practically meet.stia >> host: seven years? this. >> guest: seven years.me >> host: why?y >> guest: because i can't think of a more important question. i certainly, as a reporter, have heard so much about this overblown and oversimplified clash of civilizations narrative, and i wanted to see what actually happens in floods, in droughts, in fights over land, oil, water and even in indonesia, crops of cock -- chocolate.e gl because when the price spikes, ca coo is brown in indonesia, and christians and muslims began to fight over that very valuablv land. so i wanted to see what actually happens when resource conflicts

are mixed with faith because it isn't that religion can be explained away by politicale economy. it isn't always a question of haves and have notses. and so essentially i wanted too look, try to restore the realitt of this beyond this monolithic, oversimplified clash which is simply not the truth on thewhic ground. >> host: why is the price of cacao a religious issue? >> guest: that's a good question. the price of cacao is a dividing issue, right? and so because -- essentially, what has happened in eastern, in eastern indonesia which is really interesting in termsdone of -- because it dates back hundreds of years. some of these confrontations and the history of coexistence are n hundreds, if not thousands of years old between christians and muslims. what happened in easternter indonesia primarily, the spice trade., the trade winds brought christian and muslim missionaries to the same beachea and islands and ports much assln

hindus and buddhists before them. this is where theis trade winds drop, essentially. so in the eastern part of the pr archipelago, islam arrived first. islam arrived first throughout what is today's indonesia which is more than 24,000 islands. and so the muslims took up the coast. they were traders, they were sailers -- sailors, and islame rang the coast -- ran the coast of many places. e but when the dutch, first the portuguese and then the dutchugu arrived, what happened really in the 16th century is that the dutch targeted inland populations where islam hadn't reached yet. w on these islands. why? because the people who livedi inland ate pork, and pork isnl forbidden by muslims. and so the dutch used, disturb missionaries used the naturally pre-existing trends and practices of the people there to

draft christianity on to local conditions. so, now, how does cacao come to bear on this?? the muslims in the eastern parti of indonesia tend to be wealthier because they're on th coast. the christians who live inlando do not have these global links, and they're poorer. so what's happened is the muslims have bought up a lot of the highlands, the christians live up on these ridges, and the muslims have bought a lot of the land,. and the christians are,rp essentially, sharecroppers.like and that process can make people absolutely outraged especially when they see the price of theie crops going through the roof. so christians had been forested to sell off their land to muslims over the past decade, and that has made people super angry. >> host: eliza griswold, are there any generalizations you can make about your travels, be about the people you met throughout this tenth parallel?

>> guest: well, probably the largest surprise for me and -- is that we talk a lot about the clashes between religions, but the most important religious confrontations of our time are r not between christianity and islam, they're those inside of christianity and islam. they are the con confrontations between christians and christians, muslims and muslims over who's a true believer andv who's not, who has the right toa speak for god and who doesn't. we certainly see that in americ when people, for example, we see that between liberals anda conservatives. when people like reverend franklin graham, head of a half billion dollar evangelical empire and billy graham's sonre questions whether president barack obama is a true christian or not. what's that about? that's about this confrontation inside of christianity.nfr and within islam it's even more. important to understand that there's no such single thing as islam. there are thousands of islams..

this isn't only a sectarianh division between sunnis andn shia, it's also a question between liberals andtes. conservatives over who's going to control what islam means in theis 21st century in practicald terms whether it's veiling or practices for women's rights orl economic policies. these are confrontations within the religions, and they are the most important confrontations of our time. >> host: what's your relationship with franklin graham? >> guest: my relationship with franklin graham, i'm glad toship say, is a very friendly one. i have a great deal of respect for him.re he's also good fun. we traveled together in the 2003 to sudan when he was going foret the first time in history towh meet with a man he had called just as evil as saddam hussein. and that man is still sudan's president today, president omar bashir.t he stands indicted by the international criminal court fol crimes of genocide and crime against humanity for what

happened in darfur.w so in 2003 darfur was just really a whisper. and at that time franklin graham was very much in the public eyee because he had called islam a wicked and evil religion, and so that sound bite was echoing around, especially in sudan. because the north of sudan is primarily muslim. and so there was a lot of outcry against his arrival. and so when i found out he wass going to meet with his sworn enemy, i asked if i could go along, and i was working fory. that bastion of religious values, ""vanity fair"" magazine. and so he said yes, and he took me, and when we went and sat in the marble palace, these two men, it was like watching -- it was fascinating. these two men each tried tohe's convert the other, and can thato was not terribly successful. and then graham made reference to a hospital that he ran until very recently in louis that is south sudan's largest hospital.

