know, we're going to make the servicers do the right thing. but if you look at it, investors had very little control over servicers. servicers -- i read a recent quote from an investor who sent servicers treat us like a thanksgiving turkey, you know, they just decide where to carve. i'm investors i think you're getting tired of it. they're not trying to figure out how to make it together to for servicers to do the right thing? if it's important to note that this is not just a problem for borrowers. it is a problem for investors. every time a servicer imposes bad junk fees on a borrower, every time a servicer forecloses when they should modify, there are two victims. there is a borrower and there is the investor, who doesn't get the return they should get.

quorum call be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection, so ordered. mr. mcconnell: mr. president, for the last two years democratic leaders in washington have spent virtually all of their time ticking off items on the liberal wish list while they've had the chance. government-run health care, a national energy tax, financial regulations, bigger government, bigger deficits, union bailouts, government takeovers, and so here we are, just a few weeks left in the session, and they're still at it. last month the american people issued their verdict on the democratic priorities. democrats have responded by doubling down. for two years they legislated as if they weren't in the middle of a national jobs crisis and now they're legislating as if they

don't realize that the government is about to run out of money and every taxpayer in america is about to get slammed with a giant tax hike. with just a few weeks to go before the end of the session, democrats continue to place their priorities over the prieties of -- priorities of the american peep the. this is what they have chosen to do rather than a -- republicans have pleaded with democrats to put aside their wish list to focus on the things americans want us to focus on. they've ignored us. voters repudiated their agenda at the polls. they've ignored them. time is running out and they're ignoring that. the election was a month ago. it's time to get serious. it's time to focus on priorities. now, a while ago i delivered a letter to senator reid signed by all 42 senate republicans. it says that every republican will vote against proceeding to any legislative matter until we've funded the government and

protected every taxpayer from a tax hike. basically what it means is first things first. with time running out in this session, we need to focus on these critical priorities. as the letter states, our constituents have repeatedly asked us to focus on creating an environment for private-sector job growth. it is time our constituents' priorities become the senate's priorities. at the moment every taxpayer in the country stands to get a massive tax increase and a cut in pay on december 31. we need to show the american people that we care more about them and their ability to pay their bills than we do about the special interest groups' legislative christmas list. republicans are united in our opposition to proceed to any of these things until democrats make the priorities of the american people their own. so, mr. president, with that i'd like to ask unanimous consent that the letter to senator reid

that i just referenced appear in the record at this point. the presiding officer: without ms. stabenow: thank you. mr. president, as we come to the end of the year and the end of the session, i want to talk about what is really happening here for the american people, for small businesses, what's happening here in terms of the senate and what's really at stake as we come to the end of the year for american families, folks that are struggling every day, people trying to keep in the middle class, get into the middle class, small businesses trying to keep their heads above water, as well as our manufacturerses and so on. and it is exstriewmly concerning to me that -- and it is extremely concerning to me that colleagues on the other side of the aisle -- they've written a letter to the leader today -- they are willing to risk everything in order to get a

bonus round of tax cuts for millionaires and billionaires. they are literally willing to stop everything, risk everything in the economy in order to get an extra tax cut. and i'm not talking about -- and the reason i say "extra" or "bonus" is because we have in front of us an agreemen agreeme% of the public who earn less than $250,000 a year for their family should be continuing to receive tax cuts permanently, and everyone who has income up to $250,000, whether they are their real income is $1 billion or not, they get a tax cut up to $250,000 on their income. so the question that we will be answering this month is whether or not millionaires and billionaires get a bonus, get an

extra tax cut on top of that. and here's what's at risk. that the republicans are willing to put at risk. the same people, mr. president -- you heard it as well as i did throughout the year talking about the deficit, how we needed to stop the exploding deficit, we need to bring deficits down. in order to get a bonus tax cut for millionaires and billionaires, they are willing to risk the federal deficit, balloon it another $700 billion. not pay for it, not paid for. now, they're saying we at ought to pay for unemployment benefits for somebody who lost their job in this economy through no fault of their own. but $750 billion -- but $700 billion, the average tax cut, $100,000 for somebody earning $1 million. $100,000 is more than the average person in michigan

makes, mr. president. my guess is, west virginia is the same. so in order to keep $100,000 a year going in a bonus tax cut for people earning $1 million, they're willing to risk the federal deficit exploding. they are willing to risk jobs, because, you know, we have seen a policy in the last ten years of basically giving tax cuts to folks at the top and everybody else waiting for them to stricko trickle down. and my folks are tired. colleagues on the other side of the aisle think we just haven't waited long enough for this to trickle down. but the reality is that, that policy that they want to continue, that explodes deficits, gaffes bonus tax cut for people at the top, has not created jobs. in fact, my question is after ten years of tax cuts for the wealthy, where are the gorks

mr. president? my state has lost over 800,000 jobs during the period of this bonus tax cut policy for millionaires and billionaires. if it had worked, if we had created 800,000 jobs in michigan rather than losing 800,000 jobs, i would be on the floor of the united states senate fighting to continue this policy. this is not partisanship. this is about common sense and what works. we have had a policy in place that has not worked. so why would we continue it? they say, well, we have to continue this because we're in a recession. mr. president, this was part of the reason we're in a recession. in terms of the fact that it didn't invest in the right way. now, if we want to take those dollars and put it back in clean energy manufacturing and focusing on making things in america, we want to put this into things that we know are

going to actually focus on jobs, good-paying, middle-class gorks i'm all for t it. $700 billion of a policy that of has not worked for ten years makes no sense. so that's my question. where are the jobs? show me the jobs. i'll be the first person on the floor voting "yes" to continue. but they are willing to risk the deficit. they are willing to risk jobs. they are willing now, mr. president -- they are willing -- in a letter that they have now sent to the leader today -- to risk tax cuts for middle-class families and small businesses. by saying, you know what, we're not going to do anything else until we continue the tax cuts for everybody in this country, including millionaires and billionaires. they're not willing to work with us to make sure middle-class families, who are the folks that need to have money back in their pocket, and small businesses who

need to have money back in their pocket get permanent help, and then we can work on the rest of it where people disagree. now, we're going to hear a lot about small business, and i find it quite surprising when colleagues have filibustered in the last two years 16 different tax cuts for small businesses. a small business jobs bill to put -- make capital available for small businesses so they can keep their head above water, refinance, grow their business. personally, mr. president, i'm not going to be lectured by people who voted against p 16 different tax cuts in the last two years for small businesses. and who are now using small businesses to hide behind. you know, the folks that are hiding behind small businesses that they're holding up are the ones that they're fighting for. we're happy on our side. we take a back seat to no one on

fighting for small business. i want to thank our chair, mary landrieu, who was on the floor over and over and over again for from the small business committee and a wonderful group of colleagues who fought and fought and fought to make sure that we put forward a bill, took way too long because of foot dragging, everybody trying to throw sand in the gears, but we finally got it passed, a tremendous a effort to increase capital and add eight tax cuts in the small business jobs bill, which only two republican colleagues had the courage to step across the aisle and join us. we are grateful that they were willing to do that. but the senate republican caucus is willing to put all of that in jeopardy, hold hostage tax cuts needed by people, working people, middle-class families, small businesses, if they can't get a bonus tax cut for millionaires and billion

yaimplets they're also willing frankly to jeopardize social security and exphair. we've a debt commission coming up with proposals that are very concerning, tough decisions about social security and medicare going forward, because we have a deficit, and they're saying, well, wait a minute. first you got to increase the deficit by $700 billion. in order to give millionaires and billionaires a tax cut. no, we do care. we don't care if that impacts social security and medicare and tough decisions that have to be made, seniors who live on social security and medicare. you know, we don't care. the most important thirng -- we have heard this over and over and over again -- the most important thing, we don't care if it is paid for. doesn't matter if anything else gets done, doesn't matter about national security, we're not going to tank the start treaty, we don't care about our relationship with russia, we don't care about national security issues. we want a tax cut for our

friends. millionaires, billionaires, adding $700 billion to the debt. so they're willing to risk it all, stop the tax cuts for middle-class families and small businesses in order to get that bonus tax cut. and finally, and most insulting to me of all, mr. president, is they can stand and say we won't support helping people who are out of work in an economy that is way beyond normal, an economy where there are five people looking for every one job. and in my state, you're talking about folks who have never been out of work before in their life and they are mortified and they're doing everything they can to hold it together. they are trying desperately to keep their head above water,

while their house is under water. may not have been able to have the kids continue in college this year. folks that are just trying to make it and they're saying you know what? we didn't create this economy, we didn't cause the crisis on wall street, we didn't create all the rest of this. we have done nothing but play by the rules their whole lives and now they are in a situation where they can't find a job. you know, i talk to a lot of folks 50, 55 years old, 60 years old. worked all their lives. we're coming up to the holidays now. all they want is for us to do what we have always done as a country in the past with high unemployment, and that is allow them to receive unemployment benefits to get them through a tough time temporarily while we should be focusing on jobs because people want to work. people don't want to get $200 or $300 in unemployment

benefits. they want to work. they want the dignity of work. americans know how to work, they want to work, and they are looking to us to create a climate, working with businesses so they can get a job. but here we have a situation where the republicans in the house turned down unemployment benefits yesterday. senator jack reed came to the floor to ask unanimous consent to -- and we will be asking again unanimous consent to be able to extend unemployment benefits. the regular system. not -- i also believe we need to add additionally for people who run out of their benefits, who have been dubbed the 99ers. we need to be helping them as well. this is just to start, this is to keep the regular system going, so somebody who loses their job today is treated as fairly as the person who lost their job on monday. right now, the whole system is up in the air.

and what we hear on the other side is oh, my goodness sakes, we can't possibly extend unemployment benefits without -- quote -- "paying for it, cutting someplace else, paying for it. it's for a year about $50 billion. that's a lot of money. i'm not saying it's not. but how about, how about we help pay for it by not giving a bonus tax cut to millionaires in this country? $700 billion. $700 billion, and colleagues on the other side of the aisle do not believe that should be paid for. somehow, tax cuts for millionaires and billionaires have different rules than a little bit of help for somebody who lost their job through no fault of their own and is trying to keep their family together and a roof over their head in these times.

that's a heck of a choice in terms of values, mr. president. i'm amazed that what we have here as we come to the end of the year is a situation where colleagues on the other side of the aisle have indicated that they are going to continue to block everything. it's not new. filibusters aren't new. throwing sand in the gears is not new. it's been done every day on this floor for the last two years. but now they are saying that in addition to extending -- obviously, getting the budget done, we all agree with that, we all agree with that, but if we don't extend the tax cuts for everybody, meaning millionaires and billionaires, then they're going to filibuster everything else, including unemployment benefits. so let me just say in closing that we are in a situation where right now today we could give