and president bashir's government and his army hasd pr actually twice bombed thisa hospital. that's how sudan's 40 years of civil war have played out on the ground, that especially baa surt has -- bashir has really bombed feeding stations, bombed hospitals in the south, and graham has seen that up front which is what really shapes hisr opinions about islam which heios holds to this day. so graham said, mr. president bashir, i have a hospital in thi south, and bashir said the one and only sentence he uttered in english during the whole time whichdd is to his aide, he turnr to his aide and said, center that the hospital we -- isn't that the hospital we bombed? and graham leaned forward and said, twice, and mow missed. tha and -- you missed. what happened next was even more fascinating.what graham told me later that he remembered that in the pocket of his blue blazer he had a george w. bush 2004 re-election pin which he'd taken from the deske of karl rove's secretary.

so he leaned forward and took the pin from his pocket and gave it to bashir and said, mr.e president, i understand you'll be speaking to my president later today. why don't you tell him you're his first voter here in the sudan. so what does that mean?. if essentially, that means thatm watch out, bashir. i've got the ear of the president, and i found that particularly interesting at the time because of the relationshia between state and foreign policy which goes so unexplored becauso we don't really know who are serving as d our de facto ambassadors abroad a lot. now, of course, that meeting would be impossible given bashir's record on human rights, but for me at the time it was just fascinating. it was like watching history books come alive. >> host: poet and investigative journalist eliza griswold is our guest. this is her first nonfiction book, "the tenth parallel." 585-3885 for those in the east and central time zones, 585-3886

if you live in the mountain and pacific time zones. first call up for eliza griswold from portland, oregon. please go ahead, portland. >> caller: hello, everybody. i really appreciate the author for reaching so many nations. the talk, especially now, that the world has become a worldd village. i have a couple of questions in regards to what kind of economic power she perceived in the book or she exposes in the book not only in the regards to -- [inaudible] but i think it is very acute the fact that she points out that a lot of the economy that comes from the fifth parallel down inh the hemisphere, it's related to cacao and other crops.o and then my question, i guess, is do you know of any companies that are doing businesss currently that profit from thatu cacao economy?u

so that is it. thank you. >> guest: so a lot of the local businesses, the cacao businesses in indonesia do have, they have local elements, and they have international elements. i mean, cacao was just one and really one of the smaller resources that i was looking at and the crops that i was looking at in the course of this seven years of reporting. much more certainly relevant on a world scale today would be oil because sudan, for example, is a huge oil supplier, but not to the united states, right?se so one thing that i was seeing quite a bit of in many africa especially was chinese oilbit development. and you know what?a i was also seeing malaysian oil development in sudan.ng and i had a very curious conversation along the tenth parallel in an oil field which we're going to be hearing more about in sudan because southern sudan which has had intermittent

40-year civil war with northern sudan which has led to the death of two million people, southern sudan on january 9th of 2011, so very soon, is going to be votin for its right to its own's independence. now, 80% of sudan's oil is in the south of the country, buts there's only one way that oilry. leaves the country, and that's through the north. that's through a pipeline.y, and that pipeline is heavily protected by chinese oil interests.r now, it used to be a u.s.eres company which had divested becausee of so much political power.h and i had the very curious conversation with some of the former farmers, sudanese southern farmers who have been essentially scorch earth shoved off their land by oil interests, right? so they have, her now essentially fishermen, and they fish in puddles. and i had a group of men say toh me, why can't you bring back chevron?ri we'd much prefer chevron and western oil interests to chinesh

ones because at least they try to get to know us.ea so, you know, that is to say in shorthand that what looks at a distance like dismal economic policy and we should bring sanctions and we need to stay out of particular areas is frequently on the ground much more complicated than it looks at a distance. >> host: redding, california. good afternoon to you, you're os with eliza griswold. >> caller: hi, i just wanted to thank this lady for her>> statement about so much of thetn conflict that's blamed betweenhr christians and muslims is really between their own kind, muslims against muslims and christians against christians. i think that was a very profound insight that's not recognized. i'd also like to ask her if she knows of any third party that's interested in the conflictst' between christians and muslimsen and if she could expound on that, i'd appreciate it. thank you. >> guest: uh, like a thirdik party, a political party or a --