97% of the public certainty going forward about tax cuts, small businesses, middle-class families by simply joining together on a proposal to protect and extend permanently middle-class tax cuts, and those for the vast majority of small businesses, and we certainly can come together in a way that does even more for small business, and our side is happy to do that. the side that has voted 16 times for tax cuts for small businesses. but we believe that it is economically and morally wrong to allow an average $100,000 in additional tax cuts, tax relief for a millionaire next year while somebody who has worked all their lives and lost their

jobs through no fault of their own can't keep a roof over their head this year. it's not right, mr. president. it's just absolutely not right. and so -- and by the way, let me just reiterate one more time because we're going to hear a lot about small businesses. this is not about small business. this is not about small business. we are willing to come together as we always have for small businesses. this is about a few people, and not even everyone in that category is asking, by the way, for a tax cut. we have got a lot of folks that understand we have the biggest deficit in the history of the country who are blessed through their own hard work or through their circumstances to be very well off who are saying i want to do my part, i'm willing to do my part, ask me to do my part. i will. they're not even asking for this. they are not asking to hurt

people who are out of work in order for them to get another tax cut. but unfortunately on the other side of the aisle, our colleagues are willing to risk everything, the deficit, jobs, social security, medicare, tax cuts for the middle class and small businesses and help for people who are out of work in order to give a bonus tax cut for a privileged few people. and that's not what we're about. that is not what we are about or what we're going to fight for. mr. president, i'd like at this point because it is absolutely critical that we understand what families are going through right now in this holiday season that someone who is losing their job

today should be treated as fairly in our country as someone who lost their job two days ago. i would ask unanimous consent that the finance committee be discharged from s. 3981, a bill to provide for a temporary extension of unemployment insurance provisions and that the senate then proceed to its immediate consideration, that the bill be read three times, passed, and the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, that any statements relating thereto appear at the appropriate time in the record as if read. the presiding officer: is there objection? a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from wyoming. mr. barrasso: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, reserving the right to object, and i will object. i understand that senator brown of massachusetts objected to this request yesterday, and he offered a fully offset alternative. therefore, on his behalf, i do object and ask consent that his proposal be inserted into the record. the presiding officer: objection is heard. is there objection to the --

ms. stabenow: mr. president, i will not object -- i would reserve the right to object. i will not. but i just simply want to say this is a sad day for -- for millions of families in this country, and a message that we should all be embarrassed to have sent, that millionaires and billionaires should be the ones that are being fought for on the floor of the united states senate and millions of people who are out of work don't count, and i regret

>> we have a very good panel. we have discussed these issues before publicly.

we discussed these issues with you this morning. i am delighted to see everybody here is struggling back after a thinks giving weekends. i think you -- i think we can formally mark the end of the redskins season. we await the return of the senators and members of congress for the rest of the lame-duck session. the new start treaty is on the agenda up -- agenda. we will run down the line with presentations of about 8-10 minutes each. we're talking about the new start treaty, recently signed this year and awaiting senate consideration. we will be talking about the future of nuclear weapons. you are invited to raise whatever parts of the broader subject you like in discussion. sitting to my left is my

colleague here at brookings and one of the nation's export negotiators and practitioners as well as academics on nuclear arms control. he is a former member of the state department and worked a great deal on the inside process during his time in government. he was also the u.s. ambassador to the ukraine. i will briefly take the [inaudible] we're not quite there yet. much of today's discussion will be on a new start. i think as people make a case largely in support of the treaty. keith payne is the ceo and the author of the great american gamble. he is the foremost expert on nuclear arms.

he is a member of the congressional commission on the strategic posture of the united states. i was honored to be part of his working group last year. he is extremely thought- provoking and will raise some different points of views on arms control. tom donnelly is that the american enterprise institute. he is a distinguished author u.s. written a number of books on ground forces and conventional combat. all the more reason why it is very important to have tom on the panel because he brings a perspective on the interrelationships between different military forces, different military capabilities. forthcoming paper is strategies and forces for the third nuclear age. his most recent book is "lessons

for a long war." i will briefly mentioned that my most recent book on this general subject is called "a skeptic's case for nuclear disarmament." they have articulated a world sunday free of nuclear weapons, whether that would be a good thing, if feasible thing, or in any way relevant to the issues today. let me briefly remind you that this new start treaty that is now being considered by the senate would lower our overall deployed strategic forces by 10-30%. it depends on how you do the counting and on how the two countries would posture their courses. it would not affect tactical

nuclear weapons. it would not affect surplus nuclear weapons, weapons that are in a stockpile. or missile defense, even though there has been a great deal of controversy about even the mention it -- missing to the possible association between a missile defense and arms -- offensive arms. there are no binding restrictions whatsoever. there is no differential or distinguishing between a nuclear arms long-range missile and a conventionally armed one. for those people who are interested, there is no particular allowance for that. if we do that, it counts against your treaty limits. these are a few of the points that will come up in discussion.

we are looking at 10-30% reduction in deployed strategic forces. that is the basic immediate issue, but we will be talking more generally about everything that is under the sun about nuclear. >> thank you. about what thelk next step is. let me remind you about the three basic limits. the united states and russia would be limited to no more than 1515 strategic warheads. each heavy bomber would count as one. there is a set limits, at each cycle can deploy it no more than [inaudible] ballistic missiles.

a non deployed launch europe would be a ballistic missile submarine it tube with no missile in it. typically, they are in long-term overhaul with no missiles on board. they would count as non deployed launchers. let me talk about why the u.s. start treaty is in our interest. first of all, it will reduce and cap the level of russian strategic nuclear forces. i do not lie awake at night worried about a russian attack. but i think that americans are more secure if the russian forces is limited. the new treaty it contains a wide range of verification measures, detailed informational exchange. it will give the u.s. military a lot more information about

russian strategic forces than the u.s. military would otherwise have. that means that we would be in a position where we can avoid assumptions. the military could make smarter decisions. the third, it will require some reductions on the u.s. side, the result would be a u.s. strategic deterrent that is very agile and robust. it would be capable of defending the united states and american allies. bringing the new start treaty is going to strengthen the u.s. in terms of raising the -- the assault against abrasion. we have already seen over the last 15 months as -- you see a better relationship with moscow. russia has provided more access

to provide supplies to american and nato forces in afghanistan. russia has taken a much tougher attitude toward iran and the nuclear question. that flows from the recent that has been driven by the new start treaty. i do believe that the new treaty is going to be ratified in the end. the arguments in its favor are compelling. it is difficult for me to see how serious republican senators can justify opposing the treaty that has been supported you guessed it -- unanimously by the joint chiefs of staff. by every senior serious republican statesman, every former secretary of defense, and national security advisers. i am optimistic regarding the ratification.

i do not know whether it will happen in the lame duck session or sometime in 2011. i hope it will happen sooner. the transparency of measures will begin to give us information about russian strategic forces that we have not been receiving for the last year. in december of 2009. i think that when the treaty comes into force, there is a question of what comes next. president obama has said that he envisions a step-by-step process in reducing nuclear forces. i am not enthusiastic about further cuts, but they have had a step-by-step process. when you get into that, you have to look at a number of questions that may arise. what would be the level of strategic warheads under a new tree? do we go below 1550? how far?

would you also want to reduce strategic vehicles, at strategic launchers below the 708 hundred limits. going beyond that, i think we are going to get into some new territory. when president obama signs the treaty this year, he said the next round will address nonstrategic and non deploy strategic weapons. that will again have some new territory. it is not going to be easy for a couple of reasons. the russians have a large numerical advantage. when you have this kind of disparity, moreover, because the russians perceive that their conventional forces have disadvantages through nato and china, the russians that adopted the nato nuclear strategy now is the technical -- tactical nuclear weapons as a disadvantage.

that will complicate non- strategic forces. moreover, you will have a new verification challenges. a lot of the verification measures centered on the go ahead with intercontinental ballistic missiles. you are likely to talk about weapons that have been -- we are seeing them somewhere in bunkers, and that will approach to verification challenges that the united states and russia have had to grapple with before. it will likely be an area of u.s. numerical advantage. the united states plans to achieve most of its limits by down lading missiles, taking more heads off.

it will carry three warheads and will be -- will be deployed. they will be stored somewhere, they won't be in the immediate future. it would give the united states the potential should the russians put those warheads back on. the russians appear to be reducing their forces by eliminating missiles and keeping their residual missiles with full war headsets. they will not have that capability. in terms of non and deploy strategic warheads, there might be a bit of bargaining on the russian advantage from the tactical side. the russians i suspect will raise missile defense again in the next round of negotiations. there is potentially limit for the administration because the russians will seek some kind of constraints with missile defense and i don't detect any interest on the part of the administration in negotiating missile defense.

i think they also understand that any treehopper will contain how meaningful restraint and will be done arrival at goes to the senate for ratification. there is this potential box here. many have articulated about engaging and when the russian president met with leaders and expressed interest in working towards cooperation on missile defense. if you could adopt a genuine cooperation between the united states, nato, and russia for missile defense protection, it might change the whole dynamic surrounding the missile defense question. another issue that might come up is the question of third country nuclear forces like britain, france, and is tied up. the greater the pressures will be to bring other countries in. my sense is that the u.s. administration folks would like to have one more negotiation

that will focus mostly on u.s. forces before you got into the much more complex of bringing in other countries and in bringing those -- making those negotiations multilateral. one thing that we'll mention either now or for early on the web site, the paper also talks about what might be a u.s. position for the next round. what i suggest is looking toward the 2500 total nuclear weapons counting everything except those weapons that are in hot the queue for dismantlement. it would include strategic, tactical, and within that 2511, there would be a supplement for strategic correspond to the start treaty. it would allow a trade-off.

the russians might have an advantage of tactical weapons in the context of overall quality. i should add that in that kind of limitation regime, he would likely have a verification system in which you would have high confidence in your ability to monitor the limits on deployed strategic warheads in you have much less confidence in your ability to monitor limits on capitol warheads. i think in the end, even though it is a verification scheme, there is some monitoring on the constraints on russian tactical weapons, and hopefully, as you go through that verification scheme, you get the expertise that would allow you to form a smarter verification system for later on. this kind of agreement and will

help reductions on the russian side and also to maintain a robust deterrent. and i think at that point, you get a little bit of stress on the triad and it will make decisions that will be a bit painful. all of this is the next step in the immediate future, the ratification of the new start treaty. >> it is a pleasure to be here this morning. how to thank them for the invitation to speak. as the academic, i usually look out 50 years in my discussions and writings, but because it is an immediate concern, a subject of immediate attention, of like to comment on the process that has gone along with a new start in washington because in this case, the process has been

important to the substance of the debate. the obama administration efforts to garner support for ratification of this newfie have met greater than expected resistance. this resistance follows primarily from concerns about the various loopholes in the trees and limits on forces, the narrow but explicit limits on missile defense and nonnuclear strategic missiles. and those of the strategic weakening of the verification provisions. it might well be that the opposition in this resistance that we see has as much to do with the administration's mode of promoting the treaty as it does with the substance. senior members of the administration have contributed to skepticism about a pattern of

this characterization and misdirection about a tree while simultaneously being dismissive of reasonable concerns identified by knowledgeable commentators. for example, even before president obama signs the treaty in april of 2010, some commentators expressed concern that the administration would agree to limits on missile defense. they fan the flame by frequently claiming that the treaty would in the limit u.s. defenses. in response, the administration assured that there would be no such limits whatsoever. the start was to be a treaty on strategic offensive forces and not on the offensive forces. during april 29 press conference to explain new start, the secretary of state for arms control and international security stated that the treaty has nothing to constrain missile

defense, is about strategic weapons. there is no limit or constraint on what the united states can do. further, there are no constraints to missile defense. the actual text of the treaty shows russian commentators and u.s. skeptics to be correct. it explicitly limits and u.s. missile defense options. the treaty establishes some bilateral commission where a missile defense can be the subject of further ongoing secret discussions and possible limitations. the administration has repeated the false claim of no limits on missile defense so often and so definitively that the claim continues to be erroneously presented as fact by journalists and commentators. several u.s. commentators

expressed concern that the administration would allow russia to gain limits on prospective strategic forces under a new start. senior military commanders have pressed for nonnuclear strategic forces for prompted global strike, and specifically warning against such limits. it assured that there is no affect for -- it doesn't have any constraints to it. posted on march 26, the long- range conventional strike capabilities. this carefully nuanced statement is precisely correct. it would have been impossible

for profs capabilities of the strike -- explicitly constrains options for these prospective weapons for strategic nuclear warheads, on deployed nuclear warheads and launchers. the pattern of this characterization is not limited to -- and several commentators observed an old russian favorites and were not specifically defined as they had been in previous agreements. this raised the concern that the mobile icbms -- the supporters

in general who dismissed to this concern. when the demand, the tree does -- is stated that such a u.s. claim can tell them to stop action on the treaty. he noted that the americans are trying to apply the new start treaty to icbm rails if they are built. this problem identified early on was not so outlandish. new star will reduce the number of warheads by about 30% below the 2002200 maximum.

however, the specific terms of the treaty preventing number of weapons to move higher than the 2200 under the previous moscow treaty. despite the claims of 30% reductions, new start would have an increase because hall of the weapons would count as only one warhead. even though some are capable of carrying many more. and nuclear-armed cruise missiles would not be captured at all. the russian strategic expert described as this sleight of hand has nothing short of fraudulent. aa nevertheless, the universe 0 -- nevertheless, the universal

talking point is that it would be by 30%. not only nuclear warheads, but in the number of strategic launchers. the fact that the administration has typically been left and sen -- as presented in the oakland russian press, russia is already well below hot climates and is headed lower. with or without the treaty. in short, the strategic water limits imposed reductions only on the united states. the department immediately responded with a continuation

of this characterization and misdirection. the treaty does not force the united states unilaterally. the administration rightly claims that new start mandates commendations on watchers. it erroneously denies the fact that number of launchers trying to meet those. and you have to build up its forces to do so. the administration claims that the lame-duck senate must ratify a new start immediately. for u.s. national security would be seriously endangered. secretary gates has stated repeatedly that russia poses no military threat to us or our allies. so why the urgency? this of illogic remains

unexplained. it remains hot overstatement and hyperbole. perhaps the administration's apparent treaty as characterization and misdirection will be left -- if it is not so frequently -- there are numerous illustrations of this behavior. for example, an assistant secretary of state observed that no one with any pedigree has raised concerns about new start. this dismissive characterization manages to be simultaneously insulting and arrogant and nonsensical when notables whole

raised serious concerns about the treaty. in addition, the undersecretary of furred concerns about the trees as red herrings. in the testimony before the senate, hillary clinton suggested that those expressing concerns just don't believe in arms control treaties at all. and from my perspective, are unfortunately slanting a lot of what they say. so dismissing skeptics concerns has been the administration of's -- the administration's mode of operations. it is cause for bipartisanship. as the president harry truman famously observed, if you can't stand the heat, -- advanced arms

control, even its current mode of operations had engaged in concerns about the tree be seriously and thoughtfully. thank you. >> over to tom. >> he very kindly set aside the heart of the long term, so i will take that as my team. but before i do that, i have two words to say on starts. there is conventional military power as opposed to all things nuclear from the congressional

staff and a political hack who can count votes and read the constitution recently. i am also painfully aware of the senate. i want to talk about the politics of the start to deal. as a way of suggesting why a there is unlikely to be a vote during the lame duck session. i think the administration could have had and ultimately will get sent ratifications of the tree because they have not seriously engaged in making any concessions are any deal making particularly with senator john cabell who is a man with a pedigree when it comes to nuclear issues and the leading figure in opposition to the treaty as it currently stands.

he signaled, and i think certainly the senator himself and the representatives have suggested in particular on upgrading missile defense investments and making a serious investment in the modernization of the nuclear infrastructure, not just for the purposes of the tabling a test ban, but actually modernizing the infrastructure in the event, i think it is a reasonable price. but the obama administration having governed keeping 60 senate votes in mind up until this point has reached the juncture where it needs 67 votes and cannot get them. senator kyl is likely to have more influence to get more of

what he wants in the coming session of congress. i would say there is very little incentive for senator kyl to reach an agreement unless the obama administration is willing to move the needle pretty substantially and make more commitments, and the president himself is going to engage in these negotiations or deal with it at a much higher level. the president's priorities have been elsewhere. it is sort of like an expanded version of the courier free trade deal in this is that you can't get there from here in the time remaining. having that would be the one note that i could contribute about the current debate. if we look a little bit more at the larger picture, the

connection between nuclear issues and the larger questions of international politics and military correlations as we used to say are coming much more interrelated than they have been. certainly during the later years of the cold war when it was the presumption that nuclear weapons were qualitatively different. it is what they enjoyed during the salad years, quite capable of eradicating all life on the planet. those days are gone. that is also the case that the sort of by polar international system of the nuclear balance was a reflection and also a thing of the past. why are we negotiating with the

soviet union? they are totally unlike the united states except with the amount of nuclear weapons that it has. there is a demographically collapsing state, a politically imploded empire. they are highly unrepresentative, and the economy is a resource extraction ha ha ha larger scale, but not quantitatively different. by contrast, the world that we see coming in the twenty first century that everybody talks about features most prominently the rise of the people's republic of china. is that behind that, the rise of

india. but with many other factors that complicate national politics. the administration felt right rightly and spends a lot of time talking about proliferation and and the proliferation efforts to keep it out of the hands of terrorists and other non-state actors again. it is a terrifying prospect. the sensible american which stand against that. this has nothing to do with that. it is the rise of other was weak and a second-rate powers with iran and north korea had been the leading edge examples

of aspiring in a small nuclear states the constantly have larger arsenals, the efforts to contain north korea oppose the program as we have heard in recent weeks has not been successful. likewise, it is highly unlikely that any effort to prevent iran from obtaining nuclear weapons -- and obtaining a militarily significant arsenal not measured in the thousands or tens of thousands of warheads, but certainly measured in dozens if not low hundreds over the course of time. those points, those facts are creating uncertainty and instability and new questions about the need for nuclear weapons among not only

adversaries of the united states such as venezuela, but also america's friends. the conversation that we have thed as the story's over weekend suggests, the prospect of an iranian bomb is believed to aerifying to the persian gulf region, and long-term strategic partners. secretary clinton i think quite rightly but without much discussion extended an offer of deterrence to the gulf states about 15 months ago, and the pressure is likely to expand. demand for american security guarantees in the face of proliferation is already

increasing. finally, as i suggested, the competition will inevitably have wheat to modernization and expansion of small arsenals that we see in china and india and pakistan for example, if not all three categories were played out, pakistan would be subject for yet another panel. at any rate, this is an entirely different feature that our cold war past. all of these things that we told ourselves were stable and predictable, who do not obtain any future.

what of the great debates in the negotiating committee is when you expand the realm of negotiations to include certain parties? an interesting question, but as he suggested, and much more complex set of negotiations. it will make our cold war and ongoing negotiations look like child's play. there is no consensus for nuclear disarmament. that is the only way you can explain the behavior of those that feel threatened by american powers and those that have their own regional ambitions or own domestic regimes abilities-north koreans do. if we are so uncertain about

what the future is going to be like except to say that it will be deeply on like our past experiences, it continues to be locked like to scorpions in the bottle. we don't know what is coming, and that is exactly the point. we don't know what kind of arsenal we will need, although we do know that we need to respond to very different nuclear crises and nuclear use in the face of very different nuclear threats. why should we continue to go down this road with the russians? even if the treaty itself is ultimately ratified, it doesn't really address the most pressing nuclear questions.

we will face this now and we will face this in the future. and we don't know what kind and what are re of nuclear capabilities we will need, but it is almost certain that we will need some form, probably more varied forms of nuclear weapons ourselves. now is a good time to open the aperture and ask ourselves not what deal we can reach with the russians, but what set of deals and what kind of arms control agreements will actually secure americans in the future, and what kind of arsenal do need to respond to the future that is almost impossibly different from the past? >> we are anxious to get you involved in the discussion.

i will use my will presentation to make some comments in support, and we will engage you in that conversation. as i expected, there have been some comments from various participants on this issue, and i think that senator kyl is being entirely sincere in serious -- and serious. republicans have proven that they are willing to be supportive of president obama on foreign policy issues and the policies have largely been relegated to domestic matters. it is a little bit of an affirmation of the old adage that politics should stop at the water's edge. i have been struck by how much in the past two years we have

had a bipartisan accord on issues like iraq and afghanistan, and i will come back to that in just a second. i think his arguments that he has the kind of questions on his mind, as opposed to wondering whether this is the moment to give the obama administration a political boost or not. let me make some arguments in favor of new start. the obama administration is correct, it has helped improve u.s. strategic cooperation in general on other issues. while it can be critiqued here and there, he has done a very good job on specific points. it is generally solid and tough that i don't worry about the loopholes allowing one side to increase their forces and not worried about how one particular

way could be constrained because the overall possibilities are generally run wide open for american and russian consideration. i am interested in seeing that u.s.-russian relations are much improved, and this is not a critique of how u.s.-russian relations were handled under george w. bush. i agree with president bush about his approach to arms control, to say that the strategic details shouldn't matter anymore the way they used to. let's do a treaty and agree among inhuman to reduce forces, we don't need to verification, we don't need the lengthy consultations. unfortunately, it did not really seem to work in the sense that it improve the relationship

dramatically. and also felt it was losing a little bit of clout internationally. the bush administration was controversial in other ways, leading to a situation where russia wanted to resume a classic form of arms control. i see no harm in it, i think the treaty is generally sound, and let me quickly itemized where i think it has actually improved security. it has fostered a spirit of cooperation on the northern distribution network shipping supplies into afghanistan where we don't want complete dependence on pakistan for the war effort that involves hundred and 45,000 foreign troops to require an enormous number of supplies. in much of the early years of the war, russia either opposed or tried to interfere with the

shipping of supplies from its own territories where the soviet republic. now we have seen a mellowing of that to the point that depending on which supplies you're looking at, 30%-40% is not just important numerically, it is important because it may also strengthen our handle the to remind pakistan that, in fact, we don't depend on them exclusively entirely likely once might have thought. this is important as we seek to pressure pakistan to work harder against the insurgents. we have come a long way, and linkages we are -- real. we have seen benefits because of this generally improved relationship which is partially due to giving russia what it asked for.

just mention one more issue, in the spirit of bipartisanship or nonpartisanship the of the present across the entire panel, it is a very serious substantive argument. i think that in their earlier years, not only did they have a very reasonable approach towards trying to limit offensive arms in a way that is consistent with our interests of the day of american interests in general, in fact, russia was putting greater pressure -- began to impose some of the un sanctions

and informal cooperation is starting to improve during the 2007-2008 time period. putting pressure on iran, a high-technology, some of this was not officially, some of it more unofficially. it has accelerated under president obama. we have seen more u.n. resolutions, more u.n. sanctions and more international cooperation, including russia and stopping the shipment of advanced surface to air missile batteries to iran partly as a result of this improve u.s. russia relationship that is helped along by the start treaty. i don't want to get into the details any more that i already have on the specifics of the treaty. not to say that we should side

of that treaty to do good things elsewhere, but even the midsized flaws that might have, the stipulation that might not be as quiet as ideal, it is generally solid and it allows us to do everything we need to win a nuclear, conventional, and other defense forces. it helps strategic relations on other issues that are more pressing and will get to the matter is that we were talking about with other countries. and how we can work together to deal with those. i look forward very much to the conversation with you all on any other issue in the future of nuclear deterrence, so for the benefit of the tv cameras in your fellow members of the audience, identify yourself and wait for a microphone. please post a concise question.