>> host: i think he meant generically, if there's anything that you recognize as a third party. p be it a corporation, be itw whatever.ues >> guest: sure. so i will just be totally frank, i'm the daughter of a priest, so i grew up watching a lot oft interfaith dialogue -- >> host: episcopalian priest. >> guest: ing yes, just to clarify, episcopalian priests can have children. [laughter] so i grew up in a household where questions of faith and intellect were daily questions, and seeing a lot of what does i mean when christians and muslime and jews or buddhists, hindus, whoever it is sit down and try to find common ground. and a lot of that, i'll be frank, was a lot of hot air. are so many places along the tenth parallel where i've seen substantive interfaith worw really being done by people themselves. they don't need a third party. in fact, sometimes they'res better served without one.ved so in nigeria, for example, there is a pastor and an imam who are both self-avowed

fundamentalists. they both believe the other one is is going to hell no matter what -- >> host: that james -- >> guest: yes, it's james and asafa.o so this james, who's the pastor who has one arm. why? because his other arm was loppeh off in fighting between the two men about 15 years ago. and so these guys have done the most successful interfaith work that i've seen in the practicalu terms. it's essentially community and organizing 101. they don't deal with garbage collection, but it's like that.k one of the things that christians and muslims fight about in northern nigeria is firewood. so essentially they get a buy-ir from christian and muslim women because the women are much moren likely to be amenable, and they say, hey, you guys, it costs $360 to get enough wood every year to burn, you know, to make to make your food in a single year.

this stove costs $100. we can't buy it for you, how are you going to figure out to buy it? so it's bringing in a secular element, really a third element rather than a third party is maybe the best way to say it. i think in most situation peopls are better off building on their own.th >> host: dispatches between the fault line of christianity and islam is the subtitle.sti next call comes from the belfast, maine.es >> caller: yes, good afternoon.l i'm curious whether the author has an idea from the places she's traveled how the twot different religions discussed how they might or might not be reacting to the controversy of the islamic center proposed fora manhattan? >> host: thank you, caller.

>> guest: that gets to a super:h important point which is that global realities make, can lead to deaths in many, many places that i traveled along the tenth parallel.el in particular, the danisht cartoon riots left more people dead in knew year ya than --an nigeria than any other country. >> host: why?r >> guest: why? because, for one, we're looking at failed states that are weaka at best, right? and so local identities tend to be based not around -- if youar ask someone who are you, thene w answer isn't i'm a nigerian,i it's i'm a christian or i'm a muslim.ause why?r because being a christian or a muslim is what guarantees that you get electricity, freshh water, a good road. when there is no functioningis government, people turn to other factorsrds in order to safeguar those most basic human rights, and along the tenth parallel, people turn to religion quite ar lot. so,l essentially, what happens is, i have to say i forgot the

question -- >> host: it was about the muslim center in new york city.mu [laughter]sl >> guest: okay. >> host: it was a very good w answer. >> guest: thank you. essentially what happens is pastor james said something to me which i really repeat all thp time which is when the westt needs us, africa and asia catch the colds.d. so when something, again, the u.s. invasion of afghanistan,a the lunatic holding up the koran and saying he was going to burnt it. you know, these imimaginesg rocket around the -- images rocket around the world, andpe people do die.e they do in kabul, they do in nigeria, so in terms of the ground zero question because ite has not turned explicitly violent here, i have not seen that leading to a lot ofa violence elsewhere along the tenth parallel.t that said, these two sides shapo each other. radicals on one side mouth off, and they create an equal andite