we will begin in the front row and moved back to the third row. >> i am from the center for american and arab studies. this seems to me that the nuclear clock expanding lately and the prospect of the expansion on the horizon. even the issue of iran probably going to end up guiding the arab states and other states to renew their efforts to establish their nuclear programs. the question is, what is this -- [unintelligible]

to get rid of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. it seems to me that in particular, i sense that he is looking into new forms of nuclear weapons for the united states to introduce more weapons and stability. the question remains for the rest of the world, how do we get rid of the weapons of mass destruction and why don't we go through the issue of nuclear freezes for each continent. we look at this goal and everything will be measured toward that goal. >> that is the topic of my book. i would quickly say that i don't think this panel would all agree of the desirability of that goal of a nuclear-free world.

there is no particular linkage between the start treaty and judging the long-term ability to reach that conclusion. i have a skeptic who supports the vision of a nuclear-free world, but i think it is several decades into the future. i am worried about rushing too much toward that at a time where a lot of american allies are worried about whether the u.s. nuclear commitment is strong enough. of volunteer myself to start the answer, i am pretty skeptical of how much we can pass for the process in the next few years. let me go down the aisle. >> i agree that we should have the objective, and i am not sure that we can reach it. a lot of things have to happen,

and we might agree here that if we can get to a non-nuclear world, it might not be a bad thing. it would probably be about how likely is to get to the new verification mechanisms, and it would require fundamental changes in political relationships. a non-nuclear world is not bad. we have the pacific ocean, the atlantic ocean, and friendly neighbors. you may have a different view, and until you can get that likewise comfortable, the country is going to have hesitation about nuclear weapons. i have come to a different conclusion, as we think about u.s. weapons in a broader context, we have to worry about not just russia and china, but others.

or it might come to a different conclusion, looking at 1550 deployed warheads or even 1000, it seems to me that that level of forces will be sufficient in deterring anybody else. if the country is not going to be deterred by 1000, you're going to have to come up with some way to affect calculations. >> i am agnostic on the goal, i must say. you have seen what a non-nuclear world looks like. it looked like the first half of the last century. it looks like world war one and world war two. of thing that was a very attractive world.

i am a bit agnostic about the possibility or the possibility of that as a goal to its -- aspire to. as long as they provide a profound deterrent effect, it seems to me that they are enormously important for us and for many other countries. let me add to that, because the bipartisan strategic commissioned i believe got it right with regard to the goal of nuclear 0, the pie partisan commission saying that it will be feasible with the transformation of the world order. i agree that it will be feasible and even admiral as a goal -- an admirable as a goal. the question in my mind is whether the transformation is feasible. if there is any indication of what might be possible in the

future, the answer is that level of transformation is not possible. the league of nations was an effort to create security to end international war. it failed. the united nations was an effort to create a security system to an international war. so far, it has failed to do that. in my mind, absent a collective security system that can provide security for all members, nuclear 0 will be difficult to get to if not impossible. let me say lastly, i think nuclear zero is zero weapons of mass destruction. if we are going to have a goal to aspire to, it should be no

weapons of mass destruction. biologicaln't want weapons that can be every bit as devastating as nuclear-weapons. it is difficult to get rid of nuclear weapons if biological weapons are going to remain out there. some countries want a nuclear deterrent to prevent a biological attack. i would much rather see the goal of no weapons of mass destruction if we're going to pause at a goal. it will take a transformation of the world order. >> i am not going to speculate in the scholastic way as to what the world should be like. i prefer thinking more practically about the world that we actually live.

there has been a lot of fashionable talk of the last 18 months or so about containing the miracle cure. it has been interesting to go back and read what exactly containment is. and it will be sort of quantitatively being experts. to thatknow the answer question, but i think it is an open question. in the cold war, there is an intermediate range which the american side of the nuclear

bazooka, not that was a very useful solution, but we do ourselves a injustice if we think it was just that the people who were trying to solve those puzzles were completely misguided. there is a huge ballistic missile competition going on right now. there is something destabilizing in east asia. that is a game that we are constrained from entering because of past deals with the ex-soviet union. again, i just think that we have to confront the world as we find it. trees limitative armaments are traditional state crafts and strategy to achieve goals.

you cannot simply export mechanisms in wholesale fashion from one strategic era to another and expect them to be perfectly effective and efficient in the way you expect them to be. particularly when the landscape is different and the number of factors is much more perverse, inspired by a wide array of ideology and geopolitical goals. these are questions that we need to ask and did not foreclose answers now because we are continuing a set of negotiations. >> we will take to questions that time, we will take responses. >> thank you for a very

excellent and analyze questions. one was that in the first response, but let me repeat so that i make sure we are totally clear. is it the policy of the obama administration to declare -- is it a rhetorical policy or anything else, that they embraced and endorsed the nuclear-free concept? that does have some bearing on whether we go beyond the current will, or the new start make sense. secondlym, -- secondly, it is contended that given that pressure, they have mapped all of the objections and given him more than he asked for.

somehow he has welshed on his commitment. hearing him yesterday on the news shows, he may have thought a verily -- a fairly persuasive case is a request for modernization, upgrades, except in a kind of loose goals way. they didn't practically commit. isn't the illustration's policy to strive -- but to embrace it as a goal? what is their policy and in particular, the request to modernize the facility. >> >> thank you for your presentation.

my question is, what about north korea? a question. i will defer to others. the president of the commitment to a nuclear-free world is pretty clearly stated, and there is still a question of that is their policy. it doesn't obligate them to take any particular set of next steps. the path to get there, there are many paths to get there. the understanding is that it has been pretty consistent about what they have wanted from the start and that the particular investments in budgets proposed

by the administration have not met his threshold. and we can't make commitments for future administrations that said the bay though there are things they could do to prepare for a long-term modernization of the facilities that you describe the. i would tend to take a senator kyl's word, but have not been privy to discussions. it is hard to judge from the outside. again, i think that is another case that is demonstrative of the world, trying to describe a very broad and general way. these are the kinds of nuclear issues that we are likely to see more of. and for which we do not have a very good response, which are

only tangentially related to either our overall relations with russia and our arms control, but again, my point is not that it is bad, it does raise some important issues that need to be addressed. i would agree about the need for investment elsewhere. we're not devoting most of our efforts to the most critical nuclear problems that we face navajo and will only get greater in the future. >> let me address the first question, i believe it had to do with the obama administration's policy concerning nuclear zero. let me point you to the 2010

revue that the administration produced and by and large is a very good document. i think if you look at that document, what it says is that movement toward non- proliferation is the highest nuclear policy. i mention that because the administration in the past has given rhetorical support to nuclear disarmament. they tend to balance that goal of the goal of maintaining a nuclear deterrent and assuring allies with the extended nuclear deterrent. administrations in the past have had a goal of nuclear disarmament. the really dramatic change that i see any kind of document that

i refer to is the comment that this is the highest nuclear policy priority which leads to concerns that we will see is a disadvantage of requirements and assurance. it is connected with the other question concerning the nuclear program in north korea, as a see the potential for nuclear proliferation continue, north korea, other countries interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. how do we assure our allies who live in these growing and increasingly dangerous neighborhoods? if north korea is going to stay with a nuclear capability and

modernize that capability, we need to inspect the requirements to ensure that japan and south korea are likely to change ha. it will likely become deeper and wider in scope. as a country that provides these kind of guarantees, they're very important to our alliance structure. the suit nuclear proliferation does continue, it will require us to be very agile and listen closely to what our allies say about what they see the requirements are for this emerging threat. this has been very typical of the types of debates in the united states, we identify weapons that are adequate for deterrence and say it is a good number. arms control can obtain that

number and we are satisfied. deterrence is not the only role for the strategic nuclear forces. deterrence of enemies is a role for strategic nuclear forces, but assuring allies is a very important role, and i believe it was said that during enemies is 10% of what it takes to assure our allies. to see the different requirements for what the u.s. force structure needs to be to provide these important roles of deterring opponents in assuring allies, the latter goal is going to become more challenging and require more of the united states if nuclear proliferation continues at a pace. >> in response to your question about where the obama administration is, i think that when the

every time he has come back to the subject, he has made the point that as long as nuclear weapons exist, united states needs to have a safe and robust nuclear deterrent. i think he square that circle. if you go back to the time the new start treaty was signed, the administration put out a couple of plans looking at 10 years. both are with regards to the strategic retirement of heavy bombers, but also modernization of the nuclear weapon conflict, the national labs and infrastructure that maintains the weapons themselves. the announcement was that over

the next 10 years the spending plan was $100 billion for the strategic triad and $80 billion for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, which was a 10% or 15% increase over previous plans. i think that was in part to concern.senator kyl's if you are going to reduce nuclear weapons, you have to have complex -- of to have confidence that the weapons you have a reliable. there have been a lot of exchanges of their last four months between administration officials including the vice president and secretary. two weeks ago, the administration said it was prepared to commit an additional 4 billion to $5 billion to upgrade nuclear weapons contracts. it does sound like there is an effort on the part of the administration to address the senator's concern and to assure

him that there will be sufficient funds so that the weapons complex can support the nuclear arsenal in the future. my sense is that the administration has gone quite part in this. i think there is a question of how much more it needs to go to in order to secure senator kyle's support. i would agree with keith, who said in a point of nuclear weapons is not only to deter a range enemies, but to assure allies including japan, australia, and the asia-pacific region. as far as i have seen, every allied governments so far has spoken out on the new start treaty and has endorsed the treaty. i think i have to come to the conclusion that our allies say -- at the end of the day, the u.s. has a strategic force. in needs to be sure that force can not only deter attack on the united states but can also extended deterrence to them as well.

>> let us go to the next round. i will start with gary and take one more as well. then we will go to responses from the panel. here and then in the middle, and then we will have a set of responses. >> gary mitchell from "the mitchell report." i wanted to say at the outset that i feel like a paid some attention to this issue. this is far and away the best conversation i have heard about it, because i think it is laid out, the complexity which is very very helpful. it seems to me we have heard at least four points of view. one is the treaty is good on its own merits, vote for it. the other is the treaty is good enough, and is also important because it helps us in other issues related to russia. the treaty has been badly misrepresented and has been

badly handled politically, and therefore it is in trouble. and if i can characterize toms, widen the aperture. this is not necessarily the time to be concerned about whether we close this deal but whether we take this opportunity to take a wider look at the way we think the world should be further out. i will throw in another one which is not mine, but you are probably familiar with the case that was made last week in an off-ed by jamie rubin that we do not need to do these big trees anymore because so much can get done under executive deals, and given the difficulty that non- parliamentary governments like ours have, we ought to be thinking about that. mike also alluded earlier in his presentation to the notion that this sort of helps us with our

discussions on deep- nuclearizing -- denuclearizing the world. this deal will help smooth the path. i wonder if that is operational but -- is aspirational. what i would really like to do is say, "how are you going to vote on this?" i have a clear sense in a couple of places. but i would be interested in knowing is given everything we have heard, each of your contributions and the contributions of your partners -- when push comes to shove, it is there more upside in approving this treaty and approving it during the lame- duck session, or is there more downside on doing that? if there is no downside in doing that, what is your

recommendation about how the senate ought to move forward on this? >> before we hear the vote, what is the next question, and then respond. >> i am not speaking for any organization. is there any strategic utility for the u.s. to modernize nuclear weapons? assuring allies is really just an extension of deterrence, because we are assuring the allies that we will defend them against an attack, and it is to help deter anyone who could attack them. related to this, is there any strategic advantage for high reliability for nuclear weapons? this seems to be taken as a given. but since the basic point of possessing the weapons is deterrence, not fighting, and the appointment cannot assume that a weapon will not work -- any opponent cannot assume a weapon will not work, and so it is useful.

without very high reliability that any particular warhead would work, that would actually make it so a first strike might be less likely for whoever might need to assure that a surgeon bonn needs to go off. -- a certain bon mot needs to go off. -- a certain bomb needs to go off. >> i would not support the new start treaty if i did not believe we could have very high confidence with that treaty and with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. i support both those accords and believe we can have high confidence in our arsenal, part of the reason being that we are showing the plutonium in and hold up quite well. we do a lot of monitoring for $6 billion to $7 billion a year of stockpile stewardship in various

ways. i understand the debate senator kyle is having now with the administration. we are all doing a great deal to assure the reliability of the u.s. nuclear arsenal. the question is what assets be needed in the future. i think americans can have confidence in the very high reliability of our nuclear arsenal today. a couple of more things and i will pass the time to steve. in terms of jamie rubin's thinking, he did want to seek congressional action, not just executive dictate. he wanted law as opposed to treaty. that would allow a majority vote instead of a two-thirds vote. other countries will say that means the united states is not quite as committed as we would like them to be. there is a pro and con. while i do support, way down the road, a nuclear-free road, but i do not support new start for that region. if new start prejudged the pace at which we could assure a nuclear-free road, i would not

support it. we are a ways from being on that path. there things i would like to see the next round to. for example, more focus on cooperative missile defense. i applaud the lisbon summit spirit for what it has done, but it has not yet translated into programs. these are things we have to learn more about and do more of to even see if a nuclear-free world may someday be a tenable. ratifying new upstart does not prejudge that debate. -- ratifying new start does not prejudge that debate. >> i emphatically support new start. i think it is good arms control, but i think it also has other positive effects, such as on the u.s.-russia relationship. if the treaty does not get rectified in the lame-duck session but polls in 2011, that may not be the end of the world, but i do not know what that time from looks like. i do not think it is january and

february. how far back does that get pushed? that is why do linda, six days from now -- that is why the lame-duck, six days from now -- how far do we stretch that out? the longer that time goes, the more our confidence in our assessments about russia's strategic forces weakens. is it going to weaken fatally? probably not. but i think there is a certain logic there to say getting new start into force sooner rather than later will limit that time when we do not have inspectors on the ground, when we do not have data exchanges. why not do it in the lame-duck session? you have 18 senate hearings. i think the time i heard from the administration is they have answered 955 questions for the record. there has been a lot of study over the last six or seven months. it seems to me the senators have

the information they need. certainly, it is out there. they ought to be able to take that and make a decision. i do not see a persuasive argument for not going into the lane duck session. to come back to the point keith made, i think the administration is partially in this bind because i think as keith said they did oversell new start, and some of their language was in precise. it raised suspicions that do not need to be there. the administration did say -- some administration officials said there are no limits to this treaty on missile defense. i think it is more correct to say there are no reasonable restrictions. one paragraph says the united states and russia could not put a missile defense interceptor into an old silo. that is a constraint. but i do not think it is a meaningful constrict, because we have converted five icb silos to hold missile defense

interceptors and built 25 or 30 new silos in alaska to hold interceptors. the new start treaty allows us to grandfather those five interceptors. those are ok, but do not do it again. it would cost about $20 million more per silo to convert them to build one grand -- and to build one brand new. it seems it is a constraint that prevents us from doing something we would never do under any circumstances. that is probably a constraint we could live with. likewise, i think the administration was in precise when it said there are no constraints on conventional ballistic missile warheads. we have more than 5050 icbms. neither the united states nor russia deployed those. there has been talk about a combined strike system, where the bush administration proposal

was for strategic ballistic missiles. the administration now says if there were able to exercise the option, it would be a few tens of warheads. i know some people are uncomfortable with the idea that a strategic offensive arms treaty would limit any conventional capability. i am not uncomfortable with the idea that if you want to deploy 30 or 40 conventional warheads -- i do not see that cutting deeply into a total war had of 1550 on the nuclear side. how the administration originally described some of these provisions raised suspicion. i think that is where we do not have a strong base. >> i will start with your question and follow on from stevens point. -- stephen's point. it reflects on what we talked

about earlier. i am not making the argument -- i did not intend to make the argument the restrictions on missile defense are extremely significant restrictions. that was not my point. my point was that the administration took the opportunity to explain the treaty in a number of different ways. it was incorrect in its explanation. it misrepresented the treaty. the was in very important areas. these were the folks who created the treaty. they misrepresented it in open testimony. the reason why that is important, never mind for now whether the missile defense option is important are not important -- the point was that by misrepresenting the treaty and overselling it so thoroughly and so consistently, even to the current time, what it creates is skepticism about those who are asking for answers.

so i point you to, for example, senator kit bond tips speech on november 18, where kit bond it said factual, correct things about the treaty. the state department replied last week specifically to senator bond's speech. some of the responses to the senator's point are literally factually incorrect. when you have a process like that, which went on in the past and continues now, what it suggests is there would be many who would like more time to sort this out. that is why i think that not having this decided in the lame- duck would be a good idea, because there are still questions about the treaty, given the types of responses before you have the administration. i see no value or advantage whatsoever in pushing this treaty through during the lame-

duck. there are some great disadvantages i think in trying to do so. and the advantage of moving it into 2011 in the senate is that the senate will have time to methodically, systematically, seriously go through these issues that have been created by the administration handling of it. it would seem to me that the administration would want that. >> let me go to the second question, with regard to the terms. it was a fabulous question. thank you for pointing it. but the question said essentially was that nuclear weapons provide a deterrent effect even with great uncertainty about them. therefore, why do you worry about modernization or in essence the details of the structure? if deterrent effect is available because of the uncertainty surrounding nuclear weapons, if the deterrent effect is available with uncertainty, and stop worrying about the rest of this. we do not need to spend all the money to get these things down

to great precision. the gentleman is shaking his head yes. that is the point. let me suggest there is a strong tenant of u.s. thought on strategic policy going back to the mid-60s that is exactly that. that was one of the profound schools of thought in the united states on nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, and force requirements. the other school of thought says that in some cases opponents will not be deterred by uncertainty. in other words, you have to posit an opponent that is deterred by uncertainty for them to apply. you have to have an opponent who is deterred even if the reliability of our weapons may not be our satisfaction. you have to posit an opponent who is deterred even if the weapons may not be structured such that they meet our satisfaction. you have to pause at, i should

say, a very specific type of opponent who is deterred within a great context of uncertainty for those points to apply. that, as i said, has been a team in u.s. strategic policy for decades. that is exactly so. the other thing is that on occasion there will be opponents who will need to be deterred, lest we are allies suffered a devastating attack, and they will not be deterred by uncertainty. in fact, they may be spurred on by uncertainty. they may feel uncertainty is something to take advantage of instead of something to be deterred by. because we do not know what the future looks like and we do not know what all the opponents -- how we are quick to catch a late in the future -- my view -- how we are going to calculate in the future -- my view is we want to also a -- also deter opponents

who might be spurred on by uncertainty within the u.s. support structure. michael, i believe, said i am one of those who say we want to have reliability. we want to have precision. we want to have a very effective strategic force structure. deterrence to require it. the failure of deterrence one time in this area could lead to several millions of to scores of millions of fatalities in the united states or in our allied countries. we cannot afford to take a lot of chances with deterrence in my view. and relying on opponents who are deterred by uncertainty, and thinking we have an adequate deterrent in that case, i believe is a mistake. >> before passing to tom for what will have to be the last word, i wanted to make sure you did not want to directly respond to gary's question about the vote. the use want to say that is up

for this month or -- do you want to say we should not wait for this month, but should wait until 2011? >> would probably should. -- we probably should. >> my desired outcome for the treaty would probably be for the administration to essentially satisfied its critics. -- satisfy its critics, to frame a deal that would be acceptable to senator kyl and ideally would be passed in the lame-duck session, because that would represent a commitment on the part of the administration and the democrats as a party to nuclear modernization and missile defense that has so far been lucky -- been lacking. you could not take that to the bank for very long, but in american politics that is as good as it gets. and actually i would like to put this whole discussion in the rearview mirror and talk about

the things that i was describing earlier. my ideal promoting for the treaty would be like a five-year moratorium on arms control negotiations with the russians. just simply cut it out and actually start talking about the things that are more critically important. if you can meet those threshold tests, i would be willing to vote for the treaty, and the sooner the better. >> i think you just ratified it. three votes of four. >> thank you for being here and things for the pattern. -- ag member for up to

seven minutes, each for purposes of making an opening statement. i will then recognize the

chairman, the ranking members of the middle east and south asia subcommittee and a terrorism non-proliferation and trade subcommittee for three minutes each to make their opening statements. we have to than today's hearing by noon, so without objection all of the members may submit opening statements for the record. for a begin my statement i want to say a few words about steve solarz, one of our most distinguished former colleagues who passed away on monday after a long battle with cancer. steve had struggled for several years with this terrible illness, but was a typical discipline and good humor he maintained an active and productive schedule. he served in congress from 1975 to 1992. on this committee he was chairman of the africa subcommittee and later chairman of the asia subcommittee where his hearings and activism played a key role in ending the dictatorship of philippine president ferdinand marcos. steve was one of the most

creative legislators i have ever worked with. time after time the committee would be debating an amendment to a bill that was resisted by the committee leadership. arguments would be made on both sides and then solarz would seek recognition, offer the perfect synthesis between the two positions and get the unanimous backing of the committee for his compromise. he was a unique talent. after leaving congress steve continued his activism as the leader of the international crisis group. those of us who have the privilege of calling steve both a friend and colleague or a member for his sharp insights, good humor and willingness to push american foreign-policy beyond the boundaries of conventional thinking. we expressed to his wife anita and his family are deepest request -- regrets at this lost to them into our nation nation and i ask that we take a moment of silence while we remember steve.