opposite reaction on the other side, and that is what is so enably polarizing within each community because somebody stands up and says, hey, this is what it is to be a truet believer, i am a true, exclusive believer, and that creates fissures in the same side and creates fear across that fault line. >> host: how prevalent is sharih law? >> guest: we'll just stick to nigeria. 16 of 36 -- 12 of 36 nigerian states follow sharia law, so they follow islamic law.uc what does that mean in practical terms? it has proven to mean very little. essentially, the call to the return to islamic law is sol frequently in this area of the world about rejecting corruption, rejecting what'srup seen as the failed democracys imposed by the west which ism curious to us.i we don't think of that. we think, well, it's about the criminal code that says lop off

hands, stone people to death. ino fact, not. in fact, the first religious edict we have about stoning unbelievers to death comes from the book of deuteronomy.mes it comes from the old testament or one of the -- yeah. it comes from one of our older scriptures, not from islam.e sor sharia is present in the northernmost third of nigeria, and curiously enough probably one of the most interesting places i've ever seen ande practiced and one of the mostc interesting pieces of the booka is what happened in indonesiap after the tsunami where in the province of ache the peopleen decided to adopt sharia. and the book tells the story of going out one saturday night ons a raid with the vice and virtue squad which was like taliban meets keystone cop, essentiallys >> host: next call foreliza griswold comes from orlando.

go ahead, orlando. >> caller: yes, thank you for your work. my question is do you believeis these differences in this religion are really a cover for a grab for political power? thank you.er >> guest: you know, the answer to that is a complicated one because a lot of the work that i that is essential we understand i never found myself in a place where i coulda explain away somebody's belief in god. really the jobl of this book wai to bring back people's stories whole cloth, right? there was no objective truth toj saying, oh, this is just about politics or -- and there wereh certainly situations in which youi could see people's politicu interests and what was playingls out on the ground and how they used religion as a mask. but i would say that would be one time out of ten. nine times out of ten there wasm a faith factor, there was a fault line there that had to do with people's beliefs about god. and a lot of the book is about restoring that just as people told me themselves.

>> host: eliza griswold, how did you shop a book called "the y tenth parallel"? >> guest: so, with some difficulty. as a freelance journalist, i became a freelance journalist in 2000 really, and my first storyi was about honor crimes. itot was about women who are killed by their families for perceived infractions against their honor, usually around sex. being raped, adultery. so that was right before 9/11, and i ended up in many new -- iw york on 9/11 like so many young reporters, and two weeks later e was in pakistan with the dustm from the world trade centers on my shoes. and i was wearing -- i mean, i was one of throngs who had thatw same experience. most of us really haven't looke' back. and so i came of age at a particular time where religionil was trying to understand religion was very much -- there was a market for it,

essentially. and so i, thanks to be honest my wonderful editor, jonathan anda paul eli at fsg who decided theh would take on this cue cuee project and allow me a longo leash which might take several years longer than anticipated. e >> host: next call comes from east hampton, new york. good afternoon to you. >> guest: thanks. i have a book fair type question. i've been following ms. griswold's poetry for someie years, and can it's extraordinary work.f it's class call poetry, it's very deep, highly symbolic, conceptual, intellectual,cept moving. and you don't expect that sort of thing from journalists. so i'm wondering maybe part ofd the question is answered in her own biography whether being the daughter of a priest sort of predisposed her for a literary

life and that moving fromr literature to journalism provided a opportunity to get into prose but that the great poetry book that's come out as r kind of return to origins. that's sort of the first part or the question.e if there's a distinctly literary background which might bea related to religious life to th poetry. and then secondly, people who see what you see around thesee world, tremendous pain,e injustice, depravity, most ofin them, i think, need some sort of vent for that. and i'm wondering whether yous think your poetry operates as at vent or it may be somewhates therapeutic for you because iven wonder whether human beings canc really absorb the kinds of things that you see, forh example,er around the world andi then seem to come back and havee a tremendous balance and so ona and o forth. >> host: thank you, caller.o eliza griswold. >> guest: well, thank you very much. so, yes.eli

mostly i write poetry about what i don't understand.most that's really it.e i mean, so if that is while i'm reporting a story and i seepo something or i meet somebody and i can't figure it out on the page in prose, that stuff usually goes to poetry.se and for me there is something -- thatth is, to be honest, that's my, that's my religion in a certain way, that this idea ofn there's a theologian, a romanian theologian who writes about something called the space wher the horizontal and the vertical world, the secular and the sacred meet, and that that is the creation of ceremonial space. and that's what i write -- i mean, for me when i can kind of feel that heat around somethingh that usuallyen becomes a poem.h and i do have a new book of poems that will be out no time soon, but i'm working on ito right now. >> host: so he, obviously, bought "wide awake fields."