now, my opening statement. iran's nuclear program is a fundamental threat to the united states, our friends and allies into the global consensus on halting and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons. as we meet this morning, iran's centrifuges continued to spin, making more and more enriched uranium that could ultimately be turned into fuel for nuclear weapons. this threat continues to grow with each passing day. this summer in response to that threat congress passed the most rigorous sanctions ever imposed on iran, the comprehensive -- [inaudible]

we passed the comprehensive iran sanctions accountability and divestment act or cisada. it was a powerful demonstration of the bipartisan commitment to a tough approach to halting iran's nuclear program. this act broadly expanded the applicability of the original iran sanctions act, including sanctioning third country companies and banks involved in activities such as sales of refined petroleum to iran, assistance to iran's domestic refining capacity and financial dealings with the iranian islamic revolutionary guard corps or irgc. the fundamental premise of our

approach is that companies should choose u.s. market over the uranium market. it is a sound approach but by no means a silver bullet for addressing iran's desire to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. our legislation even before the president signed into law on july 1, helped to galvanize international opinion regarding the iranian nuclear issue. the european union previously a key source of iranian commerce and investment, past -- [inaudible] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible] pursued by the administration most major western japanese and south korean companies have ceased selling iran refined petroleum and investing in iran's energy sector and the doors of much of the financial shipping world have been close to iran. major oil companies such as royal shell, france, italy is by and by, norway's -- spain, and japan have all ended or in the process of bending their energy projects in iran and there are numerous reports of the sanctions have seriously hurt the iranian economy and deepen political fissures in the iranian leadership but is that

in fact the case and if so, how much closer does it ring us to a real objective which is to -- in odd. [inaudible conversations] >> i get 10 more seconds. the purpose of this hearing is to attempt to answer these questions. i would like to hear the witnesses candid assessment of the current sanctions regime. is it helping us to achieve our goal of an iran without nuclear arms? or sanctions having the desired impacts on iran's economy and are we getting closer to persuading iran to suspend its

uranium enrichment program as repeatedly demanded by the international community. in particular is international support for sanctions holding firm? how much backfilling is there by companies who governments have not impose national sanctions? at that last point, on that last point there seems to be no doubt that chinese companies are pursuing energy investments in selling iran refined petroleum. the chinese acknowledge, i would like to know why we haven't sanctioned any of the chinese companies engaged in clearly sanctionable actions. i'm concerned we will not be able to sustain a robust -- [inaudible] [inaudible]

based in switzerland but since it is an iranian state owned company that by definition will be barred from dealing with the u.s. market, that action doesn't seem to me to have much of a deterrent effect. i hope under secretary burns and protect her will address these issues. in addition i would welcome undersecretary byrne's use another e. each aspects of iranian nuclear issue such as the recent interruption in iran's enrichment activities and the general diminishing of its enrichment efficiency as reported by the iaea. how meaningful is that? should alter our previous calculations regarding iran's nuclear program? at the recent revelations regarding north north korea's apparently enhanced nuclear facilities affected those calculations? what can you tell us regarding

upcoming negotiations in iran now scheduled to commence in a few days in geneva? lastly, this month marks the one-year anniversary of the last major demonstrations by iran's reformist green movement, which mushroomed in the wake of the june 2002 -- 2009 hijacking of the presidential election by ahmadinejad. will where does the green movement stand today? what can we do to reaffirm our close support for the pro-democracy forces in iran? i would like to close by reaffirming my own strong support for our sanctioned efforts. it is her last best hope for resolving the iran nuclear nh peaceful manner. as they i've said the alternatis are military action and even worse acquiescence to a nuclear-armed iran. both of these alternatives are unpalatable. i also want to really commend the administration for placing such a high priority on the iranian nuclear issue and for

the effectiveness of its policies thus far. thanks to this administration's artful diplomacy, we have far more international support on this issue than most of us thought even remotely possible as little as six months ago. from the outset this administration has made iran a top rarity item in virtually every meeting with foreign leaders and the results show. the administration's successful jawboning of companies have also made a significant contribution to the effort to isolate iran economically. so, type days, five months of to the day since cisada became i look forward to your candid assessment of the effectiveness of our sanctions effort, how it can be approved as well as your assessment of the prospect we will succeed in our larger goal of preventing iran from achieving nuclear weapons status. [inaudible]

>> just to recognize the ranking members, iliana ros-lehtinen for opening remarks. >> thank you very much mr. chairman and i would like to start by recognizing some of my constituents who are in the audience. they are iranian americans who are staunchly opposed to the iranian regime. some of shed light on iran's nuclear programs and the unveiling of information on different iranian nuclear facilities. many have relatives and camp -- rob and i raced with assistant secretary of state feldman a few weeks ago the need for the administration to ensure that the iraqi government lives up to its human rights commitments and protects the resident -- residents. with respect to iran mr. chairman, as we all know the jena must have one vital objective and that is to stop the regime's pursuit of nuclear

at other unconventional weapons and the missiles to deliver them, its sponsorship of terrorism and other activities that threaten americans, our interests and our allies. however since the 1990s, the u.s. and international efforts to stop the growing iranian threat has been half-hearted at best with results to match. the problem is not that a tough approach has failed, but it has yet to be fully tried. the sanctions were not fully implemented or enforced, then the focus was not on measures the u.s. could easily take but instead on persuading the so-called international community to act collectively, collectively meaning a green to the lowest common denominator while continuing to cultivate ties with the regime in tehran. rush of coors has a long record of cooperation with iran on missiles and nuclear matters reticular leg its construction of the busheir reactor which is scheduled to come on line in

january. to secure russian cooperation, the current and previous administrations have resorted to a series of concessions to moscow. what did we buy at so great a price? tacit support for u.n. sanctions and assurances that russia will wrap up assessments in iran's energy sector and russia will not at this time proceed with its sale of advanced missiles to iran. of course despite all of their concessions, russia has indeed offered a nuclear cooperation agreement and advanced missile sales to the syrian regime. china is another key ally and protector of iran and has made it clear it will prevent significant, prevent significant pressure to be placed on tehran. chinese companies are eagerly expanding their trade with and investments in iran. many taking advantage of opportunities created i western and other companies which are

curtailing or finally severing their ties. recently reports indicate that china is actively facilitating north korea's providing iran with advanced missiles and ingredients for chemical weapons in violation of u.n. security council sanctions. but support for iran comes from other places as well. determined to demonstrate its growing distance from the u.s., turkey has publicly embraced tehran, increased its economic cooperation, signed a major gas pipeline deal and try to undermine u.s. efforts to stop the iranian threat, including voting against u.n. security council resolution 1929. turkey recently prevented nato from designating iran as a missile threat to be countered with a proposed antimissile shield despite tehran's expanding missile capabilities. are manias financial trade transport and energy cooperation with iran.

unfortunately securing effective action by one administration after another has been an uphill battle. for over 14 years since the passage of the iran sanctions act, only one determination of sanctionable activity has ever been made and the resulting penalties were immediately waved. efforts to strengthen existing laws were opposed by each administration, citing a reluctance to tie the president's hands or upset other countries who want to keep doing business with tehran. this past june after a long, hard-fought struggle, the comprehensive iran sanctions accountability and divestment act, cisada, was enacted. although weaker than some of us hope this law could represent a major step forward, especially through his energy refined petroleum and financial sanctions. this congressionally driven effort has led some countries, including the e.u., japan,

australia and south korea to finally impose their own albeit more limited sanctions on tehran. on the financial front, the actions taken by foreign governments to sever their ties with the iranian financial institutions and other iranian entities designated as involved in the iranian proliferation and sponsorship of terrorism is encouraging. undersecretary levey, let me again thank you and your team and treasury for your pivotal role in these developments and/or years of dedication and acting against the iranian regime and its enablers. thank you, sir. i am however concerned history may be repeating itself regarding the state department's implementation efforts. for example the law requires the administration to investigate upon receiving credible evidence suspected sanctionable foreign investment in iran's energy sector. ..

responsible for human rights abuses. we've wasted enough time 14 years. no more waivers, exceptions are excuses. we cannot live within it near a van. we must ensure that the tools we have are used to the maximum effectiveness and look for new means of compelling iran's iic

fact dvd, are interested in in outlays. i'm not just referring to the nuclear pursue, but also to a state sponsorship of terrorism. of particular concern is iran's support for hezbollah in lebanon, mr. chairman, which has threatened violence and is expected in operatives are invited for the assassination of former lebanese prime minister are really has a massive arsenal of about 50,000 rockets and participates in and has veto power over the current lebanese government. i would ask undersecretary burns, with the u.s. is doing, to address this situation before it comes a full-blown crisis and hezbollah takes over completely. thank you, mr. chairman. and i'll ask the administration also about the continued military assistance to the lebanese armed forces. thank you for a much, mr. chairman. and i think the witnesses. >> thank you. i'm pleased to recognize for three minutes, chairman of the

middle east and south asia subcommittee, the gentleman from new york, mr. ackerman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. the 112 congress and those in junior will be the same. how do we prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. it is i believe the most critical national security question facing our nation today the successive failures the buyer nation will decide what kind of world or children area. i went straight to acquire nuclear weapons is near success, but not yet succeeded and it must not. the consequences of the successful effort by iran to acquire nuclear weapons and open defiance of numerous u.n. security council resolutions solemnly undertaken treaty obligations and it is suicidal reddick which changes the world and this must not happen. implementation the sanctions of iraq been surprisingly successful, but the combined effect of u.n. sanctions and new sanctions imposed new on the

ayatollah regime. it must be comprehensive and here there are two points to make. first, the economic pain must be severe as we can make it. stations must be applied without exception or distinction. the congress will accept nothing less. second, economic team is not enough. by luck of providence the mullahs regime face and international -- internal political crisis more severe than any since the creation of the islamic public. while it is to the green movement has been effective, suppressed by the tools of oppression and the legitimacy has permanently undercutting the eyes of the iranian people. elections whose results have to be forced on an unwilling populations throughout means of mass murder,, torture or sign of weakness and that weakness needs to be excessively exploited. i call upon the obama administration administration to simulate the reagan -- president reagan's which provided across-the-board pressure as combined economic political diplomatic culture and military

pressure with arms control negotiations, we might call today engagement that advance american interests. iranian regime is likewise right for comprehensive pressure, multilateral forms the multinational institutions need to be pushed to focus the deplorable human rights record. our broadcast into iran must be ramped up to iranian people know they are not alone. the president and secretary of state need to be consistently reminded of the impression the arabian people by the illegitimate iranian regime. the armed forces of the united states need to need to be deployed in with key partners to demonstrate our ability to respond overwhelmingly to aggression and provocation. those willing to take up arms against iran, iranian influence should have material support. the iranian of the illicit materials must be able to shadow the united states, pursuing them with vengeance. it is not too late to stop iran,

to rollback the nuclear program, to meet the iranian people and taking back their country, but we must engage in this great and necessary challenge with even greater effort and vigor than we have managed so far. time is running out. thank you, mr. chairman. >> time has run out. and the ranking member of the subcommittee middle east and south asia is here, so i'm going to recognize the chairman of the terrorism non-proliferation trade subcommittee of this committee. the gentleman from california, mr. sherman for three minutes. >> thank you for holding these hearings, mr. chairman. i believe it is the most important work for us to do. this month i think that we need to see even more enforcement of existing non-and the adoption of new statutes. i hope that later this month or early next year we consider the stop of the iran nuclear program

act which would strengthen the sanctions still further. in addition i should note that our colleague, congressman filner of california has a bill with over 106 cosponsors to take the pmo i offer the terrorism list and i hope that respect for our 106 plus colleagues that have cosponsored that bill would lead to a serious consideration of the bill any hearings on it. so if much legislating to do, just as our friends from the administration have much to do as well. major oil companies from the west for the most part 1 of death in oil sector for some refined petroleum. this is a success. it is a success that comes perhaps a dozen years too late. at this point, we have to not only prevent the investment in the energy your iran. we have to prevent iran from getting refined petroleum process. i have the executive ridge of

government decided to follow the law when it was passed over a dozen years ago, we would be in a much better position now. now the only way to stop iran's nuclear program is not only what is already being done, but the much, much more difficult job of preventing iran from getting refined petroleum. and i would point out that we are where we are, not because there's been a radical change, the policy has been sincerely and sanctions act was adopted to follow the law, only to the extent that its implementation does not offend any foreign government except that of iran. this is described by a ranking member, the lowest common denominator policy. the good news is the lowest common denominator is now a higher number than it used to be, especially for japan and western europe. and we have obtained a lot of cooperation and it is now a

difficult for iran to find partners to invest in its oil fields. we also want to give credit, however, to the wisdom of our allies, but especially to the corruption and ineptitude of those who are running iran, to make doing business with that country so difficult. as to stop iran nuclear program act, it would, for example, prevent our sanction the $5 billion euro sovereign bond issuance that iran is now engaged. they realize that they may not be able to get western investment in the oil fields, so they feel they'll borrow the money due to investment themselves. the way to stop that is your legislation, which i look forward to taking up expeditiously. i yield back. >> the time of the gentleman has expired. at the ranking member of the terrorism non-proliferation and trade subcommittee, gentleman from california, mr. royce.