>> guest: that was "wide awake field," and i do hope he bought it. and some of the answers i hope biographically, this tentho parallel is not at all a first-person narrative. is a story about africans and asians. but one thing i've definitely. learned is in this kind of work rs no such thing as objectivity. the best thing i could do was do own my own subjectivity, and creating poetry allows one to b honest about the lens through which one is looking. >> host: where did you go to college? >> guest: i went to princeton university. >> host: why?o this.vers >> guest: why?y? because the creative writing t department was extremely stronge and i grew up in philadelphias which isn't so far, and weirdly. enough i missed the light. there's a kind of light ingh, delaware, new jersey and philadelphia that's kind of low slant of light that is note, n anywhere else. but, yes, we will leave it there.h >> host: next call for eliza griswold whose book is "the

tenth parallel: dispatches from the fault line betweenani christianity and islam.": milwaukee, good afternoon. >> caller: hello. i'm on the airou? this. >> host: you are, sir.i >> caller: hello. i didn't hear you mention, ms. depress world -- griswold, the fault line within thewi islamic world on the ethnic basis. you did mention that the majority of muslims are not arabs, but in the sudanf specifically the fault linea between the muslim non-arabs and the central government which is arab and the fact that theh non-muslims of theat fact have f many years emphasized that the darfur issue like the other smaller muslim northerners together form a majority of black africans which together muslim non-arabs with non-muslim southerners form a huge two-thirds majority and that th

darfur issue is, essentially, racial because the muslim non-arabs of the darfur aren being marginalized much like thm southerners which is what the hero of the whole black majoritw movement and they considered sort of an apartheid and that the zahn si bar revolution was very similar and that the wholei killing of -- >> host: okay, caller?: >> caller: yes?e this. >> host: caller, we got the point.n let's get an answer from. ms. griswold. >> guest: okay, so great point.r the larger thing to understand,o again, we're talking aboutda sudan,n, africa's largest count. this is how all of sudan's warsa relate whether it's darfur, whether it's the south, whether it's the people in the east,r, whether it's even the northerners, the nubians. the central cabal based in cartoons is very small political, very powerful regime

fights against its own peripheries wherever those areae against any terms they may be with. in the south, traditionally, they've used islam.ed christians and muslims alike in its own country.and you're right, darfur is muslim-muslim. these are the kindh of nuances which are essential to understand to try to decode some of this, oh, it'ss christian-muslim all the time. no, it's not. it's the fault lines within that are truly the most important to watch.fne >> host: we haven't talked about ethiopia orgy beauty.: >> guest: okay, ethiopia. probably my most favorite story that i learned in doing this book was i didn't go to ethiopia until very late in the reporting, and before i went i learned that in 615 s.d. when the prophet muhammad was a

40-something rich trader preaching to his own people inow mecca, in saudi arabia, theyh kicked him out.t. they didn't want to hear thisear message of one single god, and he fled with most of his followers 210 miles away to medina, the city of the prophet. at that same time, 615 a.d., islam wasn't really a religion yet. he sent a dozen of his followers to africa. whysome because he wanted them in the safest place he could think of, and that was in the court of a christian king.o and his own daughter was one ofr these 12, right? so they go to the court of thego christian king, and this is one of the earliest cases of political asylum we have inum t history.w and they say to the king, theys tell the king a story to try to safeguard their passage.afeg they tell him the story of the virgin mary giving birth to the baby jesus which is a story inv the koran, and the king is a bit mystified, doesn't really understand who these people are but gives them land in a place