recognized for three minutes. [inaudible] >> i've got one. hold on tight. [inaudible] mr. chairman, i want to thank you for holding this hearing because we face a crisis. and this has to sink in. here's the headline from the "washington post" recently. the obama administration has concluded that chinese firms are helping iran to improve its missile technology and develop nuclear weapons. that represents a crisis.

when we've learned yesterday that china declined to act on multiple, multiple u.s. requests that it stop shipments of ballistic missile components from north korea, that were going to beijing on korean airlines, north korean airlines on the arabian carriers as well. when we learned that our secretary of state has asked china to act on the fact that iran was trying to buy gyroscopes and carbon fiber ports ballistic missiles from chinese companies, when we find that chinese companies were supplying iran with precursors, for chemical weapons. when we find that iran gets

posed its parts and its technology from china, we face a crisis. and i am appreciative of the fact that mr. levy is here. because as he puts it in his testimony, foreign financial institutions have a choice. if you conduct certain business with iran, you risk losing access to the u.s. financial system. the message we need to convey, republicans and democrats alike, is this conduct on the part of china in terms of violating the sanctions and helping give iran the wherewithal to develop the missile technology and the nuclear weaponry has to stop immediately. and if it does not stop, there certainly is going to be legislation from this congress to bring it to a halt. the way to do it is to simply have an understanding that this

is now the law on the books of the united states. it needs to be followed by china and it needs to be followed now. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> time of the gentleman has expired and now i am quite pleased and honored to introduce our two witnesses, to people i think this are among the most exceptional public service we have working for the united states government. the first is master william burns. under secretary of state for political affairs. previously her ambassadors served as russia come assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs and ambassador to jordan. a career foreign service officer, he has also served as executive secretary of the state department and a special assistant to secretaries of state christopher and albright.

ambassador burns is a central player in the obama administration's iran policy team. in october 2009, he led the u.s. negotiating team in the p5 plus one talks and iran with geneva, where he struck an agreement with the iranian negotiators that would have removed significant amounts of low enriched uranium from iran sacks. the agreement was widely held internationally at the time, both subsequently rejected by the leaders in iran. as i understand, he will once again be leaving the u.s. negotiating team at upcoming p5+1 talks with iran, scheduled to begin in a few days in geneva. stuart leavy as the undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, a position he has held since 2004. in this position, he has played a central role in the efforts about the bush administration and obama administration to combat iran's illicit conduct in the international financial system. in fact, he is widely considered

a key architect of those efforts. but that is why the obama administration asked him to remain in this position. previously mr. levey served as the principal associate deputy attorney general in the united states permanent justice. and before that as an attorney in a private law firm. gentlemen, thank you for coming this morning. we look forward to hearing your testimony. if you decide to come you can summarize your entire statements about part of the records and under secretary burns, why not give the dog. >> thank you very much in good morning. chairman berman, congressman layton and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you again with my friend and colleague undersecretary levey. we meet today at a moment of great consequence and prolonged and complicated history of concerns of iran and its nuclear ambitions. in recent months working closely

together, the administration, congress and international partners have put in place the strongest and most comprehensive set of sanctions that the islamic republic of iran has ever faced. it is a set of measures that we are determined to implement fully and aggressively. it is a set of measures that is already producing tangible results in a set of measures that reinforces our collective resolve to hold iran to its international obligations. a great deal is at stake for all of us. a nuclear armed iran would severely threat to security and stability of a part of the world crucial to our interest into the health of the global economy. it would seriously undermined the credibility of the united nations and other international institutions and seriously weaken the nuclear non-proliferation regime that precisely the moment when we are seeking to strengthen it. these risks are only reinforced by the way directions of the iranian leadership, particularly its lone standing up for for for

terrorist groups like hezbollah and hamas, its position to middle east peace, is repugnant rhetoric about israel, the holocaust, 9/11 and so much else and its brutal repression of its own citizens. in the face of those challenges, american policy is straightforward. we must prevent iran from developing nuclear weapons. we must counter is destabilizing actions in the region and beyond. and we must continue to do all we can to advance our broader interest in democracy, human rights, peace and economic development across the middle east. president obama has made clear repeatedly that we will stand up for those rights they should be universal to all human beings and stand with those brave iranians who speak only to express themselves freely and peacefully. the simple truth is that a government that does not respect the rights of its own people will find it increasingly difficult to win the respect that it professes to speak in the international community. we have emphasized from the

start that what is at issue between iran and the rest of the world is not its right to a peaceful nuclear program, but rather its decades of failure to live up to the responsibilities that come with that price. if iran is sincere, it should not be hard to show the rest of the international community that its nuclear program is aimed at exclusively peaceful purposes. facts are stubborn things, however, and it is a telling fact that iran alone among signatories of the npt continues to fail year after year to convince the iaea and the united nations at its peaceful nuclear intentions. nearly two years ago, president obama began an unprecedented effort of engagement with iran. we did so without illusions about who we are dealing with, what the scope of our differences over the past 30 years. we sought to create early opportunities for iran to pursue a different path than to build confidence in its intentions. this was both a serious

demonstration of our good faith and also an investment in partnership with the growing coalition of countries profoundly concerned about iran's nuclear ambitions. when regrettably those early efforts made little headway, we and our partners were left with no choice but to respond to iran's intransigence by appointing another tool of diplomacy, political and economic pressure. the cornerstone of this campaign was u.n. security council resolution 1829, passed early last june. by far the toughest of the four chapter seven resolutions enacted in recent years, 1929 broke important new ground in curbing arms transfers to iran, targeting the central role of the higher gc and iran's liberation efforts, planning for the first time all green and activities related to ballistic missiles that could deliver a nuclear weapon, sharply limiting iran's ability to use the international financial system to find and nuclear proliferation and for the first time highlighting for formal

between its sector and its nuclear ambitions. russia's partnership was particularly crucial to passage of such an effective resolution, which led directly to it's enormously important inflation of the s. 300 surface air missile to iran. the significance of 1929 is only partly about its content. it is also about the message of international solidarity and apart from its carefully crafted knowledge has provided for subsequent steps. a week after the passage of 1929, the european union announced by far its most sweeping collections of its measures against iran, including a full prohibition of new investment in iran's energy sector, bans on the transfer of key technology in the strictest steps to date against iranian banks and correspondent banking relationships. canada, australia, norway, japan and south korea have followed

the use example. new provisions in 1929 regarding cargo expections already been applied, resulting, for example, in a recent seizure by nigeria of an illicit iranian arms shipment. none of this is exact a toll. we have worked with our partners in conversation after conversation and trip after trip around the world to produce an unprecedented package of measures and to ensure robust enforcement. central to our strategy up in the efforts made by the congress by all of you to sharpen american sanctions. when the president signed into law the father, they sent an unmistakable resolve and purpose to expand significantly the spoke of our domestic sanctions and maximizing the impact of new multilateral measures. we are enforcing the law vigorously and energetically. already, more foreign investment in iran has been curbed than at any time since congress enacted the original iran sanctions act

nearly 15 years ago. late september, senator clinton imposed sanctions for the first time in history of the ifa and a swiss-based iranian conference involved in hundreds of millions of dollars worth of deals in iran. deputy secretary steinberg announce that we've opened formal investigations into other firms. just as importantly, we've used a powerful instrument divided by cisada baby special role to persuade european and asian firms including shell, statoil, eni and inpex for iran and provide clear assurances that they would not undertake any activities in the future. according to label x-men fame a business such as 50 to $60 billion overall and potential energy investments along with the critical technologies and know-how that comes with them.

faced with new international concerns and the choice between doing business with iran and doing business with america, more and more foreign companies are pulling out of the iranian market. major energy traders like vitol, shell, reliance ipg, glencore, trafigura have stopped sales of refined petroleum products to iran. until last july, according to open source is, iran imported roughly 130 barrels per day of refined petroleum products. in october that figure had dropped by 85% to 19,000 barrels per day. large shipping companies like hong kong-based n. y k. or withdrawing completely from the iranian market. major firms like lloyd stopped insuring. daimler madrid if you have stopped exporting cars to iran. still we must address the impact of these in more detail in his own personal efforts with firms and governments around the world remain hugely important. the short answer is that the net

result of all the measures we've applied in recent months is substantial. our more substantial than any previous set of steps. i'd also like to emphasize that we take very seriously cisada's provisions regarding human rights concerns in iran. earlier this fall redesignated a senior iranian officials for human rights abuses and we are working with treasury on other potential designations. one of the best ways in which we and others can support the cause of universal human rights in iran and the brave people who defend them is to hold accountable the people who deny them. i cannot honestly predict for you with any certainty how all these collective and individual measures will affect the choices that iran's leadership ranks. we will continue to sharpen those choices. we will show what is possible that iran meets its international obligations and here's to the same responsibilities that apply to other nations. we will intensify the cost of continued noncompliance and

showing grant the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program will make it less secure, not more secure. and in the meantime we will continue to reassure our friends and partners in the gulf of our long-term commitment to their security, a commitment clearly reflected in the visits to the region that both secretary clinton and secretary gates will be making in the next two weeks. let me conclude by emphasizing too simple but important realities. first iran is not 10 feet tall. its economy as badly mismanaged. iran's leaders have tried very hard to deflect or divert the international pressures all around them. it's often acknowledgment of their potential effect. second and just as significant, sanctions and pressure are not meant to themselves. their complement, not a substitute for the diplomatic solution to which we and our partners are still firmly committed. there is still time for diplomacy is iran is prepared to engage in serious discussions. there's still room for a renewed effort to break down this trust and begin a careful process of

building confidence between iran and the international community. there is still an opportunity for an outcome, which ensures both iran's rights and the fulfillment of his responsibilities. the p5+1 led by representative actionable approach next week's meeting with iran with serious purpose and a genuine readiness to engage constructively on international concerns about iran's nuclear program. the door is open to serious negotiations if iran is prepared to walk through it. thank you. >> thank you very much, secretary burns. secretary levey. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ranking member ros-lehtinen, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the current status of the global effort to impose sanctions on iran. i appreciate the true partnership we've had with this committee over many years and i'm happy to be here at undersecretary burns who has been an excellent leader on this issue and many others.