north of the capital of addis ababa, not the capital at the time, but that's where it is. i went there a few months ago,h the followers of those firsth descendants are still there. so this story of coexistenceer between christianity and islam is long, and it's powerful. and it's important to rememberty not in some kind of mealy-mouthed we all believe the same thing, but in understanding how these two religions havea shaped each other since they began. >> host: tallahassee, good afternoon. >> caller: hello. this is mario from tallahassee. can you hear me? >> host: we're listening, mario. >> caller: i wanted to ask about the conflict between the upland and the, well, it's muslims and the christians under the occupation of israel.e oc it's a brutal occupation -- >> host: eliza griswold, does

the middle east issue play outs on the tenth parallel? >> guest: not at all. in fact, the point -- does it play out? this it does in that same globad reality, like in the same way the u.s. invasion of afghanistan, in the same way a cookball wanting to burn thes, koran, yes.i globalization brings this issue to bear, very much so. i mentioned this town where then pastor and the imam live, it's in northern nigeria, a river runs down the middle of it.. now, one side of that river has christian neighborhoods, thede other muslim.ris the muslim neighborhoods are, called baghdad and afghanistan, the christian neighborhoods are called jerusalem and, inexplicably, television. a reporter asked me if maybel they'd misunderstood tell avive, but i don't think so. so global -- this is globalization. does israel/palestine play out there? in those names alone you can see that the christian community in nigeria and in be other places

very strongly identifies with the israelis. oftr course you're going to seei much of that within the muslimn context too.s sometimes, though, it's ans excuse. osama bin laden, we know, came to the issue of israel/palestine late. it wasn't an issue for him before 1998.the sometimes israel can be a political football for people trying to garner their own local interests. >> host: petite blond american woman along the tenth parallel. what was that like? >> guest: it was dirty littlee secret, it's easier to be a. woman and do this reporting than it is to be a man. >> host: why? >> guest: because most violencee is random.a and so if somebody comes up to your car with their ak-47 and they have mal intent and theyo look in and there's a woman, you get 15 seconds of grace period. a little bit of shock goes at long way. that doesn't mean that many ofat my female colleagues haven't

been horrificically mistreated. but kidnapping a woman is expensive, it's ethically anda religiously suspect. you need a woman to watch her, you need ap separate space, ande sod in those small ways which ae really the most important ways doing this kind of reporting, it was given some safety. >> host: did somebody walk up t> your car with an ak-47? >> guest: there is an episode -- yes, someone strafes the car with -- yes. automatic fire in somalia. there were definitely -- in fact, there was an episode thati i was attacked by something called the nigeria taliban in northern nigeria. don't write about it in the w book because the book is not bec about, like, hot zones, rah rah. the book is about africans and asians. but there's plenty of that if somebody wants to read af little -- you know, i was also in some very bad shelling in somalia, but just to be -- wheny we hear these statistics, ilia mean, somalia, for example, is

the most dangerous place on earth for journalists.us the reality is that statistic means local journalists.a everywhere i went i worked with local people, and it's those people who end up paying the price should i do somethingu wrong. >> host: what's the takeaway on this book?t what do you want people to take away on this book? >> guest: i really want people t to take away the idea that it is this clash within that we have to pay attention to.t i want them to take a little ho air out of this overlyy simplified narrative because itf does no one any good, and that kind of martial rhetoric can actually lead to people dying. >> host: eliza griswold, "tenth parallel." first-time guest on booktv. thank you for being with us here in miami. >> guest: thank you for having me. >> host: john dour is the author of cultures of war, parallel harbor, hiroshima, 9/11.

he's a finalist for the national book award in the nonfiction category. professor dower, what's the similarity between pearl harbor and 9/11? >> guest: well, that's where the book began when 9/11 happened. headlines all over the u.s. said day of infamy, infamy, some of them quoted roosevelt's famous saying a day which will live in infamy and immediately people said surprise attack, they used the word kamikaze, they went back to pearl harbor to try to grasp the enormity of this. but then i work on, i've written on asia, i'm a historian of japan, and i've done a lot of thinking about the war. then it got more complicated because then it spun into failure of intelligence, surprise attack. then it started to get into world war world war ii where you had the firemen picture raising

the stars and stripes, that iconic picture. it was i woe iwo jima. people put the two pictures up. the president began calling for a war on terror, and then he began quoting roosevelt and truman. so it went from pearl harbor, 9/11 into world war ii. and then they christened world trade center ruins ground zero and then we're in a whole different dimension of world war ii. so it began with 9/11 in infamy, and it became much more complicated. >> host: tie together hiroshima and iraq. >> guest: well, the real tie is hiroshima and 9/11. that's, that was the real tie. because ground zero is is an atomic bomb phrase. that was the original association, and that would put

you into the question of terror bombing or deliberately targeting civilians. and that's a practice that comes out of world war ii. the air war in world war ii you wanted to destroy enemy morale of the anglo-american air powers, england and the united states. and it was done in the germany, carried to japan, culminates in hiroshima. so the ground zero '45, ground zero 2001 is the link. the iraq link is is, was a choice to begin with because we go from 9/11, this war of choice by the islamist terrorists, to the japanese war of choice earlier, and there's a parallel. and then suddenly we have a war of choice against iraq. and then we have a terrific failure of intelligence in iraq, just a disastrous failure of intelligence on on the part of

the united states. and so then you've got pearl harbor which was a japanese tactical, tactically brilliant, strategically idiotic thing. you have the war of choice of the islamists, then america's doing a war of choice. so i'm a historian, and i wanted to understand it's not all the same. but i wanted to see how you could do, think comparatively about war and then every side is talking holy wars. and war's always been with us in our modern times, even with our new technologies. and i really wanted to wrestle with it. it was a wrestling -- i had to try to figure some things out for myself, questions i hadn't asked. >> host: vietnam is not a focus of your book. whysome. >> guest: it's not a focus of the book because there was simply not space to do it.

vietnam figures in the as one of the major cultures of war. it's mentioned in passing in a number of ways. vietnam figures in both as a place where you deliberately target targeted noncombatants. vietnam figures in a different way in the failures of intelligence, and i write about this at some length. the subtitle could only be so long, and it wasn't that i was going back to vietnam. but the striking thing in the failure of intelligence was that in vietnam we had, basically, the united states had lost in an insurgency, and of after vietnam -- after vietnam we ceased to study counterinsurgency in the u.s. government. it was dropped from the military academies. it was dropped out. we weren't going to get involved in that. and there was no preparation for what we encountered in iraq and

in afghanistan. afghanistan figures in, of course, also. but i focus mostly on iraq. and there the failure of intelligence on our part, on the u.s. part, was extraordinary. why? so i was trying to think of this over time, and one thing this does is it takes you to think comparatively about the u.s. in ways that are sometimes a bit taboo and a little bit make people uncomfortable. it's not saying it's all the same, but also it lifts it out of the bush administration per se when you ten back in history and look at -- step back in history and look at the bigger picture. you're going back to world war ii, you're going pack to other thicks -- back to other things. at one point in the book i end up many this the philippines at the turn of the century, you know, when the u.s. conquered philippines in 1898, early 1900s, and all the rhetoric

was there. i have a line in the week that you -- book that you want to find a ghost behind the ghost writers for george bush, you go back to the philippines. the rhetoric, the language is all there. so to think about war as a culture is very painful. it's painful because it's asking very hard things about us as human beings. not just, not about americans or something. it's not -- it's about us as human beings in a modern age where we have war with us all the time, the technology may change, but somehow we're caught in this coil. and it seems hard to get out. and i do it at level of both the individual and the institutions. so at the end i came upon talking about concepts of pathology, of individual pathologies and institutional bureaucratic dysfunctions. very, very hard things to

wrestle with, but that's where it ended up. >> host: speaking of george bush, have you or will you be reading "decision points," particularly the chapters on afghanistan and iraq? >> guest: well, i haven't read -- i've read very, very extensively in memoirs by everyone, memoirs, investigative journalists, reports leaked from the bush administration. and i made a decision to keep working on the book to the end of the bush administration. that's where the research stopped. i will look at his autobiography, certainly, but i hope i can move on to a subject maybe that's cultures of peace or cultures of something else in the future rather than go back to this right now. >> host: professor john dower has already won the national book award for embracing defeat. in fact, he won the pulitzer prize for that