he has given an excellent overview of our overall iran policy. i can assure you that we share a sense of urgency well expressed and we have the same priority placed on this challenge. i can report to you that we have made significant progress in implementing our strategy to impose sanctions on iran and the strategy is beginning to have the effect it was designed to have peer pressure in the choice iran's leaders between integration with the international community, living up to their international obligations and ever-increasing isolation, we are beginning to create the leverage we need for effective diplomacy. the strategy we designed it are now implementing that several critical elements. first, we recognize from the outset that no one measure would put enough pressure on iran and so we are imposing a variety of measures simultaneously. second, as bill pointed out, we take steps in advance to generate the support necessary for a broad coalition of governments in the earth to

support its own sanctions. third, we focused our measures on iran's illicit conduct, such as wmd proliferation and support for terrorism since that is proven to be an effective way to build broad coalition. and finally, we designed a strategy that uses iran's expected attempts to evade sanctions to our advantage by aggressively exposing iran's deceptive content and underscoring iran's riskiness of the commercial partner. it is difficult to overstate the importance of security council resolution 1929 and building our international coalition in implementing the strategy. in addition to the provisions that go much into the the resolution financial provisions are particularly powerful as they call upon member states to prevent the provision of financial services if there are reasonable grounds to believe the services could contribute for iran's nuclear missile program. and given the vast body of public information demonstrating the scope of iran's illicit conduct of deceptive practices

is virtually impossible for banks and governments to assure themselves of transactions with iran could not contribute to proliferation sensitive activities. indeed in the aftermath of the resolution's adoption, many of our partners as was mentioned by several of you at undersecretary burns have enacted robust sanctions programs. these sanctions, regimes both asset freezes and financial restrictions on a wide range of assets including the irgc and irisl, and they have enacted broad measures to protect their financial systems for my winning abuse such as reporting or preapproval requirements for transactions involving iran. also critical to our strategy is the passage and implementation of cisada's. as you know, financial provisions of cisada are quite powerful as they increased the star choice birds pointed out. it is a very dear connie and potential sanction.

we have moved quickly to implement society. we publish required regulations promptly and we've traveled to more than 24 countries since jan, both to educate governments in the private sector about cisada and also to share information about iran's illicit conduct. we have more than dozen countries to investigate what could be under the act. but we are seeing thus far is very dramatic. even banks that had previously been willing to do business with designated iranian banks are now reversing course and cutting ties with iran altogether. beyond this average, treasury has used its authority to designate a wide range of iranian actors melissa condit. as i mentioned earlier, we expected iran to try to evade and include action such as definitions to maintain the effects of sanctions. just since june, we have designated 53 z two individuals,

10 individuals or entities related to the irgc into iranian phone banks, host bank, homburg pih. we have also identified 42 entities as being bad at the iranian government. the cumulative effect of sanctions has been to increasingly isolate iran from the international financial system. iran is effectively unable to access financial institutes and it increasingly difficult to conduct major transactions in dollars or euros. iran's reduced access has made it very difficult for iran to make payments on loans and maintain insurance coverage on irisl's ships and to continue cooperations. exuma to the seizures by irisl creditors. the chairman indicated in his opening statement with great regularity, major companies across the range of industries, finance, engineering, energy, manufacturing, automobile,

insurance, accounting firms are all announcing that they are curtailing their business dealings with iran. there are clear signs that the speed, scope and impact of sanctions have caught the iranian regime by surprise. in the face of pressure, the reigning government has increasingly returned to the irgc for key economic products. the trend meshes perfectly with her strategy as is hard to imagine a better sanctions target than the irgc. relying on the irgc is likely to exacerbate iran's isolation of companies around the world have begun to show my business with the irgc, given its support for terrorism and involvement in iran's proliferation activity and human rights activity. our efforts to consistently exposed iranian sanctions are also paying off. in september a high-ranking iranian government official underscored exactly the effect we try to create when he said quote, we have never had such intense sanctions and they're getting more intense every day. whenever we find a loophole, they block it, close quote.

in order to maintain and you increase the impact we've create a company to remain vigilant and intensify efforts. by doing so we can continue to create leverage data for diplomacy to be effective. i look for to continuing to work with this committee to achieve that goal. thank you. >> thank you drew much, secretary levey for the testimony and the overview. i got myself five minutes to begin the questioning. neither of you mentioned china in your testimony. our chinese companies involved iran's energy sec there -- and if so, why are we not sanctioning them? i understand the dilemma. what are the implications for relations with china if we were to sanction a state owned energy company? i also throughout the alternative proposition . what are the implications for our entire sanctions regime if

we don't? power imports and our chinese companies to iran's energy sector and refined petroleum products? and are there other countries or companies that are currently supporting iran's energy sector? >> mr. chairman, first, let me take very seriously just a few and congressman royce emphasized the iranian energy sector. we have at the very highest levels, including in president obama's most recent meeting emphasized the importance we attach to restraint on the part of china and its dealings in the iranian energy sector. we've seen reports and also the importance we attach to not only slowing down existing investments, not engage in a new one, but not battling behind companies that the large number of companies that are pulling out of the iranian energy sector. recent reports and spent and

that trade repressed other open sources of slowdowns in chinese sec duties in the iranian energy sector. it may be that the chinese are concluding that the iranians in so many other companies around the world are not reliable energy partners. they are clearly -- the chinese are clearly trying to diversify their energy partnerships around the world. it's also clear with regard to your question about refined petroleum products, that rising domestic demand in china is occupying a much greater proportion of the attention of chinese refined petroleum producers. so for all those reasons, we will continue to push very hard on this issue, which remains quite significant anything to our hopes to apply the sort of pressure that's going to be needed. >> thank you. i don't like raising points of revelations from wikileaks, i'm going to make an exception here because it concerns a matter of great -- potentially great significance and i think both

the ranking member and mr. ruiz made references to this. do you wish to comment on "the new york times" claimed, based in southern wiki leak documents that iran has acquired 19 medium-range nuclear-capable missiles from north korea? according to these articles, they can reach berlin or moscow. the article also says that possession of these missiles can facilitate iran's development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. and i should point out that that was treated skeptically today in today's "washington post," based on the post-interpretation of the same wikileaks documents. rather than take one or the other, what are your thoughts about -- >> just several quick comments. first and wikileaks in general, i think the reality is that the despicable breach of trust that we seem through the wikileaks disclosures has been substantial damage to our ability to carry

out diplomatic efforts like the one that just described to you. confidentiality of conversations that the core of what we do with diplomats, just as it is for journalists or doctors or lawyers or others. and it has done damage. secretary clinton is literally working night and a conversation with countless leaders around the world to try as best we can, not only to express regret but to work through these issues. we've also taken some quite stringent measures to ensure that the state department doesn't need other, is according to people who don't need to know. the first general point and wikileaks. i can't comment on the content of particular alleged cables that wikileaks has referred to. what i will however stress as a response to mr. royce's very serious reinforcement of concerns about any evidence that we come across the support for iran's illicit missile and

nuclear activities, we take seriously every piece of information that we see. we have on a number of occasions raised that information with the chinese government as well as with other governments. in some cases, we see them we see them act on it, but the record is the next one to be honest and were continuing to press those specific concerns that we have because i agree with you, that it is extremely important to fully implement the provisions, particularly resolution 1929, which adds significantly to the flat prohibition of any support, technical or otherwise for ballistic missile activity in iran is capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. so we'll continue to take this very seriously and follow up on it vigorously. >> my time has expired. the yield now five minutes to the ranking member. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen for your testimony. as he pointed out, secretary burns, the next round of the

p5+1 negotiations with iran is sensibly scheduled to take place in just a few days in geneva. however, in the lead out to these talks, iranian leaders have reiterated their commitment to continuing their uranium enrichment program, given the statements in the position of the iranian leadership, what does the administration expect to accomplish with his upcoming negotiations? and related to that, a previous negotiations were aimed at reaching an agreement that would require iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activity as mandated by the u.n. security council? so was a complete halt to enrichment prerequisite or is the administration willing to consider a partial halt? also, there are rumors of a new p5+1 offered to the iranians.

does such an offer exist? and what type of incentives and disincentives are included in the proposals? also, what is the administration's plan regarding the uranium that tehran has enriched to the 20% level? will we insist that iran surrender the entire amount or as a deal in the works allowing iran to keep some portion of what has already amassed? and how do you plan to deal with iran using the negotiation, this stalling procedure or the u.s. and other countries? and then lastly, i know the chairman has talked about the energy and refined petroleum that cavities with iran and china being a repeat offender, but we also have the iran north korea syria non-proliferation

act and that is also a sanctionable procedure that we can use. and i wanted to ask about the administration possibly taking action against russia in their entities implicated in the proliferation assistance to iran. i don't know for time for all of that. thank you, sir. >> thank you. and i'll try that they can very briefly to go through four or five points. first time in terms of our general approach, as i emphasized in my opening statement, the p5+1 will go into what we hope will be a serious round of discussions with the iranians prepared to engage seriously about a very profound concerns about iran's nuclear program. we will continue to emphasize the importance of taking tangible steps to address those concerns, tangible steps, which are necessary as a result of iranian noncompliance over many years and the mistrust that is created.

we will be guided and the response of my second point, the p5+1 will be guided by a whole series of security council resolutions and iaea resolutions, security council resolutions commotions of the mandate and provision you mentioned. third, we will certainly look for ways in which we could build confidence, fits the iranians could take that could be taken together to build confidence. last year, as you know, we made an attempt to the original tehran reactor proposal to do that. were still prepared to consider the p5+1 for the possibility of making use of that concept. the last june, we made clear to mr. amato, the director general of the iaea, that we, the russians and the french, are partners in the so-called vienna group on the trr issue had several concerns that would have to be addressed if the trr is to be a real confidence building

measure because circumstances have changed since this was originally proposed last october. >> thank you. you talk about the steps. are they tangible steps? and is there a deadline? are we really providing these deadlines for them to make good on what they supposedly offer or just keep stalin and stalinism in one club? >> know, first in terms of tangible steps, you mentioned the issue of enrichment almost 20%. that's one of the concerns we made clear. they mean, that is something i would have have to be addressed. >> terms of later. i want to ask about the russian entities. any movement and sanction those? >> on inks, which is the question i was asked, we have produced -- the state department has finished its draft of the report for 2008. we're trying quickly to catch up. we provided the 2007 report i

think a few months ago and that is in circulation interagency right now. so we take very seriously the importance of following through on inks and hope that report early to next year. >> thank you very much. sorry ran out of. thank you, mr. chairman. >> the time of the gentlelady has expired. chairman of the middle east and south asia subcommittee. >> thank you. first of all, it seems that the evil twins of iran and north korea had been separated at birth and are now reunited and found each other and have certain things in common and certain things that are different, with iran insisting that its nuclear program is for energy only and the north koreans protesting very, very

about late that it is absolutely for nuclear weapon, demonstrating that at every moment that they can. the combination of the two of them joining in their mutual interest is very lethal. it seems to me that i'm on terrorists and terrorizing nations, it almost seems that possessing a nuclear program is a rite of passage to becoming a respected member of the international community and they are pursuing that at all costs. trying to evaluate the effectiveness of placing sanctions on iran, to drive it to the point where they become an economic basket case, such as north korea, where we really don't have to have too many economic sanctions because they

are there already at the bottom of where they have to be, still not giving up their program. i think we should reflect a bit on what happens when the iranians are driven to that economic low point, should the program of imposing strangling sanctions as the successes seem to indicate that we will have, whether or not that reduces the goal that we are looking for. some of the things we have seen in these leaks th